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Electoral (Registration of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 5, 12, 19(1)) [2020] NZBORARp 4 (14 February 2020)
Last Updated: 10 March 2020
Mind litre o te Kurnool'
CTown
LAW
14 February 2020
Attorney-General
Electoral (Registration of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill (22565/5.0)
Consistency with New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Our
Ref: ATT395/308
- We
write to advise you of Crown Law's view on whether the Electoral (Registration
of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill (`the Bill')
is consistent with the
rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
- The
Bill removes the blanket disqualification from electoral registration that,
since 2010, has applied to all sentenced prisoners.
It restores electoral law to
its pre-2010 position, under which only prisoners serving a sentence of
imprisonment of three years
or more were disqualified from registration.
- The
Bill engages the right to vote affirmed by s 12 of the Bill of Rights Act, and
the right to be free from discrimination (including
on the ground of race)
affirmed by s 19(1). In our opinion the Bill does not appear to be inconsistent
with either right.
Summary
- By
providing that prisoners serving a sentence of imprisonment of three years or
more are disqualified from registering as electors,
the Bill would limit the
right to vote. However, the limitation serves the aims of deterring and
denouncing serious criminality,
and enhancing civic responsibility and respect
for the rule of law. Moreover, the fact that the Bill:
4.1 restricts
the limitation to prisoners convicted of serious criminal conduct;
4.2 restricts the limitation to the duration of their imprisonment only;
and
4.3 contains measures to assist prisoners to re-register upon release
means the limitation goes no further than necessary to fulfil those aims.
The restriction may therefore be considered justified under s 5, in that it
represents a reasonable limit on the right to vote, prescribed
by law, which can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
6. In Ngaronoa v Attorney-General the Court of Appeal held that
blanket disqualification
did not give rise to unjustified discrimination against Maori, since the Bill
applies
Level 3 Justice Centre 19 Aitken Street PO Box 2858 DX SP20208 Wellington
6140 New Zealand Ph: +64 4 472 1719 Fax: +64 4 473 3482
5590400_I www.crownlaw.govt.nz
equally to and with equal effect on Maori and non-Maori prisoners. Applying
the Court of Appeal's approach, but also taking into account
the evidence and
findings of the Waitangi Tribunal in He Aba i Pera Ai? The Maori Prisoners'
Voting Report, we conclude:
6.1 the Bill does not discriminate against Maori, since the numbers of
potential
voters likely to have their right to vote temporarily removed is so small
that it would not give rise to material disadvantage.
6.2 in the event we are wrong, and the measure does limit the right to be
free
from discrimination, that limitation may be justified under s 5. Therefore,
the Bill is not inconsistent with s 19(1).
Background
- The
recent history of restrictions on prisoners' voting rights may be briefly
summarised.
7.1 Prior to 1993, all sentenced prisoners were
disqualified from electoral
registration.
7.2 Between 1993 and 2010, only prisoners sentenced to three years' or
more
imprisonment were disqualified.
7.3 Since 2010, all sentenced prisoners have been disqualified (i.e. a return
to
the pre-1993 position). At the time this disqualification was proposed, the
then Attorney-General reported to Parliament "the blanket
disenfranchisement of
prisoners appears to be inconsistent with s 12 of the Bill of Rights Act and
that it cannot be justified under
s 5 of the Act".
7.4 In 2015 the High Court declared blanket disqualification inconsistent
with
s 12 of the Bill of Rights Act.'
7.5 In 2017 the Court of Appeal held blanket disqualification was not
inconsistent with s 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act.'
7.6 In 2019 the Waitangi Tribunal concluded that in introducing the
blanket
disqualification in 2010, the Crown acted inconsistently with principles of
the Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi. It recommended
the removal of all
restrictions on prisoners' right to vote.
- The
Bill proposes to revert to the 1993-2010 position, in that only prisoners
sentenced to imprisonment for three years or more would
be disqualified. The
Bill would also:
Taylor p Attorney-General of New Zealand
[2015] NZHC 1706, [2015] 3 NZLR 791. The case was appealed to the Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court (on the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to
make declarations
of inconsistency), which upheld the declaration.
