You are here:
NZLII >>
Databases >>
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act Reports >>
2019 >>
[2019] NZBORARp 55
Database Search
| Name Search
| Recent Documents
| Noteup
| LawCite
| Download
| Help
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC 2021) Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 16, 17, 18, 21) [2019] NZBORARp 55 (17 October 2019)
Last Updated: 28 March 2020
17 October 2019
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Asia-Pacific
Cooperation (APEC 2021) Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC 2021) Bill
(“the Bill”) is consistent with the
rights and freedoms affirmed in
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“the Bill of Rights
Act”).
- We
have concluded that the Bill is consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed
in the Bill of Rights Act.
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
with the latest version of the Bill (PCO 21839/4.0).
We will provide you with
further advice if the final version of the Bill includes amendments that affect
the conclusions in this
advice.
- In
reaching that conclusion, we have considered the consistency of the Bill with
the following sections of the Bill of Rights Act:
- s 14
(freedom of expression);
- s 16
(right of peaceful assembly);
- s
17 (freedom of association);
- s 18
(freedom of movement); and
- s 21
(unreasonable search and seizure).
- Our
analysis is set out below.
Summary
- The
Bill grants wide discretionary powers during the three-week period in November
2021. APEC 2021 is a major international event
of significant scale and
complexity. Leaders from up to 21 APEC economies will be in New Zealand.
- The
exercise of the discretionary powers granted under the Bill are likely to result
in significant limitations on some protected
rights and freedoms, particularly
freedom of movement. However, we consider these limits can be justified in a
free and democratic
society. This is largely on the basis that:
- there
is a clear and pressing need for security at an event of such international
significance; and
- there
is nothing to suggest that Parliament is authorising the powers be used in a way
that is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights
Act. While the powers appear to
be
The Bill
granted in wide-terms, s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act
requires that these powers be interpreted consistently with the Bill of Rights
Act where possible. Rights- consistent interpretations of these powers are
available.
General overview
- The
Bill provides a legislative framework enabling New Zealand to host the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in November 2021
(“APEC
2021”). APEC 2021 will be attended by world leaders, officials, and media
from an expected 21 countries. This
event is of significant scale and
complexity, and it creates a unique security challenge for the New Zealand
Police (“the Police”).
- The
purposes of the Bill at cl 4 are to:
- ensure
the security of all involved in APEC 2021 (including the media and members of
the public); and
- facilitate
the efficient operation of APEC 2021.
- The
Bill achieves these objectives by:
- enabling
the Commissioner of Police (“the Commissioner”) to authorise members
of the New Zealand Armed Forces to assist
the Police during the leaders’
event period (1 – 21 November 2021). Those members of the Armed Forces
will be integrated
into the Police’s security operations, be put under
Police control, and be given constabulary powers and training;
- providing
for the Commissioner to designate certain groups of people as APEC security
staff with limited statutory powers;
- providing
for foreign protection officers to import and possess, if approved by the
Commissioner, weapons and ammunition that would
otherwise be illegal to import
or possess;
- creating
temporary powers and offences to enable the securing of APEC venues, sites, and
surroundings, as well as to enable road closures
for motorcades and security
purposes (discussed in detail below); and
- providing
for the Police and foreign protection agencies, with approval by the
Commissioner, to import and use wireless electronic
countermeasure technology
during APEC 2021 events.
- The
Bill also makes a number of related consequential amendments to several
Acts.
- The
Bill (including its consequential amendments) is repealed on 21 November 2021 at
the closure of APEC.
Powers to close places, transport routes, and airspace
Closure of places
- The
Bill provides for the planned closure of public and private places. The
Commissioner may close a public place (cl 47) or a private
place (cl 48) on any
day during the three- week long leaders’ event period in November 2021. To
do so, the Commissioner must
reasonably believe that the closure is required to
prevent a security risk at, or near, a leaders’ event or near a protected
person. Clause 52 also empowers a constable to reactively close any place on any
day during the leaders’ event period if the
constable reasonably believes
the closure is required to prevent or respond to a security risk at or near a
leaders’ event
or near a protected person.
- The
effect of closing a place (including homes and marae) is that the owner or
occupier of the public or private place (cl 49):
- is
prohibited from excluding or ejecting people who are permitted by a constable to
enter or remain that place;
- is
prohibited from permitting other people to enter or remain at the place;
and
- may
themselves be excluded or removed from the place.
- Clause
49 of the Bill does not include any explicit matters that the decision-maker
must consider in deciding whether to exclude an
owner or occupier from a public
or private place that is closed. The Bill is also not explicit as to who is
empowered to exercise
that discretion, whether it is the Commissioner (in
designating a place be closed), or a constable on the day of an event.
