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New Zealand Law Commission Reports |
Last Updated: 12 May 2016
E31(139)
May 2016, Wellington, New Zealand | R E P O R T 1 3 9
UNDERSTANDING
FAMILY VIOLENCE
REFORMING THE CRIMINAL
LAW RELATING TO HOMICIDE
May 2016, Wellington, New Zealand | REPORT
139
UNDERSTANDING FAMILY VIOLENCE
REFORMING THE CRIMINAL LAW RELATING TO HOMICIDE
The Law Commission is an independent, publicly funded, central advisory body
established by statute to undertake the systematic review,
reform and
development of the law of New Zealand. Its purpose is to help achieve law that
is just, principled and accessible and
that reflects the heritage and
aspirations of the peoples of New Zealand.
The Commissioners are:
Honourable Sir Grant Hammond KNZM – President
Honourable Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Helen McQueen
Honourable Douglas White QC
The General Manager of the Law Commission is Roland Daysh
The office of the Law Commission is at Level 19, 171 Featherston Street, Wellington
Postal address: PO Box 2590, Wellington 6140, New Zealand
Document Exchange Number: sp 23534
Telephone: (04) 473-3453, Facsimile: (04) 471-0959
Email: com@lawcom.govt.nz
Internet: www.lawcom.govt.nz
A catalogue record for this title is available from the National Library of New Zealand. ISBN: 978-1-877569-76-0 (Print)
ISBN: 978-1-877569-75-3 (Online)
ISSN: 0113-2334 (Print) ISSN: 1177-6196 (Online)
This title may be cited as NZLC R139
This title is also available on the Internet at the Law Commission’s
website: www.lawcom.govt.nz
ii Law Commission Report
9 May 2016
The Hon Amy Adams
Minister Responsible for the Law Commission
Parliament Buildings
WELLINGTON
Dear Minister
NZLC R139 – UNDERSTANDING FAMILY VIOLENCE: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL LAW RELATING TO HOMICIDE
I am pleased to submit to you the above Report under section 16 of the Law
Commission Act 1985. Yours sincerely
Sir Grant Hammond
President
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide iii
Foreword
There is widespread acceptance that the incidence and level of family
violence in New Zealand is a national disgrace, and that we
presently need
distinct and effective action on a number of aspects of this problem. This is
not to decry further research, but there
are important things which we can and
should safely do now.
The Law Commission was asked to undertake three projects on family violence
and sexual violence. The first Report (R136), which has
already been tabled in
Parliament, was as to alternative models for prosecuting and trying criminal
cases. It is still under active
consideration by the administration.
The second (R138) addresses the case for a new offence in our
criminal code, of non-fatal strangulation. It too has been
delivered to
Parliament and is under consideration.
This third Report (R139) addresses whether the law in respect of the position
of a victim of family violence who kills their abuser
can be improved. It
addresses the long troublesome issues of self- defence, partial defences and
sentencing principles. These are
all areas which raise difficult criminal law
issues.
The three Reports the Commission has lodged are not the only possibilities in
this unhappy area of criminology and will form part
of a broader package being
considered by Parliament. But they have the potential to greatly improve law
relating to the position
of the victims of family violence.
We are heartened by the public response to the Reports which are already in
the public domain. As many commentators have already noted
– our proposals
“will take courage”, but we are firmly of the view that real change
is needed in this unhappy area
of human interaction.
Sir Grant Hammond
President
iv Law Commission Report
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to all the people and organisations that provided input
during the preparation of this Report. We would particularly
like to thank all
members of our expert panel. Their advice, contributions and cumulative years
of experience were crucial in highlighting
key issues relevant to this
reference. Members of the expert panel were Dr Ang Jury, Annabel Markham, Judge
Caren Fox, Associate
Professor Elisabeth McDonald, Helen Cull QC, John
Billington QC, Associate Professor Julia Tolmie, former High Court Judge the Hon
Ronald Young and Superintendent Tusha Penny. A list of those who provided
submissions on the Issues Paper can be found at Appendix
B of this
Report.
The lead Commissioner responsible for this reference was the Hon Dr Wayne
Mapp. The Hon Douglas White QC and Helen McQueen held
warrants as Law
Commissioners from 9 February 2016. The legal and policy advisers were Bridget
Fenton, Nichola Lambie and Jacob
Meagher.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to
homicide v
Contents
Foreword
..............................................................................................................................
iv Acknowledgements
...............................................................................................................
v Summary
...............................................................................................................................
4
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 4
A better understanding of family violence .......................................................................................... 5
A change to the law of self-defence ..................................................................................................... 7
Greater recognition of reduced culpability
..........................................................................................
9
No partial defence to murder
............................................................................................................
|
10
|
Changes to sentencing for homicide
.................................................................................................
|
11
|
Conclusion
..........................................................................................................................................
|
13
|
PART 1 Setting the scene
.....................................................................................................
|
15
|
Chapter 1 Scope, context and approach
..............................................................................
16
|
|
Introduction
.......................................................................................................................................
|
16
|
Context of this review
.......................................................................................................................
|
17
|
Scope of this project
...........................................................................................................................
|
19
|
Our approach
.....................................................................................................................................
|
21
|
Chapter 2 Understanding family violence
..........................................................................
|
23
|
Introduction
.......................................................................................................................................
|
23
|
The different forms of family violence
.............................................................................................
|
23
|
Evolving understanding of intimate partner violence
.....................................................................
|
26
|
Contemporary understanding of family violence
............................................................................
|
28
|
Improving understanding of family violence
...................................................................................
|
36
|
Chapter 3 The legal context
................................................................................................
|
39
|
Introduction
.......................................................................................................................................
|
39
|
Homicide law
.....................................................................................................................................
|
39
|
Summary of our case review
.............................................................................................................
|
45
|
Conclusion
..........................................................................................................................................
|
50
|
Chapter 4 The law reform context
.....................................................................................
|
51
|
Introduction
.......................................................................................................................................
|
51
|
Previous New Zealand Law Commission Reports
...........................................................................
|
51
|
Reform in other jurisdictions
............................................................................................................
|
56
|
PART 2 Self-defence
.............................................................................................................
|
65
|
Chapter 5 Self-defence in New Zealand
..............................................................................
66
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 1
Contents
Introduction
.......................................................................................................................................
|
66
|
The theory of self-defence
.................................................................................................................
|
66
|
History of self-defence in New Zealand
...........................................................................................
|
67
|
Operation of self-defence in New Zealand
.......................................................................................
|
68
|
Chapter 6 Self-defence and family violence – is there a problem?
.....................................
|
71
|
Introduction
.......................................................................................................................................
|
71
|
The role of gender in the development of self-defence
....................................................................
|
72
|
Persisting misconceptions
.................................................................................................................
|
75
|
Imminence of the threat and lack of alternatives
............................................................................
|
75
|
Proportionality
...................................................................................................................................
|
82
|
Self-defence in other jurisdictions
....................................................................................................
|
85
|
The role of battered woman syndrome evidence
.............................................................................
|
86
|
Submitters’ views on whether there is a problem
............................................................................
|
89
|
The Commission’s view
.....................................................................................................................
|
90
|
Chapter 7 Proposals to reform self-defence
........................................................................
|
93
|
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 93
Proposals for substantive reform ...................................................................................................... 93
Proposals for procedural reform ..................................................................................................... 104
Other procedural matters
................................................................................................................
110
PART 3 Recognising reduced culpability
...........................................................................
115
Chapter 8 The conceptual framework for reduced culpability
........................................ 116
Introduction
.....................................................................................................................................
|
116
|
Setting the scene: Two illustrative cases
........................................................................................
|
117
|
Options for recognising reduced culpability
..................................................................................
|
118
|
Conclusion
........................................................................................................................................
|
121
|
Chapter 9 Observations from the cases
............................................................................
|
123
|
Introduction
.....................................................................................................................................
|
123
|
Conviction outcomes
.......................................................................................................................
|
123
|
Sentencing outcomes
.......................................................................................................................
|
134
|
Conclusion
........................................................................................................................................
|
136
|
Chapter 10 Is a partial defence justified?
.........................................................................
|
137
|
Introduction
.....................................................................................................................................
|
137
|
overview of the submissions
...........................................................................................................
|
137
|
Arguments for a partial defence
.....................................................................................................
|
138
|
Arguments against a partial defence
...............................................................................................
|
143
|
What would a partial defence look like?
........................................................................................
|
145
|
A specific homicide offence
.............................................................................................................
|
157
|
Conclusions and recommendation
..................................................................................................
|
159
|
2 Law Commission Report
Chapter 11 Sentencing for homicide
.................................................................................
161
Introduction
.....................................................................................................................................
|
161
|
The approach of the Sentencing Act 2002
.....................................................................................
|
161
|
Overview of the submissions
..........................................................................................................
|
162
|
The purposes of sentencing
.............................................................................................................
|
162
|
Mitigating factors under the Sentencing Act
.................................................................................
|
163
|
Specific issues in sentencing for murder
........................................................................................
|
171
|
Sentencing for manslaughter
..........................................................................................................
|
175
|
The three strikes provisions
............................................................................................................
|
175
|
APPENDICES
.......................................................................................................................
|
181
|
Appendix A Terms of reference
........................................................................................
|
182
|
Appendix B List of submitters on the Issues Paper
.........................................................
|
184
|
Appendix C Recommendations
.........................................................................................
|
185
|
Appendix D Glossary of terms
..........................................................................................
|
187
|
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 3
Summary
Summary
INTRODUCTION
3 When a victim of family violence kills their abuser, they will usually be charged with murder.
In only some of these cases, however, will the defendant be able to
successfully rely on self- defence under the Crimes Act 1961.
In reality these
defendants are more likely to be convicted of the lesser crime of manslaughter,
than be convicted of murder or acquitted
on the basis of self-defence.
6 The Law Commission’s terms of reference are as
follows:
The Law Commission will re-consider whether the law in respect of a victim of
family violence who commits homicide can be improved.
As part of this review the
Law Commission shall consider:
(a) (b)
(c)
Should the test for self-defence, in section 48 of the Crimes Act, be
modified so that it is more readily accessible to defendants
charged with murder
who are victims of family violence; and
Whether a partial defence for
victims of family violence who are charged with murder is justified and if so in
what particular circumstances;
and
Whether current sentencing principles
properly reflect the circumstances of victims of family violence who are
convicted of murder?
1 Law Commission Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide
(NZLC IP39, 2015).
4 Law Commission Report
Previous law reform activity in New Zealand and
elsewhere
2001, the Commission again recommended that provocation be
abolished.
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF FAMILY VIOLENCE
2 R v Wang [1989] NZCA 290; [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA).
3 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001).
4 Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, 2007).
5 Ministry of Justice Strengthening New Zealand’s legislative response to family violence: A public discussion document (Wellington, August 2015) at
4–5.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 5
Summary
intimate partner homicides, it is the primary victim of the past abuse who
kills the predominant aggressor.
6 The Family Violence Death Review Committee reported that between 2009 and 2014 there were 85 intimate partner homicides, 71 of which had a known abuse history. Of those 71 homicides, 13 (18 per cent) of offenders were primary/suspected primary victims, and 58 (82 per cent) were predominant/suspected predominant aggressors. Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 9. All 13 primary/suspected primary victim homicide offenders were women.
7 Or less than 10 per cent of all family violence homicides. This is based on the Family Violence Death Review Committee’s identification, in the period 2009–2012, of nine cases where a primary victim killed a predominant aggressor and one further suspected case, out of a total of 126 family violence homicides and 297 total homicides. Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December
2013 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June 2014) at 34 and 75.
8 Ministry of Justice, above n 5, at 13.
9 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 7, at 39.
10 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fifth Report: January 2014 to December 2015 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, February 2016)
at 36.
11 State of Victoria Royal Commission into Family Violence: Summary and
recommendations (Parl Paper No 132, March 2016) at 27.
6 Law Commission Report
therefore recommends (continued) education to improve understanding within
the criminal justice system of the dynamics of family
violence.
RECOMMENDATIONS
R1 Judges should continue to receive education, including through the Institute of Judicial Legal
Studies, on the dynamics of family violence.
R2 Regular and ongoing education courses on the dynamics of family
violence should be made available to all criminal lawyers, including
Crown
prosecutors and defence counsel.
R3 Police should receive regular education on the dynamics of
family violence.
R4 Education recommended above should:
· reflect contemporary social science understanding of family violence and victims’
responses;
· explain the primary victim/predominant aggressor analysis in intimate partner violence;
and
· identify common misconceptions of family violence that
persist today and their implications in the criminal justice
system.
A CHANGE TO THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENCE
21 It should be noted that section 48 applies to all occasions when recourse is made to self-defence;
the section is not limited to homicide. It states:
Every one is justified in using, in defence of himself or herself or
another, such force as, in the circumstances as he or she believes
them to be,
it is reasonable to use.
12 Julia Tolmie “Battered Defendants and the Criminal Defences to
Murder – Lessons from Overseas” [2002] WkoLawRw 5; (2002) 10 Wai L Rev 91 at
91.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 7
Summary
48 may apply even if that
person is responding to a threat that is not imminent, provided that the
defendant believed their actions
to be necessary, and the response was otherwise
reasonable. This would apply where a victim of intimate partner violence kills
their
abusive partner, as well as in other family violence contexts, such as
where a person kills a parent or partner of their parent in
response to family
violence. To avoid the unintended consequence of violent offenders being able to
take advantage of the change
of law, this amendment is only made available to
victims of family violence. It applies in all circumstances where self-defence
is
relevant and would not be limited to charges of homicide.
13 R v Wang, above n 2.
14 Afamasaga v R [2015] NZCA 615. See also the observations of the Supreme Court in declining leave to appeal in Vincent v R [2016] NZSC 15.
15 Stella Tarrant “Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own
Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law and Laws” (1990) 20 UWAL Rev 573 at
598.
8 Law Commission Report
gain a proper understanding of all of the circumstances of the alleged
offending. We therefore make a recommendation to identify
in legislation the
full range of evidence of prior family violence and expert evidence that may
be relevant to a jury’s assessment
of whether a defendant who is a victim
of family violence was impelled to act in the way they did. Expert evidence is
likely to assist
by explaining the social context of the homicide rather than by
focusing on the outdated and much criticised battered woman syndrome.
RECOMMENDATIONS
R5 A new provision should be inserted into the Crimes Act 1961 to
ensure that, where a person is responding to family violence, section
48 may
apply even if that person is responding to a threat that is not
imminent.
R6 The Ministry of Justice should consider whether the term
“family violence” should be consistent with the definition
of
domestic violence in the Domestic Violence Act 1995, incorporating any
amendments that may be made following the Ministry of Justice’s
current
review of domestic violence legislation, or whether an inclusive definition of
family violence is preferred, including, but
not limited to, the definition of
domestic violence in the Domestic Violence Act 1995.
R7 The Evidence Act 2006 should be amended to include provisions based on sections 322J and
322M(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) to provide for a broad range of family
violence evidence to be admitted in support of claims of self-defence and to
make it
clear that such evidence may be relevant to both the subjective and
objective elements in section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961.
GREATER RECOGNITION OF REDUCED CULPABILITY
16 The concern of the principle of “fair labelling”, Ashworth
and Horder explain, is “to see that widely felt
distinctions between kinds
of offences and degrees of wrongdoing are respected and signalled by the law,
and that offences are subdivided
and labelled so as to represent fairly the
nature and magnitude of the law-breaking”: Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy
Horder Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2013) at 77.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 9
Summary
victim of family violence.
RECOMMENDATION
R8 The Solicitor-General should, when next reviewing the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution
Guidelines, consider whether they should include express reference
to the potential relevance of a defendant’s history as a victim
of
family violence.
NO PARTIAL DEFENCE TO MURDER
. “Defence-based” partial defences, which normally require an honest belief that the
defendant’s actions were necessary to defend or preserve him or herself or another.
. “Provocation-based” partial defences, which require a loss of control, triggered by
provocation sufficient to deprive a person of ordinary tolerance, in a similar position, of the power of self-control.
. “Diminished capacity-based” partial defences, which require an abnormality of mental
function that impaired the defendant’s capacity to understand events
and to judge whether their actions are right or wrong,
or to exercise
self-control.
10 Law Commission Report
RECOMMENDATION
R9 No new partial defence or separate homicide offence should be
introduced in New Zealand.
CHANGES TO SENTENCING FOR HOMICIDE
17 We adopt the same conclusions as the Law Commission did in Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961: Crimes Against the Person (NZLC R111,
2009) at 30–31. See also Law Commission Strangulation: The Case for a New Offence (NZLC R138, 2015) at [1.17].
18 See Simon France (ed) Adams on Criminal Law – Sentencing
(online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [SA9.01]–[SA9.28].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 11
Summary
relevant, however, the offender’s diminished intellectual capacity or
understanding of the situation will also be taken into
account and the Court
of Appeal has accepted that the psychological effects of sustained abuse may
justify a sentencing discount.19
102); second, finite sentences for
murder; and third, the so-called three strikes regime (provided for in sections
86A–86I).
19 R v Whiu [2007] NZCA 591.
20 R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775.
21 R v Rihia [2012] NZHC 2720.
22 The only case in which a shorter sentence was imposed is R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500 (HC), a euthanasia case.
23 Prescribed by ss 86A–86I of the Sentencing Act 2002.
12 Law Commission Report
strike offences include sexual offences, most violent offences and offences
against property where a weapon is used. These offences
range in
seriousness.
RECOMMENDATIONS
R10
R11
The Sentencing Act 2002 should be amended as follows:
· amending section 9(2)(c) to clarify that “conduct of the victim” includes prior family violence against the offender; and
· amending section 9(2)(e) to clarify that
“diminished intellectual capacity or understanding” includes any
impairment
resulting from being subject to family violence.
The Ministry
of Justice should undertake further policy work to address the issues noted in
this Report in relation to sections 86D(4)
and 86E of the Sentencing Act 2002 as
they apply to homicide offenders in exceptional circumstances and
specifically:
· consider the position of victims of family violence who kill their abusers in situations where the three strikes regime would mandate a life sentence; and
· consider how to amend the legislation to allow judges to
impose a finite sentence in deserving cases.
CONCLUSION
– whether or not the
defendants were acting in self-defence – in circumstances most of us do
not fully understand and
will never experience. This Report recommends changes
to the law
24 Those cases are R v Brown HC Napier CRI-2008-020-3130, 24 November 2009; R v Stone HC Wellington CRI-2005-078-1802, 9 December 2005;
and R v Rihia, above n 21.
25 We understand that the Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear appeals by
the Solicitor-General against the sentences imposed in
R v Harrison
[2014] NZHC 2705 (in which the offender’s first strike offence was an
indecent assault) and R v Turner [2015] NZHC 189 (in which the
offender’s first strike offence was wounding with intent), on 9 and 10
June 2016.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 13
Summary
and measures to improve understandings of family violence, appreciating that
legal reform is meaningful only when accompanied by shifts
in thinking.
57 As Julia Tolmie has recently written:26
If there is a lesson to be learned from the repeal of the provocation defence
it may be that legal rules, and therefore law reform,
make less of a difference
than we might expect in the resolution of criminal cases – or certainly
criminal cases that involve
the “wicked” problem of family violence
... [I]f the same unexamined assumptions that are typically made in these kinds
of cases continue to be made (that women’s use of violence in intimate
partnership simply mirrors what we know about men’s
use of violence; that
help is readily available to those victims who are facing dangerous and
potentially lethal violence who seek
it; and that leaving a violent relationship
is always an option and is an effective means of addressing the violence) and if
we fail
to understand the manner in which coercive control, social
marginalisation and structural exclusion entrap victims of family violence,
then it is unlikely that reforms to the legal requirements of self-defence will
effect much substantive change either.
26 Julia Tolmie “Defending Battered Defendants on Homicide Charges in
New Zealand: The Impact of Abolishing the Partial Defences
to Murder”
[2015] NZ L Rev 649 at 681 (footnote omitted).
14 Law Commission Report
Part 1
SETTING THE SCENE
CHAPTER 1: Scope, context and approach
Chapter 1
Scope, context and approach
INTRODUCTION
1.1
1.2
1.3
Family violence destroys lives and takes a significant toll on New Zealand
society. New Zealand has the highest reported rate of family
violence in the
developed world,27 and nearly half of all homicides are related to
family violence.28 Disproportionately, family violence affects the
lives of women and children,29 and women are overwhelmingly more
likely to be killed by an intimate partner than commit homicide
themselves.30 The consequences of family violence can be devastating
both for the victims and their families. Discussing intimate partner violence,
Jane Maslow Cohen writes:31
Terrible and tragic things happen within the contexts of battering
relationships, even beyond the violence and resultant injury itself.
These
tragedies include the death of the battered victim; the physical and
psychological abuse of others, especially children,
within the household; the
destruction of employment situations and opportunities; the withering away of
basic trust, particularly
trust in intimacy; and, often, the waste of what
might, and should, have been rewarding and productive
lives.
Unsurprisingly, most family violence homicides are committed by
those who have a history of perpetrating violence, usually against
the
deceased.32 Most homicide offenders are men.33
In a
very small number of cases, accounting for less than five per cent of all
homicides in New Zealand, a victim of family violence
kills their abuser.34
In intimate partner killings, these offenders are almost always
women.35 Whatever their gender or relationship to an aggressor,
however, victims of family violence who kill their abusers have typically
suffered years of physical, sexual and/or psychological abuse that can be severe
and extreme.
In this Report, we consider how the law responds to victims
of family violence who commit homicide and whether the law can be
improved.
27 Ministry of Justice Strengthening New Zealand’s legislative response to family violence: A public discussion document (Wellington, August 2015).
28 There were 139 family violence-related homicides in the period 2009–2012 out of a total 297 homicides. See Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December 2013 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June 2014) at 32 and 35; and Ministry of Justice, above n 27.
29 State of Victoria Royal Commission into Family Violence: Summary and recommendations (Parl Paper No 132, March 2016) at 18.
30 Between 2009 and 2012 three-quarters of intimate partner homicide offenders were men, and almost three-quarters of victims were women.
See Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 28, at 39.
31 Jane Maslow Cohen “Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?” (1995) 57 U Pitt L Rev 757 at
762.
32 The Family Violence Death Review Committee reported that, for the period 2009–2014, the homicide offender was the predominant/suspected predominant aggressor in 82 per cent of intimate partner homicides where the abuse history was known: Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 9.
33 In the past 10 years in New Zealand, 84 per cent of homicide offenders were male: Statistics New Zealand “Adults convicted in court by sentence type – most serious offence fiscal year” <nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz>.
34 Or less than 10 per cent of family violence homicides. This is based on the Family Violence Death Review Committee’s identification, in the period 2009–2012, of nine cases where a female primary victim killed a male predominant aggressor and one further suspected case, out of a total of 126 family violence homicides and 297 total homicides: Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 28, at 34 and 75. An earlier study undertaken by the Ministry of Social Development identified two cases in the five years from 2002–2006 of a female against male homicide where there was documented evidence of the male’s violence towards the female in the past and in the context of the event. This accounted for 1.5 per cent of family violence deaths and 0.7 per cent of total homicides for that same period: Jennifer Martin and Rhonda Pritchard Learning from Tragedy: Homicide within Families in New Zealand 2002-2006 (Ministry of Social Development, April 2010) at 38.
35 The Family Violence Death Review Committee identified 13 intimate
partner homicides between 2009 and 2014 in which a victim of
intimate partner
violence killed their abuser, all of whom were women: Family Violence Death
Review Committee submission at 9.
16 Law Commission Report
CONTEXT OF THIS REVIEW
The Family Violence Death Review Committee
1.4
1.5
1.6
The impetus for this Report is a recommendation from the Family Violence Death Review
Committee (FVDRC) that the Government:36
.
considers modifying the test for self-defence set out in section 48
of the Crimes Act 1961 so
that it is more readily accessible to victims of family violence;
and
. considers the introduction of a partial defence
to murder that can be utilised by primary
victims of family violence who are not acting in self-defence at the time
they retaliate in response to the abuse they have experienced.
These
recommendations were made in the FVDRC’s Fourth Annual Report,
published in June
2014, which reported that, over the period 2009–2012, there were 126
family violence deaths. The FVDRC identified that 10 family
violence deaths
involved a killing by a victim of family violence of their abusive
partner.37 The defendants in all those cases were women. A further
three deaths involved killings by children who had been abused by fathers
or
step-fathers and had witnessed their mothers being
abused.38
The FVDRC observed that victims of family violence
who kill their abusers are usually charged with murder and, if convicted, can
face long terms of imprisonment rather than having their long-term history of
victimisation and, at times, extreme abuse recognised
in the criminal justice
response to their crimes.39 The FVDRC concluded, as a result, that
victims of family violence who kill their abusers are not well served by the
New Zealand justice
system. The FVDRC observed that, compared with similar
international jurisdictions:40
... Aotearoa New Zealand is out of step in how the criminal justice system responds to [intimate partner violence] primary victims when they face homicide charges for killing their abusive partners
... Firstly, it can be attributed to the fact that the defence of self-defence has been interpreted in a restrictive manner in Aotearoa New Zealand, making it difficult to apply in cases involving primary victims. Secondly, by abolishing provocation New Zealand now has no partial defences to murder for those primary victims whose circumstances do not fit within the full defence of self-defence. These defendants will now be convicted of murder rather than manslaughter. And thirdly, Aotearoa New Zealand retains a presumption of life imprisonment for murder, which is difficult to overturn even in such cases and, when it is overturned, still results in long sentences of imprisonment. As such the violent circumstances (that offenders who were [primary victims] were entrapped in and responding to) do not appear to be reflected in local verdicts to the same degree as they are in comparable international
jurisdictions.
Government family violence initiatives
1.7
Also in 2014, the Minister of Justice and the Minister for Social Development
announced that family violence and sexual violence are
amongst their top
priorities and undertook a package of
36 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 28, at 20.
37 At 42. This included one suspected case. In its submission on our Issues Paper the Family Violence Death Review Committee reported that it had identified a further three intimate partner homicides committed by a victim of family violence between 2012 and 2014: Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 9.
38 At 65. The circumstances of the three intrafamilial deaths reviewed by the Family Violence Death Review Committee are not clear. In particular, it is unclear whether the deceased was the abusive father/step-father, or another family member. If they were not, those cases are outside our terms of reference. As we discuss in Chapter 2, however, two of the 24 cases we reviewed involved children killing parents.
39 At 19.
40 At 102.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 17
CHAPTER 1: Scope, context and approach
1.8
initiatives.41 One of the key initiatives was publication in
August 2015 of a discussion document about strengthening the legal response to
family
violence. Within the scope of the review are the Domestic Violence Act
1995, the Care of Children Act 2004, the Crimes Act 1961,
the Bail Act 2000 and
the Sentencing Act 2002.
Submissions on that document closed in September
2015, and a report is likely in mid-2016.
Law Commission projects on family violence and sexual
violence
1.9
This review is one of three family violence or sexual violence projects referred to the
Commission.42 The other two were:
.
Alternative models for prosecuting and trying criminal
cases.43 We were asked to
identify best practice for improving the court experience for complainants, with a particular focus on sexual offence cases. We recommended:
. establishing an alternative process outside of court for resolving sexual violence cases
(such as in situations where the victim wants to maintain a relationship with the perpetrator);
. improving the court experience for victims of sexual offending by mechanisms such
as statutory time limits to ensure speedier case resolution, introducing less traumatic methods for complainants to give evidence at trial, and piloting a specialist sexual violence court with expert judges and lawyers who are trained and accredited in dealing with sexual violence cases; and
. establishing a sexual violence commission to coordinate and oversee wraparound care
and services for victims of sexual violence.
This reference was tabled
in Parliament in December 2015.
. Creation of a separate
crime of non-fatal strangulation.44 In that Report,
we examined
the case for a new offence of strangulation. The Commission found that the
risks following strangulation are not well understood by
Police, judges and
others who assist victims of family violence. In at least half of all cases,
strangulation does not result in
an obvious external injury, which makes it
difficult to lay serious charges against the perpetrator and means that
perpetrators
of strangulation are often getting a much lower sentence than they
deserve. The Commission makes seven recommendations to improve
the way that the
criminal justice system responds to strangulation in family violence
circumstances, including a recommendation that
a specific offence of
strangulation should be enacted.
This reference was tabled in Parliament
in March 2016.
41 Cabinet Paper “Progress on the Work Programme of the Ministerial Group on Family Violence and Sexual Violence” (22 July 2015) SOC 15/
68.
42 The reports are available to download from the Law Commission’s website at <www.lawcom.govt.nz>.
43 Law Commission The Justice Response to Victims of Sexual Violence: Criminal Trials and Alternative Processes (NZLC R136, 2015).
44 Law Commission Strangulation: The Case for a New Offence (NZLC
R138, 2016).
18 Law Commission Report
SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT
1.10
The terms of reference for this project, which are in Appendix A, require
us to consider whether the law in respect of victims of
family violence who
commit homicide can be improved, including whether:
. the
test for self-defence, in section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961, should be modified
so that it
is more readily accessible for victims of family
violence;
. a partial defence to murder is justified
for victims of family violence and, if so, in what
circumstances; and
. current sentencing
principles properly reflect the circumstances of victims of family
violence
who are convicted of murder.
Terminology
1.11
1.12
1.13
In this Report, we use the general term “victim of family
violence” to refer to all persons who have suffered abuse,
regardless of
whether that person is an adult or child or is being abused by a partner, parent
or some other family member. Similarly,
our use of “abuser” refers
to all perpetrators of family violence, regardless of their relationship with
the victim.
We use the term “family violence” in a broad
sense. Consistent with the FVDRC, we adopt the definition of the Taskforce
on
Violence within Families, which defines family violence
as:45
... a broad range of controlling behaviours, commonly of a physical, sexual
and/or psychological nature, which typically involve fear,
intimidation and
emotional deprivation. It occurs within a variety of close interpersonal
relationships, such as between partners,
parents and children, siblings and in
other relationship where significant others are not part of the physical
household but are
part of the family and/or are fulfilling the function of
family.
At times in this Report, it is necessary to refer to the
different forms of family violence. We use the categorisation adopted by
the
FVDRC, which separates family violence into three forms of
abuse:46
. Intimate partner violence: any
behaviour within an intimate relationship (including
current and/or past live-in relationships or dating relationships) that
causes physical, psychological or sexual harm to those in
the
relationship.
. Child abuse and neglect: all forms of
physical and emotional ill-treatment, sexual abuse,
neglect and exploitation that results in actual or potential harm to the
child’s health, development or dignity.
.
Intrafamilial violence: all forms of abuse between family
members other than intimate
partner violence and child abuse and neglect, including abuse/neglect of
older people aged approximately 65 years and over by a person
with whom they
have a relationship of trust, violence perpetrated by a child against their
parent, violence perpetrated by a parent
on their adult child, and violence
among siblings.
45 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 28, at 13, citing Ministry of Social Development "Background to family violence indicators"
46 At 14.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 19
CHAPTER 1: Scope, context and approach
1.14
1.15
Throughout this Report, we also use the terms “primary victim”
and “predominant aggressor” to describe the
dynamics of intimate
partner violence.47 We adopt these terms from the FVDRC, which
applies a “primary victim/predominant aggressor analysis” in its
review
of intimate partner homicides.48 This analysis requires
looking at patterns of abuse and harm across the entirety of an intimate partner
relationship. The “predominant
aggressor” is the person “who
is the most significant or principal aggressor ... and who has a pattern of
using violence
to exercise coercive control”.49 The
“primary victim” is the person “who (in the abuse history
of the relationship) is experiencing ongoing coercive
and controlling
behaviours from their intimate partner”.50 The primary
victim/predominant aggressor analysis is discussed further in Chapter
2.
These key terms and others are also set out in a glossary in Appendix
D of this Report.
What this Report does and does not cover
1.16
1.17
While our terms of reference refer to victims of family violence who
“commit homicide”, in this Report, we focus on victims
of family
violence who kill perpetrators of family violence (abusers). We do not consider
the law in relation to victims of family
violence who kill third parties,
although we recognise in some cases that offending may be caused or explained in
part by the defendant’s
prior history of abuse.51 We have
taken this approach for several reasons. First, the FVDRC’s Fourth
Annual Report, which led to this reference, raised concerns in relation to
primary victims who kill predominant aggressors, rather than primary
victims who
kill generally.52 Second, the problems identified in this Report in
relation to self-defence and reduced culpability arise by virtue of the dynamics
between the homicide defendant as a victim of family violence and the deceased
as a perpetrator of family violence. In most of the
cases we have considered,
the homicide defendants were primary victims of intimate partner violence by the
deceased. Sometimes, however,
a person other than a primary victim may kill an
abuser.53
Accordingly, in this Report, we also consider victims of
family violence who kill in response to other forms of family violence, namely
child abuse and neglect, and intrafamilial violence. What will be relevant in
any case is the link between the homicide and the prior
abusive conduct of the
deceased.54
This Report is not a first principles review of
the law of homicide or defences to homicide. We are limited in our consideration
of
the law to how it applies to victims of family violence. We do not,
therefore, consider the law in respect of other defendants who
may also be less
blameworthy in a comparative sense. We further note that this reference is
limited to the offence of homicide.
It does not cover other offences that may
be responses to family violence,
47 Most of the cases we discuss involve intimate partner violence, but two, R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA) and R v Raivaru HC Rotorua CRI-2004-077-1667, 5 August 2005, involve children who killed violent parents. We are also aware of a third case, before the High Court at the time of publication of this Report, involving the killing by a 19 year old, Daryl Kirk, of her mother’s partner. At the time of publication of this Report Ms Kirk had been found guilty of manslaughter but had not yet been sentenced. The term “primary victim” is less obviously appropriate for these cases, in part because the offender appears more likely to be reacting to the abuse of another (for example, a mother) in addition to themselves (see, for example, Raivaru at [6]–[7] and [19]). Thus, where appropriate, we may describe defendants who kill abusers as simply “victims” of family violence.
48 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 28, at 74.
49 At 15.
50 At 15.
51 For example, in R v Rongonui [2000] NZCA 273; [2000] 2 NZLR 385 (CA), the defendant, Janine Rongonui, was ultimately convicted of manslaughter in relation to the killing of her neighbour, who she stabbed 10 times after the neighbour declined to babysit her children. Ms Rongonui had been under extreme social and financial pressure, was suffering from a major depressive episode triggered by recent and historical violence, and was brain damaged as a result of long-term physical and chemical abuse.
52 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 28, at 19.
53 For example, R v Raivaru, above n 47, in which the primary victim was apparently the defendant’s mother. (See further the explanation above at n 47).
54 See further the discussion of mitigating features for sentencing in
Chapter 11.
20 Law Commission Report
such as assault or failure to protect a child. We are conscious, however, of the potential for unintended consequences that necessarily arises whenever the law is of specific, rather than general, application.
OUR APPROACH
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
In this Report, we focus our consideration on:
. the law
of self-defence, and how it applies when a person commits homicide in response
to
family violence (Part 2 of this Report); and
.
how the law can and should recognise the reduced culpability of
victims of family violence
who kill their abusers other than in self-defence (including when a plea of
self-defence is unsuccessful) (Part 3 of this Report).
Part 3 considers
in detail the interrelated issues of partial defences to murder and sentencing
reform, both of which can be utilised
to recognise the reduced culpability
victims of family violence.
We rely on the data collected and reported by
the FVDRC to supplement our own analysis of reported cases. The FVDRC is a
statutory
“mortality review committee” established by the Health
Quality & Safety Commission.55 It was established to review and
report on family violence deaths in New Zealand.
We have also drawn
extensively on law reform work in other jurisdictions, particularly the
Australian states of Victoria, Western
Australia, New South Wales, Queensland
and Tasmania, as well as England and Wales, Canada and Ireland.
Guiding principles
1.22
We explained in the Issues Paper that we have framed our examination of the
problems in this area of the law, and our analysis of
the options for reform, by
using the following guiding principles:56
. The
law of homicide should reflect community values. The sanctity of and right
to life
is inherent in our legal system, and the law of self-defence must
reflect this core principle.
. The law should
achieve substantive equality for all defendants. The law should
apply
equally irrespective of whether a person is a victim of family violence and
should strive to be free from any form of gender or other
bias. In this context,
we do not mean neutrality of the law on its face but rather substantive equality
in the manner in which the
law operates. For substantive gender equality to be
achieved, the law must not have a discriminatory effect in
practice.57
. The law of homicide should
reflect the context in which homicides typically
occur.58
Reform grounded in abstract philosophical principles or historical legal
categories is not useful or realistic. Any reform must be
driven by an
understanding, based on contemporary social science, of the actual context in
which victims of family violence commit
homicide.
55 Under s 59E of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000.
56 Law Commission Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide (NZLC IP39, 2015) [Issues Paper] at [1.28].
57 United Nations Women’s Rights are Human Rights HR/PUB/14/2 (2014) at 30.
58 A similar approach was also adopted by the Law Reform Commissions in
Victoria and Western Australia. See Victorian Law
Reform Commission
Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) at 14–15; Jenny Morgan
Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond Legal Categories (Victorian Law
Reform Commission, Melbourne, 2002) at 1–2; and Law Reform Commission of
Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report (Project
97, September 2007) at 9.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 21
CHAPTER 1: Scope, context and approach
1.23
These principles represent the underlying objectives of our recommendations
for reform and are consistent with New Zealand’s
international obligations
and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
Consultation
1.24
1.25
1.26
The Commission convened an expert panel to advise it on this reference. The
panel was made up of academics, Crown and defence counsel,
current and retired
judges, victim advocates and Police.
Our Issues Paper was published in
November 2015,59 with submissions open until late December 2015.
Due to the relatively condensed timeframe for submissions, we accepted late
submissions
where requested.
We also held consultation meetings with key
stakeholders, including (but not limited to) victim support organisations,
the Ministry
for Women, the FVDRC, Crown solicitors, the New Zealand Law
Society, the Criminal Bar Association, the Public Defence Service, legal
academics and experts in family violence.
Structure of this Report
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
This Report is divided into three parts.
Part 1 (Chapters 1 to 4) sets
the scene of this review. Chapter 1 sets out the scope of the review and our
approach to it, and Chapter
2 provides an overview of the present state of
knowledge of the dynamics of family violence and how this has evolved over time.
In
that chapter, we draw on the FVDRC’s Fifth Report, which calls
for a shift in how we think about intimate partner violence and victims’
responses. Chapter 3 explains the law
of homicide and the criminal trial process
and makes some observations as to how the law currently responds to victims of
family
violence who kill their abusers. Chapter 4 sets out the law reform
context to this Report, which includes the history of reform in
this area in New
Zealand and in other comparable jurisdictions.
Part 2 (Chapters 5 to 7)
focuses on the law of self-defence. These chapters set out the current law and
explore the problems that
arise in applying the law to victims of family
violence, before going on to analyse the options for reform.
Part 3
(Chapters 8 to 11) considers how the criminal justice system takes into account
the reduced culpability of defendants who
kill their abusers in response to
family violence, other than in self-defence. Chapter 8 introduces the topic and
sets out the options
for addressing reduced culpability. Chapter 9 makes a
number of observations around how the reduced culpability of a victim of family
violence is currently taken into account. Chapter 10 considers and concludes on
the question of whether a partial defence is justified,
and Chapter 11 goes on
to explore the options for sentencing
reform.
59 Issues Paper, above n 56.
22 Law Commission Report
Chapter 2
Understanding family violence
INTRODUCTION
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
Understanding why victims of family violence kill their abusers
requires a broader understanding of the general nature and dynamics
of family
violence. Otherwise, the individual circumstances and abuse history in any case
can be misinterpreted or minimised, which
can affect case outcomes. How New
Zealanders think about family violence also drives broader public policy
decisions, including
decisions around family violence intervention, prevention
and punishment for family violence-related offending.
As we explain in
this chapter, understandings of family violence, within the community and among
practitioners, are evolving. Recognising
that previous understandings have
propagated erroneous assumptions and misunderstandings, the Family Violence
Death Review Committee
(FVDRC) has called for a change to the way New Zealand
understands intimate partner violence and victims’
responses.60
We agree with the FVDRC that understanding of
family violence needs to change. Underlying the legal issues discussed in Parts
2 and
3 of this Report are misconceptions that are outdated and unhelpful. The
result is that victims of family violence may not be recognised
as such
(particularly if they have, on occasion, been violent too), they may be seen as
being to blame for not having left the relationship,
or the threat posed, and
the overall impact of the violence on the victim may not be fully
appreciated.
In this chapter, we:
. identify the
different forms of family violence occurring in different relationship
types;
. discuss evolving understandings of intimate
partner violence and victims’ responses to
violence and some misconceptions that these understandings have
perpetuated;
. explain contemporary social science
understanding of family violence, including the
significance of factors such as gender, race, economic deprivation and
gang association; and
. make recommendations targeted
at improving the understanding of family violence by those
working in the criminal justice system.
THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE
2.5
Family violence comes in many forms, including intimate partner violence,
child abuse and neglect, elder abuse, violence by children
towards parents, and
sibling violence. Family violence homicides are, however, most common in
intimate partner relationships.61 Intimate partner violence is
defined as “[a]ny behaviour within an intimate relationship (including
current and/
60 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fifth Report: January 2014 to December 2015 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, February 2016)
at 13.
61 Among the 126 deaths the Family Violence Death Review Committee reviewed
for its Fourth Annual Report, 63 (50 per cent) were intimate partner
deaths, 37 (29 per cent) were child abuse and neglect deaths, and 26 (13 per
cent) were intrafamilial
deaths. See Family Violence Death Review Committee
Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December 2013 (Health Quality
& Safety Commission, June 2014) at 32.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 23
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
or past live-in relationships or dating relationships) that causes physical,
psychological or sexual harm to those in the
relationship”.62
The gendered nature of intimate partner violence
2.6
2.7
2.8
2.9
Historically, consideration of family violence has focused on male aggression
towards women and “battered woman syndrome”
developed alongside the
organised women’s movement. Family violence in intimate partner
relationships is a gendered phenomenon.
Perpetrators of violence are usually
men, and victims are usually women and children.63 In this context,
it needs to be recognised that men and women kill their intimate partners for
different reasons and in different
ways.64
Family violence
does, however, occur within other intimate relationships. The FVDRC
identified one case of intimate partner
homicide occurring in a same-sex
relationship but reports that same-sex family violence deaths are likely to be
undercounted.65 Intimate partner violence in lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, queer and intersex relationships has received less attention in
the
literature,66 but there is some evidence that indicates it may be
as prevalent as heterosexual violence.67 Some contend the dynamics of
same-sex intimate partner violence are similar to those in heterosexual
relationships,68 while others suggest they may be different in
material ways.69 In any event, it is widely acknowledged that further
research is required.
Concepts and models that have traditionally been
applied to women in the context of intimate partner relationships might be
applied
to other victims. Most obviously, battered woman syndrome has in some
cases been reframed as “battered person syndrome”70
and/or applied to victims of all genders. The nature and effects of family
violence may perhaps more helpfully be conceptualised in
terms of behaviours
rather than participant characteristics.
It does not seem to us to be
problematic to extend our consideration to the positon of victims or aggressors
who are not or who are
only minimally represented in the available data. We
agree with the Victorian Law Reform Commission that the same legal issues arise
for all victims of
62 At 14. The Family Violence Death Review Committee defines intimate partner violence as including acts of physical aggression, psychological abuse, forced intercourse and other forms of sexual coercion, and various controlling behaviours. See also Etienne G Krug and others (eds) World report on violence and health (World Health Organisation, 2002).
63 At 41. In a small number of cases, however, men may be victims of intimate partner violence. One of the 55 intimate partner deaths considered by the Family Violence Death Review Committee in its Fourth Report about which relationship history information was available involved a male primary victim and a female predominant aggressor. In its recent discussion document on New Zealand’s legislative response to family violence, the Ministry of Justice noted men’s experience of domestic violence is often different to that of women. Intimate partner violence perpetrated by women against men is much less severe, and men are more likely to experience other forms of family violence, like sibling violence. See Ministry of Justice Strengthening New Zealand’s legislative response to family violence: A public discussion document (Wellington, August 2015) at 14.
64 The different ways in which men and women commit homicide in the context of intimate relationships is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
65 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 39.
66 For a helpful and recent discussion from the Australian Institute of Criminology, see Alexandra Gannoni and Tracy Cussen “Same-sex intimate partner homicide in Australia” (2014) 469 Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1. See also, for example, “Breaking the taboo of domestic violence in LGBTI relationships” (30 May 2015) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>; Ally Fogg “LGBT victims of domestic abuse are rarely catered for – or acknowledged” The Guardian (online ed, London, 14 March 2014); Maya Shwayder “A Same-Sex Domestic Violence Epidemic Is Silent” The Atlantic (online ed, Washington DC, 5 November 2013); and Joanna Jolly “Is violence more common in same-sex relationships?” (18 November 2014) BBC News <www.bbc.com>.
67 See for example Social Policy Evaluation and Research Unit (Superu) Reducing the impact of alcohol on family violence (April 2015) at 2. See also United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention “CDC releases data on interpersonal and sexual violence by sexual orientation” (press release, 25 January 2013).
68 Leonard D Pertnoy “Same Violence, Same Sex, Different Standard: An Examination of Same-Sex Domestic Violence and the Use of Expert Testimony on Battered Woman’s Syndrome in Same-Sex Domestic Violence Cases” (2012) 24 St Thomas L Rev 544 at 545. See also Social Policy Evaluation and Research Unit (Superu), above n 67.
69 Gannoni and Cussen, above n 66. See also Evan Stark Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 397.
70 In New Zealand, see RR v KR [2010] NZFLR 809 (HC). In Australia,
see R v Monks [2011] VSC 626.
24 Law Commission Report
family violence who kill their abusers, whatever their gender and whatever
their relationship with the abuser.71
Family violence in other relationships
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
While intimate partner relationships are the most common context in which
primary victims kill predominant aggressors, victims of
family violence also
kill abusers within other close interpersonal relationships. Of the 24 New
Zealand cases we have reviewed
in which victims of family violence killed
abusers,72 two involved killings of male parents by male
children.73 A further case that was before the High Court at the
time of publication of this Report involved a female defendant, Daryl Kirk, who,
at the age of 19, shot and killed her mother’s partner during a violent
confrontation.74
In R v Erstich, the defendant had been
subjected by his father to abuse that the Crown accepted amounted to “not
much short of a reign of
terror”.75 When he was 14 years old,
after a decade of being subjected to physical and psychological abuse and
witnessing violence towards his
mother and brothers, the defendant killed his
father by shooting him at close range. The killing was premeditated. Although
he was
charged with murder, he was convicted of manslaughter. At trial, he
claimed the killing was provoked.76 He ultimately received a
suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment.77
In
R v Raivaru, the defendant was 15 years old when he stabbed his
step-father to death with a carving knife in circumstances the sentencing Judge
considered amounted to “serious provocation”.78
Before the killing, the stepfather had assaulted and verbally abused
the defendant and his mother, and the Judge accepted the
homicide arose from the
defendant’s desire to protect his mother, which “regrettably,
resulted in disproportionate use
of force with a weapon”.79
The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to four
years’ imprisonment.
Erstich and Raivaru are cases of
homicide by children, not intimate partners, but both involved violence by the
deceased against other family members,
including the defendants’ mothers.
The FVDRC notes that intimate partner violence and child abuse and neglect are
“entangled”
forms of abuse and that:80
It is well known that exposure to [intimate partner violence] is a form of
child abuse and that there is a high rate of co-occurrence
between intimate
partner violence and the physical abuse of children. Many children affected by
family violence are living with what
Edleson et al have described as the
“double whammy” – the co-occurrence of being exposed to family
violence in
relation to other family members and being a direct victim of child
maltreatment. Children are also injured in the “crossfire”
of a
violent assault or attack against the adult primary victim and can be used as
“weapons” by abusive (ex-) partners
in the context of [intimate
partner violence].
71 Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) at 61.
72 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the cases reviewed.
73 R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA); and R v Raivaru HC Rotorua CRI-2004-077-1667, 5 August 2005. Both cases involved the partial defence of provocation, before its repeal in 2009. Provocation, and its repeal, is discussed in detail in Chapter 10 of this Report.
74 Daryl Kirk was charged with murder and claimed self-defence. Shortly before publication of this Report the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter. She has yet to be sentenced.
75 R v Erstich, above n 73, at [3].
76 The Court of Appeal recorded at [3] the verdict “may have reflected acceptance of lack of intent to murder, but was more likely on the facts of the case to have entailed the jury’s acceptance of the partial defence of provocation”.
77 The sentence of imprisonment was imposed on appeal. The defendant was, in the first instance, sentenced to two years’ supervision.
78 R v Raivaru, above n 73, at [8].
79 At [19].
80 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 76 (footnote
omitted).
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 25
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
2.14
The FVDRC notes, in addition, that intimate partner violence and child abuse
and neglect are “not necessarily separate co-existing
forms of
violence” and that their co-occurrence may “only [make] sense if you
understand family violence as a pattern
of coercive control and that actions
directed at one individual are not necessarily designed to impact only on that
individual”.81
Other forms of family violence (for example,
elder abuse or violence among siblings) can be similarly
“entangled”.82
EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
2.15
Visibility and understanding of family violence, most particularly intimate
partner violence, is relatively recent and still evolving.83 In its
most recent Report, the FVDRC calls for a change to how we understand intimate
partner violence and victims’ responses
to such violence.
Misunderstanding intimate partner violence as “marital
conflict”
2.16
2.17
Historically, intimate partner violence was thought of as “marital
conflict” and less serious than stranger violence.
Disputes between
couples were seen as a private matter and a relationship issue for which both
parties were responsible.84 The FVDRC observes that some still view
family violence as “just a domestic”, which minimises the serious
impact of the
abuse by relegating it to “household
affairs”.85
Not only does this misunderstand family
violence and its impact on victims, it also affects family and whānau
members’
perceptions of the seriousness of family violence they may
witness or be involved in, and the need for intervention.86 Evidence
suggests that misconceptions held by family, whānau, friends and wider
society about violence and victimisation make
it harder for victims to seek help
and leave violent relationships.87
Misunderstanding intimate partner violence as a series of
incidents
2.18
2.19
To date, understandings of family violence have, according to the FVDRC,
tended to be violent incident focused, that is, a series
of violent incidents
between which it is assumed the victim is not being abused and, in the case of
adult victims, there are opportunities
to leave or address the
violence.88
Incident-focused conceptions may seem useful in
court proceedings because “incidents can be asserted and often
proven”,89 but the FVDRC argues that an emphasis on discrete
events may obscure the broader dynamics of family violence.90
Intimate partner violence in particular usually involves a combination of
physical, psychological, emotional, social and financial
abuse,91
and focusing on discrete episodes can minimise other harmful aspects of
the violence,
81 At 76–77.
82 At 64–65.
83 As to which, see Stark, above n 69, at 142–145. See also Martha Mahoney “Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation” (1991) 90 Mich L Rev 96 at 27.
84 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 34; and Stella Tarrant “Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law and Laws” (1990) 20 UWAL Rev 573 at 579–581.
85 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 77; and Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 35.
86 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 77.
87 Fleur McLaren Attitudes, Values and Beliefs about Violence within Families: 2008 Survey Findings (Ministry of Social Development, March 2010)
at 14.
88 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 77–78.
89 Mahoney, above n 83, at 30.
90 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 35.
91 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 161.
26 Law Commission Report
such as coercive control (discussed below).92 It can also mean
that some practitioners93 and members of the public are not attuned
to the danger posed by possessive and controlling partners.
Learned helplessness and battered woman syndrome
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
The concept of “learned helplessness” was developed in an
attempt to ensure victims’ experiences and responses
to family violence
were properly understood. Central to the concept of learned helplessness is Dr
Lenore Walker’s work on
battered woman syndrome, which applied the cycle
of violence and learned helplessness theories to battered women.94
Unifying Dr Walker’s theory is the proposition that “women
stay with abusive men because they are rendered helpless and
dependent by
violence”.95 Like other conceptions of battering, it is
incident focused, emphasising the type and number of assaults (or other coercive
acts).96
However, the theory of battered woman syndrome is
criticised for a number of reasons:
. It promotes a rigid,
limited view of battered women’s experiences and behaviour
that
overemphasises their psychological reactions and defines women by
reference to victimisation.97 The word “syndrome” is
considered misleading as it “medicalises” a person’s response
to violence and
implies that battered women suffer from a condition or mental
disability.98
. The theory does not take into
account cultural diversity.99 This is particularly
important
given that Māori women are overrepresented as victims of family violence who kill in New
Zealand.100
. The theory risks
creating a stereotype of the battered woman to the detriment of victims
of
family violence who do not fit that stereotype.101
The
FVDRC submits that its regional death reviews demonstrate that victims of
intimate partner violence are, in fact, neither passive
nor helpless. To the
contrary, they are proactive help seekers, and those victims experiencing the
lowest levels of informal support
from friends, family and whānau are more
active in seeking help from agencies.102
More recently, the
FVDRC has identified that a dialogue of “empowerment” has arisen,
with an aim of supporting victims
in addressing the abuse they have suffered.
This is the approach
92 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 71.
93 Including all practitioners who work within agencies to provide services that are accessed by people experiencing, perpetrating and exposed to violence and abuse. This may include dedicated family violence services, as well as mainstream services (such as health, housing and income support). It includes people who operate in the criminal justice system, as well as teachers, psychologists, and those delivering parenting programmes. For further information see the Family Violence Death Review Committee’s discussion of the terms “multi-agency family violence system” and “family violence workforce” at 13–14.
94 J Bruce Robertson “Battered Woman Syndrome: Expert Evidence in Action” [1998] OtaLawRw 7; (1998) 9 Otago L Rev 277 at 281, discussing Dr Walker’s books
The Battered Woman (Harper & Row, New York, 1979) and The Battered Woman Syndrome (Springer, New York, 1984).
95 Stark, above n 69, at 120.
96 Mahoney, above n 83, at 28–32.
97 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Securing Fair Outcomes for Battered Women Charged with Homicide: Analysing Defence
Lawyering in R v Falls” [2014] MelbULawRw 25; (2014) 38 MULR 666 at n 2.
98 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report (Project 97, September 2007) at 286; Victorian Law
Reform Commission, above n 71, at 170; and Elisabeth McDonald “Battered Woman Syndrome” [1997] NZLJ 436 at 437.
99 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 98, at 286.
100 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 44.
101 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 98, at 286; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 170; Danielle Tyson and others “The Effects of the 2005 Reforms on Legal Responses to Women Who Kill Intimate Partners” in Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Arie Freiberg (eds) Homicide Law Reform in Victoria: Retrospect and Prospects (The Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2015) 79 at 83; and Heather Douglas “A consideration of the merits of specialised homicide offences and defences for battered women” (2012) 45 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 367 at 377.
102 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 12.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 27
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
used by many family violence services currently.103 The FVDRC
criticises the empowerment approach, as it places the burden on the victim
rather than the wider family violence response
system.104 It
states:105
It is important to put the concept of empowerment within victims’
complex and sometimes chaotic lives, as structural inequities
constrain and
shape the lives of victims, albeit in different ways. The concept of
“empowerment” is problematic when
working with victims facing
lethal violence, who also frequently face severe structural disadvantages. This
is because it may appear
as though an individual’s inability to keep
themselves or their children safe is a result of their decisions and choices. It
renders invisible the systemic barriers that impede those choices (such as lack
of stable housing and access to money, poverty, racism,
sexism and the legacy
left behind by colonisation).
CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDING OF FAMILY VIOLENCE
2.24
2.25
2.26
The FVDRC calls for a change to the way New Zealand understands:
.
intimate partner violence as a pattern of harm, rather than
as a series of incidents; and
. victims’
responses to that violence, which requires understanding family violence as a
form
of entrapment rather than trying to explain victims’ responses
by reference to learned helplessness and battered woman syndrome.
Central
to this Report is how we understand and interpret the action of a victim of
family violence in killing their abuser. In
particular, as we go on to explain
in Chapter 6, a victim’s use of fatal force against her abuser must be
regarded as “reasonable”
in the circumstances for a claim of
self-defence to succeed.
Understanding victim responses to family
violence can be difficult. People who have not experienced violence themselves
can struggle
to understand why a victim responded in the way that they did. The
question commonly asked is “why didn’t she just leave?”
The
answer to questions of this kind can be complex and counter-intuitive. The FVDRC
argues that victims’ responses can be
properly understood only by viewing
intimate partner violence as a form of “social
entrapment”.106
Intimate partner violence as a pattern of harm
2.27
2.28
The FVDRC suggests that, rather than a series of discrete events, family
violence is best understood as a pattern of harmful behaviour.107
This behaviour, it is argued, belongs to the primary aggressor (not the
relationship) and is bigger than both the constituent incidents
of physical
violence and the current relationship.
In its submission on the Issues
Paper,108 the FVDRC suggested that thinking of intimate partner
violence as a pattern of harm enables a helpful shift in thinking. Episodes
of
violence can better be understood in the wider context of the primary
aggressor’s behaviour (including physical violence
as well as controlling
and coercive behaviour) in both the current relationship and previous
relationships.109
103 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 33.
104 At 33.
105 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 83 (footnote omitted).
106 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 36.
107 At 36.
108 Law Commission Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide (NZLC IP39, 2015).
109 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 11. See also
Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 36.
28 Law Commission Report
2.29
2.30
2.31
Viewing intimate partner violence as a pattern of harm also reframes single
violent episodes as components of an “escalating
spiral of violence”
rather than one-off events.110 This recognises the cumulative effect
of such violence, which is more than the sum of individual acts of violence. The
FVDRC’s
regional reviews, for example, showed that:111
The cumulative and compounding effect of the abuse also frequently resulted
in a raft of secondary issues. These included physical
and mental health issues,
histories of self-medicating with drugs and alcohol, suicide attempts and the
inability to hold down employment.
[Victims of intimate partner violence] often
had difficulty in parenting their children, which – in some cases –
resulted
in them terminating pregnancies because they could not face bringing
another child into “a nightmare situation” or
their children being
physically removed from them because they were unable to keep them
safe.
In a similar vein, American researcher Evan Stark notes it is
difficult to reconcile long-term abuse and cumulative harm with the
criminal
law’s traditional focus on discrete incidents of violence. He
says:112
Sheer repetition is not the issue. Even though pickpockets, muggers or car
thieves typically commit dozens of similar offenses, because
each harm is
inflicted on a different person, the law is compelled to treat each act as
discrete. But the single most important characteristic
of woman battering is
that the weight of multiple harms is borne by the same person, giving abuse a
cumulative effect that is far
greater than the mere sum of its parts. As British
sociologist Liz Kelly has pointed out in her work on sexual predators, a
victim’s
level of fear derives as much from her perception of what could
happen based on past experience as from the immediate threat by the
perpetrator.
When family violence is understood as a pattern of harm,
misconceptions such as those discussed below can be addressed.
MISCONCEPTION 1:
“ALL HE DID WAS HIT HER NOW AND AGAIN. THE VIOLENCE
WASN’T THAT BAD.”
Family violence is more than just physical assaults. It usually involves a
combination of physical, psychological, emotional, social
and financial
abuse.113 Physical violence is generally only one method of
maintaining power and control in the relationship.
Failing to understand family violence as being more than physical assaults
overlooks the broader dynamics often involved in family
violence, including the
use of coercive control.114 Coercive control operates through the
use of a range of abusive strategies tailored to the unique psychology of the
target, designed
to control the victim even when she is not in the presence of
her abuser.115 Threats of physical violence, for example, are often
as powerful in maintaining control over a victim as actual incidents of
violence,
as once a perpetrator has shown they are capable of carrying out the
threats made, there is no need to resort to physical assaults.116
The often unpredictable nature of abusive outbursts leaves some women in a
state of constant fear for their lives.117
110 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 36.
111 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 79.
112 Stark, above n 69, at 94.
113 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 71; and Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 161.
114 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 71.
115 At 72.
116 At 71.
117 At 71.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 29
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
MISCONCEPTION 2:
“HER FEAR IS IRRATIONAL OR UNREASONABLE.”
International reviews have consistently found that the number one risk factor
for intimate partner homicide is prior family violence.118 This poses
a considerable challenge in objectively assessing the risk of intimate partner
homicide, as only a “tiny proportion”
of men who have been violent
eventually commit homicide, and there is clear empirical evidence to suggest
that, qualitatively, men
who kill their spouses do not differ greatly from those
who use non-lethal violence.119
Instead, the research tells us that a woman’s own appreciation of risk
is the most reliable predictor of her partner’s
future violence towards
her.120 This is because the victim will have become hypervigilant
and attuned to signals of impending violence.121 Primary victims
who misjudge the likelihood of future violence tend to underestimate, rather
than overestimate, the risk of violence.122
Intimate partner violence as a form of entrapment
2.32
2.33
2.34
The FVDRC considers that two assumptions underpin current understanding of victims’
responses:123
. With help, victims can
effectively deal with family violence.
