You are here:
NZLII >>
Databases >>
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act Reports >>
2019 >>
[2019] NZBORARp 49
Database Search
| Name Search
| Recent Documents
| Noteup
| LawCite
| Download
| Help
Resource Management Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 21, 27(2)) [2019] NZBORARp 49 (10 September 2019)
Last Updated: 11 March 2020
10 September 2019
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Resource Management
Amendment Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Resource Management Amendment Bill (‘the
Bill’) is consistent with the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
PCO 21656/9.3 We will provide you
with further advice if the final version of the Bill includes amendments that
affect the conclusions
in this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion we have
considered the consistency of the Bill with s 19 (freedom from discrimination),
s 21 (freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure) and s 27(2) (right to
judicial review). Our analysis is set out below.
The Bill
- The
Bill principally amends the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) and the Resource
Legislation Amendment Act 2017 (RLAA), with the
overarching objectives of
reducing complexity, increasing certainty, restoring public participation
opportunities and improving RMA
processes. The Bill also aims to improve
freshwater management outcomes in New Zealand. The Bill includes consequential
amendments
to the District Court Act 2016, Judicial Conduct Commissioner and
Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, Remuneration Authority Act 1977
and the
Judicial Salaries and Allowances (2018/19) Determination 2018.
- Specifically,
the Bill repeals changes made under the RLAA in order to:
- reduce
the powers of the Minister for the Environment to prohibit or overturn local
plan rules;
- remove
preclusions on public notification and appeals for certain types of subdivision
and residential activity resource consents;
- repeal
the power to make additional “fast-track” activities or prescribe
information requirements for fast-track applications;
- reinstate
the presumption of subdivision restriction; and
- reinstate
the ability of consent authorities to charge financial contributions in
particular circumstances.
- The
Bill also amends the RMA to:
- enable
applicants to suspend processing of their non-notified resource consent
applications;
- enable
consent authorities to suspend resource consent applications for non-payment of
administrative charges;
- extend
the time period to lodge retrospective resource consent applications for
emergency works;
- enable
the review of conditions of multiple resource consents concurrently;
- allow
for the increase of maximum infringement fees and the extension of the statutory
limitation period to file charges for RMA prosecutions;
- enable
the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) to take enforcement action under
the RMA;
- protect
special advisors to the Environment Court from legal proceedings over actions
taken in good faith in the course of carrying
out their duties;
- allow
for the appointment of alternate Environment Judges; and
- clarify
the process for making national environmental standards.
- Finally,
the Bill institutes a new planning process for freshwater management to replace
the collaborative planning process introduced
by the RLAA. The new planning
process provides for the Minister for the Environment to appoint panels of
freshwater commissioners
to provide recommendations to local councils on
freshwater planning processes.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 19 - freedom from discrimination
- Section
19 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom from
discrimination on the grounds of discrimination
set out in the Human Rights Act
1993 (‘the Human Rights Act’).
- The
key questions in assessing whether there is a limit on the right to freedom from
discrimination are:1
- does
the legislation draw a distinction on one of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination under s 21 of the Human Rights Act and,
if so,
- does
the distinction involve disadvantage to one or more classes of
individuals?
- A
distinction will arise if the legislation treats two comparable groups of people
differently on one or more of the prohibited grounds
of discrimination. Whether
disadvantage arises is a factual determination.2
1 See, for example, Atkinson v Minister
of Health and others [2010] NZHRRT 1; McAlister v Air New Zealand
[2009] NZSC 78; and Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General
[2008] NZHRRT 31.
2 See, for example, Child Poverty Action Group v
Attorney-General above n 1 at [179]; and McAlister v Air New Zealand
above n 1 at [40] per Elias CJ, Blanchard and Wilson JJ.
- Clause
41 of the Bill allows for retired Environment Judges under the age of 75 years
to be appointed as alternate Environment Judges.
It also provides that a retired
Environment Judge must not be appointed or reappointed for a term that extends
beyond the date on
which the Judge reaches the age of 75 years. Environment
Judges are currently required to retire from office on attaining the age
of 70
years. Clause 41 therefore allows for Judges who have retired at the age of 70
to still be eligible for appointment as an alternate
Environment Judge.
- This
provision prima facie limits s 19 rights to the freedom from
discrimination on the basis of age, which is a prohibited ground of
discrimination in the Human
Rights Act.
