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Racing Industry Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 19, 21, 25(c)) [2019] NZBORARp 61 (21 November 2019)
Last Updated: 26 May 2020
21 November 2019
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Racing Industry
Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Racing Industry Bill (‘the Bill’) is
consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed in
the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO 21819/4.2). We will provide
you with further advice if the final version includes amendments that affect the
conclusions in
this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with:
- s 21
(right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure);
- s 19
(freedom from discrimination);
- s
25(c) (right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty);
and
- s 14
(freedom of expression).
- Our
analysis is set out below.
The Bill
- The
purpose of the Bill is to revitalise the racing industry and minimise harm from
gambling and will replace the Racing Act 2003.
- The
Bill makes key changes in the following areas:
- governance
of the racing industry;
- property
of racing clubs; and
- betting.
Governance
of the racing industry
- The
Bill devolves the current betting and race organising functions of the New
Zealand Racing Board and:
- creates
TAB NZ as the sole betting provider for racing and sports, and
- empowers
the existing 3 racing codes to effectively govern their respective industries
and networks of clubs and venues.
- The
Bill establishes the Racing Integrity Board as an entity independent from the
racing codes, that is responsible for all integrity
functions, and oversees an
investigative arm and an adjudicative arm that operate independently of each
other.
- These
changes are intended to provide the industry with independence from government,
however the Bill includes the ability for the
Minister for Racing to intervene
if required.
Property of racing clubs
- The
Bill provides for a process whereby the racing codes can determine that a racing
club is no longer racing. The racing code would
then advise the Registrar of
Incorporated Societies that the racing club should be dissolved. The Minister
for Racing would have
the power to recommend an Order in Council to transfer the
assets from the racing club that is no longer racing to vest in the relevant
racing code.
Betting
- The
Bill introduces an approval mechanism to enable consideration of new gambling
products, which to date has required legislative
change. TAB NZ will be able to
seek agreement by an independent body to new betting rules, requiring that harm
minimisation is prioritised
in any application for a new betting
rule.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 21 – Unreasonable Search and Seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right of everyone to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure, whether of
the person, property, correspondence
or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including personal privacy,
dignity, and
property.1
Clause 21(2) -
Transfer of assets by Order in Council
- Clause
21(2) provides for the assets of a racing club to vest in the racing code to
which the club was registered following dissolution
of that club.
- While
initially there was some uncertainty by the New Zealand courts, it now appears
to have been clearly established that s 21 of
the Bills of Rights Act does not
provide a general protection for property rights on their own. Section 21 is
grounded in privacy,
and therefore expectations of privacy will need to be
engaged for property rights to be protected by the
section.2
- The
process for dissolution of a racing club by a racing code is done with notice
and full knowledge of the racing club in question.
Clause 21(2) poses no
intrusion into a racing club’s privacy in the transfer of assets and
accordingly we do not consider s
21 of the Act to be
engaged.
Clause 40 – Powers of inspector to enter
premises
- Clause
40 enables inspectors appointed by the chief executive of the Department of
Internal Affairs, to enter any racecourse or premises
of TAB NZ, and demand
information
1 See, for example, Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
2 See R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52
or examine documents or things, for the purposes of ascertaining whether
betting rules and licenses are being complied with.
- Clause
40 constitutes search and seizure powers for the purposes of s 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act. Ordinarily, a provision found
to limit a particular right or freedom
may nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if it can be
considered reasonably
justified in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
However, the Supreme Court has held that, logically, unreasonable search or
seizure cannot be demonstrably justified with reference to s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.3
- In
assessing whether the search and seizure powers in the Bill are reasonable, we
have considered the importance of the objective
sought to be achieved and
whether the provisions are rationally connected and proportionate to that
objective. Overall, we consider
cl 40) does not authorise unreasonable searches
and seizures as per s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act. This is
because—
- the
purpose of the inspector is to ascertain whether betting licenses and rules are
being complied with. This is an important objective
because there are real harms
that come from unregulated gambling, and the Bill recognises those harms and
aims to mitigate them;
- the
powers in cl 40 are rationally connected to the objective of preventing harm
from gambling as betting rules and licenses need
to be enforced in order for
them to be effective;
- inspections
can only be done at reasonable times;
- the
powers of the inspector are limited to those directly related to betting matters
for example, examining books, accounts and machines
or equipment used for the
purposes of racing betting or sports betting; and
- the
clause does not place any limits or effects on the privilege against self-
incrimination.
- We
consider that the search powers under this Bill are therefore not unreasonable
for the purpose of s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 19 – Freedom from Discrimination
- Section
19 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom from
discrimination on the basis of age, commencing
at the age of 16
years.4 While age limits of any kind are likely to
involve a degree of arbitrariness, Parliament has chosen 16 as the starting
point for discrimination
on this basis.
- The
key question in assessing whether there is a limit on (breach of) the right to
freedom from discrimination are:5
- does
the legislation draw a distinction on one of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination under s 21 of the Human Rights Act, and
if so,
3 Cropp v Judicial Committee
[2008] 3 NZLR 744 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [162].
4 Section 19(1) Bill of Rights Act and s 21(1)(i)
Human Rights Act 1993.
