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Land Transport (Drug Driving) Amendment Bill (Inconsistent) (Sections 21, 22, 25(c)) [2020] NZBORARp 41 (2 September 2020)
Last Updated: 12 September 2020
Report of the
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Land Transport (Drug
Driving) Amendment Bill
Presented to the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 7 of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Standing Order 265
of the Standing Orders of
the House of Representatives
- I
have considered whether the Land Transport (Drug Driving) Amendment Bill
(‘the Bill’) is consistent with the rights
and freedoms affirmed in
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights
Act’).
- I
have concluded that the provisions of the Bill are inconsistent with the rights
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure,
the right not to be
arbitrarily detained, and the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
as affirmed in ss 21, 22 and
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act.
- As
required by s 7 of the Bill of Rights Act and Standing Order 265, I draw this to
the attention of the House of Representatives.
- At
the outset I note that I consider two simple changes, to focus on preventing
impaired drivers from driving rather than general
deterrence, if implemented,
would be more likely to be make the Bill consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act:
- 4.1 Introducing
an infringement offence threshold, below which the presence of a qualifying drug
would not be an infringement offence;
and
- 4.2 A
consequential amendment to the approval of the oral fluid testing device to
include only those devices that are likely to detect
the presence of drugs at
this infringement offence level.
- I
understand that Cabinet has requested that Ministers consider these changes be
raised at Select Committee stage.
The Bill
- The
Bill amends the Land Transport Act 1998 (‘the principal Act’) to
insert a random roadside oral fluid testing scheme.
The purpose of the Bill is
to introduce a more effective regime for detecting and deterring drug-impaired
driving, as part of the
Government’s general objective to increase road
safety.
- The
current approach to roadside drug testing is through a compulsory impairment
test (‘CIT’). This is a type of behavioural
test that an officer may
require a person to take if the officer has good cause to suspect that the
person has consumed a drug or
drugs. The test involves an eye, walk and turn,
and one-leg-stand assessment. If a person fails the CIT, they may be required to
provide a blood specimen.
- The
testing device and the manner in which the test is to be carried out is to be
approved by the Minister of Police by notice in
the Gazette. Before doing so,
the Minister of Police must:
- 8.1 consult
with the Minister of Transport and the Science Minister; and
- 8.2 have regard
to the accuracy of the device; and
- 8.3 be
satisfied that the device and the testing method will only return a positive
result if it detects a level of recent use of
a qualifying drug specified in the
notice.
- This
reflects the general policy intent to capture only those persons with the kind
of recent drug use that is likely to impair driving.
The device will be set at a
threshold to capture this type of use. Though I note that the Bill will not
define the threshold or levels
of the qualifying drugs for the oral fluid
testing device to be set to test at.
- Clause
20 of the Bill (proposed new ss 71A – 71F) sets out the procedure for the
oral fluid testing scheme. Key features of
the oral fluid testing scheme
include:
- 10.1 a person
may be required to undertake a first oral fluid test without cause, whether or
not the person has already undergone
an alcohol breath-screening test. However,
they cannot be required to undertake an oral fluid test if they have already
been required
to undergo a CIT;
- 10.2 the oral
fluid test detects the presence of drugs, not the amount;
- 10.3 if the
first oral fluid test is positive, the person will be required to undertake a
second oral fluid test. The person may be
required to undertake a further test
if the first or second test yields no result;
- 10.4 unless
they elect to have a blood test, the person commits an infringement offence if
the second oral fluid test is also positive
and the results of both oral fluid
tests indicate the use of:
- 10.4.1 the same
qualifying drug;
- 10.4.2 2 or
more qualifying drugs (but with a higher penalty than for a single drug); or
- 10.4.3 the same
qualifying drug and the proportion of alcohol in the person’s breath
ascertained by an evidential breath test
is less than 400mcg of alcohol per
litre of breath (the legal limit is
250mcg);1
- 10.5 alternatively,
if the person refuses to undergo a first or second oral fluid test, the person
will be required to permit the
taking of a blood specimen to determine the
proportion of the qualifying drug(s) (also referred to as an evidential blood
test);
- 10.6 depending
on the proportion of the qualifying drug(s) in their blood, a person may either
commit an infringement offence or a
criminal offence. It will be a criminal
offence if the proportion is at or above the limit specified in proposed new sch
5 (cl 31
of the Bill), and an infringement offence if it is below. Criminal
offences, similar to the infringement offences, may arise from
use of a
qualifying drug, 2 or more qualifying drugs, or a qualifying drug in combination
with alcohol;
- 10.7 a person
may be liable to pay the blood test fee and associated medical costs if they
elect to have a blood test (after receiving
two positive oral fluid test
results), and the blood test establishes that the person has committed a
1 There are lower limits if the
person is younger than 20, or holds an interlock licence.
