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Education and Training Bill (Consistent) (Sections 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 25(c)) [2019] NZBORARp 62 (21 November 2019)
Last Updated: 26 May 2020
21 November 2019
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Education and Training
Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Education and Training Bill (‘the Bill’)
is consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed
in the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO
21113/8.0).1 We will provide you with further advice if
the final version includes amendments that affect the conclusions in this
advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with sections 9 (right not to be
subject to torture or cruel treatment),
13 (freedom of thought, conscience,
religion, and belief), 15 (manifestation of religion and belief), 14 (freedom of
expression),
17 (freedom of association), 18 (freedom of movement), 19 (freedom
from discrimination), 21 (freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure), 22
(liberty of the person), and 25(c) (presumption of innocence). Our analysis is
set out below.
The Bill
- The
Bill repeals the Education Act 1989 (the 1989 Act), Education Act 1964 (the 1964
Act), and Industry Training and Apprenticeships
Act 1992 and replaces them with
a new Education and Training Act. The Bill updates various provisions, removes
redundant provisions,
and gives effect to policy changes including:
Early childhood education
- requiring police
vetting of all adults who live, or may be present, at a home in which children
are receiving early childhood education
and care;
- providing the
Education Review Office with the power to enter homes where home- based early
childhood education is taking place;
- allowing the
Minister of Education to approve or decline applications to open new early
learning services based on specified criteria,
and to request further
information if required;
1 Many of the internal cross-references
between provisions in the Bill are wrong in this version as they have not been
adjusted to take
account of re-numbering. In addition, some provisions have also
not been sequentially numbered (i.e. the numbering bears no relationship
to the
position of the provisions within the Bill).
Primary and secondary education
- requiring school
boards who wish to allow religious instruction in the schools that they govern
to do so on an “opt-in”
basis;
- shifting the
responsibility for developing and consulting on enrolment schemes from school
boards to the Ministry of Education;
- specifying that
physical force is to be used only as a last resort;
- updating and
clarifying legislation that supports on-line and distance education;
- refocusing
school boards on a wider range of objectives, not just educational achievement,
in recognition of the important role that
they play in developing all aspects of
New Zealand’s future generations;
- creating new
objectives for school boards, including giving effect to the obligations under
Te Tiriti o Waitangi;
- requiring a
school board to consult with students (as appropriate), staff, and its school
community when making school rules;
- establishing
minimum eligibility criteria for appointing principals;
- establishing a
mandatory Code of Conduct for members of school boards, with sanctions for
non-compliance;
- establishing
dispute resolution panels to help students and their whānau resolve
complaints and disputes with their school;
- prohibiting the
awarding of the National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA) offshore,
except in limited circumstances;
Performance, funding and support
- enabling the
Education Review Office to obtain governance and management information from
controlling entities (e.g. parent companies)
where the information relates to
early learning services under their control; and
Administration of the education system
- changing the
student loan and allowance regime to enable more efficient and effective use of
client information and aligning the limitation
period for laying charges for
information-related offences with those applying to other offences.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 9 – torture or cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe
treatment or punishment
- Section
9 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right not to be
subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or
disproportionately severe
treatment or punishment.
- The
Bill re-enacts, with some amendments, the current provisions around the use of
physical force or seclusion against primary and
secondary school students.
Clause 82 of the Bill re-enacts the prohibition on corporal punishment and
seclusion in ss 139A and 139AB
of the 1989 Act. Clause 83 of the Bill re-enacts
(with some amendments) s 139AC of the 1989 Act, which provides
that:
- a teacher or
authorised staff member at a registered school may use physical force on a
student only where this is necessary to prevent
imminent harm to the student or
another person; and
- any physical
force used must be reasonable and proportionate in the
circumstances.
- However,
the Bill amends the existing provision by also requiring that physical force
only be used if the teacher or authorised staff
member reasonably believes there
is no other option available in the circumstances to prevent the harm.
- The
Bill also re-enacts, with some amendments, the current requirements in ss 139AD
and 139AE of the 1989 Act that the Secretary make
rules prescribing the practice
and procedure to be followed relating to the use of physical force and issue
guidelines on the use
of physical force.2
- In
light of the safeguards, we do not consider that cl 83 of the Bill engages s 9
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 13 and section 15 – freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and
belief, and manifestation of religion and belief
- Section
13 of the Bill of Rights Act provides that everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, religion, and belief,
including the right to adopt and to
hold opinions without interference. Section 15, which is a related right,
provides that every
person has the right to manifest that person’s
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either
individually
or in community with others, and either in public or in
private.
