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Civil Aviation Bill (Consistent) (Sections 11, 14, 21 and 25(c)) [2021] NZBORARp 46 (29 July 2021)
Last Updated: 9 September 2021
29 July 2021
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Civil Aviation
Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Civil Aviation Bill (the Bill) is consistent with
the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the
Bill of Rights Act).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO 18744/28.5). We will provide
you with further advice if the final version includes amendments that affect the
conclusions in
this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with s 11 (right to refuse to
undergo medical treatment), s 14 (freedom
of expression), s 21 (freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure) and s 25(c) (presumption of innocence
until proven guilty).
Our analysis is set out below.
Summary
- The
Civil Aviation Bill repeals and replaces New Zealand’s main pieces of
primary civil aviation legislation.
- The
Bill enacts and re-enacts significant search and seizure provisions to support
the operation of civil aviation security regimes.
These regimes allow for
searches and seizures that have broad application and high levels of intrusion
into personal privacy. However,
we consider that the high importance of the
objective of securing aviation safety, as well as the strong constraints and
safeguards
surrounding the use of the powers, render them proportionate and
reasonable in the context.
- The
Bill also engages rights in its provisions enabling regulatory searches and
seizures, the compelling of information, compelled
medical testing regimes for
pilots and safety- sensitive staff and a wide range of offences and penalties
for conduct prohibited
by the Bill. However, we consider that the limits on
rights are reasonable and necessary in the context.
The Bill
- The
Bill repeals and replaces New Zealand’s main pieces of primary civil
aviation legislation:
- the
Civil Aviation Act 1990, which governs the civil aviation system in New Zealand
and sets the overall framework for aviation safety,
security and economic
regulation in New Zealand, and
- the
Airport Authorities Act 1966, which provides for local authorities and other
persons (e.g. airport companies) to be authorised
as airport authorities with
functions and powers to operate airports.
- The
main purpose of the Bill is to provide for the regulation of a safe and secure
civil aviation system. The Bill also has the following
additional
purposes:
- to
maintain, enhance, and promote a transport system that contributes to
environmental sustainability, economic prosperity, inclusive
access, healthy and
safe people, and resilience and security;
- to
promote innovation, effectiveness, and efficiency in civil
aviation;
- to
ensure that New Zealand’s obligations under international civil aviation
conventions, agreements, and understandings are
implemented;
- to
preserve New Zealand’s national security and national interests;
- to
take into account the interests of people, property interests, and interests of
the environment from adverse effects of civil
aviation.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 11 – right to refuse to undergo medical treatment
- Section
11 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to refuse to
undergo medical treatment. The right protects
the concept of personal autonomy
and bodily integrity, specifically the idea that individuals have the right to
determine for themselves
what they do or do not do to their own body, free from
restraint or coercion.1
- Clause
3 of Schedule 2 of the Bill gives the Director of Civil Aviation the power to
require an applicant for a pilot’s licence
to undertake any test,
examination or re-examination, or to provide any medical information that the
Director considers necessary
to assess the applicant. Clauses 110 - 112 in Part
4 of the Bill contain offences for acting as a pilot without the required
medical
certificate, for making fraudulent or misleading statements to obtain a
medical certificate, or for failing to disclose relevant
medical information.
These provisions limit the right of a person to refuse medical treatment.
- A
limit on a right may nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
the limit is justified under s 5 of the Act. The
s 5 inquiry asks:
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation on the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary to
sufficiently achieve the objective?
1 New Health New Zealand Inc
v South Taranaki District Council [2014] NZHC 395 at [52].
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?2
- We
consider that the requirements for medical testing set out within the Bill are
justifiable under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Requiring applicants for
aviation documents (such as pilot’s licences) to be proven to be medically
fit is rationally connected
to the important objective of ensuring aviation
safety. It is minimally impairing and proportionate to the risk posed by unsafe
aviation
document holders to require them to undergo testing as requested by the
Director. Applicants voluntarily opt into medical testing
as a consequence of
the decision to apply for an aviation document and therefore will be aware of
potential testing requirements.
