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Immigration (Mass Arrivals) Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 21) [2022] NZBORARp 77 (1 December 2022)
Last Updated: 16 April 2023
1 December 2022
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Immigration (Mass
Arrivals) Amendment Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Immigration (Mass Arrivals) Amendment Bill
(‘the Bill’) is consistent with the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘the
Bill of Rights
Act’).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO 22498/3.0). We will provide
you with further advice if the final version includes amendments that affect the
conclusions in
this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with s 14 (freedom of expression), s
21 (right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure) and s 22 (right to be
free from arbitrary detention). Our analysis is set out
below.
The Bill
- The
Bill amends the Immigration Act 2009 (“the principal Act”) to ensure
that Immigration New Zealand is able to manage
an irregular mass maritime
arrival (a mass arrival) in an orderly and safe manner.
1
- The
Bill:
- provides
explicit confirmation that members of a mass arrival group are required to apply
for a temporary entry class visa; and
- allows
for an extension of the usual court process for determining warrants of
commitment to detain members of a mass arrival
group.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 14 – Freedom of expression and section 21 – Freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure
- Clause
6 of the Bill inserts new ss 103(1)(daa) and 103(2A) into the principal Act.
These sections provide that a person who is a
member of a mass arrival group,
who is not the holder of a visa granted under the principal Act, must apply for
a temporary entry
visa, and if they do not they must be treated as if they had
applied for a visa.
1 A mass arrival is defined in s 9A of the
principal Act as meaning a group of more than 30 people, who arrive on the same
craft, or
group of craft, without any visa or entry permission allowing them to
lawfully enter New Zealand.
- Applying
for a temporary visa under the principal Act means that the applicant must
comply with a number of requests that may be made
by an immigration
officer.
- Among
the obligations that an applicant may be required to comply with
are:
- to
submit to an interview by an immigration officer, to produce further information
or evidence (including photographs) that the officer
thinks necessary for him or
her to determine the application, or to undergo a medical examination as set out
in the Immigration (Visa,
Entry Permission and Related Matters) Regulations
2010; and
- to
provide biometric information in accordance with s 111(1) of the principal
Act.
- Where
these obligations are not complied with a person may be denied entry into New
Zealand.
- The
requirements referred to above engage rights and freedoms affirmed under the
Bill of Rights Act. Requiring a person to provide
information engages the right
to freedom of expression, which has been interpreted by the courts to include
the right not to be compelled
to say certain things or to provide certain
information.2 Requiring a person to provide biometric
information and submit to a medical assessment amounts to a search of the person
under s 21
of the Bill of Rights Act.
- We
will assess the consistency of these requirements with the Bill of Rights Act as
a single piece of analysis, as they stem from
the single action of requiring a
person to apply for a temporary entry visa, or, if they refuse, of treating the
person as if they
had applied for an entry visa.
- Where
a provision is found to limit a particular right or freedom, it may nevertheless
be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered a reasonable
limit that is justifiable under s 5 of that Act.
- The
s 5 inquiry may be approached as follows:
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?3
- With
respect to legislative provisions that engage s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act,
the question is whether the search is reasonable.
The Supreme Court has held
that an unreasonable search or seizure cannot be demonstrably justified with
reference to s 5.4
- Requiring
a person who enters New Zealand as part of a mass arrival group to be treated as
if they have applied for a temporary entry
visa, whether or not they agree to
applying
2 See, for example, Slaight
Communications v Davidson 59 DLR (4th) 416;
Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705 (1977).
3 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7.
4 Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] 3 NZLR
744 at [33]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [162].
for that visa, serves the important objective of protecting New
Zealand’s security through ensuring safe and orderly management
of the
mass arrival. If a person arriving as part of a mass arrival were to be allowed
to refuse to apply for a visa they would have
no legal status for being in New
Zealand. They could present a risk to New Zealand society, either in terms of
security or as the
carrier of a communicable disease, however, the government
would not be able to assess this risk.
- The
obligations associated with the visa application process are rationally
connected to ensuring that those who enter New Zealand
as part of a mass arrival
group are quickly processed, are not allowed to abscond, and are also supported
on their arrival. The obligations
materially assist Immigration New Zealand in
determining the identity of arrivals, evaluating potential security risks
associated
with their arrival, and conducting needs assessments for health and
other services.
