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Corrections Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 17, 21, 23(5), 25(5), 27) [2023] NZBORARp 25 (13 June 2023)
Last Updated: 6 August 2023
13 June 2023
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 24
Hon David Parker, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Corrections Amendment
Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Corrections Amendment Bill (the Bill) is consistent
with the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
(the Bill of Rights Act).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
in relation to the latest version of the Bill
(PCO 24524/16.0). We will provide
you with further advice if the final version includes amendments that affect the
conclusions in
this advice.
Summary
- The
Bill amends the Corrections Act 2004 (the principal Act) and raises a number of
potentially significant limitations on rights
and freedoms affirmed in the Bill
of Rights Act, specifically:
- s 14
(freedom of expression),
- s 17
(freedom of association),
- s
21 (unreasonable search and seizure),
- s
23(5) (rights of persons deprived of liberty to be treated with humanity and
dignity),
- s
25(c) (right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty), and
- s 27
(right to justice).
- These
rights are fundamentally concerned with fairness, individual autonomy, privacy
and dignity of individuals within the corrections
system. Any limitation on
these rights requires careful scrutiny and justification.
- We
conclude that the Bill is consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed in
the Bill of Rights Act. Our analysis is set out
below.
The Bill
- The
Bill introduces amendments to the principal Act intended to improve
rehabilitation, reintegration and safety outcomes in the corrections
system.
Specifically, the measures are designed to:
- modernise
and future-proof the principal Act to clarify Corrections’ powers to
monitor prisoner communications and information
sources for intelligence
purposes;
- make
changes to the disciplinary process in prisons to ensure it is timely and
incentivises good behaviour;
- strengthen
processes for the authorisation and use of non-lethal weapons on
prisoners;
- support
improved rehabilitation and reintegration outcomes for Māori under
Corrections’ management;
- enable
the limited mixing of remand accused and convicted prisoners;
- introduce
miscellaneous amendments that are intended to enable best-practice operations in
prisons.
Section 21 – Unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to be secure against unreasonable
search and seizure, whether it be of the
person, property, correspondence or
otherwise. The right protects an amalgam of values including property, personal
freedom, privacy
and dignity. The touchstone of this section is the protection
of reasonable expectations of privacy, although it does not provide
a general
protection of personal privacy.1
- The
Bill includes various provisions that we consider constitute, or may constitute,
a search or seizure for the purposes of s 21.
These include provisions for the
search of prisoners and cells which replace existing provisions in s 98 of the
principal Act.
- Ordinarily,
a provision found to limit a particular right or freedom may nevertheless be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered reasonably
justified in terms of s 5 of that Act. However, the Supreme Court has held that
logically, an unreasonable
search cannot be demonstrably justified and therefore
the inquiry does not need to be undertaken.2 Rather, in
order for a statutory power to be consistent with s 21, engagement of the right
must not be unreasonable. Whether a search
will be unreasonable turns on a
number of factors, including the nature of the place or object being searched,
the degree of intrusiveness
into personal privacy and the rationale of the
search.3
Refusal to issue or allow
at-risk prisoners to keep authorised property
- The
Bill amends s 43(3) of the principal Act to enable the prison manager to refuse
to issue or allow a prisoner to keep an item of
authorised property if the
prisoner is an at- risk prisoner.
- To
the extent that this provision constitutes seizure under s 21, we consider it to
be reasonable in the circumstances. At-risk prisoners
are prisoners who have
been assessed
1 See, for example, Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
2 Ibid at [162] per Blanchard J.
3 Ibid at [172] per Blanchard J.
as being at risk of self-harm.4 We note that the
principal Act already allows a prison manager to refuse to issue or allow a
prisoner to keep an item of property
where there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the item may be used to injure the prisoner or another person.
However, the Department
of Corrections advises it is possible that even where
property may not be used for that purpose, it may still be inappropriate or
harmful given the prisoner’s at-risk status.
