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Retail Payment System Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 21 and 25) [2021] NZBORARp 62 (23 September 2021)
Last Updated: 31 October 2021
23 September 2021
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Retail Payment System
Amendment Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Retail Payment System Bill (the Bill) is consistent
with the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
(the Bill of Rights Act).
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with s 14 (freedom of expression), s
25 (minimum standards of criminal
procedure) and s 21 (freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure). Our analysis is set out below.
The Bill
- The
purpose of the Bill is to promote competition and efficiency in the retail
payment system for the long-term benefit of merchants
and consumers in New
Zealand.
- To
achieve this the Bill is introducing a regulatory regime. The Commerce
Commission (the Commission) will be the regulator of this
new regulatory
regime.
- The
Bill sets out a process and factors for the Commission to apply to determine
which retail payment networks should be designated
for regulation.
- The
Commission can issue network standards and directions that designated networks
must comply with. These may cover information disclosure,
pricing, and access to
infrastructure or the network.
- In
exercising its powers under the Bill, the Commission will be able to use
existing enforcement and functional powers provided by
the Commerce Act 1986
(the Commerce Act). The Bill also gives the Commission additional powers when
regulating designated networks.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Interaction with other legislation
- Our
analysis reveals that the Bill engages several rights and freedoms affirmed
under the Bill of Rights Act by applying existing
provisions of the Commerce Act
to a new regulatory regime, through sections 37 and 39 of the Bill.
- We
have determined that the freedoms and rights engaged by these Commerce Act
provisions do not fall within the scope of our analysis,
except in relation to s
39(p) of the Bill, which is discussed at paragraph 22
below.
Sections 38(c)-(e) of the Bill
- Sections
38(c)-(e) of the Bill empower the Commission to compel participants to provide
information; and non-compliance with such
a requirement will be an offence under
s 103 of the Commerce Act.1
Section 21
– Unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property, or
correspondence or otherwise.
- There
are two limbs to the section 21 right. First, section 21 is applicable only in
respect of those activities that constitute a
“search or seizure”.
Secondly, where certain actions do constitute a search or seizure, section 21
protects only against
those searches or seizures that are
“unreasonable” in the circumstances.
- We
consider that the power to compel information under ss 38(c)-(e) of the Bill
constitutes a search for the purposes of s 21 of the
Bill of Rights
Act.2
- The
next question is whether this search power is reasonable. In assessing this, we
have considered the place of the search, the degree
of intrusiveness into
privacy, and reasons why it is necessary.3
- We
consider that the search powers in ss 38(c)-(e) of the Bill are reasonable, and
therefore consistent with s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act. This is
because:
- the
search powers contribute to the important objective of administering, and
ensuring compliance with, the regulatory regime;
- the
search powers are exercised by written notice, rather than physical entry onto
premises, which is less of an intrusion into a
person’s expectation of
privacy; and
- a
regulated supplier in a marketplace has less of an expectation of privacy than
an ordinary citizen.
Section 14 – Freedom of
expression
- In
addition to engaging s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act, we consider that ss
38(c)-(e) also engage s 14 of that Act.
- Section
14 affirms the right to freedom of expression, and has been interpreted as
including the right not to be compelled to say
certain things or provide certain
information.4
1 Pursuant to s 39(p) of the Bill.
2 New Zealand Stock Exchange v Comissioner of Inland
Revenue [1992] 3 NZLR 1 (PCP).
3 Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR
305 at [172] per Blanchard J.
4 See, for example, Slaight Communications v
Davidson 59 DLR (4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705 (1977).
- We
consider that the powers contained in ss 38(c)-(e) of the Bill limit the right
to freedom of expression. However, we consider that
this limit is justified
under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, for the reasons canvassed at
paragraph 15.
Sections 20 and 32 of the Bill
- Sections
17 and 30 of the Bill empower secondary legislation (referred to as
“standards”) to be made, in order to regulate
designated networks
and merchant surcharging respectively. Sections 20 and 32 provide that these
standards may compel participants
or merchants to disclose certain
information.
- These
empowering provisions do not, in themselves, limit the right to freedom of
expression, and are accordingly consistent with the
Bill of Rights Act. However,
secondary legislation made under these empowering provisions may limit the right
to freedom of expression.
We note for completeness that secondary legislation
must be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act, otherwise it risks being ultra
vires.
Section 39(p) of the Bill
- Section
25 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to minimum standards of criminal
procedure. This includes s 25(c), which protects
the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
- We
have considered s 39(p) of the Bill in our analysis, because this section
provides that the Commission’s new powers in s
38 of the Bill are
enforceable by existing offences in s 103(1)(a) and (b) of the Commerce Act. We
consider that s 103(1)(a) of the
Commerce Act, as modified by s 39(p) of the
Bill, contains a strict liability offence for where a person, without reasonable
excuse,
refuses or fails to comply with a notice given under s 38 of the Bill or
s 98 of the Commerce Act.
- Strict
liability offences prima facie limit s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act by
shifting the onus of proof onto a defendant. We have
therefore considered
whether this limit can be justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
- We
consider that this limit is justified because:
- these
provisions have the important objective of supporting the promotion of
competition and efficiency in the retail payment system;
- the
limit is rationally linked to this objective, as it encourages greater efficacy
in the supervision of, and maximum compliance
with, the regulatory
regime;
- the
offence involves straightforward issues of fact, and the relevant context is
often only known to the defendant. In such cases,
it is easier for the defendant
to explain why he or she took (or failed to take) a course of action than it is
for the Crown to prove
the opposite, justifying a strict liability
offence;
- the
penalty for this offence is a fine only.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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