- The
obligations being placed on mass arrivals are no different from the obligations
on any other person who applies for a temporary
visa. These obligations have
been considered proportionate and justified in the processing of all other
people on temporary visas.
They are targeted at collecting the information
necessary to determine whether a person should be allowed to enter New Zealand
and
on what immigration basis, and to enable immigration staff to manage support
for the person on their arrival.
- In
the ordinary course, people arriving in New Zealand in a conventional manner
choose to make an application for entry permission,
and so can be taken to have
consented to the requirements outlined above at paragraph 8. In the case of members of a mass arrival
group, they will have been deemed to have made an application for entry and
consent is
less clear-cut. We have considered whether this affects the
justification arguments. We have concluded that it does not, on the basis
that
the policy reasons for requiring people to seek entry permission apply
regardless of how the person has arrived.
- For
these reasons, we conclude that any limits to the freedom of expression in the
Bill are justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act, and also that any
searches carried out under the Bill are not unreasonable, and thus do not
contravene s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Section 22 – Right to be free from arbitrary detention
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to be free from arbitrary
detention. Section 22 recognises that there are circumstances
where it will be
necessary for the state to detain individuals, but that there are limits on the
legitimate use of state power for
that purpose. The purpose of the right is the
protection of human dignity, autonomy and
liberty.5
- There
has been considerable discussion in domestic and international case law
regarding the definitions and boundaries of arbitrary
detention. The Court of
Appeal has described a detention as being arbitrary “if it is capricious,
unreasoned, without reasonable
cause: if it is made without reference to an
adequate determining principle or without following proper
procedures.”6 Similarly, the United Kingdom House
of Lords has set out a two-step description of lawful detention, ruling that:
7
- The
detention must be for an authorised purpose (e.g. prior to deportation); and
5 R v Briggs [2009] NZCA
244 at [85] per Arnold J.
6 Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR
433, 441.
7 R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial
Singh [1983] EWHC 1; [1984] 1 WLR 704, 706 [1983] EWHC 1; [1984], 1 All ER 983, 985.
- The
detention must be limited to a period which is reasonably necessary for that
purpose to be carried out.
- These
decisions indicate that it is not enough that detention is merely prescribed by
law; it must also be for a proper purpose, for
a reasonable period, and be
appropriate and proportionate. Further, the Court of Appeal has held that an
initially lawful detention
can become arbitrary if the purpose of detention
cannot be fulfilled.8
- Finally,
it should be noted that where an enactment is inconsistent with s 22, there can
be no role for justification under s 5 of
the Bill of Rights Act. The term
“arbitrarily” is intended to provide a measure of the reasonableness
of statutory powers,9 as well as the exercise of those
powers. There can be no detention that is both arbitrary and
reasonable.
Detention within the Bill
- Section
313 of the principal Act currently provides for a person who has arrived as part
of a mass arrival to be detained for up to
96 hours. For detention to continue
beyond this time, the principal Act currently provides that a District Court
Judge must issue
a warrant of commitment under s 317A of the Act authorising the
further detention. A warrant of commitment under s 317A must be issued
within
the initial 96 hour period of warrantless detention. The warrant of commitment
may have a maximum duration of 6 months.
- Clause
8 of the Bill amends s 313 of the principal Act so that if an application for a
warrant of commitment has been lodged within 96 hours, a person from a
mass arrival group may continue to be detained (without a warrant) until the
District Court makes
a determination with regard to that warrant.
- Clause
9 of the Bill inserts new s 317AB into the principal Act, providing that the
application for the warrant of commitment must
be heard by a District Court
Judge as soon as reasonably practicable and, in any event, within 7 days of the
application being lodged.
Section 317AB(2)(a) provides for the hearing to be
adjourned if the judge considers this necessary, but s 317AB(2)(b) provides that
the maximum timeframe for a warrant to be determined is 28 days.