- Further,
the penalties that apply to those who are convicted of an offence under cls 110-
112 are proportionate to the seriousness
of the potential safety risks. On
conviction, a person is liable for a fine not exceeding $30,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 12 months, or both. The offences require
an element of intent, with the general defence of reasonable excuse for failing
to disclose medical information.
- On
this basis, we consider that any limits within the Bill on the right to refuse
to undergo medical treatment are justified in terms
of s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act,
Section 14 – freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form. It has also been interpreted as including the
right not to
be compelled to say certain things or to provide certain
information.3
- Clauses
within the Bill which engage the right to freedom of expression can be
categorised into those that require speech or provision
of information, and
those which constrain or restrict speech.
Required speech within
the Bill
- A
large number of clauses within the Bill require speech and/or the provision of
information.
- Firstly
the Bill contains a large number of clauses which require aviation participants
(people who operate, maintain, and/or service
an aircraft or aviation service or
product) to provide information in the course of the normal regulatory regime
that monitors civil
aviation.4 The information able to
be required under these clauses is regulatory in nature and supports
administration and monitoring of the
sector.
- The
Bill also requires information from aviation participants in the form of
incident and emergency reporting. Clauses 15-16 and 49
of the Bill require
participants to provide information related to breaches of the civil aviation
code as a result of an emergency
arising and to report accidents and incidents
to the Civil Aviation Authority.
- Aviation
participants may also be required to provide information to support an
investigation into a breach of the civil aviation
code in an emergency (cl 18)
or as part
2 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7.
3 See, for example, Slaight Communications v
Davidson 59 DLR (4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705 (1977).
4 See cl 37, 55, 124, 176, 205, 207, 212,219,
409-411
of entering into an enforceable undertaking.
- Clause
403 also allows the Director, or someone they authorise, to require a passenger
to provide their details if the Director or
authorised person has reasonable
grounds to believe that the passenger has committed an unruly passenger
offence.
- All
of these clauses engage aviation participants’ and passengers’ right
to freedom of expression under s 14 of the Bill
of Rights Act. However, we
consider each to be justifiable in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- Information
requirements relating to monitoring and administration of the civil aviation
sector are rationally connected to the purpose
of supporting the safe and
efficient functioning of the civil aviation sector. The information required to
be provided is only that
which relates to the aviation participant’s
activities while carrying out their job and duties (and therefore can be
reasonably
expected to be provided).
- Civil
aviation is a highly regulated industry, and aviation products and activities
have a high risk associated with their operation
and service. Those who engage
in the sector as aviation participants do so in the knowledge that a minimum
standard of regulation
and information provision will be required of them.
Offences for failing to provide information are proportionate to the importance
of receiving this information.
- Information
requirements related to incident and emergency reporting, and those which
support investigations of breaches of the civil
aviation code or offences, are
rationally connected to the important objectives of ensuring aviation safety and
protecting the rule
of law. The information that may be obtained under these
clauses is only that information which would support enforcement or prosecution
of a breach or offence.
Restricted speech within the Bill
- Clause
197 allows the Minister of Transport to prohibit the publication or disclosure
of any information, document or evidence involved
in a decision concerning
international air carriage applications This prohibition may be maintained until
20 working days after the
date that the Minister makes a final determination on
the application. This restriction prima facie limits the freedom of
expression of parties to these decisions.
- However,
we consider this restriction can be justified in terms of s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- Restricting
the publication or disclosure of sensitive commercial information in the course
of decisionmaking serves the important
objective of providing decision makers
with the opportunity to make decisions free from external influence or
pressure.
- The
information that may be restricted is only that which the Minister considers
would prejudice decisionmaking on the application,
and the information is
subject to the Official Information Act 1982 following the expiry of the
restriction.
