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Incorporated Societies Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 19, 21, 25(c)) [2020] NZBORARp 62 (24 July 2020)
Last Updated: 19 March 2021
24 July 2020
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Incorporated Societies
Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Incorporated Societies Bill (‘the Bill’)
is consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed
in the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
- This
advice has been prepared in relation to the latest version of the Bill (PCO
18129/10.0). We will provide you with further advice
if the final version of the
Bill includes amendments that affect the conclusions in this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with s 14 (freedom of expression), s
19 (freedom from discrimination),
s 21 (unreasonable search and seizure) and s
25(c) (right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty). Our analysis is set
out below.
The Bill
- This
Bill repeals the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 and replaces it with a new
Incorporated Societies Act. The purpose of the Bill
is to put in place a modern
framework of legal, governance, and accountability obligations for incorporated
societies and those that
run them.
- The
purposes of the Bill, as outlined in cl 3, are to:
- provide
for the incorporation of societies that are carried on for lawful purposes other
than for the financial gain of any of their
members;
- provide
a legislative framework that promotes high quality governance of
societies;
- make
the law of societies more accessible; and,
- recognise
the principles that societies are organisations with members who have the
primary responsibility for holding the society
to account; that societies should
operate in a manner that promotes trust and confidence of their members; that
societies are private
bodies that should be self-governing and free from
inappropriate Government interference; and that societies should not distribute
profits or financial benefits to their members.
- The
Bill also closes gaps in the 1908 Act by providing an express mechanism for
societies to amalgamate with each other, and by including
civil law enforcement
provisions that clearly state who may apply to the court for orders in respect
of an incorporated society and
the type of orders that a court can
make.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 14 – Freedom of Expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to freedom of expression,
including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and opinions of
any kind in any form. The right to freedom of expression has also been
interpreted as including the right
not to be compelled to say certain things or
to provide certain information.1 The provisions of the
Bill of Rights Act apply, so far as practicable, for the benefit of all legal
persons as well as for the benefit
of natural persons (s 29 of the Bill of
Rights Act). Incorporated societies are legal persons, and accordingly benefit
from the rights
set out in the Bill of Rights Act.
Right not to
be compelled to provide certain information
- There
are various provisions of the Bill that require an incorporated society or its
members to provide information2, particularly in
relation to applications for incorporation, its constitution, requests from
members for information, annual general
meetings, financial statements, annual
returns and communications. These requirements engage the right to freedom of
expression affirmed
in s 14 of the Bill of Rights.
- Where
a provision is found to limit a particular right or freedom, it may nevertheless
be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered a reasonable
limit that is demonstrably justified in terms of s 5 of that Act. The s 5
inquiry may be approached
as follows:
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
- We
consider the Bill’s objective of putting in place a framework of legal,
governance, and accountability obligations for incorporated
societies is a
sufficiently important objective to justify some limit on the right to freedom
of expression. We also consider that
the information that is required to be
provided is rationally connected to that objective, and is clearly necessary to
support the
regulatory regime set out in the Bill. We note that societies are
only required to provide specific information in specific circumstances,
such as
the provision of a constitution to the Registrar when incorporating. In our
view, the limits impair the freedom of expression
of an incorporated society no
more than is reasonably necessary and are proportionate to the objective of the
Bill.
1 RJR MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada (1995) 127 DLR
(4th) 1.
2 Requirements to provide certain information may be
found within the Bill at clauses 9, 25, 26, 31, 33, 47, 58, 60, 67, 74,
77, 80, 82, 86, 95, 97, 100, 102, 104, 109, 114, 186, 190, 219, 224; Schedule
1: 8(4); Schedule 3: 3.
Limits on name of incorporated society
- The
Bill also limits the name under which a society may incorporate itself. Under cl
11, the Registrar must refuse to incorporate
a society if in the
Registrar’s opinion any of the following apply:
- the
name would contravene an enactment;
- the
name is identical or almost identical to the name of another society or reserved
under the Companies Act;
- be
likely to be misleading or if the name is offensive; and,
- the
name does not include the word “Incorporated”, “Inc” or
“Manatōpū” as the last word
or words of the
name.