criminal offence because the proportion of the drug(s) in their blood is at
or above the level in proposed new sch 5.
- Qualifying
drugs are defined in the Bill as the controlled drugs specified in the Misuse of
Drugs Act 1975,2 which includes cannabis. Clause 31 of
the Bill inserts proposed new sch 5 that will specify the level of qualifying
drugs at and over
which a person commits a criminal offence. The Ministry of
Transport has advised that it is intended that the initial levels in sch
5 be
inserted by Supplementary Order Paper at the Committee of the Whole House stage.
Once the Bill is in force, any changes to existing
levels or levels for new
drugs are to be set by the Governor-General by Order in Council, on
recommendation from the Ministers of
Transport and Police. Before making a
recommendation, the Ministers must seek and consider advice from independent
experts who will
try to identify the proportion of each drug that would cause
the equivalent level of impairment as the limit for
alcohol.3
- I
note that my analysis of the Bill is similar to previous 2018 advice in relation
to the Land Transport (Random Oral Fluid Testing)
Amendment Bill, a
member’s Bill, which was also found to be inconsistent with the same
rights in the Bill of Rights
Act.4
Section 21 of the Bill of Rights Act (freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure)
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search and seizure, whether
of the person, property,
correspondence or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including
personal privacy, dignity,
and property.5 The
touchstone of this section is a reasonable expectation of
privacy.6
- In
order for a statutory power to be consistent with s 21, the intrusion into the
values noted above must be justified by a sufficiently
compelling public
interest. The intrusion must be proportional to that interest and be accompanied
by adequate safeguards to ensure
it will not be exercised unreasonably. The
Supreme Court has held that, logically, an unreasonable search or seizure cannot
be demonstrably
justified with reference to s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act.7 Rather, the assessment to be undertaken is first,
whether what occurs is a search or seizure, and if so, whether that search or
seizure
is reasonable.
2 More particularly, Schedules 1, 2 and 3
(but only Parts 1 to 5, and 7 of Schedule 3) of the Misuse of Drugs Act
1975.
3 These experts will consider the specific effects
of the drug, the proportion of a qualifying drug in a person’s blood that
is
likely to impair a person’s driving to a similar extent as alcohol, and
have regard to the purpose of aligning the impairment
limit for each qualifying
drug as far as practicable with a blood-alcohol limit of 80 milligrams of
alcohol per 100 millilitres of
blood.
4 Hon David Parker Report of the Attorney-General
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Land Transport (Random Oral
Fluid Testing) Amendment
Bill (12 May 2018).
5 See, for example, Hamed v R [2011] NZSC
101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
6 At [161].
7 Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] 3 NZLR
744 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [162].
The oral fluid test constitutes a search
- As
outlined above (see paragraphs 7 to 10), the Bill introduces an oral fluid
testing regime. The Bill does not specify what the device
will be or how the
test will be carried out (this is to be notified in the Gazette).
- The
Ministry of Transport advises that, depending on the device procured, the
testing process could be a few swipes of the tongue,
which can be done in
seconds with a small device. A test could detect 6 different drugs, and indicate
which drug is present, but
not the amount. In their cost benefit analysis,
Ministry of Transport have assumed oral fluid testing devices are likely to be
approximately
95 percent accurate, and take 1 to 8 minutes to administer, with
an average time of 3 minutes.8
- While
I have not been able to consider the actual test that will be carried out, and
how invasive it will be, my view based on the
information provided is that
undergoing the test will constitute a physical search of the person and seizure
of a bodily sample for
the purposes of s 21.
