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New Zealand Royal Commission Reports |
Last Updated: 16 February 2023
FINAL REPORT
H.2
VOLUME 5
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN VOLUMES
5-7
CHRISTCHURCH, THE CITY AND APPROACH TO THIS INQUIRY
A
B C
A. A bird’s eye view of Banks Peninsula and the Canterbury Plains (source: Alexander Turnbull Library) B. Manchester Street, looking towards the Avon River, circa 1868 (source: Christchurch City Libraries)
C. An aerial photo of Christchurch central city taken in October 2012 after many of the buildings had
been demolished (source: Canterbury Earthquake Recovery
Authority)
ISBN: 978-0-478-39562-4 (Final Report Microsoft Word)
ISBN: 978-0-478-39575-4 (Volume 5 Microsoft Word)
Contents
Letter of Transmittal
Introduction
Section 1: Summary and recommendations – Volumes 5–7
Volume 5: Christchurch, the City and approach to this Inquiry
Volume 6: CTV Building
Volume 7: Roles and responsibilities
Section 2: Christchurch, the City
-
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Ma-ori Settlement in Otautahi (Christchurch)
2.3 European settlement
2.4 Christchurch’s built environment
2.5 Christchurch before the earthquakes
2.6 Economic activity of the region and city
2.7 Impact of the earthquakes
Section 3: Methodology
3.1 Establishment of the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission
3.2 Terms of Reference
3.3 The Royal Commission’s approach to the issues
3.4 Records management
3.5 Communications
3.6 Bereaved families, injured and tenants
3.7 Reporting requirements
Appendix 1: Terms of Reference
Appendix 2: Expert advisors
Appendix 3: Submitters and witnesses
Appendix 4: Hearings Schedule
Appendix 5: Glossary of terms
Letter of
Transmittal
To His Excellency, Lieutenant General The Right Honourable Sir Jerry
Mateparae GNZM, QSO Governor-General of New Zealand
Your Excellency
Pursuant to the Orders in Council dated 11 April 2011, 7 February 2012 and 23 October 2012 appointing us to be a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Building Failure caused by the Canterbury Earthquakes and to provide a Final Report not later than 30 November 2012, with a first part delivered by 29 June 2012 and a second part delivered on10 October 2012, we now humbly submit the third and final part of our Final Report for Your Excellency’s consideration.
We have the honour to be
Your Excellency’s most obedient servants Hon Justice Mark Cooper (Chairperson) Sir Ronald Carter
Adjunct Associate Professor Richard Fenwick
Dated at Wellington this 29th day of November 2012.
Introduction
Volumes 5, 6 and 7 of this Report complete the reporting of the findings and
recommendations of our Inquiry into building failures
caused by the Canterbury
earthquakes. These Volumes must be read in the context of the earlier volumes of
our Report: Volumes 1–4.
Those Volumes include a detailed discussion of
the nature of the Canterbury earthquakes and the earthquake risk that must be
taken
into account by building designers in New Zealand (see section 2 of Volume
1); and the findings of the study of the representative
sample of buildings,
including all those buildings whose failure caused death (see Volumes 2 and 4)
except for the CTV building, which is reported in Volume 6.
They also include our recommendations about matters to consider:
• when designing new buildings (see section 4 of
Volume 1, and Volumes 2 and 3);
• when assessing existing buildings; and
• when dealing with those buildings that are considered to be
earthquake-prone or potentially earthquake-prone (see Volume
4).
This is the third, and final, part of our Final Report. The first part
(Volumes 1–3) was delivered in June 2012; the second
part (Volume 4) was
delivered in October 2012. The Terms of Reference for our Inquiry are set out
again, for ease of reference, in
Appendix 1 of this Volume. The matters dealt
with in Volumes 5, 6 and 7 relate to the:
• Inquiry into specified buildings, namely the
Canterbury Television (or CTV) building (Volume 6);
• Inquiry into the adequacy of legal and best-practice requirements for the design, construction, and maintenance of buildings in central business
districts in New Zealand to address the known risk
of earthquakes and, in particular–
Volume 5 sets out our approach to the Inquiry as
a whole and includes a brief description of the city of Christchurch and the
impact of the Canterbury earthquakes.
One of the most significant and
tragic consequences of the 22 February 2011 earthquake was the rapid and total
collapse of the CTV
building, which is the subject of Volume 6. We extend our
sympathy to all those who lost a family member or friend in the collapse
of that
building and acknowledge their grief. We have endeavoured in our Inquiry to be
thorough and to find the reasons why this
building suffered such a catastrophic
collapse. We hope that the investigation we have carried out, and the findings
we have made,
will provide some of the answers people have sought. In Volume 6
we have set out the facts, and our analyses of the building’s
design,
construction, assessment following the September earthquake,
and
collapse.
Volume 7 addresses matters relating to the systems and skills we have in New
Zealand to ensure that buildings are well-designed and
well-built, and that
following an event such as an earthquake, damage to buildings can be assessed
and appropriate actions taken.
Section 2 of Volume 7 addresses the latter
subject in some detail: we have reviewed the building safety evaluations that
occurred
after the September and Boxing Day 2010 earthquakes, and the subsequent
processes, and conclude that the system and skills we have
are adequate but that
there is a significant gap in respect of those buildings whose rapid assessment
resulted in a “green
placard”. In sections 3 and 4 of Volume 7 we
have discussed, and made recommendations for changes to, the regulatory
requirements
for what we have called “complex structures”. For these
buildings, we have recommended a new requirement, that their
design be certified
by Recognised Structural Engineers, intended to be structural engineers highly
experienced in the design of complex
structures. This, in our view, will achieve
an increased level of quality assurance in the design of such structures. We
have also
made recommendations that are intended to strengthen the leadership
role of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment.
These include the
development by the Ministry of a policy and regulatory work programme, in
consultation with various parties. We
have also concluded that the various
documents that support compliance with the Building Code need to be reviewed and
updated regularly,
and have made recommendations for this to occur.
Other subjects we address in Volume 7 include the training and education of
civil engineers and the organisation of the civil engineering
profession. Among
the recommendations that we make are a proposal that there should be an ethical
obligation to advise the relevant
territorial authority and the Institution of
Professional Engineers New Zealand about structural weaknesses that have been
discovered
in buildings.
An issue at the margin of our Inquiry is the subject of subdivision and land use. We considered how various relevant resource management powers had been exercised by the Canterbury Regional Council (CRC) and Christchurch City Council (CCC), since one way of minimising the risk of building failure in the future is to ensure that land development rules take into account the effects that earthquakes might have on the land. Recognising the inherent uncertainties in dealing with issues of earthquake risk, we nevertheless conclude that the Resource Management Act 1991 should more explicitly acknowledge the potential effects of earthquakes and liquefaction, and we make recommendations accordingly.
Section 1:
Summary and recommendations – Volumes
5–7
In these last three Volumes of our Report, we make a number of
recommendations for changes to the legislation, policies and practices
for the
prevention or minimisation of the failure of buildings in earthquakes, on the
legal and best- practice requirements for the
management of buildings after
earthquakes and for the design of new buildings. The numbering of the
recommendations we make continues
sequentially from the recommendations made in
Volumes 1 to 4 of
our Report
Volume 5: Christchurch, the City and approach to this Inquiry
Section 2 of Volume 5 provides a brief history of the city of Christchurch,
its buildings and its economy. It also describes the impact
the Canterbury
earthquakes have had on the city and its population.
In section 3 of this Volume we have set out our approach to this Inquiry, including communications
with the families of those who lost their lives in building failures in the
22 February 2011 earthquake, the public hearings we conducted
and the other ways
in which we gathered information, investigated matters and received submissions.
We have also described the way
in which we managed the thousands of documents we
received in the course of our Inquiry, and the reporting structure we have
followed.
Volume 6: CTV building
The CTV building, designed and constructed in the
mid-1980s, collapsed during the earthquake that struck Christchurch at 12:51pm on 22 February 2011. The collapse resulted in the death of 115 people and others suffered serious injuries.
Our Terms of Reference directed us to inquire into:
• whether the building as originally designed and constructed, and
as altered and maintained, complied with legal and best
practice
requirements;
• whether the building was identified as earthquake- prone or was subject to any measures to make it less susceptible to earthquake-risk before
4 September 2010;
• the nature of the land associated with
the building;
• the nature and effectiveness of assessments and
remedial work after the earthquakes on
4 September and 26 December 2010;
• why the building failed
on 22 February 2011;
• why the failure caused extensive injury
and death;
• why it differed from other buildings in the extent
to
which it failed; and
• whether any particular features of the
building
contributed to the failure.
The Terms of Reference precluded any
inquiry into questions of liability. However, this did not prevent consideration
of errors or
failings in design, permitting, construction, inspection or any
other matter that might explain why the CTV building failed and why
the failure
caused such extensive injury and death.
In Volume 6 we have set out our findings on these matters. The collapse of
the CTV building caused much more injury and death than
any of the other
building failures on 22 February 2011. Even though it was designed under
relatively recent building codes, its failure
was severe and resulted in the
floor slabs collapsing on top of one another, leaving most of those inside the
building with no chance
of survival.
We do not summarise our conclusions here. Readers wanting to see a summary of
those findings are directed to section 9 of Volume 6,
where we set out the
principal conclusions we have reached. That section was also written with a view
to it being translated into
the languages spoken by many of the bereaved.
Unusually for a New Zealand tragedy, many of those who died were foreign
nationals.
Resources have not permitted the full report to be translated.
However, section 9 of Volume 6 has been translated into Japanese,
simplified
Chinese, Thai and Korean.
The engineering design of the building was deficient
in a number of respects. While there were elements of the applicable codes
that were confusing, a building permit should not have
been issued for the
building as designed. There were also inadequacies in the construction of the
building. The post-earthquake inspections
of the CTV building also illustrated
areas in which building assessment processes could be improved. As noted above,
a summary of
all our findings in respect of the CTV building is set out in
section 9 of Volume 6 of this Report.
We mention here matters that are the subject of specific recommendations
arising from our inquiry into the CTV building.
The CCC issued a number of permits and consents (including resource consents) for work on the CTV building between the time of its original construction and the September earthquake. In most cases, the approved work would have had no impact on the structural performance of the building in an earthquake. A penetration was cut in the floor of level 2 for installation of an internal staircase during a fit-out in 2000. We are satisfied that the penetration would not have affected the seismic performance of the building. However, in our view particular care should be takento ensure that damage to critical reinforcing does not occur when buildings are altered.
Recommendation
We recommend that:
107.Where holes are required to be drilled in concrete, critical reinforcing
should be avoided. If it cannot be avoided, then specific
mention should be made
on the drawings and specifications of the process to be followed if steel is
encountered, and inspection by
the engineer at this critical stage should be
required.
Following the earthquake, Urban Search and Rescue engineers
working on the CTV site, Mr Graham Frost, Dr Robert Heywood and Mr John
Trowsdale, took extensive photographs and labelled building elements. Their
public-spirited initiative created an excellent record
of the state of the
building and individual elements following collapse. There was no formal system
whereby this information was
collected and the Royal Commission commends these
engineers for their very thorough documentation and assessment of the collapse
debris.
Overall, we consider that the evidence provided an adequate basis
to make findings about the state of
the building after its collapse and to
draw conclusions about possible collapse scenarios. However, implementation of
practice guidelines
for forensic engineering is warranted to ensure that high
quality forensic work is guaranteed for future investigations.
Recommendation
We recommend that:
108. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should consider
developing guidelines for structural failure investigations,
including
circumstances in which sites should be preserved for formal forensic
examination.
It is important to identify other buildings in New
Zealand that have characteristics that might lead to their
collapse in a
major earthquake, so that appropriate steps can be taken to reduce the potential
hazard posed by these structures.
Recommendation
We recommend that:
109. In the assessment of buildings for their potential seismic
performance:
• the individual structural elements should be examined to see if they
have capacity to resist seismic and gravity load actions
in an acceptably
ductile manner;
• relatively simple methods of analysis
such as the equivalent static method and/ or pushover analyses may be used to
identify load paths through the structure and the individual
structural elements
for first mode type actions. The significance of local load paths associated
with higher mode actions should
be considered. These actions are important for
the stability of parts and portions of structures and for the connection of
floors
to the lateral force resisting elements;
• the load path assessment should be carried out to identify the load paths through the different structural elements and zones where strains
may be concentrated, or where a load
path depends on non-ductile material characteristics, such as the tensile strength of concrete or a fillet weld where the weld
is the weak element;
• while the initial lateral strength of a building
may be acceptable, critical non-ductile weak links in load paths may result in rapid degradation in strength during
an earthquake. It is essential to identify these characteristics and allow for this degradation in assessing potential seismic performance. The ability of a building to deform in a ductile mode and sustain its lateral strength is more important than its initial lateral strength; and
• sophisticated analyses such as inelastic
time history analyses may be carried out to further assess potential seismic performance. However, in interpreting the results of such an analysis, it is essential to allow for the approximations inherent
in the analytical models of members and interactions between structural members, such as elongation, that are not analytically modelled.
110. Arising from our study of the CTV building, it is important that the
following, in particular, should be examined:
• the beam-column joint details and the
connection of beams to structural walls;
• the connection between floors acting as diaphragms and lateral
force resisting elements; and
• the level of confinement of columns to ensure that they have
adequate ductility to sustain the maximum inter-storey drifts
that may be
induced in a major earthquake.
In sections 8 and 9 of Volume 2 and
section 6.2.5 of Volume 4 of our report we discuss other issues related to the
assessment of the
potential seismic performance of existing
buildings.
Volume 7: Roles and responsibilities
Section 2:
Building management after earthquakes
This section considers the
management of buildings after an earthquake, both during and after a state of
emergency. We briefly outline
New Zealand’s civil defence and emergency
management framework
and give an overview of the building safety evaluation
process used to assess buildings after an earthquake.
We consider that,
overall, New Zealand was very well served by the engineers, building control
officials and others who volunteered
in the building safety evaluation process
carried out after the Canterbury earthquakes. We appreciate the valuable
evidence many
of these volunteers gave the Royal Commission to assist us to make
recommendations for improvements to the management of buildings
after
earthquakes.
The Royal Commission considers that life safety should be the main objective for managing buildings after earthquakes. We consider that current legislation provides for New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process, but we recognise that proposals to introduce new emergency management provisions into the Building Act 2004 may address some of the problems that occurred when the process transitioned from
civil defence to normal building control arrangements controlled by
territorial authorities.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
111. Life safety should be the overarching objective of building management after earthquakes as communities both respond to and recover from the disaster.
112. The building safety evaluation process should be used following a range of disasters.
113. Legislation should provide that a building safety evaluation operation should only be commenced during a state of emergency.
114. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should progress its
proposals to incorporate new emergency risk management
provisions into the
Building Act 2004 to:
• make the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment responsible for the development and maintenance of
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation
process;
• make territorial authorities responsible for delivering a building
safety evaluation operation; and
• give the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment a formal role within national civil defence and emergency planning arrangements.
115. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should continue working with the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management on the detail of the above proposals.
As well as considering the process of building safety evaluation, we have
discussed and made recommendations about the way in which
engineers evaluate
buildings when carrying out rapid assessments and detailed engineering
evaluations after earthquakes. We also
make recommendations about the way that
building safety evaluators should be identified and trained.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
How evaluators assess buildings after earthquakes
116. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, GNS Science, the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering and other engineering technical groups should research how and when building safety evaluators should account
for aftershocks.
117. The building safety evaluation process should set out the factors
evaluators need to take into account when considering how a
building will
respond in an aftershock, including:
• how close the main shock was to an urban centre that could be
affected by an aftershock;
• the direction of the main shock and any
likely aftershocks; and
• how soil, ground conditions and any other relevant factors may affect the intensity of the ground motions in an aftershock.
Mobilising a sufficient number of skilled building safety evaluators
118. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should progress their proposal to establish a core team of building safety evaluators that the Ministry could call on.
119. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should carefully consider the merits and detail of any proposals about the size of this group of building safety evaluators.
120. The ability to supplement this team with more evaluators who have
received basic training should be maintained.
121. Legislation should continue to provide for a waiver of liability for building safety evaluators carrying out rapid assessments.
122. The liability waiver for building safety evaluators should be aligned with the building safety evaluation process instead of being restricted to an operation carried out in a
state of emergency.
Guidelines for building safety evaluators
123. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should work with the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, the Structural Engineering Society New Zealand and others with appropriate experience and expertise to finalise guidelines for Detailed Engineering Evaluations as soon as possible.
124. Guidelines should be developed that assist building safety evaluators to assess when and how to enter a damaged building.
125. These guidelines should be based on the Urban Search and Rescue training on when and how to assess entry to a damaged building.
126. These guidelines should be attached to the guidelines that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment is developing on the way in which engineers should carry out Detailed Engineering Evaluations after earthquakes.
127. New Zealand’s building safety evaluation guidelines should incorporate detailed guidance to engineers about the way they should assess the damage to particular building types.
128. The field guide for building safety evaluators should be
finalised.
Training for building safety evaluators
129. The building safety evaluation process should incorporate a training programme for all building safety evaluators.
130. Such training should cover:
• what the building safety evaluation
process is and how it works; and
• how to identify and assess the damage
evaluators observe in buildings after an earthquake.
131. This training programme should be
developed using the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering’s building evaluation resource and training capability objectives framework, in which building safety evaluators are split into three different groups and each group receives a different level of training.
132. The core group of building safety evaluators who are a national resource capable of
leading a building safety evaluation operation, and those Chartered Professional Engineers, structural engineers and senior building officials who wish to be building safety evaluators, should be required to attend compulsory training.
133. Only trained building safety evaluators should be authorised to participate in a building safety evaluation operation unless the circumstances of a particular disaster make this impractical.
134. If the scale of the emergency requires the mobilisation of the largest group of potential building safety evaluators, who have not received the compulsory training, these evaluators should work, wherever practicable, under the supervision of those evaluators
who have attended the compulsory training.
135. Territorial authority staff with civil defence and emergency management responsibilities should be required to attend the compulsory building safety evaluator training as part of their job training.
Indicating that evaluators have the right skills
136. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should keep a list of the people who complete the compulsory training for building safety evaluators and should make this list available to all territorial authorities.
137. Where available, only Chartered Professional Engineers should carry out
Level 2 Rapid Assessments.
Despite some problems, we consider that,
overall, the building safety evaluation operations after the Canterbury
earthquakes were
well delivered. We recommend that a number of changes are made
to improve the delivery of New Zealand’s building safety evaluation
process, which follows current international best-practice.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
138. The Indicator Building model should be incorporated into New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process.
139. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should provide guidance to territorial authorities to support their plans to carry out a building safety evaluation process.
140. Territorial authorities should be required to plan their building safety evaluation process as part of their civil defence and emergency management plans.
141. Only official building safety evaluators should be authorised to place, change or remove placards, and to carry out rapid assessments for this purpose.
Recommendations related to the placards
142. The placards placed as a result of the building safety evaluation process should be rewritten in a plain English format.
143. In principle, the colour of the green placard should be changed to white. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should consult with the international building safety evaluation community about the merits and detail of the change before deciding whether or not to do this.
144. Formal procedures should be developed that set out when and how the
status of a building could be changed. The placard on a building
should only be
changed if the formal procedures are followed.