2 Ngaronga v Attorne),
General [2017] NZCA 351, [2017] 3 NZLR 643. Leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court on this point was refused: [2017] NZSC 183.
8.1 require prison managers to advise prisoners serving a sentence of less
than
three years' imprisonment, and prisoners to be released after a longer
sentence, about registering as electors;
8.2 require prison managers to ask prisoners whether they want their
details
sent to the Electoral Commission; and
8.3 require the Electoral Commission to treat receipt of a prisoner's
details as
the receipt of an application to register as an elector.
Section 12 — The Right To Vote
- Section
12(a) of the Bill of Rights Act provides that every New Zealand citizen
over
the age of 18 years has the right to vote in genuine periodic elections
of members of the House of Representatives.
- The
Bill would limit that right. The limitation would be less restrictive that
the
current (blanket) limitation, but would be a limitation nonetheless. It
is therefore necessary to consider whether it may be justified
under s 5.
- The
right to vote is foundational to our democracy. Weighty reasons must be
given
if its restriction is to be justified. The justifications for
restricting a prisoner's right to vote are twofold: enhancing civic
responsibility and respect for the rule of law; and enhancing the criminal
sanction.
- These
principles may be expressed in different ways in different
jurisdictions,
nevertheless they are clear and they march together. The
restriction may be seen as forming part of an overall sentencing package
intended to denounce and deter serious criminal conduct. It also marks the moral
approbation society conveys to those who cause serious
harm to society, and
serves to convey the importance society accords to civic responsibility and the
rule of law.
- These
justifications may be considered sufficiently important reasons for limiting
the
right to vote. They express a coherent view of moral responsibility,
sentencing and democratic rights deeply held by many in society.
The 'social
contractarian' approach to democratic rights upon which they draw may be in
tension with the universalist promise of
human rights, but to some extent this
tension is built into s 12 itself, which restricts the right to vote to citizens
(who have
chosen to further restrict it to those citizens who are resident in or
maintain a connection with the country), in contrast to other
rights which are
held by 'everyone'. The aims are not incompatible with the aims of
rehabilitation or the dignity of the person,
and the return of voting rights
upon release marks the former prisoner's full return to the democratic
community.
- This
view is consistent with a number of domestic and international
authorities,
including the approach taken by former Solicitor-General Sir
John McGrath QC,' the High Court of Australia,4 the
European Court of Human Rights,' the
European
3 Opinion on consistency between
NZ Bill of Rights Act and restrictions on prisoners' voting rights by the Former
Solicitor General
JJ McGrath QC dated 17 November 1992
- 1
Roach v Electoral Commission (2007) 233 CLR 162 in which the High Court held
that amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act that disqualified all
prisoners from voting were invalid,
in that they were incompatible with the
right of
Court of Justice,6 the United
Nations Human Rights Committee' and a minority of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Sauve 8
- We
have considered the criticisms of this view expressed by the majority of
the
Supreme Court of Canada in Sand v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),
but are not persuaded that its approach need be followed. Context is
important. The Sauve majority relied on the fact the right to vote was
subject to protection from unjustifiable parliamentary limitation.' Any
limitation
on the right therefore required a special standard of justification,
beyond that required for some other Charter rights and freedoms.10
No such
special protection is afforded to the right to vote in the structure of our Bill
of Rights Act.
- The
Sand majority also took account of the fact that sentences of two years
were
sometimes imposed for offences of no particular gravity." It may be
significant that the threshold of two years was lower than the
thresholds in
other jurisdictions where restrictions on prisoner voting have been upheld, and
lower than the threshold in this
Bill.
- In
our opinion, the measure may be considered rationally connected to its aims.
It
pursues them with minimal interference to the right in question and
therefore represents a proportionate limitation of the right to
vote. We reach
that view in the light of the following.
17.1 By imposing the
limitation only on those who have received a sentence of
imprisonment for three years or more, the Bill restricts the limitation to
those prisoners convicted of serious criminal conduct.
17.2 There is also some force in the point made by the 1986 Royal
Commission
on the Electoral System that three years is the time which a citizen can
spend overseas without returning to New Zealand, before temporarily
losing the
right to vote."