. Help is
readily available to those prepared to seek it.
However, these
assumptions are challenged when intimate partner violence is understood as a
form of social entrapment with three
dimensions:124
.
Social isolation, fear and coercion that the abusive partner creates
through violence.
. The institutional responses to the
victim’s suffering and their attempts to seek
help.125
. The ways in which coercive
control (and indifferent institutional responses to victims
seeking help) can be aggravated by structural inequities of gender, class and racism. The FVDRC argues:126
An entrapment approach requires an investigation in each case of the manner in which a particular
victim’s choices have been constrained by the violence they have
experienced. This includes considering past responses to their
help-seeking and
the larger structural constraints of their lives, including the
118 Jennifer Martin and Rhonda Pritchard Learning from Tragedy: Homicide within Families in New Zealand 2002-2006 (Ministry of Social
Development, April 2010) at 38.
119 At 39, discussing M Aldridge and K Browne “Perpetrators of spousal homicide: a review” (2003) 4 Trauma, Violence and Abuse 265. According to a Report commissioned by the United States National Institute of Justice (USNIJ) in 2005, several studies have examined “escalation” within intimate partner violence and found that, while patterns vary across different types of relationship and different types of violence, increases in the frequency and intensity of domestic violence were common and unpredictable: Alex R Piquero and others Assessing the Offending Activity of Criminal Domestic Violence Suspects: Offense Specialization, Escalation, and De-Escalation Evidence from the Spouse Assault Replication Program (United States National Institute of Justice, NSJ 212298, December 2005). The findings of another study undertaken for the USNIJ similarly “contradicted overgeneralisations about high-risk batterers” who are not “easily ‘typed’ or predicted”: D Alex Heckert and Edward W Gondolf Predicting Abuse and Reassault Among Batterer Program Participants (United States National Institute of Justice, NCJ 199730, 2004) at 50. Findings of these Reports are discussed in Kellie Toole “Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality before the New Victorian Law” [2012] MelbULawRw 7; (2012) 36 MULR 250 at 276–277.
120 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 162.
121 Toole, above n 119, at 276–277.
122 At 276–277.
123 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 37; and Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 11.
124 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 39.
125 The Family Violence Death Review Committee refers to this, at 39–42, as the “indifference of powerful institutions to the victim’s suffering”.
126 At 39.
30 Law Commission Report
2.35
2.36
structural constraints of their families, whanau and communities. It involves
interpreting their behaviour in that context.
This does not involve
assuming all victims’ experiences of or responses to abuse are the same,
nor does it assume victims automatically
possess autonomy and choice or are
deprived of autonomy and choice as a result of being
abused.127
By understanding family violence as a form of
entrapment, the misconceptions identified below and others such as “if a
victim
stays in a relationship or returns to a relationship, the violence
can’t have been that bad or the victim must have been partly
to
blame”128 and “a person’s cultural background or
language is no barrier to accessing help”129 can be
addressed.
MISCONCEPTION 3:
“SHE COULD HAVE JUST LEFT.”
A common assumption is that a primary victim can avoid further violence by
simply leaving the relationship.130 However, the evidence
demonstrates that it is in fact very difficult for primary victims to safely
leave abusive relationships and
that women are most likely to be killed by an
abusive partner in the context of an attempted separation.131 The
FVDRC states that “of the 85 [intimate partner] deaths from
2009–2014, Police records suggested that almost half
took place in a
separation context. Nine of these were planning separations, while 29 had
already separated from the predominant
aggressor.”132 This
trend is consistent with overseas patterns.133 Indeed, some studies
conclude that, following a break-up of a relationship involving intimate partner
violence, the predominant aggressor
stalks, harasses, attacks and sometimes
kills their ex-partner in 75 per cent or more of all
cases.134
127 At 39.
128 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 168.
129 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 37; and Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 165.
130 A 2008 New Zealand survey on individual attitudes, values and beliefs about family violence found that 67 per cent of respondents believed that a woman who is beaten by her partner just needs to leave the relationship to be safe. See McLaren, above n 87, at 14. Australian research in 2013 found nearly eight in 10 people found it hard to understand why a woman would stay in a violent relationship, with more than half agreeing women would leave a violent relationship “if they really wanted to”: VicHealth Australians’ attitudes to violence against women: Findings from the 2013 National Community Attitudes towards Violence Against Women Survey (NCAS) (P-MW-147, 2014) at 12. United States research found two-thirds of people believed that women could exit abusive relationships: Alissa Pollitz Worden and Bonnie E Carlson “Attitudes and Beliefs About Domestic Violence: Results of a Public Opinion Survey: II Beliefs About Causes” (2005) 20 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1219 at
1238.
131 Walter S DeKeseredy, McKenzie Rogness and Martin D Schwartz “Separation/divorce sexual assault: The current state of social scientific knowledge” (2004) 9 Aggression and Violent Behavior 675 at 677.
132 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 22.
133 In the United States and Canada, compared to married women, separated women are 25 times more likely to be assaulted by ex-partners and five times more likely to be murdered: Deborah K Anderson and Daniel G Saunders “Leaving an Abusive Partner: An Empirical Review of Predictors, the Process of Leaving, and Psychological Well-Being” (2003) 4 Trauma, Violence, & Abuse 163 at 179. In Australia, a quarter of intimate partner homicides (1989–2002) occurred between separated, former or divorced couples, with 84 per cent of those victims being women: Jenny Mouzos and Catherine Rushforth “Family Homicide in Australia” (2003) 255 Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1 at 2.
134 Elisabeth McDonald “Defending Abused Women: Beginning A Critique
of New Zealand Criminal Law” (1997) 27 VUWLR 673 at 680–681.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 31
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
MISCONCEPTION 4:
“SHE WAS VIOLENT TOO, SO HER FEAR WAS NOT REAL.”
Some women retaliate and resist coercive control by using violence
themselves, sometimes in an attempt to try and establish a semblance
of parity
in the relationship, other times in violent self- defence, violent retaliation
and violent resistance.135 Primary victims may also use violence
when they sense another attack from the predominant aggressor is about to
occur.136
However, while a predominant aggressor may not be the first party to initiate
violence on any particular occasion, he or she will
use violence more –
and differently – across the relationship as a whole. The primary
victim/predominant aggressor dynamic
is important in assessing culpability for
relationship violence because it takes account of the whole of the relationship,
not just
discrete events.
Social isolation, fear and coercion
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
Coercive control is considered by many to be central to contemporary
understandings of family violence and particularly intimate
partner
violence.137 Stark explains coercive control by separating the
different tactics of “coercion” and
“control”.138
Coercion tactics involve the use of
violence or threats to intimidate or hurt victims and instil fear. Examples
include severe beatings,
sexual violence and acts like strangulation, which has
been described as “the domestic violence equivalent of water
boarding”,139 as well as threats, stalking, destruction of
property and violence against children or pets.140 Coercive behaviour
is apparent in the cases we have reviewed. One expert, cited in the Victorian
Law Reform Commission’s Report
Defences to Homicide, explained the
power of this kind of abuse:141
A commonly reported pattern of abuse is the limited use of physical assaults,
with daily threats of physical abuse and verbal abuse.
The threats of physical
violence are often as powerful in maintaining control over a victim as the
actual incidents of violence.
Once the perpetrator has shown they are capable of
carrying out the threats made, there is no need to resort to physical assaults.
The often unpredictable nature of abusive outbursts leaves some women in a
constant state of fear for their lives.
Control tactics, on the other
hand, are designed to isolate and foster dependence on the abuser and their
lifestyle. They include
deprivation, exploitation and micro-regulation of
everyday life, for example, limiting access to money and food, or controlling
how women dress.142 Together, coercive and control tactics undermine
a victim’s ability for independent decision making and inhibit resistance
and
escape.143
Not all family violence can be explained this
way, but coercive and controlling behaviours are “prototypical” in
intimate
partner violence and help explain why victims stay in
abusive
135 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 74.
136 At 74.
137 See for example the Ministry of Justice’s recent discussion document: Ministry of Justice, above n 63. See also United Kingdom Home Office
Strengthening the Law on Domestic Abuse Consultation – Summary of Responses (December 2014).
138 Discussed in Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 72.
139 Susan B Sorenson, Manisha Joshi and Elizabeth Sivitz “A Systematic Review of the Epidemiology of Nonfatal Strangulation, a Human Rights and Health Concern” (2014) 104(11) Am J Public Health 54 at 57. Strangulation is the subject of another Law Commission Report: Strangulation: The Case for a New Offence (NZLC 138, 2016).
140 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 72.
141 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 161.
142 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 72.
143 At 72.
32 Law Commission Report
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
relationships.144 Further, while coercive control has been
applied and discussed principally in connection with intimate partner violence,
non-intimate
family relationships may also involve behaviours of coercion and
control.145
Stark has said that women with whom he has worked
“[insist] that ‘violence isn’t the worst part’ of the
abuse they experience”.146 In essence, family violence is more
than physical assaults and isolates and entraps victims. The FVDRC states
that:147
[The] nature of coercive control makes it almost impossible for many victims
to remove themselves and their families from an abusive
partner ... The violence
is directed at isolating the victim from potential support and undermining her
self-determination.
Examples of coercive controlling behaviour by the
primary aggressor recorded by the FVDRC include smashing multiple phones so
their
partner is uncontactable and cannot contact others, keeping at least one
child at home every time a partner leaves so the partner
has to return, and
controlling access to friends and relatives.148
These
behaviour types receive little attention in the cases we have reviewed. They
are less obvious than physical assaults and may,
of course, not be reported by
primary victims. The FVDRC cautions that, within a coercive and controlling
environment:149
Many women are hypervigilant in order to manage their and their
children’s safety. Thus, apparent rejections of help or a lack
of response
to service enquiries may be an attempt to maintain their personal safety and
that of their children.
Just as it is important to consider the use of
violence by predominant aggressors within the context of a pattern of harm, the
FVDRC
argues it is also important to think of violence used by primary victims
as resistance to that pattern of harm rather than as an
isolated incident of
aggression.
Institutional responses to victims seeking help
2.45
2.46
Despite the dangers separation poses for primary victims and the coercive
and controlling tactics that may inhibit escape, the
FVDRC records that many
victims go to considerable lengths to try and protect themselves and their
children. They may relocate to
refuges, take out protection orders, or contact
Police, other agencies or family, whānau and friends for
help.150
The FVDRC found in its death reviews that many
victims of family violence were unable to access proper support to achieve
safety,
despite their attempts and the well-meaning efforts of many individuals
working within the family violence system. It notes that
the “reality is
that
144 Stark, above n 69, at 12. See also Evan Stark “Re-presenting Battered Women: Coercive Control and the Defense of Liberty” (paper presented to Violence Against Women: Complex Realities and New Issues in a Changing World, Quebec, Canada, 2012) at 7: “The primary outcome of coercive control is a condition of entrapment that can be hostage-like in the harms it inflicts on dignity, liberty, autonomy and personhood as well as to physical and psychological integrity.”
145 See for example United Kingdom Home Office, above n 137. In a consultation on the proposed enactment of a new offence of domestic abuse to criminalise patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour, the Home Office received submissions on “the importance of any new offence capturing inter-familial abuse as well as intimate partner abuse” and noted, at 9, that, while some respondents considered coercive control is limited to intimate partner relationships, others had submitted it was not and that such behaviours may affect other victims, including the elderly. As enacted, the offence of “controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship” applies both to people in intimate personal relationships and family members who live together: Serious Crime Act 2015 (UK), s 76.
146 Stark, above n 144, at 16.
147 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 35.
148 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 72.
149 At 73.
150 At 80.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 33
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
real help within our current family violence system is sporadic,
unpredictable and frequently not available for
victims”.151
Structural inequities
2.47
The FVDRC cautions that, beyond the dynamics of individual relationships,
wider structures contribute to and support entrapment.152 It observed
that a number of primary victims identified in the regional death reviews had
unaddressed histories of childhood abuse
and trauma and compounding experiences
of victimisation throughout their adult life, which left them extremely
vulnerable.
Primary victims were often grappling with co-occurring issues such
as addiction and mental health, and many were in positions of
extreme economic
disadvantage.153
It states:154
Gender inequity, racism, poverty, social exclusion, disability, heterosexism
and the legacy of colonisation shape people’s experiences
of abuse.
Victims who are in the most dangerous social positions may face higher levels of
violence and have less support and resources
to manage. These victims may well
have extended families and communities that are experiencing intergenerational
trauma as the historical
legacy of colonisation. They are also more likely to
be confronted with discriminatory attitudes when seeking help from services
charged with protecting and/or providing support to them and their
children.
Māori
2.48
2.49
Māori are disproportionately represented in family violence
deaths as both offenders and victims.155 The FVDRC identified
that:156
Māori women are likely to have lower levels of education, be poorer,
live in areas with poor quality housing and have their children
younger.
Māori women are more likely to experience racist attitudes and indifference
when seeking help from agencies and services.
They are also almost six times
more likely to be hospitalised because of assault and attempted homicide, and
1.6 times more likely
to die of assault and homicide. When their children are
harmed, Māori women tend to be socially demonised, evident in the
media’s
“mother blaming”, with little consideration of the
horrific ongoing abuse and violence the women themselves live with.
The
FVDRC considers this is a matter of significant concern and suggests that
“patterns of normalisation of violence”
revealed by the regional
reviews may be “a legacy of colonisation and institutional
racism”.157 It states:158
Violence within Māori whānau (immediate and wider family) cannot be
addressed without considering the impacts of colonisation
on Māori
whānau. The colonising agenda was assimilation of Māori and the
dispossession of their land, language and
cultural practices. The loss of land,
along with the urbanisation of many Māori, disconnected them from their
tūrangawaewae
(place connected with whakapapa to stand) and their cultural
connections. With this disconnection came the loss of the protective
supports
that are inherent in the traditional functioning of whānau, and also the
important cultural beliefs that saw women
and children as valued and protected
members of Māori society.
151 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 42; and Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 13.
152 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 80–81.
153 Alcohol and drug abuse is strongly correlated with family violence in New Zealand, and research demonstrates that alcohol escalates aggressive incidents. See Social Policy Evaluation and Research Unit, above n 67, at 4. Alcohol was identified as a factor in 14 of the 24 cases we identified in which victims of family violence killed their abusers.
154 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 45 (footnote omitted).
155 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 49.
156 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 42–43 (footnote omitted).
157 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 81.
158 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 43 (footnotes
omitted).
34 Law Commission Report
2.50
2.51
These losses, combined with the imperative that Māori conform to
dominant (ie, colonial) cultural traditions, meant the collective
responsibility
and obligation to protect and nurture women and children within whānau and
hapū disappeared. In addition
to structural changes to many whānau,
gender roles that were traditionally complementary and involved men having an
active role
in caring for tamariki were changed. Instead, whānau became the
private domain of men, and male dominance became a feature in
Māori
society. Māori women no longer held equal positions and could not rely on
the protective korowai (cloak) of the wider
whānau. In today’s
society, many Māori men are exposed to, and influenced by, dominant
non-Māori forms of masculinity.
The Ministry of Justice, in
Strengthening New Zealand’s Legislative Response to Family
Violence, also suggests:159
... compounded disadvantage rather than individual risk factors may underlie
the risks of wāhine and tamariki Māori being
victims of family
violence and tāne Māori being apprehended and convicted of a family
violence offence.
The Ministry of Justice also identifies Pacific
people and ethnic migrant communities as experiencing higher rates of intimate
partner violence than the general population.160 These groups can
face distinct socio-economic, cultural and practical barriers that may make it
more difficult to seek help. Other
groups of people identified as being
particularly vulnerable to family violence include older people, who may be at
risk of intimate
partner violence or financial abuse by other family members,
and disabled people, who may rely on others for day-to-day care, increasing
the
risk of family violence.161
Gang association
2.52
2.53
The FVDRC also highlights that gangs are frequently environments where the
members compound and exacerbate traditional assumptions
about women’s
roles and justifications for violence against women.162 Women who
live with gangs are at greater risk of more frequent and severe
violence.163 The FVDRC posits that violence against women and
children in gang cultures is often more frequent and extreme than in other
contexts,
and victims’ fears of retaliation if they leave abusive
relationships may be greater. In its submission on the Issues Paper,
the FVDRC
stated that resistance to a partner’s violence is likely to be impeded and
made more dangerous “due to the
collective tactics of entrapment and
coercion that gang membership can enable”.164 Women may be
abused by other gang members as well as their partner, and fear of gang
retaliatory violence and intimidation are “very
real barriers” to
seeking help or leaving a violent relationship.165
Seven of
the 12 cases the FVDRC identified between 2009 and 2014 in which female primary
victims of intimate partner violence killed
abusive male partners had a gang
element,166 yet in our review of cases since 2001, a gang element
was identified in only one sentencing decision,167 in which that
aspect of the defendant’s background was addressed in expert evidence
filed on
159 Ministry of Justice, above n 63, at 14.
160 At 15.
161 At 15.
162 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 61, at 85.
163 At 85.
164 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 15.
165 At 15.
166 At 19.
167 R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775 at [36].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 35
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
appeal. Some degree of gang association appears also to have been a feature of in three further cases168 although our source of information in those cases is media reports.
IMPROVING UNDERSTANDING OF FAMILY VIOLENCE
2.54
2.55
2.56
2.57
A proper understanding of the dynamics of family violence in the criminal
justice system, based on contemporary social science, is
important to ensure
that victims of family violence who commit homicide are treated equitably before
the law. Put simply, if the
judge or the jury does not understand the social
context of the homicide and the realities of the defendant’s situation,
the
actions of the defendant cannot be accurately assessed.
How family
violence is understood will be relevant to:
. the
prosecutor’s decision to lay the charge;
. how
the prosecutor and defence counsel approach pre-trial plea
discussions;
. if the case goes to trial, how the
prosecutor and defence counsel choose to run their cases,
including the evidence they seek to
introduce;169
. the issues and questions on
which the trial judge directs the jury;
. how juries
assess the credibility of the defendant, their state of mind at the time and, in
the
case of self-defence, the nature of the threat the defendant faced and
whether the defendant’s actions were reasonable in the
circumstances;
and
. if the defendant is convicted, how the judge determines
the appropriate sentence.
In this chapter, we have identified
several ways in which traditional understandings of family violence have
contributed to misconceptions.
These include misconceptions that:
.
family violence is comprised of a series of discrete incidents of
physical violence;
. a victim’s fear of future
violence is irrational or unreasonable;
. a victim can
avoid future violence by simply leaving the relationship; and
.
if a victim was violent as well, their fear was not
real.
A proper understanding of the nature of intimate partner
violence as a pattern of behaviour with a cumulative effect and as a form
of
social entrapment, is necessary to counter these misunderstandings. As the FVDRC
states:170
Attempting to reform the current system while we continue to think about
family violence in exactly the same way will not produce
the kinds of systemic
changes we all want.
168 In relation to R v Brown see “Jail time led to p addiction, a life of crime – and a violent death” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland,
12 January 2010). In relation to R v Keefe see “Jessica Keefe not guilty of murder” (19 September 2013) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>; and “Murder charge unwarranted – lawyer” (21 September 2013) Radio New Zealand < www.radionz.co.nz>. In relation to R v Tagatauli (also known as Amanda Taitapanui) see “Fatal stabbing in the leg leads to rare sentence of home detention” (21 April 2016) Stuff.co.nz
169 We note, as a particularly grave example, the Australian case of R v Kina [1993] QCA 480, discussed in Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 97, at 704–705 and Rebecca Bradfield “Is Near Enough Good Enough? Why Isn’t Self-defence Appropriate for the Battered Woman?” (1998) 5 PPL
71 at 72. Robyn Kina, an Aboriginal woman, stabbed her de facto partner and was convicted of murder after a trial lasting one day. On advice
from her lawyer, she did not give evidence at trial, and her defence was that she had not intended to kill the deceased. It was not until five years later, after spending years speaking to a particular social worker, that her story emerged, one of extreme and sadistic violence at the hands of the deceased. Her conviction was quashed on the grounds that there had been a miscarriage of justice based on the “exceptional difficulties of communication between her legal representatives and the appellant”, and the prosecution exercised its discretion not to proceed with a retrial.
170 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 60, at 13.
36 Law Commission Report
Improving understanding through education
2.58
2.59
2.60
2.61
2.62
As we observe throughout this Report, our review of the cases in which
victims of family violence killed their abusers strongly suggests
the need for
improved understanding of family violence. Discussion of prior abuse is largely
focused on previous incidents of physical
violence. Abusive relationships are
often described as “volatile”,171 or defendants at
times are described as just as violent. Sometimes the significance of tactics of
coercion and control, beyond physical
violence, appear to be missed or
minimised.
The Victorian Royal Commission into Family Violence
recently observed, in relation to introducing new family violence-specific
offences and sentencing provisions:172
Introducing new offences and sentencing provisions often has only a symbolic
effect and does not result in changes in practice. Whatever
laws we have will be
only as effective as those who enforce, prosecute and apply them. Improving
these practices—through education,
training and embedding best practice
and family violence expertise in the courts—is likely to be more effective
than simply
creating new offences.
To ensure the recommendations made in
this Report have more than symbolic effect they must be supported by
improvements in the understanding
of family violence within the criminal
justice system. The importance of supporting legislative reform with measures
to improve
understanding has been emphasised in recent years by law reform
bodies in other jurisdictions, particularly Australia. In their joint
Report,
the Australian and New South Wales Law Reform Commissions recommended
legislative guidance and judicial and legal professional
education and training
focused on improving the application and effectiveness of existing legal
defences in the family violence
context.173 The Victorian Law
Reform Commission made similar recommendations to promote a better
understanding by judges, jurors and legal
representatives of the circumstances
of family violence and the range of ways people might react to it.174
The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia recommended including a
section on the nature and dynamics of family violence in the
judiciary’s
“bench book” to assist judges confronted with social and cultural
issues around family violence.175
Reviews of reforms targeting
the legal response to victims of family violence who kill abusers also
emphasise the need for comprehensive,
consistent and ongoing training within the
criminal justice system.176 Without that training, the potential of
statutory law reform may not be realised.177
In New Zealand,
the Institute of Judicial Studies (IJS) has been active in educating the
judiciary on both the family violence context
and how to spot tell-tale
“red flags” of abuse.178 However, in specific cases,
judges can be limited by the evidence put before them. It is therefore
important
171 For example R v Stone HC Wellington CRI-2005-078-1802, 9 December 2005; R v Tamati HC Tauranga CRI-2009-087-0868, 27 October 2009;
R v Wihongi, above n 167; and R v Woods HC Gisborne CRI-2011-016-000048, 10 June 2011.
172 State of Victoria Royal Commission into Family Violence: Summary and recommendations (Parl Paper No 132, March 2016) at 27.
173 Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission Family Violence — A National Legal Response (ALRC R114 and NSWLRC R128, October 2010) at 649–650.
174 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 71, at 92.
175 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 98, at 295.
176 Tyson and others, above n 101, at 92; Mandy McKenzie, Debbie Kirkwood and Danielle Tyson “‘Unreasonable’ self-defence?” (2013) 2 DVRCV Advocate 12 at 16; and State of Victoria, above n 172, at 57.
177 McKenzie, Kirkwood and Tyson, above n 176, at 15.
178 As part of the Higher Courts Update Programme a full-day seminar was
held on these two specific issues in 2015. Also in 2015,
the three-day District
Court Judges’ Triennial Conference was devoted to family and sexual
violence, the first time in the
history of the District Court Bench that the
entire conference was devoted to a single subject. Judges received education
from psychologists,
community workers, academics and Police.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 37
CHAPTER 2: Understanding family violence
2.63
2.64
2.65
2.66
that prosecutors and defence counsel are also alert to the circumstances in
which family violence will be relevant to criminal offending.
As we
discuss in Chapter 7, expert evidence can educate jurors on the dynamics of
family violence and dispel misconceptions, but this
depends on defence counsel
identifying the need for and significance of such evidence. It also depends on
the availability of family
violence experts and of funding for such expert
evidence. Education of prosecutors is equally important to ensure consistency in
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The role of Police in homicide
trials is primarily investigatory, and the extent to which they identify
relevant family violence
evidence that may be material to the offending is
crucial.
In our view, the FVDRC’s Fifth Report makes a
compelling case for changing how New Zealand understands family violence, and
we recommend that education be available to
all key participants in the criminal
justice system. Such education should focus on the contemporary social science
of family violence
and the importance of identifying and dispelling
misconceptions that have arisen previously and remain evident
today.
These recommendations are intended to support and promote a change
in how we think about family violence. We hope this will remove
barriers that
result from persisting misconceptions and contribute to the achievement of
substantive equality before the law for
victims of family violence who commit
homicide.
RECOMMENDATIONS
R1 Judges should continue to receive education, including through the Institute of Judicial Legal
Studies, on the dynamics of family violence.
R2 Regular and ongoing education courses on the dynamics of family
violence should be made available to all criminal lawyers, including
Crown
prosecutors and defence counsel.
R3 Police should receive regular education on the dynamics of
family violence.
R4 Education recommended above should:
· reflect contemporary social science understanding of family violence and victims’
responses;
· explain the primary victim/predominant aggressor analysis in intimate partner violence;
and
· identify common misconceptions of family violence that
persist today, and their implications in the criminal justice
system.
38 Law Commission Report
Chapter 3
The legal context
INTRODUCTION
3.1
3.2
3.3
Homicide is the killing of a human being by another. Culpable homicide, which
is the unlawful killing of a human being by another,
is regarded as the most
serious kind of criminal conduct. Andrew Ashworth writes that this is
because:179
The harm caused by homicide is absolutely irremediable, whereas the harm
caused by many other crimes is remediable to a degree. Even
in crimes of
violence which leave some permanent physical disfigurement or psychological
effects, the victim retains his or her life
and, therefore, the possibility of
further pleasures and achievements, whereas death is final. This finality makes
it proper to regard
death as the most serious harm that may be inflicted on
another person, and to regard the culpable causing of death without
justification
or excuse as the highest wrong.
There are different forms
of culpable homicide, and the law of homicide is complex. This is in part a
reflection of the seriousness
of the crimes and in part a legacy of the
sentencing rules for murder. We discuss these features of homicide throughout
this Report
and particularly in Part 3.
In this chapter, we introduce the
law of homicide and the justice process to which people accused of homicide are
subject. We also
introduce the homicide cases we have reviewed where victims of
family violence have killed abusers. We have identified 24 New Zealand
cases in
this category over a 15-year period. This is a small sample but some trends are
identifiable. We note those trends in the
second part of this chapter and
consider them in greater depth in Chapter 9.
HOMICIDE LAW
3.4
To be an offence, homicide must be “culpable”, that is,
blameworthy according to law. Different legal systems criminalise
homicide in
different ways. Most jurisdictions comparable to New Zealand have a two-tier
division of murder and manslaughter,180 and beyond this basic
division, there are some lesser related offences that we discuss
below.
179 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 237.
180 Or an offence like culpable homicide, which is the equivalent of
manslaughter in some common law jurisdictions, including Scotland.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 39
CHAPTER 3: The legal context
3.5
In New Zealand, culpable homicide is defined by section 160 of the Crimes Act
1961:
160 Culpable homicide
(1)
(2)
Homicide may be either culpable or not culpable.
Homicide is
culpable when it consists in the killing of any person—
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e)
by an unlawful act; or
by an omission without lawful excuse to perform
or observe any legal duty; or by both combined; or
by causing that person by
threats or fear of violence, or by deception, to do an act which causes his or
her death; or
by wilfully frightening a child under the age of 16
years or a sick person.
(3)
(4)
Except as provided in section 178, culpable homicide is either murder or
manslaughter.
Homicide that is not culpable is not an
offence.
The origins of murder and manslaughter
3.6
3.7
Under the ancient common law of England, only homicides caused in the
enforcement of justice (such as execution of a death sentence)
were lawful. All
others were punishable by death unless the offender received a royal pardon
because the homicide was “without
felony” and, therefore, excusable.
While “murder” came to describe more serious homicides, that had
little practical
importance because every felonious killing attracted the same
penalty.181 A sentence of death could, however, be avoided if the
offender received the “benefit of clergy”, which transferred the
case to the ecclesiastical court, which never imposed the death penalty. This
was a device to alleviate the harshness of the uniform
penalty for
homicide.182
Over time, the benefit of clergy was expanded,
and in the 15th and early 16th centuries, a series of statutes excluded certain
particularly
serious killings (referred to as murder with “malice
aforethought”) from its scope. The result was a division of culpable
homicide into two categories. Killings with malice aforethought were called
“murder” and punished by death, while killings
without malice
aforethought were punished by a brand and imprisonment for not more than a year.
“Manslaughter” was the
word adopted to describe this lesser form of
culpable homicide.183
The modern distinction between murder and
manslaughter
3.8
The distinction between murder and manslaughter endures. Murder remains the
most serious form of culpable homicide, although in few
jurisdictions is it
still punishable by death. In New Zealand, murder is defined by sections 167
and 168 of the Crimes Act 1961.
Section 167 provides as
follows:184
181 Rollin M Perkins “A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought” (1934) 43 Yale LJ 537 at 539–541. See also New South Wales Law Reform
Commission Partial Defences to Murder: Diminished Responsibility (Report 82, 1997) at n 1.
182 Perkins, above n 181, at 539–541.
183 At 540–544.
184 Section 168 of the Crimes Act 1961, which provides a further definition
of murder, derives from the common law “felony
murder” rule. It
provides that, in certain situations where an offender does not mean to cause
death or know that death is
likely to follow but does one of a number of
specified acts for the purposes of facilitating one of a number of specified
criminal
offences and death results, it will also amount to murder. This
provision is not relevant for the purposes of our case review.
40 Law Commission Report
167 Murder defined
Culpable homicide is murder in each of the following
cases:
(a) (b)
(c)
(d)
if the offender means to cause the death of the person killed:
if the
offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury that is known to
the offender to be likely to cause death, and
is reckless whether death ensues
or not:
if the offender means to cause death, or, being so reckless as
aforesaid, means to cause such bodily injury as aforesaid to one person,
and by
accident or mistake kills another person, though he or she does not mean to hurt
the person killed:
if the offender for any unlawful object does an act
that he or she knows to be likely to cause death, and thereby kills any person,
though he or she may have desired that his or her object should be effected
without hurting any one.
3.9
3.10
Manslaughter is culpable homicide that is not murder or some other specific
form of homicide. In New Zealand, manslaughter is culpable
homicide that does
not amount to murder or infanticide.185 This includes all
instances when death is caused by an unlawful act but there is no murderous
intent.
In jurisdictions with “partial defences”,
manslaughter also includes homicides that meet the requirements of the defence.
Partial defences, which we discuss in detail in Part 3, avert murder
convictions by partially excusing, and categorising as manslaughter,
intentional killings committed in certain mitigating circumstances. This form of
manslaughter is often referred to as “voluntary
manslaughter”
because it involves killing with the intent for murder and is categorised as
a different form of homicide
only because a partial defence
applies.186
Other homicide offences
3.11
As well as murder and manslaughter, the law includes some lesser and
overlapping specific homicide offences. In New Zealand, the third
form of
culpable homicide is infanticide.187 Other specific offences (which
fall outside the definition of “culpable homicide” but overlap with
the conduct captured
by manslaughter) include driving offences causing
death.188
Homicide prosecutions
3.12
3.13
Among the issues we consider in this Report is how prosecutors decide what
charges to lay when victims of family violence kill their
abusers and, where
charges are laid, how these defendants are convicted. We consider these issues
in Part 3, but note some key points
here.
Charging is governed by the
Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines and a person may be
charged if the “evidential” and “public interest” tests
for prosecution are met. The
evidential test requires credible evidence upon
which a jury could “reasonably be expected to be
satisfied
185 Crimes Act 1961, s 171.
186 Law Commission of England and Wales Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 2006) at 4.
187 Infanticide is provided for by s 178 of the Crimes Act 1961, subs (1) of which states: “Where a woman causes the death of any child of hers under the age of 10 years in a manner that amounts to culpable homicide, and where at the time of the offence the balance of her mind was disturbed, by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to that or any other child, or by reason of the effect of lactation, or by reason of any disorder consequent upon childbirth or lactation, to such an extent that she should not be held fully responsible, she is guilty of infanticide, and not of murder or manslaughter, and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 years.” Infanticide is a form of diminished responsibility and has a dual role as an offence and a defence. The role performed in any given case affects the burden of proof. If a person is charged with infanticide, the prosecution must prove all elements beyond reasonable doubt, but if a person is charged with murder or manslaughter, she will be entitled to a finding of infanticide if there is a sufficient evidential foundation for it that leaves the jury with a reasonable doubt. See AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at
591.
188 Land Transport Act 1998, ss 7, 8, 36AA, 38 and 39.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 41
CHAPTER 3: The legal context
3.14
3.15
3.16
beyond reasonable doubt” that the defendant committed the
offence.189 The public interest test invites consideration of whether
prosecution is required in the public interest. This test is likely to be
met in
most homicide cases, given the value placed on human life. The
Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines include the overarching
principle that the nature and number of charges should adequately reflect the
criminality of the defendant’s
conduct.190
Murder and
manslaughter may be charged in the alternative, and manslaughter is usually
included as a lesser offence when a person
is charged with murder. This means
that, if there is an evidential basis for manslaughter, a jury may convict of
that offence, even
if the defendant is charged only with murder.191
This is a feature of homicide law to which we return in Part 3.
In
any criminal case, a defendant may discuss with the prosecution the possibility
of the charge being amended. The Solicitor-General’s Prosecution
Guidelines permit principled plea discussions and arrangements in which a
defendant may agree to plead guilty to a lesser charge instead of defending
the
more serious charge. Such arrangements can reduce the burden on victims, save
time and resources and provide a forum for a defendant
to accept responsibility
for criminal conduct.192 The Solicitor-General must approve all plea
arrangements in relation to murder charges.193
If a defendant
is charged with a homicide offence and goes to trial, the case will almost
always be heard by a jury in the High Court.194 The jury is the
fact-finder, but a judge will preside and sit through the entire trial, deal
with questions of law and hear the same
evidence as the jury. The judge will
summarise the case at the end of the trial and direct the jury on the law. The
prosecution
must prove each element of the offence and the absence of any
relevant defence beyond reasonable doubt.195 If the elements of an
offence are not proved or any defence not excluded to this standard, the
defendant must be acquitted of the
offence charged, although in homicide cases
where manslaughter is an alternative or included offence, a jury may acquit of
murder
but convict of manslaughter.
Capacity for criminal conduct and defences
3.17
In addition to the evidence of offending, a prosecutor considering whether to
pursue a criminal charge must consider the prospective
defendant’s
capacity for criminal conduct. The most relevant example of capacity is
“infancy”, which means a
person is under the age of criminal
responsibility.196 In New Zealand, no person under the age of 10
years may be convicted of an offence.197 The law also restricts the
situations in which children under the age of 14 may be charged with criminal
offending. One situation
where a charge may be laid is “where the child is
of or over the age of 10 years, and the offence is murder or
manslaughter”.198 We have
189 Crown Law Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines (2013) at 6.
190 At [8.1].
191 R v Tavete [1988] 1 NZLR 428 (CA); and Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 110.
192 Crown Law, above n 189, at [18.1].
193 At [18.9].
194 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, ss 74 and 103. Some criminal charges may be tried before a judge without a jury, but in New Zealand murder and manslaughter must be tried before a jury other than in cases of juror intimidation.
195 Some crimes, however, have inbuilt defences that put an onus of proof on the defendant. See for example Crimes Act 1961, s 134A (defence to charge of sexual conduct with young person under 16); s 124(2) (defence to charge of distribution or exhibition of indecent matter); s 124A(3) (defence to indecent communication with a young person under 16); and s 125(2) (defence to indecent act in a public place). See also Simester and Brookbanks, above n 187, at 39.
196 Another potentially relevant instance of capacity is insanity. Insanity is commonly characterised as a defence but may be better conceptualised as an instance of legal incapacity. See Simester and Brookbanks, above n 187, at 316. If a judge or jury finds a person accused of a criminal offence insane, the defendant will be acquitted on that basis and then subject to the range of detention orders provided for by the relevant legislation, the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003.
197 Crimes Act 1961, s 22.
198 Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s
272(1)(a).
42 Law Commission Report
3.18
3.19
3.20
reviewed no homicides by victims of family violence in this age range or
below the age of capacity, although we have identified two
cases of homicide by
young people.199
Assuming a charge is not precluded on grounds
of capacity, a prosecutor considering whether to pursue a charge must also
anticipate
and evaluate likely defences.200 Defences are provided
for in statutes like the Crimes Act and in “common law” principles
that have developed through the
courts.201 A defendant who contests
a charge at trial202 may also rely on a relevant defence, although
in some cases, a judge may withhold a defence from the jury. We discuss this
issue in
connection with self-defence in Part 2.
Some defences, including
self-defence, may be described as “justifications”, while others,
like compulsion, are described
as “excuses”.203
Justifications effectively claim a defendant acted acceptably and so did
not commit a crime. For this reason, they are sometimes also
called
“permissions”.204 Because a person who can rely on a
justification is not guilty of a crime, these defences “involve judgments
about the situation
which apply to all participants”.205 To
say a person was justified in acting in self-defence means they were right to
use the force they did and others would have been
wrong to intervene. Excusatory
defences are more restrictive. They acknowledge that, in certain circumstances,
a person should not
be subject to the full extent of the penalties of the
criminal law because their actions were understandable. Partial defences to
murder are generally considered to be partial excuses, although they may have
justificatory elements.206
HLA Hart explained the difference
between justificatory and excusatory defences in this way:207
In the case of “justification” what is done is considered as
something that the law does not condemn or even welcomes.
But when the killing
... is excused, the criminal responsibility is excluded on a different footing.
What has been done is something,
which is deplored, but the psychological
state of the agent when he did it exemplifies one or more of a variety of
conditions,
which are held to rule out the public condemnation and punishment of
individuals. This is a requirement of fairness or of justice
to
individuals.
Homicide penalties and sentencing
3.21
For most crime, sentencing is an opportunity for the court to consider a
person’s particular culpability. Matters judges must
generally consider
include “the gravity of the offending in the particular case, including
the degree of culpability of the
offender” and “the seriousness of
the type of offence in comparison with other types of offences”.208
The principles of sentencing provide that the maximum penalty for an
offence is for the most serious cases,209 and the
court
199 R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA); and R v Raivaru HC Rotorua CRI-2004-077-1667, 5 August 2005.
200 Crown Law, above n 189, at 7.
201 Section 20 of the Crimes Act 1961 expressly preserves as part of New Zealand law all “rules and principles of the common law which render any circumstances a justification or excuse for any act or omission, or a defence to any charge”.
202 Not all charges are contested. A person charged with an offence may enter a plea – of guilty or not guilty – before trial: Criminal Procedure Act
2011, pt 3, subpt 1.
203 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 187, at 11–12.
204 See for example Jeremy Horder Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 200.
205 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 187, at 12.
206 On the justificatory elements of the partial defence of provocation, see Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, 2007).
207 HLA Hart Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968) at 13–14.
208 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8.
209 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8(c). See also R v Xie [2006] NZCA 201; [2007] 2 NZLR 240
(CA) at [26].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 43
CHAPTER 3: The legal context
should impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate in the
circumstances.210 Thus, sentencing permits fine-tuned
offender-specific assessments of culpability.211
The legacy of a mandatory sentence for murder
3.22
Historically, homicide has been exceptional among criminal offences because
murder has attracted a mandatory sentence. While the
maximum penalty for murder
is now generally life imprisonment rather than death, in many countries that
sentence is compulsory and
judges have no discretion to depart from it, even
where there are extenuating circumstances. This has led to the development of
unique
mechanisms for recognising reduced culpability for homicide, including
partial defences. As we discuss in Chapter 10, however, in
jurisdictions where
judges have discretion in murder sentencing, there is a less compelling case
for such mechanisms.212
Homicide sentencing in New Zealand
3.23
3.24
Mandatory murder sentencing was abolished in New Zealand in 2002. Other than
in cases captured by the “three strikes”
regime,213 life
imprisonment is now the maximum, but not a compulsory, penalty. There is,
however, a strong presumption in favour of life imprisonment,
rebuttable only
if the court considers that sentence would be “manifestly
unjust”.214 For manslaughter, there is no presumptive
sentence. As the least blameworthy form of culpable homicide, infanticide has a
maximum
penalty of three years’ imprisonment. These differences in penalty
signal that some cases are more serious than others, and
particular categories
of unlawful killing warrant significant
leniency.215
Sentencing for homicide, as for other offences
tried before a jury, is usually conducted by the trial judge who heard the
evidence
and legal arguments – unless the defendant pleaded guilty before
trial.216 Whether sentencing follows a conviction after trial or a
guilty plea, the prosecution and the defendant may make submissions and
can seek
to present further evidence. The judge will take into account an
offender’s prospects for rehabilitation and
risk of reoffending,
usually on the basis of a pre-sentence report and any reports by professionals
such as psychologists or psychiatrists.217 The judge will also
consider victim impact statements, which, in homicide cases, will be from
immediate family members of the victim.218 We discuss some
sentencing issues in Chapter 11.
210 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8(g).
211 Nicola Lacey “Partial Defences to Homicide: Questions of Power and Principle in Imperfect and Less Imperfect Worlds ...” in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds) Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 107 at 108. See also Paul Robinson Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) at ch 6.
212 Indeed, it is notable that, among comparable jurisdictions, only three that have discretionary sentencing for murder (New South Wales, Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory) also have partial defences. Other jurisdictions that retain partial defences (England and Wales, Canada and Ireland, as well as Queensland, Northern Territory and South Australia) also have mandatory murder sentencing.
213 The “three strikes” regime, which is provided for by ss 86A–86I of the Sentencing Act 2002, significantly curbs sentencing discretion for violent offences, including murder and manslaughter. We discuss this regime, and its implications for victims of family violence who commit homicide, in Chapter 11.
214 Sentencing Act 2002, s 102.
215 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 187, at 590, discussing infanticide.
216 A defendant who is considering whether to plead guilty may seek a sentence indication before deciding whether to do so. A sentence indication is a statement by the court that, if the defendant pleads guilty, the court would or would not impose a sentence of a particular type and/or length: Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 61. Sentence indications give defendants clarity and certainty about the jeopardy they face if they plead guilty: Taylor v R [2013] NZCA 55 at [17].
217 Sentencing Act 2002, s 26.
218 Victims’ Rights Act 2002, s 17AA. Section 4 of that Act defines
“victim” to include “a member of the
immediate family of a
person who, as a result of an offence committed by another person, dies or is
incapable, unless that member
is charged with the commission of, or convicted or
found guilty of, or pleads guilty to, the offence concerned”.
44 Law Commission Report
SUMMARY OF OUR CASE REVIEW
3.25
3.26
In Chapter 9, we review how the criminal justice system has responded, on a
case-by-case basis, to victims of family violence who
have killed their abusers.
We focus on cases in which the homicide was not accepted by the court or the
jury to have been committed
in self-defence.
In the remaining part of
this chapter, we highlight some aspects of this case review, which includes
acquittals, convictions for manslaughter
and convictions for murder. Although we
consider the cases in detail later, we summarise key features here because
they provide
important background to why our package of recommended reforms is
focused on education about family violence, self-defence and sentencing.
A note on methodology
3.27
3.28
Although our case review captured a 15-year period, we have identified only
24 cases. This makes it difficult to draw definitive
conclusions about the
existence or extent of issues or problems in practice.219
Individual cases can also have a disproportionate effect on the
impression of overall trends.220
Our review has, however, not
been an attempt to scientifically discern trends. We have largely relied on
reported court decisions
and, in some cases, media reports. We have identified
cases through news databases for reports on trial outcomes and legal databases
for sentencing notes, trial rulings and appeal decisions. Given this
project’s time constraints, we have not done a full audit
of all relevant
homicides, nor have we reviewed Crown prosecutor or defence files, or spoken
with the defendants, counsel or judges
involved in all cases. We therefore
cannot be certain we have identified all relevant cases. We may have missed
unreported decisions
and homicides for which no charges were laid.
Case outcomes
3.29
Since 2001,221 at least 24 victims of family violence have
been prosecuted for killing an abuser or suspected abuser.222 With
one exception,223 the cases were summarised in the Issues
Paper.224
Convictions
3.30
As set out in the table below, across the cases we have reviewed, four
defendants were acquitted and 20 were convicted of murder or
manslaughter. Three
of the four defendants who were acquitted relied on
self-defence.
219 The limitations involved in analysing a case sample on the basis of public records, and where case outcomes are multi-factorial, was also noted by a leading New Zealand commentator who recently considered the effects of the abolition of partial defence of provocation on battered defendants: Julia Tolmie “Defending Battered Defendants on Homicide Charges in New Zealand: The Impact of Abolishing the Partial Defences to Murder” [2015] NZ L Rev 649 at n 4.
220 A number of variables are also unknown. These include the grounds on which the Crown decided in any given case to lay or amend particular charges, the content of plea discussions, the reasons for guilty pleas, the reasons for verdicts and the primary evidence on which juries and judges reached verdicts and sentencing decisions.
221 The year the Law Commission published its Report Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001).
222 We are aware of two further relevant cases that we have not addressed in this Report. In one, the defendant was found unfit to stand trial and so the prosecution was not seen through to completion (whether by a guilty plea or finding of guilt after trial). We understand the details of that case may also be subject to ongoing suppression. In the other, the defendant, Daryl Kirk, was charged with the murder of her mother’s partner. She claimed self-defence, but was found guilty of manslaughter shortly before the publication of this Report. She has yet to be sentenced. In these circumstances, we have excluded these two cases from our review.
223 The 24th case, of which we became aware after the Issues Paper was published, is R v Tagatauli. In 2015, Ms Tagatauli (also known as Amanda Taitapanui) was charged with the murder of her partner, Mura Tagatauli, after she stabbed him in the leg, severing his femoral artery. The charge was, however, subsequently amended to manslaughter, to which she pleaded guilty. She was sentenced on 21 April 2016 to 12 months’ home detention. See “Fatal stabbing in the leg leads to rare sentence of home detention” (21 April 2016) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.
224 Law Commission Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide
(NZLC IP39 2015) at 124–131.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 45
CHAPTER 3: The legal context
DISPOSAL OF CHARGES
Original charge Guilty plea to murder Guilty plea to manslaughter Charges
defended at trial
Murder (n=19) 1 4 14
Manslaughter (n=5) - 3 2
TOTAL (n=24) 1 7 16
TRIAL RESULTS
Original charge Acquittal Convicted of murder Convicted of
manslaughter
Murder (n=14) 3 3 8225
Manslaughter (n=2) 1 - 1
TOTAL (n=16) 4 3 9
Sentences
3.31
Among those convicted, sentences ranged from life imprisonment with
10-year minimum periods of imprisonment for murder226 to a suspended
sentence of imprisonment in one of the manslaughter cases.227 Among
the four murder convictions, in only the most recent two – R v
Wihongi228 and R v Rihia229 – was the
presumption of life imprisonment displaced. For this reason, those cases are
particularly significant, and while
they are discussed throughout this Report,
it is convenient to note their facts and disposition here:
.
Wihongi: after a trial, Ms Wihongi was convicted of the murder
of a man with whom she
had been in a relationship. For years before the homicide, she had suffered
physical and sexual violence from the deceased and others.230 She was
also cognitively impaired after an overdose at age 13, and her ability to make
judgements and reason and plan was in the low
to borderline range. She displayed
“residual, complex features of post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety
and depression
dating from the rapes and home invasion”.231
Initially, she was sentenced to a finite term of eight years’
imprisonment, the trial Judge having found it would be manifestly
unjust to
impose life imprisonment.232 On appeal by the Solicitor-General and
in receipt of fresh evidence about Ms Wihongi’s future risk of violent
reoffending, the
Court of Appeal concluded a longer finite term of 12
years’ imprisonment was required.233 Having considered the
legislative history of section 102 of the Sentencing Act and Ms Wihongi’s
status as a “battered
defendant”, however, the Court of Appeal did
not depart from the High
225 In R v Fairburn, the defendant was initially convicted of murder, but on appeal, the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered: R v Fairburn HC New Plymouth CRI-2008-043-931, 3 March 2009 [Fairburn (HC)]; Fairburn v R [2010] NZCA 44 [Fairburn (CA)]; and Fairburn v R [2010] NZSC 159, [2011] 2 NZLR 63. After the second trial, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter: R v Fairburn [2012] NZHC 28. For the purposes of this analysis, we treat this case as a manslaughter conviction.
226 R v Reti HC Whangarei CRI-2007-027-2103, 9 December 2008 [Reti (HC)] and R v Reti [2009] NZCA 271; and R v Neale HC Auckland
CRI-2007-004-3059, 12 June 2009 and Neale v R [2010] NZCA 167.
227 R v Erstich, above n 199.
228 R v Wihongi HC Napier CRI-2009-041-2096, 30 August 2010 [Wihongi (HC)]; R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775 [Wihongi
(CA)]; and R v Wihongi [2012] NZSC 12 [Wihongi (SC)].
229 R v Rihia [2012] NZHC 2720.
230 At the age of 14 Ms Wihongi was sexually abused by a drug and alcohol counsellor, and around the same time, she had been prostituted for drugs and money by the older brother of the deceased. The violence she suffered over the years included gang rape and a home invasion that saw her scarred from an assault with a bottle: Wihongi (HC), above n 228, at [19]–[20].
231 At [19]–[22].
232 Per Sentencing Act 2002, s 102.
233 This was in part for reasons of community protection and Ms
Wihongi’s future risk (about which the Court of Appeal had
received fresh
evidence) and in part to meet the sentencing purposes of denunciation and
deterrence: Wihongi (CA), above n 228, at [98].
46 Law Commission Report
Court Judge’s assessment that life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust.234 Ms Wihongi was declined leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.235
. Rihia: some 11 months after the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wihongi, Ms Rihia was
sentenced for the murder of her estranged husband, having pleaded guilty to that charge.
236 As in Wihongi, and with reference to “the
similarities” of that case, the High Court Judge found it would be
manifestly unjust to
impose a life sentence and that the appropriate response
was a finite term of 10 years’ imprisonment. 237 Among other
matters, the Judge was satisfied that Ms Rihia “would not have stabbed Mr
Rihia to death had it not been for the
significant mental impairment [she]
suffer[ed] through years of alcohol abuse and physical abuse most recently,
until [she] parted
with him, at the hands of Mr Rihia himself”. 238
There was no appeal against sentence.
The partial defence of provocation
3.32
3.33
3.34
The outcomes of the cases we have reviewed can be further broken down into
offending committed before and after repeal of the partial
defence of
provocation in December 2009. In
14 of the 24 cases, the offending took place
pre-repeal and so provocation was available. In the remaining 10 cases, the
offending
post-dated repeal. Provocation may, of course, have been unavailable
on the facts of any given case.
Among the 14 cases in the pre-repeal
group, 10 defendants were tried for murder, and provocation was relied on by
five. In three
of the five cases, the defendants were convicted of manslaughter,
and in the other two, the verdicts were murder. Defendants in the
pre-repeal
group pleaded guilty to manslaughter in four cases, but the original charge was
murder in only one of those cases. In
none of the pre-repeal cases was a
defendant tried for manslaughter.
Among the 10 post-repeal cases, four
defendants were tried for murder, but none was convicted of murder.239
The only murder conviction, R v Rihia, resulted from a guilty
plea. Two defendants were charged with and tried for manslaughter, and another
three pleaded guilty to
manslaughter. In one of the cases that went to trial
for manslaughter, the defendant was ultimately acquitted.240 In
Chapters 9 and 11, we consider whether repeal of provocation has made a
difference to case outcomes for victims of family violence
who commit homicide
but, as we note at the end of this chapter, there is no clear empirical basis to
conclude it has.241
A complex range of circumstances
3.35
In R v Woods,242 one of the cases we reviewed that
involved an initial charge of murder, that was resolved by a guilty plea to
manslaughter, the sentencing
Judge, Potter J, remarked
upon
234 Wihongi (CA), above n 228, at [94].
235 Wihongi (SC), above n 228.
236 R v Rihia, above n 229.
237 At [25]–[33]. The 10-year term was calculated from a 12-year starting point (by reference to Wihongi), with a two-year discount to recognise
Ms Rihia’s guilty plea.
238 At [28].
239 Of the four cases that went to trial for murder, two were convicted of manslaughter and the other two were acquitted.
240 R v Gerbes. See “Hung jury in manslaughter trial” (13 February 2014) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>; and Tracey Chatterton “Accused ‘just needed to call out’” (12 February 2014) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.
241 At least in terms of conviction outcomes, this is consistent with Julia Tolmie’s conclusion that the repeal of provocation “has not shifted the fact that the majority of battered defendants are still convicted of manslaughter”: Tolmie, above n 219, at 663.
242 R v Woods HC Gisborne CRI-2011-016-000048, 10 June 2011 at
[27].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 47
CHAPTER 3: The legal context
the “striking similarity” of a number of previous manslaughter
cases that counsel had cited to the Court for Ms Woods’
sentencing.243 In each case:
3.36
3.37
... the offender is female, had been in a volatile relationship with the
deceased, had been involved in a domestic dispute immediately
preceding the
stabbing, was under the influence of alcohol, had been the subject of abuse from
the deceased immediately prior to
the stabbing (except perhaps in the case of
Brown), and had used a kitchen knife to stab the deceased with death
being an unintended result. In all these cases the women involved
had difficult
childhoods, had children, and in most cases had only minor previous
convictions.
There are, as Potter J observed, common features among the
cases we have reviewed. Most defendants were female, and had killed their
abusive male partners. Most of the fatal weapons were kitchen knives or other
readily available instruments. Most of the homicides
occurred in the context of
a confrontation, and most of the deceased abusers had recently been violent
towards the defendant or intimated
they would be.
A number of defendants
endured years of violence and abuse before the homicides, often from other
people as well as the deceased.
In R v Reti, for example, the Court
acknowledged the defendant’s “difficult and miserable life”
and “appalling history
of childhood physical and sexual
abuse”.244 Terrible personal histories beyond the abusive
relationship were also recounted in R v Fairburn,245R v
Wihongi,246R v Hu,247 R v
Stone,248 R v Brown,249R v
Woods250 and R v Rihia.251 As well as
complex abuse histories, many defendants had mental health and alcohol problems,
ranging from a lack of “normal
coping mechanisms”,252 to
depression,253 post-traumatic stress disorder,254
self-harming and borderline personality traits,255 genetic
pre- disposition to alcoholism,256 and cognitive impairment.257
These cases bear out observations by the Family Violence Death Review
Committee (FVDRC) on intergenerational family violence and “compounding
trauma”.258
243 Each of the cases to which Potter J was referred is included in our review: R v Brown HC Napier CRI-2008-020-3130, 24 November 2009; R v Mahari HC Rotorua CRI-2006-070-8179, 14 November 2007; R v Stone HC Wellington CRI-2005-078-1802, 9 December 2005; and R v Tamati HC Tauranga CRI-2009-087-0868, 27 October 2009.
244 Reti (HC), above n 226, at [5]–[6].
245 Fairburn (HC), above n 225, at [10]. The Judge recorded that Ms Fairburn had “a long history as a victim of both sexual and physical abuse dating back to [her] childhood” and that the deceased was abusive towards her.
246 Wihongi (HC), above n 228, at [19]–[26]. As noted above at [3.31(a)], Ms Wihongi was sexually abused at age 14 and prostituted for drugs and money by the deceased’s older brother from the age of 14 or 15. She had been gang raped and subjected to home invasion in the course of which she was injured and scarred. She had cognitive deficits from a drug overdose at age 13 and “residual, complex features of post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety and depression dating from the rapes and home invasion”: Wihongi (CA), above n 228, at [18]–[22].
247 R v Hu [2012] NZHC 54 at [7]. Ms Hu’s pre-sentence and psychiatrist’s reports painted a “bleak picture of [her] life so far”, Ms Hu having
“described sexual and physical abuse as a child and young woman” in China, drug use and chronic depressive disorder.
248 R v Stone, above n 243, at [5]. Ms Stone described her upbringing as “been shocking and [she] recollect[ed] violence from [her] mother and apparently an alcoholic step-father. There were constant changes of school. On the one estimate 11 primary schools, in part suggested so that the abuse of [her] could not be detected.”
249 R v Brown, above 243, at [12]. Ms Brown, the Court noted, had a “disturbed and disrupted upbringing”.
250 R v Woods, above n 242, at [11]. Ms Woods grew up with “frequent domestic violence by her father against her mother”.
251 R v Rihia, above n 229, at [18]–[28]. The sentencing Judge recorded Ms Rihia had a “longstanding history of violence”, and “[t]here was much violence and alcohol abuse in [her] past before [she] met Mr Rihia. [Her] parents were both alcoholics and it was [her] father’s violence towards [her] which required [her] removal as a child to the care of [her] grandparents.” Ms Rihia had “abused” alcohol since secondary school and her first marriage (not to the deceased) had also been violent. She had “significant mental impairment ... through years of alcohol abuse and physical abuse most recently, until [she] parted with him, at the hands of Mr Rihia himself”.
252 R v Erstich, above n 199.
253 R v Hu, above n 247.
254 Reti (HC), above n 226; Wihongi (HC), above n 228; and R v Rakete [2013] NZHC 1230.
255 Fairburn (CA), above n 225.
256 R v Stone, above n 243, at [6].
257 Wihongi (HC), above n 228; and R v Rihia, above n 229.
258 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fifth Report: January 2014 to
December 2015 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, February 2016) at 51
and 55. The Committee records, at 55, findings from the Adverse Childhood
Experiences study that “exposure to family violence during childhood
heightens the risk of intergenerational violence, with
girls more likely to
become victims and boys more likely to perpetrate [intimate partner violence] as
adults” (footnotes omitted).
48 Law Commission Report
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
Not all cases, however, mention the presence of significant trauma
outside the abusive relationship that resulted in the homicide.
The defendant in
R v Wickham, for example, suffered from multiple sclerosis and had a
violent and controlling husband, but the Court did not record other sources
of
abuse, and Ms Wickham was acknowledged to have a “widespread network of
people who care[d] greatly for [her]”.259
The emotions
or psychological states of the defendants at the time of the homicides seem
also to vary (as far as we can tell from
the record). In some cases, the
evidence suggests the defendant was acting primarily defensively,260
while in others, the courts record feelings of fear, anger or other
distress – or combinations of a number of emotions.261 In all
cases we reviewed, however, the defendant’s lethal force was in some way a
response to or explained by abuse the defendant
had suffered at the hands of the
deceased.
It may be problematic to attempt bright-line distinctions
between defensive and non-defensive reactions in cases of this kind. In
a
submission to the Law Commission of England and Wales on reformulation of the
partial defence of provocation to accommodate both
provoked and fear- based
reactions, the Royal College of Psychiatrists cautioned against the assumption
that “the two emotions
of anger and fear are distinct”,
when:262
... in medical reality they are not. Physiologically anger and fear are
virtually identical, whilst many mental states that accompany
killing also
incorporate psychologically both anger and fear. Hence, the abused woman who
kills in response even to an immediate
severe threat will also be driven at
least partly by anger ... Again, the woman who waits until the man is
‘helpless’
to kill him, is likely not merely to be angry but also
fearful that eventually he will kill her, and/or her children ... Any legal
solution to the current perceived problems with partial defences to murder which
rested upon the assumption that fear and anger can
(even usually) be reliably
distinguished must, from a medical perspective, therefore fail.
The
caution sounded by the Royal College of Psychiatrists in connection with the
physiology and psychology of homicidal reactions
to abuse may be relevant more
generally. The cases we have reviewed often share important elements, but no two
are the same. The
nature and effects of the defendants’ histories as
victims of family violence and the impact of often-entwined factors, like
mental
health and alcohol or drug issues, differ. So, too, do defendants’ risk
profiles and rehabilitative needs and prospects.
The circumstances in which
victims of family violence come to kill abusers and the circumstances in which
they progress through the
criminal justice system are not amenable to a
straightforward or one-size-fits-all
analysis.
