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New Zealand Human Rights Commission Submissions |
Last Updated: 26 May 2015
Submission by the
Human Rights Commission
(FUTURE FOCUS) BILL
Select Committee
14 May 2010
Principal Legal and Policy Analyst
Phone 09 306 2650
Social Assistance (Future Focus) Bill
1.1 This submission on the Social Assistance (Future Focus) Bill is made by the Human Rights Commission. The Commission is an independent Crown Entity that derives its statutory mandate from the Human Rights Act 1993 (the Act).
1.2 The long title to the Act states it is intended to provide better protection of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with United Nations Covenants and Conventions of Human Rights. The Commission has two primary functions including advocating and promoting “respect for and an understanding and appreciation of human rights in New Zealand society”.[1] It also administers a disputes resolution process for complaints about alleged discrimination[2]and deals with a significant number of broader human rights complaints.
1.3 To give effect to the primary functions, the Commission can report on the implications of any proposed legislation that it considers may affect human rights[3] and make public statements on any matter affecting human rights ... including compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.[4]
1.4 The Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner is required to evaluate the role that legislation plays in facilitating and promoting best practice in equal employment opportunities[5].
2.1 The Commission agrees that most people would benefit from being able to access decent and meaningful work and recently carried out a nationwide research project, the National Conversation about Work, that established the centrality of work in the lives of New Zealanders, whether currently in the labour market or seeking jobs.
2.2 The Bill has some positive features. It clarifies when benefits will be adjusted to ensure equitable treatment across all forms of income support and provides for improved assistance and support in relation to training.
2.3 However, the Commission strongly opposes sections of the Bill because:
3. RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
3.1 The right to social security is found in Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[6] (the Declaration). Various forms of social security are also recognised in Art.25(1) of the Declaration.[7]
3.2 Art.9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights[8] recognises the right of everyone to social security. Art.10(2) specifically recognises the right of working mothers to “adequate social security benefits”, Art.10(3) requires States to undertake special measures of protection and assistance for children and young people while Art.11 recognises the “right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing, and housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”.
3.3 There are also provisions guaranteeing the enjoyment on a non-discriminatory basis of the right to social security in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination[9] and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women[10]. The Convention on the Rights of the Child[11] recognises the right of every child to benefit from social security as well as a right to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.
3.4 The most recent UN instrument, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities[12], an innovative treaty which is designed to ensure that persons with disabilities can access the same rights as everyone else, also recognises the right of persons with disabilities to an adequate standard of living and social protection including access to social protection programmes and poverty reduction programmes.
3.5 Although the right to social security is found principally in international instruments dealing with economic and social rights, in the absence of an individual complaints mechanism[13], Art.26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[14] (non-discrimination) has been used to protect the right to social security through the complaints procedures in treaties dealing with civil and political rights[15].The Human Rights Committee explained this as follows:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any State to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State’s sovereign power, then such legislation must comply with article 26 of the Covenant[16].
3.6 There are also a large number of core labour standards that relate to fundamental principles and rights at work embodied in eight “fundamental” ILO Conventions. New Zealand has ratified six of these[17]and considers that its law and practice substantially comply with the principles that underlie the other two Conventions[18].
3.7 New Zealand is a strong supporter of the ILO’s efforts to promote core labour standards and voted for the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (which places an obligation on the ILO’s 181 member States to protect, promote and realise in good faith the principles and rights inherent in the fundamental Conventions, even if members have not ratified all of them)[19].
3.8 Although New Zealand has not ratified Convention 102[20], it provides a benchmark for meaningful income replacement benefits and plays a key role in the definition of the right to social security under the international human rights instruments.
3.9 More recent ILO research has emphasised the importance of a social security floor and, having established it, moving towards more comprehensive social security benefits, while ensuring that levels of protection already reached are maintained.[21]
3.10 The latest consensus is that this will be best achieved by an integrated approach. It is also generally agreed that such an approach is more necessary than ever in the current economic climate[22].
4.1 As a general principle, to satisfy even the core minimum obligations set out in the international instruments, States must ensure that their social security systems provide a “safety net” or - to use the ILO terminology – social security “floor”, to protect the most vulnerable groups in society[23].