- The
Bill re-enacts, with some amendments, a number of provisions in the 1964 and
1989 Acts that relate to religious instruction and
observances.
State integrated schools
- State
integrated schools offer ‘education with a special character’,
meaning education within the framework of a particular
or general religious or
philosophical belief, and associated with observances or traditions relating to
that belief. The Bill and
the current law contain an underlying assumption that
a student enrolled at a State integrated school will participate in the general
school programme that gives the school its special character.3
Similarly, where religious instruction forms part of the special
character of a State integrated school, a willingness and ability
to take part
in religious instruction appropriate to that school is a condition of
appointment to certain positions.4 We do not consider
that these matters limit religious freedom for the reasons that follow.
- Enrolment,
or acceptance of a position, at a State integrated school is voluntary. Anyone
seeking to enrol a child, or applying for
a position, at a State integrated
school will do so in full knowledge of the school’s special character and
because they wish
to be associated with it. The provisions of the Bill do not
attempt to change or prevent the pursuit of an individual’s belief
system,
or impose any other belief system. Further, they do not prevent activities
undertaken by individuals in pursuit of manifesting
their religion
2 Cls 84 and 85 of the Bill.
3 s 443 of the 1989 Act, re-enacted in cl 27 of Sch
7 of the Bill.
4 ss 464 – 467 of the 1989 Act, re-enacted in
cls 47 – 50 of Sch 7 of the Bill.
or belief. In fact, cl 29(2) of sch 7 provides that if religious instruction
and observances form part of education with a special
character, the school must
be responsive to the sensitivities of students and parents of different
religious or philosophical affiliations,
and may not require a student of a
different religious or philosophical affiliation to participate in religious
observances and religious
instruction if a parent of the student states that
they do not wish that student to participate.
- Consistent
with previous advice on the existing provisions regarding religious instruction
and observance in State integrated schools,5 we do not
consider that the Bill’s provisions on this subject limit religious
freedom.
State primary schools
- The
Bill also re-enacts, with some amendments, the provisions in the 1964 Act
relating to religious instruction and observances at
State primary schools.
Teaching in every State primary school must, while the school is open, be
entirely of a secular character.6 However, Boards may
choose to close their school to allow religious instruction or observances,
including during school hours, by
voluntary instructors for up to 60 minutes per
week to a maximum of 20 hours per year.7 The Minister
may also authorise additional religious instruction if satisfied that the
majority of parents at the school wish their
children to receive additional
religious instruction and this will not be to the detriment of the normal
curriculum.8
- Student
attendance at religious instruction or observances is not compulsory under the
existing law or the Bill, but the Bill changes
attendance at religious
instruction9 from an ‘opt-out’ to an
‘opt-in’ model, whereby a student may only attend if a parent
confirms in writing
to the principal that they want their child to
attend.10 Attendance at religious observances remains
‘opt-out’.11
- The
current ‘opt-out’ model for religious instruction has been
controversial and has prompted legal proceedings in recent
years, although there
have not to date been any determinations on the merits.12
The opt out model carries the risk that children will take part in
religious instruction or observances without the full and informed
consent of
parents and caregivers, who may not be aware that religious instruction or
observances are taking place or what they involve,
or how to withdraw their
child. Parents and
5 See the Ministry of Justice’s
advice to the Attorney-General dated 12 August 2016 – ‘Consistency
with the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990: Education (Update) Amendment Bill,
publicly available at https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/education-update-amendment-bill.pdf.
6 s 77 of the 1964 Act, re-enacted in cl 81 of the
Bill.
7 s 78 of the 1964 Act, re-enacted in cl 54 of the
Bill.
8 s 78A of the 1964 Act, re-enacted in cl 55 of the
Bill.
9 The Ministry of Education Guidelines on Religious
Instruction in state primary schools, intermediate schools and nga kura, May
2019,
available at https://www.education.govt.nz/school/boards-information/religious-
instruction-guidelines/
, defines religious instruction as “the teaching or endorsing of a
particular faith. It is the non-neutral partisan teaching
of religion which
supports or encourages student belief in the religion being taught.”
10 Compare cl 56 of the Bill with s 79 of the 1964
Act.
11 s 79 of the 1964 Act, re-enacted as cl 57 of the
Bill.