- A
place may not be closed under cls 47 or 48 unless the requisite consultation has
been completed. The Commissioner must consult with
the owners of the place (or
if there is no owner of a public place, the local authority), and may consult
with any person the Commissioner
considers is directly affected more than the
public generally. There is no obligation to consult anyone else. No consultation
is
required for a constable to close a place at cl 52. This is because cl 52 is
designed to only be used reactively, in response to
security situations that
develop during the leaders’ event period.
Closure of roads,
marine areas, and the creation of secure transport routes
- Roads
and marine areas—cls 50 and 51 respectively—may be closed in whole
or in part by the Commissioner on any day during
the leaders’ event
period. To do so, the Commissioner must reasonably believe that the closure is
required to prevent a risk
to security at, or near, a leaders’ event or a
protected person.
- Before
closing a road or marine area, the Commissioner must consult the road
controlling authority in the case of a road, and the
harbourmaster and the local
authority in the case of a marine area. The Commissioner may also consult with
any person the Commissioner
considers is directly affected more than the public
generally, but need not consult anyone else.
- Roads
and marine areas —cls 57 and 58 respectively—may also be closed
temporarily by a constable in order to create a
secure transport route, if that
route leads to or from an aerodrome, a leaders’ event, or a protected
person’s accommodation.
To do so, a constable must reasonably believe the
closure is required to ensure the security of
protected persons
while travelling. In addition to the road or marine area that forms the actual
transport route itself, a constable
may also close roads and marine areas in the
vicinity of the transport route, along with places adjacent to, or in the
vicinity of,
the route.
- An
owner or occupier of any place that is closed by a constable for the purpose of
creating a secure transport route is subject to
the restrictions set out at cl
49, and could potentially be excluded from their homes, or disallowed from
permitting others to enter.
Closed places and secure transport
routes are security areas
- The
Bill provides that closed places and secure transport routes are security areas
(cl 44). A person can only enter or remain in
a security area with the
permission of a constable (cl 60) and may be prevented from entering or be
removed (cl 62). The Bill does
not include any explicit matters that a constable
must consider in deciding whether to grant permission to enter or remain in a
secure
area.
- A
person may be asked to produce accreditation or evidence of permission to enter
or remain in a secure area, and must provide satisfactory
evidence of their
permission to enter, their reason for doing so, and their personal details (cl
63). A person in a security area
may be directed to stop any activity that may
cause a risk to security (cl 64). A constable may require vehicles in a security
area
to stop and remain stopped for as long as is reasonably necessary (cl
65).
- Constables,
and others permitted by constables, may enter, remain in, and use a security
area that is not a home or marae (cl 61).
The Bill does not include any explicit
matters that a constable must consider in deciding whether to enter, remain in,
or use a closed
private place (which may potentially be against the
owner’s or occupier’s wishes).
- The
Bill is not completely clear as to how the power to enter security areas at cl
61 (which explicitly excludes homes and marae)
relates to the restriction at cl
49(b) preventing owners and occupiers of closed places from excluding or
ejecting people who are
permitted by a constable to enter or remain in that
place. We consider that cl 49(2)(b) implies that there can be no entry to a home
or marae without a warrant; however, the Bill clearly envisages that homes and
marae can be closed by the Commissioner at cl 48,
and it appears that they are
intended to be subject to the restrictions at cls 49(3) and (4).
- Security
areas, except homes or marae, may be entered and searched for security risks
without warrant (cl 66). Homes and marae may
be searched with the owner’s
or occupier’s consent, or with a warrant. Warrants may be issued by an
issuing officer if
the issuing officer is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that it is necessary to search the home or marae, for
a
security risk because:
- the
home or marae’s particular location in a security area poses a risk to
security if it has not been searched; and
- it
would be a risk to security if there were a security risk at the home or
marae.
- Searches
under cl 66 do not require reasonable suspicion that a security risk is present
in the home or marae, merely that there would
be a security risk if the home or
marae was not searched. Because of the very wide definitions of “risk item
or substances”
and the associated “risk to security” at cl 6
of the Bill, it is unlikely that any home or marae in a security area would
not
satisfy this requirement. The search power therefore is functionally identical
to a general inspection power for all homes and
mare that are
within
security areas. Items found during a search may be seized if
the item is reasonably believed to be a “risk item or substance”
(cl
72).
- People
and things in a security area or at an entrance to a security area (cl 70(4))
may be screened or searched with the consent
of the person, or in the case of an
unattended thing, without consent (cl 68). The power to screen and search may be
exercised without
consent if the constable has reasonable grounds to suspect
that there is a risk to security and it requires an immediate response
(cl
68(4)). A person who does not consent may be prevented from entering, or be
removed from, the secure area (cl 69).