Communication and information management
145. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should be responsible for developing and releasing public communication materials about building management after earthquakes and other disasters during and after the state of emergency.
146. GNS Science should develop protocols and plans to ensure that it is ready to advise the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, other government agencies, local authorities and the wider public after an earthquake.
147. Information management systems should be developed as part of planning for
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process.
148. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should work with territorial authorities and other relevant agencies to develop a way for territorial authority building records to be electronically recorded and stored off-site.
149. A clear system for identifying individual buildings should be developed and included in the
plans for a building safety evaluation process.
150. Land Information New Zealand should continue to work on initiatives that
develop consistent national addressing protocols and
make this information
available to the general public.
The Royal Commission heard evidence
that there were significant issues in the transition of responsibility for the
building safety
evaluation process from civil defence to normal building
management arrangements governed by territorial authorities. We discuss
and make
recommendations about the need for transition mechanisms and about the way in
which territorial authorities should manage
buildings after earthquakes. We
consider that all buildings should be assessed further after the rapid
assessment phase of the building
safety evaluation operation. This assessment
should be based on the nature of the event, the type of structure and the level
of damage
observed. The Royal Commission has heard evidence regarding the
barriers faced by some building owners motivated to address the damage
to their
building after the September earthquake. We consider that some of these barriers
are indicative of issues with the management
of earthquake-prone buildings and
we make recommendations about these specific issues in Volume 4 of our
Report.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
151. After an earthquake that has given rise to the declaration of a state of emergency, buildings should be assessed in accordance with the following process:
a all buildings should be subject to a rapid assessment process;
b for the purposes of subsequent steps, buildings should be placed in the following categories:
i) Group 1: non-unreinforced masonry buildings that do not have a known
critical structural weakness, and either,
• in the case of concrete buildings, were designed to NZS 3101:1995 or
later editions of that Standard;
• in the case of structural steel
buildings, were designed to NZS
3404:1992 (informed by the Heavy Engineering Research Association guidelines published in 1994) or later editions of that Standard;
or have been subject to an evaluation that has shown that the building has
67% ULS or greater (we discuss the term “ULS” in section 6.2.4 of Volume 4);
ii) Group 2: buildings designed between
1976 and the mid-1990s, but not included in Group 1;
iii) Group 3: buildings designed before
1976, but not included in Group 1; and
iv) Group 4: unreinforced masonry buildings;
c buildings used for residential purposes that are three or less storeys in height should be excluded from Groups 2 and 3. In the case of those buildings, a pragmatic approach needs to be taken to assessment and occupancy, which balances the need
for shelter with safety considerations. Other commercial and residential buildings
should not be occupied unless approved for occupancy in accordance with the process outlined below;
d legislation should require territorial authorities to classify buildings in their districts in accordance with the preceding Recommendation within the timeframes established under Recommendation 82 in Volume 4 of our Report (Recommendation 82 requires the assessment of earthquake- prone and potentially earthquake-prone buildings);
e where the rapid assessment process had identified the need for further evaluation of a building in one of these defined Groups, the building should not be occupied
until the Civil Defence Controller or the territorial authority (as appropriate) has approved the occupancy of the building after the following assessments:
i) for Group 1 buildings:
• where no significant structural damage was seen, a Level 2 Rapid
Assessment;
• where significant structural damage was seen, a Plans-Based Assessment for lower levels of structural damage and
a Detailed Engineering Evaluation for
higher levels of structural damage;
ii) for Group 2 buildings:
• where no significant structural damage was seen, a Plans-Based
Assessment;
• where significant structural damage was seen, a Detailed Engineering Evaluation;
iii) for Group 3 buildings:
• for all levels of damage, a Detailed
Engineering Evaluation;
iv) for Group 4 buildings:
• where no significant structural damage was seen and the building has
been retrofitted to 67% ULS or greater, a Plans-Based
Assessment;
• where significant structural damage is apparent and where the
building has not been retrofitted to 67% ULS or greater, a Detailed
Engineering
Evaluation;
f arranging for the Plans-Based Assessments and Detailed Engineering Evaluations should be the responsibility of the owner of the buildings concerned; and
g the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should further develop
the Plans-Based Assessment concept, in consultation with the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering and the Structural Engineering Society New Zealand, and set out the Plans-Based Assessment in published guidelines.
152. Plans-Based Assessments and Detailed Engineering Evaluations should include checking the vulnerabilities observed after the Canterbury earthquakes that the Royal Commission describes in Volume 2, section
6.2.5 of Volume 4, and section 6.3.8 of
Volume 6 of this Report.
153. Any Plans-Based Assessment and Detailed
Engineering Evaluation of a building after an earthquake should begin with a careful examination of the building’s plans.
154. The Plans-Based Assessment and Detailed
Engineering Evaluation should confirm that all known falling hazards and other vulnerabilities have been assessed and secured or removed.
155. A copy of the Plans-Based Assessment and the Detailed Engineering Evaluation should be given to the relevant authorities.
Cordon management
156. Civil defence and emergency management should be responsible for setting up and maintaining cordons during the state of emergency.
157. Territorial authorities should be responsible for maintaining any cordons that are in place at the end of the state of emergency until
the public space or building they surround is made safe.
158. Territorial authorities should be able to recover the costs of maintaining any necessary cordons from the building owner after three months.
159. The roles and responsibilities of decision makers should be described in the building safety evaluation process. The roles and responsibilities should allow for flexibility of operation according to the circumstances and scale of the event.
Buildings that act as one structure in an earthquake
160. The building safety evaluation process should direct evaluators to assess properties that
act as one structure in an earthquake as one structure, rather than as separate buildings.
Transition mechanism
161. The building safety evaluation and wider building management after
earthquakes (and other disasters) framework should be developed
and provided for
in legislation.
Section 3: Roles and responsibilities
Through the course of our Inquiry, we identified some systemic issues
relating to the regulatory framework for buildings, such as
misunderstanding of
the framework, a complex and confusing suite of regulatory documents, and
quality assurance issues. These issues
relate to the design and construction of
complex, new buildings.
Quality assurance is vital in the structural design of complex buildings.
Quality assurance occurs at a number of levels throughout
the design and
construction of such buildings. The currently large number of building consent
authorities results in inconsistent
application requirements and consent
decisions around the country, and varying levels of capability within these
authorities.
The experience and skill of structural engineers designing such structures
also may vary, with reliance placed on the building consent
authority to provide
a check.
This poses risks for the quality of our buildings. We have concluded that the design of complex buildings
(as defined in section 3.3.8.2 of Volume 7 of this Report)
requires a higher level of competence. We consider the appropriate regulatory procedure to ensure this occurs is through the preparation and submission of
a Structural Design Features Report at the start of the building consent authority’s assessment of a building consent application. The building consent authority would, on the basis of this report and criteria to be developed, determine if the structure is a complex one. If it is determined to be a complex structure, a “Recognised Structural Engineer” would be required to certify the structural integrity of the design. The building consent authority would then determine whether it has the staff with the appropriate competency to process the consent application in-house (and whether any additional peer review certified by a Recognised Structural Engineer is required), or whether it needs to refer the application to another building consent authority that has the staff with the appropriate competency to process the application. If the structure is determined to be not complex, the engineer who provided the Structural Design Features Report would certify the structural integrity of the building’s design. These recommendations would give further assurance of building quality and reduce reliance on the building consent authority.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
162.Building consent applications for:
• buildings in importance levels 3, 4 and 5
in Table 3.2 of AS/NZS 1170.0:2002;
• commercial buildings comprising three
or more storeys; and
• residential buildings comprising three or more storeys with three or more household units
should be accompanied by a Structural Design Features Report, which describes the key elements of the design, including the foundations and gravity and lateral load resisting elements.
163. A structural Chartered Professional Engineer should be engaged at the same time as the architect for the design of a complex building.
164. After consideration of the Structural Design Features Report, the building consent authority should decide whether or not the structure should be regarded as complex.
165. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should develop criteria to be applied in determining whether a structure is complex, in consultation with the Structural Engineering Society New Zealand, the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering, the New Zealand Geotechnical Society and other relevant groups, including building consent authorities. When developed, the criteria should be given regulatory force.
166. If the structure is determined to be not complex, the engineer who provided the Structural Design Features Report should certify the structural integrity of the building’s design.
167. If the structure is determined to be complex, a Recognised Structural
Engineer should be required to certify the structural integrity
of the
design.
168. On receipt of the building consent application, the building consent authority should decide:
a whether it has the staff with the appropriate competency (qualifications
and experience) to process the application in-house (including any decision as to whether the structure is complex and whether any additional peer review
certified by a Recognised Structural
Engineer should be required); or
b whether it needs to refer the application to another building consent
authority that has the staff with the appropriate competency
(qualifications and
experience) to process the application.
We have also reviewed the leadership structures within the building sector, as they relate to the matters we are concerned with, and consider that the role of Chief
172. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should consult with
learned societies, such as the New Zealand Society for
Earthquake Engineering,
the New Zealand Geotechnical Society and the Structural Engineering Society New
Zealand, about the ongoing
membership of the Engineering Advisory Group. The
membership of the Group should always include senior practising structural
engineers.
We discuss the role of Standards in New
Zealand’s “performance-based” regulatory system and note that
the suite
of Standards supporting the Building Code plays a vital role in
ensuring our buildings are designed well and built well. We have
concluded that
these Standards should be regularly reviewed and updated.
Recommendations
Engineer within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should be strengthened and supported
with additional capability.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
169. The role of Chief Engineer should be renamed Chief Structural Engineer to reflect a greater focus on the structure of complex buildings and should be further strengthened and supported with additional capability.
170. The Chief Structural Engineer should have the statutory power to collect consent applications for complex structures (as part of the Policy and Regulatory Work Programme in Recommendations 173 and
174 below) for the purpose of analysing trends, identifying issues and risks, and sharing knowledge with the building and construction sector.
171. The Engineering Advisory Group should continue as an ongoing function to provide expert advice to the Chief Structural Engineer.
We recommend that:
173. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should develop, lead and fund a Policy and Regulatory Work Programme
in consultation with the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand, the New Zealand Construction Industry Council, Standards New Zealand, the Building Research Association of New Zealand, the New Zealand Geotechnical Society, the
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering and the Structural Engineering Society New Zealand.
174. The Policy and Regulatory Work
Programme should identify the priorities
for the development, review and update of compliance documents and Standards,
and define the status of compliance documents and guidance
material. Work
relating to Standards prioritised for update as part of the Policy and
Regulatory Work Programme should be funded
as part of the work
programme.
175. Standards referenced in the Building Code should be available online, free of charge.
176. The Policy and Regulatory Work Programme should be the responsibility of the Chief Structural Engineer.
177. A communications plan should be developed by the Ministry of Business, Innovation
and Employment to communicate the Policy and Regulatory Work Programme and ensure information is effective, and targeted for different participants in the sector. There should be clarity about the
status of information provided to the sector; for example, whether it is a
compliance document, Standard or guidance.
Section 4: Training and education of civil engineers and organisation of the
civil engineering profession
In this section of our Report, we have reviewed the training and education of
civil engineers and the organisation of the civil engineering
profession.
International agreements underpin the nature and content of engineering education in New Zealand.
The Royal Commission has heard nothing that suggests there should be a change in the structure of the
Bachelor of Engineering degree. Rather, key matters for further consideration
are in post-degree training and continuing education
through provision of
tailored block courses for those who are working, and mentoring within
engineering firms.
Life safety is and should remain the paramount objective in the design and construction of buildings to resist earthquake motions. This is best achieved by having highly experienced people performing
the highest risk activities. In this regard, the Royal Commission has heard proposals and views from interested parties as to the merits, issues and risks of implementing a two-tier certification system that would raise the level of training and experience required of
a structural engineer who certifies engineering design plans for complex structures. We consider there is merit in this concept and recommend the creation of the role of ”Recognised Structural Engineer” for these purposes (see also section 3 of Volume 7 of this Report).
We have also reviewed the competence requirements against which engineers are
assessed for registration as a Chartered Professional
Engineer (CPEng).
We
recommend the introduction of an additional competence measure against which
every structural engineer must be assessed –
“a good knowledge of
the fundamental requirements of structural design and of the fundamental
behaviour of structural elements
subjected to seismic
actions”.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
178. The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (as the Registration Authority) should publish on the Chartered Professional Engineer register information about a Chartered Professional Engineer’s area of practice, and any other information that may further inform consumers of engineering services of the competence of individual engineers, under section 18(1)(d) of the Chartered Professional Engineers of
New Zealand Act 2002.
179. There should be ongoing provision of post- graduate continuing education for engineers through the provision of block courses, mentoring within engineering firms and courses suitable for those who are working.
180. The universities of Auckland and Canterbury should pursue ways of increasing the structural and geotechnical knowledge of civil engineers entering the profession.
181. Legislation should provide for Recognised Structural Engineers to be
responsible for the certification of the design of complex
buildings as
described in Recommendations 162–168.
182. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment should develop prescribed qualifications and competencies for “Recognised Structural Engineers” in consultation with the Chartered Professional Engineers Council, the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand, the Structural Engineering Society New Zealand and the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. These prescribed qualifications and competencies should be a more
specific prescription of the qualifications and competencies of the role, and
require more extensive design experience of the type
required for the design of
complex structures than that required for a Chartered Professional Engineer.
These should be included
in an appropriate regulation.
Members of the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) are required to act in accordance with the IPENZ Code of Ethics, and Chartered Professional Engineers (CPEng) are bound to a Code
of Ethical Conduct. Both codes are identical in the obligations they impose on the registered engineers. The key matters of interest to the Royal Commission have been the clauses governing the requirement not to misrepresent competence (IPENZ clause 4 and CPEng rule 46) and the obligations to report buildings
and structures that place the public’s health and safety at risk (IPENZ
clause 11 and CPEng rule 53). We consider that reviewing
structural engineers
should have a clearly expressed ethical duty to disclose the existence of a
critical structural weakness, in
a process which protects them from any
liability where they have acted in good faith.
Recommendation
We recommend that:
183. The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand should provide clarification of its codes of ethics, in respect of the following matters:
a the test for taking action should be well understood by engineers – i.e. ensuring public health and safety;
b each clause in the codes of ethics stands alone and no one clause can override another. In the case of a perceived conflict between two or more clauses, the question as to which clause should carry most
weight in the circumstances presented should be a carefully considered matter of judgement; and
c reporting obligations of engineers when a structure has been identified that presents a risk to health and safety. There should be clarity as to the point at which an obligation of a reviewing engineer to report is extinguished, and where the accountability for addressing the matter and rectifying any weaknesses rests.
184. Part 3, clause 6 of the Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Code of Ethics and Rule 48 of the Chartered
Professional Engineers Rules of New Zealand
(No 2) 2002 should be amended to provide for an obligation to advise the
relevant territorial authority and the Institution of Professional
Engineers New
Zealand in circumstances where a structural weakness has been discovered that
gives rise to a risk to health and safety.
A particular feature of
the engineering profession is the existence of learned societies dedicated to
particular fields of engineering
practice. Membership
of the individual
societies largely consists of engineers practising within the society’s
particular field, although many engineers
are multi-disciplinary and are
therefore members of more than one society.
These learned societies
include the Structural Engineering Society New Zealand (SESOC), New Zealand
Society for Earthquake Engineering
(NZSEE), New Zealand Concrete Society (NZCS),
New Zealand Geotechnical Society (NZGS), New Zealand Timber Design Society
Incorporated,
Cement and Concrete Association of New Zealand (CCANZ), the Heavy
Engineering Research Association (HERA) and others.
The work undertaken
by the societies’ members includes both contributing to formal
processes
for reviewing and updating New Zealand Building Standards, and
issuing guidance on best-practice for the profession and industry,
some of which
is paid work but much of which is not. Society members also
contribute
technical papers for conference proceedings
and provide guidance on best-practice to industry. Processes in which
guidance is given are informal, and do not pass through the
scrutiny of a
regulatory review process: the best-practice advice is not formalised as legal
requirements, and therefore may or may
not be utilised or taken into account by
practitioners.
There are risks in the informal component of this approach. These include whether the necessary expertise will remain available on a voluntary basis
to enable the process to continue over time, and the absence of an objective process that tests the content and assesses the consequences of the
best-practice guidance by formal regulatory review. Assessment of consequences would include
examining the costs of the best-practice standards and requirements to
determine value in the context of the risks being managed.
In addition, without
any formal recognition, the adoption of the recommended best- practices is
difficult to monitor and cannot be
enforced. This makes it unlikely that they
will be consistently applied by practitioners.
As discussed above, we consider that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) should develop a policy and regulatory work programme to identify priorities and clarify roles. In doing this work, MBIE should consult with the engineering profession’s learned societies as to where best-practice guidance
is required, and the appropriate process for achieving it, including the need
to codify any parts of the advice into regulations or
Standards, and whether the
issues should be led by the regulator, or left to the societies.
The professional and learned societies play an
important role in facilitating information sharing, debate, and problem resolution across the various disciplines within the engineering profession. Of particular interest to the Royal Commission is the need for collaboration between structural and geotechnical engineers. The societies also endeavour at times to bring engineers together with other intersecting professions within
the construction industry (for example, constructors, manufacturers and
architects).
The Royal Commission considers there is a reasonable level of constructive engagement between the different branches of engineering. However, there is scope for more constructive, and early, collaboration between architects and engineers.
Recommendation
We recommend that:
185. The Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand, the New Zealand
Institute of Architects, and the New Zealand Registered
Architects Board,
supported by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, should work
together to ensure greater collaboration
and information sharing between
architects and structural engineers.
Section 5: Canterbury Regional Council and Christchurch City Council –
management of earthquake risk
As part of our Inquiry into the Canterbury earthquakes, we considered it would be inappropriate to ignore entirely the fact there has been unnecessary damage and costs sustained as a result of the development
of land subject to a risk of liquefaction without duly considering that risk.
Apart from anything else, an understanding of how that
has been possible under
the existing regulatory system might enable better outcomes in the
future.
As a result of our Inquiry into these matters, we conclude that there should be better provision for the acknowledgment of earthquake and liquefaction risk in the various planning instruments that are made under the Resource Management Act 1991. One way of minimising the failure of buildings in the future is to ensure that the land on which they are developed is suitable for the purpose. Having said that, we need to emphasise that it is not possible to predict with any
certainty when an earthquake will occur and, in reality, the public and private investment in the country’s cities is such that it is not realistic to redirect development from the existing central business districts. However, when zoning for new development areas is in contemplation, we consider that it would be appropriate for the risks of liquefaction and lateral spreading to be taken into account.
Recommendations
We recommend that:
186. Sections 6 and 7 of the Resource Management Act 1991 should be amended to ensure that regional and district plans (including the zoning of new areas for urban development) are prepared on a basis
that acknowledges the potential effects of earthquakes and liquefaction, and to ensure that those risks are considered in the processing of resource and subdivision consents under the Act.
187. Regional councils and territorial authorities should ensure that they are adequately informed about the seismicity of their regions and districts. Since seismicity should be considered and understood at a regional
level, regional councils should take a lead role in this respect, and provide policy guidance
as to where and how liquefaction risk ought to be avoided or mitigated. In Auckland,
the Auckland Council should perform these functions.