12 One long-running set of proceedings
(McClintock v Attorney-General) lapsed, and another (Hines and Jacob v
Attorney-General) is still in process. For a general discussion of this
topic see Paul Rishworth “Religious Issues in State Schools” (paper
presented to NZLS Education Law Conference, May 2006.
caregivers may also feel pressure to allow their child to attend, and
students may feel embarrassment or peer pressure. We note the
current
Ministry of Education Guidelines on Religious Instruction in state primary
schools, intermediate schools and nga kura recommend requiring informed
consent from a parent or caregiver before allowing a student to participate in
religious instruction.13
- In
a pre-Bill of Rights Act case, the Court of Appeal held that school assemblies
which included some religious observance were lawful
as long as the parents
could ‘opt out’ their children.14 It is not
clear whether a court would come to the same conclusion now under the Bill of
Rights Act.
- The
courts in Canada and the United States have considered the consistency of
‘opt out’ models of religious instruction
and observances with the
right to freedom of religion on a number of occasions.
- In
Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education15, the
Ontario Court of Appeal considered a regulation that required a public school to
open or close each day with “religious
exercises consisting of the Bible
of other suitable readings and the Lord’s Prayer or other suitable
prayers”. The regulation
conferred a right on pupils not to participate.
The Court held that the regulation was incompatible with the right to freedom of
religion in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because it imposed
Christian observances on non-Christian pupils and religious
observances on
non-believers. Similarly, in Corp of the Canadian Civil Liberties Assn v
Ontario (Minister of Education),16 the Court struck
down a regulation imposing two periods of religious education per week, even
though parents had the right to opt
out, as contrary to freedom of
religion.
- In
Engel v Vitale,17 the United States Supreme
Court considered a state law requiring public schools to open each day with a
prayer. The law allowed students
to absent themselves if they found this
objectionable. The Court struck down the law on the basis of the
‘establishment clause’
in the First Amendment to the Constitution,
which has been interpreted as prohibiting laws that suggest state support,
endorsement
or non-neutrality in matters of religion. However, the justices were
of the view that the law did not appear to be coercive enough
to violate the
‘free exercise clause’, which provides that Congress shall make no
law prohibiting the free exercise of
religion. This echoed the dicta of Justice
Jackson in McCollum v Board of Education that the risk of embarrassment
in students seeking exemption from religious instruction did not amount to
coercion.18
- However,
in Abington School District v Schempp, Brennan J came to a different
conclusion on the ‘free exercise clause’. That case involved a state
law requiring public
schools to start each day with readings from the Bible.
Students could be excused upon written request by a parent. While the Court
struck down the law on the basis of the ‘establishment clause’,
Brennan J considered that the excusal procedure itself
violated the ‘free
exercise clause’ because “the State could not constitutionally
require a student
13 Above, n 9, at p 9.
14 Rich v Christchurch Girls’ High School
Board of Governors (No 1) [1974] 1 NZLR 1 (CA)
15 Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education
(1988) 65 OR (2d) 641 (Ont CA)
16 Corp of the Canadian Civil Liberties Assn v
Ontario (Minister of Education) (1990) 71 OR (2d) 341 (Ont CA)
17 Engel v Vitale [1962] USSC 116; 370 US 421 (1962)
18 McCollum v Board of Education [1948] USSC 27; 333 US 203
(1948) at 232.
to profess publicly his disbelief as the prerequisite to the exercise of his
constitutional right of abstention.”19
- In
our view, the ‘opt in’ model for religious instruction in the Bill
does not limit religious freedom. A student will
only receive religious
instruction if their parent specifically agrees to it.
- Attendance
at religious observances remains ‘opt-out’, which prima facie
limits religious freedom. Where a provision is found to limit a particular
right or freedom, it may nevertheless be consistent with
the Bill of Rights Act
if it can be considered a reasonable limit that is justifiable in terms of s 5
of that Act.
- The
s 5 inquiry may be approached as
follows:20
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?
- We
consider that the opt out model for religious observances is, in a New Zealand
context, a justified limitation on religious freedom
because:
- there are a
number of such observances that may or may not be considered religious depending
on a person’s point of view; e.g.
singing the national anthem, carols or
waiata, or celebrating events that traditionally have a religious or spiritual
basis, such
as Easter or Diwali;21
19 Abington School District v
Schempp [1963] USSC 162; 374 US 203 (1963) at 288.
20 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7 at [121].