4.2 Guidance on how the right to social security in Article 9 of the ICESCR should be interpreted can be found in General Comment 19[24]. The introductory section of the General Comment states that social security because of its redistributive character plays an important role in poverty reduction and alleviation, preventing social exclusion and promoting social inclusion. As a result the measures that are used to provide social security benefits cannot be narrowly defined and must guarantee minimum enjoyment of the right to all peoples[25]. The Committee noted that the denial of or lack of access to adequate social security undermines the realisation of many other covenant rights.
4.3 In identifying the normative content of the right, the Committee specifically commented that while elements may vary according to different conditions it should always be borne in mind that social security is a “social good and not merely an instrument of economic or financial policy”[26].
4.4 What is required to comply with Art. 9 is a system which ensures that benefits are available to address the relevant social risks and contingencies[27]. Benefits should be adequate and cover the situations in the Universal Declaration[28]and, where benefits are withdrawn, reduced or suspended it must be for reasons that are reasonable and subject to due process.[29]
4.5 While the Committee acknowledges that, as with all the substantive social and economic rights, the right to social security is subject to progressive realisation (that is, States can implement the right incrementally over time, depending on the availability of resources[30]) some of the obligations imposed by the Covenant must be recognised immediately – namely, the rights must be exercised without discrimination of any kind and on equal terms for both men and women.
4.6 Perhaps most importantly, there is a strong presumption that there will be no retrogression. In other words, that existing measures are not repealed or amended in a way that undermines what has already been achieved in realising the right. The Committee explains this as follows:
If any deliberately retrogressive measures are taken, the State party has the burden of proving that they have been introduced after the most careful consideration of all the alternatives and that they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights provide for in the Covenant, in the context of the full use of the maximum available resources of the State party. The Committee will look carefully at whether: (a) there was reasonable justification for the action; (b) alternatives were comprehensively examined; (c) there was genuine participation of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives; (d) the measures were directly or indirectly discriminatory; (e) the measures will have a sustained impact on the realisation of the right to social security, an unreasonable impact on acquired social security rights or whether an individual or group is deprived of access to the minimum essential level of social security; and (f) whether there was an independent review of the measures at a national level[31].
4.7 For the reasons outlined below, the Commission considers that certain aspects of the Bill do not comply with New Zealand’s commitments under Art.9 because they are discriminatory. They are also retrogressive and could undermine the right to a minimum standard of living for some vulnerable groups.
4.8 The Commission, therefore, considers that the changes cannot be justified in the current climate and are likely to have an ongoing and detrimental effect on the right to social security. Further the Bill is at odds with international thinking about social security as a crisis response during the recovery from the global economic recession. The ILO, for example, considers that the crisis has acted as an accelerator in the social security debate amongst OECD countries which have developed a new understanding of the importance of social security as a prerequisite to growth rather than a burden to society.
5.1 Although the Commission deals with discrimination on a daily basis, discrimination itself is not defined in either the Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) or the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BoRA).
5.2 The BoRA standards are incorporated into the HRA by Part1A of the Act[32]. Effectively, therefore, a matter which is prima facie discriminatory may be justified in terms of s.5 BoRA and will not be considered to breach the right to freedom from discrimination.
5.3 In deciding whether a matter is discriminatory, the Commission follows the approach suggested by the Supreme Court in McAlister v Air New Zealand Ltd[33] and applied by the Human Rights Review Tribunal in Atkinson & Ors v Ministry of Health[34]. That is, a matter will amount to prima facie discrimination if it involves different treatment by reason of one of the prohibited grounds that has the effect of disadvantaging an individual or group. Here the disadvantageous treatment is the part-time work test linked to sanctions for non-compliance that applies to certain classes of beneficiaries.
5.4 The Bill discriminates on the following grounds:
5.5 Once it is established that treatment is discriminatory then it is necessary to consider whether it can be justified under s.5 of the BoRA. Section 5 provides that:
...the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
5.6 In deciding whether the limitation can be justified, the Supreme Court in R v Hansen[35] identified the following criteria:
(a) does the limiting measure serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify curtailment of the right or freedom?
(b) (i) is the limiting measure rationally connected with its purpose?
(ii) does the limiting measure impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient achievement of its purpose?
(iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
5.7 The Commission agrees with the Attorney General that the Bill “by introducing a part-time work test for solo parents on the DPB but not the Widows Benefit and the DPB (Women Alone Benefit) ...appears to be inconsistent with s.19 of the Bill of Rights Act and it cannot be justified under s.5 of that Act”. [36]While encouraging people to return to the workforce may be a significant and important objective, the treatment of women on the DPB with school age children is unlikely to achieve this goal and, given the possible long term effects of this measure, cannot be justified.
5.8 As the Attorney-General also notes, retaining the distinction between widows and
widowers promotes the stereotype of widows and older women as being less capable of supporting themselves. The Commission considers that this is outdated and incompatible with contemporary social mores.[37]
5.9 The Commission warns against attempting to rectify the discrimination by amending the offending clauses so they also apply to widowers or older women without dependent children[38]and requests the Committee to seriously consider whether imposing the work test on women in this situation can be justified at all.
6.1 The current work test requirements under the Social Security Act do not apply to solo parents on the DPB. The effect of the Bill will be to require solo parents to look for, and accept, suitable part-time work when their youngest dependent child turns six. The proposal appears to be driven purely by financial considerations[39].
6.2 The Commission considers that this is short sighted. Currently, there is insufficient good, affordable childcare or work with suitable hours and flexibility to permit solo working parents to cover school holidays and those occasions when their children are ill[40]. While clearly there are benefits for children in having parents engaged in meaningful paid work, we are not aware of any research of the effect on children who do not have adequate after school care (in addition to the extra stress in low waged or beneficiary households).
6.3 Research indicates that the cost and availability of suitable childcare can be a major barrier to solo parents seeking work[41]. Often women in this situation also have few qualifications with the result that they are less able to find work which pays enough to meet the costs of childcare and transport. They are more likely to find casual jobs or jobs that have non-standard hours - which can add to difficulties with childcare.
6.4 The National Council of Women has also raised the issue of the effect the proposed changes could have on women fleeing situations of domestic violence. Given the proposed work test regime, the cost of childcare and the need to accept poorly paid work women could be forced back, or remain in, violent relationships[42].
6.5 The Commission cannot see how forcing solo mothers to work in such situations can benefit either society or the women themselves. Contrary to what has been said in connection with this Bill, living on a benefit is not a life style choice that appeals to most people. The harsh lifestyle, loneliness and loss of social status are incentive enough to return to work without the added imposition of penalties if people do not make themselves available for unrewarding, low paid employment.
6.6 As the Human Rights Review Tribunal noted in Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General [43](a case which dealt with discrimination on the ground of employment status resulting from denial of the in-work tax credit (IWTC) to beneficiaries):
We are very troubled by the argument that anyone who is ineligible for the IWTC could simply chose to go into a job and so become eligible. That cannot be realistic for all beneficiaries, and quite likely it is not even realistic over the short - to even medium- term for the majority of them. After all, the OECD experts described the movement in other OECD countries of single digit percentages of people who receive benefit income into work in terms of being a significant achievement...
We accept that there must be a number amongst the cohort of
those who receive income-tested benefits who could work if they wanted
to, but
effectively choose not to. Nonetheless, we think it is regrettable that the
Crown sought to argue that all recipients of
income-tested benefits fall into
that same category. The ability of any given person to work depends on many
factors that can be
quite beyond their control, including their health, the need
to care for others, the availability of suitable work, and the willingness
of
prospective employers to give them a chance, to name just a few obvious things.
Overall, we were left with a real concern that
this type of generalisation as it
was put up on behalf of the Crown – i.e., that all those on a benefit
income are simply there
by choice – represents exactly the kind of
stereotyping, prejudice and disadvantage that the anti-discrimination standard
of
NZBORA is intended to protect against.
6.7 The changes proposed in this Bill are unlikely to lower the numbers of solo parents on the DPB - this is more likely to coincide with periods of low unemployment[44]or where training programmes designed to better equip people for the workforce are introduced[45].
7.1 Disability is a prohibited ground of discrimination under the HRA. It includes physical and psychiatric illness[46]. Both General Comment 19 and the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities refer to the right of people with disabilities to receive social security on a non-discriminatory basis.
7.2 The Convention recognises that people with disabilities have the right to have access to social protection and poverty reduction programmes and the General Comment emphasises the importance of ensuring there is adequate income support to persons with disabilities who have temporarily lost, or had a reduction in, their income. Further, State Parties are required to provide support in a manner that “respect[s] the principle of human dignity contained in the preamble to the Covenant”.[47]
7.3 The Bill introduces a work test and sanctions regime for people in receipt of a Sickness Benefit. At present people in receipt of a sickness benefit are not required to seek or accept offers of part-time work but, under the Bill, if people are assessed as having the capacity to work part time they will be required to seek and accept part-time work (including seasonal work)[48].