- The
existing provisions for detention in mass arrival situations were considered to
be consistent with s 22 by the Attorney-General
when they came into force in
2012. Key considerations in his discussion of this matter included:
- the
judicially controlled nature of the warrant application process, combined with
the responsibility of the judiciary to apply law
consistently with the Bill of
Rights Act;
- the
ability of the judge to issue warrants with duration and conditions as they
consider appropriate, which may differ from the particulars
requested by the
immigration application;
- the
power given to the judge to require an immigration officer to report on the
necessity for continuing detention at specified periods
throughout the duration
of the warrant; and
8 Zaoui v Attorney-General
[Habeas corpus] [2004] NZCA 228; [2005] 1 NZLR 577 (CA).
9 Butler & Butler, The New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis NZ Ltd, Wellington, 2015) at
[19.8.1].
- the
ability for the immigration officer to seek variation of the warrant from the
court at any time.
- These
safeguards in the principal Act ensure that the judiciary maintain control of
the detention process, that they may obtain the
information necessary to rule on
the necessity of continuing detention under the warrant, and that they have the
flexibility to ensure
that the detention goes on no longer than necessary to
achieve its purpose.
- However,
the extension of detention provided for in the Bill may engage the right to be
free from arbitrary detention in a different
manner from the existing
provisions. The risk of arbitrariness is engaged by the increased length of the
period between the application
for a warrant of commitment (which must occur
within the first 96 hours of detention), and a judge making the decision to
approve
the warrant.
Justifiability of detention in the
Bill
- It
is clearly accepted in domestic and international law that a range of purposes
can justify detention. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee have upheld the
principle that detention of persons who have illegally entered a country can be
justified.10 The European Court of Human Rights has
also held that detention of asylum seekers based on the policy necessity of
processing a large
volume of applications could be justified as a necessary
measure to protect public safety.11 In light of these
cases, the Attorney- General accepted that the detention of mass arrival groups
was legitimate in their assessment
of the 2012 provisions. This purpose also
justifies the Bill’s proposed extension of these provisions.
- The
extension of the detention provisions within the Bill is rationally connected to
the Bill’s purpose of ensuring a safe and
orderly processing of mass
arrivals. This change is a response to the assessment that it will very likely
be practically impossible
to obtain warrants of commitment for all persons
within 96 hours in the case of a mass arrival.
- The
key question to be decided in assessing whether the detention provided for in
the Bill is arbitrary is whether appropriate procedure
exists to constrain the
duration of detention. While it is true that the length of detention now
authorisable under the Bill is lengthened,
we do not consider that this means
that detentions under the Bill will be arbitrary.
- Judicial
oversight of detention has been held to be of high importance in considering
whether detention is arbitrary.12 The process of
detention proposed under the Bill will be under judicial oversight and control,
like the current provisions in the
principal Act. This judicial control will
occur from the point that an application for a warrant of commitment is made,
which must
occur within 96 hours of detention.
- We
would expect the courts to treat dealing with mass arrival warrants of
commitment as a matter of very high priority, to ensure
that they fulfil their
responsibilities to prevent arbitrary detention. Section 317AB also requires
that the hearing for a warrant
of commitment must occur as soon as practicable,
and s 313(2)(a) requires that a person detained under the section may be
detained
only as long as necessary to achieve the purpose of the detention.
10 A v Australia (1997) 4 BHRC 210
(HRC).
11 Saadi v United Kingdom [2008] ECHR 80; (2008) 47 EHRR
17(ECtHR, GC).
12 Human Rights Committee. General Comment 35 UN Doc
CCPR/C/GC/35 (16 December 2014) at [35].
- These
expectations are further backed up by the timeframes in the Bill, which ensure
that an application for a warrant of commitment
must be made within a maximum of
96 hours of the initial detention, be heard within 7 days of the application,
and be determined
within 28 days of application.
- Finally,
it is important to note that detainees themselves retain the use of existing
statutory options to challenge their ongoing
detention, given their rights under
s 23 of the Bill of Rights Act. Under s 23(1) the detainee may apply for a writ
of habeas corpus
to determine the validity of their detention under the Habeas
Corpus Act 2001. This has the effect of requiring a judge to give precedence
to
their application before all other matters before the court, unless they
consider that the circumstances require otherwise.
- We
consider that these safeguards ensure that there are adequate barriers to
detention being prolonged beyond what is necessary to
deal with the
circumstances of a mass arrival.
- On
this basis we consider that detentions provided for by the Bill are not
arbitrary, and thus do not conflict with s 22 of the Bill
of Rights
Act
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Edrick Child
Acting Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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