21 In the United States Supreme Court case of Elk
Grove Unified School Dist v Newdow [2004] USSC 2325; 542 US 1 (2004), the mandatory practice
of reciting the pledge of allegiance at school (although students may abstain)
was challenged because
it contains the words “one nation under
God”. The dissenting Justices (the majority having dismissed the case
on the basis of standing) did not consider that this breached
the constitutional
right to religious freedom. Rehnquist CJ (at 14) said that:
The phrase “under God” is in no sense a prayer, nor an
endorsement of any religion, but a simple recognition of the fact
noted in H.R.
Rep. No. 1693, at 2: “From the time of our earliest history our peoples
and our institutions have reflected the
traditional concept that our Nation was
founded on a fundamental belief in God.” Reciting the Pledge, or listening
to others
recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one; participants
promise fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular
God, faith,
or church.
The authors of Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis,
Wellington, 2015), at 739, express the view that the reference to God in the New
Zealand national anthem infringes
the rights of those who do not share a
Christian belief, but that it may be that such infringement is justified because
of New Zealand’s
history and that the anthem was written at a time when
reference to God was commonplace.
- such observances
may often be brief in nature and form a very small part of some other school
event, such as an assembly or prizegiving;
and
- there are
benefits of inclusiveness and understanding of different cultures and belief
systems that such traditions foster.
- We
also note that, unlike the Canadian and US cases cited above, the Bill does not
require religious observance (with an opt-out option);
it allows it if a
school’s Board decides to do it. In addition, we note that in applying the
opt-out model, schools must act
consistently with the Bill of Rights Act, which
means that:
- parents should
be made aware of religious observances at their child’s school;
- religious
observances should be conducted in a way that does not cross the line into
religious instruction (in which case it should
be opt-in);
- parents should
be made aware that they can opt out their child and the process for doing so;
and
- children who opt
out of religious observances should be provided with an equivalent secular
activity.
- Paul
Rishworth has expressed the view that providing a meaningful chance for parents
to opt their children out is virtually the same
as asking whether they would
like to opt their children in.22
- Returning
to the s 5 test, we consider that providing for attendance at religious
observances serves an important purpose of fostering
inclusiveness and
understanding of different cultures and belief systems, and that a meaningful
chance for parents to opt out is
a rationally connected and proportionate limit
on the right to religious freedom.
- We
also note that teachers may also request to attend religious instruction and
observances and their position and opportunities for
appointments or promotions
must not be adversely affected because they do not take part in such instruction
and observances.23 We do not consider that this limits
religious freedom.
- In
summary, we consider that, to the extent that the provisions providing for
religious observances on an opt out basis limit religious
freedom, those limits
are justified.
Section 14 – Freedom of Expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to freedom of expression,
including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and opinions of
any kind in any form. The right to freedom of expression has also been
interpreted as including the right
not to be compelled to say certain things or
to provide certain information.24
- The
Bill contains various provisions of a regulatory nature that prima facie
limit the right to freedom of expression, such as requirements to: make and
keep records; prepare and publish plans, policies and
reports; and provide
information requested by the Minister or an oversight body in certain
situations. They mostly apply to schools,
institutions and
22 Paul Rishworth The Religion Clauses
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights [2007] New Zealand Law Review 631, at
652.
23 s 80 of the 1964 Act re-enacted in cl 58 of the
Bill.
24 RJR MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada
(1995) 127 DLR (4th) 1.
other entities that deliver education, rather than students or their
families. These provisions are necessary for the efficient and
effective
operation of the education sector and are clearly justified.
- The
Bill also contains provisions restricting the use of specified terms. Clause
528(1)(b) re-enacts the offence in s 374(1)(b) of
the 1989 Act for a person who
is not a registered teacher to use the term “registered teacher”, or
any other words or
initials likely to make any person believe the person is
registered teacher, in connection with the person’s name or business.
We
consider that restricting the use of the term “registered teacher”
is a clearly justified limitation on the right
to freedom of
expression.25
- Similarly,
we consider that the limits on the use of the term Kura Kaupapa Māori (cl
147), and the terms university, polytechnic,
institute of technology, degree,
bachelor, master, doctor, and post graduate, and awards which include the words
national or New
Zealand (cl 302) are justified in the relevant contexts.
- Accordingly,
we consider that any limits on freedom of expression in the Bill are justified
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Sections 17 and 18 – Freedom of association and movement
- Section
17 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
association. The ambit of s 17 is “broad
and encompasses a wide range of
associational activities”.26
- Section
18(1) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone lawfully in New Zealand
has the right to freedom of movement and residence
in New Zealand. Liberty of
movement and residence is considered a fundamental right in a free and
democratic state and includes the
right of an individual not to move. The right
is closely aligned with the right to freedom of association.