- In
exercising all of these powers, reasonable force may be used against people or
things if required (cl 106). Nobody is entitled
to compensation for any actions
or omissions made in accordance with the Bill (e.g. a person deprived of the use
of their home for
three weeks because it happens to be in a security area and
they refuse consent to be searched), except that, within specified limitations,
reasonable compensation must be paid for property that is damaged or destroyed
when closing a security area (cls 114 and 115).
It is an offence
not to comply with requirements while in a closed place or transport
route
- It
is an offence to intentionally and without reasonable excuse enter, attempt to
enter or remain in a security area, knowing that
it is a security area, and
knowing that a constable has not permitted entry (cl 74). It is an offence to
intentionally and without
reasonable excuse, while knowing it is a security
area, to breach or fail to comply with any requirement, condition, direction, or
prohibition made in respect of the statutory requirements as outlined above,
except the requirement to provide information at cl
63 (cl 75). It is an offence
to intentionally and without reasonable excuse interfere with, by any means, the
closing of a security
area, knowing that it is a security area (cl 76). It is an
offence to intentionally and without reasonable excuse, knowing that it
is a
security area, to fail to stop a vehicle when required to do so, or to keep a
vehicle stopped as long as is reasonably necessary
(cl 77).
- A
person who commits and offence against the Bill is liable upon conviction to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a
fine not exceeding $2,000
(cl 98).
Closure of airspace
- Airspace
may be designated as APEC security airspace to prevent a risk to security at, or
near, an APEC event or leaders’ event
and to ensure that only authorised
aircraft enter the airspace (cl 80). Rules can be made in respect of APEC
security airspace that
ensure only authorised aircraft enter that airspace, or
that otherwise prevent a risk to security by aircraft in that airspace (cl
81).
- Where
a constable suspects on reasonable grounds that an unauthorised aircraft
without a person on board is, has just been, or will be, in APEC security
airspace, the constable may seize, detain, take control of, or destroy
the
aircraft (cl 82). Where a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that an
unauthorised aircraft with a person on board is, has just been, or will
be in APEC security airspace, the constable may seize or detain it to prevent
its operation
(cl 83). Detention or seizure at cls 82 and 83 may only last so
long as the constable considers it is necessary to prevent a risk
to
security.
- A
constable may enter and search without warrant aircraft, aerodromes, vehicles,
vessels, and building or places (including homes
or marae). To do so, the
constable
must have reasonable grounds to suspect there is, or will
be, an activity in APEC security airspace that constitutes a risk to security,
and that the risk emanated from the place being searched (cl 86).
- If
a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that an aircraft is, will be, or
has just been, in APEC security airspace in breach
of applicable rules, the
constable may require a person who the constable reasonably believes operated
the aircraft to provide their
personal details, and if known, that of the
aircraft’s owner (cl 87). If that person questioned is not, in fact, the
operator
of the aircraft, the constable may require the person provide, if
known, the personal details or other identifying particulars of
the operator and
owner.
- It
is an offence to intentionally and without reasonable excuse operate an aircraft
or do an activity in breach of the rules applicable
to APEC security airspace
(cl 88). It is also an offence to intentionally and without reasonable excuse
act in breach of, or fail
to comply with, any requirement, condition, direction,
or prohibition made as in respect of the statutory provisions outlined above
(cl
89).
- These
offences are liable upon conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3
months or a fine not exceeding $2,000 (cl 98).
Powers to use wireless electronic counter-measure technology
- The
Commissioner is empowered to authorise a constable or a foreign security agency
to use specified wireless electronic counter-measure
technologies at APEC events
and other leaders’ events (cl 92). The Commissioner may only authorise the
use of the technology
if the use is to counter potential or actual risks to
security (cl 90). The technology can be used to detect, intercept, transmit,
retransmit, modify, disrupt, disable, or interfere with radiocommunication, and
a person authorised to use the technology may use
any information derived from
the radiocommunication (cl 97).
- The
Commissioner may only authorise the use of the technology for the minimum time
that is required to counter potential or actual
risks to security at specified
locations, which includes areas adjacent to security areas (cl 92(4)-(5)).
Planned use of the technology
may only affect radiocommunications in a planned
range of frequencies, whereas reactive use allows the technology to be used to
react
and respond to types of radiocommunications as necessary (cls 93 and
94).