- For
these reasons we consider that any limits within the Bill on the right to
freedom of expression caused either by required or restricted
speech are
justified in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 21 – freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property,
correspondence or otherwise. The right protects values including personal
privacy, dignity, and property.
The touchstone of this section is a reasonable
expectation of privacy.5
- A
search can be considered in its ordinary sense of consciously looking for
something or someone, whether or not assisted by technology.6
For example, examining the contents of a bag, including by way of x-ray,
has been found to be a search.7
- In
order for a statutory power to be consistent with s 21, the intrusion into the
values noted must be justified by a sufficiently
compelling public interest. The
intrusion must be proportional to that interest and must be accompanied by
adequate safeguards to
ensure it will not be exercised unreasonably. The Supreme
Court has held that, logically, an unreasonable search or seizure cannot
be
demonstrably justified with reference to s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act.8 Rather, the assessment to be undertaken is first,
whether what occurs is a search or seizure and, if so, whether that search or
seizure
is reasonable.
- The
Bill contains three separate groups of search powers and two separate groups of
seizure powers. These are:
- Search powers at
aerodromes and navigation installations (cls 142-159);
- Powers of entry
and inspection for monitoring, inspection and enforcement (cls 283-297);
- Searches
involved in drug and alcohol testing processes within the Bill (cls. 113-
119)
- Seizure powers
at aerodromes and navigation installations (cls 149-151); and,
- Detention and
seizure provisions in relation to aircraft, aerodrome or aeronautical products
(cls 313-321)
Search powers at aerodromes and
navigation installations under clauses 142 – 159 of the Bill
- Clauses
142-159 of the Bill provide search powers of aviation security officers at
aerodromes and navigation installations9 and sets out
the consequences for persons
5 See, for example, Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
6 Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at
[220].
7 R v Truong (2002) 168 CCC (3D) 132 (BCCA), R v Fry
(1999) 70 CRR (2d) 78 (Nfld CA).
8 Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] 3 NZLR
744 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [162].
9 An aerodrome is an area of land or water intended or designed to be used
either wholly or partly for the landing, departure, surface
movement, or
servicing of aircraft. It includes any other areas, building, installations, and
equipment that are on or adjacent to
this area of land or water that are used in
connection with that area or its administration. A navigation installation is
any building,
facility, work, apparatus, equipment, or place that is intended to
assist in the control of air traffic or as an aid to air navigation
and includes
land adjacent to, and used in connection with, that building, facility, work,
apparatus, equipment, or place (s 5 of
the Bill).
travelling on aircraft, and others present at aerodromes or installations,
for failure to comply with aviation security requirements.
What or who could be searched?
- Aviation
security officers have broad powers to search people, places, items, substances
and vehicles for the purpose of detecting
a relevant item or substance (which
includes a substance or article capable of posing a risk to health, safety,
property or the environment
and includes firearms and explosive substances or
ammunition (cl 161(1)). In relation to an electronic device, the search power
does
not, however, authorise access to data (cl 142(2)).
Where
could a search take place?
- Under
these powers, a crew member or passenger can be searched anywhere within the
aerodrome or installation. If the individual is
not a crew member or passenger,
where they can be searched is more limited. They can only be searched at a
screening point immediately
before entering a landside security area, a sterile
area or a security enhanced area, or if they are present in one of those
areas.
- A
landside or airside security area is an area of a security designated aerodrome
or security designated navigation installation that
has been designated as such
by the Director of Civil Aviation and is identified by a sign or signs affixed
to the area’s perimeter
(cl 122). A security enhanced area is an area
within an airside security area that has been declared as such by the Director
by an
appropriate notification (cl 122). A sterile area means the area at an
aerodrome between the passenger inspection and screening station
and the
aircraft, into which access is strictly controlled (cl 134).
What
would a search involve?