- The
Bill re-enacts a number of provisions in the 1989 Act (corresponding section
numbers in the 1989 Act are in brackets) that prima facie limit the right
to freedom of association and movement:
- Clause 26 (s
319A) provides that a parent of a child has a right of entry to a licensed early
childhood education and care centre
or a licensed home-based education and care
service when the child is there, unless the parent:
- - is subject to
a relevant court order prohibiting access or contact, or is trespassed;
- - is suffering
from a contagious or infectious disease likely to have a detrimental effect on
the children;
- - is, in the
opinion of a person responsible for the centre, under the influence of alcohol
or any other substance, or exhibiting
disruptive behaviour;
25 Compare the
Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
on the Education (Protecting Teacher Title) Amendment
Bill, 29 January 2018,
available at https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/bora-education-protection-teacher-title-
amendment-bill-s7.pdf, where the Attorney-General concluded that
restricting the use of the term “teacher” in the same way limited
the right
to freedom of expression more than reasonably necessary.
26 Turners & Growers Ltd v Zespri Group Ltd
(No 2) (2010) 9 HRNZ 365 (HC) at [72].
- Clause 35 (s 25)
requires a student to attend a registered school whenever it is open if the
student is enrolled, or required to be
enrolled, at a registered school;
- Clause 44 (s 28)
provides that the Secretary may require a parent to enrol a student at a
distance school in specified circumstances;
- Clause 72 (s 19)
provides that a principal of a State school may preclude a student from the
school if they have reasonable grounds
to believe that the student may have a
communicable disease;
- Clause
21.327 (s 14) provides that a principal of a State
school may stand down or suspend a student for up to 5 school days (to a maximum
of 10
school days in a year) if the student’s gross misconduct or
continual disobedience is a harmful or dangerous example to other
students at
the school; or it is likely that the student, or other students at the school,
would be seriously harmed by the student’s
behaviour if the student is not
stood down or suspended. There are duties on a principal if a student is stood
down or suspended
(cl 21.728 (s 17A));
- Clause
21.429 (s 15) provides that the Board of a State school
may extend the suspension of a student under the age of 16 subject to reasonable
conditions for a reasonable period or, if the circumstances justify the most
serious response, exclude the student and require them
to be enrolled at another
school.30 If a student is excluded, the principal must
try to arrange for them to attend another school that is suitable and which the
student
can reasonably conveniently attend. If the principal does not arrange
for the student to attend another school, the Secretary must
return the student
to the school from which they were excluded, direct the student be enrolled at
another school, or direct a parent
of the student to enrol the student at a
distance school (cl 21.531 (s 16));
- Clause
21.632 (s 17) provides that the Board of a State school
may extend the suspension of a student aged 16 or over subject to reasonable
conditions
for a reasonable period or expel the student. The Secretary may
direct the Board of another State school to enrol a student who has
been
expelled (cl 21.10(3)33 (s17D(3))).
- We
consider the limitations the Bill imposes on students’ and parents’
freedom of association and movement are demonstrably
justified under s 5 of the
Bill of Rights Act. In reaching this view, we note that the purpose of the
provisions is to minimise disruption
to the delivery of education to students,
and protect the health, safety and wellbeing of students. The provisions are
rationally
connected to these objectives and minimally impairing of the rights
to freedom of association and movement.
27 This provision, on p 78 of the Bill,
has not been sequentially numbered in the current version of the Bill.
28 This provision is on p 81 of the Bill.
29 This provision is on p 79 of the Bill.
30 A student, their parent, or a representative is
entitled to be heard before the Board makes a decision to lift or extend a
suspension,
or exclude or expel the student; cl 21.8 (p 82) (s 17B).
31 This provision is on p 80 of the Bill.
32 This provision is on p 81 of the Bill.
33 This provision is on p 83 of the Bill.
Section 19 - freedom from discrimination
- Section
19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom
from discrimination on the prohibited grounds
in the Human Rights Act 1993,
including age, sex, religious belief, and national origin.
- A
legislative provision will limit the right to freedom from discrimination
if:
- the legislation
draws a distinction based on one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination;
and
- the distinction
involves material disadvantage to one or more classes of
individuals.
- In
determining if a distinction arises, consideration is given to whether the
legislation proposes that two comparable groups of people
be treated differently
on one or more of the prohibited grounds of discrimination.
Age
- Discrimination
on the basis of age commences at the age of 16 years.34
While age limits of any kind are likely to involve a degree of
arbitrariness, Parliament has chosen 16 as the starting point for discrimination
on this basis.