There is a sufficiently compelling public interest
- The
Ministry of Transport and Police’s figures show that in 2014, 18 people
were killed in crashes where the driver had consumed
drugs before driving. By
2018, this had risen to 95 people. Further, only 26 percent of New Zealanders
think they will be caught
drug driving versus 60 percent for drink
driving.9
- The
Ministry of Transport and Police consider that the current approach involving a
CIT is not effective in deterring drug-impaired
driving, because of the
requirement to have ‘good cause to suspect’ a driver has consumed a
drug or drugs. The Ministry
of Transport and Police consider that there is
likely to be a high number of drug-impaired drivers who are not tested because
there
may be no observable signs of impairment at the time of driving. Police do
not have a record of the total number of CITs
undertaken.10
- While
I consider that there is a sufficiently important public policy objective to
justify the use of some search and seizure powers
in this context, I do not
consider that the approach taken in the Bill to conduct oral fluid tests is
reasonable, for the following
reasons.
8 Ministry of Transport Enhanced
testing regime for drug-impaired driving cost benefit analysis (April
2020).
9 Starkey, N., and Charlton, S., The prevalence and
impairment effects of drugged driving in New Zealand, University of Waikato,
(2017).
10 However, Police confirm that 473 blood specimens
taken following a CIT were submitted for analysis in 2017/2018.
The intrusion is not proportionate to the public interest
- The
scheme is intrusive in two ways:
- 21.1 it
intrudes into a person’s privacy beyond the intended aim of the Bill,
which is to prevent drug-impaired drivers, by
detecting and holding a person
liable for any level of a qualifying drug (beyond any threshold set on a
device); and
- 21.2 there is
the taking of swabs from a driver’s mouth.
- Driving
is a heavily regulated activity because of the importance of road safety and the
risk to other road users caused by unsafe
practices. The driver must have a
lowered expectation of privacy as a result.11
- Any
search of the body, rather than a search of a car or house, creates a higher
expectation of privacy, and the more invasive the
procedure the greater the
expectation of privacy.12 Taking cellular material
(e.g. blood, buccal samples) from a person’s body is at the apex. Swabbing
oral fluids is less intrusive
but still further along the continuum than
capturing aspirated material as a breath test would do.
- The
Bill uses ‘recent use’ as a proxy for impairment – essentially
deeming someone who has recently used qualifying
drugs to be impaired. The Bill
does not define recent use. While this may be justifiable, the issue is that, as
drafted, the proportion
of the qualifying drugs that constitutes an infringement
offence is not specified in the Bill. This means it cannot effectively be
challenged.
- Take,
for example, a person who consumed qualifying drugs some time ago but is no
longer at the recent use level that the oral fluid
test should detect. If the
person were to have 2 false positive oral fluid tests (given the predicted
accuracy rate of 95 percent,
there is a risk of false positives) and then elect
a blood test, they would still commit an infringement offence despite being
below
the recent use threshold, because that threshold is not defined in the
Bill (the offence simply refers to presence of drugs).
- I
acknowledge that the intrusiveness of the search cannot be changed due to the
limitations of the devices available for oral fluid
testing. I consider that the
substantial abrogation of the rights could likely be justified if it were
logically connected to the
purpose of detecting impaired drivers and taking them
off the road. The fact that any drug use, impairing or not, will be punished
after a blood test weakens the connection to that purpose.
- The
oral fluid test could be linked to the purpose of the Bill if a deemed level of
impairment that constitutes an infringement offence
is set in the Bill, for
example in sch 5, similar to the process for the proposed criminal levels to be
set by independent experts.
This could be set at a level that targets recent use
(which I accept is an appropriate proxy for impairment), and the threshold for
the oral fluid testing device could also be set at this level.
11 R v Jeffries [1993] NZCA 401; [1994] 1 NZLR
290
12 R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52
- Without
a definition of impairment at the infringement level, there is a risk that a
driver may be issued an infringement notice for
a non-impairing level of a
qualifying drug, which goes beyond the objective of the Bill.