- A
search can involve the removal of outer clothing, except where the person has no
other clothing on, or only underclothing, the removal
of footwear and head
coverings and a pat down search (cl 142). A pat down search can include the
searcher running or patting their
hand over the body of the person being
searched, whether inside or outside clothing (other than underclothing) and the
searcher can
require the person being searched to open their mouth, display the
palms of their hands or soles of their feet, or lift or rub their
hair (cl
134).
- A
search could be conducted by way of an aid or device, including a dog, chemical
substance, or x-ray or imaging equipment, or some
other mechanical, electrical
or electronic device (cls 157 - 158). A search conducted by means other than a
security dog or electronic
device must be carried out by a security officer of
the same sex as the person being searched or, if the person being searched
reasonably
requests, a person of a different sex (cl 143(3)).
Is
consent required?
- Clauses
143 and 144 set out the consent requirements for searching. Consent is always
required to conduct a search of a person. If
a person presents at a screening
point, they are taken for all purposes to consent to a search of themselves
involving little or
no physical contact and a search of their baggage. A person
can withdraw consent at any time during the search and will be taken
as having
refused to consent to the search. If a person has handed over luggage to an
airline operator for transportation, that person
is also taken as having
consented to their luggage being searched.
- Consent
to search an item is not needed where that item has been left unattended.
Consent is also not needed in respect of the search
of anything other than a
person if an aviation security officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that
there is an imminent risk
to aviation safety and security and the risk requires
an immediate response.
What are the consequences of refusing a
search?
- If
a person refuses to be searched or is present in a designated security area
without having been searched, they can be denied entry
into the area or
requested to leave the area. The individual can be detained in some
circumstances, including where there are reasonable
grounds to suspect a crime
against the Aviation Crimes Act 1972 has been committed (cls 147 –
148).
- The
refusal of a person to consent to a search of the person or anything in their
possession does not itself constitute reasonable
grounds for suspecting that an
offence against the Aviation Crimes Act has been, is being or will be committed
(cl 148(2)).
- If
a person is in an area which requires them to have been searched but they have
not been, the person commits an infringement offence
and is liable to a fee of
$1,000 or a fine imposed by the court not exceeding $2,500 (cl
165).
The power to search a person is not an unreasonable
search
- We
first consider the cl 142 power in relation to the search of a person.
- Expectations
of privacy are highest in relation to physical searches of persons and because
of the high expectation, such searches
will generally be unreasonable unless
strict requirements under legislation are met.10 In the
absence of a warrant, there is authority for conducting a search where routine
inspections are undertaken by officials, including
searches at the
border.11
- As
we have set out above, the search power extends beyond passengers and crew in
some circumstances.
- In
respect of whether the power to search a person is reasonable, we have
considered the reasons for the search, the location of the
search, the level of
intrusiveness of the search, the consequences for refusing to be searched and
the safeguards present to prevent
unreasonable use of search
powers.
The location of the search justifies the use of search
powers
- The
powers in respect of aviation security reflect the ever-evolving nature and
scale of security risks in the sector. The Ministry
of Transport has said that
it is essential that regulatory settings allow for a measured and proportionate
approach to changing security
threats, and that the settings need to be flexible
enough to respond to shifts in the national terrorism threat level.
10 Forrest v Attorney-General [2012] NZCA
125, [2012] NZAR 798; Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70, [2008] 1
NZLR 429, (2007) 9 HRNZ 104; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3
NZLR 207, (2007) 23 CRNZ 1.
11 R v Simmons [1988] 2 SCR 495 (SCC); US
v Ramsey [1977] USSC 97; 431 US 606 (1977) (USSC).
- The
power is limited to aerodromes and installations for the purpose of detecting a
relevant item or substance. The search power is
broad, in that it permits the
search of any person (not just crew or passenger) and could be used in the
landside – or public
– areas of an airport, or to gain entry into
those areas, where they have been designated landside security areas. However,
we understand that search use in a landside security area would be temporary and
in response to changed threat levels.