- Age
based distinctions necessarily involve a degree of generalisation without regard
for the particular abilities, maturity or other
qualities of individuals within
the age group. Any age limit is necessarily arbitrary. However, where it is not
practical to engage
in individualised assessments, it is legitimate to use a
‘bright line’, imposing age restrictions which are rationally
connected and proportionate to an important
objective.35
- The
education system is made up of three sub-systems: early childhood education;
primary and secondary schooling; and tertiary education
and vocational training.
The age limits discussed below must be viewed in that context. The Bill
re-enacts the existing age limits
in the 1989 Act.
Free education at
State school until age 19
- Under
the current law and the Bill, education at primary and secondary school is
compulsory for children and young people between
the ages of 6 and 16, and free
but optional from ages 17 to 19 (in some situations special education is
available up to the age of
21).36 This prima facie
discriminates against those aged 20 or older (or 22 or older in the case of
special education).
- The
cut-off point of 19 is intended to differentiate primary and secondary schooling
(which is intended for children and young people)
from tertiary education and
vocational training (which is intended for adults). We consider this is a
sufficiently important objective
to justify some limitation on the right to
freedom from discrimination.
- We
also consider that an upper limit of 19 is rationally connected and
proportionate to the objective of differentiating between youth
and adult
education. An upper age limit of 19 allows sufficient time for a student to
complete year 13, even if the student has to
34 Section 19(1) Bill of Rights Act and s
21(1)(i) Human Rights Act 1993.
35 R v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
ex parte Reynolds [2005] UKHL 37 at [41] and [91].
36 Sections 3, 9 and 20 of the 1989 Act, re-enacted
in cls 32, 34 and 36 of the Bill.
repeat a year.37 It is also logical given that open
entry to tertiary or vocational learning begins at the age of 20.
Open entry to tertiary or vocational learning at age 20
- Clause
187 of the Bill re-enacts the eligibility criteria for students seeking to
attend a tertiary institution in s 224 of the 1989
Act. A person is eligible to
be enrolled if they:
- are a domestic
student (or the institution’s council consents); and
- meet the minimum
entry requirements for the programme or training scheme (as determined by the
institution’s council); and
- have attained
the minimum age for enrolment at the institution, programme or training scheme
(if any).
- However,
a person can be admitted to a programme or training scheme who has not satisfied
the minimum entry requirements if they have
turned 20 years of age, or the
institution’s council is satisfied the person is capable of undertaking
the programme or scheme
concerned.
- Clause
187 prima facie discriminates on the basis of age in that people aged 20
or over do not have to meet the minimum entry requirements for the programme
or
training scheme, whereas people aged 16 to 19 (depending on the minimum age for
enrolment) do. However, we consider that any discrimination
is justified under
section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
objective of ‘open’ entry once a person has reached a certain age is
to provide an opportunity for those persons who
may not otherwise meet the
minimum entry requirements for a programme or training scheme to enrol when they
are more mature. This
is a sufficiently important objective to justify some
limitation on the right to freedom from discrimination and we consider that
the
age threshold of 20 is rationally connected and proportionate to that objective,
particularly given:
- free secondary
education continues until age 19; and
- persons who have
not satisfied the minimum entry requirements or attained the age of 20 may still
satisfy the institution’s
council that they are capable of undertaking the
programme or scheme concerned.
Religious belief
- Clause
26 of Schedule 7 provides that children of parents who have a particular or
general philosophical or religious connection with
a State integrated school
must be preferred to other children for enrolment at the school. In regard to
religious connection (philosophy
is not a prohibited ground of discrimination),
this prima facie constitutes discrimination as children of parents with a
particular religious connection are preferred to other children for
enrolment.
37 The exception for special schools
recognises that some students with disabilities and special learning needs need
more time in the
schooling system to be adequately equipped with the knowledge
and skills required to participate fully in society and to go on to
further
learning, training or employment.
- We
have previously considered this issue in greater detail38
and have come to the same conclusion that any discrimination is
justified. Ensuring a State integrated school’s student population
generally has the same philosophical or religious beliefs is a fundamental means
of preserving that school’s special character.
In addition, we do not
consider that this removes the element of choice inherent to school selection
– i.e. to enrol at another
school – such that it constitutes a
material disadvantage.
