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Deposit Takers Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 21, 25(c) and 27) [2022] NZBORARp 34 (4 August 2022)
Last Updated: 30 September 2022
4 August 2022
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Deposit Takers Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Deposit Takers Bill (the Bill) is consistent with
the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the
Bill of Rights Act).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO 022618/7.9). We will provide
you with further advice if the final version includes amendments that affect the
conclusions in
this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with s 14 (freedom of expression), s
21 (freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure), s 25(c) (the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law), and s 27 (right to
justice).
Our analysis is set out below.
The Bill
- The
Deposit Takers Bill merges the currently separate regulatory frameworks for
registered banks and licensed non-bank deposit takers
under a single regime. The
Bill repeals and replaces the Banking (Prudential Supervision) Act 1989, and the
Non-bank Deposit Takers
Act 2013, and makes amendments to the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand Act 2021, the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, the Public Finance
Act 1989, and the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010.
- The
Bill modernises the Reserve Bank’s (the Bank) legislation for prudential
regulation and supervision of the deposit-taking
sector. The main purpose of the
Bill is to promote the prosperity and well-being of New Zealanders and
contribute to a sustainable
and productive economy by protecting and promoting
the stability of the financial system. To that end, other purposes of the Bill
include:
- Promoting
the safety and soundness of deposit takers;1
- Promoting
public confidence in the financial system; and
- Avoiding
or mitigating adverse effects of risks involving the financial
system.
- The
changes made by the Bill include:
- Modernising
the licensing process for entities involved in borrowing and lending;
- Enabling
a range of prudential standards to be applied to particular deposit takers or
classes of deposit takers;
1 Deposit taker means a person
that carries on the business of borrowing and lending money.
- Expanding
the suite of supervisory and enforcement tools available to the Bank to regulate
deposit takers; and
- Introducing
the Depositor Compensation Scheme, a fund that will be available to compensate
eligible depositors where a deposit taker
is in serious financial or other
difficulties, as well as creditors or shareholders that may be made worse off as
a result of a resolution
action under the Bill relative to outcomes under
liquidation.
- The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 2021 is companion legislation to the Bill,
focusing on the institutional foundations for the Reserve
Bank’s
prudential responsibilities and other functions.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 14 – freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form. The right has been interpreted as including
the right not to
be compelled to say certain things or to provide certain
information.2
- The
Bill includes provisions that limit the right to freedom of expression
by:
- Requiring
licensed deposit takers and others to provide the Bank and, in some instances,
each other with information about the business,
operation or management of
licensed deposit takers to assist with the performance of functions under the
Act.3 Contravention of most provisions which compel
information is either a strict liability or infringement offence. Under clause
144,
a person is not excused from answering questions or giving information on
the ground that to do so would or might incriminate them;
- Prohibiting
communications by anyone about the exercise of certain functions under the
Act;4
- Restricting
further use and disclosure of certain information by people to whom the bank
shares information received under the Act;5
and
- Requiring
that information be provided in a manner specified by the
Bank.6
- Other
provisions in the Bill limit the right to freedom of expression by placing
restrictions and requirements on what deposit takers
and others may communicate
to the public. This includes:
- Prohibiting
persons from falsely holding out that they are a licensed deposit
taker;7
2 See, for example, Slaight
Communications v Davidson 59 DLR (4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US
705 (1977).
3 Clauses 30, 31, 32, 40, 43, 64, 65, 99, 101, 102,
108, 116, 119(2)(b), 120(1)(b), 121, 341, 375, 377, 378,
413, 417, and 449. Clauses 80 and 85 to 88 authorise the Bank to issue
prudential standards requiring the provision of information
by deposit takers or
particular classes of deposit takers. Powers to compel information in the
investigatory context are discussed
separately below in relation to s 21 of the
Bill of Rights Act (freedom from unreasonable search and seizure).
4 Clauses 130 and 269.
5 Clauses 442 and 443.
6 Clauses 47, 90, Part 8 subpart 4.
7 Clause 13.
- Requiring
transparency around credit ratings8 and which financial
products are protected deposits for the purposes of the depositor compensation
scheme;9
- Restricting
the use of the words bank, banker and banking;10
and
- Enabling
the Bank to require deposit takers to publish reports relating to any aspect of
their operations11 or the fact that they have been
warned by the Bank about a suspected contravention of a prudential obligation or
fraudulent or reckless
operation.12
Is
the limitation justified and proportionate under s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act?