- The
Commissioner may impose any condition on the use of the technology that they see
fit (cl 63(2)). Authorised users of the technology
must make any alternative
arrangement required by the Commissioner relating to an existing service that
may be affected by the authorisation,
such as radio services essential to
protect life and property or services authorised under existing radio spectrum
licences (cls
96(1)(e) and 96(3)). However, there is no obligation on the
Commissioner to consult with providers of existing services before authorising
the use of the technology and setting the conditions of its use.
- All
information collected by the technology must be disposed of as soon as it is no
longer required to counter potential or actual
risks to security (cl 96).
Authorised users of the technology must not disclose a radiocommunication, or
information derived from
the radiocommunication that is a private communication
or personal information, unless required by another Act, or for the purposes
of
prosecution under the Bill (cl 97(2)-(3)).
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Democratic and civil rights affected by the Bill (ss 14, 16, 17, and 18(1))
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form. Section 16 of the Bill of Rights Act provides
that everyone
has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Section 17 of the
Bill of Rights Act provides that everyone has the right to freedom
of
association. Section 18(1) of the Bill of Rights Act provides that everyone
lawfully in New Zealand has the right to freedom of
movement.
- The
freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, association, and movement are all
democratic and civil rights which together ensure
that New Zealanders can
participate in the shaping of society and public opinion. They are the essential
building blocks to a free
and democratic society.1 In
relation to these rights, we note the following:
- freedom
of expression is “as wide as human thought and
imagination”.2 The right has been interpreted to
include the right not to be compelled to say certain things or to provide
certain information.3 A person’s conduct may
amount to expression where the conduct is intended to convey
meaning.4 Political speech has high expressive
value;5
- the
choice of method, place, and time of peaceful assembly is integral to the free
exercise of that right;6
- the
ambit of freedom of association is “broad and encompasses a wide range of
associational activities...”.7 It has been held
to include the right of an individual to associate with any other
individual.8 Freedom of association encompasses both
formal and informal assemblies and the participation in community
life;9 and
- freedom
of movement includes the right to use roads and move through public
places.10 The freedom has been asserted to include the
right of an individual not to be moved, and to be protected against forced
evictions.11,12 Notably, art 12 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the Bill of Rights Act affirms,
provides that “everyone...
shall... have the... freedom to choose his
residence”, suggesting the right may include the freedom not to be moved
from a
chosen residence in certain circumstances. While the scope of freedom of
movement is not settled in this respect, this analysis proceeds
on the basis
that
1 Handyside v United Kingdom
[1976] ECHR 5; (1976) 1 EHRR 737.
2 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review
[1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9, (1999) 5 HRNZ 224 (CA) at [15].
3 See, for example, Slaight Communications v
Davidson 59 DLR (4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard
[1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705 (1977).
4 Attorney-General v Smith [2018] NZCA 42 at
[46].
5 Morse v Police [2012] NZSC, 45 at [14] per
Elias CJ.
6 Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC, 30 at [116]
per McGrath J.
7 Turners and Growers Ltd v Zespri Group Ltd (No
2) (2010) 9 HRNZ 365 (HC) at [72].
8 B v JM [1997] NZFLR 529 (HC) at 532.
9 Morse, referred above n 5, at [110] per
McGrath J.
10 Kerr v Attorney-General [1996] DCR 951
(DC) at 955.
11 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at
16.4.5;
Family and Whanau Violence Legislation Bill – Consistency with
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (Crown Law, ATT395/261, 3 March 2017) at
[9].
12 However, this is a disputed proposition, at least
so far as it relates to freedom campers. See: New Zealand Motor Caravan
Association Inc v Thames-Coromandel District Council [2014] NZHC 2016 at
[131].
the freedom includes the right to be protected against forced evictions from
legal or customary residences.
- The
Bill contains many provisions that limit the above freedoms. These can be
grouped together as:
- those
provisions that enable the closure of public places, private places, roads, and
marine areas, and the effects of those closures;
- those
provisions that restrict access to airspace through the designation of airspace
as APEC security airspace; and
- those
provisions that enable the use of electronic counter-measure
technology.
- The
provisions of the Bill that limit the democratic and civil rights identified
above may be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act
if they can be justified in
a free and democratic society.13 This inquiry may be
approached as follows:14
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?
Are the provisions of the Bill that enable closure of public places, private
places, roads, and marine areas justified in a free
and democratic society?
- As
outlined previously (refer paras 11 – 28 above), various provisions of the
Bill enable the closure of public places, roads
and marine areas. This can
either be done:
- as a
planned closure of a public place, private place, road, or marine area, where
the Commissioner reasonably believes the closure
is required to prevent a risk
to security at, or near, a leaders’ event or near a protected person (cls
47, 48, 50, and 51);
- as a
reactive closure of any place by a constable if the constable reasonably
believes the closure is required to prevent or respond
to a risk of security at,
or near, a leaders’ event or near a protected person (cl 52);
or
- as
temporary closure of a road or marine area by a constable in order to create a
secure transport route, if the road or marine area
leads to or from an
aerodrome, leaders’ event, or protected person’s accommodation and
the constable reasonably believes
the closure is required to ensure the security
of protected persons while travelling (cls 57 and 58).