7.4 Although people on an unemployment benefit are required to make themselves available for work – effectively in return for receiving the benefit - people on a sickness benefit receive the benefit because they are unable to work because of illness, injury or disability[49]. Evidence suggests that people with disabilities have a greatly diminished likelihood of finding full–time employment generally[50]which implies that they would find it equally difficult to locate suitable part time employment. The likely outcome therefore is that people on sickness benefits will end up competing with solo mothers on the DPB for low paid, insecure employment.
7.5 The Regulatory Impact Statement for the Bill states that the 2008 economic recession has seen the number of working-age people on the Unemployment Benefit, the Sickness Benefit and the Domestic Purposes Benefit increase significantly over recent months. For example, the number of people on the sickness benefit increased from 49,093 to 59,158 in the two years to December 2009. As at March 2010 the number of sickness benefit recipients aged 18 to 64 was 55,796 - an increase of 9% or 5,000 over the year.[51]
7.6 The Commission’s National Conversation about Work found that a notable feature of the recession was the number of agencies who reported that people with disabilities had suffered disproportionately in redundancies and layoffs but as employment data is not disaggregated by disability this is not a visible indicator in national statistics. Many of the unemployed disabled people the Commission spoke to wanted suitable jobs.
7.7 It is clear that the Ministry of Social Development believes its current service model is suitable for the current labour market as it notes in the Regulatory Impact Statement:
Work and Income work actively with people to ensure that people return to work as soon as possible. The work that they do consistently results in a larger reduction in benefit numbers than is forecast through the economic and fiscal updates. The service model that they have initiated is recognised internationally as very effective in assisting people into employment.[52]
7.8 The Commission considers that many disabled people who lost jobs and are now more dependent on welfare want to access suitable work in their home towns. However, in many instances jobs are simply not available for them. Forcing sickness beneficiaries to accept poorly paid, casual or temporary work will not contribute to a fairer benefit system and is inconsistent with the international requirement to treat people who find themselves in such situations in a dignified manner.
8.1 The Regulatory Impact Statement states that, “the key assumption underpinning this analysis is that work will become available for people as the economy recovers and that the implementation of the work-test can be matched to the employment capacity in local labour markets.”
8.2 The most obvious flaw with this proposal is the assumption that work will be available when many of the measures in the Bill are due to take effect[53]. For example, the proposed date for the commencement of the part time work test for sole parents on the Domestic Purposes Benefit whose youngest child is six years old is 4 October 2010 - in less than six months time.
8.3 In the course of the National Conversation about Work the Commission talked to 3000 employers and employees, as well as individuals and groups seeking work, throughout New Zealand. There are several significant points to be made about attitudes to employment and focus on work that arise from this project.
8.4 It is the lack of jobs in regions and provinces as well as urban areas, rather than attitudes to work amongst job-seekers, that is the critical driver of a focus on work. The results of the National Conversation overwhelmingly show that many vulnerable and disadvantaged people who lose jobs or are unemployed and receive social security assistance both want to get back to work as soon as possible and to reduce their dependency on benefits. It is the unavailability of suitable, decent work where they live that relentlessly limits their employment focus.
8.5 While employment is the “lagging indicator” in economic recovery - and the ILO predicts it may take five years for proper job recovery - the Commission’s visits indicate a new wariness is abroad amongst some employers. The current conservatism of employers around hiring may become a new employment norm in some industrial sectors which has not been properly identified in economic forecasting.
8.6 A significant feature of employers’ experiences during the recession, in addition to economic pain for some business, was the emotional trauma of having to lay off workers. Companies around New Zealand who cut labour costs told us they would not be returning to previous labour levels. They say the recession had taught them they had to be more disciplined about hiring, they expected greater productivity from staff still employed, they were working in different ways, and they complained of the “hassle” of compliance issues.
8.7 The Commission heard over and over again that the lack of adequate childcare, which would allow families to match their desire for part time work with the need to care for their children, is a significant limiting factor for solo parents and others who want to work. Very often available work does not match the hours offered by childcare facilities and in many rural areas childcare does not exist at all.