- We
consider that there is a sufficiently important public policy objective to
justify the use of some search and seizure powers in
this context: a search is
necessary to protect the health and safety of those in the immediate area and
property from damage, and
to prevent prohibited items from being taken onto
aircrafts.12
Reasonable expectations of
privacy are lower in public places
- The
Court of Appeal has observed that “reasonable expectations of privacy are
lower in public places than on private property.”13
In the specific context of air travel, it is suggested that individuals
have a lowered expectation of privacy at an international
border.14
The level of intrusiveness of the
search is proportionate
- At
its most intrusive, a search could involve the removal of outer clothing, a head
covering, and/or a pat down. Although a search
of this type is further along the
continuum of intrusiveness, we consider the intrusion into privacy is logically
connected to the
purpose of the search and the power does not go beyond that
which is necessary to identify relevant items or substances.
- The
requirement for the searcher to be of the same sex as the person being searched
(or the ability for the person being searched
to request to be searched by
someone of the opposite sex) may also lessen the intrusiveness of the search for
some.
- Further,
a search of the most intrusive type will not occur in every situation. A search
involving no physical contact may be sufficient
for security purposes and we
understand that, as the power is limited to a reasonable search, the least
intrusive search would be
conducted in each circumstance. We consider that it is
incumbent on those exercising the power to use the less intrusive
means.15
There are safeguards present
- The
consent of the individual being searched is always required to conduct a search
of the person. This safeguard ensures the power
is not exercised unreasonably.
We do not consider the assumption of consent where a person is at a screening
point erodes this
12 R v Simmons [1988] 2 SCR
495.
13 R v Grayson & Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR
399, (1996) 3 HRNZ 250 (CA) at 407, 260.
14 See Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, The New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington,
2015) at 18.30.10 and R v B-P [2001] NZCA 400; [2002] NZAR 157 (CA) at 166-167, R v
Boateng (1999) 5 HRNZ 450 (HC) and
Udompun v Attorney-General (2003) 7 HRNZ 238 (HC).
15 See Andrew Butler and Petra Butler, The New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington,
2015) at 18.24.17.
safeguard such that we would consider the search unreasonable. In the context
of aviation security, a person presenting at a screening
point can reasonably
expect to be searched, it is practical for authorities to assume consent, and
the individual can withdraw consent
at any time.
- A
wider range of people may be searched at landside security areas (i.e. more than
passengers and crew), however there are safeguards
to ensure that landside
security declarations are only used to address unusually high threat levels. A
landside security area declaration
would be in place for 30 days before the
declaration lapses. A fresh decision would have to be made if the situation
required landside
security areas to be in place any longer. The time limited
nature of the more expansive search power guards against the designation
being
in place for longer than is required.
- The
fact that refusal to be searched cannot of itself constitute reasonable grounds
for suspecting that an offence against the Aviation
Crimes Act 1972 has been
committed is another safeguard to ensuring searches are not
unreasonable.
The consequences for refusing to be searched are
reasonable
- The
consequences for a person who has not been searched or refuses to be searched as
required include being denied entry into certain
areas of an aerodrome, being
detained and/or committing an infringement offence. We consider that the
heightened risk of the aviation
setting and need to ensure aviation security
justify these consequences and do not undermine the reasonableness of the limit
on the
right.
- For
these reasons, we consider that the cl 142 power in respect of the search of a
person is not unreasonable for the purposes of
s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
The power to search a thing is not an unreasonable
search
- When
considering the reasonableness of the power in respect of property, we have
taken into consideration an individual’s lower
expectation of privacy
because of what is being searched and the location of the search.
- In
our view, the definition of thing is broad, as it permits the search of any
item. However, the search power does not authorise
access to data. We consider
this limits the power to that which is necessary to achieve the objective.