259 R v Wickham HC Auckland CRI-2009-090-010723, 20 December 2010 at 39 per Ellis J.
260 See R v Wickham, above n 259; R v Mahari, above n 243; R v Tamati, above n 243; and R v Paton [2013] NZHC 21.
261 R v Brown, above 243, at [5]; R v Woods, above n 242, at [7]; and R v Rihia, above n 229, at [14] and [21].
262 Law Commission of England and Wales Partial Defences to Murder
(Law Com No 290, August 2004) at 53. The same point has been made
elsewhere. See for example Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to
Homicide: Final Report (2004) at 90; and Brenda M Baker “Provocation
as a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill” (1998) 11 Can J L and
Jurisprudence
193 at 196. Baker argues that “it is hard to credit the idea
that women are always driven solely be fear or terror when they
kill or risk
such killing, although this is a dominant emotion in many homicides and one that
is almost always operative to some
degree and so almost always has some
explanatory relevance”.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 49
CHAPTER 3: The legal context
CONCLUSION
3.42
3.43
From our case review, we can make some preliminary general observations and
identify some trends:
. Whether the defendants were acquitted
or convicted of murder or manslaughter, tragic
surrounding circumstances are a constant in these cases, but they take a
range of forms and engender different reactions.
. It is more
common for these defendants to proceed to trial than to enter a guilty plea, and
in
most cases that go to trial, the charge is murder.
.
These defendants are, however, rarely convicted of murder. Usually,
they are convicted of
manslaughter or acquitted.
. It is not clear
whether the repeal of provocation has worked against victims of family
violence who kill their abusers. In terms of charging, there were
proportionately more murder trials before repeal of the defence
than after, and
the proportion of cases where defendants pleaded guilty to manslaughter was
broadly similar pre-repeal and post-repeal.
In terms of convictions, three of
the four murder verdicts we have identified since 2001 were returned in cases
where provocation
was or could have been run. In the fourth case, R v
Rihia, the defendant pleaded guilty. We do not know what would have been the
outcome if her case had gone to trial.
. While, since R v
Wihongi, victims of family violence convicted of murder appear to have
a
good case for displacement of the presumption of life imprisonment, there has
been only one subsequent murder conviction (R v Rihia), and to date,
murder sentences have still been considerably longer than sentences for
manslaughter in this area.
We explore these observations and trends, and
their implications, further in Part
3.
50 Law Commission Report
Chapter 4
The law reform context
INTRODUCTION
4.1
4.2
In recent decades, the legal response to victims of family violence who
commit homicide has been a particular focus of law reform
both in New Zealand
and around the world. The New Zealand Law Commission has examined the position
of victims of family violence
in two previous reports, Some Criminal
Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (the
2001
Report)263 and The Partial Defence of Provocation (the 2007
Report).264 Internationally, the position of victims of family
violence who commit homicide has led to law reform in Australia, England and
Wales,
and Canada.
In this chapter, we summarise the previous work of the
New Zealand Law Commission and the range of reforms pursued in other comparable
jurisdictions. We further explore the detail of these reforms where relevant
throughout this Report.
PREVIOUS NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION REPORTS
The 2001 New Zealand Law Commission Report
4.3
4.4
In 1999, in response to criticism that existing criminal defences were
failing to protect those who commit criminal offences as a
reaction to domestic
violence, the Law Commission was asked to review these defences. It published
its Report in 2001.
The 2001 Report was primarily focused on defences
to homicide, but the scope of the Commission’s review also covered
defences to other crimes, including the defences of compulsion and duress.
Various reforms were recommended.
Self-defence
4.5
4.6
In relation to self-defence, the Commission noted criticisms of the way
self-defence was applied in the context of offending by victims
of family
violence, particularly in respect of reasonableness of force, imminence and
proportionality.265 The significance of imminence and lack of
alternatives had been discussed and confirmed in the 1989 Court of Appeal
decision R v Wang, which remains authoritative in New
Zealand.266
As the Commission recognised and as we discuss in
detail in Part 2 of this Report, the concepts of imminence and lack of
alternatives
are a poor fit for the realities of family violence and the
circumstances in which victims of family violence (who are most often
women)
kill abusers. The Commission said:267
The Commission considers that self-defence should not be excluded where the
defendant is using force against a danger that it not
imminent but is
inevitable. In many, perhaps most, situations, the use of
263 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001).
264 Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, 2007).
265 Law Commission Battered Defendants (NZLC PP41, 2000) at 12–16.
266 R v Wang [1989] NZCA 290; [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA). We discuss this case and subsequent case law in detail in Chapter 6 of this Report.
267 Law Commission, above n 263, at [30]–[31].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 51
CHAPTER 4: The law reform context
force will be reasonable only if the danger is imminent because the defendant will have an opportunity to avoid the danger or seek effective help. However, this is not invariably the case. In particular, it may not be the case where the defendant has been subject to ongoing physical abuse within a coercive intimate relationship and knows that further assaults are inevitable, even if help is sought and the
immediate danger is
avoided.
4.7
We agree that the terms of section 48 do not require the courts to exclude
self-defence where danger is inevitable but not imminent.
However, we think it
preferable to make this explicit by legislative reform, rather than to leave the
law to be developed case by
case. Relying on the courts to develop the law may
require a person to be convicted and then to appeal successfully before the
legal
position is clarified. While the Court of Appeal would be free to change
its earlier approach. A trial judge may feel he or she is
required to follow the
approach in Wang. Until the Court of Appeal has dealt with the matter,
the correct interpretation of section 48 would remain unclear, although some
trial judges may approach section 48 in terms of inevitability.
Thus, the
Commission recommended reform to make it clear there can be situations where the
use of force is reasonable even though
the danger is not imminent but
“inevitable”.268 It was also recommended that, whenever
there is evidence capable of establishing a reasonable possibility a defendant
intended to
act defensively, the question of whether the force used was
reasonable should always be for the jury.269
Recognising reduced culpability for homicide
4.8
4.9
In relation to recognising the reduced culpability of victims of family
violence who kill other than in self-defence, the Commission
considered a range
of partial defences that might be relied on by victims of family violence,
including provocation, excessive
self-defence, diminished responsibility and a
special defence for battered defendants. Of all these options the Commission
preferred
a partial defence of excessive self-defence270 but
ultimately concluded that reduced culpability should be taken into account
during sentencing rather than via a partial defence:271
The Commission does not support the retention or creation of partial defences
once a sentencing discretion is available for murder.
It does not seem fair to
make a distinction between those intentional killers who are able to bring
themselves within one of the
partial defences and those who cannot, but who are
nevertheless sentenced to a finite term because of mitigating
circumstances.
We agree with the submission that partial defences have proved to be
difficult in practice and that it would be easier to take account
of the
mitigating circumstances they represent in sentencing.
We do not agree with the submission in paragraph 158, that it is preferable
for matters of moral accountability to be set out in partial
defences rather
than to be sentencing considerations. Matters of moral accountability, such as
motive and characteristics of the
offender, are typically taken into account at
sentencing. A judge exercising a discretion must do so within established
principles,
in open court and must state reasons. If either the offender or the
Crown think the discretion was misapplied, and the sentence excessive
or
inadequate, they can appeal.
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that
provocation be repealed272 and that no new partial defence, whether
of general application or specific to battered defendants, be
introduced
268 At [32].
269 At [42].
270 At [67].
271 At [161]–[163].
272 At [120].
52 Law Commission Report
in New Zealand.273 It also recommended that the mandatory
life sentence for murder be abolished and replaced with a sentencing
discretion.274
Government consideration of the 2001 Report
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
The Government considered legislative change to self-defence was unnecessary
because, while the Court of Appeal in R v Wang had glossed the
“reasonable force” test with a requirement for imminence or
immediacy of life-threatening violence, that
case did not appear to have been
strictly followed in some subsequent cases.275 In R v Oakes, a
claim of self-defence had been put to the jury even where it did not appear the
defendant had acted on an immediate threat.276 In R v Zhou,
the defendant was charged with the attempted murder of her husband after she
drugged and tied him up and chopped him repeatedly
with a meat cleaver when he
began to struggle. The husband had, hours earlier, raped the defendant, beaten
her with the cleaver and
made lethal threats.277 The defendant
successfully claimed self-defence even though she “presumably had other
options open to her” when she tied
her husband up.278 However,
as we discuss in Chapter
6, the courts have, since then, confirmed that
Wang remains an authoritative statement of the test for
self-defence.
The Ministry of Justice also advised that amendment to
self-defence was otherwise undesirable. It noted the fact that some defendants
fail on self-defence does not mean juries are applying an imminence or immediacy
test. The Ministry also considered there was merit
in the conclusion of the
Criminal Law Reform Committee in its 1979 Report on Self Defence that a
self-defence provision should be framed in general terms, with the
“infinite variety” of factual scenarios that
may constitute
reasonable force left for case-by-case assessment.279 The
Commission’s recommendations on self-defence were, therefore, not
adopted.
In relation to the Commission’s recommendation for
recognising reduced culpability for murder through sentencing rather than
a
partial defence, the Government’s initial focus was on statutory
enactment of the sentencing recommendations. The Sentencing
Act 2002 abolished
the mandatory life sentence for murder and replaced it with a rebuttable
presumption in favour of that sentence.
Section 102 permits a judge to impose a
lesser sentence if “given the circumstances of the offence and the
offender, a sentence
of imprisonment for life would be manifestly
unjust”.
Before deciding whether to repeal provocation, the
Government in 2004 asked the Commission to consider further the implications of
repeal for mentally ill or impaired offenders. There also appeared to be
residual doubt about the impact repeal would have on battered
defendants.280 The Commission undertook further research and
consultation before publishing its Report in 2007.
The 2007 New Zealand Law Commission Report
4.14
In the 2007 Report, the Commission reiterated its recommendation that the
partial defence of provocation should be repealed. Aside
from legal, conceptual
and practical difficulties with the defence, the Commission identified a more
fundamental issue:281
273 At [86].
274 At [151].
275 Ministry of Justice Criminal Defences Discussion Paper: Provocation and Other Partial Defences, Self Defence, and Defences of Duress (2003) at [32].
276 At [32.1], referring to R v Oakes [1995] 2 NZLR 673 (CA). Mrs Oakes had suffered abuse over an 11-year period and ultimately killed her husband by dissolving a large number of tablets in a cup of coffee. This case is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
277 R v Zhou HC Auckland T 7/93, 8 October 1993; and Ministry of Justice, above n 275, at [32.4].
278 Ministry of Justice, above n 275, at [32.4].
279 Criminal Law Reform Committee Report on Self Defence (Report 15, November 1979).
280 Law Commission, above n 264, at 6.
281 At 11.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 53
CHAPTER 4: The law reform context
4.15
4.16
4.17
4.18
Section 169 excuses a homicidal loss of self-control, in the face of a
provocation of such gravity that it would have prompted a person
with ordinary
self-control to do likewise. The defence is thus open- ended about the precise
emotions that might be driving the defendant;
in other words, on its face,
provocation is not necessarily confined to an angry loss of self-control, as
opposed to one prompted
by fear or sympathy. However, anger is the context in
which it is commonly understood to operate, and is most frequently used. We
would thus argue that the defence puts a premium on anger – and not merely
anger, but homicidally violent anger. This, to our
minds, is or should be a
central issue in considering whether reform is required: out of the range of
possible responses to adversity,
why is this the sole response that we choose to
partially excuse?
The Commission considered whether provocation should be
reformed or replaced to retain jury involvement in decisions about culpability
for homicide. The options it considered included:282
.
a redrafted partial defence of provocation;
.
a smorgasbord of partial defences, to capture the broad range of
cases where culpability is
mitigated;
. a generic partial
defence;
. degrees of murder; and
.
replacing the offences of murder and manslaughter with a single
offence of culpable
homicide.
Overall, the Commission concluded none of these alternatives
were viable.283 A “smorgasbord” of partial defences would
be arbitrary, since “[t]here is no way of articulating the distinction
between what is properly to be regarded as a partial defence, and what is
“merely” a mitigating circumstance”.284 A generic
partial defence would be simpler, but the Commission doubted juries have any
particular capacity to arbitrate who is and
who is not properly labelled a
“murderer”:285
The reality probably is that, in the absence of any legal guidance, the only
delineation will be the extent to which a jury sympathises
with various
defendants and their predicaments. This has the potential to reduce homicide to
a lottery: it is an invitation to jurors
to dress up their prejudices as law,
and substantially increases the risk that more weight will be placed on jury
composition and
the advocacy skills of defence counsel than on the legal merits
of the case.
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that defendants
who would have relied on provocation should be convicted of murder,
with any
evidence of provocation in their case to be weighed with other aggravating and
mitigating factors at sentencing.286
The Commission
acknowledged that repealing provocation would limit the available options for
battered defendants but considered that,
for most such
defendants:287
[S]elf defence will tactically offer a preferable alternative to
provocation, because it results in an acquittal. We adhere to
the Law
Commission’s previous view that provocation is not benefiting battered
defendants sufficiently to warrant its retention,
and our review of case law
confirms this... While provocation may in the past have offered one option for
some battered defendants
in New Zealand, it has also arguably been something of
a mixed blessing. Although we were not able to confirm it in our own review
of
recent New Zealand homicide cases, there is a compelling case in the literature
to suggest that provocation is a defence typically
working against, rather than
for, battered defendants –
282 At [155].
283 At [183].
284 At [162].
285 At [166].
286 At [183].
287 At [121].
54 Law Commission Report
4.19
by the same violent and controlling jealous spouses that have been the
subject of much of the feminist critique of this defence.
The issue of
self-defence was not substantively revisited in the 2007 Report. Instead,
the
Commission concluded:288
In the light of the further work undertaken by the Ministry of Justice on
this matter in the development of the government response
to Some Criminal
Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, we are content
at this stage to concur with the Ministry’s conclusions.
The Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines Report
4.20
In the 2007 Report, the Commission also recommended sentencing guidelines to
address the “manifestly unjust” test in
the Sentencing Act, which
it anticipated would help guide the length of finite sentences in particular
categories of case, including
homicides committed by battered
defendants.289 This recommendation was made on the basis that the
Commission’s recommendations in its previous 2006 Report, Sentencing
Guidelines and Parole Reform, had been accepted by the Government. In
that Report, the Commission recommended the establishment of a Sentencing
Council
with a mandate to draft sentencing guidelines.290 While
legislation establishing the Sentencing Council was passed, the incoming
Government declined to implement the Council, taking
the view that sentencing
matters should either be provided for in statute or left to the discretion of
the courts.291 As a result, sentencing guidelines for murder have not
eventuated.
Conclusion
4.21
4.22
In 2001, the Commission identified problems with the way in which
self-defence operates in the context of a battered defendant who
kills their
abuser. It considered that, while the law was capable of accommodating these
defendants, legislative reform was preferable
to leaving the law to develop case
by case. The Government, while recognising these concerns, did not adopt that
recommendation,
instead preferring to leave the law to be developed through the
courts, noting that the approach in recent cases suggested that the
law was
developing appropriately to accommodate victims of family violence. This issue
was not substantively revisited in the 2007
Report. However, as we discuss in
Chapter 6, positive development in the case law has stalled, and the concepts
regarded as problematic
for victims of family violence have been confirmed in
the higher courts.
In both the 2001 and 2007 Reports, the Commission
preferred that the reduced culpability of victims of family violence be
addressed
at sentencing and emphasised the merits of sentencing reform. In
neither Report did the Commission shrink from concluding that New
Zealand’s provocation defence was irredeemably problematic as a matter of
theory and practice. We look at this in Part 3 of
this Report to understand
whether, in light of developments in the law, there is a case for reform around
partial defences to properly
recognise the reduced culpability of victims of
family violence who kill their abusers.
288 At [124].
289 At [206]–[207].
290 Law Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform (NZLC R94, 2006) at 13.
291 Hon Simon Power indicated in early 2008 that the Government did not
intend to pursue the Sentencing Council, preferring to put
the money set aside
for it into funding services for victims. Reasons for this appear to be the
concern that a Sentencing Council
would undermine judicial independence and that
the development of detailed sentencing policy would usurp the role of
Parliament.
See “National to scrap sentencing council” (2 August
2008) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>;
Warren Young and Andrea King “The Origins and Evolution of
Sentencing Guidelines – A Comparison of England and Wales
and New
Zealand” in Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts (eds) Sentencing
Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2013) 202 at 203. The Sentencing Council Act 2007 is now listed for full repeal
in sch 1 to the
proposed Statutes Repeal Bill, an exposure draft on which the
Parliamentary Counsel Office sought feedback in 2015. See Statutes
Repeal Bill
(Consultation Draft) at 13.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 55
CHAPTER 4: The law reform context
REFORM IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
4.23
4.24
4.25
4.26
4.27
The legal response to victims of family violence who commit homicide has been
a focus of law reform activity in a number of jurisdictions
since the New
Zealand Law Commission published its 2001 Report. Reviews in most states and
territories of Australia,292 as well as in England and
Wales,293 Ireland294 and Canada295 have all
considered the availability of homicide defences to victims of family violence,
either in the context of general reviews
of homicide law or reviews of
particular homicide defences.
However, despite a concentration of law
reform activity, a range of divergent approaches has emerged to address a common
concern –
namely, the gendered operation of homicide law and, in
particular, the difficulties in accommodating the experiences of women who
kill
in response to intimate partner violence.296 While some
jurisdictions reformed self-defence to ensure it accommodates the circumstances
of victims of family violence, others
reformed existing partial defences or
introduced new partial defences with victims of family violence in
mind.
The range of diverging reforms can be explained in part by the
different contexts in which each jurisdiction has pursued reform. While
some
reforms followed a broad review of homicide, others stemmed from narrower
reviews of particular defences, such as provocation,
which were constrained by
specific terms of reference. Often, therefore, the range of reform options
available for consideration
was limited.
It is also important to take
into account the legal context in which different jurisdictions have pursued
reform. The criminal justice
systems in each jurisdiction differ in subtle but
important ways. There is, for example, a range of approaches to murder
sentencing
and partial defences, and the requirements for self-defence can vary
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These factors would likely
have influenced
approaches to reform. Simple comparisons of law reform pursued in different
jurisdictions are not, therefore, always
helpful. This said, a unifying feature
of all overseas reforms has been better understanding of the circumstances in
which victims
of family violence – typically women – commit
homicide, the features and effects of family violence and changes in social
attitudes towards people who suffer abuse in intimate and family
settings.
Below, we summarise recent law reform activity in similar
jurisdictions in relation to self- defence and partial
defences.
292 In Victoria, the Victorian Law Reform Commission reviewed defences to homicide between 2001 and 2004. A similarly comprehensive review of the law of homicide was undertaken by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia between 2005 and 2007. Provocation was reviewed by the Queensland Law Reform Commission in 2008 and by parliamentary committees in New South Wales in 2013 and in South Australia in 2014. At the federal level, in 2010 the Australian Law Reform Commission with the New South Wales Law Reform Commission reported on a comprehensive review of the legal frameworks at federal, state and territory levels that relate to family violence, which included a review of the availability of legal defences to family violence victims. More recently, in 2015, the Tasmania Law Reform Institute reviewed self-defence. See Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004); Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report (Project 97, September 2007); Queensland Law Reform Commission A review of the excuse of accident and the defence of provocation (Report No 64, September 2008); Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation The partial defence of provocation (New South Wales Legislative Council 2013); Legislative Review Committee Report of the Legislative Review Committee into the Partial Defence of Provocation (Parliament of South Australia 2014); Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission Family Violence — A National Legal Response (ALRC R114 and NSWLRC R128, October 2010); and Tasmania Law Reform Institute Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (Final Report No 20, 2015).
293 The Law Commission of England and Wales considered the position of victims of family violence who commit homicide in two related reviews: Law Commission of England and Wales Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, August 2004); and Law Commission of England and Wales Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 2006).
294 Law Reform Commission of Ireland Defences in Criminal Law (LRC 95, 2009). The recommendations made in that Report appear to have been implemented only in part, in relation to legitimate defence in dwelling, by the Criminal Justice (Defence and the Dwelling) Act 2011 (Ireland).
295 The self-defence provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 were reformed by the Citizen’s Arrest and Self-defence Act SC
2012 c 9. In July 2015, the provocation defence in the Criminal Code was also amended by the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices
Act SC 2015 c 29.
296 Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Arie Freiberg “Introduction: Homicide Law
Reform in Victoria – Retrospect and Prospects”
in Kate Fitz-Gibbon
and Arie Freiberg (eds) Homicide Law Reform in Victoria: Retrospect and
Prospects (The Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2015) 1 at 1. We discuss
concerns relating to the gendered operation of self-defence in detail
in Chapter
6. We also note concerns with the gendered operation of the partial defence of
provocation in Chapter 10.
56 Law Commission Report
Reforms to self-defence
4.28
4.29
Reforms to the law of self-defence to accommodate the circumstances of
victims of family violence have been pursued in Victoria, Western
Australia and
Canada and have been recently recommended in Tasmania.
Reviews in other
jurisdictions also identified problems with the operation of self-defence but
did not recommend reform given
the limited nature of those reviews. For example,
the Law Commission of England and Wales noted the problems encountered by
victims
of family violence when claiming self-defence297 but
considered self-defence was outside the scope of its review and so did not
explore options for its reform.298 Similarly, the Queensland Law
Reform Commission noted that the battered person “receives no assistance
from the law of self-defence,
which [in Queensland] requires an
assault”,299 but because its terms of reference were limited to
a review of the partial defence of provocation, it “did not research
domestic
violence or review the law of homicide as it applies to battered women
generally”.300 In New South Wales, the Parliamentary Select
Committee established to inquire into the partial defence of provocation also
noted the
significant concerns regarding the adequacy of self-defence and the
need to “strengthen” the defence,301 but as it was not
provided with “strong arguments ... on what methods could effectively be
used to do so”, it was unable
to make a firm recommendation on the
issue.302
Victoria
4.30
4.31
Significant changes to homicide laws were introduced in Victoria in 2005,
including reforms to self-defence and partial defences (discussed
at paragraph
[4.43] below).303 These reforms followed a comprehensive review
of homicide defences by the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC). In its
2004 Report Defences to Homicide the VLRC made a number of
recommendations for reform, recognising that the existing laws of self-defence
and provocation failed to
accommodate the circumstances in which women commit
homicide in response to family violence.304 The resultant changes
have been held up as a “trendsetting” example of reforms to
“remediate gender imbalances
in legal
responses”.305
The VLRC noted the New Zealand Law
Commission’s recommendations in the 2001 Report relating to self-defence
(discussed at paragraph
[4.7] above) and agreed that the legislation should
specify that self-defence may be available “when the person believes that
the harm to which he or she responds is inevitable, whether or not it is
immediate”.306 The VLRC also recommended the legislation
specify that self-defence may be available “even though the force used by
that person
exceeds the force used against him or her”.307 In
addition to recommending changes to the substantive law of self-defence, the
VLRC also made recommendations to support
297 Law Commission of England and Wales Partial Defences to Murder, above n 293, at 79.
298 The Law Commission of England and Wales took the view that, as self-defence was a general defence, it therefore needed to be looked at as a part of a review of the general law rather than specifically in a homicide context. See Law Commission of England and Wales Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, above n 293, at 2.
299 Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 490.
300 At 490.
301 Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 292, at [1.7]. The Select Committee’s reference required consideration of the adequacy of self-defence for victims of prolonged domestic and sexual violence. However, the Committee considered that was limited to the adequacy of self-defence “in the event that the partial defence of provocation were to be abolished”.
302 At [5.75].
303 Crimes (Homicide) Act (Vic) 2005.
304 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at xxv–xxvi.
305 Debbie Kirkwood, Mandy McKenzie and Danielle Tyson Justice or Judgement? The impact of Victorian homicide law reforms on responses to women who kill intimate partners (Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria, Discussion Paper No 9, 2013) at 3.
306 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 81.
307 At 84.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 57
CHAPTER 4: The law reform context
4.32
4.33
the improved operation of self-defence, including for specific evidence
provisions to provide better guidance to judges and lawyers
about the sort of
evidence that may assist a jury to assess whether the defendant acted in
self-defence where there is a history
of prior violence, and a recommendation
for improved family violence education and training for Police, lawyers and
judges.308
The VLRC’s recommendations were largely
adopted and, with some modifications, introduced into law by the Crimes
(Homicide) Act
2005 (Vic). That Act provides that self-defence is not excluded
even if a person is responding to a harm “that is not immediate”
or
if the response involves the use of force “in excess of the force
involved in the harm or threatened harm”.309
However, this
applies only where “self-defence in the context of family violence is in
issue”,310
despite the VLRC’s recommendation that the proposed changes should be generally applicable.311
An evidence provision setting out the kind of family violence evidence that
might be relevant where self-defence is in issue was also
introduced.
In
2014, further amendments to self-defence, consistent with the VLRC’s
recommendations, were introduced.312 At the same time, a provision
was introduced that enabled a defendant to request that the trial judge give a
jury direction on
family violence where self-defence is claimed.313
The jury direction is aimed at countering misunderstandings about how
the dynamics of family violence may affect the behaviour of
family violence
victims, such as why victims of family violence remain in abusive
relationships.314
Western Australia
4.34
In 2007, the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia completed its review
of the law of homicide and took a similar view to the
VLRC in relation to the
availability of self-defence to victims of family violence. In particular, it
concluded that, “in
order to remove any gender- bias associated with the
law of self-defence in Western Australia ... it should be made clear that
imminence
and proportionality are not decisive factors for
self-defence”.315 However, rather than addressing these issues
in the substantive provisions on self-defence, it considered the best way to
achieve
this was by providing that a trial judge must direct a jury about these
factors, recommending:316
That a new section be inserted into the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) to provide
that when the defence of self-defence is raised under s 248 of the Criminal
Code (WA) the judge shall inform the
jury that:
(a)
(b)
an act may be carried out in self-defence even though there was no immediate
threat of harm, provided that the threat of harm was
inevitable; and
that
a response may be a reasonable response for the purpose of self-defence ... even
though it is not a proportionate response.
308 At xxvi–xxvii.
309 Originally introduced as s 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), now s 322M(1) of that Act.
310 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 322M(1).
311 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 81 and 84.
312 Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 4. This amendment changed the objective test for self-defence from whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable to whether their conduct was reasonable in the circumstances as perceived by the defendant. This brought the objective test in Victoria in line with the objective test in s 48 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 and with self-defence in other Australian jurisdictions. The Victorian Government considered this new formulation, which limited the objective assessment to the circumstances “as perceived by the accused” was particularly important in the context where a person kills in response to family violence. See Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 89–90; and Victoria Department of Justice Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform – Consultation Paper (September 2013) at 41.
313 Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic), s 4. See also the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), ss 58–60.
314 Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014 (Vic) (explanatory memorandum) at 21–23.
315 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 292, at 168.
316 At 168–169.
58 Law Commission Report
4.35
4.36
While the Government appeared to accept the Law Reform Commission’s
conclusions, it departed from its recommendation for
a jury direction,
preferring instead to amend the substantive self-defence provisions to make it
clear that a person may be
acting in self-defence if the person “believes
the act is necessary to defend the person or another person from a harmful act,
including a harmful act that is not imminent”.317 The
Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill introducing the reforms explained
that:318
The reference to whether or not the threatened harmful act is imminent allows
this defence to apply to the battered spouse scenario
so long as the response is
reasonable in the circumstances as the person believed them on reasonable
grounds to be. The requirement
that the response be reasonable would preclude
pre-emptive attacks where it would instead be reasonable for police to be
called.
As this amendment was made to the substantive provision on
self-defence, it has general effect, unlike in Victoria, where the 2005
self-defence reforms apply only where family violence is in issue. Western
Australia also departed from the approach in Victoria
and the recommendations of
the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia by not adopting the
recommendation regarding “proportionate
response”. Other
recommendations for guidance on the relevance of family violence evidence in the
context of self-defence have
also not yet been adopted.319
Self-defence in other jurisdictions
4.37
4.38
The reforms to self-defence in Victoria, and in particular the family
violence evidence provisions, have been endorsed elsewhere
in Australia. In
2010, the Australian Law Reform Commission and the New South Wales Law Reform
Commission published a joint Report:
Family Violence – A National
Legal Response. That Report considered whether the current defences to
homicide available to victims of family violence were adequate across the
different
Australian jurisdictions.320 Without making specific
recommendations as to what defences should be available, they recommended that
states and territories adopt
evidential provisions along the lines of the
Victorian provisions:321
The Commissions maintain their view expressed in the Consultation Paper that
state and territory criminal legislation should provide
express guidance about
the potential relevance of family-violence related evidence in the context of
homicide defences, in similar
terms to s 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)
...
The Commissions consider that there is considerable merit in focusing
attention on the potential relevance of such evidence in homicide
defences,
given its importance in these circumstances. The Commissions endorse the views
of the VLRC that such a provision would
assist in avoiding ‘unnecessary
arguments concerning ... relevance and ensure the range of factors which may be
necessary
to represent the reality of the accused’s situation are readily
identified’.
In New South Wales, while the Parliamentary Select
Committee considering provocation did not make recommendations to reform
self-defence
as noted above, it did endorse the family violence evidence
provisions in Victoria and recommended:322
That the NSW Government introduce an amendment similar to section 9AH of the Victorian Crimes Act
1958, to explicitly provide that evidence of family violence may
be adduced in homicide matters.
317 Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA), s 8, amending the Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 248(4)(a).
318 Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Bill (WA) 2008 (explanatory memorandum), cl 4.
319 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 292, at 293; and Stella Tarrant “Self Defence In The Western Australian Criminal
Code: Two Proposals for Reform” (2015) 38 UWAL Review 1.
320 Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at ch 14.
321 At 652.
322 Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 292, at
xii.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 59
CHAPTER 4: The law reform context
4.39
4.40
4.41
In 2015 the Tasmania Law Reform Institute reviewed the law of self-defence in
that State and made recommendations for reform broadly
consistent with the
self-defence reforms in Victoria, including clarification of the substantive
law, as well as family violence
evidence provisions and jury
directions.323
In Canada, reforms were introduced in 2011 to
simplify the law of self-defence.324 These reforms clarify that the
jury must engage in a contextual analysis of the reasonableness of self-defence
claims.325 They also codified an earlier ruling of the Supreme Court
of Canada in R v Lavallee that imminence was only a factor to be
considered when a defendant is responding to family violence as opposed to being
a requirement.326 Other relevant factors listed in the legislation
include “the nature and proportionality of the person’s response to
the use or threat of force” and the size, age, gender and physical
capabilities of the parties in the incident.327
The Law
Commission of Ireland, when considering the codification of self-defence, took a
different approach, recommending that the
requirements for imminence and
proportionality remain but that, to address the “difficult
cases” such as family
violence killings, the circumstances as the
accused reasonably believed them to be should be taken into
account.328
The Commission’s recommendation to codify
self-defence has not yet been implemented.
Review and reform of partial defences
4.42
In jurisdictions with partial defences, there has been considerable focus
on improving their availability to victims of family
violence. Some
jurisdictions have reformed existing partial defences, while others have
introduced new defences designed with victims
of family violence in mind, but no
jurisdiction has created a new partial defence for victims of family violence
where no general
partial defence already existed. The various partial defences
operating in other jurisdictions are discussed in Chapter 10. Below,
we briefly
summarise key reform activity in Australia, England and Wales, and
Canada.
Victoria and Western Australia
4.43
In addition to recommending reforms to self-defence, the VLRC also
recommended the abolition of provocation, taking the view that
degrees of
culpability should generally be dealt with through the sentencing process
rather than through the continued existence
of partial defences.329
However, an exception to this approach was made in relation to excessive
self- defence, which it recommended be reinstated, noting
that it would provide
a partial defence to victims who kill in response to family violence but who
cannot rely on self-defence.330 The Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005
(Vic) repealed provocation, but rather than introducing a new partial defence of
excessive self-defence,
a new offence of “defensive homicide”
was introduced, which operated as an alternative verdict to murder where a
defendant acted defensively
but did not have reasonable grounds for that belief
(and therefore could not claim
self-defence).331
323 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, above n 292, at viii. The test for self-defence in Tasmania is very similar to the test for self-defence in New
Zealand, and like New Zealand, Tasmania has no partial defences.
324 Department of Justice, Canada Bill C-26 (SC 2012 c 9) Reforms to Self-Defence and Defence of Property: Technical Guide for Practitioners (March
2013) at 1.
325 Vanessa MacDonnell “The New Self-Defence Law: Progressive Development or Status Quo?” (2013) 92 Can Bar Rev 301 at 317.
326 R v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852 at 852; and Department of Justice, Canada, above n 324, at 24.
327 Citizen’s Arrest and Self-defence Act SC 2012 c 9, s 34.
328 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, above n 294, at 52–53 and 72–73.
329 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at xx.
330 At 102.
331 Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic), s 4.
60 Law Commission Report
4.44
4.45
4.46
Similar recommendations were made by the Law Reform Commission of Western
Australia, but the recommendation to repeal provocation
was on the basis that
the mandatory penalty of life imprisonment for murder also be abolished in
favour of a presumptive life sentence.332 As in Victoria, a key
rationale for Western Australia’s introduction of excessive self-defence
was accommodation of victims
of family violence who committed homicide but could
not rely on self-defence. There was a concern that, without a partial defence
“some women may be unjustly convicted of murder if the extremity of their
circumstances was not recognised in a trial”.333 The Criminal
Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA) repealed provocation and enacted the
partial defence of excessive self-defence.
While excessive self-defence
remains a partial defence in Western Australia, defensive homicide proved
problematic in practice and
was repealed in Victoria in 2014.334
The Victorian Department of Justice identified several problems with the
operation of defensive homicide. First, there were inherent
problems in trying
to distinguish between conduct that amounted to self-defence and conduct that
amounted to defensive homicide (or
excessive
self-defence).335
Second, while defensive homicide was intended as
a safety net for victims of family violence, the Department considered
that:336
On balance ... it is difficult to conclude that this offence clearly works to
the benefit of women who kill in response to family
violence. Accordingly, it is
not clear that it achieves its intended objective. Further, defensive homicide
may work to the detriment
of women who kill in response to family violence and
its existence may inhibit attempts to drive further cultural change in
consideration
the situation of women who kill in response of family
violence.
The Department was, in particular, concerned that the existence
of defensive homicide risked suggesting that a woman who kills in
response to
family violence “is not acting reasonably, or will often not be acting
reasonably, and therefore, it is better
to plead guilty to defensive homicide
than raise self-defence at trial”.337 Finally, the Department
identified “clear evidence that defensive homicide inappropriately
provides a partial excuse for men
who kill”.338
Queensland
4.47
In a review of the defence of provocation in 2008 the Queensland Law Reform
Commission concluded “there can be no doubt that
the law of
provocation, as it presently works in Queensland does not satisfy the test of
substantive gender equality”339 but recommended retention
of the defence on the basis that the mandatory life sentence for murder was to
remain.340 The Commission recommended reform of provocation to
ensure it was not available to those who kill out of sexual possessiveness or
jealousy,341 but to accommodate victims of family violence who kill
abusers, it preferred the creation of a separate defence for battered persons
rather than distorting the defence of
provocation.342
332 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 292, at 183 and 222.
333 Tarrant, above n 319, at 6.
334 Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic).
335 Victoria Department of Justice, above n 312, at 21. We discuss these problems with reference to the defence-based partial defences in Chapter
10.
336 At viii.
337 At viii.
338 At viii. In its seven years of operation, men comprised 25 of the 28 people convicted of defensive homicide. In many of those cases men had killed in circumstances that were very similar to those where provocation previously applied.
339 Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at [19.12].
340 At [21.49].
341 See at 479–481.
342 At 491.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 61
CHAPTER 4: The law reform context
4.48
4.49
A new partial defence of “killing for preservation in an abusive
domestic relationship” was subsequently introduced in
2010. If
successfully argued, this defence would reduce murder to manslaughter where the
victim had committed acts of serious domestic
violence against the defendant in
the course of an abusive domestic relationship and where the defendant believed,
on reasonable
grounds “having regard to the abusive domestic relationship
and all the circumstances of the case”, that it was necessary
for their
preservation from death or grievous bodily harm to do the act or make the
omission causing the death.343
The introduction of a specific
partial defence was (and remains) a novel approach to unique circumstances. As
noted above, the Queensland
Law Reform Commission was operating under terms of
reference limited to a review of provocation and with a clear direction of
“the Government’s intention not to change the [mandatory life
sentence for murder]”.344 The test for self-defence in
Queensland is also substantially narrower than in other Australian
jurisdictions.345 The Queensland approach has attracted criticism
from commentators and law reform bodies on the grounds it may jeopardise
self-defence
claims by victims of family violence346 and, as a
partial defence, is less helpful than sentencing discretion to recognise
mitigating factors and is problematic to the extent
it is confined to a single
category of defendant.347
New South Wales
4.50
The Parliamentary Select Committee established in New South Wales to review
provocation recommended its retention and reform in
2013.348 One
factor in the Committee’s decision to retain provocation was the concern
that self-defence did not properly accommodate
the circumstances of victims of
family violence who commit homicide.349 The Committee
recommended that provocation be reformed, including reforms to ensure that
it:
. was more accessible to victims of family violence by
removing the requirement for a loss of
self-control;350 and
.
was not available except in cases of “gross provocation”
where the defendant had a justifiable
sense of being seriously wronged to ensure it did not provide a partial
defence to undeserving
offenders.351
343 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 304B. Few cases have considered this provision. In the first to do so the defendant was in fact acquitted as having acted in self-defence rather than convicted of manslaughter on the basis of the new partial defence: R v Falls Supreme Court of Queensland, 3
June 2010.
344 Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 521.
345 In Queensland, self-defence requires a reasonable apprehension of death or grievous bodily harm caused by an unlawful and unprovoked assault.
It is therefore extremely difficult, if not impossible, to apply self-defence to a victim of family violence who kills in the absence of an imminent threat. See Criminal Code 1899 (QLD), ss 271-272; and Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 313.
346 Thomas Crofts and Danielle Tyson “Homicide Law Reform in Australia: Improving Access to Defences for Women Who Kill their Abusers” [2013] MonashULawRw 28; (2013) 39 Mon LR 864 at 890. See also Anthony Hopkins and Patricia Easteal “Walking in Her Shoes: Battered women who kill in Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland” (2010) 35 Alt LJ 132; Michelle Edgely and Elena Marchetti “Women Who Kill Their Abusers: How Queensland’s New Abusive Domestic Relationships Defence Continues to Ignore Reality” (2011) 13 Flinders LJ 125; Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Defences to Homicide for Battered Women: A Comparative Analysis of Laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand” [2012] SydLawRw 22; (2012) 34 Syd L Rev 467; and Jeremy Horder Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 208. The Law Commission of England and Wales made a similar observation in its 2006 Report when it noted that a defendant may not wish to run a partial defence (in that case, provocation) if they do “not want the jury to be side-tracked by a partial defence if his or her main claim is for a complete acquittal”: Law Commission of England and Wales Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, above n 293, at [5.15].
347 Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 638–642.
348 Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 292.
349 At 87.
350 At 193.
351 At 193–195.
62 Law Commission Report
4.51
New South Wales replaced provocation with “extreme provocation”
in 2014, which requires that the conduct of the deceased
constitute a
“serious indictable offence”.352 The requirement for a
loss of control remains, but the legislation provides that it need not occur
immediately before the act causing
death.353
England and Wales
4.52
4.53
4.54
4.55
In England and Wales, provocation was replaced with the partial defence of “loss of control”354
following a 2004 review of partial defences by the Law Commission of England
and Wales.
The partial defence of loss of control is restricted to cases
where the defendant has lost self- control in response to a “qualifying
trigger”. A loss of self-control will have a “qualifying
trigger” if it is attributable to either “circumstances
of an
extremely grave character”, which “caused [the defendant] to have a
justifiable sense of being seriously wronged”,
or a “fear of serious
violence from [the deceased] against [the defendant] or another identified
person”.355 In this way, the partial defence has been
modernised and is:356
... designed to make a formal statement of symbolic value, in this instance
by turning on its head the law’s former implicit
endorsement of male
violence against unfaithful wives in the way that it shaped the categories of
admissible provocation (“qualifying
triggers”).
The inclusion
of “fear of serious violence” as a qualifying trigger was drafted
with victims of family violence in mind.357 It is novel, extending
the partial defence of provocation to cases where a defendant overreacted to a
fear of serious violence with
unreasonable force.358 This was
intended to capture scenarios traditionally caught by defence-based partial
defences like excessive self-defence. The defence
also excludes anything
“said or done constitut[ing] sexual infidelity” as a qualifying
trigger.359
Some commentators have criticised the English
approach on the basis it adds to the increasingly complex role of the jury in
homicide
trials.360 The VLRC considered but rejected the English
model because:361
... the provision proposed by the Law Commission [of England and Wales] does not overcome the very real concerns we have about provocation providing a proper basis for a defence. In particular
... it remains an overly subjective assessment of what constitutes sufficient provocation, and involves speculation about how a person might have reacted in the circumstances. While recognising anger as a possible motivator, the provision explicitly excludes actions carried out “in premeditated desire for
revenge”.
352 Crimes Amendment (Provocation) Act 2014 (NSW), amending Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23.
353 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23(2) and (4). The requirement for a loss of self-control is discussed further, in relation to provocation-based defences, in Chapter 10.
354 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 54.
355 Section 55(3)–(4).
356 Horder, above n 346, at 210–211 (footnote omitted).
357 Catherine Elliot “A Comparative Analysis of English and French Defences to Demonstrate the Limitations of the Concept of Loss of Control” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 231 at 231; and Susan SM Edwards “Loss of Self-Control: When His Anger is Worth More than Her Fear” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 79 at 90.
358 Law Commission of England and Wales Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, above n 293, at 87.
359 Section 55(6)(c).
360 Kate Fitz-Gibbon Homicide Law Reform, Gender and the Provocation Defence: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2014)
at 226.
361 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 292, at 91.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 63
CHAPTER 4: The law reform context
Reform of partial defences in other jurisdictions
4.56
4.57
4.58
In Canada, provocation was restricted in 2015 to serious indictable offences
punishable by five years or more in prison to ensure
a less serious act or
insult would no longer be sufficient in claiming provocation.362
Provocation in Canada continues to require a sudden loss of self-
control.363 In contrast, the Law Commission of Ireland recommended
that provocation should not be limited to unlawful conduct of the deceased,
and that insulting words and gestures that are unacceptable by ordinary
community standards should be capable of amounting to provocation,
but that
provocation should not require the provocation to have occurred immediately
before the act causing death.364
Some jurisdictions in
Australia have also reformed provocation to exclude non-violent sexual
advances.365 This issue was considered by the Parliament of South
Australia in 2013, and a 2014
Report of the Legislative Review Committee
recognised this issue, as well as wider concerns with the operation of
provocation, but
was unable to settle on options for broader
reform.366
Following a high profile court case, the issue is now
being reconsidered by that Committee.367
In 2015, the Tasmania
Law Reform Institute considered, but did not recommend a partial defence for
Tasmania. In doing so it observed
the experience with defensive homicide in
Victoria368 and noted that, unlike Queensland, Tasmania has a broad
and flexible self-defence test and discretionary sentencing for
murder.369
Conclusion
4.59
It is apparent from this brief introduction to overseas law reform
activity that a number of comparable jurisdictions have examined
the criminal
law’s response to victims of family violence who commit homicide. These
jurisdictions have recognised, to varying
degrees, the difficulties these
defendants face in relying on self-defence and establishing reduced culpability
where self-defence
is not available. It is, however, also apparent there is a
range of approaches to reform, but no best practice exists. As we explore
in
Parts 2 and 3 of this Report, an understanding of the different legal contexts
and prevailing policy choices (most obviously,
around the mandatory sentence for
murder) is crucial to any evaluation of the merits and disadvantages of
particular options for
reform.
362 See Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act SC 2015 c 29, s 7.
363 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 232(2).
364 Law Reform Commission of Ireland, above n 294, at 210.
365 See Crimes Act 1990 (ACT), s 13 (amended by the Sexual Discrimination Legislation Amendment Act 2004 (ACT)); and Criminal Code Act
(NT), s 158 (amended by the Criminal Reform Amendment Act 2006 (NT)).
366 Legislative Review Committee, above n 292, at 41.
367 Legislative Review Committee Interim Report of the Review of the Report of the Legislative Review Committee into the Partial Defence of Provocation (Parliament of South Australia, PP 244, 2016). That Interim Report resolved that it would not be prudent to make findings or recommendations until the completion of the high profile retrial of Mr Michael Joseph Lindsay on a charge of the murder of Mr Andrew Negre.
368 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, above n 292, at 50.
369 At 71.
64 Law Commission Report
Part 2
SELF-DEFENCE
CHAPTER 5: Self-defence in New Zealand
Chapter 5
Self-defence in New Zealand
INTRODUCTION
5.1
5.2
Self-defence recognises that a person is justified in using reasonable force
in the defence of themselves or another. It is contained
in section 48 of the
Crimes Act 1961. Self-defence is a complete defence, resulting in an acquittal
if successful. It is also a general
defence, which means it can be engaged as a
defence to justify the use of force by any person against almost any form of
attack or
threat to that person or any other and is not limited to defence
against unlawful assault.370
This chapter discusses the theory
and history of self-defence in New Zealand and sets out how it applies
generally. The subsequent
chapter then discusses the problems that arise in the
operation of self-defence where a victim of family violence kills their abuser.
An analysis of the options for reform follows in Chapter 7.
THE THEORY OF SELF-DEFENCE
5.3
5.4
5.5
Self-defence represents a balance between the needs of an ordered society (in
which people are generally not permitted to use force
and “take the law
into their own hands”) and the right of individuals to ensure their own
protection where the state
cannot.371
While the exact
formulations of self-defence vary in different jurisdictions, the
theoretical underpinnings of the defence are
similar. There is a fundamental
requirement of “necessity” to exert the level of defensive force
used.372 As one commentator puts it:373
Society holds life to be sacred, abhors the killing of human beings, and
considers premeditated killing among the most offensive of
crimes. However,
killing may be justified if it is necessary to prevent an act that is as or more
offensive than the killing. The
law of self-defence therefore justifies killings
that are necessary to defend oneself from death or serious bodily
injury.
As noted in Chapter 3, self-defence is what is called a
“justification-based” defence. It means that any person who
successfully
claims self-defence was morally justified, and blameless, for
acting as he or she did. It is an exception to the criminality of
the
act.
370 AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 507; and Simon France (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CA48.01].
371 Law Reform Commission of Ireland Defences in Criminal Law (LRC 95, 2009) at 26. See also Leason v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 509, [2014] 2 NZLR 224 at [64].
372 R v Wang [1989] NZCA 290; [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA) at 539; and Boaz Sangero Self-Defence in Criminal Law (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2006) at 3.
373 Nan Seuffert “Battered Women and Self-Defence” (1997) 17
NZULR 292 at 298.
66 Law Commission Report
HISTORY OF SELF-DEFENCE IN NEW ZEALAND
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
Self-defence has a long history in the common law. The Royal Commission first
appointed to consider codification of the criminal law
in England said in
1879:374
We take one great principle of the common law to be, that though it sanctions
the defence of a man’s person, liberty and property
against illegal
violence, and permits the use of force to prevent crimes, and to preserve the
public peace, and to bring offenders
to justice, yet all this is subject to the
restriction that the force used is necessary; that is, that the mischief sought
to be
prevented could not be prevented by less violent means; and that the
mischief done by, or which might reasonably be anticipated from
the force used
is not disproportioned to the injury or mischief which it is intended to
prevent.
Self-defence was first codified in New Zealand in the Criminal
Code Act 1893, which enacted the provisions drafted by the English
Royal
Commission. Self-defence was divided into three provisions applying to
self-defence against provoked assaults, unprovoked assaults
and defence of a
person under protection. These provisions were re-enacted in the Crimes Act 1908
and again, largely unmodified,
in the Crimes Act 1961.
In 1979, 100 years
after the self-defence provisions were first drafted by the Royal Commission, a
review of the law of self-defence
was carried out in New Zealand by the Criminal
Law Reform Committee with a view to rationalising and simplifying the
defence.375 Problems with the existing provisions included
uncertainty as to whether they involved an objective or subjective test and
difficulties
in determining who started the particular incident (as different
tests applied for provoked and unprovoked self-defence).376 The
Committee reported to the Government in November 1979 and recommended replacing
the existing provisions with one simple provision
that applied in all cases. The
recommended provision was enacted without alteration, becoming section 48 of the
Crimes Act 1961.
The Criminal Law Reform Committee favoured a simple
comprehensive self-defence provision for the following
reasons:377
Briefly, such a provision will require no abstruse legal thought and no set
words or formula to explain it; and only common sense
is needed for its
understanding. The jury will decide the question of reasonableness in the light
of the Judge’s summing up
of the evidence. In summing up, the Judge will
no longer be faced with varying statutory tests and distinctions that are
extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to explain simply to a jury.
The
Committee considered and rejected the option of providing a list of evidentiary
guidelines for the court, stating:378
The Judge will in any case sum up to the jury on the evidence relating to
such matters as the degree and mode of force used or threatened
by the original
aggressor or used in his own defence by the accused, the danger apprehended by
the accused, and his opportunity (if
any) to avoid the original assault or
prevent it by other means. But to list such things in the legislation as matters
to which the
Court must have regard is in our view unwise and unhelpful in
relation to self-defence, where the question is one
374 Criminal Code Bill Commission Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code Embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners (C2345, Eyre & Spottiswoode for HMSO, London, 1879) at 11, referred to in Criminal Law Reform Committee Report on Self Defence (Report 15, November 1979) at [5]. The Royal Commission included Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, who first drafted a bill to state the law relating to murder, which became known as the “Stephen Code”. See Jeremy Finn “Codification of the Criminal Law: the Australasian parliamentary experience” (paper presented to Comparative Histories of Crime Conference, Christchurch, September 2003).
375 Criminal Law Reform Committee, above n 374.
376 At [10]–[12].
377 At [20]. The Committee stated these reasons were those expressed by Lord Morris, in stating the common law principles of self-defence in
Palmer v R [1970] UKPC 2; [1971] All ER 1077 (PC) at 1088, and referred to in New Zealand by Richmond J in R v Kerr [1976] 1 NZLR 335 (CA) at 344.
378 At [21].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 67
CHAPTER 5: Self-defence in New Zealand
of fact to be decided in the light of an infinite variety of circumstances in
different cases. It might well introduce into the law
complexities of
interpretation, resulting in a further body of case law and the risk of
elevating evidentiary principles into rules
of law.
OPERATION OF SELF-DEFENCE IN NEW ZEALAND
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
Section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides:
Everyone is justified in using, in the defence of himself or herself or
another such force as, in the circumstances as he or she
believes them to be,
it is reasonable to use.
It is for the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defence, and a
defendant may
be discharged if no jury could properly exclude self-defence.
However, before self-defence goes to the jury, there must be evidence
of a
credible or plausible narrative that might lead the jury to entertain the
reasonable possibility of self-defence.379 It is for the judge to
determine, on the view of the evidence most favourable to the defendant, whether
there is sufficient evidence
to leave the defence to the jury, and self-defence
must be left unless the judge is satisfied that it would be impossible for the
jury to entertain a reasonable doubt.380
While section 48
states the law of self-defence in “deceptively simple
terms”,381 it is well established that section 48 involves
three inquiries:382
. What were the circumstances
as the defendant believed them to be at the time?
. In
those circumstances, was the defendant acting to defend himself or herself or
another?
. Given that belief, was the force used
reasonable?
The first two inquiries are subjective. The situation
is assessed by looking at it as the defendant did. The third inquiry is
objective,
although it is applied to the defendant’s subjective view of
the circumstances. The Criminal Law Reform Committee, when recommending
the
current wording of section 48, explained as follows:383
To restate our proposal in legal terms, we think that a subjective rather
than an objective test should be applied in determining
the accused’s
belief as to the facts, but that an objective test should be used in assessing
the accused’s response to
the facts as he believes them to be.
The subjective inquiries – the “circumstances as he or
she believes them to be”
5.15
5.16
As two commentators note, “a cardinal principle of criminal
responsibility is that moral obligation is dependent not merely
upon the
actual facts but also upon the actor’s perception of them”.384
Accordingly, where self-defence is raised, a defendant’s conduct is
to be assessed according to the circumstances as he or
she believed them to be
at the time force was used.
This means that, where the defendant is
acting under an honest but mistaken or objectively unreasonable belief, the
force used must
be assessed against that belief as if it were accurate.
As
379 R v Wang, above n 372, at 534; R v Tavete [1988] 1 NZLR 428 (CA) at 430; R v Kerr, above n 377, at 340; and France, above n 370, at [CA48.17].
380 R v Wharerau [2014] NZHC 1857 at [8]; R v Wang, above n 372, at 534; R v Tavete, above n 379, at 431; and R v Kerr, above n 377, at 340.
381 Afamasaga v R [2015] NZCA 615 at [46].
382 R v Li [2000] CA140/100, CA141/100, 28 June 2000 at 6; Fairburn v R [2010] NZCA 44 at [34]; R v Wharerau, above n 380, at [4]; and R v
Ford HC Auckland CRI-2010-044-000132, 22 July 2011 at [19].
383 Criminal Law Reform Committee, above n 374, at [23]. See also Simpson v R [2010] NZCA 140 at [68], where the Court of Appeal said that, if a defendant's subjective perception is clouded by alcohol, this is a matter that is able to be taken into account under the subjective part of the s 48 inquiry.
384 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 370, at 504.
68 Law Commission Report
the Criminal Law Reform Committee explained, when recommending the current
wording of section 48:385
5.17
5.18
For example, if the jury determines that the accused believed he was being
attacked – when in fact he was not – the jury
should nonetheless
find that the use of force in repelling the attack was justified unless it is
satisfied that the force used was
more than was necessary for overcoming the
danger the accused thought he faced.
This was recently confirmed by the
Court of Appeal in Fairburn v R, which stated:386
A further point of potential significance in this instance is: what
if an accused’s beliefs are unreasonable? The
accused may have had a
misapprehension, and one which might objectively be said to be unreasonable. The
present principle in New
Zealand is that an unreasonable belief that force was
necessary may still support a defence provided that belief is honestly
held. As this Court said in R v Savage: “When the knife was used,
the accused must have seen himself as under a real threat of danger, and not
merely think there
may be some future danger to him.” Or, to put it
another way, there must be an honest belief of a threat of the requisite danger.
Thus, to take an extreme example, even an insane delusion might require the
defence to be put to the jury. As Wright has correctly
observed, “[t]he
cases that really concern the judges seem to be those where the
defendant’s view of the circumstances
is wholly unreasonable”. But
on the present state of the law, so long as the belief is honestly held it does
not matter that
it was unreasonable.
However, while even an
“insane delusion” might need to be put to the jury (as noted in
Fairburn), in practice, the more unreasonable the belief, the more the
defendant’s credibility may be doubted, and a jury may simply
not believe
that an unreasonable belief was genuinely held.
The objective inquiry – assessing reasonable
force
5.19
5.20
The third inquiry in section 48 is an objective one, but it also has a
subjective element. The fact- finder must assess whether the
defendant’s
actions were reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant believed them
to be. This requires the fact-finder to “look at the situation ...
through the eyes of the accused to determine whether the force
may have been
reasonable having regard to that person’s perception of the
circumstances”.387
The Court of Appeal recently endorsed
the judicial direction given by the trial Judge – Woolford
J – in R v Afamasaga388 on the objective
inquiry:389
Whether the force used was reasonable, will require consideration of the
perceived imminence and seriousness of the attack or
anticipated attack,
whether the defensive reaction was reasonably proportionate to the perceived
danger and whether there were alternative
courses of action of which [the
defendant] was aware. In the context of lethal or deadly force, reasonableness
requires that the
force be absolutely
necessary.
385 Criminal Law Reform Committee, above n 374, at [23]. See also Simpson v R, above n 383, at [68].
386 Fairburn v R, above n 382, at [39] (footnotes omitted).
387 R v Zhou HC Auckland T 7/93, 8 October 1993 at 7.
388 R v Afamasaga [2014] NZHC 2142.
389 Afamasaga v R, above n 381, at [43].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 69
CHAPTER 5: Self-defence in New Zealand
5.21
5.22
Accordingly, whether the force used by the defendant was a reasonable
response to the facts as he or she believed them to be depends
on:390
. the perceived imminence and seriousness
of the attack or threatened attack;
. whether there
were alternative courses of action reasonably available of which the
defendant
was aware; and
. whether the defensive reaction
was reasonably proportionate to the perceived danger.
How these
three concepts operate where a victim of family violence kills their abuser
in response to long-term abuse lies at
the heart of the problems with the
current law of self- defence. The history and problems with these three
concepts are discussed
in detail in the following
chapter.
390 France, above n 370, at [CA48.08]; and Afamasaga v R, above n
381, at [43]–[47].
70 Law Commission Report
Chapter 6
Self-defence and family violence
– is there a problem?
INTRODUCTION
6.1
6.2
6.3
Self-defence is often claimed by victims of family violence who kill their
abusers, but is not usually successful. Our review of
cases since 2001
identified that self-defence was claimed in
10 out of 16 cases that went to
trial, but only three defendants were successful and were acquitted.391
Six were convicted of manslaughter392 and one of
murder.393 In all 10 cases where self-defence was claimed, the
defendant was a woman who had killed an abusive male partner.
Given the
weight of academic literature and law reform activity on this topic, it
has, as Julia Tolmie puts it, become “trite”
to point out that
defences to murder do not equitably accommodate the circumstances in which
victims of family violence, typically
women, tend to kill their
abusers.394 This inequity is said to arise because the law of
self-defence, which developed primarily in the context of male violence and
male
standards of reasonableness, fails to recognise the different ways in which
women typically use defensive force. Moreover, because
women are most likely to
use defensive force in response to family violence, this bias is deepened by
persistent misunderstandings
about family violence and victims’ responses
to it.
In this chapter, we consider the role of gender in the development
of self-defence and how misunderstandings around family violence
can
disadvantage victims who claim self-defence. We then examine the interrelated
concepts of imminence, lack of alternatives and
proportionality which the courts
have developed to assess whether the use of defensive force was
reasonable.
391 The cases of Honor Stephens, Natalie Ford and Jessica Keefe. In relation to Honor Stephens, see Bridget Carter “Jury accepts battered- wife defence in murder trial” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 24 April 2002); Natalie Ford, see R v Ford HC Auckland CRI-2010-044-000132, 22 July 2011, and Edward Gay “Ford found not guilty of murder” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 11
August 2011); and Jessica Keefe, see “Jessica Keefe not guilty of murder” (19 September 2013) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>, and “Murder charge unwarranted – lawyer” (21 September 2013) Radio New Zealand <www.radionz.co.nz>. We identified one further case in which the defendant, Juliette Gerbes, was acquitted of manslaughter after stabbing her partner. However on the basis of the information available it appears the defendant’s claim was that, while she picked up a knife to scare or stop the deceased during an argument, the deceased grabbed her and pulled the blade into himself. Therefore it was not claimed that the stabbing was an act of self-defence. See “Hung jury in manslaughter trial” (13 February 2014) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.
392 R v Mahari HC Rotorua CRI-2006-070-8179, 14 November 2007; Fairburn v R [2010] NZSC 159, [2011] 2 NZLR 63; R v Wickham HC Auckland
CRI-2009-090-010723, 20 December 2010 at 39; R v Rakete [2013] NZHC 1230; R v Paton [2009] NZCA 155; and R v Wharerau [2014] NZHC
1857. In Fairburn, the claim of self-defence was withheld from the jury. That case is discussed further in the following chapter. We also note the case of Daryl Kirk, before the High Court at the time of publication of this Report. Ms Kirk was charged with the murder of her mother’s partner, and claimed self-defence. On 20 April 2016 the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter. Ms Kirk has yet to be sentenced.