The scheme is not accompanied by adequate safeguards to ensure
it will not be exercised unreasonably
- Further,
I do not consider the safeguards provided in the Bill are adequate.
- While
a second oral fluid test reduces the possibility of false
positives,13 it will only function as another screening
for the presence of drugs, confirming the result of the first oral fluid test,
rather than
detecting the proportion of any drugs. This is different to the
alcohol testing regime, where a breath-screening test takes place
to screen for
the presence of alcohol, and upon a positive indication, an evidential breath
test is conducted to then ascertain the
level of alcohol and whether it is over
the legal limit that constitutes impairment.
- The
purpose of conducting an oral fluid test is to secure evidence. If both oral
fluid tests are positive, a person may elect to have
a blood test. However,
there is a risk that in doing so, they will either incriminate themselves
further, and then be subject to
more serious criminal offences, or confirm the
infringement offence. Because the Bill does not define impairment at the
infringement
level, there does not appear to be any benefit in providing such a
blood specimen, unless the person had not consumed any drugs at
all (bearing in
mind that many drugs are detectable in blood long after they have been taken and
any impairing effects have worn
off). Even if a blood test confirms that the
proportion of drugs is less than the level the oral fluid testing device would
normally
detect, a person would still be subject to an infringement offence
under the Bill. As such, the election to provide a blood sample
does not operate
as an effective procedural safeguard as there is a significant disincentive to
requesting it.
- The
absence of subsequent testing leads to reliance (for evidential purposes) on a
test regime which may result in false positives
between 0.01 percent and 5.5
percent of the time. If it were 5.5 percent of the time, approximately 1 in 20
results would be in error.
- Finally,
in contrast to a CIT, the Bill does not require an officer to have good (or any)
cause to suspect a driver has consumed a
drug before an oral fluid test can be
required.
- As
I noted above, the central concern is that the oral fluid testing procedure,
leading to an infringement offence, can result in
outcomes that are not
connected to the objective of reducing drug-impaired driving. If the Bill were
to include a deemed level of
impairment for an infringement offence, mirroring
the breath testing scheme, this connection could be strengthened. This would
allow
targeting of drug-impaired drivers and strengthen the existing safeguards
where the oral fluid testing device returns false positives.
If this were
included, it would be less likely to constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure.
13 The Ministry of Transport advises that
the second oral fluid test reduces the probability of a false positive from
between 10% and
1% of the time to between 5.5% and 0.01% of the time. Ministry
of Transport. (2020). Enhanced testing regime for drug-impaired driving:
Cost-benefit analysis. Retrieved from www.transport.govt.nz.
- While
I note the view that the current drug testing regime does not act as an
effective deterrent, for the above reasons, demonstrating
zero-tolerance or
other general deterrent purposes, while socially valuable, is not of sufficient
import to justify an intrusive
regime. I therefore consider that as currently
designed, the requirement to undergo one or more random compulsory oral fluid
tests
is inconsistent with s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 22 – Right not to be arbitrarily detained
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right not to be
arbitrarily arrested or detained. A person is regarded
as detained within the
meaning of s 22 if, amongst other things, there are no statutory restraints of a
person’s movements
(accompanied by penalties for
non-compliance).14 The existing breath-screening test
(in relation to alcohol) is considered by the courts to amount to a
detention.15
- The
Court of Appeal has held that a detention may be "arbitrary if it is capricious,
unreasoned, without reasonable cause: if it is
made without reference to an
adequate determining principle or without following proper
procedures”.16
- Under
the Bill, an enforcement officer may require a person to:
- 38.1 remain in
place where stopped to undergo the test, or if it is not practicable to undergo
the test where stopped, to accompany
the officer to any other place where they
can undergo the test;
- 38.2 remain at
the place where the test was taken until after the result of the test is
ascertained;
- 38.3 permit the
taking of a blood specimen under s 72(1)(a) of the Act if the person refuses to
undergo a first oral fluid test or
a second oral fluid test.