13 New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990, s 5.
14 See Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3
NZLR 1 at [123].
- Each
of these closures will limit freedom of movement. This is because areas that are
closed can be blocked off by any means, and
people prevented from entering or
remaining in the area (cls 45 and 54). This limits the ability of people to
travel through those
areas. It also may result in the eviction of people who
reside in those areas. This includes both people who might customarily reside
in
a public place that is closed (e.g. homeless people), as well as those who are
owners or occupiers of residences in areas that
are closed off (cl 49).
- Each
of these closures will limit freedom of association. Participation in normal
community life will not be possible in places that
are closed. Permission to
enter or remain in a security area is possible only with the permission of a
constable (cl 60), and a constable
may direct a person to stop any activity that
may cause a risk to security (cl 64), even if that activity would otherwise be
lawful.
Owners or occupiers of closed private places, such as residences, will
be prohibited from permitting people to enter or remain in
their residence (cl
49).
- Each
of these closures will limit freedom of peaceful assembly. People will not be
able to freely assemble at places that are closed,
and can be prevented from
doing activities that may cause a risk to security, even where that activity
would otherwise be lawful.
This will limit protesters’ choice as to site
and method of protest.
- Each
of these closures will also limit freedom of expression. The limitations arise
indirectly from limits on peaceful assembly, but
also in two other ways. First,
cl 63 requires that person must, when asked, provide accreditation or evidence
of permission to enter
or remain in a secure area, along with their reason for
doing so, and their personal details. Second, cl 49 prohibits an owner or
occupier of a public or private place from excluding or ejecting from that place
people who a constable has permitted to be there.
To the extent that the
expulsion was intended to convey a meaning, such as a political message, the
owner or occupier’s freedom
of expression would be
limited.
Do the limits serve a sufficiently important
objective?
- The
purpose of these provisions is to maintain security at a major international
event, where the need for security is fundamental
to the success of the event,
and to facilitate an efficient delivery of APEC 2021. Leaders from up to 21 APEC
economies (and other
people in need of security protection) will need to be
moved around Auckland efficiently, and to safely meet at events. We consider
this objective is sufficiently important to justify some limitation on the
democratic and civil rights referenced above.
Are the limits
rationally connected with the objective?
- The
closing of a place facilitates a high degree of Police control over the area. It
enables the Police to restrict access to people
who could create a risk to
security and regulates the conduct of people who are permitted to be in the
area. The limits that stem
from the closing of areas are rationally connected to
delivering a safe and secure APEC 2021.
Do the limits impair the
rights or freedoms no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient
achievement of the objective?
- Parliament
is entitled to appropriate latitude to achieve its
objectives.15 The issue here is whether the means are
minimally impairing of the rights, and whether the means proposed are carefully
tailored to
the objective.
15 Canada v JTI-MacDonald [2007] 2
SCR 610 at [42] – [45].
- It
is notable that the Bill gives specified decision-makers a discretionary power
to close areas only where the decision-maker has
a reasonable belief that
closure is required to prevent or respond (as the case may be) to a risk to
security, or to otherwise ensure
the security of protected persons while
travelling. The Bill envisages that areas “near” leaders’
events or a protected
person may be closed, in addition to the place where the
event is taking place itself. Discretionary powers in the Bill must be given
a
meaning consistent with the Bill of Rights Act,16 and
while “near” is not defined by the Bill, the Bill does not provide
for places to be closed where this would not be
proportionate to achieving the
security objective.
- More
generally, this obligation to act consistently with the Bill of Rights Act
extends to all the discretionary powers granted under
the Bill. Decision-makers
will need to consider the proportionality of their actions when exercising the
powers granted by this Bill.
- Similarly,
the Bill creates discretionary powers at cl 49 with respect to limiting the
rights of owners or occupiers of private places
in various ways (including their
eviction). Any discretionary power exercised under this provision that affects
freedom of movement,
association, peaceful assembly, or expression must, in
practice, be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
- It
is also relevant that these discretionary powers only apply during the
three-week leaders’ event period, limiting the overall
duration that the
provisions can limit the various rights. Further, the relevant powers relating
to the closing of places explicitly
envisage that a place could be closed for
part of a day, rather than a whole day, ensuring that there is scope for the
discretionary
powers to be exercised in a way that is closely tailored to the
specific security requirements.