188. Applicants for resource and subdivision consents should be required to undertake such geotechnical investigations as may be appropriate to identify the potential
for liquefaction risk, lateral spreading or other soil conditions that may contribute to building failure in a significant earthquake. Where appropriate, resource and subdivision consents should be subject to conditions requiring land improvement to mitigate
these risks.
189. The Ministry for the Environment should give consideration to the
development of guidance for regional councils and territorial
authorities in
relation to the matters referred to in Recommendations 186–188.
Section 2: Christchurch, the City
2.1 Introduction
In preparing this section of our Report, the Royal Commission consulted a variety of sources. For the early history of Christchurch, we turned to Te Ara1, the online encyclopaedia of New Zealand, Michael King’s2 Illustrated Penguin History of New Zealand
and John Wilson’s3 contextual history of Christchurch
City. Wilson provided information about Christchurch’s built heritage, as did Professor Geoffrey Rice. Professor Rice provided the Royal Commission with draft material and we also consulted his publication Changing Christchurch: An Illustrated History4. For modern Christchurch, and the impact of the February
earthquake upon the city and the Canterbury region, we consulted the December 2011 Briefing to the Incoming Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery5 by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA)
and their Greater Christchurch Recovery Update6. We
also consulted the Christchurch City Council’s7 (CCC) draft Central City Plan. The Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Team’s8 website describes the impact
of the Canterbury earthquakes on Christchurch’s infrastructure.
Christchurch Psychology’s website provided valuable information
about the
impact that the February earthquake has had on Cantabrians, particularly those
who lost loved ones.
O
2.2 Ma-ori Settlement in - tautahi
(Christchurch)
Canterbury was first settled by Ma-ori 600–700 years ago. Archaeological sites at Redcliffs and on the shores of the estuary, especially near the mouth of the Avon River, have provided evidence that Ma-ori lived in the Christ Christchurch area in the earliest years of Ma-ori occupation of New Zealand
The predominant iwi in Christchurch is Nga- i Tahu, the main iwi of the South Island. Originally from the East Coast of the North Island, the Nga- i Tahu people migrated south to Wellington, and then to the South Island. As they moved south they fought several
battles with two tribes already living in the South Island, Nga- ti Ma- moe and Waitaha, and today’s iwi members
are linked to these earlier peoples.
.
Figure 1 shows the Canterbury landscape, which is characterised by its flat
plain, Banks Peninsula, and the distant relief of the
Southern Alps in the
west.
The Christchurch area had plentiful resources for Ma-ori
including eel and other freshwater species in the rivers, flounder and other
fish and shellfish in the estuary, and birds in the
forests on the Port Hills
and the plains. To ensure easy access to food, the early Ma-ori lived
mainly by the wetlands near the coast, and around Te Waihora (Lake Ellesmere)
and Wairewa (Lake Forsyth). Artefacts have
also been found inland at camps for
expeditions
to gather moa, weka, eels and rats. Horomaka (Banks Peninsula)
was important because it combined the resources of forest and sea.
By 1800, as
many as 5000
Ma-ori may have lived in central Canterbury, most of
whom were at Kaiapoi and Banks Peninsula.
There were smaller pa-
and seasonal ka-inga on the swampy area of plains now occupied
by Christchurch. The most notable of these was located
at
Pu-taringamotu (in the area we now know as
Riccarton)
and Papanui. Both ka-inga were on higher, drier,
forested land surrounded by tussock grassland and swamp. Tautahi, the Nga-
i Tahu chief whose name forms part
O
of - tautahi, the
Ma-ori name for Christchurch, had a pa- located near the
position of the Barbadoes Street bridge. There were also urupa- on
the corner of
Manchester and Kilmore Streets, and on the corner of
Cambridge Terrace and Hereford Street.
The biggest pa-
site was located at Kaiapoi. This was
Nga- i
Tahu’s largest and most important pa-: it may have housed 1000
people at its peak. It was a centre of trade in pounamu from the West Coast. In
the early 1830s, the Kaiapoi
pa- was sacked by the North Island
Nga- ti Toa chief, Te Rauparaha, but overall his raids were
unsuccessful and Nga- i Tahu kept their ownership of Canterbury.
- -
Figure 1: Bird’s eye view of Banks Peninsula and the Canterbury
Plains (source: Alexander Turnbull Library)
2.3 European settlement
The first Europeans who settled the Canterbury Plains established themselves
at Banks Peninsula as they felt the land there was more
viable than the
swampland on the plains. In the 1830s, shore whaling stations were established
with small settlements in the southern
bays of Banks Peninsula. Organised
settlement began when French (and some German) settlers founded Akaroa in August
1840. By this
time, approximately 80 Europeans were living at Banks
Peninsula.
In 1840, whalers based at Oashore established a farm
at Pu- taringamotu (Riccarton) but abandoned the venture after 18 months. Brothers John and William Deans established a farm on the same site in 1843. They remained the only permanent European residents on
the Canterbury plains until the Canterbury Association immigrants arrived in
1850.
With the support of prominent Anglican clergy,
John Robert Godley and Edward Gibbon Wakefield formed the Canterbury Association in 1848 to develop an Anglican settlement in Canterbury. Over a decade earlier, Wakefield had established the New Zealand
Company, a private business venture, to settle
New Zealand using a planned colonisation scheme. In 1848, they sent Captain
Joseph Thomas, an experienced New Zealand Company surveyor,
to select the site
of the new Canterbury venture.
2.3.1 The site chosen for the settlement
Captain Thomas initially planned to establish the main Canterbury settlement
at Port Cooper, which is
now known as Lyttelton. After realising the amount
of
reclamation needed at the Lyttelton site to produce the necessary flat land
for the Canterbury Association’s plans, Captain
Thomas moved the main town
to
the proposed satellite settlement on the plains. This settlement became
Christchurch.
The site had previously been rejected by New Zealand
Company agents (who went on to establish the Nelson settlement) and the Scottish
Free Church (who founded Dunedin). They noted, as did Captain Thomas when
he
originally chose the Lyttelton site, the extensive swamps, the lack of timber,
and the difficult access between the only suitable
port site on Banks Peninsula
and the plains.
Figure 2: Sketch of the Canterbury Plains from the Bridle Path, Port
Hills, circa 1850 (source: Christchurch City Libraries)
2.3.2 The land Christchurch is built on
In section 4 of Volume 1, we describe the soils found in Canterbury. As Figure 2 illustrates, the Canterbury plains consist of a 300–500m thick layer of alluvial gravel formed from ice age glaciers and rivers. Wilson3 suggests that by 1850 the plains were characterised by a mosaic of lobes of shingle and other deposits from the Waimakariri River. Swamplands and waterways lay to the south-east of the shingle lobes. The Heathcote and Avon Rivers created an estuary where they drained into the sea from the swamplands. There were also belts of sandhills parallel to the coast. Even though
the settlement was sited on higher, drier land further up the Heathcote and Avon Rivers, it was still built on fluvial deposits and loose soil in older river beds. Traces of Christchurch’s former topography can be seen in
the creases in North Hagley Park and the sandhills in
Linwood.
The site for the Canterbury settlement was also characterised by poor drainage, high groundwater levels and flooding (although the European settlers did not appreciate the extent to which it was a flood plain for the Waimakariri River until major floods in
1868). Early maps of Christchurch show the extensive network of streams and surface water associated with the spring-fed Avon River, which bisected the original settlement. The water table in Christchurch’s Central Business District (CBD) sits at a depth of 1–1.5 metres, increasing to 5 metres west of the CBD. There are also aquifers in the top 25 metres of the ground. Cathedral Square is only 4.7 metres above the high water mark
for spring tides, although western parts of the city are about 15 metres
above that mark. This combination
of a high water table, aquifers and loose
alluvial soil composition makes Christchurch prone to liquefaction during severe
earthquakes.
Liquefaction occurred
in Amuri (North Canterbury) after an
earthquake in
1888 and in Kaiapoi as a result of the 1901 Cheviot earthquake. The attempt
to address the issues presented by Christchurch’s
swampy ground did not
begin until the Drainage Board was formed in 1875–76.
2.3.3 The
development of Christchurch
Captain Thomas founded the port town of
Lyttelton, laid out the plains town of Christchurch, and began a
road over
the Port Hills before the first settlers arrived.
Between 1850 and 1853, 3,549 settlers arrived, most of whom originated from
southern England.
Of these, 400 were land purchasers, and the rest were
mostly labourers and servants. Christchurch was the settlement that came the
closest to realising Wakefield’s vision of transplanting a cross-section
of class-based British society into a farming community
with a strong urban
hub.
As set out in Figure 3, the central city and early suburbs were laid
out in a regular grid pattern on a north-south orientation, straddling
the Avon
River. Christchurch’s CBD now covers Captain Thomas’ original
settlement. The banks of the Avon were gazetted
as public
reserves, forming a
green corridor through the built-up area, and Cathedral Square (actually a cross
shape), Cranmer Square and Latimer
Square (both of which
are rectangular) were set aside as public spaces. In addition, Hagley Park
and the Government Domain were reserved from private development.
These green
spaces, along with fenced and well planted gardens offering protection from the
wind, led to the city becoming known
as the “Garden City” from the
beginning of the twentieth century.
As European settlement on Banks Peninsula was more established when Christchurch was founded in 1850, Lyttelton was the principal Canterbury settlement
until the 1860s. From 1855, small satellite settlements developed in Sumner, New Brighton, Linwood, Richmond, Papanui and Upper Riccarton. Julius Vogel’s assisted immigration schemes spurred the rapid
growth of the city in the 1870s, when the suburbs
of Addington, Spreydon and St Albans became well established. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Christchurch expanded into the foothills of the Port Hills at Cashmere. Further suburban development occurred over the course of the next century.
2.4 Christchurch’s built environment
Like other European
settlements in New Zealand, the first residential and commercial buildings in
Christchurch were constructed from
wood. Victorian New Zealanders soon replaced
their wooden public and commercial buildings with structures comprised of more
permanent
materials (see Figure 4). In 1864,
the first stone church was
constructed in Christchurch. This building, the Durham Street Methodist Church,
completely collapsed in
the February earthquake, tragically killing three
people. Rice4 contends that the rebuilding of earlier wooden churches
in stone during the early 1870s was a sign of Christchurch’s increasing
maturity and prosperity: more substantial masonry buildings were perceived as
indicating greater wealth and status. In addition,
as European settlers moved
down the South Island they found few large forest stands to log for building
materials; this encouraged
stone and masonry construction. As the city
prospered, at the turn of the century, most (but not all) of the remaining older
wooden
buildings were replaced by
larger, masonry commercial
buildings.
Figure 3: A map of Christchurch central city dated 1877 (source: Alexander
Turnbull Library)
Figure 4: Manchester Street, looking towards the Avon River, circa
1868 (source: Christchurch City Libraries)
European immigrants to New Zealand looked to
re-create in the new, unfamiliar environment the familiar landscapes and built environment they had left behind. Consequently, they built their new homes and public and commercial buildings in the architectural styles popular in Victorian and Edwardian Europe. Early buildings in Christchurch were constructed in the
neo-Gothic style popular in England for most of the nineteenth century.
Christchurch’s commercial buildings in the late nineteenth
century echoed
the Gothic theme with variations on Venetian Gothic and Renaissance
styles.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Christchurch architecture was distinctive in combining Victorian and Edwardian architecture with Modern and Post-modern innovation. Although Christchurch has relatively few Art Deco buildings, Cecil Wood produced several buildings that combined Modernist features with Stripped Classicism (a simplified Classical style). From the 1960s to the early 1990s, older commercial buildings were replaced with large, modern high-
rise office blocks and hotels. In this period, Sir Miles Warren and Peter
Beaven were the most well-known proponents of the form of
Modernism that became
known as the Christchurch Style of architecture. The Christchurch Style combined
the structural expression
and clear exposure of construction materials that
characterised Brutalism, and the Scandinavian and Japanese commitment to
straightforward
design.
2.5 Christchurch before the earthquakes Christchurch is the largest city in the South Island. Christchurch City includes Akaroa and Banks Peninsula, but does not include adjacent satellite centres such as Kaiapoi, Prebbleton, Rolleston, Lincoln or Tai Tapu. It is the market town and transport hub for the Canterbury plains, the largest area of relatively flat farmland in
New Zealand. Canterbury comprises 9.3 per cent of
New Zealand’s land area, at 25,252 sq km. According to the 2006 Census,
its inhabitants make up 11.4 per cent of the country’s
total population.
Canterbury’s regional population was around 522,000, of which two thirds
lived in Christchurch.
In the 2006 Census, Christchurch City was
New Zealand’s second largest population district after Auckland. The city is home to 9.1 per cent of
New Zealand’s total population. Modern Christchurch, the urbanised area within a radius of 30 km of
Cathedral Square (excluding Banks Peninsula), contains approximately 370,000 people. The city comprises
a third of the South Island’s population, and about
70 per cent of the Canterbury population. Before the Canterbury earthquakes,
Christchurch’s population had increased by 7.5
per cent between 2001 and
2006 in response to a growing regional
economy.
Figure 5: Christchurch and the Canterbury Plains, August
2011
2.6 Economic activity of the region and city
In the nineteenth century, Christchurch’s early development was driven by the city’s physical growth and rapidly increasing production from the farms developing in north- and mid-Canterbury. Canterbury farmers contributed to the New Zealand economy
by producing large amounts of wool, wheat and (from the
1880s) frozen meat for export. In addition to farm- related industries,
Christchurch developed a strong manufacturing sector. At the
turn of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, brands originated in Christchurch that
became household names throughout Australasia,
including Aulsebrooks biscuits,
Edmond’s baking powder, Sanitarium health foods, Kaiapoi woollen goods,
and even cough remedies
such as Bonnington’s Irish Moss.
The reliance on supporting the farming industry, both in manufacturing and handling farm produce, has given Christchurch an industrial history that differs somewhat from that of other New Zealand industrial centres. Although the economy diversified in the twentieth century, the structure of industry in Christchurch changed little until the deregulation of New Zealand’s economy in the mid-1980s and 1990s. The Canterbury regional economy is driven largely by agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. Christchurch City contributes around 8 per cent of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
from economic activities.
2.7 Impact of the earthquakes
The scale of the damage in the September earthquake resulted in the
declaration of a local state of emergency. A national state of
emergency was
declared after the February earthquake, due to the size of this event and its
impact on Christchurch.
During the February earthquake, 185 people tragically lost their lives and many more were injured. Those who lost their lives as a result of the February earthquake came from all corners of the world, including New Zealand, Australia, Japan, China,
the Philippines, Thailand, Great Britain, Korea, Turkey, Ireland, Malaysia, Taiwan, United States of America, Israel and Canada. Of those who died in the earthquake, 77 were foreign nationals. Much of the loss of life was due to the catastrophic collapse of
two multi-storey office buildings: the CTV and PGC buildings where 115 and 18 people died respectively. Other building failures caused the deaths of a further
42 people. Other deaths attributable to the earthquake arose from causes not related to building failures. They included those attributable to rock falls.
A significant number of people were also injured to varying degrees in the
earthquakes and immediately afterwards. By 27 January 2012,
the Accident
Compensation Corporation, which provides personal injury insurance cover for all
New Zealand residents and visitors
to
New Zealand, had accepted 12,984
earthquake-related claims. Soft tissue injuries, such as bruising, strains and
sprains, accounted
for the majority (over 9,500) of these claims. The next most
common category of injury was lacerations and puncture wounds (around
1,500
claims), followed by fractures and dislocations (770 claims).
Six people had
limbs amputated.
Figure 6: The eastern suburbs suffered repeatedly from liquefaction. This
aerial photo shows a street in Bexley after the June 2011
aftershock (source:
Fairfax Media/ The Press)
Figure 7: Collapsing rocks in the suburb of Sumner caused houses to fall
down the cliff. A row of shipping containers was installed
to protect the busy
road below from danger (source: Flickr/newtown graffiti)
In the larger earthquakes that occurred in Canterbury there was extensive liquefaction, particularly in the eastern suburbs near the sea (Figure 6 shows the liquefaction in the eastern suburb of Bexley). Hill suburbs experienced cliff collapse and rock fall, as Figure 7 illustrates. In the Port Hills, especially Lyttelton, moving land, collapsed cliffs, and rockfall caused
severe damage to retaining walls. Damage to the land under the CBD is
described in section 2 of Volume 1.
Christchurch citizens were affected by widespread damage and interruptions to infrastructure including roads, fresh water, waste water systems, storm water systems, electricity and telecommunications networks. Rebuilding the city’s damaged street-level civic infrastructure to the same level of infrastructure service that existed before the earthquakes is likely to cost around $2 billion dollars and will take several years
to complete.
Figure 8 shows the road damage caused by the Canterbury earthquakes. An estimated 1,021 kilometres of road need to be rebuilt due to earthquake damage. This is 52 per cent of Christchurch’s urban sealed
roads. There will be major renewal projects to rebuild these roads and in some cases the road will need full reconstruction.
The earthquakes damaged 51 kilometres of water supply mains,
excluding those yet to be properly assessed because they are under roads.
However the damage was far less than it might have been a few years ago because
a proactive programme was already underway to strengthen
the fresh water pipe
network. Huntsbury reservoir, the city’s biggest, was seriously damaged,
placing significant pressure
on the water supply. Pump station buildings are
operating but will need to be repaired properly in the future.
Figure 8: Road damage caused by the earthquakes
(source: Michael
Campbell)
Because of a higher proportion of old materials used in
waste water pipes than in fresh water pipes, around 528 kilometres, or about
31
per cent, of the sewer system was damaged and 100 sewer pumping stations were
identified as needing to be repaired or rebuilt.
For health reasons,
restrictions on recreational use of the waterways around Christchurch were
imposed because of the effects of
the damage. The main causes of ocean and
waterway contamination were leakage of waste water and the temporary pumping of
waste water
into waterways as
an emergency diversion after severe
aftershocks.
The earthquakes badly damaged the Christchurch waste water
treatment plant and its oxidation ponds, although it continued to operate
at a
reduced capacity. As a temporary measure, for a short period, the effluent that
was pumped into the ocean was not treated to
the usual safe level.
Fortunately, the earthquakes left the storm water system largely in a functional state. There was still some damage, but the system is catching most storm
water and most breaks have been temporarily repaired. At the time of writing, about one fifth of the storm
water system had been properly assessed for damage; however CCC advises that
the system is performing acceptably with only moderate
impact from the damaged
parts.
Some of the stopbanks by the Avon River settled and cracked so that a spring tide could flood the land. Contaminated tidal water came onto roads through broken drainage pipes. Banks and pipes
failed because the ground moved toward the river and settled in a lower position than it had been. All of the stopbanks by the Avon River were at least weakened by the shaking. They need to remain raised, firm,
and uncracked to function effectively. The city needs another four kilometres
of stopbanks along the Avon River because the surrounding
land is lower than
before the earthquakes.
The city’s electricity distribution networks were severely affected by the earthquakes. Earth movement stretched some underground power cables up to a metre in the February earthquake and caused more faults than would usually be seen in a decade. The June 2011 aftershocks caused further cable damage.