393 Neale v R [2010] NZCA 167.
394 Julia Tolmie “Battered Defendants and the Criminal Defences to Murder – Lessons from Overseas” [2002] WkoLawRw 5; (2002) 10 Wai L Rev 91 at 91. See Chapter
4 for a summary of recent law reform activity on this issue. Examples from the literature include Susie Kim “Looking at the Invisible: When Battered Women are Acquitted by Successfully Raising Self-Defence” (University of New South Wales, 13–04 UNSWLJ Student Series, 2013); Mandy McKenzie, Debbie Kirkwood and Danielle Tyson “‘Unreasonable’ self-defence?” (2013) 2 DVRCV Advocate 12; Thomas Crofts and Danielle Tyson “Homicide Law Reform in Australia: Improving Access to Defences for Women Who Kill their Abusers” (2013) 39 Mon LR
864; Kellie Toole “Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality
before the New Victorian Law” [2012] MelbULawRw 7; (2012) 36 MULR 250; Heather Douglas “A
consideration of the merits of specialised homicide offences and defences for
battered women” (2012) 45 Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Criminology 367; Anthony Hopkins and Patricia Easteal “Walking in Her
Shoes: Battered women who kill in Victoria, Western Australia and
Queensland” (2010) 35 Alt LJ 132; Oliver Quick and Celia Wells
“Getting tough with defences” [2006] Crim LR 514; Elisabeth McDonald
“Defending Abused Women: Beginning A Critique of New Zealand Criminal
Law” (1997) 27 VUWLR 673; Rebecca Bradfield “Is Near Enough Good
Enough? Why Isn’t Self-defence Appropriate for the Battered Woman?”
(1998) 5 PPL 71; Stanley Yeo “Resolving Gender Bias in Criminal
Defences” [1993] MonashULawRw 5; (1993) 19 Mon LR 104; and Stella Tarrant “Something is
Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law and
Laws”
(1990) 20 UWAL Rev 573.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 71
CHAPTER 6: Self-defence and family violence – is there
a problem?
We conclude that, while section 48 is, on its face, capable of accommodating the experience of victims of family violence who kill their abusers, these concepts can operate as a barrier to a claim of self-defence in those circumstances. The concern is that defensive action by a victim of family violence can be dismissed as not being an action of self-defence simply because it does not accord with perceptions of what self-defence “really” is.395 While evidence of battered woman syndrome has gone some way to addressing these issues, its use is now criticised for a number of reasons, discussed below, and is no substitute for substantive equality in terms of the law itself.
THE ROLE OF GENDER IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DEFENCE
6.4
In New Zealand, the overwhelming majority of violent offenders are
men.396 This is typical across the world.397 As a
result, the law of self-defence has developed primarily in response to male
violence and in the context of male standards of
reasonableness. However, there
is a substantial body of literature and empirical evidence that points to
differences between who,
why and how men and women kill and use defensive
force.
Who do men and women kill?
6.5
Men are more likely to kill strangers or acquaintances, while women are most
likely to kill those with whom they have an intimate
relationship.398
However, because female homicide offenders are proportionately small in
number, intimate partner homicide is still overwhelmingly
characterised by a
male killing a female partner (or ex-partner). In New Zealand, the Family
Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC)
reports that three-quarters of intimate
partner homicide offenders are men and almost three-quarters of homicide victims
are women.399 These figures mirror recent Australian
data.400
Why do men and women kill?
6.6
Research shows that when men kill in the context of intimate relationships,
they tend to do so out of jealously or a desire for control.401 Men
who kill in this context tend to also have histories of aggression. The FVDRC,
in its submission on our Issues Paper,402 reported that 79 per cent
of intimate partner homicides between 2009 and 2014 with a known abuse history
were committed by a male
predominant/suspected predominant aggressor.403
Women, by contrast,
395 Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) at 77.
396 Eighty-four per cent of offenders convicted of homicide and related offences in the past 10 years were male: Statistics NZ “Adults convicted in court by sentence type - most serious offence fiscal year” <nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz>. Statistics New Zealand data also shows that for the 12 months ending October 2015, men committed 82 per cent of homicide and related offences, 74 per cent of acts intended to cause injury, 96 per cent of sexual assaults and related offences, and 79 per cent of abductions, harassment and other related offences against a person: Statistics NZ “Recorded crime offenders statistics – unique offenders” <nzdotstat.stats.govt.nz>.
397 Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to Homicide: Options Paper (2003) at xiv; Toole, above n 394, at 255. However, some suggest that women account for as little as 10 per cent of homicide offending across Australia, Canada, England and the United States: Kathryn Whitely “Women as Victims and Offenders: Incarcerated for Murder in the Australian Criminal Justice System” (Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2012) at 12.
398 Whitely, above n 397; Quick and Wells, above n 394, at 524; and Vickie Jensen Why Women Kill (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001).
399 For the period between 2009 and 2012: Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December 2013
(Health Quality & Safety Commission, June 2014) at 39.
400 Tracy Cussen and Willow Bryant “Domestic/family homicide in Australia” (2015) 38 Research in Practice 1 at 2.
401 Douglas, above n 394, at 368; and Quick and Wells, above n 394, at 524.
402 Law Commission Victims of Family Violence Who Commit Homicide (NZLC IP39, 2015).
403 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 9. The terms “predominant aggressor” and “primary victim” are discussed in Chapter
1 and are defined in the Glossary at Appendix D of this Report.
72 Law Commission Report
tend to kill intimate partners in response to long-term family
violence.404 The FVDRC reported that 13 of the 15 women who killed an
intimate partner between 2009 and 2014 with a known abuse history were
primary/suspected
primary victims of family violence.405 Two
commentators explain the differences in why men and women kill as
follows:406
Male killing is about power and control. Women killing abusers is about
avoiding power and control ... Women do not often kill from
anger, while anger
fuels many male killings.
How do men and women kill?
6.7
When men kill an intimate partner, it is most commonly by
“overkill”, which the FVDRC describes as “the use of
violence
far beyond what would be necessary to cause death and encompasses multiple
stabbings and/or multiple forms of violence”.407 The way in
which a woman kills is often dictated by her physical strength relative to the
deceased.408 A woman may not be able to effectively defend herself
with her bare hands in a direct confrontation with a bigger, stronger male
partner, and so when women kill intimate partners, a weapon is almost always
used, and it is most often a kitchen knife used to
inflict one or sometimes two
stab wounds.409
Gendered differences in claims of self-defence
6.8
Because of the differences in who men and women tend to kill,
self-defence is claimed in different scenarios. When men kill in self-defence,
they normally do so
in the context of a spontaneous encounter with a male
stranger or acquaintance of relatively equal strength.410
Women
are more likely to claim self-defence in the context of an intimate partner
relationship.
Most often, they will be defending themselves against a violent assault, but
sometimes they may kill in a non-confrontational situation,
while the
abuser’s guard is down, rather than waiting to match their strength
against their abuser in a direct confrontation.411 As was observed
by then Victorian Attorney-General Rob Hulls:412
[W]omen who kill in response to protracted campaigns of violence against
their partners know only too well that any attempt to defend
themselves when
facing an immediate threat frequently leads to an escalation of the violence
against them. Women in this situation
are simply not capable of defending
themselves then and there, whether because they lack the physical strength,
because they are
attempting to diffuse the assault or because they are trying to
protect children who are, tragically, so often present when this
kind of
violence occurs.
404 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 399, at 40–41; Danielle Tyson and others “The Effects of the 2005 Reforms on Legal Responses to Women Who Kill Intimate Partners” in Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Arie Freiberg (eds) Homicide Law Reform in Victoria: Retrospect and Prospects (The Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2015) 79; Crofts and Tyson, above n 394, at 879; Douglas, above n 394, at 367; Quick and Wells, above n 394, at 524; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 61; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 397, at xiv; and Bradfield, above n 394, at 71.
405 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 9.
406 Quick and Wells, above n 394, at 524.
407 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 399, at 47. In its submission on the Issues Paper the Family Violence Death Review Committee reported that overkill was the method of killing in 36 of the 85 identified intimate partner homicides for the period 2009–2014. All offenders who used overkill were male: Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 19.
408 Toole, above n 394, at 256–257; and Douglas, above n 394, at 368.
409 In its submission on the Issues Paper the Family Violence Death Review Committee reported that in 11 out of 12 cases where a female primary victim killed a male predominant aggressor, a kitchen knife or implement was used: Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at
19. All of those homicides took place at the family home, half of them in the kitchen. In our case review, we identified one or two stab wounds as the cause of death in 17 out of 24 cases since 2001. See also Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 399, at 47; McKenzie, Kirkwood and Tyson, above n 394; and Toole, above n 394, at 256–257.
410 Toole, above n 394, at 256; and Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 61.
411 Tasmania Law Reform Institute Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (Final Report No 20, 2015) at 65; Kim, above n 394, at 6; McKenzie, Kirkwood and Tyson, above n 394; Toole, above n 394, at 256; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 62; and Law Commission Battered Defendants (NZLC PP41, 2000) at 12–13.
412 At the launch of the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic) in October 2005.
Victorian Department of Justice Defensive homicide: Review of the offence of
defensive homicide: Discussion paper (August 2010) at 30.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 73
CHAPTER 6: Self-defence and family violence – is there
a problem?
6.9
6.10
6.11
6.12
Not all women who respond to abuse with fatal force will be acting
defensively,413 but the explanation for their conduct is nonetheless
likely to be the psychological stress and trauma of intimate partner
violence.414 We also note that sometimes women may be motivated by
both fear and anger, and it is not always appropriate to try to separate out
the
two emotions.415
This is borne out in empirical
studies.416 The Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) undertook a
study of homicide prosecutions in that State between 1997 and 2001.417
They identified that self-defence was far more commonly claimed by men. It
was most often raised in the context of a spontaneous encounter
(such as a pub
brawl), and it was most likely to be successful when raised in that context. In
contrast, while women were most likely
to kill in the context of sexual intimacy
and in response to alleged violence perpetrated by the deceased, only two women
were able
to raise self-defence, and neither was successful, both being
convicted of murder.418 The VLRC considered that this demonstrated
the exclusion of women from the use of self-defence, in that “self-defence
is seen
to involve a single, isolated attack between two men of approximately
equal strength, who are either strangers or
acquaintances”.419
The gendered differences in who, why
and how men and women kill mean that the actions of women may not “conform
to established
patterns of male violence”.420 The failure to
equally accommodate the ways women use lethal force to defend themselves or
another constitutes a gender bias in the
operation of the law. As one English
commentator notes:421
The relative scarcity of female killers has resulted in a paradigmatically
male ideal model and this, together with the incompatibility
of aggressive
force with stereotypical femininity, means that the apparently gender-neutral
concept of reasonableness is actually
weighted against the female
defendant.
Because the overwhelming majority of victims of family
violence who kill their abusers are women, the operation of any gender bias
in
the law is of central importance in this review. We recognise, however, that men
can also be victims of family violence and can
kill abusive partners or
parents.422 We also recognise that family violence can be perpetrated
in same-sex relationships. We agree with the VLRC that issues that arise
for
female primary victims who kill their abusive partners are also likely to arise
for other victims of family violence who kill
413 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 399, at 119.
414 Whitely, above n 394; Fiona Leverick Killing in Self-defence (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006); Jensen, above n 398; and Melanie Randall “Domestic Violence and the Construction of ‘Ideal Victims’: Assaulted Women’s ‘Image Problems’ in Law” (2004) 23 St Louis U Pub L Rev 107 at 119.
415 See also paragraph [3.40] above. Law Commission of England and Wales Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, August 2004) at 53. The same point has been made elsewhere. See for example Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 90; and Brenda M Baker “Provocation as a Defence for Abused Women Who Kill” (1998) 11 Can J L and Jurisprudence 193 at 196. Baker argues that “it is hard to credit the idea that women are always driven solely be fear or terror when they kill or risk such killing, although this is a dominant emotion in many homicides and one that is almost always operative to some degree and so almost always has some explanatory relevance”.
416 A number of empirical studies have been undertaken in Australia in particular. See discussion in Tyson and others, above n 404; Toole, above n 394; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 397; Bradfield, above n 394; and Tarrant, above n 394.
417 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 397.
418 At 110.
419 At 110.
420 Toole, above n 394, at 257.
421 Aileen McColgan “In Defence of Battered Women Who Kill” (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 508 at 515, discussed in Catherine Elliot “A Comparative Analysis of English and French Defences to Demonstrate the Limitations of the Concept of Loss of Control” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham,
2011) 231 at 233.
422 We are aware of at least four cases in New Zealand in which the defendant was a son or stepson of the deceased and killed in response to a long history of abuse from the deceased, although none involved a claim of self-defence: R v Raivaru HC Rotorua CRI-2004-077-1667, 5 August
2005; R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA); R v Powell CA393/30,
4 June 1991; and R v Gillatt [1989] NZCA 238; (1989) 5 CRNZ 1 (CA). We are also aware of
one case in Victoria where the defendant was the male de facto partner of the
female deceased and successfully
claimed self-defence: DPP v Bracken
[2014] VSC 96.
74 Law Commission Report
abusers, particularly when their relationship is marked by the characteristics of coercion and control discussed in Chapter 2.423
PERSISTING MISCONCEPTIONS
6.13
6.14
6.15
In the context of self-defence, a jury’s understanding of family
violence affects how they assess a claim of self-defence by
a victim of family
violence. Misconceptions can undermine their assessment of the defendant’s
credibility or the reasonableness
of his or her actions.
We identified in
Chapter 2 persisting misconceptions, including the belief that a primary victim
of family violence can avoid further
violence by leaving an abusive
relationship; that fear of future violence is irrational or unreasonable; and,
if the primary victim
used violence in the past, her fear was not real. We
discussed the need to understand family violence as a pattern of harmful
behaviour
with a cumulative effect and a form of entrapment. Victims’
responses must be considered in the context of:424
.
the manner in which their choices have been constrained by the
violence they have
experienced;
. what the past responses to their
help seeking have been; and
. the wider structural
constraints of their lives, including the structural constraints of
their
families, whānau and communities.
This shift in thinking is
necessary to counter misconceptions that can affect a jury’s assessment of
self-defence claims by
victims of family violence. In a similar vein, the
concepts of imminence, lack of alternatives and proportionality are difficult
to reconcile with contemporary understanding of family violence, as we discuss
below.
IMMINENCE OF THE THREAT AND LACK OF ALTERNATIVES
6.16
In judging the reasonableness of the force used by a defendant, courts have
traditionally required there to be an immediacy of life-threatening
violence to
justify the killing of another in self-defence.425 This is known
as the requirement for “imminence”. Closely related to the concept
of imminence is whether the defendant
had an alternative to the use of force,
such as leaving or seeking help from Police.
Problems with imminence and lack of alternatives in the context of
family violence
6.17
Imminence and lack of alternatives developed in the context of the
stereotypical danger envisaged by self-defence, which emanates
from an
immediate, violent one-off confrontation with a stranger or
acquaintance.426 Many argue that these concepts are difficult to
reconcile with the contemporary understandings of family violence.427
As we explained in Chapter 2, intimate partner violence is best understood
as a cumulative pattern of harmful behaviour that
423 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 61.
424 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fifth Report: January 2014 to December 2015 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, February 2016)
at 39.
425 J Bruce Robertson “Battered Woman Syndrome: Expert Evidence in Action” [1998] OtaLawRw 7; (1998) 9 Otago L Rev 277 at 279.
426 Tarrant, above n 394, at 597.
427 See for example Tasmania Law Reform Institute, above n 411, at 65; Crofts and Tyson, above n 394, at 877–880; Angelica Guz and Marilyn
McMahon “Is Imminence Still Necessary? Current Approaches to Imminence in the Laws Governing Self-Defence in Australia” (2011) 13
Flinders LJ 79 at 118–120; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report (Project 97, September
2007) at 274; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 78; Bradfield, above n 394, at 76–77; Nan Seuffert “Battered Women and
Self-Defence” (1997) 17 NZULR 292 at 300–301; Yeo, above n 394,
at 115–116; and Tarrant, above n 394, at 597–599.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 75
CHAPTER 6: Self-defence and family violence – is there
a problem?
is bigger than the incidents of physical violence on any one
occasion.428 In some cases, coercive and controlling tactics by a
predominant aggressor can mean a primary victim faces a constant and ongoing
threat. Imminence, however, focuses on danger that is close at hand. As the Law
Commission observed in 2001, this limits the inquiry
to the discrete incident
of violence or threat immediately preceding the defendant’s use of
force.429 As one commentator
explains:430
6.18
6.19
6.20
The model of self-defence which focuses on an isolated ensuing or imminent
assault envisages a killing in response to an extraordinary
eruption in normal
existence. It is the interruption of normal existence which allows for the
deviation from a simple application
of the laws against killing. Such a model
may be appropriate in the context of an isolated contest between strangers.
However, women
who kill in retaliation to systemic abuse are killing in response
to an aspect of their ordinary existence and the law at its most primary
level does not contemplate the possibility of the need to defend oneself against
normality.
The danger faced by women in violent intimate relationships is
embodied not in an isolated attack, nor even in a series of attacks,
but in an
on-going life of being abused and the fear which accompanies that life.
The nature of these two kinds of “assaults” are of a fundamentally
different
nature.
Because victims of family violence are not facing
the stereotypical scenario of a one-off confrontation, the way in which
they
respond is different. They may respond where an immediate assault appears
relatively minor, or they may respond at a time
when the violence has ceased.
They may arm themselves in anticipation of an attack, or they may act to protect
themselves by a pre-emptive
strike.431
Focusing on the
immediate event means that juries may be less likely to hear evidence on the
relationship history.432 Even if the jury does hear such evidence,
it may only be for the limited purpose of understanding the circumstances of the
immediate
event in determining whether the defendant honestly apprehended death
in light of the latest incident.433 One commentator notes several
problems with introducing evidence for this purpose. First, evidence of past
abuse tends to be elicited
as a “list” of events, with little
connection made between it and the killing, and without eliciting the experience
and
effects of living a life of being abused.434 Second, the weight
of evidence of past abuse diminishes over time, and abuse that occurred several
years before will be of less importance,
whereas for an abused woman, its
significance may increase if it indicates the fear with which she was
living.435 Third, the introduction of evidence of past abuse may in
fact work to undermine the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions,
as
if she had survived all past abuse the danger may be seen to be less serious, or
if she had “warning” of the danger
then she could have left.436
Such evidence, it is argued, is not sufficient to enable a jury to gain a
proper understanding of the circumstances of the killing.437
A
further problem with the concept of imminence is it assumes that, where a
threat cannot be carried out immediately, there will
be options other than the
use of force to avoid the threatened harm, such as fleeing or calling the
Police. However, such options
may simply delay the threatened harm. As the Law
Commission said in 2001:438
428 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 424, at 36.
429 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001) at 10.
430 Tarrant, above n 394, at 598.
431 Bradfield, above n 394, at 76; Robertson, above n 425, at 279; and Tarrant, above n 394, at 598.
432 Seuffert, above n 427, at 312.
433 Yeo, above n 394, at 115–116.
434 Tarrant, above n 394, at 599.
435 At 599.
436 At 599.
437 At 599.
438 Law Commission, above n 429, at 10.
76 Law Commission Report
6.21
6.22
6.23
Threats of future violence are typically used to keep a battered woman from
leaving a relationship ... Going to the police, for example,
is a reasonable
alternative to the use of force if thereby the defendant obtains effective
protection, but not if it will ensure
the defendant’s safety only for as
long as she is in the presence of police officers.
The Supreme Court also
recently observed, when discussing the defence of compulsion,439 that
the criteria of immediacy will be “highly indicative” of
coercive circumstances leaving no practical alternative,
but that it may be
under-inclusive, because “threats which do not meet the immediacy ...
criteria may none the less be very
coercive in the sense of leaving no
reasonable alternative”.440
For these reasons, it is
widely accepted that “the traditional understanding of what amounts to
imminent peril is unsuited to
self-defence in the context of [family]
violence”.441 It can impede victims of family violence from
relying on self-defence even where they genuinely believe there is no option to
escape
death or serious injury other than to kill their
abusers.442
We consider below how the courts currently apply
these concepts in New Zealand.
The decision in Wang
6.24
6.25
The leading case on imminence and lack of alternatives in the context of a
victim of family violence who kills their abuser is R v Wang.443
Xiao Jing Wang was charged with the murder of her husband Jing Wah Li
after stabbing him while he slept. Ms Wang was an immigrant
from China. She was
married to Mr Li for approximately four years before killing him. There was
evidence that earlier in the evening
of the fatal stabbing the deceased had
threatened to kill Ms Wang and her sister if her family in China did not send
him money.
The trial Judge also noted that, if Ms Wang’s evidence was
believed, there was “ample material” about past threats
by the
deceased.444 At trial a psychiatrist gave evidence that Ms Wang was
suffering from a major depressive illness and, in her mental state, she would
have believed that the threats of her husband would be carried through, and
“the only course she could think of was to kill
her
husband”.445
The trial Judge withheld the issue of
self-defence from the jury. This was on the basis that “a reasonable
person in the accused’s
position had a number of alternative courses open
to her” and “the only view of the evidence open is that the accused
was in no immediate danger”.446 On the question of imminence,
the Judge said:447
Here there is no suggestion that the victim had a weapon, nor had made any
move to suggest the intended use of any object as such.
The contention on behalf
of the defence has to go to the length of asserting that a jury could reasonably
find that an accused under
no immediate threat or danger,
439 Akulue v R [2013] NZSC 88, [2014] 1 NZLR 17. In that case the appellant was Nigerian and faced charges of importing and conspiring to supply methamphetamine. He claimed that he was coerced into the offending by a cousin living in Nigeria who threatened to kidnap and kill members of his family also living in Nigeria unless he assisted in the importation of drugs into New Zealand. The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether he could rely on the defence of compulsion or necessity. The defence of compulsion is provided for in s 24 of the Crimes Act 1961 and is narrowly constructed to only apply where the defendant is under compulsion “by threats of immediate death or grievous bodily harm from a person who is present when the offence is committed”. The Supreme Court, at [23]–[24], while recognising that s 24 could be seen as underinclusive, concluded that it was not drafted with a view to allowing a defence of compulsion based on the belief of the defendant that assistance from the authorities would not be forthcoming. This can be contrasted to s 48, which is clearly drafted to require the fact-finder to determine whether the use of force was reasonable “in the circumstances as [the defendant] believes them to be”.
440 At [13].
441 Robertson, above n 425, at 279.
442 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 77.
443 R v Wang [1989] NZCA 290; [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA).
444 R v Wang HC Christchurch T 40/88, 27 February–6 March 1989 (trial rulings) at 10.
445 At 10.
446 At 11.
447 At 11.
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6.27
6.28
however elastic an interpretation is given to that concept, who had
alternative courses open none of which she had tried or seemingly
considered,
was or at least might reasonably be justified in deliberately killing the other
party with a knife. To accede to that
proposition in these circumstances would I
think be close to a return to the law of the jungle.
The Court of Appeal
upheld the decision of the trial Judge, stating:448
... what is reasonable force to use to protect oneself or another when faced
with a threat of physical force must depend on the imminence
and seriousness of
the threat and the opportunity to seek protection without recourse to the use of
force. There may well be a number
of alternative courses of action open, other
than the use of force, to a person subjected to a threat which cannot be carried
out
immediately. If so, it will not be reasonable to make a pre-emptive
strike.
The Court considered that:449
In our view what is reasonable under the second limb of s 48 and having
regard to society’s concern for the sanctity of human
life requires, where
there has not been an assault but a threatened assault, that there must be
immediacy of life-threatening violence
to justify killing in self-defence or the
defence of another.
The Court of Appeal concluded that “it would
be impossible for the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt on the
point”
as there was no imminent danger to be averted by instant
reaction, and Ms Wang was not held hostage and was free to seek protection
in
other ways.450
The decision in Wang is, therefore,
authority for need for immediacy of life-threatening
violence to justify killing in self-defence.
Cases since Wang
6.29
6.30
Wang was decided over 25 years ago, and has been considered and
followed in the higher courts on a number of occasions.451 Cases
decided since Wang have done two things. First, they have confirmed the
requirement for imminence. Second, they have clarified the approach to
considering
alternatives to the use of force.
Because cases involving
victims of family violence claiming self-defence are uncommon the higher courts
have not considered the
operation of imminence and lack of alternatives in this
specific context since Wang. Accordingly, subsequent consideration of
Wang has typically been in markedly different factual circumstances
involving a male defendant and a male homicide victim.452 They
establish how the law of self-defence is to be applied in a general sense rather
than in the specific context of family violence.
The ongoing requirement for imminence
6.31
Early indications following Wang were that the requirement for
imminence was not being strictly enforced by the courts. In the early 1990s
cases of R v Zhou453 and R v Oakes,454
both involving the use of force by a victim of family violence against
their abuser, the question of
self-defence was left to the jury even though
in neither case was there an immediate threat of
448 R v Wang, above n 443, at 535–536.
449 At 539.
450 At 539.
451 See, for example, Vincent v R [2015] NZCA 201 [Vincent (CA)]; Vincent v R [2016] NZSC 15 [Vincent (SC)]; Afamasaga v R [2015] NZCA 615; Leason v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 509, [2014] 2 NZLR 224; R v Sila [2009] NZCA 233; R v Hackell CA131/02, 10 October 2002; and R v Kneale [1998] 2 NZLR 169 (CA).
452 With the exception of Fairburn v R, above n 392.
453 R v Zhou HC Auckland T 7/93, 8 October 1993.
454 R v Oakes [1995] 2 NZLR 673 (CA).
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6.32
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
harm present on the facts.455 Neither case cited Wang. The
Ministry of Justice quite reasonably inferred from these cases that Wang
was not being strictly followed and thus victims of family violence were not
being improperly excluded from relying on self-defence.456 As a
result, the Government did not implement the Law Commission’s
recommendations on self-defence in the
2001 Report,457 preferring
instead to allow the courts to continue to develop the law on a case-
by-case basis.
However, more recent Court of Appeal decisions, albeit
not in cases in the family violence context, confirm that imminence remains
central to the law of self-defence. In R v Richardson,458 the
appellant appealed his convictions for firearms possession. At trial he had
claimed self- defence, arguing that he was under
a “constant”
threat of attack from an acquaintance as a result of his involvement as a
prosecution witness in a murder
trial. Dismissing his appeal against
conviction, the Court of Appeal, while not citing Wang, concluded
that:459
[T]here was no suggestion that there was any imminent danger ... the case
seems to have been predicated on the quite unsustainable
premise that if a
person subjectively believed that they were under constant threat, they would be
able to carry loaded weapons.
That is not the law and the ground is
unmeritorious.
The FVDRC considers that this decision has the potential
to present a legal barrier to raising self-defence for a victim of family
violence who is responding to an “omnipresent threat which has the
potential to crystallise at any point in time and which
the police are unable to
defuse”.460
More recently, two Court of Appeal
decisions have considered and approved Wang, and confirmed the role of
imminence and lack of alternatives in any claim of self-defence.
In
Vincent v R, the appellant was a prison inmate who stabbed another inmate
four times in the neck. The attack followed an incident in the exercise
yard
four days earlier, where it was alleged the victim deliberately kicked a
basketball towards Mr Vincent. At trial, the appellant
claimed he was acting
pre-emptively in self-defence in response to a threat of future violence from
the victim. He appealed his conviction
for wounding with intent to cause
grievous bodily harm on the ground that the trial Judge erred in withdrawing
self-defence from
the jury.
The Court of Appeal referred to Wang
and observed that, in certain circumstances, self-defence may be available
where a defendant takes pre-emptive action to defend himself
or herself (or
another) from a perceived threat.461 The Court
said:462
While the imminence of the threat is not treated as a distinct or separate
requirement, the authorities have emphasised that the imminence
or immediacy of
the threat is a factor that is to be weighed in assessing whether the defence
is available. This is a question of
fact and degree. Amongst other things, the
opportunities available to the defendant to seek protection or adopt some other
alternative
course of action are to be considered. The defendant must have seen
himself or herself as under a real threat of danger and not merely
believe there
may be some future danger.
455 In Zhou the defendant was charged with attempted murder of her husband after she drugged and tied him up and chopped him repeatedly with a meat cleaver when he began to struggle. The husband had, hours earlier, raped the defendant, beaten her with the cleaver, and made lethal threats. In Oakes¸ the defendant and her children were physically, sexually and emotionally abused by her partner. One night after being verbally abused and threatened she spiked his coffee with more than 30 sleeping pills, causing him to die. Oakes is discussed in further detail at paragraph [6.57] below.
456 Ministry of Justice Criminal Defences Discussion Paper: Provocation and Other Partial Defences, Self Defence, and Defences of Duress (2003) at 8.
457 Law Commission, above n 429.
458 R v Richardson CA450/02, 25 March 2003.
459 At [25].
460 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 20.
461 Vincent (CA), above n 451, at [27].
462 At [28]–[29] (citations omitted).
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The Court of Appeal went on to consider Mr Vincent’s claim of
self-defence against the concepts of imminence, lack of alternatives
and
proportionality and upheld the Judge’s decision to withhold self-defence
from the jury, finding “there was no
realistic possibility that the jury
could entertain a reasonable doubt” that the defendant was acting
defensively in terms
of section 48.463 Mr Vincent sought leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court, but that was declined. The Supreme Court
observed:464
Although the proposed appeal raises questions as to when self-defence is
available in the case of a pre- emptive strike, the absence
of immediacy in
relation to the alleged threat and the alternatives available to the applicant
were material considerations. In dealing
with this part of the case, the Court
of Appeal applied settled law.
The concepts of imminence and lack of
alternatives were considered again by the Court of Appeal in the case of
Afamasaga v R. The prosecution’s case was that, with five others,
Mr Afamasaga, a gang prospect, planned to shoot the leader of a rival group.
The
plan involved provoking the victim to turn up at an address where he knew he
would find Mr Afamasaga and his associates. As the
victim got out of the car and
walked towards the house the appellant, who was in a darkened bedroom about 10
to 12 metres away, shot
him. Mr Afamasaga claimed self- defence, arguing that he
feared for his life and that he thought he saw a pistol in the deceased’s
hands. The trial Judge’s summing up to the jury included the following
passage:465
Whether the force used was reasonable, will require consideration of the
perceived imminence of the seriousness of the attack or anticipated
attack,
whether the defensive reaction was reasonably proportionate to the perceived
danger and whether there were alternative courses
of action of which Mr
Afamasaga was aware.
Mr Afamasaga was convicted and appealed, arguing
that the trial Judge failed to direct the jury adequately on self-defence.
Citing
Wang, the Court of Appeal said: “As the Judge properly
emphasised, a threat has to be ‘imminent or immediate [with] no
alternative
available’ for a pre- emptive strike to amount to
self-defence”.466
The Court of Appeal concluded that the
Judge directed the jury correctly on the elements of
self-defence.467
While the cases of Richardson, Vincent
and Afamasaga did not involve victims of family violence who had used
force against their abusers, as we read them these cases comprise general
statements about the law of self-defence that could apply equally to a defendant
in that context. Afamasaga, in particular, clearly confirms that
imminence and lack of alternatives are necessary elements of any claim of
self-defence.
It would be open to the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court to take a
different approach in a specific context. However, given that
cases involving
victims of family violence who kill their abusers are uncommon and given how
recently Vincent and Afamasaga were decided, it seems unlikely
that the roles of imminence and lack of alternatives will be revisited in the
near future.
463 At [32]–[33].
464 Vincent (SC), above n 451, at [9]–[10].
465 R v Afamasaga [2014] NZHC 2142 at [68], cited in Afamasaga v R, above n 451, at [43].
466 Afamasaga v R, above n 451, at [47].
467 At [50].
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Clarifying the approach to alternative options to the use of
force
6.42
6.43
6.44
6.45
6.46
In Wang the Courts determined that self-defence was not available
because the defendant “was not held hostage and was free to seek
protection
in other ways”.468 However, as one commentator
notes:469
Wang herself may have seen the circumstances differently. She had been
physically, sexually and emotionally abused throughout the
marriage. She was
an immigrant to New Zealand and spoke little English. The Court of Appeal
admitted that she “was not conversant
with social opportunities or
avenues for help” and described this as a case of “a weakening of
the accused’s
ability to reason leading to a situation with an apparent
absence of alternatives”.
Several commentators noted with concern
that the approach in Wang meant that reasonableness was considered in
that case on an almost purely objective basis, ignoring the defendant’s
subjective
beliefs about the options available to her.470 Ms Wang had
testified that “I had to kill him, there was no other way”.471
If this was taken as being, in the words of section
48, the
“circumstances as she believed them to be”, then “it is hard
to see how the question of
the reasonableness of the force used should not have been left to the
jury”.472 It was argued the proper interpretation of section
48 is that any belief a defendant has about an available option is a
“circumstance”
he or she believes to exist for the purposes of
section 48 and must, therefore, be treated as if it was
correct.473
It appears that this issue has been clarified by
the Court of Appeal in the subsequent cases of Fairburn v R,474
McNaughton v R475 and Afamasaga v R.476
In Fairburn, the Court of Appeal said: “The present principle
in New Zealand is that an unreasonable belief that force was necessary may
still
support a defence provided that belief is honestly
held”.477
As one commentator notes, if self-defence in
Wang was withheld because the defendant’s belief that “she
had to kill him, there was no other way” was unreasonable,
although
honestly held, that seems contrary to the approach in
Fairburn.478
In the second case, McNaughton,
the Court of Appeal considered the finer issue of the appellant’s
belief about the options available to avoid the use
of force. The appellant had
shot the deceased during a pre-arranged fight between rival groups and claimed
self-defence. A core component
of the prosecution’s case was that he had a
number of alternative options when he fired the gun. He could have fired into
the
ground or the air or fled.479 The trial Judge, in a written
memorandum for the jury, identified the issue as whether there were “other
options that he knew
he might take in the time available, such as getting help
or fleeing”.480 Responding to a question from the jury during
deliberations, Miller J gave the following
direction:481
468 R v Wang, above n 443, at 539.
469 Fran Wright “The Circumstances as She Believed Them to Be: A Reappraisal of Section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961” (1998) 7 Wai L Rev 109 at
114–115.
470 At 123–125; McDonald, above n 394, at 681; Seuffert, above n 427, at 312; Jeremy Finn “R v Xiao Jing Wang (Case and Comment)” (1990) 14
Crim L Rev 200 at 202–203; and Kurt Van Wirkervoort Crommelin “Case Note: R v Wang” (1990) 3 Auckland U L Rev 456 at 458–459.
471 R v Wang, above n 443, at 532.
472 Finn, above n 470, at 202.
473 Wright, above n 469, at 123.
474 Fairburn v R [2010] NZCA 44.
475 McNaughton v R [2013] NZCA 657, [2014] 2 NZLR 467.
476 Afamasaga v R, above n 451.
477 Fairburn v R, above n 474, at [39].
478 Elisabeth McDonald “Student Companion: Fairburn v R” [2010] NZLJ 104.
479 McNaughton v R, above n 475, at [33].
480 At [35].
481 At [52].
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6.48
6.49
6.50
The belief that he had other options is a dimension of reasonable response. In other words, you may conclude that the force used was unreasonable if the Crown have proved to beyond reasonable doubt,
– and that is a matter for you – that he knew he had other
options available to him and those options were reasonably
available to him in
the time he had to react. That is for you to assess.
Mr McNaughton
appealed his conviction for murder, arguing the prosecutor failed in cross-
examination to directly challenge his claim
that he did not have time to think
of other options. The Court of Appeal, considering the sufficiency of Miller
J’s direction,
said:482
As noted, the prosecutor had not questioned [the defendant] on the options
said to be available – principally, firing the gun
into the air or the
ground or fleeing. The first or subjective stage of the self- defence inquiry
had not been tested by the Crown.
The situation required that the Judge direct
the jury to consider whether the Crown had proved by an appropriate evidential
foundation
both that, to use the Judge’s words, Mr McNaughton (a)
“knew he had other options available to him” and (b) “those
options were reasonably available to him in the time he had to react”. An
explicit direction of this nature was required but
was not
given.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial
Judge’s direction was insufficient and thus in error. For this and
other
reasons, the Court allowed the appeal, quashing the appellant’s conviction
and ordering a retrial.483
The third and most recent case,
Afamasaga, is discussed in detail at paragraph [6.38] above. In that
case, the appellant challenged his conviction for murder on the basis
that there
were deficiencies in the trial Judge’s summing up, including on
self-defence. The Court of Appeal was satisfied
that the trial Judge directed
correctly on the elements of self-defence, which included the direction that
whether the force used
was reasonable requires consideration of “whether
there were alternative courses of action of which Mr Afamasaga was
aware”.484
In our view, the decisions in
Fairburn, McNaughton and Afamasaga clarify that the
reasonableness of a defendant’s use of force should be assessed
objectively but on the basis of any beliefs
the defendant held about the
“circumstances”. This includes beliefs both as to the nature and
seriousness of the threat
and the options available to avoid the use of force.
Where a victim of family violence kills their abuser and claims self-defence,
this appears to allow the jury to go further than the courts’
consideration of alternatives in Wang. It allows them to consider, for
example, how any language and cultural barriers could have influenced the
defendant’s assessment
of the situation and their ability to leave and
whether they could have sought effective protection from going to the
Police. In some cases, it may be reasonable for the jury to conclude that
leaving was not a viable alternative.
PROPORTIONALITY
6.51
6.52
When assessing the reasonableness of defensive force, the decision maker
must consider, alongside the imminence of the threatened
harm and alternatives
to the use of force, whether the defensive reaction “was reasonably
proportionate to the perceived danger”.485
As discussed
above, due to differences in size and strength, women are likely to use a
weapon, typically a kitchen knife, to defend
themselves against an abusive
partner armed only with fists. Further, a victim of family violence is likely to
be responding to a
threat that emanates from a cumulative pattern of harm rather
than a single threat or event. For these reasons, many argue
482 At [54].
483 At [55].
484 Afamasaga v R, above n 451, at [43]–[50] (emphasis added).
485 At [43].
82 Law Commission Report
that it can be difficult to apply a simplistic measuring process based on
the proportionality of the force used against the threatened
harm.486
A defendant’s actions may not “look” proportionate,
particularly if all the circumstances are not understood.487 When a
victim of family violence kills their abuser in a non-confrontational situation,
proportionality is even more difficult to
measure, because at that particular
moment, the deceased was incapable of using force.
The requirement for proportionality in New Zealand case
law
6.53
6.54
6.55
6.56
6.57
The term “proportionality” can create confusion. Sometimes it is
used and understood simply as a synonym for reasonableness,488 but
this can be misleading because a disproportionate response can still be
reasonable. As the Court of Appeal noted in R v Howard, reasonable
force:489
... may include force which is not in reasonable balance with the believed
threat, if for instance the accused has no real choice
of means, other than a
means which might be seen in the normal course as way out of balance with the
threat.
The recent Court of Appeal decision of Afamasaga approved
the statement of the law of self- defence by Woolford J in the High Court, set
out at paragraph [6.38] above, which identifies
“reasonable
proportionality” as a factor in – but not a replacement for
– the assessment of reasonable
force. In our view, this is the right
approach because it acknowledges that a disproportionate response may still be
reasonable.
Some argue that the law gives conflicting signals about the
degree of force that may permissibly be used in self-defence.490 On
the one hand, the law does not require strict proportionality; a person
defending himself or herself “cannot weigh to a
nicety the exact measure
of his [or her] necessary defensive action”.491 On the other
hand, section 62 of the Crimes Act provides that everyone authorised to use
force is criminally liable for any excess.
In this discussion, we are concerned
with force that may be disproportionate but still reasonable – rather than
force that
is excessive and unreasonable.
The concepts of proportionality
and imminence are interconnected. In Wang the Court of
Appeal integrated its assessment of these factors,492
noting:493
... prior to his falling asleep on his bed in a drunken state, her husband
had not armed himself in any way to carry out his threat
to kill ... [therefore]
one could not reasonably have considered that those threats might be carried out
by him, “at any moment”,
in his then state.
Proportionality
was also in issue in the 1995 case of R v Oakes, discussed at paragraph
[6.31]
above.494 In that case, the defendant and her children
had been physically, sexually and
486 Kim, above n 394, at 7; McKenzie, Kirkwood and Tyson, above n 394; Toole, above n 394, at 257; Mark Campbell “Pre-Emptive Self-Defence: When and Why” (2011) 11 OUCLJ 79 at 96–99; Bradfield, above n 394, at 77–78; Seuffert, above n 427, at 301–302; Yeo, above n 394, at 108; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 427, at 165–166; Law Reform Commission of Ireland Defences in Criminal Law (LRC
95, 2009) at [22.04]; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 83; and Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 415, at [4.20].
487 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 83.
488 For example, see R v McGrath [2010] EWCA Crim 2514, [2010] All ER (D) 185 at [5], in which the Court said the “critical question for the jury is: was his response reasonable, or proportionate (which means the same thing)”. Similar difficulties arise with the term “excess force”, which has a special meaning in s 62 of the Crimes Act 1961 and is also associated with the partial defence of “excessive self-defence”, which is not recognised in New Zealand. Section 62 of the Crimes Act provides that everyone authorised by law to use force is criminally responsible for any excess, according to the nature and quality of the act that constitutes the excess.
489 R v Howard (2003) 20 CRNZ 319 (CA) at [26].
490 AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 528; and Warren Brookbanks “Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 271 at 286.
491 Palmer v R [1970] UKPC 2; [1971] All ER 1077 (PC) at 1088, referred to in the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Kerr [1976] 1 NZLR 335 at 344.
492 Seuffert, above n 427, at 317.
493 R v Wang, above n 443, at 537.
494 R v Oakes, above n 454.
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6.60
6.61
emotionally abused by her partner for 11 years. Ms Oakes had previously
complained to Police, obtained protective orders against
the deceased and had
fled several times to a women’s refuge.495 One night, after
being verbally abused and threatened and fearing a serious beating, Ms Oakes
spiked the deceased’s coffee with
more than 30 sleeping pills. Ms Oakes
claimed that her actions were in self-defence, and that she was acting in a
state of fear
and panic. The prosecution argued that this was a case of
premeditated murder, committed in order to rid the defendant of a man who
would
not leave her alone and to rid her daughter of her
abuser.496
There was evidence that Ms Oakes had spiked the
deceased’s coffee the previous day “to obtain some respite from
him”,497 and a witness for the prosecution, P, gave evidence
that Ms Oakes told her that she wanted to kill him and that, once the deceased
“was out of it” from the drugged coffee, she proceeded to eye drop
other drugs into his throat.498 Ms Oakes denied this, but her claim
of self-defence was rejected by the jury, and she was convicted of
murder.
Ms Oakes appealed her conviction, arguing that the Judge’s
summing up, both on the relevance of battered woman syndrome (which
we discuss
at paragraphs [6.71]–[6.74] below) and on the requirements of
self-defence, was inadequate.499 The trial Judge had explained the
requirements of self-defence by comparing “shooting a person about to slap
one in the face
on the one hand, and shooting an assailant wielding an axe on
the other”.500 The appellant argued this example was
“male-oriented and not helpful in the context of this
case”.501
The Court of Appeal noted that the
reasonableness of the defendant’s response is to be judged in the light of
her perception
of the threat and, accordingly that “the use of more
drastic means than might otherwise be thought appropriate” might
be
justified.502 The Court then said:503
It is important too in the assessment of the nature of the woman’s
response to remember her physical limitations. The point
was well put by Utter J
delivering the majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington in State
of Washington v Wanrow Wash 559 P 2d 548 (1977) at p 558:
“In our society women suffer from a conspicuous lack of access to
training in and the means of developing those skills necessary
to effectively
repel a male assailant without resorting to the use of deadly
weapons.”
He went on to caution against leaving the jury with the impression that the
objective standard to be applied is that applicable to
an altercation between
two men.
However, in dismissing the appeal the Court concluded that, in
relation to the trial Judge’s explanation of
self-defence:504
The examples the Judge gave of justified and unjustified self-defence may not
have been entirely apposite, but nonetheless they did
demonstrate the need for
proportionality of response, which was certainly relevant in this case, bearing
in mind the quantity of
drugs used in comparison with the drugged coffee the
morning before and, if it was accepted, [P’s] evidence about the
eye-dropper.
Despite the Court of Appeal’s comments on matters of
legal principle in Oakes, confirming the need to take into account the
circumstances as the defendant believes them to be, including
495 At 683. For a discussion of the facts in Oakes, see also Seuffert, above n 427, at 319.
496 At 680.
497 At 677.
498 At 679.
499 At 675.
500 At 681.
501 At 681.
502 At 676.
503 At 676.
504 At 683.
84 Law Commission Report
6.62
physical disparities and the history of abuse in the relationship when
assessing whether the force used was reasonably proportionate,
the application
of those principles on the facts appears to have been grounded in what is now an
outdated understanding of family
violence, focused on the psychology of the
defendant and battered woman syndrome. As we discuss below, the Court considered
that
the poisoning could not be seen as a reasonable or appropriate response
“without the emotional fragility and the altered perception
that are
features of [battered woman] syndrome”.505 The passage quoted
at paragraph [6.60] above seems to focus on the imminent threat posed by the
deceased, and what response –
or how many pills – was in balance
with that imminent threat, rather than viewing the threat faced as emanating
from a cumulative
pattern of harm.
With a proper understanding of all
the circumstances, however, based on an understanding of family violence that
reflects contemporary
social science, we consider the requirement for reasonable
proportionality is capable of accommodating victims of family violence.
SELF-DEFENCE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
6.63
6.64
6.65
6.66
The FVDRC argues that self-defence has been interpreted in a more restrictive manner in New
Zealand compared with similar jurisdictions.506
In
Australia, imminence, lack of alternatives and proportionality are simply
factors in the jury’s assessment of self-defence
at common law.507
Queensland is alone in requiring by statute that defensive action be taken
in response to an assault.508 However, even in that State, the courts
have been sensitive to look past the question of imminence.509 The
Queensland Supreme Court in the case of R v Falls
said:510
[I]t doesn’t matter that at the moment [the defendant] shot Mr Falls in
the head he didn’t at that moment offer or pose
any threat to her. He had
assaulted her. There was the threat that there would be another one and another
one and another one after
that until one day something terrible happened. It
might have been the next day, it might have been the next week, but the risk of
death or serious injury to her was ever present.
The only Australian
jurisdiction that retains a direct reference to proportionality in its statute
is South Australia. However, this
requirement is qualified, consistent with the
approach at common law, by the statement that:511
A requirement ... that the defendant's conduct be (objectively) reasonably
proportionate to the threat that the defendant genuinely
believed to exist does
not imply that the force used by the defendant cannot exceed the force used
against him or her.
The relatively flexible approach in the Australian
common law has not prevented several states from pursuing law reform to clarify
that these concepts do not operate as a barrier to successful claims by victims
of family violence. As discussed in Chapter 4, the
VLRC considered that
legislative reform was desirable to encourage a more careful analysis by jurors
of circumstances
505 At 679.
506 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 399, at 102.
507 Zecevic v DPP [1987] HCA 26; (1987) 162 CLR 645; Hopkins and Easteal, above n 394, at 132–133; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n
427, at 164; and Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 77.
508 Criminal Code 1899 (QLD), ss 271–272, discussed in Hopkins and Easteal, above n 394, at 135–136.
509 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Defences to Homicide for Battered Women: A Comparative Analysis of Laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand” [2012] SydLawRw 22; (2012) 34 Syd L Rev 467 at 471.
510 R v Falls Supreme Court of Queensland, 2–3 June 2010, cited in Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 509, at 471.
511 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 15B. During the second
reading of the 2003 Bill introducing this qualifying statement, the Hon P
Holloway explained the amendment was
not a new principle but rather a statement
of the current principle in the codified law on self-defence. See (26 May 2003)
SAPD LC
2393.
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6.68
in which a person may reasonably believe his or her life is in danger, even
where that person is not under immediate attack or at
risk of immediate
harm.512 It also recommended reform to discourage juries from
placing undue emphasis on the proportionality of the response to the force used
or threatened against the defendant in determining whether their actions were
reasonable.513 Similar findings were made in Western Australia and
Tasmania. We consider the detail of relevant reforms pursued in these
jurisdictions
in the following chapter.
In Canada, in the 1990 case of
R v Lavallee, the Supreme Court similarly relaxed the requirement for
imminent danger in respect of victims of family violence who kill
their
abusers.514 To require a victim of family violence to wait until the
physical assault is “underway” before her apprehensions can be
validated in law would, that Court considered, be tantamount to sentencing the
defendant to “murder by instalment”.515 Given the
context in which family violence occurs, the Court also considered the
“mental state of an accused at the critical
moment she pulls the trigger
cannot be understood except in terms of the cumulative effect of months or years
of brutality”.516 Subsequent statutory reforms to the law of
self-defence in Canada, discussed in Chapter 4, codified the decision in
Lavallee to make it clear that the jury must engage in a contextual
analysis of the reasonableness of self-defence claims, of which imminence,
lack
of alternatives and proportionality are but relevant factors for
consideration.517
In England and Wales, self-defence requires
that the defendant was acting in response to what he or she perceived as an
“actual
or imminent unlawful assault” and that the defendant’s
actions were reasonable in the circumstances as he or she believed
them to
be.518 The degree of force is not to be regarded as having been
reasonable in the circumstances if it was “disproportionate in those
circumstances”, but the jury must take into consideration that a person
cannot “weigh to a nicety the exact measure of
his necessary defensive
action”, and evidence of a person having only done what they honestly
and instinctively thought
was necessary constitutes strong evidence that only
reasonable action was taken.519 The requirement for proportionality
is therefore interpreted flexibly, consistent with the approach in New Zealand.
In particular,
the use of a weapon by a woman against an unarmed but violent man
does not necessarily make their act unlawful, as the nature of
the threat must
be considered against the background circumstances.520 It is
recognised, however, that the continued requirement for imminence may exclude
cases in which the defendant acted in genuine
fear for their
life.521
THE ROLE OF BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME EVIDENCE
6.69
We have discussed above the problems with applying the concepts of
imminence, lack of alternatives and proportionality to victims
of family
violence. These problems are not new. In an effort to overcome these problems,
courts in New Zealand and overseas have
accepted evidence of battered woman
syndrome.522 This provides a framework within which the
jury
512 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 80.
513 At 83.
514 R v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852 at 876–877. See Campbell, above n 486, at 82–84. See also R v Petel [1994] 1 SCR 3 at [22].
515 R v Lavallee, above n 514, at 883.
516 At 880.
517 Citizen’s Arrest and Self-defence Act SC 2012 c 9, s 34. See also Vanessa MacDonnell “The New Self-Defence Law: Progressive Development or Status Quo?” (2013) 92 Can Bar Rev 301 at 317.
518 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 415, at 73.
519 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK), s 76, codifying the Privy Council decision in Palmer v R, above n 491, at 832. See Law
Commission of England and Wales, above n 415, at 75.
520 The Law Commission of England and Wales, endorsing the submission by HHJ Goddard QC. See Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 415, at 76.
521 At 78–79.
522 Robertson, above n 425, at 277.
86 Law Commission Report
6.70
6.71
6.72
6.73
can understand the circumstances of women who have suffered long-term
violence and enables appropriate assessment of the reasonableness
of these
defendants’ actions.523 The FVDRC notes that, without such
evidence, the fact a victim did not leave an abusive partner or seek help from
Police every time
they were assaulted or threatened is taken as evidence that
the abuse was not as bad as claimed or that the victim chose to stay
in the
situation and was, therefore, partially responsible for it.524 The
role and relevance of expert evidence is discussed in detail in the next
chapter. Below we identify the problems with battered
woman syndrome evidence in
the context of self-defence claims.
As we explained in Chapter 2,
battered woman syndrome is based on the theory that ongoing intimate partner
violence results in women
experiencing learned helplessness – the belief
that, whatever they do, victims cannot change their situation, so they make
no
attempts to break out of the cycle of violence.525
The
admissibility of battered woman syndrome evidence in criminal trials is
“beyond controversy” in New Zealand.526 Its relevance to
claims of self-defence is primarily to correct juror misconceptions they may
have about family violence and its
effect on victims.527 In R v
Zhou, an attempted murder case, the trial Judge explained battered woman
syndrome was relevant to “rebut a suggestion that she
could not have been
battered because she would have stopped seeing him”.528 In
R v Oakes, discussed at paragraphs [6.57]–[6.61] above, the Court
of Appeal confirmed its relevance to the defendant’s belief as
to the
nature and seriousness of the threat they faced, noting that a woman suffering
from the syndrome “may genuinely perceive
danger earlier than others
would, and a threat of more serious harm than others might
see”.529
The importance of expert evidence to explain
the effects of battered woman syndrome was also underlined in Oakes, when
the Court noted that “[experts] may provide an answer to questions which
would naturally occur to the average juror”.530 The Court
cited the Canadian case of R v Lavallee, which also confirmed the
relevance of expert evidence on battered woman syndrome to claims of
self-defence. In that case Wilson
J said:531
The average member of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for asking:
Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment?
Why should she continue to
live with such a man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of
requiring hospitalization?
We would expect the woman to pack her bags and go.
Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the
so-called ‘battered wife syndrome’. We need help
to understand it
and help is available from trained professionals.
However, despite the
Court of Appeal’s clear recognition of the relevance of expert evidence on
battered woman syndrome in Oakes, the Court went on to find that there
was no misdirection by the trial Judge in that case, even though there was only
one brief
reference to battered woman syndrome in the Judge’s summing up
and only in relation to the partial defence of provocation.532 The
impact of this has been noted:533
523 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 427, at 164.
524 Family Violence Death Review Commission submission at 12.
525 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 397, at xix.
526 Robertson, above n 425, at 277.
527 At 283.
528 R v Zhou, above n 453.
529 R v Oakes, above n 454, at 676.
530 At 679.
531 R v Lavallee, above n 514, at 871–872; and R v Oakes, above n 454, at 679.
532 R v Oakes, above n 454, at 682–683.
533 Seuffert, above n 427, at 321–322; and McDonald, above n 394, at
683.
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6.75
6.76
The crucial relevance of the entire context of abuse to Oakes's perception of
the circumstances and the reasonableness of a pre-emptive
strike in self-defence
was not clarified for the jury by the Judge. It appears therefore that the jury
may not have had any information
on the reasonableness of a pre- emptive strike
in the circumstances as Oakes believed them to be and the relevance of battered
woman
syndrome to those circumstances. Therefore it seems unlikely that the jury
could have grasped the relevance of Oakes's and the expert's
testimony as to
Oakes's fear on the night of the killing and her possible perception, due to an
ability to predict the abusive acts
of Gardner, that he would kill her that
night.
The Court of Appeal noted that, if the trial Judge had said more
about battered woman’s syndrome and its bearing on this case,
he could
have found it necessary to underline that the syndrome could explain why the
accused had deliberately killed the deceased,
and thus “provide a motive
for murder”.534 This “remarkable statement” has
been criticised as being apparently contrary to all the evidence given in the
case, and
in other cases, about the nature and effects of battered woman
syndrome.535 Commentators also argue that battered woman syndrome is
often interpreted as explaining the defendant’s subjective state of
mind,
but not the state of mind of a reasonable person in her position.536
In other words, evidence could be interpreted to explain that the
defendant had an unreasonable but understandable reaction, rather
than a normal
or reasonable response in the circumstances. In Oakes, for example, an
expert witness for the defence gave evidence that the defendant’s
“ability to reason rationally would
have been impaired” as a result
of suffering from battered woman syndrome,537 and the Court of Appeal
said:538
Whether or not Mrs Oakes was suffering from the battered woman’s
syndrome at the time ... was critical to self-defence ... for
without the
emotional fragility and the altered perception that are features of the syndrome
the poisoning could not be seen as a
reasonable or appropriate response to such
a threat as the deceased actually posed.
For these reasons, along with
the general criticisms of battered woman syndrome discussed in Chapter 2, many
commentators argue that
such evidence does not adequately inform judges and
jurors of the relevant effects of abuse and can in fact undermine a
defendant’s
claim to self-defence.539 Others, however consider
that despite its limitations, battered woman syndrome evidence has been useful
for educating juries about
the perceptions that women in situations of prolonged
family violence may develop.540
In its 2001 Report the Law
Commission recommended that the term “battered woman syndrome”,
or any use of the term
“syndrome” in this context be dropped and
that reference be made instead to the nature and dynamics of battering
relationships
and the effects of battering.541
In 2004 the VLRC
recommended a move away from battered woman syndrome evidence and towards the
use of expert evidence that focuses
on the social context of family
violence.542
534 R v Oakes, above n 454, at 682.
535 McDonald, above n 394, at 683; Seuffert, above n 427, at 322; and Jeremy Finn “Oakes – Case and Comment” (1995) 19 Crim LJ 291 at 293.
536 Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 509, at 468.
537 R v Oakes, above n 454, at 679.
538 At 679.
539 Crofts and Tyson, above n 394, at 881–882; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 427, at 287; McDonald, above n 394, at
683–684; Seuffert, above n 427, at 327; and Tarrant, above n 394, at 603–604.
540 Tasmania Law Reform Institute, above n 411, at 39; and Robertson, above n 425.
541 Law Commission, above n 429, at 6.
542 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 183–184.
88 Law Commission Report
SUBMITTERS’ VIEWS ON WHETHER THERE IS A PROBLEM
6.77
6.78
6.79
6.80
6.81
Almost without exception, submitters considered that a victim of family
violence should be entitled to rely on self-defence even
if the harm sought to
be avoided was not imminent or the fatal force was not strictly proportionate to
the threatened harm.
The FVDRC emphasised the need to assess the actions
of victims of family violence in the context of the threat they were
experiencing
because of their ongoing relationship with a violent perpetrator,
not just because of what was happening on any one particular occasion.
That
assessment must be informed by an understanding of family violence as a form of
entrapment. The FVDRC considers legislative
reform is necessary to address the
decision in Wang. It also notes the decision in Richardson
(discussed at paragraph [6.32] above), which it says has the potential to
present a further legal barrier for a victim of family violence
who is
responding to an omnipresent threat that has the potential to crystallise at any
point in time and that the Police are unable
to defuse.
The Auckland
Coalition for the Safety of Women and Children said that, all too often, the
assessment of what has occurred when the
defendant is responding to family
violence is “heavily influenced by male gendered normative notions of the
options available
to women victims of domestic violence”. They note a
number of factors that must be considered relevant to any consideration
of
self-defence in this context, such as whether the defendant had access to a
telephone, whether she could speak English, whether
she knew what agencies to
contact for help and what help she received in the past if she did make contact,
the size of the defendant
relative to the deceased, whether the deceased had
invaded the home of the defendant and whether the defendant had been raped by
the deceased. The idea that the use of a weapon means the use of force was
disproportionate is, the Coalition says, highly gendered
when a woman is unable
to defend herself effectively in any other way.
Members of the relevant
committees of the New Zealand Law Society543 were divided on this
issue. Some noted a major concern with the concepts of imminence and
proportionality and considered that the
approach in Wang needs to be
changed. They observed that imminence can act as a “roadblock” for
defendants because it requires a defendant
who has suffered cumulative abuse
over a lengthy period of time to artificially nominate a single point of
confrontation and wrongly
assumes threats of violence are always avoidable and
that a delayed threat will always allow for non-violent intervention. One member
also noted that the concept of imminence can be particularly problematic for
youth offenders and must be balanced against their ability
to foresee
consequences when they have themselves experienced abuse throughout their lives.
Other members, however, were equally
concerned that these conclusions were based
on unconfirmed assumptions about jury behaviour and that, while self-defence is
historical,
and applies mostly to male violence, this did not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that the existing law is inadequate for victims
of family
violence. We note, however, that our previous discussion focuses not on jury
verdicts for which reasons are unknown but
on authoritative statements of the
law by the higher courts.
The Criminal Bar Association and the Public
Defence Service also considered that section 48 should be amended to remove any
requirement
for imminence or proportionality where self- defence in the context
of family violence is in issue. The Public Defence Service noted,
however, that
proportionality should not be quite as significant an impediment as imminence,
because proportionality is assessed
in the circumstances as the defendant
believes them to be, which allows the defendant’s account of a history of
physical disadvantage
vis-à-vis the deceased to
543 The Criminal Law Committee, Youth Justice Committee and Family Law
Section.
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6.82
be introduced. They also noted that proportionality ties in with the need
to recognise that imminent harm is not a requirement for
use of force to be
reasonable, in light of the fact that, due to disparity in size and strength, a
pre-emptive strike may be justified.
An academic also noted that proportionality
should not be interpreted to permit disproportionate force in every case but
rather that
the concept of proportionality ought to be interpreted in light of
the context that force is used, including not only on the threat
of harm but
also the respective sizes of the parties and the history of abuse between the
parties.
Some submitters noted that, while they agreed that imminence and
proportionality should not be requirements, it should still be open
to the
court to reject a claim of self-defence because the harm was not imminent or
proportionate where those questions are central
to the assessment of
reasonableness. The few submitters that took a contrary view expressed concern
that the sanctity of life may
be diminished or that undeserving defendants might
exploit any change in the law.