Scanner searches to identify the risk of communicable disease
- New
s 98A(2) of the principal Act enables a scanner search of any prisoner for the
purpose of measuring their body temperature to
identify the risk that they may
be carrying a communicable disease. As the definition of scanner search in the
Bill is not limited
to non- contact or non-invasive methods of measuring body
temperature,5 this may constitute a search for the
purposes of s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act in instances where more invasive
methods are used.
- The
Bill contains safeguards around the authorisation of a scanner search. New s
103AAA(1) provides that the prison manager may authorise
a scanner search for
the purpose of measuring a person’s body temperature if:
- the
scanner search is necessary and justifiable to identify the risk that the person
entering the prison may be carrying a communicable
disease; and
- the
prison manager has taken into account advice from a registered health
professional on the matter; and
- the
chief executive has approved the device as suitable for the purpose.
- To
the extent that s 98A(2) engages s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act, we consider it
a reasonable search given the risk that communicable
diseases pose to the health
of all in the prison and the safeguards around authorisation of the
search.
Searches for the purpose of detecting unauthorised
items
- New
ss 98-98B of the principal Act enable the following searches to be conducted at
any time, for the purpose of detecting any unauthorised
item:
- a
search of any prison cell;
- a
scanner search of any prisoner;
- a
rub-down search of any prisoner.
- We
consider these searches to be reasonable. We note that the threshold for
conducting these searches is lower than that for a strip
search under new s 98D
(discussed below), in that there is no requirement for the officer to have
reasonable grounds to believe that
the prisoner possesses an unauthorised item.
However, this reflects that searches of a
4 See s 3 of the principal Act.
- New
s 92A(1)(b) defines ‘scanner search’ for this purpose as “a
search of a person using an electronic device (whether
or not the device uses
imaging technology) designed to measure a person’s body
temperature.”
cell, scanner searches and rub-down searches are
less invasive search methods. In addition, the Bill provides for an imaging
technology
search to be used as an alternative to a rub-down search in certain
circumstances.
Strip searches
- New
ss 98C-98E of the principal Act provide for:
- mandatory
strip searches for prisoners at the time of admission or transfer, and for
at-risk prisoners in specified circumstances;
- strip
searches where an officer has reasonable grounds for believing that the prisoner
has an unauthorised item in their possession;
- strip
searches to detect whether a prisoner who is required to submit to a drug or
alcohol test has used drugs or alcohol.
- A
physical search or seizure of the person is a restraint on freedom and an
affront to human dignity.6 Strip searches are
inherently degrading and can be considered an affront to the person being
searched. The high degree of intrusiveness
increases the need for justification
and attendant safeguards.
- While
strip searches are an intrusion on privacy, the reasonable expectation of
privacy of a prisoner is different from that of a
person outside prison.
Searches of various kinds in prisons are necessary for the safety of prisoners
and staff and to support efficient
operation of prisons. Furthermore, there are
safeguards in place to minimise the intrusion on privacy, which include the
following:
- “Reasonable
grounds” strip searches require managerial approval (unless this would
endanger health or safety, or prejudice
security) and can be conducted only if
necessary for the purpose of detecting an unauthorised item.
- A
strip search to detect the use of drugs or alcohol may only be carried out if
necessary to ensure that a sample is not diluted,
contaminated or tampered
with.
- The
principal Act requires all searches to be carried out with decency and
sensitivity, and in a manner that affords to the person
being searched the
greatest degree of privacy and dignity consistent with the purpose of the
search.
- A
scanner search may replace a strip search where the search device has been
approved by the chief executive as suitable for the purposes
of replacing a
strip search.
- As
a result, we consider these provisions to be reasonable in terms of s 21 of the
Bill of Rights Act.
6 R v Jefferies [1993] NZCA 401; [1994] 1 NZLR 290,
300 [1993] NZCA 401; (1993) 1 HRNZ 478, 490 (CA).
Search of persons other than prisoners
- The
Bill also enables scanner searches of people other than prisoners who are
entering the prison. These searches may be for the purpose
of detecting
unauthorised items or measuring body temperature to identify risk of
disease.