Only four of 314 substations were severely damaged in the February
earthquake, including the Pages Road substation, which sank two
metres into the
ground. The good performance of the substations was largely due to an extensive
seismic strengthening programme started
in the 1990s by the network’s
owner, Orion New Zealand Limited. Without this work, the impact of the
earthquakes would likely
have been significantly worse. Telecommunications were
also damaged and temporarily overloaded during the earthquakes.
Many
educational facilities were damaged. Consequently, some schools were temporarily
closed and the students shared premises with
other schools until they were
repaired. In the long term, schools may be permanently closed, merged, or
relocated because of damage
or falling rolls due to migration.
At the
time of writing, the Earthquake Commission (EQC) had received 459,325 claims for
damage to residential buildings, personal
property (contents) and land in the
Canterbury earthquakes. The red placards affixed to unsafe residential homes in
Operation Suburb,
the rapid assessment operation CCC carried out after the
February earthquake, meant they could not be occupied. By the end of September
2012, CERA had red zoned
7,859 residential properties as unsuitable for
long-term reoccupation and therefore likely to be demolished.
Figure 9: An aerial photo of Christchurch central city, October 2012,
taken after many of the buildings had been demolished (source:
Canterbury
Earthquake Recovery Authority)
Figure 10: In October 2011 a temporary shopping precinct was set up to attract people back into the city.
The Re: START project, located in Cashel Street, makes use of shipping containers to house a variety of businesses
(source: Paul Roper-Gee)
Because of the danger posed by damaged buildings, parts of the CBD were cordoned off after both the September and February earthquakes. After the February earthquake, the CBD Red Zone covered a significant area of the city (as Figure 9 indicates). More than 3,000 of the 5,000 businesses in the CBD were displaced, many migrating to the suburbs. There has been a general shift of activities, such as retailing, away from the damaged CBD and eastern and riverside suburbs to the south and south-west. Retailers
also moved into temporary premises (for example, the shipping container mall in Figure 10) in Cashel Mall and elsewhere. More than 1,200 Christchurch CBD buildings require full or partial demolition or deconstruction, including heritage buildings. As the
demolitions are completed the cordon is progressively reduced, enabling
further access to the central city.
2.7.1 The economic impact of the earthquakes
Estimates of net departures from the region vary, but are generally reported10 at between eight and ten thousand in the year to June 2011. It has been suggested that net departures continued at a slower rate in the second half of 2011, and in the last few months there have been more arrivals than departures, due possibly to the inflow of workers to assist with the rebuild.
Population loss has a flow-on impact to a number of economic indicators,
as discussed further below.
Economic commentators note the difficulties
inherent in isolating the effects of the earthquakes from other economic
developments.
In addition, data often lags well behind an actual event. It is
noted that New Zealand had, at the time of the September earthquake,
made a
modest recovery from recession, and was looking at a positive medium-term
outlook.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) has characterised the
Canterbury economy as having been “reasonably resilient to the
impact of
the earthquakes” and stated that the New Zealand economy “appears to
have been little affected”. In particular,
the RBNZ noted in September
2012 that exports and manufacturing activity have held up well and that the
agricultural sector was largely
unaffected. It noted that:
...disruption to industrial production, goods exports and activity was relatively short lived as the region’s manufacturing hub escaped significant damage.
But Christchurch is the tourist gateway to the South Island; accommodation
capacity has been greatly reduced and tourist numbers have
fallen
considerably.
In its 2011 Fiscal Strategy Report, the Treasury estimated that the impact of the February earthquake would be a reduction in GDP growth for 2011 of
around 1.5 per cent from what it would have otherwise been. It noted that the
impact would be offset as the reconstruction commences,
resulting in higher
growth from 2012.
2.7.1.1 Capital costs
These costs are largely related to the repair and rebuild of commercial
buildings, infrastructure and residential housing.
Damage to buildings can be defined in a number of ways, but we adopt the RBNZ definition as the cost of rebuilding and repairing in 2011 dollars. Building damage resulting from the earthquakes is estimated at around $20 billion. This equates to approximately
10 per cent of annual GDP. The RBNZ estimates
$13 billion for dwellings (estimates are that 150,000 homes, around 75 per cent of Christchurch’s housing stock, have sustained some damage, and 20 per cent have sustained damage exceeding $100,000 in value),
$4 billion for commercial buildings and $3 billion for infrastructure. In comparison, the Japanese earthquake and tsunami caused damage equal to 3–4 per cent
of GDP.
2.7.1.2 Funding the rebuild
The Treasury and the RBNZ note that much of the damage is covered by private insurance and EQC,
and reinsured through overseas insurance companies. This will help to fund
rebuilding, and lead to a large boost to economic growth
from reconstruction
activity.
Central and local government are also contributing
to the costs of repairing and replacing infrastructure. Residents of Canterbury will bear some of the cost through increased rates – an average 7.8 per cent for
2012/13 over 2011/12, of which approximately 3.7 per cent is to fund earthquake-related costs (e.g. repair of
10 major community facilities) and replace lost revenue.
Since the earthquakes, there has been limited new insurance cover available for earthquakes in Canterbury. Some owners of earthquake-prone buildings and infrastructure can no longer obtain insurance cover in Canterbury or elsewhere in New Zealand. Reinsurance premiums have increased substantially, some more
than doubling.
2.7.1.3 Economic impact
As stability has returned in Canterbury
with the reduction of aftershocks and a clearer plan for
the future, the
economy is settling as the region’s population gets back to business as
usual. Nevertheless there continues
to be disruption to business through, for
example, the red-zoned CBD being unavailable to businesses, the city’s
roading being
subject to major repair and a lack of facilities catering to
tourists at present. There remains, at present, a drag on the region’s
economy. We now discuss the major impacts on business
profitability.
Retail sales are estimated to currently be around
10 per cent behind the rest of the country, probably as a result of the loss
of premises in the CBD and the decline in population.
Retail trade has increased
by around 7.7 per cent in nominal terms nationwide since September 2010, but
only by 1.3 per cent in Christchurch.
The Treasury indicates that
employment in the
Canterbury region was 8 per cent lower in the year
to September 2011 over the previous corresponding period. The New Zealand
Institute of Economic Research reported that to September
2011, there had been
around 27,000 job losses and the RBNZ noted that the decline in employment has
been mostly in
the retail, accommodation and food services sectors with the
loss of some 12,000 jobs between June 2010 and June 2012. However, Westpac
Bank
notes that the unemployment rate in the region has remained
low because of
strong demand in certain industries and for particular occupations. Between June
2010 and June 2012, there has been
an increase in jobs in the construction
sector of an estimated 6,000. There is evidence that it is now becoming
difficult to recruit
labour for skilled jobs in Canterbury because of the
miss-match of the skills of those who lost jobs after the earthquakes and the
skills needed for the rebuild.
Business profitability has been impacted
by earthquake damage to capital items (e.g. machinery) and buildings that
reduced the production
capacity of businesses, damage to roads and other
infrastructure that has impeded their ability to carry out their
operations,
and changes in demand for goods and services from a reduced
number of clients (e.g. tourists). Some businesses benefitted from increased
clientele, especially where they were located outside the worst affected
areas.
The housing market initially turned down with uncertainty over repairs and ability to get insurance, but signs of
it rising in Canterbury while being flat nationwide were being seen by November 2011. The reduction in population appears to have been exceeded by the reduction in the housing stock, which has put upward pressure on prices. New property rental
agreements have seen rents increased by 18 per cent in Christchurch since the end of 2010 compared
with a seven per cent increase nationwide, with higher rentals being achieved
in the south-western suburbs.
2.7.2 The cultural impact of the earthquakes Before the earthquakes, Christchurch had one of New Zealand’s best-preserved heritage townscapes.
New Zealand is internationally recognised for the quality
of its Victorian and Edwardian architecture. The preference of its early settlers for neo-Gothic
architecture in its churches and public buildings gave Christchurch a
distinctive character, and prompted visitors to comment on its
“Englishness”. Christchurch had the only intact surviving set of
government buildings from the period of provincial government
in New Zealand
(1852-76), and the interior of Benjamin Mountfort’s great debating chamber
was widely recognised as the finest
neo-Gothic interior outside England. Christ
Church Cathedral was the city’s centrepiece since 1881, a rare example of
Sir Gilbert
Scott’s work outside England. The 1906 Cathedral of the
Blessed Sacrament in Barbadoes Street (Figure 11) was one of the finest
classical buildings in New Zealand. Christchurch Arts Centre (Figure 12), the
former buildings of Canterbury University College before
the university’s
move to its suburban campus at Ilam, together with the nearby Canterbury Museum,
formed
a neo-Gothic precinct unique in New Zealand.
Figure 11: The Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament, also known as the
Catholic Basilica, after the Canterbury earthquakes
Figure 12: The neo-Gothic-style Christchurch Arts Centre (source:
Roger Wong)
Of these buildings, only the Canterbury Museum has emerged from the February
earthquake without significant damage. Much of Christchurch’s
heritage
townscape was destroyed in the Canterbury earthquakes. Many adjacent Victorian
and Edwardian buildings act as one structure
in an earthquake. In the February
earthquake, whole streetscapes were lost when the façades of an entire
block of interconnected
buildings rotated outwards onto the street. This was
particularly noticeable in Colombo Street, where two buses were trapped under
fallen façades, tragically resulting in loss of life in one of
them.
While they did not collapse as substantially as Christchurch’s older
unreinforced masonry buildings, the February earthquake
damaged many of
Christchurch’s Modernist buildings beyond repair. Notable demolitions
include Beaven’s Southland Building
Society building, his central city
Holiday Inn, and Warren’s Crowne Plaza building (Figure 13). The
Christchurch Town Hall
also sustained major damage and, at the time of writing,
has an uncertain future.
Figure 13: The Crowne Plaza Hotel, formerly the Park Royal Hotel, was
damaged by the earthquakes and demolished in 2012 (source: Gudrun
Gisella)
Since the February earthquake, and the closure of the
CBD, many businesses have shifted to the west of
the city. Colombo Street south of Moorhouse Avenue, Sydenham, Addington,
Riccarton and the light industrial area surrounding Christchurch
airport have
all grown since 2011. New residential subdivisions are also emerging in
Christchurch’s satellite towns.
2.7.2.1 Impact of the Canterbury earthquakes on individuals and the
community
The Canterbury earthquakes have changed the people of Christchurch. The psychological impact of the earthquakes has been complicated by the many aftershocks since the first earthquake on 4 September
2010. The continuous aftershocks have kept people in a prolonged state of hypervigilance and exposed them to recurrent acute stress. This unpredictable and uncontrollable stress has affected some people physically and emotionally. Some relationships that
were already under stress before the earthquakes have been unable to survive
under the constant stress.
Post-traumatic stress can arise following a traumatic event that threatens people’s safety. It is characterised by symptoms of re-experiencing the original trauma(s) through flashbacks or nightmares, avoidance of stimuli
associated with the trauma, and increased arousal such as difficulty in
falling or staying asleep, anger,
and hypervigilance. While most Cantabrians
would not be classified as having post-traumatic stress disorder, many are
experiencing
or have experienced varying degrees of post-traumatic stress
symptoms. For some people this now manifests as a “startle response”
or feeling “jumpy” when they hear or feel a bus go past their house,
or a hypervigilance regarding their personal safety
or that of their family
members. Post-traumatic stress disorder develops when these symptoms do
not
lift and people remain stuck in a state of psychological shock.
Many
Christchurch people have experienced an enormous sense of loss including the
loss of work
and businesses, homes and the lives they had before. Those who
were seriously injured in the earthquakes have experienced the loss
of their
former selves, independence and autonomy. The sense of loss is, of course, most
profound for those who lost a loved one
in the February earthquake.
For
some people, the earthquakes have been a chance to reassess and re-evaluate
their lives to determine what is really important.
As time goes on, some people
who have lived through the earthquakes are able to
feel that new opportunities have emerged from it all, opening up possibilities that were not there before. People have displayed extraordinary innovation, adapting to the new situation by creating exciting new projects. People and communities banded together
and offered support to each other following each major earthquake, developing stronger relationships with others in their community as a result of a collective understanding because of a collective experience.
For many people, it appears that living through this disaster has given them a greater appreciation of life in general and a sense of what is really important
to them. Many Cantabrians now have a reduced attachment to material things
and a new appreciation for what is truly important in life.
For many, the
earthquakes have given them a chance to stop and reconsider their priorities; to
focus on what they still have despite
all that has been lost.
References
2. King, M. (2007). The Penguin History of New Zealand: Illustrated.
Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Group NZ.
6. Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority. (2012). Greater Christchurch Recovery Update, Issue 14
(14 October 2012). Retrieved from http://cera.govt.nz/sites/cera.govt.nz/files/common/greater-christchurch-
recovery-update-issue-14-october-2012.pdf
10. For example, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Westpac Bank discuss net departures from the
Canterbury region.
Section 3: Methodology
3.1 Establishment of the Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission
The Royal Commission of Inquiry into Building Failure Caused by the Canterbury Earthquakes was formally constituted on 11 April 2011. Its appointment was notified in the New Zealand Gazette on 14 April. A sitting High Court judge, Justice Mark Cooper, was appointed to be the chairperson of the Commission.
A month later two other Commissioners, eminent engineers Sir Ron Carter and
Professor Richard Fenwick, were appointed and the Terms
of Reference were
finalised. The Commissioners met for the first time in Christchurch on 4 May
2011.
Later that month, in consultation with Justice Cooper, the Solicitor-General appointed Mr Stephen Mills QC and Mr Mark Zarifeh as counsel assisting the
Royal Commission. At the request of some bereaved families for government-funded legal representation, a third counsel, Mr Marcus Elliott, was appointed in August 2011. Mr Elliott was appointed as counsel assisting the Commission, but with a particular focus
on representing the interests of bereaved families and those who were
injured.
Executive Director Ms Justine Gilliland was appointed at the end of April. A Royal Commission office
was established in Christchurch staffed with a project manager, an
administration and information management team, legal analysts,
policy analysts,
a senior communications advisor, a family and community liaison officer, a
structural engineer and hearings staff.
3.2 Terms of Reference
The full Terms of Reference are included in Appendix 1. The following is an overview of their requirements and discusses matters which emerged and required
specific attention.
The Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference were wide ranging and required the Royal Commission to investigate two major areas:
1. Buildings in the Christchurch central business district (CBD), an area bounded by the four avenues (Fitzgerald, Deans, Moorhouse and Bealey) and Harper Avenue. While the Commission’s principal focus was on the effects of the Canterbury earthquakes, the Royal Commission was also required to consider the wider implications of
these events for the rest of the country. In considering the effects in the Christchurch CBD, the Royal Commission was required to look specifically at what factors led some buildings to fail severely, why the failure of buildings caused extensive injury and death, and why buildings differed in the extent to which they failed and caused injury or death.
That meant looking at, among other things, the characteristics of buildings that may have led to failure (for example, age, location, and whether buildings conformed to earthquake risk best- practice). The Royal Commission was required to include the Canterbury Television (CTV) building, the Pyne Gould Corporation (PGC) building,
the Forsyth Barr building and the Hotel Grand Chancellor building, but was otherwise left to decide which buildings it should investigate.
2. The adequacy of current legal and best-practice requirements for the
design, construction and maintenance of buildings in central
business districts
in New Zealand.
The Terms of Reference required the Royal Commission to
make both interim and final recommendations upon or for—
(a) any measures necessary or desirable to prevent or minimise the failure of buildings in New Zealand due to earthquakes likely to occur during the lifetime of those buildings; and
(b) the cost of those measures; and
(c) the adequacy of legal and best-practice requirements for building design,
construction, and maintenance insofar as those requirements
apply to managing
risks of building failure caused by earthquakes:
The Terms of Reference also contained specific exclusions. The Royal
Commission was not permitted to inquire into, determine, or report
in an interim
or final way upon:
(a) whether any questions of liability arise; and
(b) matters for which the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, or both are responsible, such as design, planning, or options for rebuilding in the Christchurch City CBD; and
(c) the role and response of any person acting under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act
2002, or providing any emergency or recovery services or other response, after the 22 February
2011 aftershock.
The interpretation of exclusion (c) was tested on
6 March 2012 when Justice Cooper publicly heard an application from counsel for bereaved family member Mr Srecko (Alec) Cvetanov. Mr Cvetanov’s wife Dr Tamara Cvetanova survived the collapse of the CTV building but died before she could be rescued.
Mr Cvetanov requested that the Royal Commission investigate the search and rescue response. The application was opposed by counsel assisting the Royal Commission on the basis that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to address this issue.
Justice Cooper delivered a reserved decision finding that the Royal Commission did not have jurisdiction to investigate. The Coroner’s office subsequently confirmed it would investigate the deaths in the
CTV building in the hours following the collapse.
The failure of five buildings outside the CBD claimed the lives of six
people, as noted in section 4.1 of Volume 4. Although the Terms
of Reference did
not require the Royal Commission to inquire into the failure of these suburban
buildings, it decided to do so,
relying on its power to examine matters it
considered to be sufficiently linked to its principal inquiries. These buildings
were commercial
premises in Riccarton
Road in Riccarton, Coleridge Street in
Sydenham and Worcester Street in Linwood and a residential property in Bishop
Street, St Albans
(see Figure 2 in section 4 of Volume 4).
3.2.1 Issues
arising under the Terms of
Reference
Early in our Inquiry, the Royal
Commission identified
six principal issues that were to be considered. A Notice of Issues was
published on the Royal Commission website in June. The issues
were:
• Seismicity. The Terms of Reference required
the Royal Commission to understand the nature and severity of the Canterbury earthquakes, the susceptibility of land to liquefaction as a result
of earthquakes, and the nature and extent of earthquake risk that should be
provided for in the construction and maintenance of buildings,
both in
Christchurch and throughout New Zealand.
Key: Commission activities Non-Commission activities
4 September 2010
7.1Mw earthquake
strikes Christchurch and the surrounding region
at 4:35am. Three local councils declare local states of emergency
26 December
“Boxing Day” sequence of aftershocks, beginning at
10:30am
with
a M 4.7 shake
w
23 February
The Minister for Civil
Defence declares a national state of emergency
14 March
Government agrees
to establish the Royal Commission to inquire into the Canterbury Earthquakes chaired by Justice Mark Cooper
30 April
The state of national emergency ends
2010 2011
16 September
The local states of emergency end
22 February
6.2Mw aftershock strikes at 12:51pm
11 April
The Royal Commission is established
36
• Consideration of a representative sample of buildings in the Christchurch CBD. The content of the representative sample was to be determined having regard to the obligations to consider why some buildings failed severely, why the failure of some caused extensive injury and death, why buildings differed in the extent to which they failed and why some did not fail. Under this issue, the Royal Commission also investigated the subsurface
conditions in the CBD, particular features of buildings that contributed to failures, the extent of compliance of the buildings with relevant building controls, and the inspection and remediation processes followed after the September and December 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes and aftershocks.
• Legal and best-practice requirements for the design, construction and maintenance of buildings, including those that were or should be considered as earthquake-prone. This included the existing
and desirable form of legislative provision for
the inspection of buildings and remedial actions following earthquakes. The Royal Commission also considered the respective roles of central and local government, the building and construction industry and the significant inputs of volunteers (in the drafting and amendment of relevant New Zealand standards) in developing and enforcing legal and best-practice requirements.
• Change of New Zealand design standards/codes of practice over time and appropriate future controls for new and existing buildings
• Development of technical expertise in the design and construction of earthquake-resistant buildings.