- Importantly,
the Bill does not create a blanket restriction on “non-accredited”
people entering security areas. A person’s
ability to enter and remain in
a security area is at a constable’s discretion (cl 60). This ensures that,
should large parts
of public areas be closed, such as the Auckland
Domain,17 consideration can be given to facilitating
the entry and use of the place by people who have legitimate reasons to enter or
use the
place and who do not pose a real risk to security. The extent, nature,
and duration of areas closed, along with the actual need for
security at each
site, will be relevant to considering the proportionality of the closure, and
whether access by “non-accredited”
people needs to be
facilitated.
- With
respect to cl 63, the provision requires a person provide only that information
which is necessary for a constable to assess
the security impacts of allowing
the person to enter or remain in a security area. Notably, a person who refuses
to provide the information
can be removed from the security area (cl 62), but
will not be held to have committed an offence (cl 75(2)). This exception from
criminal liability ensures the limitation on expression goes no further than is
required to achieve the security objective.
Are the limits in due
proportion to the importance of the objective?
- The
discretionary powers at cl 49 could potentially enable severe intrusions to be
made into freedom of movement. Owners or occupiers
of private residences, as
well as people who customarily happen to occupy public places (e.g. homeless
people) can be evicted
16 Section 6, New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990.
17 As happened previously with the Auckland Domain
(Temporary Closure for APEC) Act 1999.
from their place of residence for the duration of the closure. These
individuals can also be forced to allow people to remain in their
homes at the
direction of a constable.
- The
Bill does not provide any explicit mandatory relevant considerations that a
decision- maker must consider when exercising the
powers at cl 49. To an extent,
the Bill is also not clear on who is empowered to exercise these range of
powers. Nevertheless, in
our view, the Bill does not authorise these
discretionary powers to be exercised inconsistently with the Bill of Rights Act.
It is
possible that, in some limited circumstances, it could be a proportionate
response to require people to vacate their homes for certain
periods of
time.
- Practically,
we understand that very few private residences are likely to be closed, and that
this is mostly likely to occur where
a person resides in a private apartment in
a building that is also contains a hotel. Amongst other relevant considerations,
whether
the eviction of an owner or occupier is proportionate will likely turn
on:
- the
specific risk posed by the individual being excluded;
- the
number of people to be excluded;
- the
actual security needs associated with the particular event or the individual
protected person;
- whether
reasonable alternatives to exclusion could be put in place to sufficiently
mitigate the risk;
- the
degree to which access could be facilitated to the residence during certain
periods of time;
- whether
the need for security at the site could be avoided altogether by a change of
venue;
- whether
the person has a legal right to occupy the place or is merely squatting;
and
- the
availability and provision of alternative accommodation to adversely affected
people.
- The
other limitations on freedom of movement from the closure of places, e.g. the
ability to freely travel through closed areas, are
less severe. Movement through
roads and other places is frequently regulated and restricted, particularly as
is required to achieve
important safety and security objectives. The Bill
includes sufficient mechanisms to ensure that the power to close roads and other
areas can be applied proportionally, such as the consultation and public
notification requirements for planned closures.
- The
degree of the limit on freedom of association, and the diminution of community
life, will depend on the overall scope of size,
nature, and duration of
closures. It is possible that the overall limit on association could be quite
significant. The proportionality
of the impact on community life is a
consideration that decision-makers exercising powers to close areas under the
Bill will need
to consider.
- The
degree of the limit on freedom of peaceful assembly and expression will also
depend on the overall scope of size, nature, and
duration of closures. For the
closure powers to be exercised proportionally, peaceful assembly
“near” leaders’
events must be
reasonably
accommodated, relative to the particular security need. Political speech (which
includes political protest) is recognised
as being of high expressive value. The
extent of the closures must not be such as to effectively deny people the
ability to freely
express themselves peacefully, such as through speech-making,
chanting, the holding banners or signs, or other expressive acts like
the flying
of balloons.
- With
respect to the information that is required to be provided at cl 63, the
information is not of high expressive value. Further,
the provision contains
explicit limits on when the information can be required. In contrast to this
limited infringement on expression,
there is a very high need for security at
APEC 2021. As such, the limits are in due proportion to the importance of the
objective.
Overall, are these limits justified?
- In
light of the above discussion, we consider that the provisions of the Bill that
provide for areas to be closed are justified limitations
on the rights to
freedom of movement, association, peaceful assembly and expression. This is
primarily because the powers are largely
discretionary in nature and there is
nothing in the Bill to suggest that Parliament is authorising the powers be
exercised disproportionately.
Are the provisions of the Bill that deal with designated APEC airspace justified
in a free and democratic society?