8.8 It seems highly unlikely that there will be adequate part time jobs available for Domestic Purpose Beneficiaries, even if they can access suitable and affordable childcare, given the annual decrease at March 2010 of 5000 in female employment (with falls in both fulltime and part time employment of 4000 and 1000 respectively).
9.1 Decent employment is central to social inclusion. The existence of a social security floor that reflects and affirms human dignity is now recognised by the ILO and the OECD as the mark of a civilised, progressive society.
9.2 New Zealand’s strong reputation for upholding non-discriminatory behaviour is reflected both in its ratification of international agreements and enactment of domestic legislation such as the BoRA and the HRA. The Commission is very concerned, therefore, that amendments such as this - which the Attorney-General has publicly acknowledged as discriminatory and unable to be justified - should be introduced and is strongly opposed to any measure that would result in further restrictions as a way of rectifying the discrimination in the Bill. The Commission also considers the proposed Bill is retrogressive and out of step with other OECD countries.
9.3 While the Commission recognises the importance and benefit of meaningful paid work, it does not consider that the “unrelenting focus” on work in this Bill will have the effect of producing a “fair social assistance system that is work-focused”[54]and nor does it acknowledge the strong desire of many job seekers to access decent work where they live.
9.4 The lack of suitable work for the groups of beneficiaries targeted by the legislation will not only undermine New Zealand’s international commitment to the right to social security but, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is likely to lead to solo parents with school age children and sickness beneficiaries accepting low paid, unrewarding work – if they can find it – and struggling to find suitable childcare, particularly in rural areas.
9.5 The Human Rights Commission considers aspects of the Bill are fundamentally flawed and it should be withdrawn. The Commission is happy to provide human rights expertise in any subsequent legislation to ensure it is consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
[1] S.5(1)(a) Human Rights Act
1993
[2] Part 3
[3] S.5(2)(k)(iii) Human Rights
Act 1993
[4] S.5(2)(c) Human Rights
Act 1993
[5] S.17 Human Rights Act
1993
[6] Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), adopted 10 Dec.1948, G.A. Res.217A (III) UN Doc
A/81(1948)
[7] Which reads in part
that ... everyone has the right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in
circumstances beyond his control
[8] ICESCR, adopted 16 Dec. 1966
entered into force 3 Jan. 1976, G.A. Res.2200A (XXI), UN Doc. A/6316 (1966)
[9] ICERD, adopted 21 Dec. 1965,
entered into force 4 Jan. 1969, 660 UNTS 195
[10] CEDAW, adopted 18 Dec. 1979
entered into force 3 Sept. 1981, G.A. 34/180, 34 UN GAOR, Supp. (No.46) UN Doc.
A/34/46 at 193 (1979)
[11]
UNCROC, adopted 20 Nov. 1989, entered into force 2 Sept. 1990, G.A. Res. 44/25,
44 UN GAOR, Supp.(No.49), UN Doc. A/44/49 at 166
(1989)
[12] UNCRPD, adopted 13 Dec.2006
entered into force 3 May 2008,
G.A.
[13] The UN General Assembly
adopted an Optional Protocol to ICESCR in 2008 but it is still too early to see
how it will play out in practice.
New Zealand has not ratified the Optional
Protocol.
[14] ICCPR, adopted
16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, G.A. Res.2200A (XXI), UN Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 993
[15] See for
example, Zwaan-de Vries v the Netherlands (Communication No. 182/1984)
and Broeks v the Netherlands (Communication No,172/1984). Both cases
involved legislation which required married women to prove they were the
breadwinner of the
family in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. The
same condition did not apply to men.
[16] Zwaan-de Vries,
ibid. para 12.4
[17] ILO
Convention 29 on Forced Labour (ratified in 1938); ILO Convention 98 on the
Right to Organised and Collective Bargaining (ratified
in 2003); ILO Convention
100 on equal remuneration (ratified in 1983); ILO Convention 105 on Abolition of
Forced Labour (ratified
in 1968); ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination
(Employment and Occupation) (ratified in 1983) and ILO Convention 182 on the
Worst
Forms of Child Labour (ratified in 2001Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade: New Zealand Handbook on International Human Rights 3rd
ed. (2008) at 37
[18] New
Zealand has not ratified ILO Conventions 87 on Freedom of Association and
Protection of the Right to Organise and 138 on Minimum
Age
[19] Ibid. at
37
[20] Social Security (Minimum
Standards) Convention (No.102)
[21] Ibid.