- Where
a provision is found to limit any particular right or freedom, it may
nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act
if it can be considered a
reasonable limit that is demonstrably justifiable in terms of s 5 of that Act.
The s 5 inquiry is approached
as
follows:13
- Does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation on the right or freedom?
- If
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected to the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
- We
consider that any limits contained within the provisions specified in para 9 above are necessary for the effective
operation of the regulatory regime by which the stability of New Zealand’s
financial system
is protected. The effective supervision of deposit takers and
appropriate management of risks require the provision of information
(including
self- incriminating information) not only to the Bank but also to other parties,
as well as the limitations on disclosure
and communications about the exercise
of functions under the Bill. We consider that these provisions impair s 14 no
more than is
reasonably necessary and are in due proportion to the importance of
the objectives, noting that the obligations apply only to participants
in a
regulated activity and that the information that may be required is of limited
expressive value.
- We
also consider that any limitations on the right to freedom of expression
contained within the provisions specified in para 10 above are also justified. The public
availability of this kind of information, and the restrictions imposed, are
necessary to enable
the public to make informed investment decisions, and to
maintain the integrity of and public confidence in the financial system.
We
consider that these provisions impair s 14 no more than is reasonably necessary,
noting again that the provisions apply only to
participants in a regulated
industry.
- Overall,
we consider that the limits imposed by the Bill on the right to freedom of
expression are justified under s 5 of the Bill
of Rights Act.
8 Clauses 66 to 69.
9 Clauses 192 and 255.
10 Clauses 422, 431, 433.
11 Clause 103.
12 Clauses 133 and 135.
13 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7.
Section 21 – freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, property,
correspondence or otherwise. The right protects a number of values including
personal property, dignity,
and
privacy.14
Powers of entry, inspection
and information gathering
- The
Bill contains powers of entry and inspection, and to require the provision of
information in an investigatory context, that constitute
search powers for the
purposes of s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.15 In
particular:
- The
Bank may enter and remain at a relevant place to carry out an on-site inspection
of a regulated party, without notice, for certain
purposes;16
- During
an on-site investigation, the Bank may require any employee, director or agent
of a licensed deposit taker to answer questions
and give all other information
that the Bank may reasonably require for the purpose of the
inspection;17
- An
investigator may compel the provision of information or enter and search any
place for the purposes of carrying an out an investigation;18
and
- The
Bank may authorise an overseas supervisor19 to
undertake an on-site inspection of a licensed deposit
taker.20
Powers to seize and
manage assets
- The
Bill also contains crisis management and resolution powers. Resolution is
similar to statutory management under the Corporations
(Investigation and
Management) Act 1989. It requires an Order in Council,21
which can only be sought when a licensed deposit taker is or is likely to
become insolvent or has contravened certain prudential obligations,
or when an
overseas supervisor has taken or is taking regulatory action against the
licensed deposit taker or the person who controls
it. The Bank must also be
satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of the matters being adequately
dealt with to its satisfaction
in a timely and orderly way other than through a
resolution.22
- The
Bank must appoint or act as resolution manager in relation to a licensed deposit
taker in resolution. Under cl 299, management
of the licensed deposit taker
vests in the resolution manager, who has broad powers to carry on the business
of a licensed deposit
taker23 and
14 See, for example, Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
15 New Zealand Stock Exchange v
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1992] 3 NZLR 1 (PCP).
16 Clause 112.
17 Clause 113.
18 See clauses 127 and 128.
19 Overseas supervisor means any authority or body
in any country other than New Zealand that performs functions in relation to
deposit
takers that correspond with, or are similar to, those conferred on the
Bank. 20 Clauses 138 and 139.
21 Clause 271.
22 Clause 277.
23 Clause 303.
manage or dispose of its property.24 We consider
that these powers constitute seizure for the purposes of s 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Are the search and seizure powers reasonable?