THE COMMISSION’S VIEW
6.83
6.84
6.85
6.86
The problems in applying the concepts of imminence, lack of alternatives and
proportionality to an assessment of the reasonableness
of force used by a victim
of family violence are well known and widely accepted.
These concepts in
the context of family violence are problematic because they assume continued
association of self-defence with a
one-off confrontation rather than an ongoing
threat of harm. This association developed in the context of male violence
and
male standards of reasonableness. It jars with contemporary understandings
of the nature and dynamics of family violence and, as
one English commentator
notes, means that self-defence is “skewed to the detriment of women since
a defendant’s action
is only considered ‘reasonable’ when
killing is a proportionate response to an immediate threat of deadly
force”.544
The theory that underpins self-defence,
discussed in the previous chapter, is that the use of force is justified only if
it is “necessary”.
The jury assesses necessity by asking whether, in
the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, the force used was
reasonable.
The concern is that the concepts of imminence and proportionality
are not always indicative of necessity in the context of ongoing
family
violence. They can focus on the immediate circumstances to the exclusion of the
wider context, including the cumulative and
compounding nature of family
violence and the history of the relationship between the defendant and the
deceased. In practice, therefore,
these concepts can operate as a barrier or
unattainable threshold even where a defendant genuinely believes himself or
herself to
be at risk of death or serious injury, and that the use of force is
necessary to avert the risk.
This is not to say the concepts should be
abandoned or that every victim of family violence who kills an abuser should be
entitled
to an acquittal. As the Law Commission said in
2001:545
In many, perhaps most, situations, the use of force will be reasonable only if the danger is imminent because the defendant will have an opportunity to avoid the danger or seek effective help. However, this is not invariably the case. In particular, it may not be the case where the defendant has been subject to ongoing physical abuse within a coercive intimate relationship and knows that further assaults are
inevitable, even if help is sought and the immediate danger
avoided.
544 Susan Edwards “Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self Defence – The Law Commission’s Options for Reform” [2004] Crim L Rev 181 at
188, discussed in Elliot, above n 421, at 234.
545 Law Commission, above n 429, at 12.
90 Law Commission Report
6.87
We therefore consider, consistent with the Commission’s view in 2001,
that imminence and lack of alternatives should not be
strictly applied where a
victim of family violence claims self- defence and should not overshadow or
substitute the jury’s
assessment of whether the use of force was, in the
circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, “reasonable”.
We
also consider that, when a victim of family violence kills an abuser,
self-defence should not be excluded simply because the
force used by the
defendant is not strictly proportionate to the force used against the defendant
in the immediate circumstances.
The reasonableness of the force used must be
assessed in light of all the circumstances, including physical disparities and
the history
of abuse between the parties.
Is legislative reform necessary?
6.88
6.89
6.90
6.91
6.92
An important principle of law reform is that non-legislative alternatives to
achieving a policy objective are considered and unnecessary
legislation
avoided.546 Legislative reform to clarify the correct interpretation
of the law may, however, be preferred where it serves an important declaratory
or educative function. The VLRC, for example, observed that there was no
requirement for imminence or strict proportionality
in Australian common law but
nonetheless recommended that the substantive test for self-defence be clarified
in statute in order
to ensure jury directions dealt with the issues adequately
and to encourage a more careful analysis by jurors of self-defence claims,
particularly by victims of family violence.547
In New
Zealand, in 2001, the Commission recognised that section 48 did not require the
courts to exclude self-defence where a danger
was inevitable but not imminent.
However, the Commission considered it was preferable to make this explicit
through legislative reform,
rather than leave the law to be developed case by
case, because:548
Relying on the courts to develop the law may require a person to be convicted
and then to appeal successfully before the legal position
is clarified. While
the Court of Appeal would be free to change its earlier approach, a trial judge
may feel he or she is required
to follow the approach in Wang. Until the
Court of Appeal had dealt with the matter, the correct interpretation of section
48 would remain unclear, although some
trial judges may approach section 48 in
terms of inevitability.
Since then, as outlined above, the Court of
Appeal has not changed its approach to the requirement for imminence. Instead,
it has
continued to follow Wang, which the Supreme Court recently
recognised as part of the settled law of self-defence.549 In the
absence of any Court of Appeal or Supreme Court decision to the contrary High
Court judges would, therefore, be bound to follow
Wang. Since 2001,
however, an extensive body of literature has examined the operation of
self-defence and maintains that the concept of
imminence is problematic in the
context of victims of family violence who kill, which has led to targeted
reform in other jurisdictions.
For these reasons, we conclude the case
for reform to address the problems with the concept of imminence when
self-defence is claimed
by victims of family violence is made out. We discuss
the options for reform in the next chapter.
The requirement for
“reasonable proportionality” between the force used and the
perceived danger is, we consider, capable
of being interpreted in a manner that
takes into account the full circumstances of victims of family violence who use
defensive force.
The statements in Oakes
546 See the Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines: Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation (2014). This is also a requirement of the
Cabinet Manual: Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at [1.2].
547 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 395, at 80 and 83.
548 Law Commission, above n 429, at 12.
549 Vincent (CA), above n 451, at [8]–[10].
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and Afamasaga confirm that proportionality is assessed in the
circumstances as the defendant believes them to be. We do not, therefore,
consider
there is a need to clarify in legislation the operation of this aspect
of the test for self-defence. However, for this concept to
operate fairly for
victims of family violence, the “circumstances” considered must
include not only the physical disparities
between the defendant and their abuser
but also the history of abuse between the parties. These circumstances may be
explained through
direct evidence from the defendant as well as expert evidence
on the dynamics of family violence. We consider that the education
of judges,
lawyers and Police on the dynamics of family violence, recommended in Chapter 2,
is also critical to ensuring the full
circumstances are put before the
jury.
92 Law Commission Report
Chapter 7
Proposals to reform self-defence
INTRODUCTION
7.1
7.2
7.3
In the preceding chapter, we concluded that legislative reform was
necessary to address problems with the concept of imminence
when self-defence
is claimed by victims of family violence. We also observed the need for the
jury, in considering a claim of self-defence
by a victim of family violence,
to have a full understanding of the dynamics of the violent relationship
including the history
of violence, the defendant’s prior responses to that
violence and the effects of the violence on the defendant. Without a
full
appreciation of all the circumstances, a jury may find it difficult to
believe the defendant’s account or to understand
the defendant’s use
of force as reasonable.
In this chapter, we consider the options for
reform and make recommendations to:
. reform the substantive
law of self-defence to address the problems encountered with the
concept of imminence by victims of family violence; and
.
support the proper application of self-defence where a defendant is
responding to family
violence, in particular, by ensuring that relevant evidence is provided to
the jury and the relevance of that evidence to the legal
requirements of the
defence is understood.
In making these proposals for reform, we have
drawn on the experiences of comparable jurisdictions and on the substantial
body
of literature on this issue. We also refer to the Law Commission’s
previous recommendations in the 2001 Report.
PROPOSALS FOR SUBSTANTIVE REFORM
7.4
7.5
In this section, we consider the different options for substantive reform of
self-defence and whether reform should be limited to
victims of family violence
and/or homicide offences.
In the Issues Paper, we set out three different
options for substantive reform of self-defence:
. Option 1
– introduce a legislative provision clarifying that, under section 48,
the force used
by the defendant may be reasonable even though the defendant is responding to
harm that is not immediate or uses force in excess of
that involved in the harm
or threatened harm.
. Option 2 – amend section
48 to replace by statute the Wang concept of imminence with
that
of “inevitability”.
. Option 3
– introduce a new complete defence to extend the concept of
self-defence to apply
to the specific circumstances in which victims of family violence kill their
abusers out of necessity.
Option 1: Clarifying the test for self-defence
7.6
The first option we put forward in the Issues Paper was to clarify the
operation of section 48 in a new provision in the Crimes Act
1961. The intended
effect of such a provision would be to reverse the presumption in R v Wang
that a victim of family violence who kills their
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CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.7
abusive partner is not acting in self-defence unless the threat is capable of
being carried out immediately550 and to avoid undue emphasis being
placed on the proportionality of the level of force used by the defendant
against the force used
or threatened by the deceased. It would not alter the
substantive requirements of self-defence in section 48, only clarify how those
requirements should be applied. In particular, the concepts of imminence and
proportionality would remain relevant in assessing whether
the force used was
reasonable but would no longer act as a barrier or threshold for victims of
family violence to successfully relying
on self-defence.
Similar reforms
have been pursued in Victoria and Western Australia, and the operation of those
reforms is discussed below.
The Victorian self-defence reforms
7.8
In response to recommendations of the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) in its
2004 Report Defences to Homicide, the Victorian Crimes Act 1958 was
amended to include the following provision, now found in section 322M(1) of that
Act:551
Without limiting section 322K [self-defence], for the purposes of an offence
in circumstances where self-defence in the context of
family violence is in
issue, a person may believe that the person’s conduct is necessary in
self-defence, and the conduct may
be a reasonable response in the circumstances
as the person perceives them, even if—
(a) (b)
the person is responding to a harm that is not immediate; or
the
response involves the use of force in excess of the force involved in the harm
or threatened harm.
7.9
7.10
Bench Notes issued by the Judicial College of Victoria explain that this
provision “clarified existing law”, namely
that:552
... a person is not required to wait until an attack is in progress or
immediately threatened before using defensive force. S/he is
entitled to take
steps to forestall a threatened attack before it has begun (Osland v R
[1998] HCA 75; (1998) 197 CLR 316). Similarly, the force used is not required to be
precisely proportionate, as long as the accused believed it was necessary
(Zecevic v Director of Public Prosecutions [1987] HCA 26; (1987) 162 CLR 645) and the
conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances.
The operation of
the self-defence reforms were reviewed by the Victorian Department of Justice in
2010553 and again in 2013.554 In 2010, the Department
identified that the self-defence reforms had been relevant to two decisions to
discontinue proceedings where
there was clear evidence that the defendant had
killed a family member in response to ongoing family violence.555 It
concluded, therefore, that the reforms had “introduced significant
improvements to the criminal
550 R v Wang [1989] NZCA 290; [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA) at 536.
551 This provision was originally enacted in 2005 as s 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic).
552 Judicial College of Victoria Bench Notes: Statutory Self-Defence (Judicial College of Victoria, June 2015) at [75].
553 Victorian Department of Justice Defensive homicide: Review of the offence of defensive homicide: Discussion paper (August 2010).
554 Victoria Department of Justice Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform: Consultation Paper (September 2013) at vii–viii.
555 The first case involved a teenage girl (SB) who killed her stepfather
after four years of “relentless sexual abuse”.
She was threatened
with a shotgun and forced to perform a sexual act. In fear for her life, she
followed his demands, and immediately
after, she picked up the shotgun and shot
her stepfather in the back of the head. Rather than proceed to trial, the
Director of Public
Prosecutions decided to discontinue the prosecution on the
basis that no jury would find the defendant guilty given the circumstances
and
the volume of evidence supporting her testimony, and also taking into account
the new self-defence provisions. The second case
involved a 57-year-old woman
(Freda Dimitrovski) who killed her husband in response to an immediate, violent
attack. Dimitrovski
had been physically and psychologically abused by her
husband for over 30 years. During the attack, he hit her in the face and knocked
her to the ground in the presence of her daughter and four-year-old grandson.
When he attempted to attack Dimitrovski’s daughter,
she stabbed him with
a pocket knife. Following a three-day committal hearing the presiding Magistrate
concluded that the evidence
“overwhelmingly” supported a history of
abuse and discharged Ms Dimitrovski on the basis that she was not satisfied
there
was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict. See Victorian Department of
Justice, above n 553, at 30–32.
94 Law Commission Report
7.11
7.12
7.13
justice system in dealing with situations in which a woman kills in
response to long-term violence”.556
Some commentators,
however, caution that celebration of the success of the Victorian self- defence
reforms might be premature.557 Both cases in which proceedings had
been discontinued involved “traditional notions of self-defence”
and, in particular,
had concerned responses to an immediate threat.558
In 2013, the Department of Justice noted that the self-defence reforms had
still not been tested in the context of a non-immediate
threat. How the reforms
might operate in that context, the Department considered, was
“exceptionally difficult to answer in
the abstract”,559
but that:560
What is essential for these purposes is that it is well within the operation
of the laws of self-defence that a woman could be acquitted
on the basis of
self-defence in this situation. Whether that is the case as a matter of fact
would need to be determined by a jury
on a case by case basis.
Since
then, it appears self-defence has been successfully relied on in at least one
case where a victim of family violence (in that
case, the male de facto partner
of the deceased) killed an abusive partner in the context of a non-immediate
threat.561
We note that the full impact of the self-defence
reforms in Victoria may still be unknown, given the operation of defensive
homicide
in that jurisdiction until 2014. Defensive homicide, discussed in
Chapter 4, was noted by the Department of Justice as having the
unintended
effect of “shift[ing] the focus of debate from the adequacy of complete
self-defence to defensive homicide”.562
The Western Australian self-defence reforms
7.14
Self-defence in Western Australia was codified following a review of
homicide by the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia.563
Adopting the Commission’s recommendations to clarify the role of
imminence, the statutory provision on self-defence in that
jurisdiction now
requires that:564
(a) (b)
(c)
the person believes the act is necessary to defend the person or another
person from a harmful act, including a harmful act that is not imminent;
and
the person’s harmful act is a reasonable response by the person
in the circumstances as the person believes them to be; and
there
are reasonable grounds for those beliefs.
[Emphasis added]
556 At 32.
557 Kellie Toole “Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality before the New Victorian Law” [2012] MelbULawRw 7; (2012) 36 MULR 250 at 270. See also Danielle Tyson and others “The Effects of the 2005 Reforms on Legal Responses to Women Who Kill Intimate Partners” in Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Arie Freiberg (eds) Homicide Law Reform in Victoria: Retrospect and Prospects (The Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2015) 79.
558 Toole, above n 557, at 270.
559 Victoria Department of Justice, above n 554, at 24.
560 At 25.
561 DPP v Bracken [2014] VSC 94. The Hon Justice Marcia Neave, who was Chairperson of the Victorian Law Reform Commission at the time Defences to Homicide was published (Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) at 77), observes that the jury “must have accepted [Mr Bracken] was the victim of family violence”. She also observes that the expert evidence given in that case, given by a forensic psychiatrist, was likely to have been very important. See Marcia Neave “The More Things Change the More They Stay the Same: Homicide Law Reform in Victoria” in Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Arie Freiberg (eds) Homicide Law Reform in Victoria: Retrospect and Prospects (The Federation Press, Leichhardt, 2015) 9 at 11.
562 Victoria Department of Justice, above n 554, at viii.
563 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report (Project 97, September 2007).
564 Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 248(4).
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 95
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
7.20
The general operation of this provision was considered by the Supreme Court of Western
Australia in the case of Goodwyn v State.565 Buss JA
explained the law as follows:566
So, it is apparent that s 248(4) enumerates four elements. First, the accused
(subjectively) believes the harmful act is necessary
to defend the accused or
another person from a harmful act, including a harmful act that is not imminent
(s 248(4)(a)). Secondly,
the accused's harmful act is a reasonable (objective)
response by the accused in the circumstances as the accused (subjectively)
believes them to be (s 248(4)(b)). Thirdly, there are reasonable (objective)
grounds for the accused's (subjective) belief that
the harmful act is necessary
to defend the accused or another person from a harmful act, including a harmful
act that is not imminent
(s 248(4)(a) read with s 248(4)(c)). Fourthly, there
are reasonable (objective) grounds for the accused's (subjective) belief as
to
the circumstances (s 248(4)(b) read with s 248(4)(c)).
The first and
second elements are similar to the subjective and objective requirements in
section
48 of the New Zealand Crimes Act, but the third and fourth elements (derived from subsection
(c) of the Western Australian self-defence provision) are not applicable in
New Zealand.567
In relation to imminence, Mazza JA in
Goodwyn noted:568
The law as it previously stood assumed that self-defence would only arise in
a case of immediate threat which was required to be met
with an immediate
response. The current provisions contemplate a person acting in respect of a
harmful act which is not imminent.
The jury direction given by the trial
Judge in Goodwyn on the relevance of imminence to the first element (not
in issue on appeal) was as follows:569
The law says that people are not required to wait until they are injured or
killed, or other persons are injured or killed, before
defending themselves or
that person. They are entitled to use force before that situation arises. As
I've said, the threat need not
be imminent. It is sufficient if the person
believes that his act is necessary to defend himself from such a threatened
assault.
Accordingly, as one commentator has observed, the Western
Australian self-defence reforms “[put] it beyond doubt that response[s]
to on-going domestic violence can come within the defence whether or not the
accused responded at the time of a physical
attack”.570
Unlike the reforms pursued in Victoria, the
Western Australian self-defence provision is not limited to where family
violence is
in issue571 and does not clarify the requirement for
proportionality.572
Should Option 1 be limited to family violence?
7.21
A further issue is whether Option 1, if recommended, should be limited to
where a defendant is responding to family violence. Some
argue that any
clarification of self-defence should have general effect, as in Western
Australia, because it may be equally relevant
in non-family violence
situations. It may be relevant, for example, where a defendant is held hostage
and
565 Goodwyn v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 141.
566 At [95].
567 J Bruce Robertson “Battered Woman Syndrome: Expert Evidence in Action” [1998] OtaLawRw 7; (1998) 9 Otago L Rev 277 at 284.
568 Goodwyn v The State of Western Australia, above n 565, at [164].
569 At [69].
570 Stella Tarrant “Self Defence In The Western Australian Criminal Code: Two Proposals for Reform” (2015) 38 UWAL Review 1 at 7.
571 The extended definition of self-defence has been relied on outside the context of family violence in Western Australia. See for example Goodwyn v The State of Western Australia, above n 565.
572 Despite a recommendation from the Law Reform Commission of Western
Australia to clarify that a response may be reasonable even
though it is not
proportionate. See Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 563, at
172.
96 Law Commission Report
7.22
7.23
uses pre-emptive force.573 We recently published our Report
Strangulation: The case for a new offence, which recommends a separate
offence of strangulation to address the problems with prosecuting strangulation
offenders in the family
violence context. We concluded, however, that the new
offence should be of general application, as the problems identified are likely
to apply equally to other contexts, and the requirement to prove the presence of
family violence circumstances may impede prosecution.574 We
considered that limiting a new offence to family violence circumstances would
risk anomalous and inconsistent treatment of different
classes of offenders
whose conduct may be equally culpable.575
In this context,
however, any perceived widening of self-defence may lead to greater use of the
defence by those prone to violence.576 This was the experience in
Victoria in relation to defensive homicide, which, as we explained in Chapter 4,
was used primarily by
violent men rather than the victims of family violence
for whom it was intended. We note, however, that this risk cannot be entirely
avoided even if Option 1 were limited to family violence. For example, a
predominant aggressor could potentially claim they killed
a primary victim in
self-defence and seek to rely on Option 1, particularly if there is evidence of
a history of violence on both
sides.577
Further, if Option 1
has general application, there is a risk that achievement of the policy
objective of the reform – to accommodate
the experiences of victims of
family violence who kill in self-defence – could be undermined, as it
would not be apparent on
the face of the provision.
Option 2: Replace imminence with the concept of
“inevitability”
7.24
7.25
The second option is to amend section 48 itself to expressly replace the
Wang concept of imminence with a new concept of
“inevitability”.
This option arguably sits closer to the Law
Commission’s recommendation in its 2001 Report, which was to “make
it clear
that there can be fact situations in which the use of force is
reasonable where the danger is not imminent but is inevitable”.578
That view was endorsed by the VLRC and the draft provision it put forward
in its Report, Defences to Homicide, provided as
follows:579
Without limiting sub-section (2) [self-defence]–
(a)
(b)
a person may believe that the conduct is necessary; and
the
person’s response may be reasonable
7.26
when the person believes that the harm to which he or she responds is
inevitable, whether or not it is immediate.
This approach, however, was
not adopted in Victoria and has been criticised for several reasons.580
First, it is argued that the inclusion of a legal requirement of
“inevitability” would extend the current judicially
determined
parameters of self-defence, which might have the
573 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 80; Nicola Wake “‘His home is his castle And mine is a cage’: a new partial defence for primary victims who kill” (2015) 66 NILQ 149 at 158; and Elisabeth McDonald “Defending Abused Women: Beginning A Critique of New Zealand Criminal Law” (1997) 27 VUWLR 673 at 690.
574 Law Commission Strangulation: The Case for a New Offence (NZLC R138, 2016) at 39–40.
575 At 39.
576 Angelica Guz and Marilyn McMahon “Is Imminence Still Necessary? Current Approaches to Imminence in the Laws Governing Self-Defence in Australia” (2011) 13 Flinders LJ 79 at 101.
577 This issue is discussed further in Chapter 10 in relation to partial defences.
578 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001) at 12.
579 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 81 and 318.
580 AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law
(4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 528; Guz and McMahon, above n
576, at 103–104; Mark Campbell “Pre-Emptive
Self-Defence: When and
Why” (2011) 11 OUCLJ 79 at 93–95; and Kevin Dawkins and Margaret
Briggs “Battered Defendants and Criminal Defences” [2001] NZ L Rev
345.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 97
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.27
unintended consequence of allowing cases of uncertain merit to
succeed.581 For example, considering the dangerous nature of prison
environments or gang culture (both being contexts in which self-defence has
been
recently claimed – but rejected – in New Zealand),582
changing the test from imminence to inevitability might allow prisoners
and gang members to justify pre-emptive strikes on the basis
of inevitable
future harm from other prisoners or rival gang
members.583
Second, it is argued that it would be more
difficult for a jury to assess whether a danger is “inevitable”
compared
with “imminent”.584 Imminence is a measure of
proximity, whereas inevitability is a measure of “moral certainty”
and is almost impossible
to establish (because the future is unknowable), so
exactly how “inevitable” must a threat be to justify
self-defence?585
An inevitability standard may necessarily
involve speculation and dangerously raise the level of error when predicting
inevitable
violence at some future but unspecified point in time.586
A judge may need to give detailed directions to a jury to ensure they are
aware of the difference between imminence and inevitability,
and these issues
may result in a further body of appellate case law to clarify how
“inevitable” the threat must be.587 These issues were
considered by the VLRC when it recommended the provision set out at paragraph
[7.25] above.588 It concluded, however:589
The question of inevitability under this formulation focuses on the
subjective belief of the accused. There is no requirement that
inevitability be
established in an objective sense, nor is it implied that by establishing that
the accused believes the threat was
inevitable the objective test of
reasonableness will be satisfied. Rather, the provision aims to ensure that the
actions of an accused
person are not automatically excluded from the scope of
the defence on the basis that the harm threatened is not immediate. Ultimately
the question of whether the accused acted reasonably in self-defence will remain
one for the jury.
Option 3: A new self-defence provision for victims of family
violence
7.28
7.29
The third option we explored in the Issues Paper is a new, complete defence
that applies only where a defendant is responding to family
violence and focuses
on the underlying principle of self-defence – necessity. A separate
provision would exist alongside the
“traditional” self- defence
provision in section 48 and would be tailored to take account of the nature of
the danger
that victims of family violence face.
The Law Commission in
2001 considered but rejected a separate defence for victims of family violence,
considering it was preferable
that the general requirement of reasonableness in
section
48 be interpreted so that it can incorporate the use of defensive
force against violence that may not be
imminent.590
581 Dawkins and Briggs, above n 580, at 348–350; Guz and McMahon, above n 576, at 104; and Campbell, above n 580, at 95.
582 Vincent v R [2016] NZSC 15; and Afamasaga v R [2015] NZCA 615.
583 Guz and McMahon, above n 576, at 104.
584 Dawkins and Briggs, above n 580, at 348–349; Simester and Brookbanks, above n 580, at 528; and Guz and McMahon, above n 576, at 103.
585 Guz and McMahon, above n 576, at 103; and Campbell, above n 580, at 93.
586 Guz and McMahon, above n 576, at 103–104.
587 Dawkins and Briggs, above n 580, at 350; and Guz and McMahon, above n 576, at 103. Dawkins and Briggs also argue, at 348, that inevitability potentially blurs the justificatory underpinnings of self-defence and “edges closer to excusing the accused’s behaviour in acting out of a sense of fear or terror as an understandable human frailty”. However, as self-defence can apply where the defendant is operating under a genuine but mistaken belief, it is arguable that this distinction between justification and excuse in section 48 is already “blurred”. See Fairburn v R [2010] NZCA 44 at [39].
588 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 79–81.
589 At 81.
590 Law Commission, above n 578, at 29.
98 Law Commission Report
7.30
7.31
7.32
We are not aware of any comparative jurisdictions adopting a separate,
complete defence for victims of family violence. Queensland
is the only
jurisdiction to have a specific defence for victims of family violence, but
that only operates as a partial defence
to murder.591 A new
complete defence was proposed, but not adopted, in Western Australia by the
Taskforce on Gender Violence, established by the
then Chief Justice the Hon
David Malcolm AC QC.592 The Taskforce proposed a new complete defence
formulated as follows:593
Conduct is carried out by a person in self-defence if the person is
responding to a history of personal violence against herself or
himself or
another person and the person believes that the conduct was necessary to defend
himself or herself or that other person
against the violence.
Law reform
bodies that have addressed this issue have generally considered it preferable if
existing general defences are made capable
of accommodating the experience of
family violence victims rather than introducing separate defences for this
specific category of
defendant.594 The risks of creating a separate
defence were identified by the Australian and New South Wales Law Reform
Commissions in their joint
report on family violence in
2010:595
The Commissions consider that criminal defences should not recognise the
circumstances of family violence victims in an ‘atypical
context’,
or typecast the reactions of family violence victims who kill as the product of
‘extraordinary psychology.’
There is substantial force in
stakeholders’ arguments that separate, family-violence specific defences
may result in the differential
treatment of persons who have killed in response
to family violence, compared with those who have killed in response to non-
familial
violence. To this end, it is preferable for family-violence related
circumstances to be integrated into existing defences of general
application. In
the Commissions’ view, existing defences–in particular
self-defence–are doctrinally capable of
accommodating the diverse
situational and psychological circumstances of family violence
victims.
The Commissions concluded that any problems associated with the
practical application of general defences should be addressed by
improving the
existing defences in the family violence context, through legislative
clarification and guidance where necessary,
and professional education and
training for lawyers and the judiciary.596
Submitters’ views on the options for substantive
reform
7.33
7.34
Most submitters preferred Option 1 over Options 2 or 3. Reasons included that
it was the least risky option for reform and that it
struck the right balance in
addressing any risk of undue emphasis being placed on the concepts of imminence
and proportionality,
whilst leaving them as relevant factors to be considered
by the courts.
The Family Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC), the
Criminal Bar Association, the Public Defence Service and most members of the
relevant committees of the New Zealand Law Society597 favoured Option
1. The FVDRC submitted that Option 1 should also include a requirement that the
threat be assessed in the context
of the victim’s ongoing relationship
with a violent perpetrator, not just what was happening on any one occasion.
Another submitter
noted that section 48 is a clear, principled statement of the
law and thus any reform should be carefully drafted as a clarification
rather
than an extension.
591 The Queensland defence is discussed in Chapters 4 and 10 of this Report.
592 Taskforce on Gender Bias Report of the Chief Justice’s Taskforce on Gender Bias (1994).
593 At 214. See Law Commission, above n 578, at 27–28.
594 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 68.
595 Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission Family Violence — A National Legal Response (ALRC R114 and NSWLRC R128, October 2010) at 649–650.
596 At 650.
597 The Criminal Law Committee, Youth Justice Committee and Family Law
Section.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 99
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
Submitters were divided on whether Option 1 should apply generally or only
where a defendant is responding to family violence. Reasons
for limiting Option
1 to family violence included the distinctive features of intimate partner
violence compared with other forms
of interpersonal violence and the risk of
unmeritorious arguments in respect of other forms of interpersonal violence. The
New Zealand
Law Society also noted that applying the proposed reform more widely
would diminish the weight that should be given to victims of
family violence in
trying to change perceptions and understandings of the dynamics of family
violence. However, committee members
of the Law Society differed as to how
Option 1 should be limited. Some considered it should be limited to victims of
family violence,
while others believed that fairness requires its availability
to any defendant who is subjected to duress to a similar degree or
of the same
nature outside a familial relationship, for example, non-familial elder
abuse.
Those who submitted that Option 1 should have general effect
included the Auckland District Law Society and the Criminal Bar Association,
who cited the need to protect other equally vulnerable defendants. The Criminal
Bar Association considered that the risk of it being
used by defendants who, in
the overall interests of justice, ought not be able to could be addressed by a
requirement that the judge
make a finding, on the basis of expert reports, that
imminence and proportionality could be dispensed with. They said that, in
effect,
this would require the judge to determine that the defendant had been
affected by a history of family violence. Several other submitters,
including
the Public Defence Service and the Auckland Crown Solicitor’s Office,
noted the need for further research and consultation
if Option 1 were to have
general effect.
Some submitters preferred Option 2. However, the
FVDRC noted that the concept of inevitability in the hands of those who
do
not understand entrapment could actually raise the standards that primary
victims are expected to meet if they are to successfully
establish self-
defence. One submitter was concerned that Option 2 could narrow the current
statutory test of reasonableness and
restrict its development, while another
submitter was concerned it could be interpreted too widely. The Public Defence
Service was
also concerned that Option 2 carries the potential to blur the
justificatory underpinnings of self-defence, noting that any amendment
that sees
section 48 becoming “excuse based” should be
avoided.
Submitters in favour of Option 3 included the Auckland Crown
Solicitor’s Office, which considered Option 3 to be less nuanced
and
potentially problematic than the other options. The Auckland Coalition for the
Safety of Women and Children also preferred Option
3, noting that different
treatment is needed in this context because the circumstances in which victims
of family violence kill
are quite different from homicide committed in other
contexts. The Public Defence Service considered, however, that self-defence
can
sufficiently accommodate the situational and psychological circumstances of
family violence. One submitter preferred a separate
defence that applies more
broadly to victims of family violence who commit other offences when acting
under coercion. Another submitter
proposed a new defence drawing on elements
from duress, necessity and self-defence.
The Commission’s views and recommendations
7.39
7.40
The Commission considers that Option 1, clarifying the operation of section
48 in a new provision in the Crimes Act, is the best mechanism for achieving
the policy objective of reform, which is ensuring that self-defence properly
accommodates the
experiences of victims of family violence who commit
homicide.
Because Option 1 does not expressly introduce any new concepts,
it has the advantage over Options 2 and 3 of minimising the risks
of unintended
consequences and of introducing complexities of interpretation that could
result in a further body of case law. In
relation to Option 2, while we agree
that self-defence should not be excluded in circumstances where the
100 Law Commission Report
7.41
danger is inevitable but not imminent, we consider the objective of this
option, and of the Commission’s recommendation in the
2001 Report, can be
achieved through Option 1 with a lower risk of adverse consequences. Given the
problem arises not with the wording
of section
48 but with the way in which
the section has been applied, in our view, it is undesirable to amend section 48
itself.
We also prefer Option 1 to Option 3 because, while Option 3 has
the advantage of enabling the law to be drafted with the particular
circumstances of victims of family violence in mind, we are concerned about the
risk of perpetuating different, unequal treatment
of this group of defendants.
We agree with the Law Commissions of Australia, New South Wales, Victoria and
Western Australia that,
where possible, the application of existing homicide
defences should be improved to ensure substantive equality in the law, rather
than introducing new defences.598 We consider that self-defence can
and should accommodate the diverse situational and psychological circumstances
of family violence
victims.
What should the proposed reform cover?
7.42
7.43
7.44
7.45
In Chapter 6, we concluded that Wang remains authority for the need
for an “imminent or immediate threat [with] no alternative
available”.599 In relation to the concept of proportionality,
however, we concluded that the law of self-defence is capable of accommodating
the
experiences of victims of family violence who use a level of force during an
immediate confrontation that may not be strictly proportionate
to the force used
or threatened against them, especially when expert evidence is adduced.600
We are concerned, therefore, that clarifying the operation of section 48
in respect of proportionality would do little to change the substantive
approach. We are also aware of the risk that such a clarification
could invite
confusion, and could risk a suggestion that unreasonable,
“excessive” force could be considered legitimate
self-defence.
Where the issues of imminence and proportionality are
interrelated (as they were in Wang), we consider that removing a
requirement for imminence will necessarily require the jury to look beyond the
immediate circumstances
and undertake a broader contextual analysis of whether
the use of force was reasonably proportionate, by reference not to the single
preceding event but in anticipation of a future of repeated violence.
We
therefore recommend that the Crimes Act be amended only to overrule the
requirement in Wang for an imminent threat. This would bring the
interpretation and application of self-defence in the context of family
violence
in line with the comparable jurisdictions of Australia (at common
law601 and in the statutory self-defence provisions of Victoria and
Western Australia) and Canada.602 Under such a provision, imminence
would remain a relevant consideration in the jury’s assessment of
self-defence claims,
as it remains so in Victoria and Western
Australia.603 Self-defence would, however, in the words of the
Supreme Court of Western Australia, “contemplate a person acting in
respect
of a harmful act which is not imminent”.604
We
have considered the view of the Criminal Law Reform Committee, responsible for
drafting what is now section 48, that the substantive provision on self-defence
should not include a list of evidentiary guidelines for the courts, as that
would
be “unwise and unhelpful in relation to
598 See Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 68; and Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 563, at 289.
599 Afamasaga v R, above n 582, at [47]; and R v Wang, above n 550, at 536.
600 We discuss expert evidence below from paragraph [7.58].
601 Zecevic v DPP [1987] HCA 26; (1987) 162 CLR 645.
602 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the operation of self-defence in those jurisdictions.
603 Guz and McMahon, above n 576, at 110.
604 Goodwyn v The State of Western Australia, above n 565, at
[164].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 101
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.46
self-defence, where the question is one of fact to be decided in the light of
an infinite variety of circumstances in different cases”.605
While we agree with that approach in principle, we are satisfied that the
problems identified with the concept of imminence in the
previous chapter, and
the recent statements of approval of Wang by the Supreme Court in
Vincent606 and the Court of Appeal in Afamasaga607
justify an exception to that approach to overrule Wang.
We
therefore recommend that the Crimes Act be amended to include a provision
clarifying that section 48 may apply even where a person is responding to a
threat that is not imminent. We do not make recommendations as to the precise
wording
of such a provision. This would be an appropriate task for the
Parliamentary Counsel Office in conjunction with the Ministry of
Justice. Such
a provision must, however, be carefully drafted so that the threat need not be
imminent in order for either the subjective
or objective elements of
self-defence to be satisfied, that is, a defendant may believe that the use of
force was necessary and the use of force may be reasonable where a threat
is not imminent. The provisions in Victoria and Western Australia may be useful
examples, but we note that the tests for self-defence in those jurisdictions
differ from section 48.
Should the proposed reform be limited to family
violence?
7.47
7.48
7.49
While the concept of imminence may also be problematic for defendants other
than victims of family violence, given the limitations
of our terms of
reference and the time constraints on this project, we have not been able to
consider properly the position of other
defendants. Without this additional
work, we are concerned about the risk of unintended consequences of recommending
reform with
general application. These risks are significantly higher than the
risks identified in recommending an offence of strangulation
with general
application608 and, in our view, require a narrower approach. We
are also persuaded of the merit in explicitly identifying the context of
family
violence in promoting changes in perceptions and improvements in
understandings of the dynamics of family violence.
For these reasons, we
recommend that the proposed reform be limited to the context of family
violence. We acknowledge that this
cannot entirely exclude the risk of
predominant aggressors or other “unmeritorious” defendants claiming
that they acted
in self-defence when they used force against an intimate partner
or other family member. We think, however, the risk of such defendants
establishing a probative evidentiary foundation for self-defence in these
circumstances is low, given the continued requirement for
objective
reasonableness.609 We also note that, in such circumstances, the
trial judge would be able to exercise his or her discretion and
either:
. withhold the question of self-defence from the
jury, if satisfied that no jury could entertain a
reasonable doubt on the issue (discussed below at paragraphs
[7.100]–[7.103]; or
. rule any evidence proposed
to be adduced as irrelevant to the question of self-defence and
inadmissible, pursuant to the general rules of admissibility in the Evidence
Act 2006.
Because the proposed reform is intended only to clarify the
application of section 48 in the specific context of family violence,
we do not
consider there is a need for any further threshold or procedure for defendants
seeking to rely on the proposed reform.
605 Criminal Law Reform Committee Report on Self Defence (Report 15, November 1979) at 8.
606 Vincent v R, above n 582, at [9]–[10].
607 Afamasaga v R, above n 582, at [47].
608 Law Commission, above n 574, at 39–40.
609 A similar finding was made by the Law Reform Institute of Tasmania when endorsing the Victorian model provision in s 322M of the Crimes
Act 1958 (Vic). See Tasmania Law Reform Institute Review of the Law
Relating to Self-defence (Final Report No 20, 2015) at 67.
102 Law Commission Report
Defining family violence
7.50
7.51
7.52
7.53
7.54
A further issue that is raised when limiting the proposed reform to family
violence is what we mean by “family violence”.
We discussed our use
of this term in Chapter 2. The Crimes Act does not include a definition of
family violence. The Domestic Violence Act 1995, however, defines domestic
violence as “violence
against that person by any other person with whom
that person is, or has been, in a domestic relationship”.610
“Violence” encompasses physical, sexual and psychological
abuse, including intimidation, harassment, threats and financial
or economic
abuse.611 A “domestic relationship” includes
relationships between spouses, partners, family members, others who are
ordinarily
members of the same household and close personal friends.612
That definition is also used in the Evidence Act 2006.
In Victoria,
section 322J of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) defines family violence in relation to
a person to include “violence against that person by a family
member”. The definitions of “violence” and “family
member”
are similar to the definitions in the New Zealand Domestic
Violence Act, although the definition of family member is inclusive rather
than
exhaustive.
The FVDRC considers that the existing definition of domestic
violence is problematic because it does not accord with contemporary
understanding of family violence as a cumulative pattern of harm.613
It argues the existing definition supports an incident-based response to
domestic violence rather than a consideration of each person’s
role in the
intimate relationship abuse history.614 The FVDRC also identifies
that an unintended consequence of the current definition is that defensive
behaviour by primary victims
can be misconstrued as acts of
perpetration.615
The Ministry of Justice is currently
reviewing family violence legislation. Included within this review is a
consideration of the
legal definition of domestic violence. The Ministry has
sought views on whether it is up to date and whether principles could more
clearly guide how the law is implemented.616
The Commission
considers it is appropriate that any definition of family violence for the
purposes of the proposed reform be consistent
with the definition of domestic
violence in the Domestic Violence Act, incorporating any amendments that may be
recommended by
the Ministry of Justice as part of its current review. We note,
however, that there may be merit in defining family violence in
an inclusive
rather than exhaustive fashion for the purposes of the proposed reform (by
stating that family violence includes rather than has the same meaning
as domestic violence in the Domestic Violence Act).
Should the proposed reform be limited to homicide?
7.55
7.56
Finally, we have considered whether the proposed reform should be limited to
homicide. Our reference is limited to victims of family
violence who
kill. However, self-defence is a general defence that can also be
claimed in relation to offences such as attempted murder and
assault.
Limiting the proposed reform to murder and manslaughter would
give rise to anomalies. A
clear example would be a victim of family violence who is charged with
attempted murder. This
610 Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 3(1).
611 Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 3(2). Section 3(5) also confirms that a single violent act may amount to abuse and that a number of acts that form a pattern of behaviour may amount to abuse for that purpose, even though some or all of those acts, when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial
612 Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 4(1).
613 Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 30.
614 At 30.
615 At 30.
616 Ministry of Justice Strengthening New Zealand’s legislative response to family violence: A public discussion document (Wellington, August 2015) at
10.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 103
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.57
issue was identified by the VLRC when it recommended similar reforms limited
to homicide in Victoria. The VLRC recommended serious
consideration be given to
their application to offences more generally.617 In 2013, the
Victorian Department of Justice considered this issue and determined that the
application of the VLRC’s recommendations
should not depend simply upon
whether a person dies or not as a result of the defendant’s
conduct.618
On balance, we consider that the proposed reform
should not be limited to murder or manslaughter charges. Unlike the issue of
whether the proposed reform should be limited to family violence, where there
clearly may be unintended consequences of general application,
here, the risk of
unintended consequences arises if we do not have general application in
terms of the offence charged. Limiting the proposed reform to homicide would
create anomalies in the law
depending on whether the defendant’s use of
force was lethal. We therefore recommend the proposed reform not be limited to
homicide offences.
RECOMMENDATIONS
R5 A new provision should be inserted into the Crimes Act 1961 to ensure that, where a person is responding to family violence, section 48 may apply even if that person is responding to a threat that is not imminent.
R6 The Ministry of Justice should consider whether the term
“family violence” should be consistent with the definition
of
domestic violence in the Domestic Violence Act 1995, incorporating any
amendments that may be made following the Ministry of Justice’s
current
review of domestic violence legislation, or whether an inclusive definition of
family violence is preferred, including, but
not limited to, the definition of
domestic violence in the Domestic Violence Act 1995.
PROPOSALS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
7.58
7.59
If the requirement for imminence is removed from self-defence, we consider
the defence is, in substance, capable of accommodating
the experiences of
victims of family violence, typically women, who kill their abusers. However,
problems will remain in the application of the law if the jury does not
adequately understand the general dynamics of family violence and the
defendant’s experiences
specifically.619 As the Australian and
New South Wales Law Reform Commissions noted in 2010, “a focus on the
doctrinal content of defences is
insufficient to ensure that the experiences of
family violence victims who kill are accommodated in
practice”.620
In Chapter 2, we explained that
misunderstandings and misconceptions of family violence persist today and
recommended further education
on the dynamics of family violence for those
working within the criminal justice system. In this section, we consider
proposals to
ensure that a jury, considering a claim of self-defence by a victim
of family violence, understands the full circumstances of the
defendant’s
actions, including the dynamics of their relationship with the deceased, the
history of violence in that relationship
and its effects on the
defendant.
617 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 157 and 326.
618 Victoria Department of Justice, above n 554, at 43.
619 Julia Tolmie “Defending Battered Defendants on Homicide Charges in New Zealand: The Impact of Abolishing the Partial Defences to Murder” [2015] NZ L Rev 649 at 681; Toole, above n 557, at 252; and Anthony Hopkins and Patricia Easteal “Walking in Her Shoes: Battered women who kill in Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland” (2010) 35 Alt LJ 132 at 134.
620 Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform
Commission, above n 595, at 651; and Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Julie
Stubbs
“Divergent directions in reforming legal responses to lethal
violence” (2012) 45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology
318 at 331.
104 Law Commission Report
Relevance of family violence evidence
7.60
7.61
7.62
In a criminal trial, the context and circumstances of the alleged offending
are presented to the jury through evidence introduced
by the prosecution and the
defence. This includes evidence of facts and, in some cases, expert opinion
evidence. In self-defence
claims, evidence will assist the jury to assess the
nature of the threat faced, the defendant’s state of mind and whether his
or her actions were reasonable in the circumstances.
Where a victim of
family violence claims self-defence, evidence of prior family violence will be
critical to the jury’s understanding
of the circumstances. The VLRC
explained the relevance of this evidence to the elements of self-defence as
follows:621
For jurors, the application of force or use of a weapon by those who are
subjected to abuse, particularly in non-confrontational circumstances,
may
raise issues about the reasonableness of the accused’s belief in the need
to use fatal force. Jurors may believe there
were other options available to the
accused to escape the violence, or that the use of a weapon was out of
proportion to the nature
of the threat. Jurors may also have questions about the
honesty of the accused’s belief in the need to use force to defend
himself
or herself because of the apparently planned nature of her actions. The broader
context of prior violence will often be critical
to the jury’s evaluation
of whether the accused acted in self- defence.
Even where evidence of
prior family violence is admitted, however, persisting myths and
misunderstandings may mean that the significance
of prior family violence may
be missed or that jurors, relying on their own limited knowledge, may
make unjustified behaviour
assumptions or rely on illegitimate reasoning when
assessing that evidence. For this reason, many acknowledge the importance of
evidence
on the general dynamics of family violence given by experts on this
topic. As some commentators note:622
Juries will commonly need assistance, for example, in understanding why
leaving may not resolve domestic abuse, why failed attempts
to get help might
make future help-seeking by the victim more difficult or dangerous, why there
may be few independent witnesses
to corroborate the accused’s account, why
the accused may have made allegations of violence in the past and recanted, and
why
her story may take some time to fully emerge. In fact it may only emerge as
a truthful and complete account after considerable time
has passed and perhaps
even then only within a relationship of trust. Expert testimony will be
particularly significant in understanding
past retaliatory violence by the
accused.
Admissibility of family violence evidence in New
Zealand
7.63
7.64
Evidence of fact is generally admissible under the Evidence Act 2006 where it
is relevant to a fact in issue.623 Expert opinion evidence is
admissible if the fact-finder “is likely to obtain substantial help from
the opinion in understanding
other evidence in the proceeding or in
ascertaining any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
proceeding”.624
An expert is someone “who has
specialised knowledge or skill based on training, study, or
experience”.625 The judge must determine whether the expert
witness is properly qualified to
621 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 134–135.
622 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Securing Fair Outcomes for Battered Women Charged with Homicide: Analysing Defence
Lawyering in R v Falls” [2014] MelbULawRw 25; (2014) 38 MULR 666 at 690–691.
623 Evidence Act 2006, s 7. Subsection (3) states that evidence is relevant “if it has a tendency to prove or disprove anything that is of consequence to the determination of the proceeding”. See also Mathew Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA7.1]; and Richard Mahoney and others The Evidence Act 2006: Act and Analysis (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2010) at 39–47. Evidence may be excluded, however, if its probative value is outweighed by the risk that the evidence will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding, or needlessly prolong the proceeding: Evidence Act 2006, s 8. Certain exceptions also apply to hearsay evidence (Evidence Act 2006, ss 16-22) and prior consistent statements (Evidence Act 2006, s 35). We are not aware of any problems with the operation of these exceptions in this context.
624 Evidence Act 2006, s 25. See also Downs, above n 623, at [EVA25.1]–[EVA25.13]; and Mahoney and others, above n 623, at 95–103.
625 Evidence Act 2006, s 4.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 105
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.65
testify. Parties may also agree on a statement of expert opinion rather than
calling witnesses to give evidence.
Evidence of battered woman syndrome
has been accepted in New Zealand courts to “disabuse jurors of
misconceptions they may have
about the nature of domestic violence and its
effect on women exposed to it”.626 Battered woman syndrome
evidence is regarded as “syndrome evidence”, usually given by
qualified forensic psychologists
and forensic
psychiatrists.627
Is there a need for a family violence evidence
provision?
7.66
7.67
7.68
Cases involving victims of family violence who kill their abusers are rare,
and we have not identified any legal difficulties with
admitting evidence of
prior family violence to support claims of self-defence under the Evidence Act.
However, in the previous
chapter, we identified the broader concern that the
focus on the immediate circumstances of the alleged offending, consistent with
the stereotypical self-defence scenario of a one-off violent confrontation with
a stranger, may mean juries are less likely to
hear evidence of prior family
violence (as it is not seen as relevant to the claim of self-defence).
Furthermore, where such evidence
is introduced, it may be for the limited
purpose of understanding the circumstances of the immediate event and may not be
sufficient
to enable a jury to gain a proper understanding of all the
circumstances of the killing.628
We also discussed in the
previous chapter the problems with battered woman syndrome, in particular, that
it promotes a rigid, limited
view of women’s experiences and behaviour
that overemphasises their psychological reactions. In light of these problems,
commentators
and law reform bodies have recommended redefining the scope of
expert evidence on family violence to place a greater emphasis on
the broader
social context of a defendant’s situation and to reflect the current state
of knowledge about the nature and dynamics
of family violence and its
effects.629 It is argued that expert evidence on family violence in
self-defence claims can perform a wide range of useful functions,
including:630
. educating jurors on the phenomenon
of family violence;
. addressing common
misconceptions;
. bridging the gap between the legal
requirements of self-defence and the defendant’s evidence,
for example, by explaining why the defendant’s actions could be
objectively reasonable, given their perception of danger or
their belief that no
lesser measure could have protected him or her; and
.
supporting the defendant’s credibility, by explaining his or
her state of mind and normalising
aspects of their behaviour or demeanour that may be troubling for the
jury.631
We also note that funding constraints and
availability of suitably qualified experts may impact detrimentally on the use
of expert
evidence in these cases. Most homicide defendants rely on legal aid
funding. Under the legal aid framework, lawyers must apply for
prior approval
of funding for an expert witness. Approval will only be granted if the lawyer
can demonstrate why the expert’s
attendance is required, how it will
contribute to a successful outcome for their client
626 Robertson, above n 567, at 283.
627 At 282.
628 Stella Tarrant “Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law and Laws” (1990) 20 UWAL Rev 573 at 599.
629 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 172–173; and Tarrant, above n 570, at 19–21.
630 Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 622, at 690–691.
631 For example, assisting the jury in determining whether the defendant
did in fact fear for her life by explaining the heightened
sensitivity of a
primary victim to the predominant aggressor’s acts: R v Lavallee
[1990] 1 SCR 852 at 882.
106 Law Commission Report
7.69
and confirm that any potentially less expensive sources of evidence have been
considered.632 We also understand that there is a small pool of
expertise on family violence in New Zealand, with perhaps as few as six or eight
people properly qualified as experts in this field.
Finally, we note the
observations of the Hon Justice Stevens of the Court of Appeal in 2015 about
inconsistent reliance on expert
evidence generally (albeit by prosecutors, not
defence counsel) across New Zealand:633
The practice of Crown solicitors and prosecutors, in determining whether to
seek to adduce such evidence, is not uniform across New
Zealand. This is a
matter of discretion for individual prosecutors and regional variations have
emerged. My enquiries suggest in
some regions, such as Rotorua, it is considered
that juries are well-equipped to deal with complex family dynamics and the
concomitant
issues that arise in these sexual assault cases. In Tauranga,
however ... counter-intuitive evidence is seen by the Crown as serving
a useful
educative function.
Family violence evidence provisions in Australia
7.70
7.71
7.72
In its Report Defences to Homicide, the VLRC
concluded:634
A broader understanding by jurors of what it must be like for a victim of
abuse to live in a situation of ongoing and serious violence
is crucial to the
further development of self-defence. Without a proper appreciation of the
circumstances of the accused, including
the nature of the threat he or she
faced, and other personal circumstances, juries are unlikely to be able to make
an informed assessment
of whether the accused acted in
self-defence.
While the VLRC recognised family violence evidence was
generally accepted by the courts, it recommended providing specific guidance
in
legislation:635
... the importance of this evidence in supporting a plea of self-defence has
persuaded us that its status should be clarified in legislation.
This will avoid
any unnecessary arguments concerning its relevance and ensure the range of
factors which may be necessary to represent
the reality of the accused’s
situation are readily identified.
The Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) was
subsequently amended to include a provision that, in circumstances where
self-defence in the context of family violence
is in issue, “evidence of
family violence” may be relevant to determine whether the defendant
carried out conduct while
believing it to be necessary in self-defence, or
whether their conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances as the
defendant
believed them to
be.636
632 Legal Services Commissioner Legal Aid Disbursement Policy: Criminal (Ministry of Justice, 31 March 2014) at 13.
633 Justice Stevens “Counter-Intuitive Evidence in Sexual Assault Cases: Current Issues and Future Solutions” (paper presented to the Triennial
District Court Judges’ Conference, Wellington, 14 May 2015) at 5.
634 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 140.
635 At 140 and 184.
636 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 322M(2).
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 107
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.73
The legislation includes an extensive definition of what is meant by
“evidence of family violence”, which provides:637
Evidence of family violence, in relation to a person, includes evidence
of any of the following—
(a)
(b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
the history of the relationship between the person and a family member,
including violence by the family member towards the person
or by the person
towards the family member or by the family member or the person in relation to
any other family member;
the cumulative effect, including psychological
effect, on the person or a family member of that violence;
social,
cultural or economic factors that impact on the person or a family member who
has been affected by family violence;
the general nature and dynamics of
relationships affected by family violence, including the possible consequences
of separation from
the abuser;
the psychological effect of violence on
people who are or have been in a relationship affected by family
violence;
social or economic factors that impact on people who are or
have been in a relationship affected by family violence.
7.74
7.75
7.76
Subsections (a) to (c) relate to evidence of prior family violence.
Subsections (d) to (f) recognise the relevance of expert social
context
evidence. The VLRC endorsed the view that the people best qualified to give
expert evidence on family violence are likely
to include those with direct
experience of working with victims of family violence and with knowledge of
current research in the
field.638
An independent review of
the operation of the Victorian provisions in 2015 identified an increased
awareness by legal professionals
of the relevance of family violence in homicide
cases and noted that the provisions made it more likely that family violence
will
be considered and linked to the defendant’s actions and the
available defences.639
The Victorian provisions were endorsed
by the Australian and New South Wales Law Reform Commissions in 2010,
recommending that the
criminal legislation in each state and territory of
Australia provide guidance about the potential relevance of family
violence-related
evidence in the context of a defence to homicide, “given
its importance in these circumstances”.640 The Law Reform
Commission of Western Australia, the New South Wales Select Committee on
Provocation and the Tasmania Law Reform Institute
also endorse specific family
violence evidence provisions, often citing the important educative function it
would serve for the
legal profession and the broader community.641
In 2010 Queensland introduced a provision to clarify that evidence of the
history of the domestic relationship between the defendant
and the person
against whom the offence is committed is admissible in relation to certain
offences.642
637 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 322J(1). Subsection (2) defines various terms, and subsection (3) confirms that a single act of violence, and a number of acts forming part of a pattern of behaviour, may amount to abuse for the purposes of the definition in subsection (2).
638 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 185.
639 Mandy McKenzie, Debbie Kirkwood and Danielle Tyson “‘Unreasonable’ self-defence?” (2013) 2 DVRCV Advocate 12 at 15; and Tyson and others, above n 557, at 92. The authors concluded, however, that there was limited use of the Victorian evidence provision and that the potential of the reforms to challenge gender-based stereotypes around self-defence has not yet been fully realised. They call for improvement through comprehensive, consistent and ongoing training for prosecution and defence counsel, judges, expert witnesses and other legal professionals.
640 Australian Law Reform Commission and New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 595, at 652–654.
641 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 563, at 293; Government of New South Wales Government response to the report of the Legislative Council Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation (2013) at 185–186; and Tasmania Law Reform Institute, above n 609, at 63–64.
642 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132B.
108 Law Commission Report
Submitters’ views on introducing family violence
evidence
7.77
7.78
7.79
7.80
7.81
In the Issues Paper, we asked submitters whether they considered there was a
problem with admitting family violence evidence under
the Evidence Act 2006
and whether a specific evidence provision similar to the Victorian provision
should be introduced in New
Zealand.
Submitters generally agreed that
evidence of prior family violence should be admissible in cases involving claims
of self-defence.
However, they did not identify any particular problems with the
current operation of the Evidence Act. The Law Society considered
there may be
problems around the “relevance” requirement in section 7, but the
current rules were generally flexible
enough to deal effectively with family
violence evidence. One academic noted, however, that the test of
“substantial helpfulness”
for expert evidence is a high
threshold.
Around half of submitters were in favour of introducing a
family violence evidence provision. Some emphasised the need to move on
from an
approach focused on the defendant’s psychology and battered woman
syndrome. Others, however, including the New Zealand
Law Society and the Public
Defence Service, noted that education and guidance around the myths and
misconceptions of family violence
could mitigate the need for such a
provision.
Some submitters also noted individuals with field experience
and an understanding of the contemporary social science of family violence
should be considered “qualified” to give expert opinion evidence,
even if they do not possess formal qualifications
as a psychologist or
psychiatrist. One expert we spoke with, however, noted that those with field
experience may not be best placed
to give this evidence if they appear to be
advocates and that medical professionals may be preferred for their perceived
neutrality.
We also asked submitters whether they favoured a family
violence evidence provision being included in the Crimes Act or the Evidence
Act. Most submitters considered the Evidence Act was the logical place for an
evidential provision. The minority
of submitters who preferred an amendment to
the Crimes Act argued it would have an important educative function, and it
would be more likely lawyers would be appraised of the provisions in
the context
in which they were relevant.
The Commission’s view and recommendations
7.82
7.83
7.84
As commentators note, family violence:643
... is particularly difficult to convey in the criminal justice context
because it spans a period of time (often lengthy), has a cumulative
impact on
those who survive it that affects how they see and respond to the world, is a
pattern of behaviour rather than an event
or events, is hidden, has been
culturally minimised, and is more complex than an account of the physical
incidents of violence that
have taken place would suggest.
Rules of
evidence do not determine the elements of self-defence, but they affect how a
case is prepared and a defendant’s story
is heard at trial.644
In this context, where victims of family violence usually rely on
self-defence in the “non-stereotypical” scenario of
an ongoing
threat posed by an intimate partner and where myths and misconceptions around
family violence persist, we consider there
is substantial value in a family
violence evidence provision to encourage a proper assessment of self-defence
claims at trial.
A statutory amendment based on the Victorian evidence
provision would draw attention to the evidence that would normally be considered
relevant in order to fully represent the defendant’s
643 Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 622, at 707.
644 Tarrant, above n 570, at 20.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 109
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.85
7.86
7.87
circumstances to the jury. The trial judge would still have a role, under the
Evidence Act, to determine the admissibility of such
evidence in individual
cases. We also expect that clarifying the relevance of expert evidence would
lead to greater reliance on
experts at trial. Such a provision would operate
alongside Recommendation 5 above, which recommends a new provision clarifying
that section 48 may apply even if a person is responding to a threat that is not
imminent, to provide a comprehensive package of
reform focused on improving the
way in which the experiences of victims of family violence are accommodated in
the application of self-defence.
We have considered whether such a
provision should be included in the Crimes Act or the Evidence Act. We recognise
that there might be some merit in including it in the Crimes Act, if, as some
submitters suggested, it may have greater visibility in that Act and thus
better serve its educative purpose. It is
not unusual for evidential issues
specific to certain offences or defences to be addressed in that Act.645
However, evidential issues should normally be addressed in the Evidence
Act, and on balance, our preference is that this provision
be included in that
Act.
We endorse the view that people with experience in the field, as
well as those with formal qualifications such as psychiatrists
and
psychologists, might qualify as “experts”. We consider the Evidence
Act is capable of providing such recognition,646 and therefore do
not make any further specific recommendations in this regard.
Consistent
with our views on amendments to self-defence at paragraph [7.57] above, we do
not recommend that the family violence
evidence provision should be limited to
homicide offences. We also refer to our discussion at paragraphs
[7.50]–[7.54] above
as to the appropriate definition of “family
violence”.
RECOMMENDATION
R7 The Evidence Act 2006 should be amended to include provisions based on sections 322J and
322M(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) to provide for a broad range of family
violence evidence to be admitted in support of claims of self-defence and to
make it
clear that such evidence may be relevant to both the subjective and
objective elements in section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961.
OTHER PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Jury directions
7.88
In addition to the introduction of expert evidence, another way to correct
any misconceptions and assumptions about family violence
is through the
judge’s directions to the jury. In jury trials, it is the role of the
judge to direct the jury on the relevant
law and facts in issue. Jury directions
should be tailored to the particular facts of the case and questions in
issue.647 Trial judges are guided by higher court decisions on
appropriate directions and by the guidance set out in the Criminal Jury Trial
Bench Book, maintained by the Institute of Judicial
Studies.648
645 See, for example, s 75 of the Crimes Act 1961 that relates to evidence of treason, which is an offence under s 73 of that Act. See also s 112 relating to evidence of perjury, false oath or false statement.
646 The provisions in the Evidence Act 2006 dealing with expert evidence in criminal proceedings are sections 4 (definition of expert) and 25 (admissibility of expert opinion evidence). See also Downs, above n 623, at [EVA25.1]–[EVA25.13]; and Mahoney and others, above n 623, at
14 and 93–104.
647 Simpson v R [2010] NZCA 140 at [100], citing R v Tukaki CA360/05, 14 June 2006 at [12].
648 The Bench Book is a reference guide, based on Court of Appeal
decisions, for High Court judges issuing directions to the jury.
Unlike the
Crown Court Bench Book in the United Kingdom, it is not publicly available. See
Christopher Pitchford Crown Court Bench Book - Directing the Jury
(Judicial Studies Board of England and Wales, 2010).
