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Forests (Legal Harvest Assurance) Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14,21, 25(c)) [2022] NZBORARp 11 (5 May 2022)
Last Updated: 24 May 2022
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
5 May 2022
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Forests (Legal Harvest
Assurance) Amendment Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Forests (Legal Harvest Assurance) Amendment Bill
(the Bill) is consistent with the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill of Rights Act).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO 23235/13.4). We will provide
you with further advice if the final version of the Bill includes amendments
that affect the conclusions
in this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion we have
considered the consistency of the Bill with s 14 (freedom of expression), s 21
(freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure) and s 25(c) (right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty). Our analysis is set out
below.
The Bill
- The
Bill amends the Forests Act 1949 (the principal Act) to establish a new
regulatory system to provide legal harvest assurance for
the forestry and wood-
processing sector, both for assurance to export markets about the legality of
the harvested New Zealand wood,
and for assurance about the legality of harvest
of imported wood. The legal harvest system will apply to exotic timber and
specified
timber products. It will generally not apply to a person trading in
New Zealand indigenous timber, with some exceptions.
- The
regime is expected to operate in a manner that will assist in the prevention of
international trade in illegally harvested timber;
strengthen the international
reputation of the New Zealand forestry and wood-processing sector; safeguard and
enhance market access
for New Zealand forestry exports; and reduce the risk that
imported timber is sourced from illegally harvested timber.
- The
Bill inserts new parts 5, 6, 7 and new Schedule 3 into the principal Act and
makes a number of other consequential amendments.
New part 5 relates to legal
harvest assurance. It establishes a regulatory system for legal harvest,
which;
- requires
a person who is responsible for harvesting regulated timber to provide legal
harvest information about timber, keep the legal
harvest information up-to-date;
and keep records of any legal harvest information they have
provided;
- requires
a person to be registered for legal harvest before acting as a log trader or
carrying out the first processing of New Zealand
logs, importing or exporting
any specified timber product (in trade);
- requires
those registered for legal harvest to have a due diligence system to eliminate
or mitigate the risk of them dealing in timber
that is not legally
harvested;
- requires
the due diligence system to be assessed by an assessor or a recognised
agency;
- provides
for the registration of assessors and recognised agencies; and,
- enables
the Secretary to issue exporter statements and impose export
requirements.
- New
Part 6 relates to log traders and it:
- establishes
a regulatory system for log traders; and,
- imposes
obligations on registered log traders to ensure logs grown in New Zealand are
bought and sold in a way that is transparent
and professional.
- New
Part 7 contains provisions relating to cost recovery.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 14 - freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form. Section 14 has been interpreted as including
the freedom not
to be compelled to say certain things or to be compelled to
provide certain information.1
- The
Bill requires the provision of information by operators within the forestry
sector in a large range of circumstances.2 The
requiring of information in these circumstances prima facie engages the
right to freedom of expression.
- However,
a limit of a right or freedom may be justified with relation to s 5 of the Bill
of Rights Act. Justification under s 5 occurs
where the limit is rationally
connected to a sufficiently important objective; impairs the right or freedom no
more than reasonably
necessary to achieve the objective; and is otherwise in
proportion to the importance of the objective.3
- The
information required from operators in the forestry sector within the Bill
serves the important objective of supporting efficient
regulation of the timber
trade, and preventing the global trade in illegally harvested timber products.
The information
1 See, for example, Slaight
Communications v Davidson 59 DLR (4th) 416;
Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705 (1977).
2 See, for example, new sections 79, 86, 87, 93, 95,
103, 108, 119, 129, 135, 138, 176A, 181, 187,
187A, 198 and 201 of new parts 5 and 6 of the principal Act.
3 See Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR
1 (SC).
that may be collected is restricted to information relevant to assuring the
legal operation of businesses. We consider the information
provision required
within the Bill to be minimally limiting and proportionate to the Bill’s
objective because;
- operators
captured within the Bill have chosen to engage in a regulated activity, with an
expectation of following appropriate standards
of practice and reporting;
- the
information gathered is commercial and regulatory in nature, and of limited
expressive value; and,
- the
Bill provides exception regimes for many of the classes of information that may
be required, allowing an operator to be excepted
from providing information
where that information would not be relevant to the Bill’s purpose, for
example because of the operator’s
size.
- For
these reasons we consider that any limits within the Bill on the right to
freedom of expression are justified under s 5 of the
Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 21 – freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property,
correspondence or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including
personal privacy, dignity,
and
property.4
Power to compel
information
- New
ss 138 and 176A provide the Secretary5 with the power
to require information by notice from a person who has obligations under new
Part 5 or new Part 6 respectively. Failure
to provide information under s 138
when required is a strict liability offence under new s 144.
- The
power to compel information is a search for the purposes of s 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- Ordinarily,
a provision found to limit a particular right or freedom may nevertheless be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered reasonably
justified in terms of s 5 of that Act. However, the Supreme Court has held that
an unreasonable search
logically cannot be reasonably justified and therefore
the inquiry does not need to be undertaken.6
- Rather,
the assessment to be undertaken is first, whether what occurs is a search or
seizure, and, if so, whether that search or seizure
is reasonable. In assessing
whether this search power is reasonable, we have considered the place of the
search, the degree of intrusiveness
into privacy, and the reasons why it is
necessary.7
4 See, for example, Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
5 Defined in s 2 of the principal Act as the Chief
Executive of the Ministry for Primary Industries. 6
Above n1 at [162].