17.3 The threshold of three years' imprisonment is consistent with what
the
High Court of Australia considers a reasonably appropriate and adapted
limitation on its constitutional right to vote," and the European
Court of Human
Rights considers is a proportionate on its Convention right."
universal suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the previous
legislation that disqualified only those prisoners serving
sentences of three
years or more was lawful.
5 Hint u UK (No 2) (2006)42 EHRR 41 in
which the Court indicated that a blanket ban was not consistent with the right
to vote guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol 1 of
the Convention. Scoppola a
Italy (No. 3) (Application no. 126/05) (2012) which indicated that applied
to those prisoners who had received a sentence of three years or more was a
proportionate and justified
limitation on that right.
6 Thierry Delvigne n Commune de Lesparre Midoc
and POI de la Gironde (Case C 650/13) (2015)
7 [141 of UNI-ICR, General Comment 25
8 Sand u Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) [2002)
3 SCR 519, 2002 SCC 68 al [36]-[37]
9 The right could not be overridden by application
of the "notwithstanding" clause: Charter, s 33. I0 Sauve v Canada (Chief
Electoral Officer) [2002) 3 SCR 519, 2002 SCC 68 al [36)—[37]. 11 At
[54]
12 Page 237 Report of the Royal Commission on the
Electoral Systemi, 1986
13 fn 4, above 11 fn 5,
above
17.4 The limitation is for the duration of imprisonment only.
17.5 The Bill contains measures to assist prisoners to return to the
electoral roll
upon release,
17.6 A limitation is not arbitrary simply because it is automatically imposed
by
operation of law upon the passing a sentence, rather than through an explicit
decision of the sentencing court. The length of the
ban will be determined by
the length of the sentence of imprisonment the court imposes, which will in turn
be tailored to the facts
of the case (including the severity of the criminal
conduct) and the personal circumstances of the offender.
- For
the above reasons, in our opinion the Bill proposes to limit the s 12 rights of
some prisoners in a manner capable of justification
under s
5.
Section 19(1) — The Right To Be Free From
Discrimination
- In
Ngaronoa the Court of Appeal considered whether the current law (blanket
disqualification) gives rise to unjustifiable discrimination within
the meaning
of s 19(1) on the ground of race. The Court's findings may be summarised as
follows.
19.1 The appropriate comparison was between Maori and
non-Maori prisoners.
Both are treated in the same way."
19.2 Although Maori may suffer the loss of opportunity to register on the
Maori
electoral roll, the potential loss of voters from the Maori roll as a result
of the 2010 law was not sufficient to trigger the creation
of an additional
Maori electoral district.'
19.3 The right to choose to register in a Maori or general electoral district
is a
form of positive discrimination. Removal of this choice is not
discriminatory."
19.4 Because of the disproportionately high numbers of prisoners who
identified
as Maori, Maori were disproportionately affected by the law." However,
because the number of prisoners affected was so small (less
than one percent of
Maori as a whole), no material disadvantage arose."
- Following
Ngaronoa, the Waitangi Tribunal conducted an urgent inquiry into the
consistency of prisoner disqualification with the principles of the Treaty/te
Tiriti, and any prejudicial effect that may arise. The Tribunal was not directly
concerned with s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act, but
with the different but
related Treaty/te Tiriti principles of equity and active
protection.
15 Ngaroiioa v
Attorney-General [2017] NZCA 351, NZLR at [138).
16 At [140]-[143].
17 At [143]-[144].
18 At [147].
19 At [147].
- The
Tribunal's findings were made with the benefit of evidence not before the
Court
in Ngaronoa. The evidence before the
Tribunal showed:
21.1 In 2018 Maori were 11.4 times more likely to
be removed from the electoral
roll because of a prison sentence than non-Maori, compared to in 2010 (before
blanket disqualification) where Maori were 2.1 times
more likely to be removed
from the electoral roll because of a prison
sentence.2°
21.2 That because those who were removed from the electoral toll tended not
to
re-register, the impact of the 2010 legislation on the roll was increasing
over time.