Sex
- Clause
135 of the Bill re-enacts s 146A of the 1989 Act, which provides that the
Minister may declare any school to be single-sex
(and specify the number or
proportion of the roll, if any, that may be the opposite sex). There are valid
educational reasons for
operating single sex schools. In addition, we do not
consider that this removes the element of choice inherent to school selection
– i.e. to enrol at another school – such that it constitutes a
material disadvantage. Consequently, we consider any discrimination
on the basis
of sex is justified.
- For
the same reasons, we consider any discrimination on the basis of sex arising
from the ability of the Minister to declare any
school to be single-sex (cl 135
of the Bill, re- enacting s 146A of the 1989 Act) is
justified.
Disability
- There
are number of clauses in the Bill that re-enact provisions that provide that a
person is not eligible for appointment to an
office if they are subject to a
property order, or personal order that reflects adversely on their competence to
manage their own
affairs in relation to their property, or capacity to make or
communicate decisions relating to any particular aspect(s) of their
personal
care and welfare, under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act
1998.
- We
have previously considered such limits on s 19(1) justified because they are
rationally connected to the important objective of
ensuring that only those
people capable of discharging relevant functions of office are
appointed.39 We consider that the provisions in the
current Bill are justified for this reason.
Nationality
- A
number of clauses in the Bill re-enact provisions in the 1989 Act that
prioritise domestic students40 over foreign students.
For example, cl 32 provides that every domestic student attending primary and
secondary school (aged 5 to 19)
is entitled to free enrolment and free education
at any State school. This distinction recognises that
38 See the Ministry of Justice’s
advice to the Attorney-General dated 12 August 2016 – ‘Consistency
with the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990: Education (Update) Amendment Bill,
publicly available at https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/education-update-amendment-bill.pdf.
39 See the Ministry of Justice’s advice to the
Attorney-General dated 19 August 2019 – ‘Consistency with the New
Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990: Vocational Education Reform Bill’,
publicly available at https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/Vocational-Education-Reform-Bill.pdf.
40 The definition of domestic student is wide.
Domestic student is defined as an individual who is a New Zealand citizen, the
holder
of a residence class visa under the Immigration Act 2009, or a person of
a class or description of persons required by the Minister,
by notice in the
Gazette, to be treated as if they are not international students.
primary and secondary education is funded through taxation and, without
placing restrictions on who can access state-funded education
the system, would
be under considerable financial strain.
- Another
example is clause 11 of Schedule 9, which re-enacts the preference for domestic
students over international students for access
to secondary-tertiary programmes
in s 31L of the 1989 Act. We have previously considered this provision to be a
justified limitation
on the right to freedom from discrimination because
secondary-tertiary programmes are not appropriate for international students
with no long-term right to stay in the country and there are a range of other
study options available.41
- We
consider that the various clauses in the Bill that prioritise domestic students
over foreign students are justified limitations
on the right to freedom from
discrimination on the basis of nationality.
Section 21 – Freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property,
correspondence or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including
personal privacy, dignity,
and
property.42
Inspection powers of
Education Review Officers
- Clause
365 of the Bill re-enacts s 327 of the 1989 Act, which provides that a review
officer may enter any place occupied by an applicable
organisation or applicable
person for the purposes of: conducting inspections or inquiries; reviewing and
making copies documents
or information; taking statements; inspecting work; and
meeting and talking with relevant people. Clauses 369 and 373 re-enact similar
powers in respect of enrolment exemptions and student hostels respectively, and
cl 501 creates a new power to inspect homes used
by home-based early childhood
education services.
- We
consider that cls 365, 369, 373 and 501 do not authorise unreasonable search or
seizure for the following reasons:
- The powers to
search are in respect of an important objective:
- - clause 365
provides for review of the performance of applicable organisations;
- - clause 369
ensures that students with enrolment exemption are being taught as regularly and
well as they would at school;
- - clause 373
ensures a safe physical and emotional environment for students which supports
learning; and
- - clause 501
provides for review and evaluation of curriculum delivery and health and safety
in homes used by home-based early childhood
education services;
- There are
restrictions on entering living spaces:
41 See the Ministry of
Justice’s advice to the Attorney-General dated 28 May 2010 –
‘Consistency with the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990: Education
Amendment Bill (No 2)’, publicly available at https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/bora-education-amendment-bill-two.pdf.
42 See, for example, Hamed v R [2011] NZSC
101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
- clauses 365 and 369 do not provide authority to enter dwelling houses without
consent;
- clause 373 does not allow for the review officer to enter a room or sleeping
area of a student unless it is deemed necessary and
the student is present
during the inspection; and
- clause 501 only allows a review officer to inspect areas of the home that are
used to provide the home-based early childhood education
service;
- The clauses
provide for the type of documents/information that may be copied, and statements
that may be gathered;
- Reasonable
notice must be given, and the inspections/inquiries carried out at a reasonable
time; and
- Review officers
must produce their certificate of designation before exercising their
powers.