- However,
the imposition of mandatory retirement ages on the judiciary has been considered
to be a justified limit on the right to
freedom from discrimination. Mandatory
retirement has been viewed as providing the necessary balance between upholding
the principle
that judges may only be removed in truly extraordinary
circumstances,3 so as to protect judicial independence
from any threat of arbitrary or politically motivated removal, and the
acknowledgement that
advancing age is, in general, associated with diminution of
mental and other faculties.
- Clause
41 goes no further than existing legislation in determining a maximum age to
which retired judges may be eligible to be appointed
or reappointed as alternate
Environment Judges.
- For
this reason, we consider that any limits within the Bill on the right to be free
from discrimination are justified under s 5 of
the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 21 – freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property,
correspondence or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including
personal privacy, dignity,
and property.4
- Clause
67 inserts new sections 343E-343L, which set out new enforcement functions for
the EPA. Section 343F authorises the EPA to
take an enforcement action either
unilaterally or in partnership with a local authority. Enforcement actions may
include (as per
section 343E) “an inspection, investigation or other
activity carried out in accordance with the Act.” We consider that
the
application of these powers constitutes a search under s 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
3 Constitution Act 1986, s 23.
4 See, for example, Hamed v R [2011] NZSC
101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
- The
Bill does not expand on the range of search powers currently available under the
RMA, but rather extends the use of these powers
to the EPA, which must apply
them in accordance with the RMA. Current RMA search powers are regarded as
reasonable and proportionate
based on the range of safeguards, controls and
protocols set in place to manage their use.
- On
this basis, we regard searches under the Bill as being reasonable, and thus not
in conflict with s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 27(2) – right to judicial review
- Section
27(2) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that every person whose rights,
obligations, or interests protected or recognised
by law have been affected by a
determination of any tribunal or other public authority has the right to apply,
in accordance with
law, for judicial review of that determination.
- The
right to judicial review is intended to ensure that a person with an interest in
a decision can challenge the lawfulness of that
decision. The phrase “in
accordance with law” that appears in s 27(2) recognises that limits may be
imposed on the power
of judicial review, but “any attempt completely to
deprive the High Court of its review powers would violate the
guarantee.”5
- Clause
73(2) of the Bill inserts new Part 4 into Schedule 1 of the RMA, which sets out
the new freshwater planning process. Clause
54(2) of this new Part 4 prohibits a
person from applying for both judicial review and appeal of a single decision
made in respect
of the freshwater planning process, unless applications for both
appeal and judicial review are lodged together.
- Statutes
will generally impose two types of limitation on judicial review; an ouster
clause, where the courts’ jurisdiction
is entirely excluded (‘a
substantive ouster’), or a procedural restriction regulating the
courts’ power to review.6 Prohibiting a person
from applying for both judicial review and appeal of a single decision unless
these applications are lodged together
is appropriately characterised as a
procedural restriction on the right to judicial review, and therefore prima
facie limits s 27(2) of the Bill of Rights Act.
- However,
limitations on rights and freedoms may still be consistent with the Bill of
Rights Act if they can be considered a reasonable
limit that is justifiable in
terms of s 5 of that Act. The s 5 inquiry may be approached as
follows:
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
5 A Bill of Rights for New
Zealand: A White Paper’ [1984-1985] I AJHR A6 at [10.175].
6 Legislation Advisory Committee at [13.7.1].
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?7
25. Prohibiting a person from
applying for both judicial review and appeal of a single decision made in the
freshwater planning process
of the RMA unless these applications are lodged
together serves the important objective of ensuring the efficiency of the
planning
process by reducing the likelihood of claimants hamstringing the
process by drawn out litigation. This prohibition also rationally
supports the
efficiency of the court process by requiring claimants to raise all substantive
objections to a planning decision at
one point in time.
- We
regard this limit on the use of judicial review as a proportionate means to
enhance the efficiency of the planning and court processes.
This limit does not
represent a substantive ouster of an individual’s review options, but
rather a limit on the number of times
in which a single decision of the
freshwater planning process may be questioned by a single individual. The
prohibition reaches no
further than necessary to achieve this objective.
- For
this reason, we consider that any limits within the Bill on the right to
judicial review are justified under s 5 of the Bill of
Rights
Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Edrick Child
Acting Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
7 Hansen v R [2007]
NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 at [102]. The test draws on the leading Canadian
case
of R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/NZBORARp/2019/49.html