• Future measures for existing and new buildings.
3.3 The Royal Commission’s approach to the
issues
Commissions of Inquiry are often conducted by inviting
submissions from interested parties and considering what they might be prepared
to tell the Commission, supplemented where appropriate by questioning from
counsel assisting, with findings based on evidence from
one or more
hearings.
The Royal Commission decided that, because of the breadth of
the investigation required by the Terms
of Reference, this approach alone
would not be adequate. It would risk some relevant issues being covered
incompletely, or even not
at all. There would be a risk also that the Royal
Commission would not be presented with differing opinions on some
important
issues, because in the absence of clear disputes arising plainly or
by necessary implication from the Terms of Reference itself, persons
having
rival opinions might
not be aware of what others were saying to the
Royal Commission.
Accordingly the Royal Commission developed and
implemented its own approach to the investigation of the principal issues, which
had
the elements discussed below.
4 May
The Commissioners meet for the
first time in
Christchurch
2 July
Expressions
of interest open
14 July
Potential representative building sample list is published
22 July
Expressions of interest close
24 August
Mr Marcus Elliott is appointed as counsel assisting with a focus on bereaved
families and injured
2012
13 June
15 July
9 August
30 September
w
6.0M
aftershock
A delegation of
First technical
The results of the DBH
at 2:20pm
bereaved families and officials from China visits
report published
technical investigation into
the PGC, Forsyth Barr and Hotel Grand
Chancellor buildings are received
37
3.3.1 Expressions of interest
Section 4A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908 sets out which persons
(including organisations) are entitled to be heard by the
Royal
Commission:
Persons are entitled to be heard if they are parties to
the inquiry, or satisfy the Commission that they have an interest in the inquiry apart from any interest in common with the public. Persons who satisfy the Commission that any evidence given before it may adversely affect their interests must be given an opportunity during the inquiry to be heard in respect of the matter to which
the evidence relates. Every person entitled, or given an opportunity, to be
heard may appear in person or be represented by a lawyer
or agent.
In addition to identifying affected and interested parties, the Royal Commission concluded there would be other people and organisations who might wish to participate in the Inquiry, for example, because they had been
or may have been affected in some relevant way by the Canterbury earthquake
sequence or might have information of relevance to the
Inquiry.
To identify these people and organisations, and what part of the Inquiry they wanted to contribute to and in what manner, on 2 July 2011 the Royal Commission called for public expressions of interest in relation to each of the identified principal issues. Public notices were placed in four major metropolitan papers: the New Zealand Herald, Dominion Post, The Press and Otago Daily Times. In addition, notices were placed
in the following regional daily newspapers:
Northern Advocate, Bay of Plenty Times, Waikato Times, Gisborne Herald, Wanganui Chronicle, Taranaki Daily News, Manawatu Standard, Hawke’s Bay Today,
Nelson Mail, Timaru Herald, Southland Times, Greymouth Star,
Marlborough Express and Hokitika Guardian. People or organisations
were requested to register with the Royal Commission and indicate if they wished
to meet with the Royal
Commission, provide a written submission, participate in
public hearings or communicate information to the Royal Commission.
The
Royal Commission received 80 expressions of interest by the 22 July 2011
deadline. They were from people who were trapped in buildings
as a result of the
February 2011 earthquake, building owners and tenants, persons with professional
knowledge about matters arising
in the Inquiry, learned societies, the Auckland
Council, the Christchurch and Wellington City Councils, Local Government New
Zealand
and the former Department of Building and Housing (DBH) (now the
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment or MBIE). Other
individuals and
organisations came forward with information as the Inquiry progressed. Some
organisations that did not respond were
contacted by the Commission if it was
thought that their views may be of value.
The Royal Commission also
advised persons bereaved in the February earthquake that they would be regarded
as affected parties, and
advised of the progress of the Commission’s work
(unless they preferred not to be) without the need for them to lodge expressions
of interest.
3.3.2 Expert advice
On the principal issues the Royal
Commission commissioned advice in the form of reports from people and
organisations within New Zealand
who
had appropriate expertise. The Royal
Commission also adopted a policy that advice received would
generally
Commission activities Non-Commission activities
10 October
The Royal Commission delivers Interim Report to the Governor-General
17 October
Public hearings commence
7 February
The Terms of Reference are modified to
enable a later final reporting
date
(by 12 November)
21 February
Delegations of bereaved families and officials from
Japan and China
visit
Christchurch and the
Royal Commission
2012
12 October
23 December
9 February
6 March
The Government
5.8M
aftershock
The results of the
Justice Cooper rules on
w
releases the
Interim Report
strikes at 1:58pm
DBH technical investigation into the CTV building are received
the jurisdiction of the Commission in response to an application
from Mr
Srecko
(Alec) Cvetanov
38
be peer reviewed by eminent overseas experts. The expert advisers and peer reviewers contracted by the Royal Commission are listed in Appendix 3 of this Volume, in Appendix 2 of Volume 1 and Appendix 3 of Volume 4 of the Report. The reports were published on the
Royal Commission’s website. Details of the reports can also be found in
the relevant Volumes of this Report dealing with the
subject matter covered in
the reports.
3.3.3 Consultation
The Commission sought submissions from those who had lodged expressions of
interest and from a wide variety of other parties the Royal
Commission
identified as having relevant contributions, including local government,
educational institutes and engineers.
3.3.3.1 Technical reports
The Royal Commission sought submissions on each of the expert reports. The
submissions received were analysed and published on the
Royal Commission’s
website.
3.3.3.2 Memorandum about issues raised
The Royal Commission sought input from Structural Engineering Society New Zealand (SESOC) and other engineers on a memorandum about issues identified in two expert reports – “Stairs and Access Ramps between Floors in Multi-storey Buildings”, by Professor Desmond Bull and “Preliminary Observations from the Christchurch Earthquakes” by John Hare. This process is discussed
in more detail in section 3.4 of the Royal Commission’s
Interim Report, delivered in October.
3.3.3.3 Draft SESOC practice note
The Royal Commission also
published a draft SESOC practice note “Design of Conventional Structural
Systems Following Canterbury
Earthquakes”, called for submissions on it
and then held a technical workshop to discuss the issues raised. This input was
considered when formulating the findings and recommendations reached in Volume
2.
3.3.3.4 Discussion papers
To seek further information
and comment, prior to some of the public hearings, discussion papers were
published and written submissions
were sought
from invited parties. The
discussion papers refined the issues, canvassed options to address identified
problems, and outlined the
main areas of common view or debate in order to
ensure that the hearings were as focused and effective as possible. Submitters
were
asked to consider the extent of the identified issues in practice, provide
evidence and analysis underpinning the issues/problems,
and to describe the pros
and cons of options to address the problems.
Three discussion papers were
published on the topics of:
• building management after
earthquakes;
• training and organisation of the engineering
profession; and
• roles and responsibilities.
The
submissions received helped refine the issues and draw out options for
addressing them ahead of the hearings.
15 April
Technical workshop about draft SESOC practice note held
29 June
The Royal Commission delivers Volumes
1–3 of its Final
Report to the
Governor-General
25 July
Officials from Toyama city in Japan attend
the CTV building hearing
12 September
Public hearings finish
23 October
The Terms of Reference are modified to
enable a later final reporting
date
(by 30 November)
21 June
“Training and organisation of the engineering profession” and “Building management after earthquakes” discussion papers are published
11 July
“Roles and Responsibilities” discussion paper is published
23 August
The Government releases Volumes
1–3 of the Final
Report
10 October
The Royal Commission delivers Volume 4 of its Final Report to the Governor- General
29 November
Part three of the Final Report is delivered to the Governor-General. The
Commission of Inquiry is complete
39
Figure 14: Children of St. Teresa’s school sing at opening of Royal
Commission hearings on 17 October 2012 (source: The Press/Fairfax
Media)
3.3.4 Department of Building and Housing technical investigation
The Terms of Reference envisaged that the Royal Commission would receive and take into account the results of a separate technical investigation conducted by the former Department of Building and Housing
into the failure of the CTV, PGC, Forsyth Barr and Hotel Grand Chancellor buildings. Early in its Inquiry, the Royal Commission decided that the results of the
DBH investigations would be peer reviewed by eminent
Californian structural engineer Mr William T. Holmes, be contestable, and the
subject of individual hearings in our Inquiry process.
In order for the results
of the DBH investigation to be properly contestable in the Royal
Commission’s own Inquiry, the results
needed to be available to affected
and interested parties prior to the hearings.
When the DBH technical investigation was established, it was expected that the results would be available
by 31 July 2011. However, that proved to be overly optimistic. The DBH consultants’ and expert panel’s reports about three of the four specified buildings were made available on 30 September 2011. The results
of the investigation into the CTV building were not available until 9
February 2012.
It was therefore not possible to schedule hearings on
the four specified buildings in the order that might have been ideal and the Royal Commission decided to defer scheduling hearings in respect of some issues relevant to the Inquiry, which logically had to be addressed after the hearings on the failure of these four buildings.
These issues included the management of buildings after earthquakes, the
training and organisation of the engineering profession and
the roles and
responsibilities of those in the building and construction sector.
3.3.5
Public hearings
Public hearings were conducted on an issue-by-issue basis. They began on 17
October 2011 with a simple opening ceremony that included
singing and kapa haka
by St Teresa’s School children and a blessing/karakia
by Reverend Gray
of Nga- i Tahu and Father Antoine Thomas of St Teresa’s Parish.
Justice Cooper welcomed a large contingent of bereaved family members
and
acknowledged their loss with the words: “Welcome to this Inquiry in which
we will find out the reasons why people died
in the tragic earthquake of
22 February. We begin by acknowledging the families of those who died and
your suffering. We express our deepest sympathy to you.”
The
acknowledgment was translated into the other seven languages spoken by those who
died. Mr Elliott then read out the names of
all those who died due to building
failures. This was followed by two minutes of silence. At the start of
each
hearing about a building that caused loss of life, Justice Cooper
acknowledged those who died in that particular building and their
families and
the injured.
The hearing about seismicity and New Zealand’s seismic
landscape began in the afternoon of 17
October (see Volume 1). The following
week a one- day hearing was held about the soil conditions in Christchurch (see
Volume 1).
Figure 15: A hearing underway at St Teresa’s church hall in
Christchurch
In November, the Royal Commission commenced
a hearing about policies for earthquake-prone building types, including unreinforced masonry buildings
(see Volume 4) and the failure of the PGC building
(see Volume 2).
The PGC hearing ran into December and the 2011 hearing programme concluded
with the first of 19, usually one-day, hearings about other
building failures
that had caused loss of life (see Volume 4). The CTV building (see Volume 6) was
the subject of a later, separate
hearing.
After the Christmas break the hearings programme resumed in January 2012 with a two-day hearing about the Hotel Grand Chancellor building (see Volume 2), followed by more hearings about other buildings whose failure caused loss of life. These hearings continued
into March, interrupted by a two-day hearing about the Forsyth Barr building
(see Volume 2). In March a hearing about new building
technologies (see Volume
3) was also held followed by the final hearings about other buildings whose
failure caused loss of life.
The hearings programme was then adjourned for three months to enable the Commission to meet the date
set to deliver the first part of the Final Report and to continue the
investigation and preparation for the hearing into the failure
of the CTV
building. The CTV hearing began on 25 June and it was by far the longest
hearing, taking 32 days including closing submissions
(see Volume 6). The final
three hearings were held in September 2012. They canvassed systemic issues
regarding the engineering profession,
building management after earthquakes, and
roles and responsibilities (see Volume 7).
Because many public buildings and convention centres, were closed due to earthquake damage, the hearings were held at St Teresa’s Hall in Riccarton. Carpet, furniture, computers, internet, microphones and heating were installed to equip it as a hearing venue and
Canterbury Arts and Heritage Trust artist Mr Wayne Seyb provided the
finishing touches by kindly agreeing to display his paintings
of
earthquake-damaged Christchurch buildings in the hall.
To facilitate open
communication, people who wished to give evidence and/or make submissions were
required to provide them in electronic
form in advance of the hearings. In the
interests of fairness, evidence and other information the Royal Commission had
received about
the CTV building and other buildings whose failure caused loss of
life was made available on a confidential basis to affected and
interested
parties prior to the hearing, via a secure online document
Figure 16: Canterbury artist Wayne Seyb with one of his works at the
hearings venue
access system. Evidence was published for the general public on the Royal
Commission’s website once it had been presented in
evidence at a
hearing.
In total, the Royal Commission held hearings for
82 days, hearing evidence and submissions in person and via video link from other places in New Zealand and overseas. Witnesses included technical experts, eye witnesses, injured people, engineers, building inspectors, property owners, property managers, local and central government
officials and others. The technical experts in many cases participated in expert discussion panels.
Offsite Ministry of Justice transcribers produced 10,877 pages of official transcripts, which were published on the Royal Commission’s website. A summary setting
out the Royal Commission’s hearing topics and the dates of the hearings
is in Appendix 4 of this Volume.
3.3.6 Representative sample
The requirement that the Royal Commission analyse a representative sample of buildings required a different approach to other issues addressed in the Inquiry.
A full description of the approach to the representative sample of buildings is explained in section 1 of Volume 2. In summary, a ‘long list’ of buildings of potential interest was created. Information and existing reports were then sought about these buildings from a range of people
and organisations, and technical reports were commissioned. The long list was eventually reduced to
15 buildings, which were fully assessed.
The studied buildings are expected to be of interest to structural engineers in New Zealand and internationally, to improve knowledge of building performance in earthquakes now and in the future. Reports and other information about the studied buildings are available
on the Royal Commission’s website for a limited time and are discussed
in Volume 2. Once they are no longer available on the
website they will be
available from Archives New Zealand.
3.4 Records management
By its very nature the Inquiry generated vast quantities of information. More than 6,000 documents were logged in the Royal Commission’s Inquiry database including reports, photos, emails and letters, statements, drawings, presentations, invoices, articles, video clips, forms, work files, microfiche scans, handwritten notes and sketches, minutes, interviews, lists and schedules. All records were logged and assigned an ID number according to their content, and meta-data was added for search purposes.
As part of the study of the representative sample of buildings, building
records for approximately 200 buildings were obtained from
the Christchurch City
Council or viewed on their system and assessed for relevance. Documentation was
also sourced from building
owners and engineers for many of these buildings. The
availability of records varied widely. A very large amount of documentation
was
available about some buildings.
For example, the Royal Commission received
over
20,000 pages of documentation about the CCC civic offices in Hereford Street.
After assessment, relevant documents were tracked in
a separate buildings
database.
A third database was established to record next of kin details
and contact the Royal Commission had with bereaved families. As many
family
members as wished to be were on the Royal Commission’s communications
database to receive information. The list expanded
from
216 to 350 as people
took the opportunity to be kept informed of the Royal Commission’s
work.
At the end of the Inquiry originals of all documentation and
evidence acquired in the course of the Inquiry
are being transferred to
Archives New Zealand for archiving. Some of the material is also being harvested
by the University of Canterbury
CEISMIC Canterbury Earthquake Digital Archive
and published on the earthquake-related research material website http://www.ceismic.org.nz/ to ensure
people have easy access to it in perpetuity.
3.5
Communications
Due to the scale of damage to the Christchurch CBD and
subsequent loss of life, the Royal Commission anticipated high levels of public
interest in the
Inquiry from around New Zealand and the world. The Commission
also wished to conduct a transparent and accessible Inquiry, and was
mindful of
the significant number of persons from overseas who lost close family members
and friends in the February earthquake.
In conjunction with the
Department of Internal Affairs, the Royal Commission’s website http://canterbury. royalcommission.govt.nz/ was
developed as the major communications channel because of its ability to make
information available to
anyone in the world at any time. At the time of writing
in October 2012, the website had been visited more than 137,000 times since
October
2011 and more than half a million pages of content had been
viewed.
Early on in the Inquiry the Commission decided to web-enable the
Inquiry database to simplify and speed up the document publishing
process. More
than 1200 of the Inquiry database records were web-
published, including reports, photos, emails and letters, statements, drawings and presentations. During the hearings, evidence was published within minutes
of being presented, giving people timely access to information. At the time
of writing, the document library had been viewed more
than 50,000 times and a
wide range of material had been viewed and downloaded. The reports prepared for
the Department of Building
and Housing on the CTV building collapse were among
the most frequently accessed documents published by the Commission.
To cater for people who were interested in the hearings but could not attend personally, the Royal Commission live streamed the proceedings on the internet. Three high definition webcams were installed to record the Commissioners, counsel and witness stand. The footage was mixed in real time and web-cast on the Commission’s website with information about who
was speaking at the time. The Commission’s hearings were the biggest and longest live stream broadcast undertaken in New Zealand to date with more than
500 hours streamed and nearly two terabytes of data downloaded by viewers. The majority of the traffic was from New Zealand but there was also interest from
the US, Australia and Japan. The first day of the CTV building hearing on 25
June 2012 saw the highest usage of the Commission’s
website with almost
5,000 people visiting the site, mostly to watch the live feed of the morning
session.
To overcome international time differences and make the hearings accessible at any time, the Royal Commission also recorded the entire live stream, edited it into approximately 15 minute videos and published the videos on the Commission’s website. The videos were published throughout each hearing day in the website video library with website links to the appropriate
hearing timetable, evidence presented by each witness and related reports.
Each video was also linked to the appropriate written transcript
once it was
available.
A search tool enabled website users to search for
videos by date, topic, building and witness. In total, 1866 videos were
published and linked to 1200 documents. At the time of writing
people from 132
countries had viewed the videos 73,588 times. The videos have also been watched
more than 2000 times since the hearings
finished. The Department of Internal
Affairs will continue to manage the Royal Commission website now the Inquiry is
over. It is likely
eventually to be archived by Archives New Zealand.
The
Royal Commission recognised that the news media would also play an important
role in keeping the public informed about its work.
Regular media
statements
were issued to keep the media informed of the Inquiry progress and
interviews were granted with the
Royal Commission as required. Prior to the
hearings, the media were requested to register with the Royal Commission and
invited to
attend two background media briefings. Such was the level of interest
from the Japanese media that a Japanese-only media conference
was held in
February 2012. There was only room for one television camera operator and press
photographer in the actual hearing room.
The Royal Commission thanks TVNZ,
Mediaworks and
The Press for providing their footage and photographs
to other media throughout the hearings. Reporters worked from a portable media
centre
provided
outside the hearings venue. Media who could not attend the
hearings personally also watched via the live stream from around New Zealand
and
the world. The Royal Commission believes there has never been a more accessible
Royal Commission process.
Figure 17: Volunteers translate Justice Cooper’s condolences to
bereaved families at the opening of the hearings
3.6 Bereaved families, injured and tenants
From the time it was established, the Royal Commission endeavoured to assure bereaved, seriously injured people and other surviving occupants of failed buildings that there would be a thorough inquiry, and that they would be kept informed if they wished to be. People’s needs differ greatly when grieving. Accordingly, the Royal Commission’s approach was to ask people
what they needed rather than making assumptions, and to provide information
to them before it was released publicly.