- Clauses
80 and 81 of the Bill provide for the Director of Civil Aviation to designate
any portion of airspace over a security area
(along with surrounding areas) as
APEC security airspace and to make emergency rules relating to that airspace for
the purposes of
preventing risks to security at, or near, a leaders’ event
and to ensure only authorsied aircraft enter the airspace.
- These
clauses could limit freedom of movement as it relates to aircraft that have
people on-board. The rules may restrict or severely
limit the passage of
aircraft through designated airspace at certain periods of time. However, in our
view these limits are clearly
justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. The
purpose of the provisions is to protect security. Aircraft travelling through
a
security area are likely to present a significant risk to security if not
appropriately regulated, and the powers to designate
APEC security airspace and
make rules are discretionary. There is nothing in the Bill that is intended to
authorise the powers be
exercised in a way that is not consistent with the Bill
of Rights Act. Overall, the impacts of freedom of movement are minor (aircraft
can move around the areas), whereas the need for security is high.
- Clause
87 of the Bill makes it a requirement that a person who a constable reasonably
suspects is operating an aircraft in breach
of APEC airspace rules must provide
the constable with their personal details, and if known, the personal details or
identifying
particulars of the owner of the aircraft. Notably, it is also an
offence to fail to comply with this requirement (cl 89).
- This
clause limits freedom of expression in that it compels a person to provide
information. However, this limit is clearly justified
under s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act. The provision clearly supports the security objective. The presence
of unauthorised aircraft
in APEC secure airspace would be a significant threat
to security, and the requirement that a person operating such an aircraft
identify
themselves (along with the owner of the aircraft) supports the Police
to:
- efficiently
investigate the risk;
- obtain
information necessary to support a proportional response to the risk;
and
- issue
a summons in relation to any offending that may have occurred, in cases where it
was not necessary that the person be taken
into custody on the
spot.
- All
of the information that cl 87 requires be provided is necessary to identify and
swiftly respond to the risk posed by the unauthorised
access of aircraft to APEC
security airspace. Overall, the nature of the information sought is not of high
expressive value, whereas
the security needs are very
high.
Are the provisions of the Bill that enable the use of electronic counter-measure
technology justified in a free and democratic society?
- Clause
97 of the Bill provides for the use of electronic counter-measure technology in
security areas, which could enable wireless
electronic communications to be
intercepted, modified, disrupted, or otherwise interfered with. This provision
will prevent people
from communicating with each other, limiting the freedom of
expression. The provision also amounts to a search under s 21 of the
Bill of
Rights Act. This aspect of the provision is considered later in the
analysis.
- The
limits on freedom of expression arising from the use of electronic
counter-measure technologies is clearly justified under s 5
of the Bill of
Rights Act. The provisions enabling the use of electronic countermeasure
technologies support the security objective
by mitigating the security risks
that could emanate from the use of wireless communication technologies, such as
remote triggering
devices or remote-control devices.
- The
Bill contemplates that electronic countermeasure technology may significantly
interfere with communications, including communications
that do not actually
present a security risk. The Bill also envisages that the technology could
disrupt communications entirely,
modify the messages being sent, and intercept
private communications and/or other personal information. This could create a
chilling
effect with respect to a broad range of high-value expression in
security areas.
- However,
the Bill provides for the Commissioner to exercise discretion in setting the
time, place, and frequency restrictions (cl
92). Further, the Commissioner is
empowered to impose any condition they see fit on the use of the technology, and
the user of the
technology is required to make alternative arrangements required
by the Commissioner as it relates to existing services that might
be affected
(cl 96).
- Altogether,
these limitations provide the Commissioner with a high degree of flexibility in
relation to authorising and controlling
the use of electronic countermeasures
technology. In turn, this ensures that the technology will be used in a way that
is carefully
tailored to the security objective, which results in a
proportionate response.
Unreasonable search and seizure (s 21)
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right of everyone to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure, whether of
the person, property, correspondence
or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including personal privacy,
dignity, and
property.18
18 See, for example, Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
- There
are several provisions of the Bill that provide for the searching or screening
of places, people, and things. In most cases,
the Bill provides for those
searches to be carried out under a warrant or by consent. In general, we
consider these search powers
to be reasonable. However, three provisions in the
Bill that provide search powers merit further consideration as to whether they
are reasonable—
- cl 66
of the Bill provides for warrantless searches of security areas that are not a
home or marae. Clause 66 also allows for warranted
searches of homes or marae,
where by its particular location in a security area, the home or marae poses a
risk to security if it
has not been searched for any risk item or substance, and
it would be a risk to security if there were a risk item or substance
there;
- cl 68
provides for a person to be searched without their consent where a constable has
reasonable grounds to suspect that there is
a risk to security and it requires
an immediate response. A person can only be searched under cl 68 if they are at
the entrance to
a security area or if the person is in a security area;
and
- cl
97 provides for the use of electronic counter-measure technologies in secure
areas, which will result in the collection of people’s
communications.