[22] ILO Responding to the
crisis: Building a “Social Floor” World of Work No.67 Dec.2009
at 13
[23] EU-China Human Rights
Network: Working Paper on the Right to Social Security, Network Seminar
on Human Rights, Colchester U.K (2004) at 7.
[24] Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.19: The right to social
security (art.9) E/C.12/GC/19 adopted 23 Nov.2007. General Comments are
interpretations of aspects of treaties by the international body responsible
for
monitoring their implementation. As such they are regarded as the most
authoritative legal interpretation of how a treaty should
be implemented and
indicate the requirements and standards that must be satisfied to ensure a State
does not breach its international
commitments.
[25] Ibid. para
4
[26] Ibid. para
9
[27] Ibid. para 11
[28] See fn 7
[29] General Comment 19 at para
24
[30] For further on this see
statement by the Committee: An evaluation of the obligation to take steps to
the “maximum of available resources” under an optional protocol to
the
Covenant (E/C.12/2007/1)
[31] General Comment 19 at para
42
[32] Part 1A applies to the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government or anybody or agency
carrying out a public function
conferred pursuant to law.
[33] (2009) 8 HRNZ 801; (2009) 9
NZELC 93,242 (SCNZ); [2009] NZSC
78
[34] HRRT 33/05 (8 Jan
2010)
[35] [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC)
at 28
[36] Report of the
Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Social
Assistance (Future Focus) Bill (2010) at paras 11 et seq
[37] Since the 2001 Amendment to
the HRA (which allowed complaints about discriminatory legislation for the first
time) the Commission
has received 26 complaints and enquiries relating to the
widows’ benefit. Of these 17 related to the perceived unfairness that
the
benefit was only available to women.
[38] Clauses 13 and
14
[39] On introducing the social
welfare reform package, the Prime Minister stated that “if we were to
assist just 5% of solo parents
with a youngest child aged over six into work,
there would be a saving of almost $200 million over the next ten years”.
Susan
St. John - an economist at Auckland University- has queried this claim
noting that it fails to account for the other costs that will
be incurred as a
result such as the cost of balancing it with the demand for the unemployment
benefit that could result with the
influx of solo parents in the casual labour
market (which could have the effect of ousting single people).
[40] See, for example, The
State of the Nation, a report by the Salvation Army Report available at http://salvationarmy.org.nz/uploads/State
OfTheNation.pdf at p.8 “ the availability of ECE places in poor urban
suburbs is nearly half the national average suggesting a large and lingering
inequality of access for poor and generally brown children”.
[41] Centre for Social Research
and Evaluation , The 2002 Domestic Purposes and Widow’s Benefit Reform:
Evaluation Report Ministry of Social Development (2007) at 4; See also
comments at para 8.6
[42]
National Council of Women, Press Release: Any DPB Sanctions Can’t
apply to Domestic Violence (30 March 2010)
[43] [2008] NZHRRT 31 (16
December 2008) at paras 187 &
188
[44] St John (supra)
[45] The Commission also queries
in this regard the removal of the personal development aspect from employment
plans under s.60O SSA 1964.
Personal development can be a powerful underlying
motivator and source of confidence.
[46] S.21(1)(h) HRA
1993
[47] Supra (fn 26) at paras
20 & 22
[48] In deciding
whether this is the case the Commission adopts the approach suggested by Tipping
J in McAlister, i.e. it is enough that the ground is a material
ingredient in the different treatment.
[49] Research indicates that of
the 56,000 working age people currently in receipt of the Sickness Benefit 41%
had psychological or psychiatric
conditions: Centre for Social Research and
Evaluation, Ministry of Social Development, National Fact Sheet –
Sickness Benefits March 2010
[50] Jensen at al. Work
Participation Among People with Disabilities: Does the Type of Disability
Influence the Outcome? Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, Issue 24 (2005)
at 134. The overall likelihood of finding employment diminishes sharply with
the
severity of the disability.
[51]
Supra fn 50
[52] at para 16
[53] There was a loss in New
Zealand of 8000 part time jobs for women identified in the latest Household
Labour Force Survey, December
2009
quarter.
[54] Explanatory note to
the Bill at 3
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