The Commission communicated directly with all bereaved families, including
overseas families, throughout the Inquiry. Contact began
early in the Inquiry
when Justice Cooper wrote to all known family members and invited them to meet
with him individually or in a
group. Many families took up this offer over a
period of several months. They included families from Japan and China. Efforts
were
also made to contact injured people and building tenants although this was
more difficult because of a lack of a centralised list.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade arranged a briefing for foreign
missions and kept them informed at key points during the
Inquiry, particularly
about the release of reports.
Ms Kate Collins was appointed as the Royal Commission’s Family and Community Liaison Officer. Her role was to act as the first point of contact with the Royal Commission for bereaved families, injured people and survivors of failed buildings that the Royal Commission was investigating. She sent regular
email updates to all bereaved families to keep them informed of Inquiry progress. Face-to-face briefings were organised prior to and during the PGC and CTV hearings including meetings with visiting overseas bereaved families. The Royal Commission particularly acknowledges the assistance of Chinese volunteer
Mr Cai Qunliang (Liam) and Ms Susan Urakami of the Toyama College of Foreign Languages in Japan
in organising these meetings and providing language support. Teleconferences
were held for those living outside Christchurch.
Chinese and Japanese bereaved families specifically requested language support to enable them to follow our investigation into the failure of the CTV building where 28 Japanese and 23 Chinese language students died. The Commission responded by translating key documents and communications into Chinese and Japanese as resources allowed, and made these
available via the online document access system.
The Royal Commission acknowledges the support of embassies that helped their
citizens gain access to the system. At the request of
next of kin, section
9
of Volume 6, which summarises the Commission’s conclusions about the
causes of the CTV building collapse, is also translated
into Simplified Chinese,
Japanese, Thai and Korean documents that are published separately.
Ms
Collins attended all hearings about buildings that caused loss of life and was
available to liaise between families, injured people,
tenants, survivors and Mr
Elliott. She organised on-site counselling support as needed.
A memorial
board was available at the Royal Commission’s hearings venue, where
families and community members could place photos,
mementos and messages
acknowledging the deceased and their friends and families. The children of St
Teresa’s School decorated
this space and wrote messages of
support.
Figure 18: Memorial board at Royal
Commission hearings venue
Ms Collins’ role also included
arranging practical support for families, for example, referrals to
psychotherapists and counsellors
and advocating on behalf of those applying for
grants to help raise children after the loss of a partner. She also organised
facilitated
support groups for bereaved families, and then handed these over to
the Red Cross to provide ongoing assistance beyond the life of
the Royal
Commission.
To provide continuity, Ms Collins also attended events organised
by other organisations such as Coronial Services and the former DBH.
As noted earlier, families of those who died, the injured and tenants were given the status of affected parties for the hearings related to buildings that caused their death or injury. This conferred certain rights, including the
right to access evidence, on a confidential basis, prior to the hearings. In
this way they had the opportunity to be prepared for
the evidence that would be
presented at the hearing and be well informed. It is thought that this enabled
them to engage more effectively
in the hearing process. The status of affected
party also gave them the right to be represented by counsel at the relevant
hearing
and to suggest to counsel assisting additional documents or witnesses
that ought to be called. As affected parties, families were
also invited to
contribute to a closing submission for the CTV hearing presented by Mr Elliott
on behalf of bereaved families and
those who were injured.
Mr Elliott kept bereaved families and the injured informed of details of the investigation at group briefings and, upon request, individually. Bereaved families
and injured were invited to have input into Mr Elliott’s questioning of
witnesses. He often prefaced his questioning with “the
bereaved families
would like to know...” Almost without exception bereaved families, tenants
and the injured chose not to engage
their own counsel. One CTV bereaved family
member exercised her right to make a closing statement.
The Royal Commission wished to acknowledge in this Final Report, all those
who lost their lives due to building failure. Biographical
information was
sought from bereaved family members and short biographies on those who died,
based on the information received, were
published in the following Volumes of
the Final Report:
• Volume 2 section 2: PGC building fatalities;
• Volume 4 section 4.3: Individual unreinforced
masonry buildings that caused fatalities; and
• Volume 6 Introduction: CTV building fatalities.
The Royal Commission is grateful to all the families for generously sharing their memories and also wishes to acknowledge the Japanese and Chinese embassies
for language support and The Press for providing additional
information.
3.7 Reporting requirements
It was necessary for the Royal Commission to run parallel work streams in order to prepare its Reports progressively as various aspects of the Inquiry were completed.
3.7.1 Interim Report
It was important that the reasons for the
severity of the damage to buildings were understood as soon as possible to
facilitate new
building work in Christchurch. The Terms of Reference accordingly
specified that
an Interim Report was to be provided by 11 October
2011. As the Inquiry was then only part-way through, and there had been no
opportunity to hear and test evidence on any issues, the
Interim Report
consisted largely of preliminary views.
The Interim Report, which was
delivered to the Governor-General in Wellington on 10 October 2011, nevertheless
contained 15 recommendations
covering seismicity, geotechnical considerations,
the general performance of unreinforced masonry buildings, design practice and
new building technologies. It focused on measures that the Royal Commission
recommended should be implemented in Christchurch as
it rebuilt following the
earthquakes, but also dealt with matters that required early attention in New
Zealand as a
whole. The Report was released by the Government on 12 October
2011.
3.7.2 Final Report
The Terms of Reference required the Royal
Commission to deliver a Final Report by 11 April 2012. Delays in receiving the
results of
DBH’s technical investigation
into the four named buildings
soon made it plain that the Royal Commission was not going to be able to achieve
this deadline.
In February 2012 the Governor-General agreed to an
extension to the reporting date. To enable decisions about the central city
rebuild
to be made as soon as possible, it was agreed that the Final Report
would be delivered in stages. Part one, to be delivered by
29 June 2012,
would contain recommendations to inform early decision-making about the
Christchurch CBD’s recovery from the Canterbury
earthquakes.
It
consisted of three Volumes, which were delivered
to the Governor-General in Auckland on the due date. The Volumes
were:
• Volume 1: Summary and recommendations in Volumes 1–3:
Seismicity, soils and the seismic design of buildings (112
pages);
• Volume 2: The performance of Christchurch CBD
buildings (236 pages); and
• Volume 3: Low-damage building
technologies
(39 pages).
Part one contained 70 conclusions and recommendations based on the Royal Commission’s consideration of the performance of the representative sample of Christchurch central business district buildings, as well as the Commission’s analysis of many of the technical expert reports it had received and insights gained through the public hearings held
to date. It also set out the Commission’s findings on the PGC building.
It was released by the Government on 23 August 2012.
The modified Terms of Reference required the remainder of the Final Report to be delivered on or before 12 November 2012. Part two of the Final Report was delivered to the Governor-General in Wellington
on 10 October 2012. It consisted of:
• Volume 4: Earthquake-prone Buildings (240 pages).
It contained reports on the individual buildings whose failure caused death
(excluding PGC and CTV). Part two contained a further
35 recommendations as well
as conclusions about unreinforced masonry and other earthquake-prone buildings.
At the time of writing,
it was yet to be released by the Government.
When the Terms of Reference were modified, planning for the CTV hearings was
still in its preliminary stages. At this time it was
thought the hearing would
take a few weeks and that the 12 November deadline would be achievable. However
the eventual length of
the hearing meant a short second extension was required
to enable the Commission to deliver a quality report. In October the
Governor-General
agreed to extend the reporting date to 30 November
2012.
The remainder of the Final Report consists of this
Volume and two others. These three Volumes are:
• Volume 5: Summary and recommendations in Volumes 5–7,
Christchurch, the City and approach to this Inquiry;
• Volume 6: CTV building; and
• Volume 7: Roles and responsibilities.
Appendix 1:
Terms of Reference
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Building Failure caused by Canterbury
Earthquakes
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of New Zealand and her Other
Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender
of the Faith:
To The Honourable MARK LESLIE SMITH COOPER, of Auckland, Judge of the High Court of New Zealand; Sir RONALD POWELL CARTER, KNZM, of Auckland, Engineer and Strategic Advisor; and
RICHARD COLLINGWOOD FENWICK, of Christchurch, Associate Professor of Civil Engineering: GREETING:
Recitals
WHEREAS the Canterbury region, including Christchurch City, suffered an
earthquake on 4 September 2010 and numerous aftershocks, for
example—
(a) the 26 December 2010 (or Boxing Day) aftershock; and
(b) the 22 February 2011 aftershock:
WHEREAS approximately 180 people died of injuries suffered in the 22 February
2011 aftershock, with most of those deaths caused by
injuries suffered wholly or
partly because of the failure of certain buildings in the Christchurch City
central business district
(CBD), namely the following 2 buildings:
(a) the Canterbury Television (or CTV) Building; and
(b) the Pyne Gould Corporation (or PGC) Building:
WHEREAS other buildings in the Christchurch City CBD, or in suburban commercial or residential areas in the
Canterbury region, failed in the Canterbury earthquakes, causing injury and
death:
WHEREAS a number of buildings in the Christchurch City CBD have been
identified as unsafe to enter following the 22 February 2011
aftershock, and
accordingly have been identified with a red card to prevent persons from
entering them:
WHEREAS the Department of Building and Housing has begun to investigate the causes of the failure of 4 buildings in the Christchurch City CBD (the 4 specified buildings), namely the 2 buildings specified above, and the following
2 other buildings:
(a) the Forsyth Barr Building; and
(b) the Hotel Grand Chancellor Building:
WHEREAS it is desirable to inquire into the building failures in the
Christchurch City CBD, to establish— (a) why the 4 specified
buildings
failed severely; and
(b) why the failure of those buildings caused such extensive injury and
death; and
(c) why certain buildings failed severely while others failed less severely
or there was no readily perceptible failure:
WHEREAS the results of the inquiry should be available to inform
decision-making on rebuilding and repair work in the Christchurch
City CBD and
other areas of the Canterbury region:
Appointment and order of reference
KNOW YE that We, reposing trust and confidence in your integrity, knowledge,
and ability, do, by this Our Commission, nominate, constitute,
and appoint you,
The Honourable MARK LESLIE SMITH COOPER, Sir RONALD POWELL CARTER, and RICHARD
COLLINGWOOD FENWICK, to be a Commission
to inquire into and report (making any
interim or final recommendations that you think fit) upon (having regard, in the
case of paragraphs
(a) to (c), to the nature and severity of the Canterbury
earthquakes)—
Inquiry into sample of buildings and 4 specified buildings
(a) in relation to a reasonably representative sample of buildings in the Christchurch City CBD, including the 4 specified buildings as well as buildings that did not fail or did not fail severely in the Canterbury earthquakes—
(i) why some buildings failed severely; and
(ii) why the failure of some buildings caused extensive injury and death;
and
(iii) why buildings differed in the extent to which—
(A) they failed as a result of the Canterbury earthquakes; and
(B) their failure caused injury and death; and
(iv) the nature of the land associated with the buildings inquired into under this paragraph and how it was affected by the Canterbury earthquakes; and
(v) whether there were particular features of a building (or a pattern of features) that contributed to whether a building failed, including (but not limited to) factors such as—
(A) the age of the building; and
(B) the location of the building; and
(C) the design, construction, and maintenance of the building; and
(D) the design and availability of safety features such as escape routes;
and
(b) in relation to all of the buildings inquired into under paragraph (a), or a selection of them that you consider appropriate but including the 4 specified buildings,—
(i) whether those buildings (as originally designed and constructed and, if applicable, as altered and maintained)
complied with earthquake-risk and other legal and best-practice requirements (if any) that were current— (A) when those buildings were designed and constructed; and
(B) on or before 4 September 2010; and
(ii) whether, on or before 4 September 2010, those buildings had been identified as “earthquake-prone” or were the subject of required or voluntary measures (for example, alterations or strengthening) to make the buildings less susceptible to earthquake risk, and the compliance or standards they had achieved; and
(c) in relation to the buildings inquired into under paragraph (b), the nature and effectiveness of any assessment of them, and of any remedial work carried out on them, after the 4 September 2010 earthquake, or after the
26 December 2010 (or Boxing Day) aftershock, but before the 22 February 2011
aftershock; and
Inquiry into legal and best-practice requirements
(d) the adequacy of the current legal and best-practice requirements for the design, construction, and maintenance of buildings in central business districts in New Zealand to address the known risk of earthquakes and, in particular—
(i) the extent to which the knowledge and measurement of seismic events have been used in setting legal and best-practice requirements for earthquake-risk management in respect of building design, construction, and maintenance; and
(ii) the legal requirements for buildings that are
“earthquake-prone” under section 122 of the Building Act 2004 and
associated regulations, including—
(A) the buildings that are, and those that should be, treated by the law as
“earthquake-prone”; and
(B) the extent to which existing buildings are, and should be, required by law to meet requirements for the design, construction, and maintenance of new buildings; and
(C) the enforcement of legal requirements; and
(iii) the requirements for existing buildings that are not, as a matter of law, “earthquake-prone”, and do not meet current legal and best-practice requirements for the design, construction, and maintenance of new buildings, including whether, to what extent, and over what period they should be required to meet those requirements; and
(iv) the roles of central government, local government, the building and construction industry, and other elements of the private sector in developing and enforcing legal and best-practice requirements; and
(v) the legal and best-practice requirements for the assessment of, and for remedial work carried out on, buildings after any earthquake, having regard to lessons from the Canterbury earthquakes; and
(vi) how the matters specified in subparagraphs (i) to (v) compare with any
similar matters in other countries; and
Other incidental matters arising
(e) any other matters arising out of, or relating to, the foregoing that come
to the Commission’s notice in the course of its
inquiries and that it
considers it should investigate:
Matters upon or for which recommendations required
And, without limiting the order of reference set out above, We declare and
direct that this Our Commission also requires you to make
both interim and final
recommendations upon or for—
(a) any measures necessary or desirable to prevent or minimise the failure of buildings in New Zealand due to earthquakes likely to occur during the lifetime of those buildings; and
(b) the cost of those measures; and
(c) the adequacy of legal and best-practice requirements for building design,
construction, and maintenance insofar as those requirements
apply to managing
risks of building failure caused by earthquakes:
Exclusions from inquiry and scope of recommendations
But, We declare that you are not, under this Our Commission, to inquire into,
determine, or report in an interim or final way upon
the following matters (but
paragraph (b) does not limit the generality of your order of reference, or of
your required recommendations):
(a) whether any questions of liability arise; and
(b) matters for which the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, or both are responsible, such as design, planning, or options for rebuilding in the Christchurch City CBD; and
(c) the role and response of any person acting under the Civil Defence
Emergency Management Act 2002, or providing any emergency or
recovery services
or other response, after the 22 February 2011 aftershock:
Definitions
And, We declare that, in this Our Commission, unless the context otherwise
requires,—
best-practice requirements
includes any New Zealand, overseas country’s, or international
standards that are not legal requirements
Canterbury earthquakes
means any earthquakes or aftershocks in the Canterbury region—
(a) on or after 4 September 2010; and
(b) before or on 22 February 2011
Christchurch City CBD
means the area bounded by the following:
(a) the 4 avenues (Bealey Avenue, Fitzgerald Avenue, Moorhouse Avenue, and
Deans Avenue); and
(b) Harper Avenue
failure
in relation to a building, includes the following, regardless of their nature
or level of severity:
(a) the collapse of the building; and
(b) damage to the building; and
(c) other failure of the building
legal requirements
includes requirements of an enactment (for example, the building
code):
Appointment of chairperson
And We appoint you, The Honourable MARK LESLIE SMITH COOPER, to be the
chairperson of the Commission:
Power to adjourn
And for better enabling you to carry this Our Commission into effect, you are authorised and empowered, subject
to the provisions of this Our Commission, to make and conduct any inquiry or
investigation under this Our Commission in the manner
and at any time and place
that you think expedient, with power to adjourn from time to time and from place
to place as you think
fit, and so that this Our Commission will continue in
force and that inquiry may at any time and place be resumed although not
regularly
adjourned from time to time or from place to place:
Information and views, relevant expertise, and research
And you are directed, in carrying this Our Commission into effect, to
consider whether to do, and to do if you think fit, the following:
(a) adopt procedures that facilitate the provision of information or views related to any of the matters referred to in the order of reference above; and
(b) use relevant expertise, including consultancy services and secretarial
services; and
(c) conduct, where appropriate, your own research; and
(d) determine the sequence of your inquiry, having regard to the availability of the outcome of the investigation by the
Department of Building and Housing and other essential information, and the need to produce an interim report:
General provisions
And, without limiting any of your other powers to hear proceedings in private
or to exclude any person from any of your proceedings,
you are empowered to
exclude any person from any hearing, including a hearing at which evidence is
being taken, if you think it proper
to do so:
And you are strictly charged and directed that you may not at any time
publish or otherwise disclose, except to His Excellency the
Governor-General of
New Zealand in pursuance of this Our Commission or by His Excellency’s
direction, the contents or purport
of any interim or final report so made or to
be made by you:
And it is declared that the powers conferred by this Our Commission are
exercisable despite the absence at any time of any 1 member
appointed by this
Our Commission, so long as the Chairperson, or a member deputed by the
Chairperson to act in the place of the Chairperson,
and at least 1 other member,
are present and concur in the exercise of the powers:
Interim and final reporting dates
And, using all due diligence, you are required to report to His Excellency
the Governor-General of New Zealand in writing under your
hands as
follows:
(a) not later than 11 October 2011, an interim report, with interim recommendations that inform early decision-making on rebuilding and repair work that forms part of the recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes; and
(b) not later than 11 April 2012, a final report:
And, lastly, it is declared that these presents are issued under the
authority of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth
the Second
constituting the office of Governor-General of New Zealand, dated 28 October
1983*, and under the authority of and subject
to the provisions of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and with the advice and consent of the
Executive Council of New Zealand.
In witness whereof We have caused this Our Commission to be issued and the
Seal of New Zealand to be hereunto affixed at Wellington
this 11th day of April
2011.
Witness Our Trusty and Well-beloved The Right Honourable Sir Anand Satyanand,
Chancellor and Principal Knight Grand Companion of Our
New Zealand Order of
Merit, Principal Companion of Our Service Order, Governor-General and
Commander-in-Chief in and over Our Realm
of New Zealand.
ANAND SATYANAND, Governor-General. By His Excellency’s Command—
JOHN KEY, Prime Minister. Approved in Council—
REBECCA KITTERIDGE, Clerk of the Executive Council.