110 Law Commission Report
7.89
7.90
Some jury directions are prescribed by legislation. The Evidence Act includes
jury directions about unreliable evidence, offering
evidence in different ways,
warnings about giving undue weight to evidence that a defendant lied and
warnings of special caution
in relying on identification
evidence.649
Legislated “standard” jury
directions, intended to correct erroneous beliefs juries may hold, are rare.
There is only
one example in the Evidence Act in the context of sexual
offending. Section
127 provides:
127 Delayed complaints or failure to complain in sexual
cases
(1)
(2)
Subsection (2) applies if, in a sexual case tried before a jury, evidence is
given or a question is asked or a comment is made that
tends to suggest that the
person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed either delayed
making or failed to make
a complaint in respect of the offence.
If this
subsection applies, the Judge may tell the jury that there can be good reasons
for the victim of an offence of that kind to
delay making or fail to make a
complaint in respect of the offence.
7.91
7.92
7.93
7.94
The advantage of legislating for a specific jury direction to address juror
misconceptions is that it can fill a “gap”
where expert evidence is
not introduced. However, if it is too removed from the facts of the case, it may
be unlikely to have any
positive effect. Research suggests, in the context of
sexual offending, jury directions aimed at addressing stereotypical and biased
expectations of witness behaviour may be more effective in preventing
preconceptions if given at the beginning of the trial.650 Directions
given later, during the judge’s summing up of the case, may have little or
no effect on verdicts.651
The Supreme Court recently
considered the different methods for addressing juror misconceptions in
sexual offending cases in
DH v R.652 It
observed:653
We do not think it is appropriate to be prescriptive about how erroneous
beliefs or assumptions are best to be countered in criminal
trials. Judicial
directions, s 9 statements and expert evidence are all possibilities. We do,
however, consider that a cautious approach
needs to be taken to the ambit of
expert evidence given at trials of this kind to ensure that such evidence is
confined to what would
be substantially helpful, there is focus on live issues
and that the evidence is not unduly lengthy or repetitive and is expressed
in
terms that address assumptions and intuitive beliefs that may be held by jurors
and may arise in the context of the trial.
Jury directions of the type used in England and Wales on topics where there
is a general acceptance of the topic are a worthwhile
alternative to expert
evidence. If all the areas that would otherwise be covered by expert evidence
are amenable to jury direction,
this would obviate the need for the evidence and
it would no longer be substantially helpful. If not, the jury directions could
reduce
the scope of the evidence to topics not covered in the
directions.
Accordingly, jury directions may be appropriate to counter
juror misconceptions where there is a general acceptance of the topic and
little
controversy. If a topic is amenable to judicial direction, then that may reduce
the need for expert evidence.
In Victoria, VLRC in its Report Defences
to Homicide recognised that while those with expertise in family violence
are best placed to address misconceptions, the trial judge has an
important
649 Evidence Act 2006, ss 122–124 and 126.
650 Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley “Evidence Issues” in Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley (eds) From “Real Rape” to Real Justice: Prosecuting Rape in New Zealand (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2011) 371 at 372.
651 At 372.
652 DH v R [2015] NZSC 35, [2015] 1 NZLR 625.
653 At [110]–[111].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 111
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
role in assisting the jury to recognise the significance of prior violence
and to make the connections between expert evidence
and the issues at
trial.654 Where expert evidence is not led, the judge’s
directions to the jury take on even greater significance. However, the VLRC did
not favour legislating to require a set jury direction to be delivered when a
history of family violence is
raised:655
7.95
7.96
The Commission accepts that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to
jury directions will not allow sufficiently flexibility.
Moreover, we think that
a standard charge suffers from the fundamental difficulty of the trial judge
intruding into territory which
belongs exclusively to the jury. But it is in
many cases vital, if the trial is to be fair, that relevant matters be brought
to the
jury’s attention. In our view, this should be the role of social
framework evidence, and of the experts who are appropriately
qualified to give
it. The trial judge will play an important role in highlighting the relevance of
a history of abuse, and of the
social framework evidence, to the particular
facts in issue in the case.
Subsequently, however, in 2014, the
Victorian Government introduced a standard jury direction aimed at juror
misconceptions around
family violence, observing that many members of the
community do not fully understand the dynamics of family violence and that
jury directions can play an important role in addressing juror
misconceptions.656
The Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) provides
that, where requested by defence counsel or the defendant, the trial judge must
give a direction on certain matters
unless there are good reasons for not doing
so.657 The direction may be given at any time during the
trial.658 Where relevant, the judge must inform the jury that
self-defence is in issue and that evidence of family violence may be relevant
to
determining whether the defendant acted in self-defence.659 The
judge may also include any of the following matters in the direction:
(a)
that family violence—
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
is not limited to physical abuse and may include sexual abuse and
psychological abuse;
may involve intimidation, harassment and threats of
abuse;
may consist of a single act;
may consist of separate acts
that form part of a pattern of behaviour which can amount to abuse even though
some or all of those acts
may, when viewed in isolation, appear to be minor or
trivial;
(b)
if relevant, that experience shows that—
(i)
(ii)
people may react differently to family violence and there is no typical,
proper or normal response to family violence;
it is not uncommon for
a person who has been subjected to family violence—
(A)
(B)
to stay with an abusive partner after the onset of family violence, or to
leave and then return to the partner;
not to report family violence
to police or seek assistance to stop family
violence;
654 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 561, at 188–193.
655 At 192.
656 (20 August 2014) VicPD LA 2834.
657 Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), s 58.
658 Section 58(5).
659 Section 59.
112 Law Commission Report
(iii)
decisions made by a person subjected to family violence about how to address,
respond to or avoid family violence may be influenced
by—
(A)
(B)
family violence itself;
cultural, social, economic and personal
factors;
(c)
that, as a matter of law, evidence that the accused assaulted the victim on a
previous occasion does not mean that the accused could
not have been acting in
self-defence or under duress (as the case requires) in relation to the offence
charged.
7.97
7.98
7.99
In the Issues Paper, we sought views on the desirability of a statutory jury
direction and asked what matters it should address. Those
submitters in favour
included the Public Defence Service, who thought there would be little utility
in adopting Recommendation 5
above without an accompanying jury direction, and
the FVDRC, who noted the importance of jury directions to address the
misunderstandings
surrounding the cumulative and compounding effect of family
violence and victim entrapment. Members of the relevant committees of
the New
Zealand Law Society660 noted, however, a lack of evidence that
acquittal or conviction rates are a result of misconceptions and were concerned
that a “one
size fits all approach” would be misguided. Experts in
jury research we spoke with stressed the importance of any jury directions
being tailored and flexible and noted that judicial education could lead to
appropriate jury directions in any event. One submitter
recommended that any
supporting legislative reforms be deferred until the operation of any changes to
section 48 can be reviewed.
In the Commission’s view, it is
preferable that juror misconceptions be addressed by expert evidence rather
than through the
judge’s direction to the jury. While we note there may be
an issue with expert availability, given the relative infrequency
of these
cases, we think that the issue is best addressed by encouraging greater use of
expert evidence. This is the intended effect
of Recommendation 7 above which
provides a clear statement of the type of evidence that may be relevant to
claims of self-defence.
In relation to jury directions on the operation
of self-defence if Recommendation 5 is adopted, we are of the view that
appropriate
jury directions will naturally follow. An express jury
direction is, therefore, unnecessary.
Withholding self-defence from the jury
7.100
7.101
A final issue in relation to self-defence is the role of a trial judge to
withhold claims of self- defence from the jury. In R v Wang, the Court
of Appeal confirmed that a trial judge may withhold self-defence from the jury
if he or she considers no jury could
properly regard the defendant’s use
of force as reasonable.661 This has been confirmed in subsequent
cases.662
The Law Commission in its 2001 Report considered
that the determination of what is reasonable force in self-defence calls
for
the application of community values, and contrary to Wang, that issue
should always be left to the jury.663 The Commission observed that a
judicial filter would remain because a trial judge would still have to decide
whether, on the evidence,
there was a reasonable possibility that the defendant
intended to act defensively.664
660 The Criminal Law Committee, Youth Justice Committee and Family Law Section.
661 R v Wang, above n 550. This case is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 at paragraphs [6.24]–[6.28].
662 Fairburn v R [2010] NZSC 159, [2011] 2 NZLR 63; and Vincent v R, above n 582.
663 Law Commission, above n 578, at 14–15.
664 At 14.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 113
CHAPTER 7: Proposals to reform self-defence
7.102
7.103
This issue was considered by the Court of Appeal in R v
Bridger.665 In that case, the appellant argued, consistent with
the Commission’s recommendation in 2001, that the question of the
reasonableness
of the force used in the perceived circumstances should always be
left as a matter for the jury.666 However, the Court considered that
a distinction between ruling upon whether the accused might possibly have been
acting defensively
and ruling upon whether, in so acting, the accused used no
more than reasonable force was:667
... more than a little artificial since the question of whether the accused
acted purely defensively in the perceived circumstances
is surely to be assessed
in part by reference to what the accused did in response to those circumstances
... Although the reasonableness
of the response is a separate question, it is so
closely connected with whether the response was defensively motivated that we
can
see no sensible reason for allowing the Judge to make an assessment of the
first two matters but not the third in deciding whether
self-defence should be
left to the jury.668
An assessment of reasonableness involves
the application of the community’s sense of justice. Community views on
what is reasonable
can, and do, change over time. We consider that only in
exceptional cases should the issue of self-defence be withheld from the jury
if
there is evidence of a reasonable possibility that the defendant intended to act
in self-defence. Vincent may be regarded as such a case.669
However, we do not consider there is a need to recommend a change to the
general operation of section 48 in this regard. We note the Court of
Appeal’s comments in Bridger, as quoted in paragraph [7.102]
above. Further, as we apprehend it, the problem identified in the
Commission’s 2001 Report was the Court’s decision to withhold
self-
defence in the case of Wang on the basis that an imminent threat was not
made out on the evidence. While we agree self-defence should have gone to the
jury
in that case, the effect of Wang is most appropriately mitigated by
legislative reform to remove the requirement for imminence rather than by
limiting judicial discretion
to withhold claims of self-defence from the jury.
We therefore make no recommendations in this
regard.
665 R v Bridger (2002) 19 CRNZ 676 (CA).
666 At [15].
667 At [20].
668 The three matters referred to in this quote are the three elements of self-defence discussed in Chapter 5: (a) What were the circumstances as the accused honestly believed them to be? (b) In those circumstances, was the accused acting in the defence of himself or another? (c) Was the force used reasonable against the circumstances as the accused believed them to be?
669 In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial Judge’s
decision to withhold self-defence from the jury, and the Supreme
Court dismissed
the appellant’s leave to appeal. The defendant was a prison inmate who
stabbed another inmate four times in
the neck. The attack followed an incident
on the exercise yard four days earlier where it was alleged the victim
deliberately kicked
a basketball towards Mr Vincent. At trial, the appellant
claimed he was acting pre-emptively in self-defence in response to a threat
of
future violence from the victim. The decisions of the trial Judge, Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court are discussed in Chapter
6. See Vincent v R,
above n 582; and Vincent v R [2015] NZCA 201.
114 Law Commission Report
RECOGNISING REDUCED CULPABILITY
CHAPTER 8: The conceptual framework for reduced culpability
Chapter 8
The conceptual framework for reduced
culpability
INTRODUCTION
8.1
8.2
In Chapter 3, we introduced some aspects of the law of homicide and the key features of the 24
New Zealand cases we have identified in which victims of family violence
have been prosecuted for killing their abusers since 2001.
In Part 2 we examined
how the law of self-defence applies to these defendants. Self-defence is a
complete defence to a charge of murder or
manslaughter. A person who
successfully defends a homicide charge on grounds of self-defence will be
acquitted.
In this part, we put self-defence to one side and turn to
consider cases where a homicide cannot be justified but the defendant can
point
to circumstances that reduce their culpability. Building on our introductory
discussion of homicide law in Chapter 3, we consider
how the law deals with
people who commit homicide in extenuating or mitigating circumstances:
.
In this chapter, we consider the range of ways the law can provide
for recognition of reduced
culpability for homicide.
. In Chapter 9, we
build on the summary of our case review in Chapter 3 and look in more
depth at recent New Zealand cases of homicide by victims of family violence.
We consider whether the cases reveal any problems or
gaps in this area of the
law.
. In Chapters 10 and 11, we explore whether a partial
defence for victims of family violence is
justified and whether New Zealand’s sentencing law is fit for purpose for these defendants.
The main mechanisms: charge and sentence
8.3
There are two principal means by which reduced culpability may be recognised
in homicide cases:
. The charge: instead of a charge
of murder, a person may be charged with a lesser offence
such as manslaughter or infanticide. These are less serious types of
homicide. Even if a person is charged with and tried for murder,
a jury may find
them guilty of manslaughter or, in appropriate cases, infanticide. This could be
the outcome for a number of reasons,
as we discuss in Chapter 9.
.
The sentence: in some countries, murder attracts a mandatory
life sentence. In others, a
person convicted of an unlawful killing, including murder, may be sentenced
in a way that reflects their individual level of culpability
within the
offence category, whether murder, manslaughter or some lesser offence. New
Zealand’s murder sentencing rules fall
somewhere between mandatory and
discretionary. The mandatory life sentence was abolished in 2002, but there
remains a strong presumption
in favour of life imprisonment and prescriptive
rules for minimum periods of imprisonment where a life sentence is imposed.
Furthermore,
in
116 Law Commission Report
2010, the so-called three strikes legislation introduced outright mandatory
sentencing for certain repeat violent offenders, including
murder and
manslaughter.670
8.4
As we noted in the Issues Paper, over the past 15 years there has been
significant law reform activity in New Zealand and overseas
that has addressed
victims of family violence who commit homicide and the role of charging, partial
defences and sentencing in recognising
reduced culpability. It is apparent
from this body of work that there is a range of ways reduced culpability can
be taken into
account. A great deal turns on the circumstances of and prevailing
attitudes in individual jurisdictions and their wider homicide
law.671
SETTING THE SCENE: TWO ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
8.5
8.6
To illustrate how charging and sentencing decisions may enable recognition
of reduced culpability for homicide, it is useful to
consider two New Zealand
cases – those of Tikiahi Erstich and Jacqueline
Wihongi.672
Erstich and Wihongi are not the only
cases we could have selected to contrast the different means by which the law
may recognise reduced culpability for
homicide, but they stand out. Having
committed homicide when he was just 14 years old, Tikiahi Erstich is the
youngest defendant
in our case review. Ms Wihongi’s case, as noted in
Chapter 3 and discussed in the following chapters, is significant in large
part
because the Court of Appeal considered the circumstances in which the
presumption of life imprisonment for murder may be displaced
for offenders who
kill after severe and prolonged abuse.
Tikiahi Erstich
8.7
We noted the case of 14 year old Tikiahi Erstich in Chapter 2.673
In 2001, after he had been subjected by his father to a 10-year
“reign of terror” that included beatings with pipes and
sticks,
having his head battered against hard surfaces and being thrown against walls,
Tikiahi Erstich shot and killed his tormentor
at point-blank range. He was
charged with murder and, at trial, relied on the partial defence of
provocation,674 which the jury apparently accepted because it
returned a verdict of manslaughter. He was ultimately sentenced to a two-year
suspended
term of imprisonment, imposed by the Court of Appeal following a Crown
appeal against sentence.675
Jacqueline Wihongi
8.8
8.9
We summarised the facts and disposition of R v Wihongi in Chapter
3,676 and so we reiterate only immediately salient points
here.
In 2009, Jacqueline Wihongi fatally stabbed her partner. She was in
her early 30s and had suffered years of sexual and physical violence,
including
gang rape, at the hands of the deceased and others. She was charged with murder
and pleaded not guilty. She did not rely
on self- defence or the partial defence
of provocation, and the jury convicted her of murder. She
was
670 Sentencing and Parole Reform Act 2010. We consider the implications of the three strikes law for victims of family violence who commit homicide in Chapter 11.
671 See discussion at paragraph [10.36] below, and the footnotes therein.
672 R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA); and R v Wihongi HC Napier CRI-2009-041-2096, 30 August 2010 [Wihongi (HC)]; R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775 [Wihongi (CA)]; and R v Wihongi [2012] NZSC 12 [Wihongi (SC)].
673 At paragraph [2.11].
674 The partial defence of provocation was available until December 2009 when it was repealed by the Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment
Act 2009.
675 Tikiahi Erstich was initially sentenced in the High Court to a sentence of two years’ supervision with special conditions: R v Erstich, above n
672.
676 At paragraph [3.31].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 117
CHAPTER 8: The conceptual framework for reduced culpability
ultimately sentenced by the Court of Appeal to a 12-year term of
imprisonment. She was spared life imprisonment because the Court
of Appeal found
that sentence would be manifestly unjust in the circumstances.
Observations
8.10
8.11
8.12
These cases share two important features. The first is that it is
probable both defendants were found to have killed with murderous
intent.677 The second is that, in both cases, it was recognised
that the defendants’ culpability was, in differing ways, reduced
because
of the violence they had suffered before the killings.
The
outcomes in these cases demonstrate how partial defences and sentencing can
reflect reduced culpability for homicide. In Erstich, the partial defence
of provocation likely meant the defendant was convicted of manslaughter, rather
than murder, and sentenced on
that basis, while Ms Wihongi, who did not rely on
a partial defence, was convicted of murder. Despite this difference, both
offenders
received sentences that took account of their personal circumstances.
Tikiahi Erstich’s sentence reflected the violence he
had suffered, his
youth and rehabilitative prospects and his low risk of future offending.678
Ms Wihongi was sentenced as a murderer but also in recognition of her
personal circumstances. In combination with her cognitive
deficits, Ms
Wihongi’s history of abuse justified displacement of the presumption of
life imprisonment,679 although her level of risk together with the
need to deter and denounce the taking of a life were found to require a 12-year
finite
term.680
New Zealand law no longer includes the partial
defence of provocation or any other relevant partial defence,681 and
so if Tikiahi Erstich was tried today, he could not defend the murder charge on
that basis. A key question in this part is
whether there is a need for a
partial defence for cases of this kind or whether reduced culpability can
– and should –
be recognised principally through sentencing, as it
was in Ms Wihongi’s case.
OPTIONS FOR RECOGNISING REDUCED CULPABILITY
8.13
There is a range of options for recognising reduced culpability during the
criminal justice process in homicide cases.
Degrees of homicide
8.14
Some argue a murder-manslaughter bifurcation is, in itself, problematic,
and it would be preferable to divide murder by degrees
to better distinguish
grades of blameworthiness for homicide.682 In 2006, the Law
Commission of England and Wales concluded that the offences of murder and
manslaughter in that jurisdiction had been
strained to accommodate
“changing and deepening understandings of the nature and degree of
criminal fault and the emergence
of new
677 For Ms Wihongi, this follows from the conviction for murder, while in Tikiahi Erstich’s case, the sentencing Judge acknowledged the jury’s verdict “may have reflected acceptance of lack of intent to murder” but observed it “was more likely on the facts of the case to have entailed the jury’s acceptance of the partial defence of provocation”: R v Erstich, above n 672, at [2].
678 At [27].
679 Wihongi (CA), above n 672, at [88].
680 At [98].
681 While infanticide and killing pursuant to a suicide pact (Crimes Act 1961, ss 178 and 180) are available as pathways to lesser convictions in certain narrow groups of cases that would otherwise meet the criteria for murder, there are no general partial defences in New Zealand. For the purposes of this Report, we largely disregard infanticide and killing pursuant to a suicide pact. As Warren Brookbanks has noted, they are closely circumscribed (infanticide) and rarely engaged (killing pursuant to a suicide pact): Warren Brookbanks “Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 271 at 271. They are also not relevant in cases where victims of family violence kill abusers. We refer to infanticide insofar as it may be some precedent for a separate homicide offence for victims of family violence but not otherwise.
682 See for example Brenda Midson “Degrees of blameworthiness in
culpable homicide” [2015] NZLJ 220 at 234. See also Jeremy Horder
Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2012) at 92.
118 Law Commission Report
8.15
partial defences” and recommended that murder be split into first and second degree offences.683
The Commission considered that questions about who should be labelled a
“murderer” had become identified with questions
about
punishment.684 This recommendation was not taken up, but degrees of
murder are used in Canada685 and in American law686 and
have previously been proposed in New Zealand.687
The ambit of
New Zealand’s homicide offences and the merit of degrees of murder is
beyond the scope of this reference. By their
nature, these issues go wider than
victims of family violence who commit homicide. We therefore do not explore them
in this Report,
although we touch on associated questions as we review options
for distinguishing degrees of culpability, through partial defences
and
sentencing, in Chapters 10 and 11.
Partial defences
8.16
8.17
8.18
A partial defence may arise when a person is charged with murder. If
successfully relied on, a partial defence results in a lesser
conviction of
manslaughter, even where the homicide otherwise fits the criteria for murder.
A partial defence cannot be invoked
if a person is charged with manslaughter
(or any other criminal offence). This serves to illustrate that these defences
were originally
a way to circumvent the capital punishment for murder.688
Creation of sentencing discretion is not the only contemporary explanation
for partial defences, however. Other frequently cited rationales
are fair
labelling, the desirability of sharing assessments of culpability between the
judge and the jury, ensuring homicides are
not “overcharged” as
murder and minimising perverse conviction outcomes.
New Zealand repealed
its only general partial defence – provocation – in December
2009689 after two Law Commission reports recommending abolition in
2001 and 2007.690 On both occasions when it recommended repeal, the
Commission concluded it was irrational to single out provocation (or anything
else)
as capable of reducing an intentional killing to manslaughter and
emphasised that the defence was anachronistic.691
We discuss
the arguments for and against partial defences in Chapter 10.
A specific homicide offence
8.19
It is a feature of partial defences that, if accepted, they always lead
to a conviction for manslaughter. Because of the breadth
of offending
manslaughter captures, a manslaughter conviction in itself conveys little
information.692 The Law Commission noted this in
2007.693
683 Law Commission of England and Wales Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 2006) at 4.
684 At 9.
685 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 231.
686 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 683, at 25.
687 Degrees of Murder Bill 1996 (157). See also Midson, above n 682, at 234; and Law Commission Battered Defendants (NZLC PP41, 2000) at 46.
688 See discussion in Nicola Lacey “Partial Defences to Homicide: Questions of Power and Principle in Imperfect and Less Imperfect Worlds ...” in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds) Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 107 at 111. See also Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 683, at 48.
689 Crimes (Provocation Repeal) Amendment Act 2009.
690 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001); and Law Commission The Partial
Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, 2007).
691 Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, above n 690, at 41–42; and Law Commission The
Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 690, at 11 and 72.
692 The range of killings manslaughter captures is more or less wide depending on how a particular jurisdiction’s homicide law is structured. It includes cases of “involuntary” manslaughter, which are unlawful killings that are not murder because of the absence of murderous intent and, where partial defences exist, cases of “voluntary” manslaughter, which are unlawful killings that are not murder even though the defendant may have killed with that intention. See AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington,
2012) at 560. See also Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 690, at 53. We consider the implications of this potentially wide capture in connection with the “fair labelling” argument for partial defences, in Chapter 10.
693 Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n
690.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 119
CHAPTER 8: The conceptual framework for reduced culpability
8.20
8.21
8.22
Other than in provocation cases, the Commission observed, cases of
manslaughter in New Zealand “are all unintentional killings,
perhaps
arising from careless or dangerous driving, medical misadventure, or a misjudged
assault”.694
An alternative and perhaps preferable way
to recognise reduced culpability is a separate homicide offence. Separate
homicide offences
have the advantage of not “lumping together”,
under a common manslaughter label, people who kill intentionally in mitigated
circumstances with people who may have had no intention to kill or even injure;
they may avoid straining the scope of manslaughter
and achieve clearer
labelling.695
Examples of specific offences include
infanticide,696 which exists across common law jurisdictions,
and, of more recent vintage, Victoria’s now-repealed “defensive
homicide”.
Defensive homicide was in substance akin to a partial defence
of excessive self-defence, but the Victorian Government preferred to
enact a
separate offence partly on the basis it would confer more accurate information
for sentencing.697
The merits of a new homicide offence are
considered alongside our discussion of partial defences in Chapter 10.
Charging practices and jury decisions
8.23
8.24
8.25
Sometimes a decision to charge the lower-level offence of manslaughter or to
substitute a charge of murder with manslaughter is in
itself a way to recognise
a person’s reduced culpability for homicide.698
An
apparent example in the context of family violence is R v Woods,699
in which the defendant was charged with the murder of her partner after
stabbing him twice in the upper chest. Just before trial,
a charge of
manslaughter was substituted when Ms Woods offered to plead guilty to that
charge. The sentencing Judge accepted “unreservedly
the sincerity and
integrity of [the defendant’s] remorse”.700 She also
noted that Ms Woods had responded to her family’s view she should have
claimed self-defence with the explanation that
“she would ‘never be
able to live with [herself]’ if she were acquitted”.701
We understand from the prosecutor in Woods that, while there was an
evidential basis to put murder to the jury, there were both evidential and
public interest reasons that supported
amending the charge to manslaughter. This
suggests that, within New Zealand’s current homicide offence structure,
there may
be scope for recognition of reduced culpability at the charging
stage.
Another circumstance in which a person may be convicted of
manslaughter, despite a charge of murder, is if the jury finds the person
guilty
of the lesser charge. This may occur because the prosecution fails to prove the
elements of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
A jury might also return such a
verdict if it sympathises with the defendant.
694 At 53.
695 Horder, above n 682, at 92; and Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 683, at 9.
696 As noted above, infanticide is a hybrid provision; it is a separate substantive homicide offence, but it can also be pleaded as a form of defence to a charge of murder or manslaughter. It is a partial defence to the extent it results in a conviction of less gravity but not an acquittal. See paragraph [3.11] and the footnotes contained therein.
697 See the discussion in Kate Fitz-Gibbon Homicide Law Reform, Gender and the Provocation Defence: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave
Macmillan, Hampshire, 2014) at 122–126.
698 For a general discussion (in the English context) of opportunities for discretion in cases of homicide by family violence victims, see Martin
Wasik “Cumulative Provocation and Domestic Killing” [1982] Crim L Rev 29 at 32–34.
699 R v Woods HC Gisborne CRI-2011-016-000048, 10 June 2011.
700 At [20].
701 At [18].
120 Law Commission Report
8.26
We look at New Zealand charging practice in cases of homicide by victims of
family violence and the role played by juries in our case
review in Chapter
9.
Sentencing
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
Finally, an offender’s reduced culpability may be recognised at
sentencing. Where mandatory murder sentencing has been abolished,
judges have
discretion to make case-specific decisions about culpability for murder,
although that discretion may still be fettered.
Jurisdictions that have
abolished mandatory sentencing include New Zealand (outside of the three strikes
regime), Victoria, Western
Australia, New South Wales, the Australian Capital
Territory and Tasmania.702 Life imprisonment remains mandatory
in England and Wales, Ireland, Canada, South Australia, the Northern Territory
and Queensland.
Whether or not the mandatory sentence has been
abolished, murder sentencing in some jurisdictions is still constrained by a
presumption
in favour of life imprisonment703 and, in New Zealand,
prescriptive rules about mandatory minimum periods of imprisonment where a life
sentence is imposed. This is
not the case for manslaughter for which sentences
cover a wide range.704
Because of the discretion it generally
affords judges to make decisions tailored to particular cases and offenders,
the current
sentencing process is well suited to enquiring into and
accommodating “hard cases” that might fall through the
cracks
of the trial structure or encourage strained and artificial
arguments.705 Sentencing also permits a full range of responses
rather than the much more limited and often binary possibilities available
through
verdict. We discuss in Chapter 11 whether New Zealand’s current
sentencing laws are fit for purpose for victims of family violence
who kill
their abusers.
CONCLUSION
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
Historically, a conviction for murder resulted in a mandatory sentence:
first, the death penalty and, later, life imprisonment. This
limited
judges’ capacity to recognise and reflect mitigating circumstances in
sentencing. It was in this context that partial
defences, which reduce murder to
manslaughter in certain circumstances, developed. Outside of the three strikes
regime, New Zealand
no longer has mandatory murder sentencing, and at present,
New Zealand law includes no general partial defences.
The question in
this part of the Report is whether New Zealand’s current approach to the
recognition of reduced culpability
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate cases
in which victims of family violence kill their abusers.
In this chapter,
we have discussed means by which reduced culpability may be recognised in the
course of a homicide prosecution. These
include degrees of murder, tailored
homicide offences, partial defences and sentencing rules. They also include
“softer”
mechanisms not governed by statute, namely charging
practices and jury decision making.
We discuss the “softer”
mechanisms in our case review in Chapter 9, where we recommend that the
Solicitor-General consider
whether the Solicitor General’s Prosecution
Guidelines should
702 Life imprisonment is, however, mandatory in New South Wales if the person killed is a police officer in certain circumstances: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 19B.
703 There is a presumption of life imprisonment for murder in New Zealand and Western Australia and, formerly, in New South Wales. For discussion, see Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report (Project 97, September 2007).
704 R v Wickliffe [1986] NZCA 444; [1987] 1 NZLR 55 (CA).
705 See Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation, above n
690, at 48–49.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 121
CHAPTER 8: The conceptual framework for reduced culpability
8.35
refer to the potentially mitigating effect of a defendant’s history as
a victim of family violence. However, while prosecutorial
discretion and jury
decision making may sometimes be favourable to defendants, due to the way the
law is currently structured they
lack transparency, cannot be consistently
relied on and are not as readily amenable to reform.706 Thus, our
first line of focus in this part is the suite of statutory mechanisms for
recognising reduced culpability for homicide.
More specifically, we are
focused on statutory mechanisms that could be introduced or reformed with some
degree of specificity to
improve the legal response to victims of family
violence who kill their abusers. We have not substantively considered options
that
are inherently wider than our terms of reference, like degrees of murder.
Reform options that would necessarily affect the whole
of the law of homicide
would need to form part of a broader
review.
706 Prosecutorial discretion is largely outside the control of defendants
(even plea discussions are negotiations and not overseen
by the courts) and jury
deliberations are secret in all but exceptional circumstances which promotes
“the finality of verdicts
and uninhibited discussion during jury
deliberations”. See Evidence Act 2006, s 76; and Neale v R [2010]
NZCA 167 at [9]–[13].
122 Law Commission Report
Chapter 9
Observations from the cases
INTRODUCTION
9.1
9.2
9.3
If section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 is clarified as we have recommended in
Chapter 7, we expect that the defence of self-defence
will be more accessible
to primary victims of family violence. However, that defence will provide no
relief for victims who kill
their abusers other than in self-defence or defence
of another, including those whose claims to self-defence are rejected by the
jury. This is significant because the Family Violence Death Review Committee
(FVDRC) considers that, although self-defence will
be the more appropriate
defence in the majority of cases in which victims of family violence kill their
abusers:707
... not every victim of severe [intimate partner violence] uses retaliatory
physical violence from a position of self-protection,
as opposed to reacting
with anger to what has been done to her. This means that it cannot be assumed
that even if self-defence is
appropriately reformed and sensitively applied in
such cases, that it will necessarily always be available on the facts. In one of
our regional reviews, the female offender had a very strong case for provocation
but was unable to argue it because it had been abolished
prior to the killing.
Self-defence was also not available on the facts.
The question is how the
law should deal with such homicides, which, although not justified, often
involve significant mitigating
circumstances. Currently, the approach in New
Zealand, for all homicides where judges have discretion, is to recognise reduced
culpability
mainly through sentencing.708
In this chapter, we
look at how the criminal justice system has responded on a case by case basis to
victims of family violence who
have killed abusers, particularly where the
defendant did not rely successfully on self-defence. We look at how defendants
were charged,
whether they pleaded guilty or went to trial and how they were
convicted and sentenced. We build on the summary of our case review
in Chapter
3.
CONVICTION OUTCOMES
9.4
A homicide defendant may be convicted of a crime by one of two routes: by
pleading guilty or by being found guilty after trial. The
range of possible
conviction outcomes in a given case will be affected by the ultimate charge
(which may, for example, be amended
from murder to manslaughter), and, if the
case proceeds to trial, the jury’s decision.
Charging and plea discussions
9.5
Under the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines, which set
core standards for the conduct of public prosecutions, criminal charges are
required to adequately reflect the criminality
of a
707 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December 2013 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June
2014) at 119. As well as certain intimate partner homicides, the Family Violence Death Review Committee considers children who kill abusive caregivers may in particular fall outside the scope of self-defence, as the facts of such cases can tend to “look like retaliation rather than defensive force”: Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 21 (footnotes omitted).
708 Exceptions are cases of infanticide and killing pursuant to a suicide
pact (Crimes Act 1961, ss 178 and 180) and, where relevant,
cases in which a
defendant is insane. Otherwise, reduced culpability for homicide may be
recognised outside the black letter of the
law, through the use of prosecutorial
discretion to reduce the charge and/or accept a plea to a lesser charge, or jury
nullification.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 123
CHAPTER 9: Observations from the cases
9.6
9.7
defendant’s conduct but should not be inflated to increase the
likelihood of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser charge
(overcharging).709 The overarching consideration in any plea
discussions is the interests of justice.710
We have not been
able, in the time available to prepare this Report, to ascertain methodically
how decisions to lay or amend charges
were made or how plea negotiations
unfolded in all the cases we have reviewed. Charging and plea discussions are
neither public nor
formally overseen by the courts,711 and we have
been almost entirely limited to the public record. In some cases, we can infer
the charge was a straightforward reflection
of the evidence and the Solicitor
General’s Prosecution Guidelines. In others, the basis of the original
charge or amendment of a charge from murder to manslaughter is less
obvious.
Most victims of family violence who kill their abusers are
charged with murder, but few are found guilty of murder at trial.
Most are
convicted of manslaughter. There have also been proportionately fewer guilty
pleas to manslaughter in New Zealand to date
than in the comparable
jurisdictions of Australia and Canada.712 Some have argued these
features of the cases suggest a comparatively more punitive criminal justice
response to victims of family
violence in New Zealand and a lack of
understanding of contemporary social science around family violence.713
We explore this possibility below.
Initial charges
9.8
9.9
9.10
Cases we have reviewed in which defendants were charged with manslaughter
usually involved force that did not suggest murderous intent,714
and in some cases where the charge was murder, the defendant’s use
of force was such that intent could be readily inferred.715
In
other cases, however, the basis for the charge is less clear. Examples are R
v Hu and R v Gerbes. In Hu, the defendant stabbed the deceased
in the neck while he was sitting at a desk with his back turned. She said she
thought she was
aiming for his shoulder.716 In R v Gerbes, the
defendant allegedly stabbed her boyfriend multiple times in the stomach during a
violent confrontation. She said the deceased
grabbed the blade of the knife and
stabbed himself.717 Ms Hu and Ms Gerbes were both charged with
manslaughter. Ms Hu pleaded guilty to that offence. Ms Gerbes was ultimately
acquitted
at trial.718
The prosecutorial decisions to lay
manslaughter charges in Hu and Gerbes may be contrasted with the
murder charges in a number of cases that involved single stab wounds inflicted
in
709 Crown Law Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines (2013) at 11.
710 At 19.
711 The Victorian Law Reform Commission noted that charging and plea practices had been generally criticised for their lack of transparency and accountability and that there is arguably a public interest in records of charging and plea decisions being publicly available: Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) at 108.
712 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Battered Women Charged with Homicide in Australia, Canada and New Zealand: How Do
They Fare?” (2012) 45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 383 at 393–395.
713 At 393–395.
714 Including a stab in the leg (R v Stone HC Wellington CRI-2005-078-1802, 9 December 2005; and R v Tamati HC Tauranga CRI-2009-087-0868,
27 October 2009) and a hit over the head with a pepper grinder (R v Rakete [2013] NZHC 1230).
715 For example, multiple stab wounds to the upper body (R v Neale HC Auckland CRI-2007-004-3059, 12 June 2009; and Neale v R [2010] NZCA
167); and the use of a shotgun (R v Wickham HC Auckland CRI-2009-090-010723, 20 December 2010).
716 R v Hu [2012] NZHC 54 at [2].
717 “Hung jury in manslaughter trial” (13 February 2014) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>; and Tracey Chatterton “Accused ‘just needed to call out’” (12 February 2014) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.
718 Ms Gerbes was acquitted at her second trial; the jury in her first
trial was hung: “Hung jury in manslaughter trial”,
above n
717.
124 Law Commission Report
9.11
response to violent assaults.719 In R v Mahari,720
for example, the defendant stabbed her partner in the shoulder area behind
his neck with a kitchen knife as he broke into the cabin
she shared with the
deceased. In R v Wharerau, the defendant killed her partner with a single
stab wound to the chest. The couple had been arguing, and the deceased slapped
her
in the face and broke her phone. He followed her into the kitchen, and Ms
Wharerau grabbed a knife off the bench and swung it in
his direction to scare
him away. After stabbing him, the defendant sought help from a neighbour and
returned home to support the
victim until the ambulance
arrived.721
Despite being charged with, and tried for, murder, Ms
Mahari and Ms Wharerau were both
convicted of manslaughter.
Looking only at the inflictions of fatal
injuries in these cases, there is little in isolation from the defendants’
accounts
to distinguish them in terms of murderous intent. The manslaughter
charges in Hu and Gerbes are apparently most readily explicable on
the basis that, in those cases, weight was accorded to the defendants’
version of
events.
Charges amended from murder to manslaughter
9.12
9.13
In four cases, including R v Tagatauli,722 the defendants
avoided a trial for murder by pleading guilty to manslaughter.
One such
case pre-dated the repeal of provocation, and the decision to accept the plea
seems to be explained by a provocation narrative.723 In the other
three, R v Brown,724 R v Woods725 and R
v Tagatauli,726 the defendants stabbed their abusive partners in
the context of confrontations. In R v Brown, the sentencing Judge
considered that manslaughter was the right outcome on the basis that, while the
defendant had “intended
to stab [the victim] and in a general way to hurt
him, she had no intention to kill and had no realisation that she might kill him
or even that she had done so”. Thus, she had committed a “deliberate
but unthinking act”, which, in law, “add[ed]
up to the offence of
manslaughter”.727 In R v Woods, the defendant said she
did not mean to hurt the deceased. She acknowledged she had been angry at the
time of the stabbing but said
she believed he was going to continue his
assault.728
Do the cases reveal a problem with charging
practice?
9.14
One commentator has recently observed that a significant number of cases
since 2009 in which victims of family violence have been
alleged to have killed
their abusers appear to have been resolved by guilty pleas to
manslaughter.729 If so, and if such charging decisions are in
part
719 R v Raivaru HC Rotorua CRI-2004-077-1667, 5 August 2005; R v Mahari HC Rotorua CRI-2006-070-8179, 14 November 2007; R v Brown HC Napier CRI-2008-020-3130, 24 November 2009; R v Ford HC Auckland CRI-2010-044-132, 22 July 2011; R v Paton [2013] NZHC 21 [Paton (HC)]; R v Paton [2009] NZCA 155 [Paton (CA)]; R v Wharerau [2014] NZHC 1857 [Wharerau (HC)]; and Wharerau v R [2015] NZCA 299 [Wharerau (CA)]. See also in relation to Honor Stephens, Bridget Carter “Jury accepts battered-wife defence in murder trial” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 24 April 2002); and in relation to Jessica Keefe, “Jessica Keefe not guilty of murder” (19
September 2013) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>, and “Murder charge unwarranted – lawyer” (21 September 2013) Radio New Zealand
720 R v Mahari, above n 719.
721 Wharerau (CA), above n 719, at [2]–[3].
722 Aaliyah Tagatauli is also known as Amanda Taitapanui. See “Woman admits killing partner” (23 March 2016) Stuff.co.nz
723 R v Raivaru, above n 719, at [13].
724 R v Brown, above n 719.
725 R v Woods HC Gisborne CRI-2011-016-000048, 10 June 2011.
726 See “Fatal stabbing in the leg leads to rare sentence of home detention” (21 April 2016) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.
727 R v Brown, above n 719, at [16]–[17].
728 R v Woods, above n 725, at [7].
729 Julia Tolmie “Defending Battered Defendants on Homicide Charges
in New Zealand: The Impact of Abolishing the Partial Defences
to Murder”
[2015] NZ L Rev 649 at 663.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 125
CHAPTER 9: Observations from the cases
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
recognition of the defendants’ reduced culpability, it is debatable
whether, in practice, there is any problem with charging.
On the other
hand, whatever the outcome for individual defendants, reliance on prosecutorial
discretion may be problematic if there
is inconsistency in approach across the
cases. Some also argue that in any event discretion is no substitute for
transparent legal
rules about when homicide will and will not amount to
murder.730
On the basis of the information we have
identified, it appears that, in some cases (notably Mahari and
Wharerau), it would have been tenable to charge manslaughter rather than
murder. However, we do not have all the information to make that
assessment,
and even if the lesser charge would have been tenable, that does not mean the
decisions to charge murder were wrong.
Murderous intent is a question of fact
and therefore legitimately put to the jury where it is in issue and the
evidential test
for prosecution is met. A decision to charge murder is not
impugned just because the charge is subsequently amended or the jury
convicts
of manslaughter. That is particularly so when the jury has scope to convict
the defendant of manslaughter or acquit.
The small number of cases in which
defendants pleaded guilty to manslaughter after first being charged with
murder also suggests
it is unlikely there is
“overcharging”.
We do not consider the low number of guilty
pleas overall in our case review is in itself evidence of a problem. It means
most
defendants are testing the prosecution case at trial. In jurisdictions
where most victims of family violence who commit homicide
plead guilty, concerns
have been raised that the limits of the law are not being tested, risking
inconsistent outcomes, slow development
in the law and limited guidance for
judges and lawyers as to how such cases should be
treated.731
We have therefore identified no evidence of a
practical problem in this area. It appears that the fact a defendant may have
been a
victim of family violence can be taken into account in charging for
homicide, and the Crown Law Office has told us there have been
recent cases in
which that fact was very much to the fore of the prosecutor’s mind in
respect of requests for consideration
of amending charges of murder to charges
of manslaughter. We do not, however, know the extent to which this is reflective
of standard
practice or whether approaches are consistent among
prosecutors.732 The Solicitor-General will be in the best position
to make that judgement.
We understand the Solicitor-General’s
Prosecution Guidelines are periodically reviewed. In these circumstances,
the Solicitor-General may wish to give consideration to whether the
Solicitor- General’s Prosecution Guidelines should include express
reference to the potential relevance of a defendant’s history as a victim
of family violence.
730 See James Chalmers “Partial Defences to Murder in Scotland: An Unlikely Tranquility” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of
Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 167. Chalmers argues, at
180–181, that, in Scotland, “even if the current law is operating satisfactorily in terms of the outcomes arrived at in particular cases (something which is difficult to assess in the absence of empirical research), the law as it stands is overly reliant on the benign exercise of prosecutorial discretion” and that it is necessary that “the letter of the law creates a clear, transparent and just framework for determining when a verdict of culpable homicide is to be preferred to one of murder”.
731 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide: Final Report (Project 97, September 2007) at 284.
732 The Attorney-General’s Introduction to the
Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines notes that, unlike most
similar jurisdictions, “New Zealand has no centralised decision-making
agency in relation to prosecution
decisions”, and that “[t]he
absence of a central decision-making process underscores the importance of
comprehensive
guidelines, and the acceptance of core prosecution values”:
Crown Law, above n 709, at 1.
126 Law Commission Report
RECOMMENDATION
R8 The Solicitor-General should, when next reviewing the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution
Guidelines, consider whether they should include express reference
to the potential relevance of a defendant’s history as a victim
of
family violence.
Trial outcomes
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
While, in most cases we reviewed the defendants were charged with murder,
few were convicted of murder. Setting to one side cases
resolved by guilty
pleas, out of the 14 victims of family violence who defended a murder charge,
three were convicted of murder.
Eight were found guilty of manslaughter, and
three were acquitted.
In the absence of a partial defence, on a charge of
murder, the only legal route to a manslaughter conviction is a finding that the
prosecution has not proved that the defendant had murderous intent.733
As we identified in the Issues Paper, however, it may be difficult
to explain manslaughter verdicts for some cases on this
basis.
An
alternative explanation for such verdicts is that the jury departed from a
“strict” application of intent. The jury
may have sympathised with
the defendant if, for example, they believed the defendant was acting
defensively, but that self-defence
did not apply, or some verdicts may reflect
jurors’ differing assessments of the facts.
In this section we
examine trial outcomes. Because jury decision making is secret and juries do not
give reasons, we have been able
only to examine whether the manslaughter and
murder verdicts are explicable in terms of the law and the facts disclosed by
the reported
material (usually sentencing decisions).
The manslaughter verdicts: was murderous intent absent or not
proved?
9.24
9.25
9.26
To be convicted of murder, a defendant must have either intended to kill or
intended to cause bodily injury known to them to be likely
to cause death and
been reckless whether death ensued (reckless intent).734 Intent is a
question of fact that can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and the
circumstances he or she must have known.735 If, on a
person’s trial for murder, the jury finds the defendant committed a
culpable homicide but is not satisfied they did
so with murderous intent, it
should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
In light of the
criminal standard of proof and the seriousness of a murder conviction, it is to
be expected juries will scrutinise
evidence of murderous intent. Given New
Zealand has no general partial defences, it is also unsurprising that intent may
be the “battleground”
in these
trials.736
Murderous intent (particularly reckless intent)
is often complicated, particularly when the defendant was responding to an
attack
or confrontation. Determining the factual position involves fine
judgements. Proof of intent will turn on evidence about the defendant’s
state of mind, why they used force and the circumstances in which the injury was
inflicted. Many of the cases we have reviewed involved
frenetic confrontations
marked by fear and other emotions.
733 For recent discussion of the issue of murderous intent in cases of homicide by victims of family violence, see Tolmie, above n 729, at 664.
734 Crimes Act 1961, s 167. A person may also be guilty of murder under the “felony murder” rule, noted in Chapter 3, but that is not relevant in the present context.
735 AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 554.
736 This was observed by the Irish Law Reform Commission when considering
the implications of the repealing provocation: Law Reform
Commission of Ireland
Consultation Paper on Homicide: the Plea of Provocation (LRC CP 27-2003,
2003) at 127–128. See also Law Commission The Partial Defence of
Provocation (NZLC R98, 2007) at n 93.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 127
CHAPTER 9: Observations from the cases
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
We would suggest they illustrate the complexities involved in murderous
intent in this context. Some examples provide helpful illustrations.
In
R v Wickham,737 the defendant, who suffered from multiple
sclerosis, called the Police before retrieving a gun and shooting her husband.
She said
afterwards she could not recall pulling the trigger. She claimed
self-defence, saying that her husband had grabbed her by the throat,
knocked her
over, thrown a full bottle of spirits at her and threatened to drown her in
the swimming pool and “gut [her]
like a fish”.738 The
jury rejected her claim of self-defence but convicted her of manslaughter. The
sentencing Judge had “no doubt” the
defendant had been scared at
the time of the killing, considered it “likely that the jury considered
that the force that [she]
used in ... presenting a loaded shotgun at [the
deceased] was disproportionate to the threat [she was] facing” and
“agree[d]
with the submission made by [her] counsel and the Crown that in
finding [her] guilty of manslaughter the jury must have concluded
that [she]
pulled the trigger by accident”.739
R v Wharerau
and R v Mahari, where the defendants were convicted of manslaughter,
also involved claims of self-defence. In Wharerau, the defendant claimed
that she grabbed a knife off the kitchen bench and swung it at the deceased to
scare him away but did not
mean to stab him. In Mahari, the defendant
stabbed the deceased in the shoulder as he broke into the caravan in which she
had barricaded herself.
That an unsuccessful claim of self-defence may
see a defendant convicted of manslaughter for reasons relating to intent has
also been
noted overseas. In its report on partial defences to murder, the Law
Commission of England and Wales observed that, “notwithstanding
the
complete nature of the defence [of self-defence], the facts which fall short of
substantiating self-defence may, nonetheless,
form the basis of a conviction for
manslaughter”,740 citing the following passage from the
English Court of Appeal case of McInnes:741
[I]f a plea of self-defence fails for the reason stated, it affords the
accused no protection at all. But it is important to stress
that the facts upon
which the plea of self-defence is unsuccessfully sought to be based may
nevertheless serve the accused in good
stead. They may, for example, go to show
that he may have acted under provocation or that, although acting unlawfully, he
may have
lacked the intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm, and in that way
render the proper verdict one of manslaughter.
As well as factual
complexity where a fatal injury is inflicted during a confrontation, it is
possible juries are taking into
account histories of family violence when
analysing murderous intent. Rebecca Bradfield has researched Australian cases
where women
killed male partners and concluded that, in some, lack of intent was
“being used as a defacto defence of domestic violence”.742
The violence the defendants had suffered before the homicides, Bradfield
suggested, was:743
... appropriated to explain the emotional state of the accused at the time of the killing. It has been accepted that emotional turmoil and anger are factors relevant to the issue of whether the accused had the requisite intention for murder (Cutter [(1997) 94 A Crim R 168] at 156 per Brennan CJ
and Dawson J). The impact of the history of violence on the
accused’s psychological/emotional state,
737 R v Wickham, above n 715. See also Brenda Midson “Degrees of blameworthiness in culpable homicide” [2015] NZLJ 220; and Victoria
Robinson “Home detention for killing husband” (20 December 2010) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.
738 R v Wickham, above n 715, at [13]–[16].
739 At [17].
740 Law Commission of England and Wales Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, August 2004) at 75.
741 R v McInnes [1971] 1 WLR 1600 (CA).
742 Rebecca Bradfield “Women Who Kill: Lack of Intent and Diminished Responsibility as the Other ‘Defences’ to Spousal Homicide” (2001) 13
CICJ 143 at 151.
743 At 152.
128 Law Commission Report
9.31
together with the accused’s fear or anger before the killing, are used
to explain the finding of lack of intent.
This approach may have arisen
in cases in our sample. In R v Paton,744 the defendant’s
partner followed her into the kitchen after attacking her in the hallway, and
she stabbed him in the neck with
a kitchen knife. The jury rejected her claim
of self-defence but convicted her of manslaughter. At sentencing, the Judge
noted
this must reflect a finding of lack of intent but said he viewed the
homicide as very close to murder:745
The jury rejected your claim that you acted in self-defence, but found that
you did not have murderous intent. Now murderous intent
can be present where you
do not actually intend to kill, but intend to cause injuries of a type that are
likely to kill, and where
you are reckless as to whether death does occur. A
stab wound to the neck with a large kitchen knife is likely to kill the victim.
You may recall the evidence from the pathologist that the injury was effectively
“unsurvivable”. I treat the jury analysis
as recognising that the
view as to the risk of death from a stab wound of this kind, by a woman in your
position, would not be analysed
as it would be by most of us. The prolonged
history of beatings conditioned you to downplay the risks and consequences of
violent
attacks, so that a woman in your position would not appreciate the risk
of causing death when others, who had not experienced the
sad domestic history
you had, could reasonably be expected to recognise that risk.
I accept the jury’s analysis but I see the level of violence used in a
stab to the neck with a large knife as being at the
most serious end of any
scale of attacks that might not involve murderous intent. That means, Ms Paton,
that a stabbing of this type,
in these circumstances, is only a very short way
from murder.
The manslaughter verdicts: was the verdict a result of sympathy or
jury nullification?
9.32
9.33
Explaining manslaughter verdicts in terms of lack of intent, however
construed, puts them in a legal framework, but there is no way
to be certain
such an analysis actually reflects the juries’ reasoning. It is also
possible juries are reaching manslaughter
verdicts on grounds of sympathy rather
than a strict application of the law. Wickham and Paton may be
examples.746 Some verdicts may, alternatively, reflect compromises
between jurors with different views of the evidence. Yet another possibility
is that some verdicts reflect mingled doubt about defendants’ moral
blameworthiness and legal culpability. One person we spoke
with who is
experienced in jury research suggested that, even if asked, some juries may not
readily be able to articulate the reasons
for their decisions. A jury might both
have doubt about the evidence and consider the defendant’s culpability to
be less than
that reflected by the offence charged. It may be unsurprising for
legal and moral considerations to be mingled in juries’
decision
making.747
“Jury nullification” describes verdicts
that result when juries deliberately do not apply the law because doing so would
run counter to their view of justice in a particular case. It has been observed
to be a legitimate feature of the jury system and
consistent with the
jury’s function to act as the “conscience of the community”
and “safeguard against
arbitrary and oppressive government”.748
This is an important function, even if there are few cases in which the
jury
744 Paton (HC), above n 719; and Paton (CA), above n 719. See also the discussion of the approach to intent in Paton in Tolmie, above n 729, at
664–665.
745 At [11]–[12]
746 We also note the case of Daryl Kirk, before the High Court at the time of publication of this Report. Ms Kirk was charged with the murder of her mother’s partner, and claimed self-defence. On 20 April 2016 the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter. Ms Kirk has yet to be sentenced.
747 Martin Wasik “Partial Excuses in the Criminal Law” (1982) 45 MLR 516 at 517–518.
748 Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials Part One: A Discussion
Paper (NZLC PP32, 1998) at 15–18.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 129
CHAPTER 9: Observations from the cases
actually acts as such a “check”.749 The special role
of jury nullification in murder trials has been noted in Australia by White J in
R v Marshall:750
9.34
9.35
9.36
9.37
In a murder case, community values are reflected in a special way on such
subject matters as provocation, self-defence, intention
and manslaughter; in the
latter case, the jury has a “constitutional right” to bring in a
merciful verdict of manslaughter
even where the elements of murder are proved.
That merciful verdict belongs to the jury ...
If juries were consistently
returning manslaughter verdicts even where the elements of murder were made out,
however, there would
be an argument the law should be brought into line with
this collective view of culpability. It might be thought wrong that a jury
could
feel forced either to make a decision at odds with its finding on a
defendant’s moral culpability or to convict of manslaughter
or acquit
“perversely”.751
Brenda Midson develops this
argument by reference to three apparently intentional New Zealand homicides
– one of which was
Wickham, discussed above – where the
defendants were acquitted or convicted of manslaughter.752 She argues
that the outcomes in these cases were “undoubtedly fair if moral
blameworthiness is the basis of criminalisation”
but
that:753
The fundamental problem with these decisions is that they signal that the
outcome for a defendant depends upon the whims of the jury
rather than the
application of legal principles. If these decisions continue unchecked,
inconsistent outcomes will result. In other
words, if there are degrees of
culpability then it would be as well to be upfront about them.
The point
about fairness, as Midson notes and some submitters raised,754 is
that decision making that depends on sympathy or prejudice is inconsistent.
Different juries have different sympathies, and some
defendants evoke more
sympathy than others. It seems unfair for decisions about culpability to turn
on these “whims”.
Cases of jury nullification might also be
troubling if they make it harder for judges to determine facts for
sentencing,755 although, as we discuss in the next chapter, a legal
mechanism such as a partial defence would not necessarily provide greater
clarity.
If the cases demonstrate that juries are already empowered to
reach verdicts that reflect their views of moral culpability, thus
averting
substantive unfairness, it is difficult to argue that introduction of a partial
defence would lead to different results.756 Because our review is
limited to victims of family violence, we have not considered manslaughter
conviction rates for other murder
trials and cannot say to what extent the
trends we have observed are particular to these defendants. As a general point,
though,
there will always be cases in which the elements of
749 Law Reform Commission of Canada The jury in criminal trials: Working Paper 27 (1980) at 10–12.
750 R v Marshall (1986) 43 SASR 448 at 449. Discussed in Law Commission, above n 748, at 26.
751 Wasik, above n 747.
752 The other two cases were R v Apatu HC Wellington CRI-2009-041-3156, 14 October 2010; and R v Scollay [2014] NZHC 465. Mr Apatu was acquitted of the murder of his neighbour, whom he shot. He admitted going to the neighbour’s house but said he only intended to scare him. There was evidence at trial about Mr Apatu’s mental state at the time of the killing. Midson notes that, in sentencing Mr Apatu on a minor offence to which he had pleaded guilty, Miller J, at [6], observed that the acquittal must be explained by a jury finding that the Crown had not negated beyond reasonable doubt that the killing was accidental. See Midson, above n 737, at 231. Ms Scollay was found guilty of the manslaughter of her husband, whom she stabbed. She said she did not intend to kill him but wished to shake him out of his deeply depressed state: at [7]. See Midson, above n 737, at 231.
753 Midson, above n 737, at 230–231.
754 The Family Violence Death Review Committee, for example, noted it was important to ensure that manslaughter convictions are placed on a solid legal foundation rather than relying on the jury to “do the right thing regardless of the legal position”. The Auckland District Law Society and Jeremy Hammington, Barrister, expressed similar views. The Law Commission of England and Wales took the same view in respect of prosecutorial discretion in its 2004 Report on partial defences: Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 740, at 54.
755 See, for example, the Courts’ observations as to the likely grounds for the verdicts in R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA) at [2]; and R v King
CA71/06, 11 August 2006 at [2] and [9]. See also Wasik, above n 747, at 520.
756 James Chalmers suggests, for example, that a possible explanation for the lack of impetus for reform of provocation in Scotland is that
“substantive injustice” in the operation of the defence has been averted by prosecutorial discretion and jury nullification: Chalmers, above n
730, at 180. See also Tolmie, above n 729.
130 Law Commission Report
9.38
an offence seem to be proved but the jury appears to sympathise with the
defendant. The law cannot necessarily anticipate all exceptional
or
“hard” cases.757
Any decision making that
depends on value judgements by the jury presents a risk of inconsistency.
Determining whether conduct
was “reasonable” for the purposes of
self-defence, for example, requires application of community values and
reference
to individual experiences. These will inevitably vary, depending on
the composition of the jury.
The murder verdicts
9.39
9.40
We identified three cases where defendants were found guilty of murder after
trial, and a fourth case where the defendant pleaded
guilty to murder:
.
In R v Reti,758 a 2008 case, the
defendant relied unsuccessfully on provocation. The day of
the murder, after an argument, Ms Reti stabbed the victim in the leg. She
called for help, and the victim was treated. Later that
day, they argued again
and Ms Reti got a knife and stabbed the victim “with so much force that
the whole blade was buried in
his chest”. Ms Reti said that, after she
retrieved the knife, she asked the victim if he wanted her to “poke”
him,
and he “kept saying bring it on bitch bring it on”, spat in her
face and kicked her in the stomach. Ms Reti said she
“just
retaliated” by attacking him.759
. In R v
Neale,760 a 2009 case, the defendant and victim had
been in an on-again, off-again
relationship. Ms Neale went to the victim’s apartment with a knife in
her handbag and stabbed him in the chest while he was
in the shower. She
inflicted eight more stab wounds (to the back, throat, shoulder, arm and
abdomen).761
. In R v
Wihongi,762 a 2010 case the circumstances of which
we discuss elsewhere in this
Report, the defendant followed the victim out of the house and stabbed him in
the chest when they were both outside the house. When
the victim drove away, Ms
Wihongi followed and, when she reached his car, punched at him through the
window.
. In R v Rihia, a 2012 case and the one case
in our review involving a guilty plea to murder,
the defendant stabbed the victim in the chest as he lay on the couch. He had
been assisted to lie down there after Ms Rihia threw
a stereo speaker at his
head.
Of the murder cases, R v Reti may be the most finely
balanced in terms of intent, as Ms Reti’s evidence that she intended only
to injure the victim was
supported by the fact she sought assistance when he
began to bleed. However the fatal wound was inflicted only hours after Ms Reti
had stabbed the deceased in the leg (for which he had received paramedic
treatment). The sentencing Judge observed that the murder
verdict suggested that
the jury:763
... would have found that when you stabbed him in the chest you did intend to
cause him grievous bodily harm. You knew there were
risks but you were simply
reckless whether death ensued or not. You showed that by stabbing him in in the
area of the chest where
you did and, as I said, embedding the knife up to the
handle. Also, while accepting you may have suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder as a result of what you have suffered as a young child, the jury in
my assessment would have
757 Law Commission, above n 736, at 72.
758 R v Reti HC Whangarei CRI-2007-027-2103, 9 December 2008 [Reti (HC)]; and R v Reti [2009] NZCA 271.
759 Reti (HC), above n 758, at [3]–[4].
760 R v Neale, above n 715; and Neale v R, above n 715.
761 We note our information source for Neale includes media reports, given the bare nature of the court decisions. See Kim Ruscoe “Accused was ex’s prostitute” (20 April 2009) Stuff.co.nz <www.stuff.co.nz>.