21.3 That by December 2020, under the current law, approximately 32,000
people would have been removed from the electoral roll since December 2010,
with a number of people removed multiple times. Almost
60 percent of those
removed would have been Maori.
21.4 That if the law had not been changed in December 2010 then by
December
2020 only 5,000 people would have been removed from the roll; 27,000 fewer
than under the current law. Furthermore, under the pre-2010
law, 48 percent of
those removed would be Maori, approximately 12 percent less than the current law
2t
- The
Tribunal found:22
Maori are
disproportionately and prejudicially affected by section 80(1)(d) of the Act [as
amended by the 2010 legislation] and therefore
the Act is in serious Treaty
breach because:
Maori are significantly more incarcerated than non-Maori, especially for less
serious crimes;
young Maori are more likely to be imprisoned than non-Maori impeding the
development of positive voting habits;
the practical effect of disenfranchisement goes wider than the effect on
individual prisoners, impacting on their whanau and communities;
and the legislation operates as a de facto permanent disqualification due
to low rates of re-enrolment amongst released prisoners.
- Like
the Court in Ngaronoa, the Tribunal did not find sufficient evidence to
conclude
the loss of potential Maori electors as a result of prisoner
disqualification may have supressed the number of Maori electoral
districts?23
20 At 18-19.
21 Affidavit of Robert Donald Lynn, Ministry of
Justice in the matter of the Treaty of Waitangi Act and the Maori Prisoners
Voting Rights
Inquiry (22 March 2019).
22 He Aha i Pi, Ai? The Maori Prisoners' Voting
Report 2019 at 72.
23 He Aha i Para Ai? The Maori Prisoners' Voting
Report 2019 at 27.
Analysis
- Discrimination
involves treating like cases differently on a prohibited ground,
in
circumstances where this differential treatment gives rise to a 'material
disadvantage'.24 Section 21 of the Human Rights Act
1993 sets out the prohibited grounds for the purposes of s 19(1) of the Bill of
Rights Act, one
of which is 'race'.
- If
enacted the Bill would not discriminate directly on the basis of race, e.g.
by
introducing a race-based qualification for electoral registration.'
- The
Ngaronoa Court of Appeal's finding that the current law does not give
rise to
indirect discrimination was arrived at on the basis that the law
applied equally to prisoners of all races and affected prisoners
in the same
way. The fact that Maori prisoners lost the right to enrol and vote in a Maori
electoral district did not mean that they
suffered any greater material
disadvantage than non-Maori prisoners.26 Applying that
approach to this Bill leads to the same answer.
- The
Court went on to consider whether the current blanket restriction on
prisoner
voting might be discriminatory, were the basis of comparison not
Maori and non-Maori prisoners, but the wider Maori and non-Maori
voting
populations.
- Following
established case law," the Court described this approach as involving
the
selection of a 'different comparator group'." However, it is unclear who,
under such a comparison, the potential victim of discrimination
might be. Even
if it could be shown that disenfranchisement impacts disproportionately on the
Maori electorate, that does not make
it any more likely that any particular
member of the Maori community would be prevented from voting unless they were
themselves to
be convicted of serious criminality.
- The
comparison might be justified on the basis that Maori, as a group, would
suffer
discrimination because their voting base would be disproportionately
diminished by disqualification. This consideration of the effect
on Maori as a
group appears to be what the Court had in mind in drawing this wider comparison"
and we proceed on that basis.3°
- Because
a higher portion of the Maori population than the non-Maori population
are
serving prison sentences of imprisonment of three years or more, the Bill
would necessarily have a proportionally greater impact on
the wider Maori
potential voting pool.
24 Ministry of Health v Atkinson
[2012] NZCA 184.
25 Following similar reasoning as in Ngaronoa
Attorney General [2017] NZCA 351, NZLR at [1331,
25 Ngaronoa v Attorney Genera/ [2017]
NZCA 351, NZLR at [143]—[146].
27 In particular, McAlister v Air New Zealand [2009] NZSC 78.
28 Ngaronoa v Attorney General [2017] NZCA
351, NZLR at [147].
29 !bid at [149].