*SR 1983/225
Modifications to Reporting Requirements and Powers of Royal Commission of
Inquiry into Building Failure Caused by Canterbury Earthquakes
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of New Zealand and her Other
Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender
of the Faith:
To The Honourable MARK LESLIE SMITH COOPER, of Auckland, Judge of the High Court of New Zealand;
Sir RONALD POWELL CARTER, KNZM, of Auckland, Engineer and Strategic Adviser;
and RICHARD COLLINGWOOD FENWICK, of Christchurch, Associate
Professor of Civil
Engineering:
GREETING:
WHEREAS by Our Warrant, dated 11 April 2011, issued under the authority of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second constituting the office of Governor-General of New Zealand, dated 28 October 1983, and under the authority of and subject to the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and with the advice and consent of the Executive Council of New Zealand, we nominated, constituted, and appointed you, the said The Honourable MARK LESLIE SMITH COOPER, Sir RONALD POWELL CARTER, KNZM, and RICHARD COLLINGWOOD FENWICK,
to be a Commission to inquire into and report (making any interim or final
recommendations that you think fit) upon certain matters
relating to building
failure caused by the Canterbury earthquakes:
AND WHEREAS by Our said Warrant you are required to report finally to His Excellency the Governor-General of
New Zealand not later than 11 April 2012:
AND WHEREAS it is expedient that the time and other requirements for
reporting under Our said Warrant should be modified as hereinafter
provided:
NOW, THEREFORE, We do by these presents require you to report and make final
recommendations (required and otherwise) on the matters
in Our said Warrant as
follows:
(a) not later than 29 June 2012, on matters that would inform early decision-making on rebuilding and repair work that forms part of the recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes;
and
(b) at any time before 12 November 2012 on any other matter, if you are able
to do so; and
(c) not later than 12 November 2012, on all matters on which you have not
otherwise reported:
AND WHEREAS it is expedient that the powers conferred by Our said Warrant be
modified, We do by these presents declare that the powers
are exercisable by the
Chairperson, or a member deputed by the Chairperson to act in the place of the
Chairperson, despite the absence
of 1 or 2 of the persons appointed to be
members of the Commission, so long as at least 1 other member concurs in the
exercise of
the powers:
AND it is declared that nothing in these presents affects any act or thing
done or decision made by the Commission or any of its members,
in the exercise
of its powers, before the making of these presents:
And We do hereby confirm Our Warrant dated 11 April 2011 and the Commission
constituted by that Warrant, except as modified by these
presents:
And, lastly, it is declared that these presents are issued under the
authority of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth
the Second
constituting the office of Governor-General of New Zealand, dated 28 October
1983, and under the authority of and subject
to the provisions of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and with the advice and consent of the
Executive Council of New Zealand.
In Witness whereof We have caused these presents to be issued and the Seal of
New Zealand to be hereunto affixed at Wellington this
7th day of February
2012.
Witness Our Trusty and Well-beloved Lieutenant General The Right Honourable Sir Jerry Mateparae, Chancellor
and Principal Knight Grand Companion of Our New Zealand Order of Merit,
Principal Companion of Our Service Order, Governor-General
and
Commander-in-Chief in and over Our Realm of New Zealand.
[L.S.]
LT GEN SIR JERRY MATEPARAE, Governor-General
By His Excellency’s Command- JOHN KEY, Prime Minister. Approved in Council-
REBECCA KITTERIDGE, Clerk of the Executive
Council.
Further Extension of Time Within Which Royal Commission of Inquiry into Building
Failure Caused by Canterbury Earthquakes May Report
Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of New Zealand and her Other Realms and Territories, Head of the
Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith:
To The Honourable MARK LESLIE SMITH COOPER, of Auckland, Judge of the High Court of New Zealand;
Sir RONALD POWELL CARTER, KNZM, of Auckland, Engineer and Strategic Adviser;
and RICHARD COLLINGWOOD FENWICK, of Christchurch, Associate
Professor of Civil
Engineering:
GREETING:
WHEREAS by Our Warrant, dated 11 April 20111, issued under the
authority of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second
constituting the office of Governor-General
of New Zealand, dated 28 October
19832, and under the authority of and subject to the provisions of
the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and with the advice and consent
of the
Executive Council of New Zealand, we nominated, constituted, and appointed you,
the said The Honourable MARK LESLIE SMITH
COOPER; Sir RONALD POWELL CARTER,
KNZM, and RICHARD COLLINGWOOD FENWICK, to be a Commission to inquire into and
report (making any
interim or final recommendations that you think fit) upon
certain matters relating to building failure caused by the Canterbury
earthquakes:
AND WHEREAS by Our said Warrant you were required to report finally to His Excellency the Governor-General of
New Zealand not later than 11 April 2012:
AND WHEREAS by Our Warrant, dated 7 February 20123, the time
within which you were so required to report finally was extended to 12 November
2012:
AND WHEREAS it is expedient that the time and other requirements for
reporting under Our said Warrant should be extended as hereinafter
provided:
NOW, THEREFORE, We do by these presents extend, until the end of 30 November
2012, the time within which you are required to report
finally on all matters on
which you have not otherwise reported:
And We do hereby confirm Our Warrant dated 11 April 2011 and the Commission
constituted by that Warrant, save as modified by these
presents:
And, lastly, it is declared that these presents are issued under the
authority of the Letters Patent of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth
the Second
constituting the office of Governor-General of New Zealand, dated 28 October
1983, and under the authority of and subject
to the provisions of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act 1908, and with the advice and consent of the
Executive Council of New Zealand.
In Witness whereof We have caused these presents to be issued and the Seal of
New Zealand to be hereunto affixed at Wellington this
23rd day of October
2012.
Witness Our Trusty and Well-beloved Lieutenant General The Right Honourable
Sir Jerry Mateparae, Chancellor and Principal Knight Grant
Companion of Our New
Zealand Order of Merit, Principal Companion of Our Service Order,
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief in
and over Our Realm of New
Zealand.
[L.S.]
Lt Gen Sir JERRY MATEPARAE, Governor-General. By His Excellency’s Command—
Rt Hon JOHN KEY, Prime Minister. Approved in Council—
REBECCA KITTERIDGE, Clerk of the Executive
Council.
1 New Zealand Gazette, 14 April 2011, No 51, page 1201
2 SR 1983/225
3 New Zealand Gazette, 9 February 2012, No. 14, page 345
Appendix 2: Expert advisors
Dr Christopher Allington, Managing Director, Holmes Solutions LP,
Christchurch
David Brunsdon, Kestrel Group, Wellington
Athol Carr, Professor Emeritus, Department of Civil and Natural Resources
Engineering, University of Canterbury
Dr Barry Davidson, Director, Compusoft Engineering Limited, Civil, Structural
and Mechanical Engineers, Auckland
Dr Andrew Dickson, Technical Director, Civil Structures Section, Beca
Infrastructure Limited, Auckland
Graeme Frost, Chief Engineer, Fletcher Construction Company, Auckland
John Henry, Associate, Eliot Sinclair and Partners Limited,
Christchurch
Dr Robert Heywood, Principal, Heywood Engineering Solutions Pty Ltd,
Queensland
Dr Clark Hyland, Director, Hyland Consultants Limited Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) Dr Murray Jacobs, Consulting Engineer, Auckland
Dr James Mackechnie, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Department of Civil and Natural
Resources Engineering, University of Canterbury
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE)
Nigel Priestley, Emeritus Professor, University of California at San Diego
and Emeritus Co-director of the ROSE School
Gerard Willis, Enfocus Limited, Auckland
International peer reviewers/experts
William T. Holmes, Principal, Rutherford and Chekene, Consulting Engineers,
San Francisco
Bret Lizundia, Principal, Rutherford and Chekene, Consulting Engineers, San Francisco
Appendix 3:
Submitters and witnesses
Submissions received: Local government management of earthquake
risk
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
Christchurch City Council
|
Response by the Christchurch City Council to Enfocus report
“Management of Earthquake Risk by Canterbury Regional Council and
Christchurch City Council”
|
Environment Canterbury
|
Environment Canterbury’s response to the
Royal Commissions report on the Management of Earthquake Risk by
Canterbury Regional Council and Christchurch City Council
|
Malcolm Flain
|
Submission
|
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (including submissions by
the former Department of Building and Housing)
|
Department of Building and Housing submission to the Royal Commission
for the Canterbury Earthquakes on the management of earthquake
risk by
Canterbury Regional Council and Christchurch City Council
|
|
|
Submissions received: Building management after earthquakes
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
Brian Andersen
|
Submission by email on 13 December 2011 regarding Street Address Records
and Confusion in Emergency Response
|
Auckland Council
|
Discussion Paper: Building Management After
Earthquakes
|
Christchurch City Council
|
Submissions on the process and authority for building assessment after
earthquakes (stickering/placarding) (Issue 3(e)) and related
issues
|
Submissions on the Discussion Paper: Building
Management after Earthquakes
|
|
Bronwyn Dewar
|
Submission by email on 15 December 2011 regarding
Confusion of status of buildings safe to occupy
|
Dunning Thornton
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission: Building
Management after Earthquakes
|
Malcolm Flain
|
Further submission from Malcolm Flain
|
Nigel Harwood
|
The Placarding of Buildings and Barricade Location
(The Perspective of a Volunteer Chartered Engineer)
|
Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand
|
Discussion Paper: Building Management After Earthquakes: Submission to
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
|
|
Submissions received: Building management after earthquakes
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
Dr Marion Irwin
|
Dr Marion Irwin Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission Submission
|
Guy Marriage
|
Submission to: Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission
|
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (including submissions by
the former Department of Building and Housing)
|
Department of Building and Housing submission to the Royal Commission
for the Canterbury Earthquakes on Building Assessments after
Earthquakes
|
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Submission on the
Discussion Paper: Building Management after Earthquakes
|
|
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
|
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management Submission on the
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission Discussion Paper: Building
Management
after Earthquakes
|
New Zealand Historic Places Trust
|
Submission of New Zealand Historic Places Trust
Pouhere Taonga to Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission discussion papers
|
New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering
|
Building Management After Earthquakes: Submission to the Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
New Zealand Society for Risk Management
|
Evidence to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission: Submission by
the New Zealand Society for Risk Management in Respect of the
Discussion Paper:
Building Management after Earthquakes
|
Structural Engineering Society New Zealand
|
Building Management after Earthquakes: Submission to the Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
Submissions received: Education and training of engineers and
organisation of the profession
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
Paul Baker
|
Education of Engineers
|
Beca
|
Submission Concerning Training and Professional
Development of Graduate Structural Engineers
|
Derek Bradley
|
Submission by letter on 31 January 2012 regarding The Training of
Engineers and Organisation of the Engineering Profession
|
David Brunsdon
|
Integrating Professional Engineering within Emergency
Management Planning and Response in New Zealand
|
Cement and Concrete Association of New Zealand
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission on Discussion Paper: Training and Education of
Engineers and Organisation of the Engineering Profession
|
Chartered Professional Engineers Council
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission
|
Department of Geological Sciences, University of Canterbury
|
Education of Structural and Geotechnical Engineers at the University of
Canterbury
|
The Education of Engineers; Submission to the
Royal Commission: Response to the Discussion Paper: Training and
education of engineers and organisation of the engineering profession
|
|
Matt Furness
|
Submission – Training and Education of Engineers and Organisation
of the Engineering Profession
|
Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand and the Association of
Consulting Engineers New Zealand (joint submission)
|
Discussion Paper: Training and Education of Engineers and Organisation
of the Engineering Profession: Submission to Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission
|
C. Lund & Son Ltd
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission: Education and Training in the
Construction Industry
|
Submission by letter on 23 July 2012 in response to the Discussion
Paper; Training and Education of Engineers and Organisation of
the Engineering
Profession
|
|
Guy Marriage
|
Submission to: Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission
|
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (including the former Department of Building and Housing) |
Department of Building and Housing submission to the Royal Commission on
the training of engineers and the organisation of the profession
|
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Submission on the
Discussion Paper: Training and Education of Engineers and Organisation
of the
Engineering Profession
|
Submissions received: Education and training of engineers and
organisation of the profession
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
Peter Morgan
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission, on the role of professional societies in the
engineering sector
|
New Zealand Concrete Society
|
Submission by the New Zealand Concrete Society to the
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
New Zealand Historic Places Trust
|
Submission of the New Zealand Historic Places Trust
Pouhere Taonga to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission discussion papers
|
Carl O’Grady
|
Report to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal
Commission. July 2012. Discussion paper: training and education of
engineers and organisation of the engineering profession
|
Opus International Consultants
|
Submission Re: Discussion Paper on Training and Education of Engineers
and Organisation of the Engineering Profession
|
John Scarry
|
A Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission: Training and Education of Engineers and Organisation
of the Engineering Profession
|
Structural Engineering Society New Zealand
|
Training and education of engineers and organisation of the engineering
profession: Submission to Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
Submissions received: Roles and responsibilities
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
The Architectural Centre Incorporated
|
Architectural Centre submission on The Canterbury Earthquakes Royal
Commission Discussion Paper: Roles and Responsibilities
|
Building Officials Institute of New Zealand
|
Submission to Canterbury Earthquake Royal Commission
Aug 2012
|
Brian Carter
|
Roles and Responsibilities
|
Cement and Concrete Association of New Zealand
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission on Discussion
Paper: Roles and Responsibilities
|
Claire Chambers
|
A Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission: Roles and
responsibilities – An Architect’s Perspective
|
Christchurch City Council
|
Submission on the Discussion Paper: Roles and
Responsibilities
|
Submissions received: Roles and responsibilities
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
Environment Canterbury
|
Submission by letter on 12 August 2012 regarding the Discussion Paper:
Roles and Responsibilities
|
Ian Fraser
|
Submission by email on 13 August 2012 regarding the
Discussion paper: Roles and Responsibilities July 2012
|
Hamilton District Council
|
Submission to the Commission’s Discussion Paper on
Roles and Responsibilities
|
Dr David Hopkins
|
Roles and Responsibilities: Submission by
Dr David C Hopkins, Consulting Engineer, Wellington
|
Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand and the Association of
Consulting Engineers New Zealand (joint submission)
|
Discussion Paper: Roles and Responsibilities: Submission to the
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
International Accreditation New Zealand
|
Submission by email on 14 August 2012
|
Local Government New Zealand
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission In the matter of Discussion Paper: Roles and
Responsibilities
|
Guy Marriage
|
Submission to Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission
|
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
|
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Submission on
Discussion Paper: Roles and Responsibilities
|
New Plymouth District Council
|
Submission by email on 10 August 2012
|
New Zealand Concrete Society
|
Submission by the New Zealand Concrete Society to the Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
New Zealand Construction Industry Council
|
CERC Discussion Paper: Roles & Responsibilities in the Building
& Construction Industry
|
New Zealand Geotechnical Society
|
Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission: NZGS Submission on Discussion
Paper: Roles and Responsibilities
|
New Zealand Institute of Building Surveyors
|
Roles and Responsibilities in the Building and
Construction Industry
|
Queenstown Lakes District Council
|
Queenstown Lakes District Council Submission to Canterbury Earthquake
Royal Commission Aug 2012: Topic: Roles and Responsibilities
in New
Zealand’s building controls and regulatory system
|
John Scarry
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission: Roles and Responsibilities
|
Standards Council
|
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Building Failure Caused by the
Canterbury Earthquakes: Standards Council – Submission on Discussion
Paper:
Roles and Responsibilities
|
Submissions received: Roles and responsibilities
|
|
Person or organisation
|
Paper
|
Structural Engineering Society New Zealand
|
Roles and Responsibilities: Submission to Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission
|
Stuart Thomson
|
Submission by letter on 6 August 2012
|
Waikato Building Consent Group
|
Submission to: Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission On: Discussion
Paper: Roles and Responsibilities
|
Waimakariri District Council
|
Submission to the Canterbury Earthquake Royal Commission on its
Discussion Paper: Roles and Responsibilities
|
Wellington City Council
|
Wellington City Council submission on the Royal Commission
‘Discussion Paper: Roles and Responsibilities’
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for the Canterbury Television
building
(25 June–16 August 2012; 5–7 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
Margaret Aydon
|
Building occupant (Level 4) 26 June 2012
|
|
Andrew Ayers
|
Urban Search and Rescue
|
Written statement
|
David Bainbridge
|
Witness to the damage after the
September earthquake
|
26 June 2012
|
Geoffrey Banks
|
Director, Structex Harvard
|
16 August 2012,
17 August 2012
|
Neil Blair
|
Former Director, Prime West
Corporation
|
Written statement
|
Dr Brendan Bradley
|
Lecturer, Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering, University
of Canterbury
|
24 July 2012,
25 July 2012,
26 July 2012,
15 August 2012
|
Derek Bradley
|
Senior Engineer, Compusoft 25 July 2012, Engineering 26 July 2012,
13 August 2012,
14 August 2012
|
|
Marie-Claire Brehaut
|
Witness to the damage after the
September earthquake
|
26 June 2012
|
Michael Brooks
|
Formerly of Williams Construction
|
8 August 2012
|
Peter Brown
|
Witness to the damage after the
September earthquake
|
26 June 2012
|
Graeme Calvert
|
Former Senior Building Support
Officer, Christchurch City Council
|
28 June 2012
|
Elizabeth Cammock
|
Building occupant (Level 6)
|
25 June 2012
|
Bruce Campbell
|
Witness to the collapse of the
CTV building
|
26 June 2012
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for the Canterbury Television
building
(25 June–16 August 2012; 5–7 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
Athol Carr
|
Emeritus Professor, Department 25 July 2012, of Civil and Natural
Resources 26 July 2012
Engineering, University of Canterbury
|
|
David Coatsworth
|
Senior Associate, Structural
Engineers, CPG New Zealand
|
4 July 2012
|
Michael Collins
|
Loss Adjustor, Cunningham Lindsey
|
Written statement
|
Barry Davidson
|
Director, Compusoft Engineering
|
25 July 2012,
26 July 2012,
13 August 2012,
14 August 2012
|
Dr Andrew Dickson
|
Technical Director, Auckland Civil Written statement