5 See, for example McAlister v Air New Zealand
[2009] NZSC 78 [2010] 1 NZLR 153; Ministry of Health v Atkinson
[2012]
NZCA 184[2012] NZCA 184; , [2012] 3 NZLR 456; and Child Poverty Action Group v
Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 402, [2013] 3 NZLR 729.
- does
the distinction involve disadvantage in one or more classes of
individuals?
- Clause
79(1) of the Bill makes it an offence for a person under 18 years old to make a
bet, or for a person to make a bet on behalf
of a person under 18 years old.
This prima facie limits the right to freedom from discrimination on the
basis of age in respect of 16 and 17 year-olds. Put another way, 16 and 17
year-olds are disadvantaged vis-à-vis those aged 18 and over
because they are ineligible to make a bet.
- Where
a provision is found to limit a particular right or freedom, it may nevertheless
be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered a reasonable
limit that is justifiable under s 5 of that Act.
- The
s 5 inquiry may be approached as follows:6
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?
25. One of the main objectives of the Bill is to minimise
harm from gambling. The Bill’s age restrictions reflect the likely
greater
vulnerability of young people to problem gambling. Due to their earlier stages
of mental development, young people may be
more susceptible to addiction and
more likely to engage in problem gambling. Age-based distinctions necessarily
involve a degree
of generalisation without regard for the maturity or other
qualities of individuals in that age group. It is legitimate in these
circumstances to use a ‘bright line’, imposing age restrictions
which are rationally connected and proportionate to an
important objective.
- The
exclusion of 16 and 17 year olds from gambling is rationally connected to the
minimisation of harm from gambling as those people
would not have the
opportunity to incur harm through their inability to place bets.
- Comparatively,
the age restriction for pokie machines is 20 years old, and for lotto tickets
there is no legal age limit. The nature
of horse racing is that the speed of
play is lower than for example a pokie machine because there is space between
each race before
making a bet. However, the results are only delayed until the
end of the race, and then there is another race to bet on, which is
more
repetitive than for example lotto.
- The
speed of play, intensity, and repetition of the gambling in comparison to other
forms of gambling and their age restrictions,
is likely to justify the age limit
of 18. We accept that such limit is no more than reasonably necessary and in due
proportion to
the objective of minimising harm form gambling.
- For
these reasons, we conclude that any limits to be free from discrimination
imposed by the Bill are justified under s 5 of the Bill
of Rights Act.
6 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7 at
[123]
Section 25(c) – Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law. The right to be
presumed innocent requires
the prosecution to prove an accused person’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- Clauses
79(2)(a) and 79(2)(b) of the Bill provide for strict liability offences if a
member, officer, agent or employee of a racing
club, or of TAB NZ, receives or
permits to receive a bet by a person under 18 years, whether the bet is made by
that person on their
own behalf or on behalf of any other person. A person
guilty for either offence is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding
$5,000.
- Strict
liability offences prima facie limit s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act
because the accused is required to prove a defence, or disprove a presumption,
in order to
avoid liability.
- We
consider that this limit to the right under s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act is
justified in the circumstances. In reaching this
conclusion we have taken into
account the nature and context of the conduct being regulated, the ability of
the defendants to exonerate
themselves and the penalty levels.
- Strict
liability offences have been considered more justifiable where the offender
(here a person found to receive or permit to receive
a bet by a person under the
age of 18 years old) is in the best position to justify their apparent failure
to comply with the law
rather than requiring the Crown to prove the
opposite.
- Clause
79(3) provides for a defence where the defendant had reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to whom the charge relates
was 18 years old or over.
Clause 79(4) further adds that reasonable grounds can include and are not
limited to seeing an evidence
of age document indicating that the person was 18
years old or over.
- The
penalty for the offence is at the lower end of the scale and proportionate to
the importance of the Bill’s objective.
Section 14 – Freedom of Expression
- Various
provisions of the Bill require the provision of information. These include a
statement of intent and business plan which must
be provided by each racing
code, the Racing Integrity Board and TAB NZ to the Minister prior to the start
of a racing year (clauses
9, 37-38 and 49-50 respectively).
- These
provisions engage the right to freedom of expression. Section 14 of the Bill of
Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right
to freedom of expression,
including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information. The right has
been interpreted as including
the right not to be compelled to say certain
things or provide certain information.
- The
racing codes, the Racing Integrity Board and TAB NZ all have statutory functions
set out in the Bill which form part of the overall
objective of the Bill. The
provision of operational information in specified contexts is necessary to
ensure effective oversight
of these bodies and ensure compliance with these
functions.
- The
Bill contains a number of other clauses which prima facie limit the right
of freedom of expression, such as requirements to: publish and make copies of
rules available; prepare and provide
budgets, financial statement and annual
reports; provide specified requested information if an offshore betting
operator. These provisions
are necessary for the efficient and effective
operation of the racing industry and clearly justified.
- The
provisions identified in paragraph 34 and 37 are also proportionate and go no
further than reasonably necessary to achieve their
purpose. The instance where
information can be requested is limited to those circumstances prescribed in the
relevant clauses.
- For
these reasons, we conclude that any limits to the freedom of expression imposed
by the Bill are justified under s 5 of the Bill
of Rights
Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Edrick Child
Deputy Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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