30 The right to be free from discrimination under s 19 is guaranteed to
'everybody', which leaves open the question of whether social
groups, as well as
individuals, enjoy its protection. However, in defining indirect discriminations
65 of the Human Rights Act expressly
includes within its ambit, affected 'groups
of persons'. Therefore, for the purposes of this advice, we proceed on the basis
s 19
is to be read in the light of section 65 and that Maori as a group enjoy
the protection of s 19.
Material disadvantage
- In
Ngaronoa the Court held that any disproportionate impact of the current
law was
so small that it did not give rise to a material disadvantage. By
'material advantage' the Court appears to have had in mind the impact
of the
legislation on the potential size of the Maori vote, as expressed through both
the Maori and the general electoral roll31
- The
Court drew this conclusion on the basis that less than one percent of the
Maori
population were in prison at any one time. This Bill would reduce the
number of Maori affected by the restriction even further. However,
it is
necessary to consider the evidence before the Waitangi Tribunal, which showed
that whilst the number of Maori who were in prison
at any one time was small,
the effect of the measure must be considered over time, since prisoners tended
not to re-register following
their release.
- We
do not, for the purposes of this analysis, accept the Tribunal's conclusion
that
the long-term impact of the current law means that the restriction
amounts to a `de facto permanent exclusion from the
register'.32 However, we do accept that the removal of
prisoners from the roll creates difficulties for those who are seeking to
exercise their
voting rights after their release from prison. Further, that it
may discourage Maori who are incarcerated at a young age from establishing
the
habit of voting, and is therefore capable of reducing the number of Maori voters
in the voting pool over the long-term.
- However,
the evidence before the Tribunal indicated that, taken at its highest,
the
numbers of Maori who would have been removed from the electoral roll
between 2010 and 2020, had the 2010 amendments not been made,
would have been
small: approximately 2,500 over a decade or approximately 250 every year."
- This
level of de-registration cannot confidently be projected into the future
since
much depends on future offending rates, sentencing policy and the (as
yet unknown) impact of the measures contained in the Bill to
assist prisoners to
return to the register following their release.
- Applying
the approach of the Ngaronoa Court in to this evidence, it remains
difficult
to see how such low numbers could give to any material disadvantage
to Maori as a whole, if material disadvantage is understood as
significant,
potential electoral impact.
Any minimal disadvantage may be
capable of justification
- Notwithstanding
the above, it is at least arguable that there may be some
material
disadvantage to Maori arising from the Bill, particularly if its
impact is approached not on the narrow basis of potential electoral
impact but,
as the Waitangi Tribunal did, through an exploration of the wider social impact
of the loss of the franchise.
31
Ngaronoa v Attorney General [2017] NZCA 351, NZLR at 1124
32 He Aha i Ai? The Maori Prisoners' Voting Report 2019 at 28-29.
33 See para. 21.4, above
- It
is therefore necessary to consider whether any such limitation on the right to
be
free from discrimination is capable of justification. For the following
reasons, it is our opinion that it may be justified.
- For
the reasons set out above at paras. 11 to 14, the restriction pursues a
legitimate
aim. This aim is pursued in a manner that gives rise to minimal
interference with the right to be free from discrimination, in
that:
39.1 The number of prisoners who are potentially affected
will be small. So, the
wider the impact of the limitation will be limited.
39.2 By restricting the measures to those serving significant custodial
sentences,
the restrictions on voting are less likely to apply to many younger
prisoners. This would address the Tribunal's concern that, in
capturing so many
younger people, the current law has the effect of preventing them from acquiring
the habit of voting.34
39.3 The measures the Bill proposes in order to assist prisoners to
re-register at
the conclusion of their sentence will help ameliorate any difficulties that
prisoners may face in enrolling after their release.'
Conclusion
- In
our opinion the measures in this Bill are not inconsistent with the rights
affirmed
by ss 12 and s 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act.
- In
accordance with Crown Law policy, this advice has been peer reviewed
by
Daniel Perkins, Team Manager/Crown Counsel.
ett..Af Noted
Daniel Jones Crown Counsel
027 213 8751
|
41
|
Hon David Parker Attorney-General /I-7 /2020
3'1 See 22, above
35 See para. 8, above
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