- Ordinarily,
a provision found to limit a particular right or freedom may be consistent with
the Bill of Rights Act if it can be considered
reasonably justified in terms of
s 5 of that Act. However, the Supreme Court has held that an unreasonable search
logically cannot
be demonstrably justified and therefore the inquiry does not
need to be undertaken.25 Rather, s 21 is self-limiting
in that the assessment to be undertaken is whether the search power is
reasonable. The reasonableness
of a search and seizure can be assessed with
reference to the purpose of the search and seizure and the degree of intrusion
on the
values which the right seeks to protect.
- We
consider the search powers in the Bill are consistent with its purposes of
protecting and promoting the stability of the financial
system and reasonable in
the circumstances. The powers apply only to participants in a regulated activity
and are necessary to monitor
compliance with the regime set up by the Bill. Any
intrusion into privacy is minimal, and there will not be another viable way for
the bank to obtain the information. We also consider that the search powers are
appropriately limited in scope, noting for example:
- The
Bank’s search powers must be exercised at a reasonable time and in a
reasonable manner; 26
- Investigators
may only enter and search a place with the consent of the occupier or a
warrant;27 and
- The
Bank must notify a licensed deposit taker if it authorises access to information
by an overseas supervisor.28
- We
also consider that the seizure powers discussed at paras 17 and 18 above are
reasonable. While substantial and wide-ranging, they
are likely to be used
rarely and are subject to procedural safeguards.
- Accordingly,
we consider that the search and seizure provisions of the Bill are reasonable,
and therefore consistent with s 21 of
the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 25(c) – right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that anyone charged with an offence has
the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to the law. The
right to be presumed innocent requires that an individual must be proven guilty
beyond reasonable
doubt, and that the state must bear the burden of
proof.29
Strict liability
offences
- Strict
liability offences prima facie limit s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act. This is
because a strict liability offence may be proved
by finding that certain facts
occurred without proof of mens rea. The accused is then required to prove a
defence (on the balance
of probabilities), or
24 See for example clauses 307, 311 and
316.
25 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1
(SC) at [162] per Blanchard J
26 Clause 112.
27 Clause 128.
28 Clause 139.
29 R v Wholesale Travel Group (1992) 84 DLR
(4th) 161, 188 citing R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
disprove a presumption, to avoid liability; whereas in other criminal
proceedings an accused must merely raise a defence in an effort
to create
reasonable doubt.
- Strict
liability offences may nevertheless be justifiable limits on rights under s 5 of
the Bill of Rights Act. They have been found
to be more likely to be justifiable
where:
- The
offences are regulatory in nature and apply to persons participating in a highly
regulated industry;
- The
defendant will be in the best position to justify their apparent failure to
comply with the law, rather than requiring the Crown
to prove the opposite;
and,
- The
penalty for the offence is proportionate to the importance of the Bill’s
objective.
- The
Bill contains a range of strict liability offences, some of which include a
defence of reasonable excuse.30 Clause 184 also
provides a general defence in relation to most of the strict liability offences
in the Bill, for the defendant to
prove that the contravention was due to the
conduct of an unrelated person, an accident, or another cause beyond their
control, and
that they took reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence
to avoid it. The Bill also preserves the common law defence of
total absence of
fault.
- Most
strict liability offences in the Bill (with the exception of cl 344, which we
discuss separately below) are punishable by fines
ranging from $50,000 to
$100,000 for an individual and $500,000 to $2.5 million for body
corporates.
- The
strict liability offences in the Bill operate as part of a scheme to regulate
deposit takers to avoid and mitigate risks involving
the financial system.
Deposit takers are sophisticated commercial entities operating in a highly
regulated industry, and would be
in a better position to justify a contravention
of the Bill’s requirements than a prosecuting agency would be to prove
mens
rea.
- It
is a general principle that strict liability offences are associated with
penalties at the lower end of the scale. The financial
penalties for strict
liability offences in the Bill are significantly higher than fines typically
associated with strict liability
offences. Nevertheless, we consider these fines
are reasonable in the context of a highly regulated financial industry. The
fines
are likely to be commensurate to affected entities’ and
individuals’ ability to pay, and necessary to contribute to the
purposes
of the offence regime (including deterrence and punishment). A court retains the
discretion to impose a lower penalty than
the maximum described in the
Bill.