- The
need for consent provides a safeguard against an unreasonable search. The
circumstances in which consent is not needed (an unattended
item or where there
are reasonable grounds to suspect an imminent risk to safety and security which
requires an immediate response)
are reasonable. Obtaining consent in these
circumstances would undermine the objective of the search power and could limit
the authorities’
ability to protect aviation safety and security. We also
consider that it is justified in the context of airline travel to assume
consent
to a search is given by a person when they hand over their baggage to an airline
for its transportation.
- For
these reasons, we consider that the powers to search property within aerodromes
and navigation installations in the Bill are not
unreasonable for the purposes
of s 21 of the Bill of Rights.
Powers of entry and inspection
for monitoring, inspection and enforcement (cls 283-297);
- Clauses
283-291 give powers to inspectors appointed under the Bill related to
monitoring, investigation and enforcement.
- Clause
283 enables an inspector to enter any aviation place and conduct examinations,
tests, inquiries and inspections, as necessary
to carry out the
inspector’s functions. This may include taking photographs and
measurements, making sketches or recordings,
requiring an aviation participant
to produce information and permit the inspector to make copies of this
information, and requiring
the aviation participant to make statements.
- Clause
286 also gives the inspector the power to take or remove a sample of any
material or substance for the purpose of carrying
out their monitoring or
investigation functions.
- Further,
as already discussed in our analysis of the right to freedom of expression, cl
18 allows inspectors to require information
from aviation participants in the
course of an investigation.
- The
exercise of these powers by an inspector clearly constitutes a search for the
purpose of s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- In
considering the reasonableness of these searches we have considered the location
of the searches authorised, the level of intrusion
into personal privacy and the
safeguards attached to the search powers.
- Searches
largely take place in a commercial environment, where inspection is an expected
feature of regulation and monitoring. This
limits the intrusiveness of the
search. Where an inspector is to enter an aviation place that is, or is within,
a home, marae or
building associated with a marae, or where access to the
aviation place is through one of these spaces, the inspector must have a
warrant
or receive the consent of the occupier to enter.
- Similarly,
the material which may be obtained during a search is commercial and regulatory
in nature and is unlikely to be of high
personal privacy value. Clause 286(2)
specifically exempts a person’s body from the things that an inspector may
take samples
or gather evidence from.
- Finally,
there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that no inspections authorised under
this part of the Bill are unreasonable. For
example:
- The inspection
may only be carried out at a reasonable time (cl 283);
- If the inspector
is unable to find the person in charge of the aviation space in the course of
their inspection, they must leave a
written notice stating their contact
details, the date and time of entry and their reasons for entry (cl 285);
and,
- If an inspector
removes or takes samples from any thing, they must provide written notice of
what has been removed (cl 286(3).
- On
this basis, we consider that searches undertaken under cls 283 – 297 are
reasonable for the purposes of s 21 of the Bill
of Rights
Act.
Drug and alcohol testing of safety-sensitive workers
within the Bill
- Clauses
113 – 119 set out provisions relating to drug and alcohol testing. Clause
116 allows the Director of Civil Aviation
to appoint an inspector to carry out
drug or alcohol testing of safety-sensitive workers (i.e. people whose work
activities could
significantly affect the health and safety of people on board
an aircraft). Clause 115 requires a person
registered as a drug and
alcohol management plan (DAMP) registered operator to carry out random testing
of employees who engage in
safety-sensitive activities. These tests clearly
constitute searches for the purpose of s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
reasonableness of these searches will turn on the objective of the search, the
intrusiveness of the search and the safeguards
attached to the search.
- Alcohol
and drug testing of safety-sensitive workers within the aviation industry is
clearly rationally connected to ensuring aviation
safety. Both random testing
and compelled testing where usage is reasonably suspected hold a rational
connection to this objective.
- Testing
may hold a high level of intrusiveness, but this is in proportion to the
importance of the objective. Section 113 allows a
test to be a test of a
person’s bodily sample, which may include biological fluid, biological
tissue or breath.