- Requiring
a person to provide information serves the important objective of supporting
efficient regulation of the timber trade, and
preventing the global trade in
illegally harvested timber products. There are also several safeguards on the
exercise of the information
gathering power. The Secretary may only require
information from persons who have obligations under new Part 5 or new Part 6
(for
example those registered for legal harvest or registered log traders) and
not from other persons. The Secretary may only compel information
if satisfied
it is required for certain purposes relevant to determining whether a person is
‘fit and proper’ (in relation
to new s 138 only), verifying whether
they are complying with their obligations, or gathering statistical information
on the forestry
supply chain or the legal harvest system.
- For
these reasons we consider the power to compel information is
reasonable.
Power of entry and inspection
- New
s 139 provides a power for an officer to enter and inspect a place (other than a
dwelling house or a marae) without a search warrant
for the purpose of
determining whether a person is complying with provisions relating to legal
harvest in the primary legislation,
secondary legislation or notices given under
the Bill.
- This
constitutes a search for the purposes of s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act. In
assessing whether this search power is reasonable,
we have considered the place
of the search, the degree of intrusiveness into privacy, and the reasons why it
is necessary.8
- The
purpose of the power is to monitor compliance with the legal harvest regime.
This monitoring serves the important objective of
supporting efficient
regulation of the timber trade, and preventing the global trade in illegally
harvested timber products. We understand
that the power is intended to be used
where there is indication of potential non-compliance. For example, an
indication that a registered
person is not complying with due diligence
obligations relating to legal harvest.
- The
warrantless power of entry and inspection cannot be used to enter a dwelling
house or marae, so those places where the expectation
of privacy is greater
cannot be accessed under this provision. Entry and search of those places
requires a warrant (see new s 140).
- The
places that may be entered are further qualified in new s 139(3) to be tied to
places where the activities regulated under the
Bill are undertaken. The
“places” are:
- a
place where a responsible person, person registered for legal harvest, or
assessor operates; or
- any
land, premises, vehicle, conveyance, ship, aircraft, railway, railcar, or bulk
cargo container, or other area or thing where the
officer reasonably believes
any of the following will be found:
- timber
that results from the harvest of New Zealand logs;
or
- specified
timber products:
- documents,
records, or other information that relate to carrying out a regulated
activity.
- The
places that may be entered are workspaces of a regulated industry and have a
lesser expectation of privacy. Regulated operators
will be aware that their
activities will periodically be subject to inspection.9
The entry and inspection must also take place at a “reasonable
time” (see s 139(2)).
- On
this basis, we regard the warrantless entry and inspection power under the Bill
as being reasonable, and thus consistent with s
21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 25(c) – presumption of innocence until proven guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that anyone charged with an offence has
the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to the law. The
right to be presumed innocent requires that an individual must be proven guilty
beyond reasonable
doubt, and that the State must bear the burden of
proof.10
- In
order to give full recognition to this right, which is also a fundamental
principle of criminal law, the legal burden of proving
every element of an
offence to the required standard of proof, and the onus for disproving any
potentially available defence, must
remain on the
prosecution.
Strict liability offences
- New
ss 143(1)(b), 144(1) and 193(1) contain a number of strict liability offences
relating to requirements not to provide false information,
and other aspects of
the legal harvest and log traders. Some statutory defences are provided. For
example, if the defendant can show
they did not know information was false, and
took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to ensure it was not
false,
or if the defendant can show the commission of certain offences was due
to the act or omission of another, an accident or some other
circumstance
outside their control.11 The maximum penalty for an
offence under any of these provisions is a fine not exceeding $40,000 for and
individual, or not exceeding
$100,000 in any other case.
- Strict
liability offences prima facie limit s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act. This is
because a strict liability offence may be proved
by a finding that certain facts
occurred without proof of mens rea. The accused is required to prove a
defence (on the balance of probabilities), or disprove a presumption, to avoid
liability. This
means that, where the accused is unable to prove a defence, they
could be convicted even where reasonable doubt exists as to their
guilt.
Justification
- A
reverse onus may nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if the
grounds for the offence are rationally connected
to a sufficiently important
objective; the onus impairs the right or freedom no more than reasonably
9 See Andrew Butler and Petra Butler,
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (2nd
ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at 18.24.20 and 18:29.5.
10 R v Wholesale Travel Group (1992) 84 DLR
(4th) 161, 188 citing R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
necessary to achieve the objective; and is otherwise in proportion to the
importance of the objective.12
- As
mentioned above, the Bill serves the important objective of supporting efficient
regulation of the timber trade, and preventing
the global trade in illegally
harvested timber products.
- We
consider that the strict liability offences limit the right no more than
necessary and are proportionate because:
- the
offences are regulatory in nature and apply to persons participating in a highly
regulated industry;
- the
defendant will be the best position to justify their apparent failure to comply
with the law, rather than requiring the Crown
to prove the opposite;
and
- the
penalty for the offence in each instance is a fine and is proportionate to the
importance of the Bill’s objective.
- Accordingly,
we consider that the limits the Bill places on the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty are justified under
s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act and
therefore consistent with s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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