762 R v Wihongi HC Napier CRI-2009-041-2096, 30 August 2010 [Wihongi (HC)]; R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775 [Wihongi
(CA)]; and R v Wihongi [2012] NZSC 12 [Wihongi (SC)].
763 Reti (HC), above n 758, at [8].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 131
CHAPTER 9: Observations from the cases
found that even if you were provoked you did not display the self-control
expected of a person in those circumstances.
Do the cases reveal a problem with trial outcomes?
9.41
9.42
9.43
9.44
9.45
The four murder cases share a number of features:
. The
level of violence in the fatal attack was strong evidence of intent either to
kill or to inflict
very serious injury with recklessness as to death
resulting.
. While the relationship between the
defendant and the deceased was violent and abusive,
the court decisions we have reviewed do not record that there was evidence
the defendant believed her life was threatened either on
the day of the
offending, or more generally in the future. There may be an argument this
suggests the presentation or interpretation
of the evidence in those cases was
affected by persisting misconceptions about family violence, although we do not
have the information
to identify whether or not that is so.
.
The fatal attacks occurred in the context of a confrontation or
argument, but the deceased
had earlier been physically impeded or was not advancing at the
time.
Cases in which manslaughter verdicts were returned (except where
provocation was relied on and apparently accepted), by contrast,
tend to
feature:
. evidence the defendant intended to injure the
deceased but not that they were reckless as to
the risk death might result (for example, where the defendant stabbed the victim in the leg);
and/or
. evidence the defendant’s use of
force was defensive and in the face of a violent assault or
threat of violence by the deceased.
Typically, in the cases that
resulted in a manslaughter conviction despite a murder charge, the defendants
were alleged to have acted
with reckless murderous intent. As we have noted,
fine judgements are likely to be involved in determining the factual position
where a defendant is responding to an assault or confrontation. In all the
manslaughter cases (other than where provocation was apparently
accepted), there
was evidence suggesting either that, given the nature of the force, the
defendant did not act with murderous intent
or the defendant was trying only to
ward off an assault or threat. It does not appear, in other words, that these
manslaughter verdicts
were at odds with the evidence.
At first glance,
the low rate of murder convictions could suggest a reluctance to convict victims
of family violence of murder even
when the elements of murder have been proved.
However, this is not necessarily borne out by close analysis. Murder
convictions are
rare, but they appear generally to be returned in cases where
there is evidence of higher-level offending. It appears juries are
carefully
construing the requirements of murderous intent and returning manslaughter
verdicts where there is reasonable doubt about
the defendant’s state of
mind when the fatal injury was inflicted.
We do not think the cases
disclose arbitrary or inexplicable conviction outcomes. The possibility of jury
nullification cannot be
discounted, however, because jury decision making is
conducted behind closed doors. For this reason, we do not rely solely on what
we
have gauged from the cases. In the next chapter, we examine the in-principle
case for partial defences to assess whether there
is a gap in the
law.
132 Law Commission Report
Has the repeal of provocation made any difference?
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
9.51
The partial defence of provocation was, at least in law, available in 10
cases we reviewed but (apparently) successfully relied on
in only three (R v
Suluape, R v Erstich and R v King). It was relied on but
rejected in two others (R v Neale and R v Reti).
The FVDRC
suggests that a comparison of cases before and after the repeal of provocation
demonstrates that repeal has adversely affected
the position of victims of
family violence who kill abusers.764 The FVDRC compares sentences in
cases in which the verdict was manslaughter by reason of provocation –
R v Suluape (in which the defendant killed her husband by striking him a
number of times on the head with an axe while his back was turned) and
R v
King (where the defendant killed her husband by putting ground up sleeping
pills in his food) – with those in R v Wihongi and R v
Rihia, in which the verdicts were murder.
R v Wihongi
pre-dates repeal of provocation, but Ms Wihongi did not rely on the defence,
and so we are reluctant to draw conclusions from her
case.765R v
Rihia is one post-repeal case in which provocation might have availed the
defendant if it had still been in force.766 In that case, on the day
of the homicide Ms Rihia’s youngest child had been removed to Child, Youth
and Family custody. The
sentencing Judge said:767
I am satisfied in your case also that you would not have stabbed Mr Rihia to
death had it not been for the significant mental impairment
you suffer through
years of alcohol abuse and physical abuse most recently, until you parted with
him, at the hands of Mr Rihia himself.
It was that background of abuse which led
to all three of your children of that relationship being taken from you. I am
satisfied
that the immediate cause of your offending was the further and final
repetition of those distressing events and that they led you
to ‘just
snapping’, as you said.
On its face, this account of events might
have supported a finding of provocation. That may have enhanced Ms Rihia’s
ability
to negotiate a manslaughter charge or encouraged her to go to trial
rather than pleading guilty, thereby increasing the likelihood
of a manslaughter
verdict. The difficulty is that we do not know why Ms Rihia pleaded guilty, and
we do not know what would have
been the outcome if she went to trial –
with or without the aid of the partial defence.768
Further,
while Ms Rihia was convicted of murder, the sentencing Judge took into account
her “extreme reaction” to her
despair at losing her child and
concluded it would be manifestly unjust to impose life imprisonment.769
The circumstances that led to and surrounded Ms Rihia’s offending
were, therefore, recognised in a concrete way, albeit through
sentencing
discretion, not a partial defence.
Only six years have passed since
provocation was repealed, and homicides by victims of family violence are not
common. Before repeal,
provocation was relied on, and not always successfully,
in only a small number of cases. It may be too early to tell whether repeal
of
the partial defence
764 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 707, at 121.
765 Although Julia Tolmie has suggested Ms Wihongi may have had an arguable case for manslaughter by reason of provocation: Tolmie, above n
729, at 666.
766 At 659–660 and 666–667.
767 R v Rihia [2012] NZHC 2720 at [28].
768 It is worth noting that, in R v Reti, which bears some factual similarity to R v Rihia, the defendant relied unsuccessfully on provocation. At sentencing, the Judge said: “Ms Reti at trial your defence was two-fold, first a lack of intent to kill and secondly, provocation. I heard the same evidence the jury heard. In finding you guilty of murder the jury rejected those defences, I have to say rightly in my view ... while accepting you may have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of what you have suffered as a young child, the jury in my assessment would have found that even if you were provoked you did not display the self-control expected of a person in those circumstances”: Reti (HC), above n 758, at [10].
769 R v Rihia, above n 767, at [30].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 133
CHAPTER 9: Observations from the cases
has disadvantaged this group of defendants.770 At present, we consider there is insufficient evidence to conclude that it has.
SENTENCING OUTCOMES
9.52
9.53
9.54
Unlike jury verdicts, sentencing is conducted in public, and decisions are
almost always transcribed. It is therefore relatively
straightforward to
review and compare reasons for decisions, but we are still restricted to the
public record, and we have not
seen or heard the primary evidence (although
sentencing notes would usually record that evidence).
There is variation
among sentences, particularly between the murder and manslaughter cases we have
reviewed. Beyond the sentences
themselves, two features of the courts’
approach to the sentencing process warrant mention at the outset:
.
There is some variation in how the courts have characterised and
approached defendants’
histories of violence and abuse in these cases.
.
Where relevant, the courts have consistently adverted to
defendants’ future risks of
reoffending and prospects of rehabilitation in determining the appropriate
sentence.
We discuss these features in detail in Chapter 11.
Manslaughter sentences
9.55
Manslaughter captures a wide range of conduct, and the range of penalties
the courts are willing to entertain is correspondingly
wide. Sentences in the
manslaughter cases we have reviewed (of which there were 15) ranged from a
suspended term of imprisonment
(R v Erstich) and
12 months’ home
detention (R v Wickham and R v Tagatauli) to five years and six
months’
imprisonment (R v Brown). We have not identified a
problem with sentences for manslaughter in this area.771
Murder sentences
Displacing the presumption of life imprisonment
9.56
9.57
Sentencing for murder is relatively complex. Section 102 of the Sentencing
Act 2002 prescribes a presumption in favour of life imprisonment
that is
rebuttable only if, “given the circumstances of the offence and the
offender, a sentence of imprisonment for life would
be manifestly unjust”.
Where a life sentence is imposed, sections 103 and 104 prescribe mandatory
minimum terms of imprisonment.
The appropriate minimum term will depend on the
circumstances of the offending.772
The “manifestly
unjust” test is strict. Since it was enacted in 2002, the presumption of
life imprisonment has been
displaced in only six cases, as far as we have
ascertained.773 The
770 This was a point made during Victoria’s 2010 consultation on abolition or retention of the offence of defensive homicide, which had been introduced in 2005. Some submitters believed it was too early to know whether the new offence was a necessary “safety net” for women who kill abusive partners, and others recommended retention on the basis that operation of the offence would be reviewed further in three or five years’ time: Victoria Department of Justice Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform – Consultation Paper (September 2013) at 12–13. We note, however, that Julia Tolmie considers enough time has passed since the repeal of provocation to be able to assess the effects of repeal: Tolmie, above n 729, at 650.
771 Although Julia Tolmie has recently suggested that subsisting misconceptions about family violence, in conjunction with difficulties in accommodating the nature and effects of family violence within existing sentencing doctrine and structure, may mean sentences imposed on victims of family violence convicted of manslaughter are disproportionately long when compared to sentences imposed on predominant aggressors convicted of manslaughter: Tolmie, above n 729, at 680.
772 As to which, see Chapter 11.
773 According to Statistics New Zealand records, 371 life sentences have
been imposed since 2001. Finite sentences for murder are
therefore highly
exceptional – representing less than two per cent of the total.
134 Law Commission Report
presumption was not discussed in the two earlier murder cases in our review, R v Neale and R v Reti, in both of which the offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment with minimum periods of imprisonment of 10 years.774 The presumption was, however, reviewed and found to be rebutted in R v Wihongi and R v Rihia. The Court of Appeal in Wihongi considered section
102 and the circumstances of Ms Wihongi’s case and
said:775
9.58
Overall, we see this as a case of a battered defendant who has reacted in an
extreme way to her abuser in circumstances where both
the history of abuse and
the offender’s cognitive deficits have played a significant role in that
extreme reaction arising.
We see this as a case falling within the class of
cases that Parliament contemplated would justify the displacement of the
presumption
[of life imprisonment].
In Rihia, the Judge discussed
Wihongi and concluded the two cases were sufficiently similar that they
fell into the same category for the purposes of the “manifestly
unjust” test.776 There was no Crown appeal against the
sentence in that case.
The length of the finite terms
9.59
9.60
9.61
9.62
The Courts in Wihongi and Rihia imposed finite terms of 12
and 10 years respectively. In Wihongi, after considering fresh evidence
as to Ms Wihongi’s risk of future offending and the need to take account
of the sentencing
purposes of denunciation and deterrence, the Court of Appeal
substituted the 12-year term for the eight-year term originally imposed
by the
High Court. In Rihia, the Judge relied on Wihongi in setting the
finite term and assessing the starting point.777
Some
commentators and the FVDRC (in its Fourth Annual Report and its submission on
the Issues Paper) have suggested that, notwithstanding
displacement of the
presumption of life imprisonment, the finite sentences imposed in Wihongi
and Rihia may be too high.778 To some extent, this
depends on a comparison of murder and manslaughter cases, which assumes
juries’ decisions whether to return
manslaughter or murder verdicts are
somewhat arbitrary. The cases do not suggest this is valid. It is also plausible
that the murder
cases involved more serious offending and/or stronger evidence
of murderous intent.
It is also not self-evident that finite terms of 10
and 12 years are “too” high. Attitudes towards punishment vary.
Some members of the community will think that, despite mitigating
circumstances, the sentences in Wihongi and Rihia do not
adequately reflect the seriousness of the offending. Those sentences are,
moreover, among the lowest ever imposed for murder
in New Zealand,779
and the Supreme Court declined Ms Wihongi leave to appeal against the
Court of Appeal’s decision.780 We explore these issues in
Chapter 11.
Whatever view is taken of individual sentences, it must be
borne in mind that sentencing decisions are made by judges who have heard
the
evidence, considered relevant reports and other material (including victim
impact statements) and heard legal submissions. Without
being
774 At sentencing in R v Neale, above n 715, the High Court Judge said, at [1], “Ms Neale ... As you know, the maximum, and indeed the mandatory, sentence on a charge of murder is one of life imprisonment”, notwithstanding that Ms Neale’s case post-dated enactment of the Sentencing Act
2002. There appears to have been no suggestion that the s 102 presumption might be displaced in Ms Neale’s case, however.
775 Wihongi (CA), above n 762, at [94].
776 R v Rihia, above n 767, at [25]–[28].
777 Ms Rihia was sentenced on the basis of a 12-year starting point (following Wihongi) with a two-year discount to reflect her guilty plea.
778 Tolmie, above n 729, at 667; Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 707, at 121; and Family Violence Death Review Committee submission at 36.
779 The only case we have identified with a lower sentence for murder is R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500 (HC), a euthanasia case, in which the High Court imposed a finite term of 18 months’ imprisonment. The Court held, at [51]–[53], that the circumstances of the offence were such that a sentence of life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust and accepted the defence submission that the full range of sentencing options under the Sentencing Act was available. Mitigating factors were the offender’s age, health, motives, guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility, remorse and previous good character.
780 Wihongi (SC), above n 762.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 135
CHAPTER 9: Observations from the cases
fully appraised of the facts, it is difficult for us or others not involved in the cases to say with confidence whether a given sentence properly reflects the Sentencing Act and relevant case law.
CONCLUSION
9.63
9.64
Overall, we do not think the charging, trial or sentencing outcomes in these
cases suggest that the structure of New Zealand’s
homicide law –
with two main categories of culpable homicide, no partial defences and generally
discretionary sentencing –
is giving rise to problems for victims of
family violence who kill abusers. As we discuss in Chapter 11, we think there
may be scope
to improve the consistency with which histories of family violence
are approached at sentencing, but we do not consider sentence
methodology or
outcomes are otherwise troubling.
Our review has, however, taken in a
fairly small number of cases, and there are methodological limitations in our
analysis. In these
circumstances and given our terms of reference require us to
examine whether a partial defence is justified, we consider it is important
also
to review the case for partial defences in principle.781 We do so in
the following
chapter.
781 The Victorian Department of Justice took a similar approach in its 2013
review of defensive homicide. The Department considered
that its small sample of
defensive homicide cases and the low rate of such cases (such that it would take
too long to obtain a “potentially
significant” sample) meant it was
“important to consider defensive homicide both in policy terms as well as
how it applies
when men kill”: Victoria Department of Justice, above n
770, at viii. To the extent our case review also precludes definite
conclusions
– because of both its size and the uncertainties and limitations we have
identified – we think such a two-pronged
approach is helpful.
136 Law Commission Report
Chapter 10
Is a partial defence justified?
INTRODUCTION
10.1
10.2
Partial defences are a controversial aspect of the criminal law. Even in
countries that no longer have mandatory murder sentencing,
questions remain over
the role they should play in determining culpability for homicide. The purpose
of this chapter is to consider
both in- principle arguments for and against
partial defences, and the merits of some particular formulations, with
reference
to victims of family violence.
However, we do not have a remit
or the time to look at the broader question of whether a partial defence is
warranted for other defendants.
This presents a dilemma. As a number of
submitters identified, considering partial defences in terms of a single group
has the potential
to lead to unintended consequences and unfairly differential
treatment.782 To the extent required to assess possible consequences
and potential unfairness, this chapter includes some comment on the application
of partial defences to other defendants. Such comments are, however, necessarily
brief. Proper consideration of these wider issues
would best be undertaken as
part of a first- principles review of the law relating to homicide, which would
be a significant undertaking.
OVERVIEW OF THE SUBMISSIONS
10.3
Submitters were fairly evenly split on the merits of a partial defence, but
most qualified their support or opposition by noting the
difficulties
associated with formulating such a defence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
division of views among members of our
expert panel largely mirrored those of
submitters; some considered a partial defence had merit, while others were
concerned such
a defence could raise problems and lead to unintended
consequences.
Those in favour
10.4
10.5
The Family Violence Death Review Committee, the Criminal Bar Association, the
Auckland District Law Society and two academics said
that, with no partial
defence to guide plea negotiations or the presentation of evidence at trial,
defendants are subject to prosecutorial
discretion and face considerable
jeopardy if they defend a murder charge. The possibility of acquittal goes hand
in hand with the
risk of conviction for murder, with no middle ground unless
intent is not proved by the prosecution. This has implications for sentencing.
Juries, too, face binary decisions, and while they may “informally”
recognise reduced culpability with manslaughter verdicts,
such verdicts should
have a foundation in law.
One submitter argued that a partial defence is
more likely than discretionary elements of the justice system, such as
prosecutorial
decision making, to result in transparent and even-handed
treatment of defendants. Another thought a partial defence may reduce the
number
of murder charges and thereby neutralise some of the jeopardy defendants
currently face.
782 This point has been made in other jurisdictions, too. See, for example,
Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Review of the Law of Homicide:
Final Report (Project 97, September 2007) at 289; and Victoria Department of
Justice Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform –
Consultation Paper (September 2013) at 11.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 137
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
10.6
10.7
The “messaging” potential of a partial defence was identified as
a practical benefit. When a jury accepts a partial defence
and convicts of
manslaughter, it is argued, that sends a signal about reduced culpability, which
helps the judge set the appropriate
sentence and helps the public understand and
accept the verdict and any leniency in sentencing.
Two academic
submitters argued that, as a matter of legal theory, sentencing determines
punishment, but culpability is determined
through verdict. For some intentional
homicides, a murder verdict will not accurately reflect an offender’s
culpability.
Those against
10.8
10.9
10.10
One person we spoke with thought the empirical case for a partial defence for
victims of family violence is not made out and that
this was critical to whether
there is a case for reform. This consultee thought education may enhance
sentencing practice, such that
a new defence would be a “sledgehammer to
crack a nut” and noted that most jurisdictions that have partial defences
also
have mandatory sentencing for murder.
On a practical level (the New
Zealand Law Society, Aviva and Women’s Refuge), several organisations
noted there is a risk the
“wrong” defendants will rely on any
partial defence. Others were concerned a partial defence might work against
victims
of family violence by detracting from self-defence and promoting
compromise pleas or verdicts or, if specific to victims of family
violence,
“normalising” these homicides of abusers as manslaughter.
A
number of submitters and people we spoke with, including the New Zealand Law
Society, thought the proper way to recognise reduced
culpability is through
sentencing. One noted that the rest of the criminal law functions without
partial defences, and it is anomalous
for murder to be treated
differently.
ARGUMENTS FOR A PARTIAL DEFENCE
10.11
The arguments in favour of partial defences, while inter-related, generally
fall into one of the following categories:
. They promote
fair labelling.
. They enhance the role of the jury in
making value judgements.
. They have a positive impact
on charging practices.
. They have a positive impact on
sentencing.
We assess these arguments, in turn, below.
Partial defences promote fair labelling
10.12
10.13
In respect of homicide, this argument rests, at its most fundamental, on the
premise that, for some intentional killings, “murder”
is not the
right ascription and the law should permit such killings to be categorised as
manslaughter.783 This argument does not focus on the practical
effects of a murder conviction but rather on how certain killings should be
regarded
and categorised.
James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick have argued
that labels applied by the law may be important both to describe and to
differentiate
criminal conduct.784 Some differentiations, like
the
783 On fair labelling generally, see Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Horder Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2013) at 77–79.
784 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick “Fair Labelling in Criminal
Law” (2008) 71 MLR 217 at 220–222.
138 Law Commission Report
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
distinction between murder and manslaughter, are themselves
descriptive, but ideally descriptive labels should be “intelligible
on
a freestanding basis”.785 Labelling may be important in the
interests of fairness to offenders and to communicate with offenders, victims,
the public and agencies
within and outside the criminal justice
system.786
Labelling is relevant across the criminal law, but
it is often invoked in connection with homicide, perhaps because of the
particular
stigma and condemnation of a “murder” conviction. Andrew
Ashworth has said that “the distinction between murder
and manslaughter
is significant in terms of its declaratory meaning and the stigma for the
offender” and that partial defences
may be warranted because juries and
the public expect significant forms of mitigation to reflect that
distinction.787 “Murder”, on this view, should be
reserved for and applied to only the “most heinous”
killings.788
While labelling is important and fair
labelling is in itself unobjectionable,789 what amounts to a fair
label is complex. Any system of offence categorisation will involve
competing considerations and some
compromise,790 and the
significance of labels may depend on the audience.791 In the context
of homicide, it should not be presumed that the public necessarily looks more
benignly on people convicted of manslaughter.
The Law Commission said in 2007
that:792
... it is in fact arguable that the stigma attached to any given homicide
varies depending on the circumstances of the case as much
as the name of the
crime. For example, a drunk driver who crashes and kills the occupants of
another car will be convicted of manslaughter,
which reflects lack of criminal
intent, but not the public abhorrence of this kind of crime; whereas an elderly
spouse who kills
his failing partner, by consent or believing that it is in her
best interests, is dubbed a murderer. We consider that the argument
might
plausibly be made that some murders (e.g. mercy killing) may be more
sympathetically regarded by society than some instances
of manslaughter that are
widely regarded as particularly abhorrent.
The way the public understands
a sentence in a given case is likely to be more complex than the visceral
connotations of the offence
label viewed in isolation. We are not aware of any
particular public outcry at the sentence imposed by the Court of Appeal in R
v Wihongi, for example, even if the case was remarked
on.793
The complexity involved in analysing what is a fair
label is readily apparent in the case of murder and manslaughter when the
question
of partial defences arises. Generally, murder describes intentional
killings, and manslaughter describes unintentional killings.794
Partial defences carve out exceptions to that distinction based on
mitigating circumstances and confer
785 A description of a homicide as manslaughter, Chalmers and Leverick note, at 222, “draws explanatory value from the fact that it has in some way been differentiated from murder”.
786 At 224–237.
787 Andrew Ashworth “Reforming the Law of Murder” [1990] Crim L Rev 75 at 83.
788 Ashworth and Horder, above n 783, at 282.
789 Glanville Williams “Convictions and Fair Labelling” (1983) 42 CLJ 85 at 86; and Chalmers and Leverick, above n 784, at 246.
790 Chalmers and Leverick note, for example, that a balance must be struck between particularism and breadth, and that some categorisations of criminal offending may be driven by pragmatic considerations. An example is the greater likelihood of securing convictions for particularised homicide offences (like dangerous driving causing death and corporate killing) where juries are reluctant to convict of manslaughter for the same conduct): Chalmers and Leverick, above n 784, at 239–240.
791 Chalmers and Leverick suggest, at 237–239, that for people with no particular legal knowledge, the descriptive aspect of a label is important, whereas for people within the justice system (like prosecutors and judges), it is the differentiation of offences and offenders that matters, and pure descriptions are secondary.
792 Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, 2007) at 53 (footnotes omitted).
793 The Commission made a similar observation in the 2007 Report, at 52–53, about the sentence imposed in the euthanasia case of R v Law (2002)
794 Law Commission, above n 792, at 53. See also Victorian Law Reform Commission Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) at 9; and Law
Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 782, at 218.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 139
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
a generic manslaughter label despite the presence of murderous intent.
Partial defences are therefore a blunt tool for labelling purposes.795
As the Law Reform Commission of Canada (since disestablished)
said:796
10.18
10.19
[E]ven if ‘murder’ seems an inappropriate term for killing under
provocation, ‘manslaughter’ is surely (with
all due respect to the
common law) as singularly inappropriate a term for killing with intent (which
killing under provocation is).
The Law Commission of England and Wales
noted that deployment of fair labelling as a rationale for partial defences may
conflate
questions of offence categorisation and punishment797 and
that, when it comes to partial defences, fair labelling is secondary to the
“sentence mitigation principle”.798 That Commission has
said:799
The secondary importance of labelling considerations explains, in part, why
partial defences do not reduce other crimes that carry
discretionary maximum
sentences, such as attempted murder, to lesser included offences, such as, in
appropriate cases, wounding with
intent to do grievous bodily harm. We found it
significant that those who thought labelling considerations ought to have played
more
of a role in structuring our proposals for partial defences to homicide,
did not extend the logic of their arguments to those homicide-related
crimes
that have lesser included offences.
While labels may be important,
therefore, it does not follow that fair labelling is well served by partial
defences. It may be better
served by a separate offence, tailored to a subset of
homicides, but even this will not get around the problem of arbitrariness.
If
there are many circumstances that may mitigate culpability for homicide, should
they not all be able to be taken into account
in a meaningful way? This is
where, as we discuss below, sentencing seems to have a procedural
advantage.
The enhanced role of the jury
10.20
10.21
It has been argued that, when a jury returns a verdict, it is not deciding an
abstract question but rather how a person ought to be
held responsible. This
involves both legal and moral considerations so that, in some
cases:800
... it may be that the greater offence is made out in law, but the
jury feels that it is morally inappropriate to convict. Here, the jury will be
tempted to convict of a lesser
offence or, perhaps more likely, to acquit
“perversely.” This tendency will be seen by some as an example of
the jury’s
usurping the function of the judge, and by others as the
jury’s taking steps to nullify oppressive law.
To the extent jury
nullification may sometimes be a reality, some consider the law should squarely
accommodate these kinds of moral
assessments rather than force juries to make
binary choices between murder and acquittal.801 Martin Wasik says
there is “something to be said for allowing the jury the option of a
lesser offence in some cases rather
than forcing them to
795 Law Commission, above n 792, at 54. Writing in the English context, Nicola Lacey suggests that, if the mandatory penalty were abolished in that jurisdiction, “one would have to ask hard questions about the real importance of labelling homicides as ‘murder’ and ‘manslaughter’, and about the relationship between labelling and grading ... If labelling is really important, one might argue that we should then reconstruct voluntary manslaughter in relation to a discrete set of labels: provoked killing; killing under duress; killing in panic; mercy killing and so on.”: Nicola Lacey “Partial Defences to Homicide: Questions of Power and Principle in Imperfect and Less Imperfect Worlds ...” in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds) Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 107 at 130.
796 Law Reform Commission of Canada Homicide (Working Paper No 33, 1984) at 74. See also Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 782, at 218.
797 See Law Commission of England and Wales Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 2006) at 9. Where the mandatory penalty subsists, the Commission noted, at 48, “[m]atters of verdict and sentence are effectively fused in murder cases. Partial defences affect the verdict of murder, and only that verdict, because a verdict of murder is the only one that carries in its wake a mandatory sentence of such gravity (life imprisonment).”
798 At 48.
799 At 48 (footnotes omitted).
800 Martin Wasik “Partial Excuses in the Criminal Law” (1982) 45 MLR 516 at 518–520 (footnotes omitted).
801 At 520. See also Ashworth and Horder, above n 783, at 251. Also see the
discussion above at paragraphs [9.32]–[9.38].
140 Law Commission Report
choose between [conviction for the offence charged and acquittal] when
neither reflects their true finding”, which might “[reduce]
the
temptation for the jury to acquit perversely in cases where the strict
application of the law would lead to a conviction for
a morally inappropriate
offence”.802 On this view, partial defences may be desirable
not just for individual defendants but in the overall interests of justice. Lord
Bingham
has said:803
10.22
10.23
10.24
10.25
10.26
The interests of justice are not served if a defendant who has committed a
lesser offence is either convicted of a greater offence,
exposing him to
greater punishment than his crime deserves, or acquitted altogether, enabling
him to escape the measure of punishment
which his crime deserves. The objective
must be that defendants are neither over-convicted nor under-convicted, nor
acquitted when
they have committed a lesser offence of the type
charged.
There is a risk of a “perverse” outcome in any case
if a jury acquits on grounds of sympathy rather than law, and a middle-ground
offence could avoid perversity in many cases. The risk of perverse outcomes is,
in other words, not unique to homicide. Even for
homicide, partial defences can
address this risk only to the extent they apply. There will not be a partial
defence for every potentially
mitigating circumstance.
Partial defences
may also lead to a perversity that disadvantages defendants in the form of
compromise verdicts. In a trial situation,
if a jury cannot agree whether a
defendant should be acquitted on the basis of self-defence, for example, a
partial defence may provide
an attractive pathway to a middle-ground
manslaughter verdict.804 On the face of it, this risk is greatest
with excessive self-defence, as we discuss below, but it could attach to any
partial defence,
and compromise outcomes may also arise in plea
negotiations.805 In the present context, where self-defence may be
the appropriate defence in many cases,806 an increased risk of
compromise verdicts and pleas would be a particular concern.
A further
element of this argument is that significant questions of mitigation should be
left to juries. It is argued this can legitimise
lenient sentences since there
will be community endorsement of the relevant mitigating circumstances.807
A jury decision on mitigation may also assist the sentencing judge by
sending a clear message on the jury’s view of culpability,
thus promoting
sentencing consistency and fairness.808
One difficulty with
arguments about the acceptability of consequences that follow convictions (like
sentencing) is that they involve
speculation. Somewhat like fair labelling,
there is intuitive force in the idea a jury verdict may render a sentence more
comprehensible
or legitimate, but matters are probably much more
complex.
Further, although in jury trial cases factual questions are
mainly for the jury, judges may still make findings of fact for sentencing.
A
guilty verdict tells the judge the jury found the elements of the offence proved
but not how it reached that conclusion. Thus,
while a judge “must
accept
802 At 520.
803 R v Coutts [2006] UKHL 39, [2006] 1 WLR 2154 at [12].
804 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 102–103; Michelle Edgely and Elena Marchetti “Women Who Kill Their Abusers: How Queensland’s New Abusive Domestic Relationships Defence Continues to Ignore Reality” (2011) 13 Flinders LJ 125 at 141; Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation The partial defence of provocation (New South Wales Legislative Council 2013) at 61; and Law Commission of England and Wales Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290, August 2004) at 79.
805 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie “Defences to Homicide for Battered Women: A Comparative Analysis of Laws in Australia, Canada and New Zealand” [2012] SydLawRw 22; (2012) 34 Syd L Rev 467 at 492. See also Victoria Department of Justice, above n 782, at 27 and 30. The Department of Justice considered defensive homicide may have been “operating to distort the role of self-defence” and detracting from a proper focus on self-defence, which, the Department considered, “should be the primary focus” in the context of defensively motivated homicides by victims of family violence.
806 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December 2013 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June
2014) at 119.
807 Law Commission, above n 792, at 52.
808 At 79–80.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 141
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
10.27
as proved all facts, express or implied, that are essential to a plea of
guilty or a finding of guilt”,809 there may be other matters
still to make findings on. An example in the cases we have reviewed is the
circumstances surrounding the
homicide. Was the offender threatened before he or
she inflicted the fatal injury? Were they frightened? Angry?
Even if a
manslaughter verdict is returned after a defendant has relied on a partial
defence, the judge will have to infer whether
the verdict reflected acceptance
of the defence or a finding of lack of intent,810 and as the
Commission noted in 2007, if a partial defence is run and rejected,
“little if anything is articulated about the
way in which the issues have
been dealt with”811 – to the public or the sentencing
judge.
Partial defences improve charging practice
10.28
10.29
10.30
Some argue that partial defences can encourage better charging practice. It
is argued that, if the prosecution is guided by a partial
defence when making
decisions about when a charge of manslaughter should be preferred to murder,
there would be less risk of overcharging.
Defendants would have more leverage
in plea negotiations and may feel safer defending a murder charge knowing their
defence need
not be “all or nothing”.812 There may also
be positive public resource implications if less money were expended on murder
trials.813
There is a degree of circularity here in the
assumption of a problem with charging practice and the implication that
defendants should
have scope to negotiate a lesser charge even when the evidence
is that they killed with murderous intent. In any event, as we have
discussed,
we do not think the evidence from our case review discloses an
“overcharging” problem.
Further, just as a jury may take a
middle ground verdict option if one is presented, a defendant who has the
opportunity to plead
guilty to a lesser offence may take it rather than proceed
to trial on a murder charge despite the possibility of a better outcome
(acquittal) at trial.814 In other words, while a middle ground option
may relieve some pressure, it does not follow that the defendant will
necessarily ultimately
benefit.
Partial defences improve sentencing decisions
10.31
10.32
FVDRC suggests that a partial defence is required to achieve fair sentencing
outcomes for victims of family violence who are currently
convicted or at risk
of being convicted of murder. Even if the presumption of life imprisonment is
rebutted, a sentence for murder
is likely to be higher than for manslaughter
– whatever the facts of the offending.815 The FVDRC compares
sentences in cases where the conviction was for manslaughter (particularly
manslaughter cases where provocation
was successfully run) with those where the
conviction was for murder.
There is no doubt the sentences in the two
most recent murder cases (R v Wihongi and R v Rihia), where
provocation was not run or not available,816 are longer than those
imposed in the manslaughter cases, but it does not follow that this points to a
need for a partial defence.
809 Sentencing Act 2002, s 24(1)(b).
810 See, for example, R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA) at [2].
811 Law Commission, above n 792, at 79.
812 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at xxix and 109.
813 At 8–9.
814 Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, above n 805, at 489.
815 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 806, at 121.
816 As we noted in Chapter 9, provocation was in law available, but not
run, in R v Wihongi, but the offending in R v Rihia post-dated
repeal and so the defendant in that case could have sought to rely on the
partial defence. See paragraph [9.48]. See
also R v Wihongi HC Napier
CRI-2009-041-2096, 30 August 2010 [Wihongi (HC)]; R v Wihongi
[2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775 [Wihongi (CA)]; R v Wihongi
[2012] NZSC 12 [Wihongi (SC)]; and R v Rihia [2012] NZHC
2720.
142 Law Commission Report
10.33
10.34
As we discussed in Chapter 9, it cannot be assumed there is no material
difference in the culpability or risk between offenders convicted
of murder and
those convicted of manslaughter or that the murder convictions are in themselves
evidence something went wrong. Nor
is it valid to argue that the murder
sentences were too high because they were longer than sentences in manslaughter
cases where
provocation was successfully run. This presumes, rather than
illuminates, the merit of a partial defence and does not engage with
the policy
behind the repeal of provocation. In its 2007 Report, the Law Commission
said,817 in a passage cited with approval in R v
Hamidzadeh,818 that:
... if provocation is repealed on the policy basis that the defendants who
rely upon it are not inherently more deserving of favourable
treatment than many
others who are presently convicted of murder, then it would make no sense to
endorse and take steps to ensure
an ongoing lower tariff simply for provocation.
It may be that a more flexible approach to sentencing for murder ought to be
taken
to allow better recognition of the wide range of mitigating factors
(including provocation) that can be present in cases of intentional
killing, but
that is a different issue.
Even if there were an unwarranted discrepancy
between sentences for murder and sentences for manslaughter in this area, it
would
not follow that the structure of the law was the problem.819
If the issue is sentencing practice, it should be considered by looking at
whether the law is structured, and the criminal justice
system has the
resources, for sentencing to be approached in a way that is flexible, responsive
and fair. We discuss issues around
sentencing in Chapter 11.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A PARTIAL DEFENCE
10.35
In assessing the arguments in favour of partial defences we have,
necessarily, addressed many of the counter-arguments already, but
there are four
stand-alone arguments against partial defences that warrant mention.
Partial defences tend to be co-extensive with mandatory
sentencing
10.36
As highlighted throughout this part, with few exceptions, partial defences
go hand in hand with mandatory sentencing for murder.
Law reform bodies here and
overseas have noted the mandatory penalty’s historical co-extensiveness
with partial defences, and
jurisdictions where mandatory sentencing has been
abolished have, in the main, found that to point against partial
defences.820 Two law reform bodies to have recommended against
abolition of partial defences, the Law Commission of England and Wales and the
Queensland
Law Reform Commission, were
817 Law Commission, above n 792, at 82.
818 R v Hamidzadeh [2012] NZCA 550, [2013] 1 NZLR 369 at [44]. See also Hamidzadeh v R [2013] NZSC 33, [2013] 2 NZLR 137 (declining leave to appeal to the Supreme Court).
819 Law Commission, above n 792, at 82.
820 The co-extensiveness of partial defences and the mandatory penalty for murder was noted in Law Commission of England and Wales, above n
797, at 48–49; Law Reform Commission of Ireland Defences in Criminal Law (LRC 95, 2009) at 112; Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 804, at ch 2; Tasmania Law Reform Institute Review of the Law Relating to Self-defence (Final Report No 20, 2015), at 53 and 71; Queensland Law Reform Commission A review of the excuse of accident and the defence of provocation (Report No 64, September
2008), at 500; Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at xx, 11, and
241; Victoria Department of Justice, above n 782, at 17;
and Law Reform
Commission of Western Australia, above n 782, at 5–6. Among jurisdictions
to have abolished mandatory sentencing
but retained (and in some cases reformed)
or reintroduced partial defences (New South Wales, Western Australia and the
Australian
Capital Territory), New South Wales and Western Australia have
identified particular reasons for doing so. The New South Wales Select
Committee
on the Partial Defence of Provocation accepted there was a case for abolition
but, unable to reach a consensus and without
sufficient information to enable
a clear recommendation on how self-defence could be reformed to accommodate
victims of family
violence, did not recommend abolition but did recommend a
review of homicide and defences after five years and that recommendation
has
been accepted (Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, above n
804, at 87 and 209). In Western Australia, the
Law Reform Commission noted that
mandatory murder sentencing “has provided one of the strongest
justifications for the partial
defence of provocation”. The Commission
considered no partial defences should be retained or introduced “unless
the circumstances
giving rise to the defence always demonstrate reduced
culpability” but found that excessive self-defence met this test (Law
Reform Commission of Western Australia,
above n 782, at ch 4.)
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 143
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
working on the basis that the mandatory sentence for murder was not open for
reform, and that was highly relevant to their
recommendations.821
Partial defences are anomalous
10.37
For other crimes, if the elements of an offence are proved, that is
sufficient to convict, and differences in the seriousness of particular
cases
are addressed at sentencing. Culpable homicide is the only kind of crime where,
despite proof of the elements of murder, a
person may still be convicted of
another less serious offence (manslaughter or, in relevant cases, infanticide)
if a partial defence
applies. These are cases where the defendant intentionally
caused death but extenuating circumstances are seen to justify a description
of
culpability or sentencing consequences other than those that follow a murder
conviction.822 Thus, the Law Commission of England and Wales has
described the idea of a partial defence as “something of a
misnomer”,
better understood as “the way that the law has created
space for discretion in sentencing in murder cases”.823 Despite
this, some suggest a partial defence model could be applied beyond
homicide,824 while others resist the idea partial defences are
anomalous just because they are unique to the law of
homicide.825
Partial defences are not well suited to taking account of mitigating
circumstances
10.38
10.39
10.40
A compelling argument, which has considerable practical significance and was
reviewed at length by this Commission in 2007,826 is that partial
defences are a second-best way to take account of mitigating
circumstances.
One reason for this is that a wide range of circumstances
may mitigate a defendant’s culpability, and unless it is suggested
there
should be a partial defence for every such circumstance, there will inevitably
be arbitrariness in which mitigating factors
are singled out for recognition via
a partial defence.827
Partial defences also reduce complex
issues to binary inquiries. They require a jury to decide whether a defendant
fits the criteria
for mitigation as a “yes or no” question. This may
mean mitigating circumstances are excluded from consideration at sentencing,
if
a jury considers the defendant does not quite come within the partial
defence,828 or that “undesirable constraints” are
placed on the presentation of evidence at trial,829 partly because
trials are adversarial and set up to “generate a ‘winner’ and
a ‘loser’”.830 Issues that turn on matters of
degree are therefore not well served,831 and there is a strong
argument that it is preferable for evidence of
mitigating
821 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 43–44; and Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 820, at 9–10.
822 Ashworth and Horder, above n 783, at 250.
823 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 48.
824 Jeremy Horder Excusing Crime (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 143–146; and Lacey, above n 795, at 120. But compare Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001) at 41: “The argument for jury participation in determining levels of culpability should logically extend to all crimes and not be confined to murder. For good reason this has never been suggested. Instead, the task of crafting penalty to fit blameworthiness has long been the daily diet of judges.” The possibility of an expanded partial defence model is obviously beyond our remit, although we would note it is relevant, in this connection, that homicides are a small number of all violent offences, including those committed by victims of family violence responding to abuse.
825 See for example Victor Tadros “The Homicide Ladder” (2006) 69 MLR 601 at 615.
826 Law Commission, above n 792, at chs 4–6.
827 At 72.
828 At 82.
829 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 49. See also, discussing the partial defence of diminished responsibility, Jeremy Horder
Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 233.
830 Horder, above n 829, at 233.
831 Horder, above n 829, at 233–234; Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 49; and Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n
794, at 241.
144 Law Commission Report
circumstances to be dealt with through the more inquisitorial and holistic sentencing process.832
As the Law Commission of England and Wales has said:833
By making evidence of diminished responsibility relevant to verdict, when (as
in cases of second degree murder) it could simply be
made relevant to sentence,
one would needlessly force experts to distort the relevance of their evidence.
Likewise, by making evidence
of provocation relevant to verdict, one forces the
jury to work with only a partial picture of the context in which the provocation
was alleged to have been given, a partial picture largely provided (usually
uncontested) by D. These drawbacks may be something that
we must live with when
the verdict would otherwise entail the passing of an inappropriate mandatory
sentence but they should not
be tolerated outside that context.
Partial defences can have undesirable or perverse
effects
10.41
10.42
In addition to the risk of artificially rigid presentation of evidence,
partial defences can have other undesirable effects. One,
which we have noted,
is the risk of compromise pleas and verdicts. Another is complexity for juries,
which, in homicide cases,
must in any event grapple with difficult concepts and
evidence.834
In the present context, two additional potential
perversities should be noted. First, partial defences can undermine the
operation
of self-defence. This was noted by the Victorian Department of
Justice when it reviewed the operation, and recommended repeal,
of defensive
homicide in that jurisdiction. The risk has also been acknowledged by other
law reform bodies.835 Second, partial defences can lead to
unintended consequences, particularly the excusing of conduct by
“undeserving”
defendants. Victoria’s defensive homicide is a
clear example of this in practice – it was primarily used by violent
men.836
WHAT WOULD A PARTIAL DEFENCE LOOK LIKE?
10.43
10.44
10.45
Bearing in mind the in-principle arguments for and against partial defences,
we have considered what a partial defence aimed at victims
of family violence
would look like. This practical enquiry informs our view on whether a partial
defence is justified.
We have drawn on the Commission’s previous
work, and in particular Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to
Battered Defendants,837 and overseas law reform work, but there
is no standard approach in this area. Other jurisdictions’ approaches
vary depending
on policy choices about what conduct is partially excusable and
local context, including sentencing law and procedure, and whether
and what
partial defences already exist.
Experience in other jurisdictions
suggests that the essential focus of partial defences can be broken down into
three categories.
Each emphasises different elements, although there can be
significant overlap:
. Defence-based partial defences
– normally requiring an honest belief that the
defendant’s
actions were necessary to defend or preserve him or herself or
another.
. Provocation-based partial defences
– requiring a loss of control by the defendant,
triggered by provocation sufficient to deprive a person of ordinary
tolerance, in similar circumstances, of the power of
self-control.
832 Horder, above n 829, at 234.
833 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 49.
834 At 49. See also Victoria Department of Justice, above n 782, at vii.
835 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 782, at 294; and Tasmania Law Reform Institute, above n 820, at 71.
836 Victoria Department of Justice, above n 782, at viii.
837 Law Commission, above n 824.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 145
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
. Diminished capacity-based partial defences –
requiring an abnormality of mental functioning that impaired the
defendant’s capacity to understand events, to judge
whether their actions
are right or wrong, or to exercise self-control.
10.46
10.47
We have also considered a fourth option of a trauma-based partial
defence, which would focus on the trauma suffered by a defendant and their
response to it.
Below, we discuss each of the four types of partial
defence, before commenting briefly on the difficulties presented by the question
of whether any such defence should be general or limited to victims of family
violence.
Defence-based partial defences
10.48
10.49
10.50
Defence-based partial defences operate alongside self-defence to provide a
middle tier of culpability where the defendant satisfies
the subjective, but
not the objective, element of self- defence, which is usually a requirement that
the use of force must be reasonable.
Among the submitters supportive of a
defence-based partial defence were the Public Defence Service, the Auckland
Coalition for the
Safety of Women and Children and an academic. Others
considered it preferable to reform self-defence to better accommodate family
violence victims.
Below, we discuss the merits of two examples of
defence-based partial defences: excessive self-defence and killing for
preservation
in an abusive domestic relationship (killing for preservation).
The specific offence of defensive homicide in Victoria (now
repealed) has a
similar focus to these partial defences. Given that it is a stand-alone offence,
however, we have chosen to analyse
the merits of this option separately at
paragraph [10.98] below.
Excessive self-defence
10.51
10.52
10.53
In its 2001 Report, the Law Commission considered the merits of excessive
self-defence, and while it favoured this partial defence
over others,
ultimately, it preferred a sentencing discretion for murder.838 The
Commission considered a partial defence of excessive self-defence might be
worded as follows:839
It is a partial defence to a charge of murder (reducing the offence to
manslaughter) if, in the defence of himself [or herself] or
another, a person
uses more force than it is reasonable to use in the circumstances as he [or she]
believes them to be.
As the Commission recognised, this defence would
apply where a defendant intended to do something “lawful within
limits”,
unlike provocation and diminished responsibility, which apply
where a defendant does something unlawful.840 A defendant who
honestly believes they need to defend themselves but is mistaken about the level
of force required to counter the
threat is, arguably, morally less culpable than
people who kill intentionally and should not be labelled a murderer.841
This convinced both the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) and the Law
Reform Commission of Western Australia to recommend versions
of this partial
defence.842
In respect of victims of family violence,
excessive self-defence may be more appropriate than a provocation or diminished
capacity-type
defence, as there is no need for a loss of control and the
defendant’s actions are not treated as if they arise from a mental
condition.843 Not all victims
838 At 25–26.
839 At 22.
840 At 25.
841 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 94.
842 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 101; and Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 782, at 181–182.
843 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 102; and Law
Commission, above n 824, at 25.
146 Law Commission Report
10.54
10.55
10.56
of family violence who kill their abusers will be acting defensively,
however; some will be retaliating out of anger for what has
been done to them.
Excessive self-defence would therefore not apply in all cases. In fact, it is
not clear that any of the four murder
convictions identified in our case review
would have benefited from a defence-based partial
defence.844
There are problems with excessive self-defence,
which have led courts in New Zealand,845
England,846 Canada847 and Australia848 to disavow the partial defence at common law. In New
Zealand, the Court of Appeal recently considered excessive self-defence in McNaughton v R.849
Concluding that no such partial defence exists at common law, the Court noted
there was “little statutory support” for
excessive self-defence
outside New South Wales,850 South Australia,851
Western
Australia852 and a few American states (North Carolina,
Massachusetts). The Court quoted the Supreme Court of Canada, which has stated,
in R v Faid, that excessive self- defence:853
... lacks any recognizable basis in principle, would require prolix and
complicated jury charges and would encourage juries to reach
compromise verdicts
to the prejudice of either the accused or the Crown.
In Australia, the
Model Criminal Code Officers Committee rejected the reintroduction of
excessive self-defence on the ground that
it is inherently vague and would bring
unnecessary complexity to the law,854 although the New Zealand Law
Commission was not convinced excessive self-defence would involve the same
complexities in this
jurisdiction. Because excessive self-defence would sit
alongside the complete defence of self-defence, it would not involve new
concepts and would fit naturally into jury directions on
self-defence.855
While the wording of the suggested provision
in paragraph [10.51] above seems straightforward, there is an issue around how
the jury
decides what is “reasonable force” when determining whether
a defendant should be acquitted or convicted of manslaughter
(assuming the
subjective limbs are met). Self-defence does not turn on fine distinctions. As
discussed in Chapter 5, the courts
do not apply a strict proportionality test,
recognising that, when responding to a threat, “a person defending himself
cannot
weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive
action”.856 If our recommendations in Part 2 are accepted and
it is clarified that self- defence is not necessarily excluded where the degree
of force used in defending a threat exceeds the degree of threatened force, it
would be difficult for the jury to distinguish between
self-
844 In R v Neale [2010] NZCA 167, the defendant claimed self-defence, but the facts do not appear to have supported it. The defendant stabbed the deceased nine times as he got out of the shower. In R v Reti HC Whangarei CRI-2007-027-2103, 9 December 2008 [Reti (HC)]; R v Reti [2009] NZCA 271, excessive self-defence could have led to a different outcome on the facts, as the defendant stabbed the deceased after he kicked her in the stomach. However, she had previously stabbed him several hours earlier, and the jury rejected her claim of provocation. In R v Wihongi, above n 816, the defendant stabbed the deceased after an argument and while he was leaving the property. In R v Rihia [2012] NZHC 2720, the defendant stabbed the deceased during an argument and while the deceased was lying on the couch, intoxicated and after the deceased had thrown a speaker at his head.
845 McNaughton v R [2013] NZCA 657, [2014] 2 NZLR 467.
846 Palmer v R [1970] UKPC 2; [1971] All ER 1077 (PC) at 1088.
847 R v Faid [1983] 1 SCR 265.
848 Zecevic v DPP [1987] HCA 26; (1987) 162 CLR 645.
849 McNaughton v R, above n 845.
850 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 421.
851 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 15(2).
852 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), s 248(3).
853 McNaughton v R, above n 845, at [64], quoting R v Faid, above n 847, at 271.
854 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee Model Criminal Code: Fatal Offences Against the Person (1998) at 107–113.
855 Law Commission, above n 824, at 25.
856 Palmer v R, above n 846, at 1088.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 147
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
defence and excessive self-defence. This could lead to compromise verdicts,
with juries opting for the “middle ground”
of
manslaughter.857
Killing for preservation
10.57
10.58
Queensland’s partial defence of killing for preservation applies only
to victims of family violence where the defendant believes
their actions are
necessary for their “preservation from death or grievous bodily
harm”.858 The defence also requires reasonable grounds for the
defendant’s subjective belief. In that respect, it is narrower than
traditional
formulations of excessive self- defence.
The Queensland
defence has been criticised on the basis that cases captured by the defence
would, in other jurisdictions, result in
complete acquittals on the basis of
self-defence.859 In Queensland, self-defence is available only
where a person is facing an immediate threat of harm or is being
assaulted.860 Queensland also retains a mandatory sentence for
murder, and the defence was introduced in response to concerns raised by the
Queensland
Law Reform Commission that, given the unsuitability of the partial
defence of provocation, the circumstances of victims of family
violence were
unable to be considered in mitigation of the mandatory life penalty for
murder.861 Rather than repeal provocation and the mandatory
sentence (as in New Zealand), a separate partial defence was introduced to fill
the
gap where a defendant is responding to a threat of harm that is not
immediate. Queensland’s legal context is, therefore, unique
and not a
wholly helpful comparator.
Provocation-based partial defences
10.59
10.60
Provocation-based partial defences do not require a defendant to be motivated
by a need to protect him or herself or another from
a threat. They apply where a
defendant has lost control in the face of provocation.
Among submitters,
the Criminal Bar Association and the FVDRC favoured a partial defence based on
loss of control or something akin
to New South Wales’s “extreme
provocation”, which we discuss below. The FVDRC recognised this would
capture circumstances
where the victim is retaliating but the behaviour is not
defensive (although the FVDRC had a number of concerns about the detail
of the
New South Wales provision). Other submitters, including the New Zealand Law
Society and the Public Defence Service, opposed
any reintroduction of a
provocation-based
defence.
857 S Kadish The Model Penal Code’s Provocation Proposal and its Reception in the State Legislatures and Courts of the United States of America, with Comments Relating to the Partial Defenses of Diminished Responsibility and Imperfect Self-Defence (February 2004). See Appendix F of Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 804.
858 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 304B.
859 See above at paragraph [4.49] and n 346.
860 See discussion in Tasmania Law Reform Institute, above n 820, at 70; and Victorian Department of Justice Defensive homicide: Review of the offence of defensive homicide: Discussion paper (August 2010) at 50. See also Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 820, at 313.
861 Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 820, at 489. See also
discussion at paragraph [10.36] above, and the footnotes therein.
148 Law Commission Report
The traditional formulation
10.61
Provocation-based partial defences vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but a traditional formulation normally requires that:
(a) (b) (c)
the defendant lost control;
the loss of control was caused by
provocation; and
the provocation would have been sufficient to deprive
a person with the same characteristics as the defendant, but a normal degree
of tolerance or the ordinary person’s power of self-control, of the power
of self-control.
10.62
10.63
10.64
In New Zealand, provocation was relied on in five out of 11 cases
involving victims of family violence between 2001 and 2009. Three
of those cases
resulted in a manslaughter verdict, which could be attributed to an accepted
claim of provocation.862 In two cases, the defendant was convicted
of murder. Since provocation was repealed, there has been one conviction for
murder, which
followed a guilty plea,863 and the facts of that case
may have fit within a provocation- based defence.864 Accordingly,
while the number of cases we have reviewed is too small to draw conclusions, the
circumstances in which victims of family
violence kill their abusers may, in
some circumstances, come within the elements of a provocation-based
defence.
Provocation has historically been problematic, however, and was
repealed in New Zealand in
2009.865 We do not attempt to explore the problems with the
defence, which was considered in detail by the Law Commission in 2007.866
We note, however, that in the context of family violence, provocation is
regarded as problematic for two reasons. First, the traditional
version of the
defence requires a sudden loss of control, but it is argued this does not
reflect the reality of the experiences of
victims of family violence, who may
respond to prolonged abuse some time after the provocation has been
endured.867 Second, provocation can operate to excuse perpetrators
of family violence who kill their victims in unexceptional circumstances,
such
as relationship break-downs.868
While several jurisdictions
have abolished provocation, others have reformed it in an attempt to address
these problems. Reforms have
focused on guarding against inappropriate reliance
on provocation by excluding certain conduct from the scope of the
defence869 and making the
862 The jury could, however, also have found that the defendant lacked the necessary intent for murder, which would also render a manslaughter verdict.
863 R v Rihia, above n 844.
864 See the discussion of Ms Rihia’s case and the partial defence of provocation in Chapter 9 at paragraphs 9.49–9.51.
865 As discussed in Chapter 4. In Australia, provocation was also abolished in Tasmania in 2003, in Victoria in 2005 and in Western Australia in
2008. See Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act 2003 (Tas); Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (Vic); and Criminal
Law Amendment (Homicide) Act 2008 (WA).
866 Law Commission, above n 792.
867 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 58; Queensland Law Reform Commission, above n 820, at 298; Law Commission Battered
Defendants: Victims of Family Violence Who Offend (NZLC PP41, 2000) at 28–29; and Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at
81. See also Barry Mitchell “Loss of Self-Control under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009: Oh No!” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds)
Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 39 at 42.
868 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 806, at 118.
869 Reform of provocation in England and Wales expressly excludes sexual
infidelity and claims where the provocative conduct has
been incited by the
defendant as an excuse to use violence (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s
55(6)). In New South Wales provocation
was reformulated to “extreme
provocation” and applies only when the deceased’s conduct
constitutes a serious indictable
offence and excludes conduct incited by the
deceased in order to provide an excuse to use violence (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s
23(2)
and (3)). In Queensland provocation was restricted to exclude conduct of
the deceased to bring about the end of a relationship, except
in circumstances
of a “most extreme and exceptional character” (Criminal Code 1899
(QLD), s 304(3)). In Canada, amendments
were introduced in 2015 to restrict
provocation to circumstances where the deceased’s conduct constituted an
indictable offence
punishable by five or more years of imprisonment (Criminal
Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s 232(2)).
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 149
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
defence more accessible to victims of family violence.870 The most notable reformulation is
England and Wales’s “loss of control”, and New South
Wales’s “extreme provocation”.
The new formulation based on “loss of
control”
10.65
The partial defence of “loss of control” replaced provocation in
England and Wales, following two reports of the Law Commission
in that
jurisdiction.871 Loss of control applies
where:872
(a) (b) (c)
the defendant’s conduct resulted from a loss of
self-control;
the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger;
and
a person of the defendant’s sex and age, with a normal degree
of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the
defendant, might
have reacted in the same or in a similar way.
10.66
A loss of self-control will have a “qualifying trigger” if it
is attributable to:873
(a)
(b)
the defendant’s fear of serious violence from the deceased against the
defendant or another identified person;
a thing or things done or said
(or both) that:
(i)
(ii)
constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character; and
caused
the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged; or
(c)
a combination of (a) and (b).
10.67
10.68
Some commentators consider the extension to fear of serious violence is
“close to redundant” for victims of family
violence because of
constraints on the operation of the defence and this trigger.874
The most significant and controversial constraint is the requirement to
prove loss of self-control, which remains despite the Law
Commission of England
and Wales’s recommendation that it be removed. The Commission considered
the loss of control requirement
was unnecessary and undesirable because the
wrongful words or conduct, and not the loss of control, were the justification
for
the defence. The Commission also noted the criticism that a loss of control
requirement “privilege[d] men’s typical reactions
to provocation
over women’s typical reactions” and disadvantaged women responding
to family violence:875
It was clear to us that when a battered woman uses excessive force against
her abusive partner only because she fears for her safety
in any direct
confrontation, it would be wrong to rule out her plea simply because there was
no evidence of a loss of self-control.
The requirement for a loss of
control may, in addition, be illogical when the defence is invoked in connection
with a rational fear
of serious
violence.876
870 The requirement that the loss of control be “sudden” or for the provocation to occur immediately before the defendant’s use of force was removed by statute in England and Wales (Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 54(3)); New South Wales (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23(4)); and the Australian Capital Territory (Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 13(2) and (4)(b)).
871 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 804; and Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797.
872 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 54(1).
873 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 55.
874 Catherine Elliot “A Comparative Analysis of English and French Defences to Demonstrate the Limitations of the Concept of Loss of Control” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 231 at 231.
875 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 83.
876 Elliot, above n 874, at 232.
150 Law Commission Report
10.69
10.70
10.71
10.72
The recommendations of the Law Commission of England and Wales were endorsed
by the Select Committee established to review the partial
defence of
provocation in New South Wales.877 The Committee agreed that the
requirement for a loss of control should be abandoned, and the focus shifted to
the nature of the provocative
conduct:878
The Committee is concerned that the practical effect of the partial defence
requiring a loss of self- control inappropriately lends
itself to killings in
which extreme violence is used to reduce a defendant’s culpability and, in
relation to intimate partner
homicides, this tends to favour male defendants who
kill women, further contributing to concerns about gender bias. Conversely, the
requirement to show a loss of self-control tends to disadvantage those who kill,
usually women, who kill in ‘slow burn’
cases.
However, in
neither jurisdiction was the recommendation to discard the requirement for a
loss of control adopted. Ultimately, the
concern was that removing that
requirement would risk opening up the partial defence to cold-blooded
killing.879 The Ministry of Justice in England considered
that:880
... there is ... a fundamental problem about providing a partial defence in
situations where a defendant has killed while basically
in full possession of
his or her senses, even if he or she is frightened, other than in a situation
which is complete self-defence.
Rather than remove the requirement for a
loss of control, the legislation in both England and
Wales and New South Wales clarified that the loss of control does not need to be sudden.881
This may not have a major impact, however, as the period of time between the
provocation and the defendant’s response will
remain relevant.882
The explanatory notes to the loss of control provision state, for example,
that delay could be evidence as to whether the defendant
actually lost control,
and the greater the delay the more likely the defendant acted out of calculated
revenge.883 It has been argued that this will continue to be
problematic for defendants who use force where there is no immediate
threat.884
In 2007, the New Zealand Law Commission considered
the English proposal to include fear- based responses in a reformulated
provocation
defence. Overall, it was unconvinced this offered any advance on New
Zealand’s formulation and noted labelling and conceptual
issues with
combining provocation and excessive self-defence.885 Since then,
the experience in England and Wales and New South Wales demonstrates that,
while the most troublesome element of provocation-based
partial defences for
victims of family violence – the requirement for a sudden loss of control
– is not inseparable from
the defence, legislators have been unwilling to
part with it given the risk the defence will then accommodate undeserving
conduct.886
Diminished capacity-based partial defences
10.73
Partial defences premised on diminished capacity look “into the
actor’s mind to see whether he [or she] should be judged
by a lesser
standard than that applicable to ordinary men [or
877 Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, above n 804.
878 At 64.
879 Department of Attorney General and Justice Reform of the Partial Defence of Provocation: Call for Submissions on the exposure draft Crimes
Amendment (Provocation) Bill 2013 (New South Wales, 2013) at 8; and Mitchell, above n 867, at 44–45.
880 Ministry of Justice Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (MoJ CP No 19, London 2008) at [36]. Discussed in Mitchell, above n 867, at 44.