- The
Registrar may also require an incorporated society to change its name in certain
circumstances (cl 112). If an incorporated society
fails to change its name, the
Registrar may enter a new name on the register for the incorporated society.
Amalgamations may not
occur if the Registrar considers that the name does not
comply with the requirements (cl 192). The effect of this Bill is to restrict
what incorporated societies can name themselves.
- Additionally,
cl 151 makes it an offence for a person, not being an incorporated body, whether
alone or with other persons, to dishonestly
operate under any name or title of
which the word “Incorporated”, “Inc” or
“Manatōpū”
or any contraction or imitation of any of those
words, is the last word. This is punishable on conviction to a fine not
exceeding
$10,000.00.
- The
above restrictions prima facie limit the right to freedom of expression.
However, we consider that these limits are justified in terms of section 5 of
the Bill of
Rights Act. The limits serve the objective of ensuring that the
names of incorporated societies are not misleading (particularly
if another
society or company has a similar name), offensive, or fraudulent. We also
consider that the right to freedom of expression
is impaired no more than
reasonably necessary and the limit on freedom of expression is in due proportion
to the importance of the
objective. Clause 11 contains a very prescriptive list
of reasons a Registrar must refuse to incorporate a society under a name,
all of
which are connected to the purpose of ensuring that names are appropriate.
- For
the reasons outlined above, we consider that the limits on freedom of expression
imposed by the Bill are justified under s 5 of
the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 19 – freedom from discrimination
- Section
19 of the Bill of Rights Act concerns the right to be free from discrimination,
on the grounds contained in the Human Rights
Act 1993, which includes the ground
of ‘age’. Under s 21 of the Human Rights Act, ‘age’
means any age commencing
with the age of 16 years.
- The
key questions in assessing whether there is a limit on the right to freedom from
discrimination are:3
3 See, for example, Atkinson v Minister
of Health and others [2010] NZHRRT 1; McAlister v Air New Zealand
[2009] NZSC 78; and Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General
[2008] NZHRRT 31.
- does
the legislation draw a distinction on one of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination under s 21 of the Human Rights Act? and,
if so,
- does
the distinction involve a disadvantage to one or more classes of
individuals?
- A
distinction will arise if the legislation treats two comparable groups of people
differently based on one or more of the prohibited
grounds of discrimination.
Whether a disadvantage arises is a factual
determination.4
- The
Bill provides that every society must have at least one contact person whom the
Registrar can contact when needed (cls 105 –
106). Clause 107 requires a
contact person to be at least 18 years of age. The Bill treats 16 and 17 year
olds differently from those
18 and over, and accordingly prima facie gives rise
to a limit on the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of age. It
is arguable that this difference in treatment may give rise to a
disadvantage.
- Any
limit on the non-discrimination right may be justified in terms of section 5 of
the Bill of Rights Act, as outlined above. One
of the objectives of the Bill is
to provide a legislative framework that promotes high-quality governance of
societies and to recognise
the principle that societies are organisations with
members who have the primary responsibility for holding the society to account.
While the contact person does not have to be an officer of the society, it is
still a position of responsibility. The Registrar may
contact the contact person
about matters relating to a society, including delivering infringement
notices.
- We
consider that the age limit is intended to act as a proxy for maturity. Such
bright-line age restrictions are necessarily arbitrary
to a degree but can
provide a level of certainty and consistency where (as here) an individual
assessment of maturity is not practical.
The age limit set by the Bill is one
that has been generally adopted by society in a number of areas (such as voting
age and alcohol
consumption, for example) as an appropriate proxy for
maturity.
- To
the extent that cl 107 raises an issue of discrimination under section 19 of the
Bill of Rights Act, we consider that this is justified
under section
5.