- Refusal
or failure to comply with these requirements may result in an arrest without
warrant, and the arrested person may be taken
to or detained at a place to
undergo the test at that place
- In
my view, the oral fluid test can be considered to amount to a detention as it
places a statutory restraint on a person’s
movement in order to undergo
the test and is accompanied by penalties for non-compliance. The length of the
detention is open- ended
but limited because of the maximum number of times the
test can be administered.
- The
cost-benefit analysis prepared by Ministry of Transport suggests that based upon
the experience in Queensland, the assumption
is that it will take approximately
10 to 15 minutes to conduct the first oral test with the possibility that this
is extended for
a second test or longer if either test fails to produce a
result. Since each test can only be repeated once, the maximum number of
tests
is four. This suggests roadside detention
14 R v Blake HC Auckland T1737/99,
28 September 2000.
15 Temese v Police [1992] NZCA 190; (1992) 9 CRNZ 425
(CA).
16 Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR
433; (2001) 5 HRNZ 334 (CA).
could last 30 to 40 minutes but in most cases would be half that time for
someone who returns two positive tests.
- Compared
to roadside detention for breath alcohol procedures, the time difference is
significant. The combination of a passive breath
test and breath-screening test,
if both are needed, will only take a few minutes with reasonable driver
cooperation. All evidential
testing is undertaken at a police station or booze
bus.
- The
principal Act currently requires a motorist to remain stopped for up to 15
minutes just for the purpose of ascertaining their
identity (s 114), therefore
detention for the purpose of testing for an even greater length of time would
not in and of itself be
arbitrary. However, in my view, detention for the
purpose of testing under the Bill is arbitrary because there is a risk that a
driver
may be issued an infringement notice for a non-impairing level of a
qualifying drug, which goes beyond the objective of the Bill.
- I
therefore consider the Bill appears to be inconsistent with the right not to be
arbitrarily detained as affirmed in s 22 of the
Bill of Rights Act.
- As
noted above in relation to s 21, if the Bill were to include a deemed level of
impairment for an infringement offence that matched
the oral fluid testing
device, mirroring the breath testing scheme, a temporary restriction on movement
may be less likely to give
rise to an inconsistency with the right to be free
from arbitrary detention.
Section 25(c) - right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law.
- In
order to give full recognition to this right, which is also a fundamental
principle of criminal law, the legal burden of proving
every element of an
offence to the required standard of proof, and the onus for disproving any
potentially available defence, must
remain on the prosecution.
- As
noted above, cl 9 (new ss 57A(2), 57B(2) and 57C(2)) of the Bill introduces new
strict liability offences (through an infringement
regime) which shift the onus
of proof onto the defendant, by requiring them to disprove an element of the
offence in order to escape
liability. For example, that the device has
registered a false positive and they did not in fact have the requisite level of
a qualifying
drug in their system (cl 25, or new s 77A).
- I
also note that the statutory defences available in s 64 of the principal Act
(for example if the drug was consumed in accordance
with a current and valid
prescription) are only available if the person elects to have a blood test or is
required to provide a blood
specimen. There are also accompanying offences, as
noted above, for failure or refusal to comply with testing.
- Strict
liability offences raise a prima facie issue of inconsistency with s 25(c) of
the Bill of Rights Act.17 I have therefore considered
whether this limitation on the right is nevertheless demonstrably justified
under s 5 of that Act.
- Where
a provision is found to pose a limit on a particular right or freedom, it may
nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act if it can be considered a
reasonable limit that is demonstrably justified in terms of s 5 of that Act.
Following the guidance
of the New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Hansen v
R, the s 5 inquiry may be summarised as:
- 51.1 does the
objective serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify some limitation of
the right or freedom?
- 51.2 if so,
then:
- 51.2.1 Is the
limit rationally connected to the objective?
- 51.2.2 Does the
limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- 51.2.3 Is the
limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
- In
the specific context of strict liability offences, considerations especially
relevant to the reasonableness of limits on s 25(c)
are the nature and context
of the conduct being regulated, the ability of the defendants to exonerate
themselves, and the penalty
levels.