Inspection powers generally
- Subpart
6 of Part 6 the Bill re-enacts ss 35S, 78A, 144D, 255A, 319B, and 319C of the
1989 Act, which confer powers on authorised
persons to enter and inspect early
childhood education services, schools, school hostels, and private training
establishments.
- We
consider that the warrantless powers in cls 502, 504, 508, and 510 do not
authorise unreasonable search or seizure for the following
reasons:
- the purpose of
the powers is explicitly set out in each circumstance and serve an important
objective:
- the manner in
which those powers can be exercised is limited; and
- there are
protections for parties subject to inspection.
- Clauses
503 and 505 give powers to authorised persons to obtain a warrant and enter a
premise for the purposes of determining if the
premises are being used in
contravention of the Bill. The powers that may be exercised under a warrant are
wider than the warrantless
powers. However, we consider that these clauses do
not engage s 21 for the following reasons:
- the purpose of
the powers is explicitly set out;
- the person
obtaining a warrant must have reasonable cause to believe the premises are being
used in contravention of the Bill;
- a Judge or other
authorised person must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe
the premises are being used in contravention
of the Bill; and
- the powers
conferred by the warrant are only valid for four weeks from the date of
issue.
Inspection powers of teachers
- Subpart
4 of Part 3 of the Bill re-enacts, with minor changes, the existing provisions
regarding searches and surrender of property
in the 1989 Act (ss 139AAA –
139AAI). This includes provisions allowing teachers and authorised staff members
to require students
to produce and surrender items in their possession or
control that the teacher
or authorised staff member has reasonable
grounds to believe are likely to endanger the safety of other persons or
detrimentally affect
the learning environment.
- We
considered these powers when they were introduced in 2012 and found them to be
reasonable in terms of s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act due to the low level of
intrusion into students’ privacy, the limited powers, and the safeguards
in place.43 Our current assessment is consistent with
our earlier view.
- We
consider that the Bill is consistent with the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure as affirmed in s21 of
the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 22 – Liberty of the person
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right not to be
arbitrarily arrested or detained. Detention is
arbitrary when it is
“capricious, unreasonable, without reasonable cause: if it is made without
reference to an adequate determining
principle or without following proper
procedures.”44
- Clause
47 of the Bill re-enacts s 31(4) – (9) of the 1989 Act, which provides
that an attendance officer or constable may detain
and question any person who
appears to be between the age of 5 and 16 and absent from school. If the
attendance officer or constable
is not satisfied that the person has a good
reason for not being at school, the attendance officer or constable may take the
person
to the person’s home, or to the school at which the attendance
officer or constable thinks the person is enrolled.
- In
our view, the power to detain in cl 47 is not arbitrary and so does not engage s
22 of the Bill of Rights Act. The objective is
to ensure children and young
people stay in school and continue to be engaged in education, and the power is
rationally connected
and proportionate to the importance of that
objective.
Section 25(c) – Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The right to be presumed
innocent requires
the prosecution to prove an accused person’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
- The
Bill provides for various strict liability offences.45
Strict liability offences prima facie limit s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights
Act because the accused is required to prove a defence,
or disprove a
presumption, in order to avoid liability.
- We
consider that any limits on the presumption of innocence by the strict liability
offences in the Bill are justified because:
- The
offences are in the nature of public welfare regulatory offences;
43 See the Ministry of
Justice’s advice to the Attorney-General dated 28 September 2012 –
‘Consistency with the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Education
Amendment Bill’, publicly available at https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/bora-Education-Amendment-Bill.pdf-.pdf
44 Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001]3 NZLR
433; (2001) 5 HRNZ 334 (CA) at [34].
45 Typical examples include cls 171 (offence
relating to failure to comply with notice given under section 28), 173 (offence
relating
to irregular attendance), and 181 (offences relating to operation of
private schools).
- The
alleged offender is in the best position to justify their apparent failure to
comply with the law, rather than requiring the Crown
to prove the opposite;
and
- The
penalties for the offences are at the lower end of the scale (the highest
maximum penalty is a fine of $50,000 and the majority
have a maximum penalty
of
$10,000 or less) and proportionate to the importance of the
relevant objective.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Edrick Child
Deputy Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
NZLII:
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