- We
consider these provisions reasonable. The ability to search visitors to the
prison for these purposes is necessary to support effective
management of the
prison and help manage risks to the health of prisoners and staff. As we note
above, a scanner search for the purposes
of measuring body temperature is not
limited to non-contact or non-invasive methods. However, unlike a prisoner, a
visitor to the
prison would have the opportunity to decide not to undergo a more
invasive method. This may result in them not being allowed entry
to the prison,
but we do not consider in light of the purpose that this would amount to an
unreasonable search.
Monitoring and collecting prisoner
communications and information sources
- Proposed
new subpart 4A amends the principal Act by including provision for the
monitoring, collecting, using and disclosing of prisoner
communications and
information sources. The new subpart 4A responds to changes in technology by
extending the types of communications
that can be monitored, collected, used and
disclosed to include any communications to or from a prisoner, except for
specified exemptions.
- We
consider that new subpart 4A engages s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act. As noted
above, the touchstone of s 21 is the protection of
reasonable expectations of
privacy. We acknowledge that reasonable expectations of privacy in relation to
prisoner communications
is likely to be relatively low, given the prison
environment and the requirement (in new s 127P) for the chief executive to take
practical steps to ensure that prisoners and visitors are advised in advance
that communications may be monitored, collected, used
and disclosed. On the
other hand, the provisions recognise (in new s 127G(a)) that prisoners and their
correspondents and visitors
have a privacy interest, which must be protected as
far as practicable. Alongside other provisions of subpart 4A and the scheme of
the principal Act,7 this suggests that some expectation
of privacy remains intact. As prisoners and their visitors have no choice but to
use communication
methods which may be monitored, we do not consider they could
be deemed to be waiving all expectation of privacy by using those methods.
- However,
we do not consider that the powers in subpart 4A constitute unreasonable search
and seizure, because:
- the
powers can only be exercised by an authorised intelligence person authorised by
the chief executive (new s 127F);
- See
s 6(1)(g) (sentences and orders must not be administered more restrictively than
is reasonably necessary) and s 6(1)(i) (contact
between prisoners and their
families must generally be encouraged and supported).
- the
monitoring, collection and use of prisoner communications can only be
implemented in narrow circumstances and for a defined intelligence
purpose (new
s 127H);8
- monitoring
of visits can only occur where the chief executive has reasonable grounds to
believe that monitoring is necessary under
new section 127J, including that the
information communicated in the visit may threaten the security, good order and
discipline of
the prison, threaten the safety of any person or encourage or
facilitate the commission of an offence; and
- new
ss 127M-127O limit the circumstances in which prison communications can be
shared and disclosed.
- There
is a strong public interest in the monitoring, collection and use of information
where that information can be used to identify
risk and to deter and prevent
harm; to support the good order, safety and security of prisons; and to
contribute to the maintenance
of a just society.
- We
therefore conclude that new subpart 4A appears to be consistent with section 21
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 14 – Freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind and in any form. The right to freedom of expression is
recognised as one
of the essential foundations of a democratic
society.9
- We
have also considered whether new subpart 4A may engage s 14 of the Bill of
Rights Act, if the provisions have a chilling effect
on lawful prisoner
communications if prisoners and those they are communicating with know that they
are being monitored.
- If
new subpart 4A does engage s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, we consider that any
limit on the right is justified. As indicated above,
the provisions rationally
serve an important objective and are subject to a range of
safeguards.10 This appears reasonable and proportionate
in the circumstances.
- We
therefore consider the Bill appears to be consistent with s 14 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Section 23(5) – Rights of persons deprived of liberty to be treated with
humanity and dignity
- Section
23(5) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone deprived of liberty shall
be treated with humanity and with respect
for the inherent dignity of the
person. Section 23(5)
- We
note all prisoner calls can be recorded (new s 127I), though that information
could only be monitored or used in accordance with
new s
127H.
9 Moncrief-Spittle v
Regional Facilities Auckland Limited [2021] NZCA 142, [2021] 2 NZLR 795 at
[65].