Structures, Beca
|
|
William Dray
|
Civil Engineer, Engineering Services Written statement
Team, Christchurch City Council
|
|
John Drew
|
Director, EGT Holdings Limited and Company Director, New Regent Medical
Centre
|
2 July 2012
|
Alan Edge
|
Witness to the collapse of the
CTV building
|
26 June 2012
|
Shane Fairmaid
|
Project Manager, Ruby Views
|
15 August 2012
|
David Falloon
|
Falloon & Wilson Limited
|
25 July 2012
|
David Flewellen
|
Former Building Inspector, Christchurch City Council
|
28 June 2012
|
Leonard Fortune
|
Witness to the collapse of the
CTV building
|
26 June 2012
|
Graeme Frost
|
Urban Search and Rescue
|
27 June 2012
|
Robert Gaimster
|
Chief Executive Officer, Cement and Concrete Association of New
Zealand
|
15 August 2012
|
Stephen Gill
Ronald Godkin
|
Witness to the collapse of the 26 June 2012
CTV building
Building occupant (Level 4) 25 June 2012
|
|
Stephen Grenfell
|
Witness to the collapse of the CTV
building
|
26 June 2012
|
Euan Gutteridge
|
Witness to the collapse of the CTV
building
|
26 June 2012
|
Douglas Haavik
|
Consulting Engineer, Costa Mesa, California
|
15 August 2012
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for the Canterbury Television
building
(25 June–16 August 2012; 5–7 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
David Harding
|
Harding Consulting Engineers 30 July 2012, Limited 31 July 2012,
7 August 2012,
14 August 2012,
15 August 2012
|
|
John Hare
|
Director, Holmes Consulting Group
|
15 August 2012
|
Malcolm Harris
|
Witness to the damage after the
September earthquake
|
26 June 2012
|
Thomas Hawker
|
Witness to the collapse of the
CTV building
|
26 June 2012
|
John Henry
|
Associate, Eliot Sinclair and 1 August 2012, Partners Limited 2 August
2012,
13 August 2012,
14 August 2012
|
|
Dr Robert Heywood
|
Queensland Taskforce 1 Urban 27 June 2012
Search and Rescue
|
|
Peter Higgins
|
Southern Regional Manager, Concrete Techniques Limited
|
2 July 2012
|
Marie Holland
|
Former Building Inspector, Christchurch City Council
|
2 July 2012
|
William T. Holmes
|
Principal, Rutherford & Chekene, Consulting Engineers, San
Francisco
|
10 July 2012
|
Terry Horn
|
Estimator, Kingston Building
|
6 August 2012
|
Lionel Hunter
|
Director, Madras Equities Limited
|
Written statement
|
David Hutt
|
Team Leader, Building Consents, Christchurch City Council (seconded to the
Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission)
|
Written statement
|
Dr Clark Hyland
|
Director, Hyland Fatigue and 5 July 2012, Earthquake Engineering (author 9
July 2012, of the Department of Building and 10 July
2012, Housing’s
technical investigation into 25 July 2012, the collapse of the CTV building) 26
July 2012,
13 August 2012,
14 August 2012,
15 August 2012
|
|
Russell Ibbotson
|
Retired chartered accountant 17 August 2012
|
|
Maryanne Jackson
|
Receptionist, Canterbury Television
|
Written statement
|
Dr Murray Jacobs
|
Director, Murray Jacobs Limited
|
9 August 2012,
13 August 2012
|
Richard Johnson
|
Former Chairman, Canterbury
Regional Council
|
Written statement
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for the Canterbury Television
building
(25 June–16 August 2012; 5–7 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
Geoffrey Jones
|
Manager, Materials Testing Written statement
Laboratory, Opus International
Consultants
|
|
William Jones
|
Foreman for the CTV building
|
8 August 2012
|
Robert Jury
|
Manager, Wellington Structural, Beca 10 July 2012, (member of the former
Department of 25 July 2012, Building and Housing’s
Expert Panel) 26
July 2012
|
|
Brian Kehoe
|
Associate Principal, Wiss, Janney, Elstner Associates, Illinois
|
4 July 2012,
5 July 2012
|
Stephen Kissell
|
Service Technician, Otis Elevator
Company Limited
|
2 July 2012
|
Nilgun Kulpe
|
Building occupant (Level 6)
|
25 June 2012
|
Douglas Latham
Phillippa Lee
|
Structural Engineer, Alan Reay 26 July 2012, Consultants Limited 13 August
2012,
14 August 2012
Building occupant (Level 5) 25 June 2012
|
|
Stephen McCarthy
|
Environmental Policy and Approvals
Manager, Christchurch City Council
|
3 July 2012,
6 August 2012,
7 August 2012
|
Dr James MacKechnie
|
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Department of Civil and Natural Resources
Engineering, University of Canterbury
|
15 August 2012
|
John Mander
|
Zachry Professor of Design
and Construction Integration 1, Department of Civil Engineering, Texas
A&M University
|
23 July 2012,
24 July 2012,
25 July 2012,
26 July 2012,
15 August 2012,
16 August 2012
|
Kendyll Mitchell
|
Building occupant (Level 6)
|
25 June 2012
|
Murray Mitchell
|
Senior Structural Engineer, Opus
International Consultants
|
Written statement
|
Daniel Morris
|
Formerly of Knock Out Concrete 5 July 2012
Cutters
|
|
Peter Nichols
|
Retired structural engineer
|
6 August 2012
|
Robert Officer
|
General Manager, AML Limited
|
Written statement
|
Dr Arthur O’Leary
|
Retired structural engineer
|
9 August 2012,
13 August 2012,
14 August 2012
|
John O’Loughlin
|
O’Loughlin Taylor Spence Limited Written statement
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for the Canterbury Television
building
(25 June–16 August 2012; 5–7 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
Leo O’Loughlin
|
Building Consent Officer, 7 August 2012, Christchurch City Council 14
August 2012
|
|
Leonard Pagan
|
Quantity Surveyor, Rawlinsons
Limited
|
3 July 2012
|
Nigel Priestley
|
Emeritus Professor, University of California at San Diego and Emeritus
Co-director of the ROSE School
|
11 July 2012,
12 July 2012
|
Dr Alan Reay
|
Alan Reay Consultants Limited
|
12 July 2012,
16 July 2012,
31 July 2012,
1 August 2012,
7 August 2012,
15 August 2012,
17 August 2012
|
Phillip Reynish
|
Managing Director, Reynish 2 July 2012
Decorators Limited
|
|
Trevor Robertson
|
Senior Principal, Sinclair Knight Merz 16 August 2012
|
|
Matthew Ross
|
Witness to the collapse of the
CTV building
|
27 June 2012
|
Anthony Scott
|
Retired quantity surveyor
|
8 August 2012
|
Robin Shepherd
|
Emeritus Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of
California, Irvine
|
16 July 2012,
25 July 2012,
26 July 2012
|
Gerald Shirtcliff
|
Former construction manager for the
CTV building
|
8 August 2012
|
Russell Simson
|
Building Consent Officer, Christchurch City Council
|
28 June 2012
|
Timothy Sinclair
|
Principal, Tonkin & Taylor
|
25 July 2012
|
Ashley Smith
|
Director, Structure Smith Limited 5 July 2012, (author of Department of
Building 9 July 2012, and Housing’s technical investigation
10 July
2012, into the collapse of the CTV building) 25 July 2012,
26 July 2012,
9 August 2012,
13 August 2012,
14 August 2012
|
|
Graeme Smith
|
Concrete Protection and Repair Limited
|
2 July 2012
|
Paul Smith
|
Director, Alan Reay Consultants
Limited
|
6 August 2012
|
Judith Smitheram
|
Administrator, Relationships Aotearoa
|
Written statement
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for the Canterbury Television
building
(25 June–16 August 2012; 5–7 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
Penelope Spencer
|
Witness to the collapse of the 26 June 2012
CTV building
|
|
Wayne Strachan
|
Former draughtsman at Alan Reay
Consultants Limited
|
6 August 2012
|
Tony Stuart
|
Structural Engineer, Compusoft
Engineering
|
25 July 2012,
26 July 2012
|
Richard Sullivan
|
Principal, RD Sullivan & Associates
|
Written statement
|
Patricia Tapper
|
Widow of Graeme Tapper, the Christchurch City Council structural checking
engineer who reviewed the structural aspects of the building
permit for the CTV
building
|
2 August 2012
|
Simon Thomas
|
Administrator, Steelbro Limited
|
Written statement
|
John Trowsdale
|
Support Engineer, Urban Search Written statement and Rescue
|
|
Arthur Tyndall
|
Witness to the collapse of the 26 June 2012
CTV building
|
|
Chris Urmson
|
Structural Engineer, Alan Reay
Consultants Limited
|
Written statement
|
Pieter Van den Berg
|
Managing Director, Standstill and
Seymour Builders Limited
|
2 July 2012
|
Peter Van der Zee
|
Building Consent Officer, Christchurch City Council
|
28 June 2012
|
Jo-Ann Vivian
|
National Practice Manager, 2 July 2012
Relationships Aotearoa
|
|
Peter Wilding
|
National Manager, Fire Investigation and Arson Reduction, New Zealand Fire
Service
|
17 August 2012
|
Alun Wilkie
|
Director, Wilkie Bruce Registered
Architects Limited
|
30 July 2012,
15 August 2012
|
Grant Wilkinson
|
Managing Director, Ruamoko 16 August 2012
Solutions Limited
|
|
Michael Williams
|
Witness to the collapse of the CTV 26 June 2012
building |
On 7 September 2012, Marwa Alkaisi, a bereaved family member, addressed the
Royal Commission at the close of the hearing for the Canterbury
Television
building.
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for building management after
earthquakes (3–4 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
David Brunsdon
|
Director, Kestrel Group 3 September 2012,
4 September 2012
|
|
Ken Gledhill
|
GNS Science
|
3 September 2012
|
John Hamilton
|
Director, Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
|
4 September 2012
|
John Hare
|
Structural Engineering Society
New Zealand
|
4 September 2012
|
Bret Lizundia
|
Principal, Rutherford & Chekene, 3 September 2012
Consulting Engineers, San Francisco
|
|
Stephen McCarthy
|
Environmental Policy and Approvals 4 September 2012
Manager, Christchurch City Council
|
|
Peter Mitchell
|
General Manager, Regulation and 4 September 2012
Democracy Services, Christchurch
City Council
|
|
Esther Newman
|
Sisirc Consulting Limited
|
4 September 2012
|
Tony Sewell
|
National President, Property Council of New Zealand
|
4 September 2012
|
Peter Smith
|
New Zealand Society for Earthquake
Engineering
|
4 September 2012
|
Mike Stannard
|
Chief Engineer, Building and Housing Group, Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment
|
4 September 2012
|
Richard Toner
|
Chief Building Officer, Wellington
City Council
|
4 September 2012
|
Peter Wood
|
Emergency Management Advisor, Hazard Risk Management and Analysis, Ministry
of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
|
4 September 2012
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for the education and training of
engineers and organisation of the profession (10 September
2012)
|
|
Person
|
Organisation
|
Derek Bradley
|
Senior Engineer, Compusoft Engineering
|
Andrew Buchanan
|
Professor of Timber Design, Department of Civil and
Natural Resources Engineering, University of Canterbury
|
Win Clark
|
The Executive Officer, New Zealand Society for
Earthquake Engineering
|
Dr Andrew Cleland
|
Chief Executive, Institution of Professional Engineers
New Zealand
|
John Gardiner
|
Manager, Determinations, Building and Housing Group, Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment
|
Stuart George
|
Structural Engineering Society New Zealand
|
Joanne McGregor
|
C. Lund & Son Ltd
|
Peter Millar
|
Business Development Manager, New Zealand and
Australia, Tonkin & Taylor
|
Dr David Prentice
|
Chief Executive and Managing Director, Opus
International Consultants
|
David Sheppard
|
President, New Zealand Institute of Architects
|
Mark Spencer
|
General Manager, Building Structures, New Zealand, Beca
|
Witnesses who appeared at the hearing for roles and responsibilities
(11–12 September 2012)
|
||
Person
|
Organisation
|
Hearing
|
Derek Bradley
|
Senior Engineer, Compusoft 12 September 2012
Engineering
|
|
Pieter Burghout
|
Chief Executive, New Zealand
Construction Industry Council
|
11 September 2012,
12 September 2012
|
Debbie Chin
|
Chief Executive, Standards
New Zealand
|
11 September 2012,
12 September 2012
|
Dr Nicki Crauford
|
Deputy Chief Executive, Institution of Professional Engineers
New Zealand
|
11 September 2012,
12 September 2012
|
Geoff Hallam
|
Programme Manager, Inspection Bodies Accreditation, International
Accreditation New Zealand
|
12 September 2012
|
Nicholas Hill
|
Chief Executive, Building Officials
Institute of New Zealand
|
12 September 2012
|
David Kelly
|
Director, Canterbury Rebuild and 11 September 2012, Recovery, Building and
Housing 12 September 2012
Group, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
|
|
Peter Laurenson
|
Manager, Building, Lakes
Environmental (Queenstown Lakes
District Council)
|
12 September 2012
|
John Lumsden
|
Chair, Standards Council
|
11 September 2012,
12 September 2012
|
Dr Peter Mumford
|
Director, Economic Development Group, Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment
|
11 September 2012,
12 September 2012
|
Simon Pickford
|
Manager, Customer and Regulatory Services, New Plymouth District
Council
|
12 September 2012
|
John Scarry
|
Structural engineer
|
11 September 2012
|
Frances Sullivan
|
Senior Policy Analyst, Local
Government New Zealand
|
12 September 2012
|
Adam Thornton
|
Structural Engineering Society 12 September 2012
New Zealand and Institution of
Professional Engineers New Zealand
|
Appendix 4: Hearings Schedule
Date Topic
|
|
17–20 October 2011
|
Seismicity
|
25 October 2011
|
Soils and ground conditions
|
7–15 October 2011
|
Unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings and earthquake-prone policies
|
28 November – 6 December 2011
|
Pyne Gould Corporation building
|
12 December 2011
|
593 Colombo Street
|
13 December 2011
|
90 Coleridge Street
|
14 December 2011
|
7 Riccarton Road
|
15 December 2011
|
391/391A Worcester Street
|
17–18 January 2012
|
Hotel Grand Chancellor
|
23 January 2012
|
116 Lichfield Street
|
24 January 2012
|
89/89A, 91 and 93 Cashel Street
|
25 January 2012
|
194 Hereford Street
|
26 January 2012
|
200–204 Manchester Street
|
30 January 2012
|
32 Cathedral Square
|
31 January 2012
|
308 Durham Street
|
1 February 2012
|
603 Colombo Street
|
2 February 2012
|
605–613 Colombo Street
|
13 February 2012
|
595 and 595A Colombo Street
|
14 February 2012
|
601/601A Colombo Street
|
15 February 2012
16 February 2012
|
194 Gloucester Street and 246 High Street
382 Colombo Street
|
23–24 February 2012
|
Forsyth Barr building
|
27 February 2012
|
43 Lichfield Street
|
28 February 2012
|
265–271 Manchester Street
|
29 February 2012
|
753–759 Colombo Street
|
1 March 2012
|
738 Colombo Street
|
12–14 March 2012
|
New building technologies
|
15 March 2012
|
738 Colombo Street (continued) and Hotel Grand Chancellor (continued)
|
25 June – 9 August 2012
|
Canterbury Television building
|
3–4 September 2012
|
Building management after earthquakes
|
Date Topic
|
|
5–7 September 2012
|
Canterbury Television building closing submissions
|
10 September 2012
|
Education and training of engineers and organisation of the engineering
profession
|
11–12 September 2012
|
Roles and responsibilities
|
Appendix 5: Glossary of terms
A further glossary of terms is contained in Appendix 4 of Volume 1 and
Appendix 5 of Volume 4 of our Report.
Arterial route An important route in a system of roads, railway lines or rivers.
Axial force The compression or tension force acting along the longitudinal axis of a structural member.
If the load on a column is applied through the centre of gravity of its cross-section, it may be called an axial load.
Building Warrant of Fitness
Column hoop reinforcement
A building warrant of fitness (BWoF) is a statement confirming that the systems specified in the compliance schedule for their building have been maintained and checked in accordance with the compliance schedule for the previous 12 months, and that they perform as required.
In concrete columns and piles, a hoop is a circular ring of reinforcement that is placed around the longitudinal reinforcement.
Compression force The application of compression force to an object causes it to be subjected to compression. Coupled wall A coupled wall is formed when two or more cantilever walls are joined by coupling beams at
each storey which can transfer shear forces between the walls.
Damping In structural engineering, damping can be defined as the inherent property of a material and a structure that dissipates energy. The higher the damping of a system, the quicker the vibrations will cease when it is in a displaced position from its rest position.
Deflection Displacement of a structural element under a load.
Dowel action The dowel action is the shear force resisted by the reinforcing bars across a crack. Geospatial data Geospatial information is information describing the location and names of features beneath,
on or above the earth’s surface. At its simplest this can mean the basic topographical information found on a map, but also includes different location-related datasets combined into complex layers that show information such as land use and population density.
Gross Domestic
Product (GDP)
The total value of goods produced and services provided in a country during
one year.
Hypervigilance A symptom of post-traumatic stress that refers to the experience of being constantly tense and “on guard”. A person experiencing this symptom will be motivated to maintain an increased awareness of their surrounding environment, sometimes even frequently scanning the environment to identify potential sources of threat.
Inter-storey drift The relative displacement of two adjacent floors in a building.
Iwi The Ma-ori term for an extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race. Often refers to a large group of people descended from a common ancestor.
K/SM factor A term used to multiply an analysed inter-storey drift obtained from an elastic analysis to give the design drift.
Ka-inga The Ma-ori term for a village, or habitation.
Lateral load resistance system
A structural member such as a wall, or group of members such as a moment resisting frame, that provide lateral force resistance in a building.
Moa Large extinct flightless birds of several subspecies resembling an emu, formerly found in New Zealand.
Modern and Modernist architecture
A style of architecture that aims to depart significantly from classical and traditional forms, styles and values. It is generally characterised by simplification of form and creation of ornament from the structure and theme of the building.
Neo-Gothic architecture A style of art and architecture that originated in the nineteenth century, characterised by the revival of medieval Gothic forms. In architecture, it is manifested in pointed arches, vaulted ceilings and mock fortifications.
Orthogonal walls Walls that are at right angles to each other.
Pa- The Ma-ori term for a fortified village, fort, stockade, screen, blockade, or city. Party wall A partition erected between two tenancies in a building.
Pad footing A pad footing is a type of foundation. Pad foundations are used to support individual or multiple columns, spreading the load to the ground below.
Poisson’s ratio The ratio of the lateral strain to the axial
strain in a member when it is subjected to axial load.
Post-modern architecture
A late-twentieth century style of art and architecture that represents a departure from modernism and is characterised by the self-conscious use of earlier styles and conventions and a mixing of different architectural styles.
Pounamu Greenstone, nephrite jade from New Zealand.
Probative value A term used mainly within the legal profession that describes having a quality or function of proving or demonstrating something. Affording proof or evidence.
Qualitative analysis When using this analytic method, data is collected in textual form on the basis of observation. It is not converted into numerical form. This analysis also involves a certain degree of deductive reasoning.
Quantitative analysis This analytic method usually involves collecting and converting data into numerical form so that calculations can be made and conclusions drawn.
Radial force A force that is exerted perpendicular to the centre line,
or axis, of an object.
Renaissance Revival architecture
Satellite settlement, centre or town
The style of architecture that originated in the nineteenth century that
is based on the architecture of sixteenth century Renaissance
Italy and France,
with additional elements borrowed from classical Greek and Roman architecture.
Sometimes called Neo-Renaissance,
and may include buildings that others classify
as Italianate or French Baroque.
A community or town dependent on a nearby larger town.
Seating A support ledge for the end of a beam.
Seismic capacity The ability of a building or other structure to withstand earthquake actions. Shoring Shores or props used to support or hold up a structure.
Soffit The underside of a part of a structural component, such as an arch, beam, stair, slab, etc.
Stirrups A type of steel reinforcement in concrete beams formed by closed loops of steel bars placed at regular intervals along a beam.
Strip footings A strip footing is a type of foundation that distributes loads from columns or walls to the foundation soils.
Stripped Classicism architecture
An architectural style that took the typical features and motifs of
Classicism but pared them back so that decoration was reduced,
but an imposing
structure remained. It was
an authoritarian style adopted by a number of
state organisations, including the American
Postal Service and the government of Nazi Germany.
Tension force The application of tension force to an object causes it be subjected to tensile stress. Tie forces A force that ties two structural components together.
Tilt-slab construction Tilt-up, tilt-slab or tilt-wall is a type of building and construction technique using concrete elements such as walls or columns that are formed horizontally and later “tilted” into the final
position in the structure.
Transverse reinforcement
Reinforcement at right angles to the principal axis of a structural
member.
Trimmer beam A timber or metal beam (joist) in a floor or roof structure attached to truncated joists in order to create an opening around a stairwell, skylight, chimney, and the like.
Urupa- The Ma-ori term for a burial ground, cemetery, or graveyard.
Venetian Gothic architecture
A style of architecture that combines the lancet arches of the Gothic period with Byzantine and Arabic influences.
Weka A New Zealand woodhen, Gallirallus australis. A brown-feathered bird streaked with black, with a short bill and heavily built legs and feet, able to run fast but flightless.
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