Is the objective sufficiently important?
- As
noted above, I consider the policy objective of reducing harm and deterring
drug- impaired driving to be a significant and important
objective which may
justify the imposition of strict liability offences to ensure that there is an
onus on a person driving to adhere
to their obligations under the Bill. The
objective of including roadside testing and strict liability offences appears to
make the
drug driving regime more effective and efficient, as in most cases two
positive oral fluid tests will be an accurate indication of
offending. In
increasing road safety, effectiveness and efficiency gains may be sufficiently
important to justify some limitation
on the right to be presumed innocent.
Is there a rational connection between the limit and the
objective?
- I
do not consider that the limit on the presumption of innocence is rationally
connected to the objective. While the Bill provides
that the oral fluid testing
device must be set at a level so as to detect recent use of a qualifying drug,
this is not linked to
the infringement offences, nor is this level defined.
- In
particular, new ss 57A(2), 57B(2) and 57C(2) contain infringement offences for
two positive tests for the presence of a drug, not
recent use. This means that
even if a person elects a blood test, and presence of a drug was found, they
would still be subject
17 R v Hansen at [38] – [39]
per Elias CJ, [202] per McGrath J, [269] per Anderson J.
to an infringement offence, even if the proportion of the drug was less than
the level set on the oral fluid testing device.
Does the limit impair the right no more than reasonably necessary?
- I
consider that the Bill appears to impair the right more than necessary because
there are reasonable alternatives that impair the
right to a lesser degree.
Including an infringement level of impairment in the Bill, linked to the recent
use threshold of the oral
fluid testing device and the infringement offences,
would rationally connect the limit to the objective, and would allow the blood
test to function as an effective safeguard.
- I
note that the introduction of infringement offences for breath testing attracted
a s 7 report for inconsistency with the presumption
of innocence, but the
inconsistency was clearer in that instance because the result of the evidential
breath test is conclusive,
meaning that it cannot be challenged at all.
- In
this Bill, a person has a right to contest the charge (because the test is
presumptively rather than conclusively valid), but it
is limited because the
infringement offences penalise any level of drugs, regardless of quantity. If a
person also had an effective
right to a blood test (a blood test which could
exonerate them from impaired driving), that would impair the right to a lesser
degree.
However, because the blood test will result in an infringement offence
if there is any detected drug, regardless of the quantity,
it is not
sufficiently effective.
Is the limit in due proportion to the objective?
- The
reversal of the onus of proof may be seen as proportionate because it is
restricted to an infringement offence which does not
carry a criminal
conviction. However, the limitation on the presumption of innocence does not
appear proportionate because the road
safety regime would still be able to
operate reasonably effectively with an impairment level set in the Bill that is
the same as
in the oral fluid testing device, and linked to the infringement
offences. Any efficiency gains are unlikely to outweigh the right
to be presumed
innocent.
- Further,
as discussed above, I consider the process of conducting the oral fluid test
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure
and amounts to an arbitrary
detention because of the lack of requisite due cause and adequate procedural
safeguards. In my view,
it follows from this conclusion that the strict
liability offences arising from a positive oral fluid test or a failure to
comply
with testing constitute an unjustified limitation on the right in s
25(c).
- I
also discussed above that there may be concerns with the reliability of the
testing regime, which, coupled with the potentially
significant consequences
– a fine and significant demerit points – although with no
accompanying criminal conviction,
indicate that the offence (which is for
presence rather than impairment) is not proportionate to the harm sought to be
addressed.
- In
my view, the limit placed on the right in s 25(c) by the introduction of these
offences based on a testing regime that involves
unreasonable powers of search,
seizure, and
detention, and is likely to be without sufficient
checks to ensure the reliability of evidence, cannot be justified under s 5 of
the
Bill of Rights Act.
Conclusion
- I
have concluded that the Bill appears to be inconsistent with the right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure, the
right not to be arbitrarily
detained and the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty affirmed in
ss 21, 22 and 25(c) of
the Bill of Rights Act.
Hon David Parker
Attorney-General
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