- The
Supreme Court has held that unreasonable search or seizure cannot be
demonstrably justified with reference to s 5 of the Bill
of Rights
Act.19 As such, the question with respect to these
provision is whether the search is reasonable. The reasonableness of a search
can be assessed
with reference to the purpose of the search and the degree of
intrusion on the values which the right seeks to
protect.
Reasonableness of the search at cl 66 of the
Bill
- The
ability to provide secure areas is necessary for the safe hosting of APEC 2021.
As noted above, searches under cl 66 can only
occur in areas that have already
been closed (making them a “security area”) in accordance with the
Bill. If security
areas are to serve their essential function, it is important
that those areas can be searched if necessary and for risk items to
be located
and removed.
- Overall,
we consider that search powers under cl 66 provide sufficient protections to
ensure that only reasonable searches are conducted.
This is
because:
- owners
or occupiers of private places will generally be consulted before their private
property is closed. Planned closures will also
be notified publicly. This
ensures that the inspection of a closed private place should not usually come as
a surprise to owners
or occupiers of those private places;
- private
places that have a high privacy interest—e.g. homes and marae—will
be subject to searches only where a warrant
has been issued. Judicial officers
will be responsible for considering the reasonableness of any search warrant
they are asked to
consider and must be satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that it is necessary to search the home or
marae;
- private
areas other than homes or marae will likely only be closed where the owner or
occupier of that place entered into an agreement
to host an APEC 2021 event or a
protected person. In this way, the owner or occupier of that place can
19 Cropp v Judicial Committee
[2008] 3 NZLR 744 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [162].
be considered to have consented to the search as part of fulfilling their
private agreements;
- the
provision of secure areas is essential to the hosting of APEC 2021; and
- searches
under this provision will only be possible when an area is closed under the
Bill, which itself is a discretionary power that
will need to be exercised
consistently with the Bill of Rights Act.
Reasonableness of the
search at cls 68 and 70 of the Bill
- The
power to search people is set out in cl 70. A person can be searched at an
entrance to, or in, a security area or secure transport
route. This power may be
exercised by a constable only (and not by other security staff). The Bill
provides that searches of a person
must be undertaken with the consent of the
person (cl 68(1)(a)); however, a search may be undertaken without consent if
there are
reasonable grounds to suspect that there is a risk to security and it
requires an immediate response. This power exists alongside
the power of a
constable to remove a person from a security area who does not consent to be
searched (cl 69).
- Overall,
we consider that searches under cls 68 and 70 provide sufficient protections to
ensure that only reasonable searches are
conducted. This is
because:
- people
who choose to enter security areas can be taken to consent to the conditions of
entry associated with that area;
- cl 70
explicitly provides that constables can undertake “reasonable" searches
only. Thus, for example, a search cannot occur
where the security risk could be
sufficiently mitigated by denying the person entry to the security area or by
removing the person
from the security area;
- as
noted above, the provision of secure areas is essential to safe hosting of APEC
2021; and
- searches
under this provision will only be possible in an area is closed under the Bill,
which itself is a discretionary power that
will need to be exercised
consistently with the Bill of Rights
Act.
Reasonableness of the search at cl 97 of the
Bill
- As
outlined previously, one consequence of the use of electronic countermeasure
technology (authorised under cl 97) is that private
communications could be
intercepted. This interception amounts to a search.
- Overall,
we consider that the Bill provides sufficient protections to ensure that only
reasonable searches are conducted as a consequence
of the use of electronic
countermeasure technology. This is because:
- the
Bill tightly prescribes the circumstances in which the Commissioner may
authorise the technology be used, and provides the Commissioner
with a high
degree of flexibility in relation to regulating the use of this
technology—nothing in the Bill is intended to authorise
these
discretionary powers to be exercised in a way that would result in unreasonable
searches;
- the
Bill provides extensive protections regarding the use and storage of any
information collected through the use of the technology—in
particular, any
information collected must be disposed of as soon as it is no longer required
for a purpose of the Bill (cl 96(1)(d));
- use
of this technology is essential to maintaining secure areas during APEC 2021;
and
- the
technology can only be used in secure areas closed under the Bill, which itself
is a discretionary power that will need to be
exercised consistently with the
Bill of Rights Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Edrick Child
Deputy Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/NZBORARp/2019/55.html