- Accordingly,
we consider that the offences in the Bill are proportionate and justifiable
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Clause 344
- Clause
344 of the Bill provides that it is an offence for a licensed deposit taker to
destroy, alter, or conceal records when in resolution.
In relation to this
clause, we note:
- Clause
344(1)(a) creates an offence of destroying, altering or concealing records with
a mens rea element of “intent to defeat
the purposes of [Part 7 of the
Bill]”. However, this is subject to a rebuttable presumption in cl 344(3)
that any person proven
to have
30 Strict liability offences are
found in clauses 27, 33, 36, 51, 60, 100, 104, 106, 114, 117, 129, 137, 143,
151, 270, 344, 385, 399, 403, 415, 423, 432, 434.
committed the offence did so with the requisite intention. We consider this
reverse onus provision engages s 25(c) of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- Clause
344(1)(b) creates an offence of failing or refusing to answer questions asked by
the Bank, to the best of their knowledge or
ability. We consider this is a
strict liability offence as it does not include a mens rea
element.
- These
offences carry a penalty of one year’s imprisonment or a fine not
exceeding $100,000 (or both) for an individual, and
a fine of up to $2.5 million
in any other circumstances.
- As
with the strict liability offences discussed above, this offence applies to
participants in a highly regulated industry who would
generally be in the best
position to justify their conduct.
- Although
the potential for imprisonment for a strict liability offence is highly unusual,
we consider that in this instance the severity
of the penalty is in proportion
to the significant harm that could be caused by a contravention of s 344(1).
Destroying, altering,
or concealing records could severely impede the conduct of
a resolution and put New Zealand’s financial system at risk. The
penalty
generally corresponds to existing penalties applicable to deposit takers in the
Reserve Bank Act 1989 and the Non-bank Deposit
Takers Act 2013. As above, a
court retains a discretion as to both the type and extent of any penalty. While
finely balanced, we
consider the potential for imprisonment as a penalty for a
strict liability is a justified limit on s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights
Act in
this particular regulatory context.
Infringement offences
- The
Bill contains a number of infringement offences with associated infringement
fees or fines imposed by a court.31 The infringement
offences are strict liability offences, and accordingly they prima facie limit s
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act.
- In
contrast to the other offences (including strict liability offences discussed
above), the actions being punished by the infringement
offences are of
relatively low seriousness. As the offences seek to deter regulated entities
from circumventing the requirements
in the Bill, we consider that they are
rationally connected to the objectives of the Bill.
- The
infringement offences in the Bill carry infringement fees of $10,000 or $20,000,
or fines imposed by a court not exceeding $25,000
or $50,000. We note that these
are relatively high penalties. However, we consider that the fees are reasonable
in the circumstances
largely for the reasons canvassed at paras 28 and 29
above.
- We
consider that, as the infringement offences in the Bill relate to public welfare
regulatory matters and result only in a monetary
penalty and not a criminal
conviction, the limit on the right can be justified under s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Section 27 – Natural justice
- Section
27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act provides that every person has the right to the
observance of the principles of natural justice
by any public authority with the
power to make a determination in respect of their rights, obligations, or
interests protected or
recognised by law.
- Clause
421 of the Bill provides that no licensed deposit taker or related person is
entitled to be consulted, informed, or make representations
about the exercise
or possible exercise of
31 Infringement offences are found in
clauses 30, 31, 40, 43, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 192.
any powers conferred by Part 7 of the Bill, which includes the Bank’s
powers to take resolution action in relation to a deposit
taker in financial
distress.
- We
accept that clause 421 of the Bill limits s 27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act, but
consider the limit to be justified in terms of
s 5. In the absence of such a
provision, an affected entity could misuse the opportunity presented by advance
notice of resolution
action by taking actions that would undermine the
objectives of resolution. In reaching our view that the limit in clause 421 is
justified, we are mindful that its wording does not preclude prior notice or
consultation in appropriate cases. We further note that
equivalent provisions
are a common feature of statutory management regimes, including those which
currently apply to registered banks
and licensed non-bank deposit
takers.32
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
32 Section 147 Reserve Bank
of New Zealand Act 1989, section 64 Companies (Investigation and Management) Act
1989.
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