Section 21 – Unreasonable Search and Seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property,
correspondence or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including
personal privacy, dignity,
and property.5
- The
Bill provides the Registrar (or a person authorised by the Registrar) with the
powers to inspect and take copies of documents,
remove documents from where they
are kept and retain them for a reasonable time if there are reasonable grounds
for believing that
they are evidence of the commission of an offence (cl 236). A
person may be directed by the Registrar to give the documents, information
or
report to certain people (cl 238). We consider these to be powers of search and
seizure within the meaning of s 21 of the Bill
of Rights Act.
4 See, for example, McAlister v Air New
Zealand [2009] NZSC 78; and Child Poverty Action Group v
Attorney-General
[2008] NZHRRT 31.
5 See, for example, Hamed v R [2011] NZSC
101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
- Ordinarily,
a provision found to limit a particular right or freedom may nevertheless be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered reasonably
justified in terms of s 5 of that Act. However, the Supreme Court has held that
an unreasonable search
logically cannot be reasonably justified and therefore
the inquiry does not need to be undertaken.6 As such,
the question with respect to the search and seizure powers under the Bill is
whether they are reasonable. The reasonableness
of a search can be assessed with
reference to the purpose of the search and the degree of intrusion on the values
which the right
seeks to protect.
- We
note that the search powers set out in the Bill can only be exercised for the
purpose of ascertaining whether an incorporated society
or officer has complied
(or is complying) with the provisions of the Bill, or to ascertain whether the
Registrar should exercise
any of its functions under the Bill. In addition, the
Registrar must be of the opinion that it is in the public interest for them
to
exercise these powers (cl 235). The content of the information that may be
required to be provided by societies is not highly
personal, and privacy
expectations for an incorporated society are lower than for a private
individual. We consider that the search
powers are proportionate to the
importance of ensuring that societies are complying with the Bill.
- We
note that the Registrar’s search powers appear to be primarily aimed at
ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements
of the Bill. However, to
the extent that a search may relate to information that is, or could be,
relevant to a criminal investigation,
clause 236(4) provides additional
safeguards to individuals in that every person has the same privileges in
relation to producing
relevant documents as witnesses have in proceedings before
a court.
- On
this basis, we consider that the search and seizure powers contained in the Bill
are reasonable and accordingly consistent with
the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 25(c) - Right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. The right to be presumed
innocent requires
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused is guilty.
- The
Bill includes a number of offences which are strict liability offences. These
offences apply to the incorporated society, an officer
of a society, or a
person. 7 These offences largely relate to failures to
follow regulatory requirements set out in the Bill.
- Strict
liability offences prima facie limit s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act
because the accused is required to prove a defence (on the balance of
probabilities) to avoid
liability (in other criminal proceedings an accused need
merely raise a defence in an effort to create reasonable doubt). This means
that
where the accused is unable to prove a defence, they could be convicted even
where reasonable doubt exists as to their guilt.
- In
the specific context of strict liability offences, considerations especially
relevant to the reasonableness of limits on s 25(c)
are the nature and context
of the conduct being regulated, the ability of the defendants to exonerate
themselves and the penalty
levels.
6 Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008]
3 NZLR 744 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [162].
7 Strict liability offences can be found within the
Bill at cls 114,189, 236-238.
- We
consider the limits proposed by the Bill to the right to be presumed innocent
are justified in the circumstances. The offences
are rationally connected to the
important objective of protecting and enforcing the new regulatory regime for
incorporated societies.
Strict liability offences have been considered more
proportionate and justifiable where:
- the
offence is a regulatory offence and not “truly criminal” in
nature;
- the
defendant is in the best position to justify their apparent failure to comply
with the law, rather than requiring the Crown to
prove the opposite;
and
- the
penalties are solely financial in nature, are at the lower end of the scale and
proportionate to the seriousness of the offence.
No terms of imprisonment can be
imposed.
- We
consider that these factors apply here.
- We
note that the Bill also includes a number of infringement offences (cl 153)
which may be proceeded against by the filing of a charging
document under
section 14 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 or by an infringement notice.
Infringement offences that are pursued
in the criminal court cannot result in a
conviction (see section 375(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act) and therefore
do not engage
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
- For
the reasons outlined above, we consider any limits on the right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty imposed by the Bill
to be justified under s 5 of
the Bill of Rights Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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