- There
are a range of safeguards attached to testing. Both cls 115 and 116 require
tests to occur only with the consent of the person
being tested. Under cl 116,
an inspector must also provide the worker with a statement setting out the
purpose of the test, a description
of how the test will be carried out and an
explanation of the consequences of refusing consent for a test. The need for
consent to
be given, expressly or in advance, to testing, supports the
reasonableness of the testing.
- The
consequences of refusing consent are the same as for returning a non-negative
test for alcohol or drugs. Possible consequences
are for the worker to be
prohibited from performing safety-sensitive work until they are safely able to
perform those activities,
and for an operator or the Director to implement a
response plan. We consider that these consequences are in proportion to the risk
posed by the possibility of impaired workers carrying out safety-sensitive work.
In addition, cl 119 provides that test results may
not be used in criminal
proceedings except for in the case of prosecutions under the Civil Aviation Act
or the Health and Safety
at Work Act 2015.
- On
this basis, we consider that the drug and alcohol test provisions in the Bill
are reasonable and not in conflict with s 21 of the
Bill of Rights
Act.
Seizures within the Bill
- The
Bill also contains powers to allow for the seizure and disposal of
property.
- Clauses
149-151 allow for an aviation security officer to seize an item or substance in
controlled aviation areas where the officer
believes that there is no lawful
authority or reasonable excuse for a person to have the item or substance in a
sterile area, a landside
security area or a security enhanced area, or where the
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the item or substance may
pose an
imminent risk to aviation safety and security.
- Clause
314 allows the director of the Civil Aviation Authority to seize or detain an
aerodrome, aircraft or aeronautical product on
the basis that their operation or
use may endanger people or property, and that prompt action is necessary to
prevent the danger.
Clause 316 allows a constable or a response officer to
exercise the same powers on an unmanned aircraft, or to destroy the aircraft,
on
the basis that the aircraft is involved in the commission of an imprisonable
offence, or is about to be used in a way that may
endanger people or
property.
- These
clauses engage the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. As
with searches, an unreasonable seizure cannot be
found to be reasonably
justified in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. Therefore, the question to
be answered is whether the
seizures authorised by the Bill are reasonable.
- We
consider that the seizures authorised by the Bill are reasonable. In making this
assessment we have considered the importance of
the objective motivating
seizures, and the recourse for owners of seized property.
- Seizures
authorised under cls 149-151 support the highly important objective of ensuring
aviation safety. Where an aviation security
officer is correct in believing that
there is no lawful authority or reasonable excuse for a person to have an item
in a controlled
area, then the seizure is obviously justified. Where the
assessment of the officer proves incorrect, the officer is mandated to return
the item or substance to the person from whom it was seized if that is
practicable or, if impracticable, to return the item to another
party (for
example an airline) who has processes for returning the item to its original
owner. The process for returning items erroneously
seized mitigates the impact
of the seizure powers.
- Seizures
made under cls 314 and 316 of the Bill support the important objectives of
protecting the safety of people and property or
preventing criminal offences
being carried out.
- Recourse
against seizures under cls 314 and 316 likewise mitigates the potential harm
from these seizures. Clauses 315 and 320 set
out that seizures by the Director,
constables and response officers may only be maintained for the time period
considered necessary
to prevent danger to people or property, or to prevent the
commission of an offence, unless they are retained as evidence of an offence
being carried out. Under these clauses, the owner of the seized property has the
right to request that reasons are provided for the
seizure of their property.
Finally, owners have the right to appeal against any seizure under cls 314 or
316 to the District Court.
- On
this basis, we consider all seizures authorised by the Bill to be reasonable and
not in conflict with s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 25(c) – presumption of innocence until proven guilty
- Section
25(c) affirms the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means
that an individual must not be convicted where
reasonable doubt as to his or her
guilt exists. The prosecution must therefore prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
that the accused is
guilty.