- New
s 127E also identifies a list of persons whose communications with prisoners are
exempt from monitoring, for example communications
related to the
prisoner’s legal affairs.
captures conduct that lacks humanity
but falls short of cruelty, conduct that is demeaning, and/or conduct that is
clearly excessive
in the circumstances but not grossly so. Whether s 23(5) has
been breached will require a court to consider a wide range of factors
and
circumstances in an individual case.
- The
Bill includes new s 61CA of the principal Act, which enables a prison manager to
direct that an at-risk prisoner’s opportunity
for association with other
prisoners be restricted or denied. By enabling segregation of at-risk prisoners,
this provision engages
s 23(5) of the Bill of Rights Act.
- Under
s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, a limit on a right may be justifiable where the
limit serves an important objective; and where
the limit is rationally connected
to achieving that objective, no greater than reasonably necessary to achieve it,
and proportional
to its importance.11
- We
consider any limit on this right to be justified. As noted above, an at-risk
prisoner has been assessed as being at risk of self-harm.
New s 61CA allows such
a prisoner’s association to be limited only if the prison’s health
centre manager recommends that
it is desirable to address the risk of self-harm,
and only to the extent necessary for the safety of the prisoner. The provision
is therefore rationally connected and proportionate to an important objective
and appears no greater than reasonably necessary to
achieve that objective.
- We
therefore consider the Bill to be consistent with the rights of persons arrested
or detained affirmed in s 23(5) of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- We
note that this provision also prima facie limits s 17 of the Bill of Rights Act
(right to freedom of association). For the reasons
discussed above, we also
consider this limit justified.
Section 25(c) – Right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that anyone charged with an offence has
the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to the law.
- The
Bill amends s 202 of the principal Act so that, despite any international
obligations, regulations may provide for the mixing
of accused and convicted
persons:
- for
non-offence-based programmes, such as therapeutic, education, kaupapa
Māori, or religious-based programmes, if it is not
practicable or
therapeutic to provide the programmes separately, and
- who
are allowed to keep their children with them in prison if it is not practical or
therapeutic to keep the persons separate.
- Any
such regulations may limit the presumption of innocence.
- Regarding
the mixing of accused and convicted persons for programmes, the Department of
Corrections advises that there are times when
it cannot provide parallel,
non-offence focused programmes to these groups of prisoners (for example,
because there are not
11 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007]
3 NZLR 1.
enough participants, or it is not financially feasible to do so), and that
this prevents the design or implementation of innovative
programmes that
prioritise the interests of the prisoner. We understand it is intended that
mixing for such programmes would only
be with the consent of the remand accused
person.
- We
note for completeness that any regulations made under this provision must be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act, otherwise
there is a risk they will be
ultra vires (go beyond the authority of the primary
legislation).
Section 27 – Right to justice
- Section
27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act provides that every person has the right to the
observance of the principles of natural justice
by any public authority with the
power to make a determination in respect of their rights, obligations, or
interests protected or
recognised by law.
- The
Bill amends the principal Act by adding a new s 133A, authorising a hearing
adjudicator to proceed with a hearing without the
prisoner present; and a new s
138A, authorising a Visiting Justice to proceed with a hearing without the
prisoner being present.
The amendments relate to the internal disciplinary
process which ensures prisoner misconduct is dealt with through disciplinary
hearings
and the imposition of penalties by hearing adjudicators or Visiting
Justices. We consider that these provisions prima facie engage
s 27(1) of the
Bill of Rights Act.
- We
consider the limit on s 27(1) to be justified in terms of s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act. The amendments are rationally connected
to the important objective
of maintaining safety and wellbeing of staff and prisoners and appear
proportionate to that objective.
They also appear a reasonable limit on the
right to be heard, as:
- the
hearing may only proceed without the prisoner if the hearing adjudicator or
Visiting Justice is satisfied the prisoner has refused
to attend or they
required the prisoner to leave the hearing on the grounds of disruptive
behaviour, and
- where
an offence is proved before a Visiting Justice without the prisoner present, the
prisoner may request a re-hearing.
- We
therefore consider the Bill appears to be consistent with s 27 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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