- The
Bill contains strict liability offences.16 Strict
liability offences create a prima facie inconsistency with s 25(c) of the Bill
of Rights Act because the offence may be proved
by a finding that certain facts
occurred without proof of mens rea. The accused is required to prove a
defence (on the balance of probabilities) or disprove a presumption to avoid
liability.
- The
prima facie inconsistency with s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights may nevertheless be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if the
limits can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society, as per s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act. Relevant considerations
to
16 E.g. cls 19, 95, 108, 110(a), 110(c),
299.
this assessment are the nature and context of the conduct being regulated,
the ability of the defendants to exonerate themselves,
and the penalty
levels.
- The
strict liability offences in this Bill cover two groups of people: people who
are regulated by the civil aviation industry as
aviation participants, and
non-regulated persons in the industry, such as passengers and the general
public.
Strict liability offences relating to regulated
persons
- The
strict liability offences that apply to regulated persons largely relate to
failures to follow regulatory requirements set out
in the
Bill.17
- We
consider that the prima facie limits on regulated persons in the Bill are
justified. We have taken into account that:
- the
offences relate to the important objective of a safe and secure civil aviation
system.
- strict
liability offences are considered more justifiable where they arise in relation
to activities that are regulated. They may
be an appropriate way to incentivise
compliance and hold people accountable for their failure to comply. The limit on
the right to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty is rationally connected to
the objective of ensuring compliance with this heavily regulated
industry.
- the
defendant, as a specially regulated person in the industry, is in the best
position to justify their apparent failure to comply
with the law, rather than
requiring the Crown to prove the opposite.
- We
note, however, that some of the strict liability offences have high
penalties.
- Under
cl 41(2) (dangerous activity involving an aircraft, aeronautical product, or
aviation related service) an individual is liable
on conviction to a maximum
fine of $150,000 and any other person is liable on conviction to a fine not
exceeding $1,500,000. We consider
these fines high.
- We
understand that the Ministry of Transport considers cl 41(2) to be the most
important safety offence in the civil aviation system.
We also understand that
the high penalties are intended to reflect the fact that civil aviation regime
demands a high standard of
care due to the risks inherent in aviation (hence
aviation safety is closely regulated) and that people in the industry are
expected
to take responsibility to be aware of and follow safety rules. The high
penalties also reflect that relevant activities will often
be undertaken in a
commercial context. In these circumstances, we do not consider that the high
level of penalty undermines our conclusion
that the limits are justified.
- For
the above reasons, we consider the strict liability offences relating to
regulated persons to be justified in terms of s 25(c)
of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Strict liability offences relating to non-regulated
persons
17 E.g. cls 19, 95, 108, 110(a), 110(c), 299.
- The
strict liability offences that apply to non-regulated persons include cl
394(1)(a), (b) or (c) (disruptive conduct towards crew
member) and cl 395
(interference with aircraft). These offences are aimed at ensuring the safety
onboard airplanes.
- We
consider the prima facie limits on non-regulated persons proposed appear to be
justified. The offences are still aimed at a safe
and secure civil aviation
system. Even though they do not apply to regulated persons within that industry,
they arise in the context
of minimising harm. This is a sufficiently important
objective and the limit is rationally connected to the objective.
- The
defendant is in the best position to justify their apparent failure to comply
with the law. The general defence of total absence
of fault would apply to both
offences. The defence of ‘reasonable excuse’ is also available to a
charge against cl 395.
- The
penalty levels (a fine not exceeding $5,000 for committing an offence against
cl 392(1)(a), (b) or (c) and a fine not exceeding
$10,000 for committing an
offence against cl 395) are proportionate to the importance of the Bill’s
objective.
- We
are satisfied that the strict liability offences that apply to non-regulated
persons are justified in terms of s 25(c) of the Bill
of Rights Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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