881 See above n 870.
882 Mitchell, above n 867, at 50.
883 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK) (explanatory notes) at [337]. Discussed in Elliot, above n 874, at 232.
884 Elliot, above n 874, at 232.
885 Law Commission, above n 792, at 60–61.
886 A defence that partially excuses some provoked intentional killings is
also fundamentally problematic for the reason recorded
in the Law
Commission’s 2007 Report; it “assumes that the ordinary person,
faced with a severely grave provocation,
will in consequence resort to
homicidal violence, when it is in fact arguable that only the most extraordinary
person does this”:
Law Commission, above n 792, at 42. The English
reformulation does not resolve this conceptual problem.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 151
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
10.74
10.75
10.76
women]”.887 These defences do not share the objective
requirement of provocation-based defences (that the provocation have a similar
effect
on a similar person).888 They are generally intended to
capture conduct falling short of insanity, where the defendant suffers from an
abnormality of mental
functioning that impairs their capacity to understand
events, to judge whether their actions are right or wrong or to exercise
self-control.889 Diminished responsibility was considered, but
rejected, by the VLRC and the Law Reform Commission of Western
Australia.890 The VLRC noted that it had been argued that
introducing diminished responsibility would serve to entrench misleading
stereotypes
of women by attributing the homicide to a psychological disturbance
rather than a defensive reaction to ongoing and severe family
violence.891
The few submitters who supported a partial
defence of diminished responsibility, including the Auckland District Law
Society, did
so on the basis that it should apply generally rather than only to
victims of family violence. Others questioned the appropriateness
of a
capacity-based defence for victims of family violence, noting it may imply some
kind of mental disturbance and perpetuate gender
stereotypes. The FVDRC
considered this kind of defence would inappropriately focus on the
defendant’s mental state rather
than the social context within which they
were responding. The Criminal Bar Association was not comfortable with the
implication
that victims of family violence have lost their ability to make
reasonable judgements about their situation. The Public Defence Service
was
divided on the issue, noting concerns with describing defensive actions as a
manifestation of some psychological disturbance
but cautioning against rejecting
the defence out of hand on that ground if it might avert a conviction for
murder. They considered
additional research may be needed to further
investigate the potential of this partial defence for victims of family
violence.
Diminished capacity-based partial defences are recognised
in several Commonwealth jurisdictions including in England and Wales,892
New South Wales,893 Queensland,894 the Northern
Territory895 and the Australian Capital
Territory.896
An example is the English provision, which was
reformed following two reports of the English
Law Commission,897 and provides:898
Persons suffering from diminished responsibility.
(1)
A person (“D”) who kills or is a party to the killing of another is not to be convicted of murder if D
was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning
which—
(a)
arose from a recognised medical
condition,
887 Model Penal Code (US) § 210(3) (1985) (commentary) at 71–72, noted in Paul H Robinson “Abnormal Mental State Mitigations of Murder: The US Perspective” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 291 at 307.
888 For example, loss of control applies where “a person of [the defendant’s] sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of [the defendant], might have reacted in the same or in a similar way”. See Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 54(1)(c).
889 See, for example, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23A.
890 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 239; and Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 782, at 259.
891 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 239.
892 Homicide Act 1957 (UK), s 2.
893 New South Wales reformed its version – “substantially impaired capacity” – in 1997. See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23A.
894 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 304A.
895 Criminal Code (NT), s 37.
896 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 14.
897 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 804; and Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797.
898 Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 52 (amending Homicide Act 1957
(UK), s 2).
152 Law Commission Report
(b)
(c)
substantially impaired D's ability to do one or more of the things mentioned in subsection
(1A), and
provides an explanation for D's acts and omissions in
doing or being a party to the killing.
(1A) Those things are—
(a) (b)
(c)
to understand the nature of D's conduct;
to form a rational
judgment;
to exercise self-control.
10.77
10.78
10.79
10.80
...
Diminished responsibility is considered an anomaly in English law,
driven by retention of the mandatory sentence for murder.899 It
reflects the continuum of mental illness (with insanity at one end and full
competence at the other) and offers an alternative
verdict for those not willing
or able to raise the complete insanity defence.900 It is also
supported on the basis murder is not the appropriate label for someone who is
mentally ill, although as we have noted,
the force of the
“labelling” argument was rejected by the Law Commission of England
and Wales.901
Diminished capacity is a difficult concept to
define. This makes it problematic to apply and could lead to
inconsistency.902 Some commentators note that there is no reliable
way to gauge degrees of responsibility and question the utility of psychiatric
evidence
on this issue.903 For these reasons, diminished
responsibility has never been part of New Zealand law. It was considered by the
Crimes Consultative
Committee established in 1989, but the Committee’s
preference was to deal with matters of impaired responsibility at
sentencing.904 The Committee considered that difficulties with
establishing a discrete provision would be exacerbated by complexities involved
in achieving sufficiently precise wording.905
Despite
conceptual problems, the partial defence has, however, been successfully relied
on by victims of family violence in other
jurisdictions,906 and New
Zealand courts have recognised that any capacity-based partial defence might be
relied on by defendants who have been victims
of family violence and suffered
from battered woman syndrome.907
However, a partial defence of
diminished responsibility is arguably problematic in this context for two
reasons. First, it can
entrench misleading stereotypes of women by
attributing homicides of abusers to psychological disturbance or mental
abnormality
rather than defensive reactions or acts of desperation in response
to ongoing and severe violence.908 Second, it may be used by
predominant aggressors in the context of intimate partner violence (for
example,
899 Alan Reed and Nicola Wake “Anglo-American Perspectives on Partial Defences: Something Old, Something, Borrowed, and Something New” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 183 at 183–184.
900 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 237.
901 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 99–100.
902 Law Commission, above n 824, at 47; and Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 239.
903 Kadish, above n 857, at 278.
904 Warren Brookbanks “Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished
Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 271 at 283.
905 At 283.
906 See for example R v Ahluwalia [1992] EWCA Crim 1; [1992] 4 All ER 889 (CA).
907 R v Gordon (1993) 10 CRNZ 430 (CA). A capacity-based partial defence may also be relatively well suited to young offenders. The Family Violence Death Review Committee said in its submission that self-defence is often problematic on the facts of cases where children kill abusive parents or caregivers and noted children have different capacity to evaluate risk and consider outcomes” (citing Nelson v R [2012] NZHC 3570). See also Brookbanks, above n 904, at 282–284.
908 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 239; and Law
Commission, above n 824, at 47.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 153
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
10.81
10.82
by affording a defence to “depressed husbands who kill their partners
when they end the relationship”).909
For these reasons,
the Law Commission recommended against introduction of the defence in New
Zealand in 2001.910 When it rejected the partial defence, the VLRC
considered degrees of criminal responsibility should be assessed at sentencing
and
that introducing diminished responsibility would conflict with the
recommendation to abolish provocation.911 The Law Reform Commission
of Western Australia took a similar view, noting substantial impairment by
mental abnormality does not always
accurately reflect culpability or render such
homicides equivalent to unintentional killings.912
We observe,
finally, that in New Zealand the Sentencing Act 2002 provides that, if
“the offender has, or had at the time
the offence was committed,
diminished intellectual capacity or understanding”, this may be a
mitigating factor.913 This applies to all offences, not just
homicide, and we discuss it in Chapter 11.
A trauma-based partial defence
10.83
10.84
10.85
10.86
In addition to the existing types of partial defence, we have considered the
option of a new partial defence based on trauma that
would be tailored towards
victims of family violence who kill their abusers.
As we apprehend it,
the rationale for a partial defence in this context is to recognise reduced
culpability of victims of family violence
who have been traumatised by a history
of abuse. This includes, but is not limited to, defendants who overreact to a
threat and defendants
who act out of anger after reaching a “breaking
point” as a consequence of abuse. Neither a defence-based nor a
provocation-based
partial defence will capture both kinds of case. Further, we
agree with the FVDRC and other submitters that a diminished capacity-based
defence is inappropriate, as it would assume a victim of family violence was
suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning
caused by a recognised
medical condition. This may not always be the case. A tailored partial defence
based on the trauma of family
violence could better recognise and fairly capture
the unique circumstances of family violence victims.
A helpful analogue
is the partial defence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance in the
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC), which
provides:914
A homicide which would otherwise be murder [is manslaughter when it] is
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor’s situation under the circumstances as he believes them to
be.
One of the features of this provision is that it requires a
“reasonable explanation or excuse” only for the extreme mental
or
emotional disturbance under which the killing was committed and not for the
killing itself. Some commentators have noted that
this distinction avoids some
of the difficulties with provocation’s reasonableness
requirement.915 Because this provision does not require a loss of
control or reaction to an external threat, it also avoids the problem of proving
a temporal connection between an external circumstance and the defendant’s
conduct. However,
909 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 240.
910 Law Commission, above n 824, at 47–48. See also Brookbanks, above n 904, at 284.
911 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 794, at 241–242.
912 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, above n 782, at 259.
913 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(2)(e).
914 Model Penal Code (US) § 210(3)(1)(b) (1985), cited and discussed in Mitchell, above n 867, at 49.
915 See, for example, Kadish, above n 857, at 273–274. See also the
discussion in Robinson, above n 887, at 292–296.
154 Law Commission Report
this feature has also been criticised on the basis it has “permitted
juries to return a manslaughter verdict in cases where
the defendant claims
passion because the victim left, moved the furniture out, planned a divorce, or
sought a protective order”,916 and while juries rejected the
partial defence in those cases, the point may still have force,
since:917
10.87
10.88
10.89
10.90
... remitting issues to the bare sympathies of the juries invites the illicit
and the prejudiced, particularly troublesome when the
prejudice tends to be part
of the culture, as it is to some degree with sex roles and
behavior.
Another distinctive feature of the MPC provision is that the
objective aspect of the test (an extreme mental or emotional disturbance
for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse) is determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation
under the circumstances as
he or she believes them to be. This was considered “potentially
radical”918 (although it bears some similarity to the mixed
subjective-objective test for self-defence and defence of another in section 48
of
the Crimes Act 1961, which requires the defendant’s use of force to be
reasonable “in the circumstances as he or she
believes them to
be”). It may be criticised on the basis it leaves the jury with no
guidance for determining which abnormalities
should and should not count and
“individualises” the reasonableness
standard.919
The Law Commission of England and Wales closely
considered the MPC’s “extreme mental or emotional disturbance”
as
an alternative to the concept of “loss of control”.920
The concept received support from a significant number of submitters in
that jurisdiction, including representative bodies of
the legal profession and
women’s groups, but was opposed by a majority of judges and academics on
the basis that it was too
vague.921 That Commission rejected the
concept in 2004 (although it was noted as an alternative to the preferred option
in the 2006
Report) on the basis it was “unduly vague and
indiscriminate922 and could lead to “intense legal scrutiny
and, no doubt, to a number of cases in the appeal courts to determine its
meaning
and scope”.923 The phrase has, however, formed the
basis of a provocation defence in at least some states in the United
States.924
Drawing on the MPC provision, the elements of a
trauma-based defence could include that:
. the defendant had
been subjected to repeated serious violence;
. the
defendant had reacted in a state of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
caused by
the violence she or he had experienced; and
.
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse for the extreme mental or
emotional disturbance
in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.
Such a
provision would, however, raise complex issues and involve a number of policy
choices, including whether the relevant violence
was limited to that perpetrated
by the deceased. Proper
916 Kadish, above n 857, at 273.
917 At 273.
918 At 272.
919 Thereby departing from the intention of the partial defence of provocation that the provocation must have been so grave as to have affected most reasonable persons in the same fashion: Kadish, above n 857, at 276–277.
920 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 82; and Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 804, at 41–44.
921 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 804, at 41.
922 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 82; Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 804, at 41–44.
923 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 82.
924 Law Commission of England and Wales, above n 797, at 82; and Kadish,
above n 857, at 272. When the Law Commission of England
and Wales considered
this in 2004, none of the 34 United States jurisdictions that had revised their
criminal codes had adopted the
Model Penal Code proposal wholesale, but five
(Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky and New York) had adopted the proposal
with
omission of only the term “mental” from the phrase
“extreme mental or emotional disturbance”.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 155
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
application of any objective requirement would also necessitate a sound
understanding of family violence or risk the same failings
as loss of control in
England and Wales.
Should any partial defence be limited to victims of family
violence?
10.91
10.92
10.93
10.94
10.95
A further issue is whether any partial defence should be limited in terms to
apply only in the context of family violence. Given that
we do not recommend the
adoption of any partial defence, we only address this issue in brief to further
highlight the difficulties
with such an approach.925
The
introduction of a partial defence of general application would have significant
implications for the criminal law and would carry
a high risk of unintended
consequences. Given the current absence of general partial defences in New
Zealand, it would be natural
to expect the limits of any new partial defence to
be tested vigorously. As victims of family violence who kill their abusers
account
for only a small fraction of homicide offenders, other defendants are
far more likely to attempt to engage the partial defence.
On the other
hand, we see several issues with limiting a partial defence to victims of
family violence. As a general principle,
the law should, wherever possible,
apply equally to people who have the same state of mind. A partial defence
limited to specific
circumstances or defendant characteristics would likely
result in anomalous and inconsistent treatment of other classes of defendant
whose conduct may be comparably culpable.
Limiting a partial defence
also heightens the risk that a woman who kills in response to family violence is
not seen to be acting
reasonably or will often not be acting
reasonably.926 This may discourage victims of family violence from
going to trial and relying on self-defence and may distort or detract from
self-defence
reforms.927
Finally, if a partial defence were
limited to victims of family violence, definitional issues, and therefore policy
choices about
scope, would inevitably arise. Queensland is the only jurisdiction
to have enacted a defendant-specific partial defence of “killing
for
preservation”. This defence applies only where “the deceased has
committed acts of serious domestic violence against
the person in the course of
an abusive domestic relationship” and “the person believes that it
is necessary for the
person’s preservation from death or grievous bodily
harm to do the act or make the omission that causes the death”.928
This would not capture a defendant who killed to protect another (for
example, a woman who killed an abusive partner to protect her
children from
ongoing sexual and physical abuse), which has been subject to some academic
comment.929
However, as we suggest in Chapter 11 in connection
with sentencing, it is not difficult to see why Queensland might have decided
to enact a narrowly framed
defence.930
925 Submitters were divided on the question of whether a partial defence should be limited to victims of family violence. Those who favoured limiting a partial defence were concerned about the risk of unintended consequences and of undeserving defendants using the partial defence to their benefit. Others, including the Criminal Bar Association and Auckland District Law Society, could not see the justification for limiting a partial defence. They recommended providing additional criteria or a threshold test if the concern was to prevent its use by “undeserving” defendants. Some submitters emphasised the difficulties in identifying a victim of family violence, noting that many aggressors were primary victims in previous situations (as children). Historical and intergenerational violence could therefore be problematic to deal with under a partial defence. Another submitter said criminal defences should be principles based, not ad hoc.
926 Victoria Department of Justice, above n 782, at viii.
927 At 12.
928 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 304B.
929 See for example, Edgely and Marchetti, above n 804.
930 See Chapter 11 at paragraph [11.41].
156 Law Commission Report
A SPECIFIC HOMICIDE OFFENCE
10.96
10.97
At present in New Zealand, culpable homicide is either murder or
manslaughter931 unless it is infanticide, which is New
Zealand’s single specific homicide offence.932 A more
contemporary example of a specific homicide offence is Victoria’s
now-repealed defensive homicide.
Creation of a new specific homicide
offence may be an alternative way for the law to recognise reduced culpability
for homicide. Such
an offence could include any of the elements intended for a
partial defence and reflect reduced culpability by setting a lower maximum
penalty than applies to murder.933 Like manslaughter, a specific
offence could also operate as an alternative verdict so that a defendant
charged with murder might
instead be convicted of the specific offence; as
might a defendant charged with manslaughter, if the maximum penalty was lower.
As partial defences and specific offences both operate to recognise reduced
culpability, the merits and drawbacks canvassed above
would largely apply also
to a separate homicide offence.
Defensive homicide
10.98
10.99
The offence of defensive homicide was introduced in Victoria in 2005 in
response to the VLRC’s recommendation for a partial
defence of excessive
self-defence. To have found a person guilty of defensive homicide a jury must
have been satisfied beyond reasonable
doubt that:934
.
the defendant killed in circumstances that would otherwise constitute
murder; but
. the defendant was not guilty of murder
because he or she believed his or her conduct to be
necessary to defend himself or herself against the infliction of death or really serious injury;
and
. the defendant did not have reasonable
grounds for that belief.
The offence carried the same maximum
penalty as manslaughter in Victoria: 20 years’
imprisonment.
10.100 Victoria decided to introduce defensive homicide rather
than a partial defence to murder, because a separate offence would make
it
clear to the sentencing judge on what basis a verdict was reached, thus enabling
imposition of a sentence that accurately reflected
the crime.935 If
a partial defence were introduced, the basis for the jury’s verdict would
not be clear, and it would be up to the judge to
decide the basis on which to
sentence.936
931 Crimes Act 1961, s 160(3).
932 The law of infanticide in New Zealand has not been reviewed recently and infanticide is a controversial offence in the western world. See PJ Dean “Child Homicide and Infanticide in New Zealand” (2004) 27(4) Int J Law Psychiatry 339; and Eric Vallillee “Deconstructing Infanticide” (2015) 5(4) Western Journal of Legal Studies 1.
933 We consider the impact of the three strikes law on sentencing for murder and manslaughter convictions in the following chapter. We note that if the three strikes law remains unchanged, a separate homicide offence with a maximum penalty less than life imprisonment could potentially lead to a significantly different result if a defendant is convicted of that offence rather than the offences of murder or manslaughter. However we consider it preferable to focus directly on problematic aspects of the three strikes law rather than to propose a specific homicide offence as a “work-around”.
934 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 9AD (repealed).
935 See speech during second reading by Attorney-General Hulls: (6 October 2005) VicPD LA 1351. See also Kate Fitz-Gibbon Homicide Law
Reform, Gender and the Provocation Defence: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2014) at 123.
936 Victorian Department of Justice, above n 860, at 25.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 157
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
10.101 The other advantages of a specific offence identified in Victoria were that:
. a separate homicide offence provides juries and sentencing judges with more options, in a
self-defence case than the “all or nothing” choice between murder and acquittal;937
. a new offence would involve fewer complexities than a partial defence and be easier for a
judge to explain to a jury and for a jury to apply;938 and
. a separate offence means that data on excessive self-defence is easily identifiable, thereby
enabling a more effective evaluation of its operation.939
10.102 Defensive homicide proved problematic in practice, however, and for the reasons outlined in
Chapter 4, it was repealed in 2014.940
Is a separate offence warranted in New Zealand?
10.103 As a general principle, offences should be general rather than context or victim-specific. New Zealand’s Crimes Act largely reflects this approach. In a review of crimes against the person, the Law Commission noted the need to guard against the “risk of ad hoc specific offences being randomly inserted on to the statute book, every time an issue arises that causes political or public concern”.941 Specific offences should only be recommended if there is a compelling rationale.942 While context-specific offences can be helpful from a labelling perspective, the Commission has been sceptical of specific offences that capture conduct that could be adequately covered by generic offences, because:943
. they broaden prosecutorial discretion and can result in inconsistent charging practice;
. they single out one aggravating or mitigating factor among the many possible factors that may
be present in any given case, giving rise to arbitrary disparities across different offending;
and
. the overuse of specific offences could result in a patchwork of offences without logical or
coherent structure.
10.104 The Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines provide that a new offence can only be justified if it can be shown that:944
. it will successfully address the policy objectives; and
. those objectives cannot be achieved equally or better by
other mechanisms.
10.105 Accordingly, the Commission’s approach is to
recommend a specific offence only where the case is sufficiently strong to
overcome
these issues, such as where there is a clear gap in the
law.945
937 Victorian Department of Justice, above n 860, at 24; and Fitz-Gibbon, above n 935, at 122–123. Although, as we have noted, where a defendant is charged with murder, a jury already has the option of convicting of manslaughter even absent a partial defence or separate offence, and evidence that supports a claim of self-defence may also tend to support a claim of lack of intent, which may result in a conviction for manslaughter.
938 Victorian Department of Justice, above n 860, at 26. Some commentators, however, argue, to the contrary, that creation of a separate offence would unduly complicate the law and trials by adding to the number of matters a jury must consider: Wasik, above n 800, at 526.
939 Victorian Department of Justice, above n 860, at 41.
940 Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic).
941 Law Commission Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961 : Crimes Against the Person (NZLC R111, 2009).
942 Law Commission Strangulation: The Case for a New Offence (NZLC R138, 2016) at [1.17].
943 Law Commission, above n 941, at 30–31.
944 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines: Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation (2014) at ch 1.
945 For further discussion see Law Commission, above n 941, at 30–31;
and Law Commission, above n 942, at [8.32]–[8.36].
158 Law Commission Report
10.106 Few submitters supported introduction of a specific
offence. The small number who did noted a separate offence might achieve better
labelling and enable more tailored penalties but would in practice function much
like a partial defence and, therefore, achieve similar
ends and pose similar
problems.946 The Public Defence Service observed that the question
of whether a separate offence is preferable is largely philosophical.
10.107 While we can identify some practical advantages of a specific offence over a partial defence, we are unconvinced they are sufficiently compelling to recommend a specific homicide offence targeted at victims of family violence who kill abusers. We agree with the concern expressed by some that, where the policy objective is to recognise reduced culpability of offenders in certain circumstances, creation of a new offence may send a confusing message.947
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
10.108 In this chapter we have considered the in-principle case for and against a partial defence or a separate homicide offence and the form any such defence or offence might take. We have sought to review the arguments and the options fairly and comprehensively, but for the following six reasons, we do not recommend that a partial defence or a specific offence be introduced in New Zealand:
. Although a number of arguments may be marshalled in support of partial defences, a
mandatory sentence is their driving and most compelling rationale. In a jurisdiction, such as New Zealand, that has abolished mandatory murder sentencing, that rationale falls away. To the extent there are vestiges of mandatory sentencing (such as the three strikes law) or other problems with sentencing, it is preferable that they be addressed directly in that context.
. Partial defences are conceptually problematic. They are anomalous, as they apply only to
homicide, and they introduce arbitrariness and rigidity into the recognition of mitigating circumstances. They are not the best way to recognise reduced culpability.
. The experience of partial defences in New Zealand and elsewhere bears out these conceptual
problems. In whatever form and with whatever focus, partial defences have given rise to complexity and difficulties.
. It is well recognised that partial defences, and particularly excessive self-defence, can work
to the detriment of defendants who seek to rely on self-defence. The recommendations we make in this Report are intended to work as a package, and we are concerned to avert any reform that might undermine the effectiveness of our recommended clarification of section
48 of the Crimes Act.
. As in previous Law Commission reports and in common with a number of overseas law
reform bodies, commentators and submitters, we consider mitigating
circumstances are best addressed at sentencing. We would only recommend
a
partial defence or new offence if there was evidence of a clear and strong need.
We have not identified such evidence. Most victims
of family violence who commit
homicide are charged with murder but are convicted of manslaughter. As we
discuss in the next chapter,
in the rare case where a victim of family violence
is convicted of murder, we consider the essential structure of New
Zealand’s
946 A specific offence might more reliably ensure sentences reflect reduced culpability. A manslaughter conviction leaves a person at least liable to a life sentence, even if that is unlikely to be imposed in sympathetic cases. This was noted in the 1991 Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee, which observed that abolition of infanticide “would significantly increase the potential penalty for this class of offender, although it is plain enough that a degree of leniency would continue to be extended in practice”: Crimes Consultative Committee Crimes Bill 1989: Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee (Crimes Consultative Committee, Wellington, 1991) at 54. See AP Simester and Warren Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 593.
947 Wasik, above n 800, at 526.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 159
CHAPTER 10: Is a partial defence justified?
sentencing framework is capable of taking into account the mitigating circumstances of victims of family violence who commit homicide.
. Finally, our review is limited to victims of family violence and we have not had the
opportunity (or a remit) to consider the position of homicide defendants
generally. Even a carefully tailored partial defence, based
on a criterion like
trauma, would raise complexity, and there would be significant risks with
limiting any defence to a narrow
group of defendants.
10.109 The centrepiece of our recommended legislative reforms is
to make self-defence more accessible to victims of family violence who kill
their abusers. Amendments to the Crimes Act will clarify that, in the context of
family violence, self-defence may apply in the absence
of an imminent threat.
Whether the force used was reasonable will remain a question of fact for the
jury.
10.110 Cases where an offender has a history of being abused by
the deceased but there is no viable claim of self-defence will involve some
culpability, but it might be mitigated because of the history of abuse. In such
cases, our view is that sentencing provides a better
avenue than partial
defences for addressing variation in homicide offending. This presumes the
sentencing process is able to properly
take into account the various factors
that might mitigate culpability, however. In the next chapter, we consider the
adequacy of
New Zealand’s sentencing law in this context.
RECOMMENDATION
R9 No new partial defence or separate homicide offence should be
introduced in New
Zealand.
160 Law Commission Report
Chapter 11
Sentencing for homicide
INTRODUCTION
11.1
11.2
In this chapter we briefly set out the law of sentencing as it relates to
victims of family violence who kill their abusers and
analyse how this has been
applied in practice and whether there is any case for reform. We consider the
general structure of the
Sentencing Act 2002 and the purposes of sentencing. We
then canvass in greater detail the mitigating factors specified in the
Sentencing
Act and how these are taken into account in family violence cases,
before turning to issues specific to homicide sentencing, including
the three
strikes provisions. Discussing sentencing, we refer to “offenders”,
although we have used the term “defendants”
elsewhere in this
Report. That is because, by the time a person is sentenced, the charge against
them has been proved and they have
been convicted.
The question for this
chapter is how to ensure the reduced culpability of victims of family violence
who kill their abusers can be
adequately addressed in sentencing.
THE APPROACH OF THE SENTENCING ACT 2002
11.3
11.4
11.5
A key policy issue in sentencing is how best to facilitate decisions that
respond to the particular facts of the offending and
the offender’s
personal circumstances while also promoting consistency with cases of a
similar nature. Fairness requires
that both be achieved so far as possible.
However, different people within the community and different judges will have
different
views on how serious a particular offence is and the degree to which
an offender’s personal circumstances reduce their culpability
or otherwise
justify a more lenient sentence. These questions are inevitably
contentious.
Under the traditional common law model, the judiciary has
considerable discretion to determine the appropriate sentence in an individual
case, subject to the applicable maximum penalty.948 An alternative
approach is to provide more guidance to judges either through statute or
sentencing guidelines.949 At the most directive end of the scale,
mandatory sentences might be imposed through legislation – often
reflecting a community
view about the gravity of the
offence.950
In New Zealand, the approach to sentencing sits
somewhere in the middle of the scale. The Sentencing Act sets out principles
that
must be taken into account when deciding a sentence, including the gravity
of offending, the desirability of consistency and the
need to impose the least
restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances.951 It also
sets out a list of purposes the judge may consider, such as holding the offender
to account, deterrence, denunciation,
948 Warren Young and Andrea King “The Origins and Evolution of Sentencing Guidelines – A Comparison of England and Wales and New
Zealand” in Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts (eds) Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2013) 202.
949 At 202.
950 See, for example, the observations on the United States’ “grid” sentencing model in Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts “The Origins and Nature of the Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales" in Andrew Ashworth and Julian Roberts (eds) Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 2.
951 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 161
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
11.6
11.7
11.8
rehabilitation and community protection.952 The Sentencing
Act also lists a number of aggravating and mitigating factors that must be
taken into account in determining a
sentence.953
These factors are
not exhaustive.954
The Act therefore creates a framework for
the exercise of judicial discretion, providing guidance on both the purposes of
sentencing
and factors to be considered in an individual case. The Act is not
prescriptive, and the factors do not dictate a particular outcome.
For
murder, there is a strong presumption in favour of life imprisonment. The
presumption may be displaced if a sentence of life imprisonment
would be
“manifestly unjust”,955 but the threshold for
displacement is a high one. It is apparent from case law that it will be met
only in exceptional cases.
The Law Commission has previously reviewed
aspects of sentencing in its Report Sentencing Guidelines and Parole
Reform,956 which considered overall issues of fairness and
consistency within our sentencing system. In this review, we are considering
the
narrower question of whether the existing law allows courts sufficient
flexibility to impose sentences that take account of an offender’s
experience as a victim of family violence where such offenders kill their
abusers.
OVERVIEW OF THE SUBMISSIONS
11.9
11.10
All submitters agreed that it is important for judges to have sufficient
flexibility to impose reduced sentences when victims of
family violence kill
their abusers and are found guilty of manslaughter or murder. The Issues Paper
invited comment on whether additional
mitigating factors could be included in
the Sentencing Act or whether the threshold for displacing the presumption of
life imprisonment
needed to be reformed.
The majority of submitters
believed that there should be changes to sentencing law. Many considered that
there would be benefit in
elaborating on family violence as a mitigating factor.
Some noted that sentencing reform could be a viable alternative to a partial
defence. Other submitters were, however, more equivocal, stating that, although
changes to sentencing may highlight societal concern,
the list of mitigating
factors is already non-exhaustive and the presumption of life imprisonment has
previously been displaced
in family violence homicide cases.
THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING
11.11
Sentencing is not meant simply to punish. It is also intended to promote
community protection and assist offenders to rehabilitate
and
reintegrate.957 To this end, pre-sentence reports include information
on the offender’s rehabilitative needs and future risk of
offending.
952 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7.
953 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9.
954 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(4). The court is not prevented from taking into account any other aggravating or mitigating factor that the court thinks fit, and a factor referred to in s 9 need not be given greater weight than any other factor that the court might take into account.
955 The exception to the discretionary approach is found in the three strikes law, which is discussed below beginning at paragraph [11.72].
956 Law Commission Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform (NZLC R94, 2006).
957 Sentencing Act 2002, s 7(1).
162 Law Commission Report
11.12
11.13
The courts in the cases we have reviewed have consistently addressed the
defendants’ prospects of rehabilitation and risk of
reoffending. In R v
Erstich,958 R v Raivaru959 and R v
Wharerau,960 the defendants’ youth and prospects of
rehabilitation and reintegration were found to warrant sentence discounts. As
for risk
of reoffending, there are examples in both directions. In some cases,
low risk has mandated a less restrictive penalty,961 and in one case
the Court considered a lengthy sentence might actually increase the risk of
reoffending, because in an adult prison
the defendant would be exposed to
“older criminals who may lead you further
astray”.962
Among cases in which the risk of reoffending
was considered to be higher are R v Wihongi and R v Rihia –
the two most recent murder cases – and in both, risk was relevant to the
length of the finite term of imprisonment.
In Wihongi, fresh evidence
about the appellant’s risk contributed to the Court of Appeal’s
conclusion that the finite term should
be increased,963 and in
Rihia, the Court noted the need for “community protection” in
determining sentence.964
MITIGATING FACTORS UNDER THE SENTENCING ACT
11.14
11.15
11.16
The Sentencing Act prescribes several mitigating factors to be taken into
account by the sentencing judge, including the following
that might be
relevant where a victim of family violence kills their abuser:
.
the conduct of the victim of the offending, which, in the context of
homicide, refers to the
conduct of the deceased;965 and
.
the offender’s diminished intellectual capacity or
understanding.966
Depending on the circumstances, other
mitigating factors such as the offender’s age may also be relevant. There
may also be
aggravating factors. In all cases of the type we are concerned with,
however, the conduct of the deceased and diminished capacity
of the offender are
potentially prominent issues and worthy of particular
consideration.
Mitigating factors can relate to the nature of the
offending or the personal circumstances of the offender, which affect assessment
of their culpability relative to others convicted of similar offending.967
While the conduct of the deceased is relevant to the nature of the
offending, the offender’s mental state is a personal mitigating
factor.
Mitigating factors can also arise in combination. This is particularly likely in
cases where the offending can be attributed
in part to the deceased’s
conduct and in part to the offender’s psychological state. Homicides by
victims of family violence
of their abusers will often be cases of this
sort.
958 R v Erstich [2002] NZCA 122; (2002) 19 CRNZ 419 (CA).
959 R v Raivaru HC Rotorua CRI-2004-077-1667, 5 August 2005.
960 R v Wharerau [2014] NZHC 1857 [Wharerau (HC)]; and Wharerau v R [2015] NZCA 299 [Wharerau (CA)].
961 For example, R v Wickham, in which the sentencing Judge saw no need to impose a sentence that protected the community from the defendant, as it was “extremely unlikely that you will ever reoffend”: R v Wickham HC Auckland CRI-2009-090-010723, 20 December 2010 at [31].
962 R v Raivaru, above n 959, at [32].
963 The Court concluded, in the particular circumstances of Ms Wihongi’s case, that “the sentencing principle of community protection is better met by a longer finite sentence, providing a longer period of imprisonment (during which treatment can be provided to Ms Wihongi with a view to reducing future risk). It would also provide a longer period during which some supervision with the possibility of recall is available.”: R v Wihongi [2011] NZCA 592, [2012] 1 NZLR 775 at [98].
964 R v Rihia [2012] NZHC 2720 at [30]–[32].
965 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(2)(c).
966 Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(2)(e).
967 See R v Taueki [2005] NZCA 174; [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA), where the Court of Appeal cited R v Mako [2000] NZCA 407; [2000] 2 NZLR 170 (CA), noting:
The modern approach to sentencing uses as a reference point a starting point
taking into account aggravating and mitigating features
of the offending, but
excluding aggravating and mitigating features relating to the offender. Put
another way, a starting point “is
the sentence considered appropriate for
the particular offending (the combination of features) for an adult offender
after a defended
trial.”
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 163
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
11.17
Unlike a defence or partial defence, which is either accepted or rejected, a
mitigating factor can be given a different weighting
depending on the
circumstances of the case. For example, in a case where abuse was particularly
severe but self-defence is not made
out, the judge would still have scope to
recognise that mitigating circumstance through a sentencing discount.
Conduct of the deceased
11.18
11.19
11.20
11.21
11.22
In cases in which victims of family violence kill their abusers, the conduct
of the deceased is likely to be the most obvious mitigating
factor.
The
Court of Appeal has made it clear that the behaviour of the victim of the
offending includes behaviour that provokes a violent
reaction or that justifies
a degree of force, albeit less than that used.968 Below, we consider
recent statements by the Court of Appeal setting out how prior violence by the
victim of the offending should be
considered as a matter of law. We then
discuss how this issue has been treated in the cases we have
reviewed.
The leading case relevant to this review is Tuau v
R.969 The offender was an adult man convicted of wounding with
intent to cause grievous bodily harm after he stabbed his father through
the
eye with a knife. He had been abused by his father as a child and was living
with him temporarily following the death of
his mother. On the day of the
offending, the father had accused the offender of being a child molester. At
issue in the appeal
was the extent of sentencing discount appropriate for each
of three features: the provocation on the day of the offending and in
the
immediate prior period, the history of abuse by the father towards his family
including the offender and the way the offender’s
schizophrenia and
paranoia made him perceive the situation. The Court of Appeal held that the
history of abuse by the father was
a mitigating factor that should be taken into
account when considering the offender’s response to the provocation that
precipitated
the offending. The Court said:970
[The pattern of prior violence] explains how [the offender] decided he had no
alternative but to attack his father to avoid being
attacked; and no alternative
but to render his father unconscious and stab him out of fear that, unless he
went that distance, his
father would retaliate with even greater
force.
While noting the three factors identified converged and it was
important not to over-count, the Court of Appeal considered the trial
Judge
“should have allowed Mr Tuau a significantly greater discount than he did
to recognise why it was that he offended and
as seriously as he
did”.971
This is a clear statement that the historical
conduct of the victim of the offending is relevant to how the immediate conduct
is viewed.
It strongly supports an approach of considering the immediately
threatening conduct in the wider context of family violence. In
Tuau, the
offender’s sentence was reduced by a year to four and a half
years.
As for sentencing methodology, the standard approach, as explained
by the Court of Appeal in R v Taueki, is to fix a starting point by
reference to the aggravating and mitigagting features of the offending, of which
“conduct of the
victim” may be one.972 This may,
however, be done in different ways. For example, in R v Paton,973
the Judge fixed the starting point by reference to previous manslaughter
cases where victims of family violence had killed their
abusers.974
968 R v Taueki, above n 967, at [32].
969 Tuau v R [2012] NZCA 146.
970 Tuau v R, above n 969.
971 At [47].
972 R v Taueke, above n 967, at [8].
973 R v Paton [2013] NZHC 21.
974 At [14].
164 Law Commission Report
In another manslaughter case, R v Rakete,975 the Judge
explained that, but for any mitigating factors, he would set a starting point of
between three years six months and four
years. He then adverted expressly to the
conduct of the deceased as a mitigating factor,
saying:976
11.23
11.24
The victim was the primary aggressor, a much larger person than you,
intoxicated and threatening toward you. In reaching this view
I have had regard
to evidence of his aggression earlier in the day and at the time of the incident
(though as I have said I do not
accept that there was a verbal threat to kill),
and I have had regard to the evidence of his prior acts of violence towards you
in a domestic context and when he was jealous of another man.
Given the
prior acts of violence by the deceased, as well two other mitigating factors
relevant to the circumstances of the offending
(that Ms Rakete was fearful of an
assault and that the use of weapon was largely impulsive and motivated primarily
by fear), the
Judge adopted a starting point of three
years.977
Adoption of a starting point based on analogous
cases, as in Paton, may promote sentencing consistency, a goal affirmed
by section 8(e) of the Sentencing Act. However, this way of achieving
sentencing
consistency may tend to reinforce the approach of previous cases,
which will not always be helpful.978 Where a victim of family
violence is convicted of killing an abuser, a focus on previous cases might, for
example, inhibit consideration
of offending in light of up- to-date research
about family violence – notwithstanding the useful precedent set in
Tuau. We expect our recommendations for continued education will, to some
extent, address this concern.
Diminished capacity
11.25
11.26
When a victim of family violence kills their abuser, the conduct of the
deceased will often be the most relevant mitigating factor.
It enables the
sentencing judge to understand, consistent with contemporary social science,
family violence as a pattern of harmful
behaviour that belongs to the abuser,
rather than the relationship or the family violence victim.979
However, consideration of that factor alone may not always be sufficient
to capture the full range of mitigating features in the present
case. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the cumulative and compounding effect of family violence
can result in a raft of secondary issues
such as mental health issues. For
example, in many of the cases we reviewed the offender was said to be suffering
from post-traumatic
stress disorder at the time of the offending.980
Further, many offenders have a long history of being abused not just by
the deceased but by others. These matters can be taken into
account in
sentencing under the mitigating factor of diminished capacity or
understanding.
In Chapter 10, we considered the possibility of a
partial defence based in diminished responsibility. A persuasive argument
against such a partial defence is that the offender’s psychological
characteristics are better considered in sentencing,
where a more flexible
approach is available. In sentencing, the offender does not need to demonstrate
that their
975 R v Rakete [2013] NZHC 1230.
976 At [34].
977 R v Rakete, above n 975, at [36]. The ultimate sentence, with discounts for mitigating factors to the defendant personally, was two years’
imprisonment. At [40]–[48].
978 Julia Tolmie has suggested that Paton demonstrates deficiencies in the “standardised” approach to sentencing that requires determination of a starting point, by reference to certain aggravating features of the offending, and then adjustment to take account of the offender’s personal circumstances. Tolmie considers it is arguable this process “supports and replicates many of the misconceptions about family violence ... It places primary focus on one incident of violence, decontextualized from the history of violence, the larger architecture of coercive control in the relationship and the entrapment of the victim.” The author acknowledges that a history of family violence victimisation is sometimes factored into the sentence starting point in these cases, but that is “not a given”: Julia Tolmie “Defending Battered Defendants on Homicide Charges in New Zealand: The Impact of Abolishing the Partial Defences to Murder” [2015] NZ L Rev 649 at 675–677.
979 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fifth Report: January 2014 to December 2015 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, February 2016)
at 36.
980 For example, Rakete, above n 975, at [40]; Wihongi, above n 963, at [34]; Rihia, above n 964, at [20]; R v Reti [2009] NZCA 271 at [5]; and R v
King CA71/06, 11 August 2006 at [22].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 165
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
11.27
11.28
11.29
11.30
mental functioning falls below a prescribed level of criminal responsibility.
Instead, any level of impaired decision making is potentially
relevant if it
contributes to the offending, and the weight given to this factor can be
tailored to the degree of impairment.
The Court of Appeal case of R v
Whiu981 is significant for the category of offenders within
the scope of this review. In Whiu, the offender drove dangerously while
intoxicated and caused the death of another driver. She was charged with
manslaughter. She
had earlier been driving the car with her abusive partner who
had ordered her to drive him, punched through the glass of one of the
windows
and continued punching her while she drove. After he instructed her to drop him
off, she drove back towards their home and
crashed into another car on her
street. The other driver later died, and the passenger’s injuries were
serious.
The Court of Appeal considered the extent to which
psychological effects resulting from a history of intimate partner violence
were mitigating. As the deceased in this case was an innocent bystander, there
was no question of the contribution of the deceased’s
conduct to the
offending. The Court noted that “the appellant’s characteristics or
symptoms must be related to what occurred
if they are to have any significance
in terms of her sentencing”,982 and made the following
observations:983
... we agree that it is not necessary for there to be a formal diagnosis of
battered women’s syndrome before prolonged abuse
suffered by a woman at
the hands of a partner or family member can be taken into account on sentencing.
The critical point is that,
whatever label is used, there must be evidence which
supports the view that prolonged abuse suffered by an offender materially
contributed
to her offending. Typically a psychiatrist or psychologist would
give such evidence, and where it exists, it should be taken into
account like
any other relevant factor.
...
If an offender wishes to argue that she has suffered prolonged abuse at the
hands of a partner or family member and that this has
contributed materially to
her offending and so is relevant to sentence, she will have to point to an
evidential basis for the submission.
The evidence will need to address the
underlying facts of the abuse, its impact on the offender and the way in which
it is said to
have made a material contribution to the offending.
The
Court accepted that the psychological effects of sustained abuse were
relevant as a mitigating factor and justified a discount
in the order of
20–25 per cent from the starting point.984
The cases in
our review demonstrate a mixed approach to the offender’s psychological
state as a mitigating factor. Some include
extensive discussion, while others
touch on the issue briefly or not at all.985 This factor is
sometimes identified to explain a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder
– for example, that the offender’s
prolonged history as a victim of
extreme violence means they cannot be taken to have appreciated, in the same way
as a person not
exposed to high levels of violence, that the wound they
inflicted was likely to cause death.986
981 R v Whiu [2007] NZCA 591.
982 At [30].
983 At [32] and [37].
984 The Court rejected the submission that, in order to properly reflect the experiences of offenders who have suffered abuse, this mitigating factor should be taken into account in fixing the starting point and concluded there was “no reason of principle to treat post-traumatic stress disorder arising from battered women’s syndrome differently” to other psychological and behavioural conditions relevant to sentencing (at [33]). See Tolmie, above n 978, at n 152.
985 Cases in which no reference is made to psychological reports include R v Paton, above n 973; R v Neale HC Auckland CRI-2007-004-3059, 12
June 2009; R v Tamati HC Tauranga CRI-2009-087-0868, 27 October 2009; and Wharerau (HC), above n 960.
986 R v Paton, above n 973, at [11].
166 Law Commission Report
11.31
In some cases, the cumulative effect of abuse from different people including
the deceased will be relevant to the offender’s
psychological state. In
R v Fairburn, the Judge took account of the offender’s history as a
victim of family violence and sexual abuse, including the way that history
informed the offender’s belief that the deceased was a threat to both the
offender and her daughter.987
Evidence of diminished capacity
11.32
11.33
11.34
11.35
While the judgment in Whiu expressly provided that psychological
effects are relevant, it imposed an evidential requirement. It is not enough
for the defendant
to assert they have suffered abuse that has caused
psychological disturbance relevant to the offending. There must be an evidential
basis for that claim.
A defendant’s lawyer may seek to present
relevant evidence, and under the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons)
Act
2003, in some circumstances, a court may on its own initiative order a
health assessor such as a psychologist or psychiatrist to
prepare a report even
if counsel does not. Section 38(1) provides that such a report may be ordered to
assist the court to determine
whether a person is unfit to stand trial or is
insane, the type and length of sentence that might be imposed and the nature of
a
requirement the court may impose as part of, or a condition of, a sentence or
order. A report might also be ordered by the court
even if another report has
been separately arranged by counsel for the defendant.988 Section 48,
however, is not a general power to require relevant expert evidence for
proceedings beyond the purposes specified in section
38(1). It does not provide
for the provision of expert evidence at trial generally, for example, to explain
the dynamics of family
violence relevant to a claim of self-defence. Such expert
evidence was discussed in Chapter 7 above.
Therefore, at least in cases
where the court has sufficient information to identify a need for evidence
from a health assessor for
sentencing purposes and section 38 applies,989
this provision could avoid prejudice if evidence about an offender’s
psychological state is not sought or made available for
sentencing by counsel.
There may, however, still be variation in access to expert evidence and
depending on whether the court invokes
section 38 in a given case, the costs of
a defendant obtaining it independently may be a barrier, especially for
offenders whose
legal representation is being paid for through legal
aid.990
If psychological reports (whether court-ordered or
otherwise) are prepared and taken into account, this can lead to a significantly
reduced sentence. In Rakete, for example, the Judge, Whata J,
recorded:991
While your PTSD does not excuse what you have done; your action, or more
correctly, your over reaction, occurred against a backdrop
of [...] emotional
fragility and dysfunction caused by it. Indeed I am satisfied, applying the
various clinical factors also identified
by Dr Evans, that all of this affected
your capacity to act in a proportionate way when confronting Mr Simeon.
Secondly, a lengthy
term of imprisonment is likely to have a disproportionate
effect on you given your history of social phobia, agoraphobia and the
panic
attacks. I refer also to the report by the Ashburn Clinic which raises concerns
about your ability to cope if imprisoned. Third,
the likelihood of reoffending
is low as your current offending is very context
specific.
987 R v Fairburn [2012] NZHC 28 at [37].
988 Togia v Police [2012] NZCA 544, [2013] 2 NZLR 478 at [28].
989 As to which, see Togia v Police, above n 988, in which the Court of Appeal held that s 38 may apply to persons on bail if they appear in and are therefore under the supervision of the court at the time the report is ordered (at [31]).
990 See also the discussion of expert evidence in connection with self-defence, in Chapter 7.
991 R v Rakete, above n 975, at [41]–[42] (ellipses in square
brackets from original).
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 167
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
11.36
These factors taken together support a discount of 20%. I note for
completeness that I did not include your psychiatric condition
[...] in
formulating the starting point for the offending – so there is no double
counting. Rather, I preferred to apply a
discount after fixing the starting
point for offending, in a transparent way, to acknowledge the impact of your
emotional and mental
health on your offending and for the purpose of
understanding the full impact of a sentence of imprisonment on
you.
Within our sample, there are also cases in which psychological
effects of intimate partner violence are not explicitly considered
as a
mitigating factor, despite there being sufficient comment about the
offender’s history that this would seem to be relevant.
In Rakete,
quoted above, Whata J went on to say “while your condition does not form
part of the observable facts of the offending, I
consider that it is a relevant
factor when assessing your overall culpability but only with the benefit of
expert evidence”.992 Given the extent of the sentencing
discount that may be provided, there is a risk of injustice if potentially
relevant evidence is
not before the court, although, as we have noted, section
38 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 provides
some
guard against this.
Reform to mitigating factors under section 9 of the Sentencing
Act
Nature of the problem
11.37
11.38
We have considered whether some reform is required to ensure that family
violence is properly considered as a mitigating factor in
cases where victims
of family violence kill their abusers. Our review suggests that while the
reduced culpability of family violence
victims can be taken into account in
sentencing, there may be inconsistencies in approach. Whether and to what extent
that is so
is difficult to be sure of given, as we have noted, that a key
mitigating factor – the conduct of the victim – may routinely
be
factored into the sentence starting point.
In these circumstances,
arguments for and against reform are finely balanced. We are mindful of the need
to avoid unintended consequences
and to ensure that the reform is targeted to
the identified problems. In our view, the most significant problems are as
follows:
. While the Court of Appeal’s decision in
Tuau provides a clear statement that the conduct
of the victim includes historical conduct in the context of family violence,
this has not been cited in any of the subsequent cases
in our homicide sample,
perhaps because Tuau was not a homicide case. In any event, we cannot be
sure from the sentencing notes whether judges are always giving due weight to
the broader context of family violence over the course of the relationship
leading up to the incident that constituted the offending,
such as, in
particular, non-physical abuse including tactics of coercion and control. See
paragraph [2.58] above.
. There is a possibility
psychological evidence may not always be prepared despite the
circumstances of the offending being suggestive of diminished intellectual
understanding or capacity resulting from the trauma of
family violence. This
concern is mitigated by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally
Impaired Persons) Act 2003, but
if evidence is not presented by counsel or
sought by the court under the Act in a given case, the judge will not have the
information
required to properly consider this mitigating factor.
Suggested reform
11.39
We consider any risk of inconsistency could be addressed through:
. amending section 9(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act to clarify that “conduct of the victim”
includes prior family violence against the offender;
and
992 At [43].
168 Law Commission Report
. amending section 9(2)(e) of the Sentencing Act to clarify that
“diminished intellectual capacity or understanding” includes
any
impairment resulting from being subject to family violence.
11.40
11.41
11.42
This would help ensure that family violence is brought to the attention of
judges and would prompt defence lawyers to consider the
need for submissions
targeted at these areas and supported by expert evidence. Inclusion of these
factors in the statute may also
make it more straightforward for lawyers to
apply for legal aid funding for expert evidence in the event evidence is not
otherwise
before the Court.
We recognise that, in some cases, relevant
“conduct of the victim” (that is, the deceased, in homicide cases)
may include
prior family violence against people other than the offender (for
example, a child or a parent, as in R v Raivaru). Despite this, our
recommended amendment to section 9(2)(c) is limited to violence against the
offender. There are two reasons for
this:
. First, in almost
all cases we have reviewed, the offenders have been primary victims
of
intimate partner violence perpetrated by the deceased. Thus, it appears that,
most frequently, the relevant “conduct of the
victim” will be
violence against the offender. Further, in all cases we reviewed, the conduct of
the deceased included abuse
of the offender, even if other people were also
victims. As a matter of reality, a primary victim may not be the only person
subject
to abuse by a predominant aggressor because intimate partner violence
and child abuse and neglect are “entangled” forms
of abuse and often
co-occur.993 Violence against another family member may also amount
to violence against the offender because family violence encompasses
psychological
abuse.994 This would appear capable of including
witnessing or fearing abuse of a child, for example.995 Under the
Domestic Violence Act, psychological abuse of a child specifically includes
exposure to abuse of people with whom the child
has a domestic
relationship.996 In these circumstances, it does not seem necessary
to frame the amendment any more widely than we have recommended.
.
Second, we are concerned it would be difficult to frame an amendment
more widely without
risking unintended consequences or going beyond the focus of this Report,
which is the nature of the dynamics between victims of family
violence (who kill
the perpetrators) and the perpetrators who are killed.997 Our
recommended amendment will, of course, not limit the existing scope of section
9(2)(c).
These recommendations complement our approach to self-defence.
Even with an expanded definition of self-defence, there will be
cases of
homicide against an abuser that fail the test because the force used is not a
reasonable response to the threat. There will
also be cases, like Rihia,
in which the fatal attack occurred in the extenuating context of prior violence
but was not primarily related to the perception
of a future threat. In such
cases, there is a need for a flexible approach to recognise both the harm caused
by the offending and
the mitigating factors.
993 Family Violence Death Review Committee Fourth Annual Report: January 2013 to December 2013 (Health Quality & Safety Commission, June
2014) at 76.
994 At 13. See also Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 3. In Queensland, this was part of the rationale for recommending that any new partial defence for victims of serious abuse not extend to victims who act to protect third parties, such as children: “The conduct of the abuser towards the third party could be encompassed within our definition of violence towards the victim of abuse, specifically as psychological abuse. It would form part of the history of serious violence in the relationship”: Geraldine Mackenzie and Eric Colvin Homicide in Abusive Relationships: A Report on Defences (2009) at 46.
995 See, for example, M v M (2005) 7 HRNZ 971 (HC) per Miller J; and AB v ST [2011] NZFLR 669 (HC) per Priestley J.
996 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 993, at 13, citing the Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 3.
997 Again, Queensland’s experience of enacting a defendant-specific
partial defence is helpful. Mackenzie and Colvin, above
n 994, observed, at 45,
that “[a]ny broadening of the defence for victims of abuse is fraught with
risks” and, despite
recommending that any new partial defence extend to
“family members” who act to protect victims of serious abuse, even
that limited extension to third parties was not taken up. See also Michelle
Edgely and Elena Marchetti “Women Who Kill Their
Abusers: How
Queensland’s New Abusive Domestic Relationships Defence Continues to
Ignore Reality” (2011) 13 Flinders
LJ 125 at 152.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 169
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
11.43
As with self-defence, we do not suggest restricting the reforms to homicide.
Similar issues will arise for other offences by a primary
victim against a
predominant aggressor, such as assault, and it is important that these too can
be recognised.
Analysis of reform
11.44
11.45
11.46
11.47
11.48
The list of factors in the Sentencing Act “demonstrates
Parliament’s view that the specification [of factors] is primarily
a
legislative rather than a judicial responsibility”.998 While
judges can take account of any relevant factor, it is open to Parliament to
guide the courts to take particular account of certain
features relevant to the
offending. If there is a case that judges may give too little or inconsistent
weight to family violence,
this suggests there is an argument for
reform.
The counter argument is that reform is not needed because the
experience of family violence victims can be considered within the ambit
of
existing mitigating factors. The law already allows judges to impose reduced
sentences for offenders who kill primary abusers.
Fair sentencing
practice can, however, be promoted and ensured only if those involved in
sentencing – the lawyers for both
sides, experts preparing reports and the
judge – are aware of the nature of family violence and able to consider
the offender’s
circumstances based on evidence rather than
misconceptions. We are not satisfied this is currently achieved in all cases. We
have
considered whether the problems identified can be adequately addressed
through education and have reached the view that education
is likely to be
helpful but not sufficient. Education does not carry the force of
legislation.
Our assessment is that there is a case for a declaratory
provision in the statute to draw attention to family violence as a feature
within the scope of existing mitigating factors. In the absence of a facility
such as sentencing guidelines (which we understand
are unlikely to be
introduced in the near future), greater detail in the statute is
warranted.999 In particular, we are concerned that the highly
relevant feature of historical conduct of the deceased may not always be given
sufficient
weight and that it is possible evidence on psychological effects of
sustained family violence may not always be sought or available.
Statutory
recognition of family violence – as it relates to existing grounds of
mitigation – would help in this regard.
At the same time, we
acknowledge that judicial flexibility needs to be protected. It is generally
accepted that the question of relative
weighting of mitigating and aggravating
factors should be left to the sentencing judge, who is best placed to consider
all relevant
features of the offending. For this reason, we do not suggest
anything more prescriptive than the amendments outlined above. As these
amendments are consistent with statements in recent Court of Appeal cases, we
perceive a minimal risk of unintentional consequences.
Alternative option considered and not preferred
11.49
We have considered the alternative of adding a new mitigating factor, such as
“the offender’s actions are the direct result
of being a victim of
family violence”. An option along these lines was suggested in the Issues
Paper. We have reached the view
that this raises several complicated issues of
application, but for completeness, we set out the arguments for and against this
option.
998 Warren Young and Andrea King “Sentencing Practice and Guidance in New Zealand” (2010) 22 Fed Sentencing Rep 254 at 255.
999 The Commission’s earlier report, Sentencing Guidelines and
Parole Reform, above n 956, recommended establishment of a Sentencing
Council which would have the role of preparing sentencing guidelines. This
was
recommended because guidelines can promote consistency while protecting a
judge’s ability to respond to particular facts.
Without a mechanism of
this sort, there is a potentially wide gap between the abstract principles and
factors expressed in the Sentencing
Act and the facts presented by a particular
case, leaving a lot of room for judicial discretion. This can be partially
addressed
by guideline judgments of the higher courts. However, the Court of
Appeal has declined to issue guideline judgments for murder and
manslaughter on
the basis that there is too much variation in offending. The gap therefore
remains and is a potential issue for this
category of cases.
170 Law Commission Report
11.50
11.51
The chief argument in favour of this approach, as compared with the more
conservative option above, is that it would provide a stronger
signal on how a
history of family violence should be considered in sentencing. However, as a
more significant reform, we are concerned
with how it might be
applied.
We are mindful that violent offenders – both men and
women – are overwhelmingly more likely than the general population
to
have themselves been victims of violence, including sustained violence
throughout childhood.1000 Whether such previous abuse is directly
causative of offending will be difficult to assess, and judges may interpret a
new mitigating
factor based on experiences of family violence more broadly than
we anticipate. This would raise policy issues that are well outside
the scope of
this project and that we do not have time to consider. On one view, a history of
family violence can be seen as mitigating
moral culpability because the
offender’s background is one in which violence is normalised. Conversely,
from the perspective
of community protection, this group of offenders may have
complex rehabilitative requirements and pose a higher risk of reoffending
– therefore potentially justifying longer sentences. These are fairly
significant issues of policy that affect a wide range
of offending types and
offenders. They would require an examination of rehabilitation services as well
as sentencing law. Such matters
are not within our terms of reference.
RECOMMENDATION
R10
The Sentencing Act 2002 should be amended as follows:
· amending section 9(2)(c) to clarify that “conduct of the victim” includes prior family violence against the offender; and
· amending section 9(2)(e) to clarify that
“diminished intellectual capacity or understanding” includes any
impairment
resulting from being subject to family violence.
SPECIFIC ISSUES IN SENTENCING FOR MURDER
Presumptive life sentence for murder: section 102
11.52
11.53
Section 102 of the Sentencing Act provides a presumption in favour of life
imprisonment for those convicted of murder. This was introduced
in 2002, when
the mandatory life sentence for murder was abolished in New Zealand. The
presumption is rebuttable but only if a life
sentence would be “manifestly
unjust”.
As might be expected, given the inherent gravity of a
murder conviction, the “manifestly unjust” threshold for departing
from a life sentence with a 10-year minimum period of imprisonment is very
high. Since the Sentencing Act was enacted, there
have only been six cases in
which a finite sentence has been substituted for a sentence of life
imprisonment. This small group includes
two cases in our review, R v
Wihongi1001 and R v Rihia.1002 The other
cases that have met the “manifestly unjust” threshold are:
.
A “mercy killing” where a husband killed his wife who had
advanced Alzheimer’s
disease.1003
1000 Family Violence Death Review Committee, above n 979, at 105.
1001 R v Wihongi, above n 963.
1002 R v Rihia, above n 964.
1003 R v Law (2002) 19 CRNZ 500 (HC).
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 171
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
. A case with a 13-year-old offender.1004
. A case in which the offender was convicted as a party to the murder but was not directly
responsible for the death.1005
. A case in which the offender was suffering from schizophrenia and experiencing paranoid
delusions. The defence of insanity was rejected by the jury, but the
sentencing Judge noted that the attack was entirely out of character
and was
motivated only by the mental illness.1006
11.54
11.55
11.56
11.57
Other than in exceptional cases where the presumption of life imprisonment is
displaced, the Sentencing Act also includes a hierarchy
of minimum periods of
imprisonment if a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed. Section 103
prescribes a 10-year minimum
period of imprisonment, and section 104 requires
a court to impose a minimum period of 17 years for murder committed with one of
several aggravating features, such as a “high level of brutality”.
As with section 102, the 17-year minimum period can
be departed from in
qualifying cases only if the judge considers that a minimum term of that length
would be “manifestly unjust”.1007
The range of
circumstances in which the courts have been willing to depart from the
presumptive 17-year minimum period is
broader than that in which the section
102 presumption in favour of life imprisonment has been displaced,
notwithstanding that
the language of “manifestly unjust” is used
in both sections. The more severe sentence of a 17-year minimum period and
the
range of qualifying features that lead to that sentence mean that more offenders
are likely to fall within the class for whom
the punishment is clearly unduly
severe, meeting the “manifestly unjust”
threshold.1008
Thus, while murder sentencing in New Zealand
(outside of the three strikes regime) is now discretionary, it is still
tightly constrained,
and the threshold for departing from the presumption of
a life sentence will be met only in truly exceptional cases. In
these
circumstances, it is especially striking that, in two cases, a history of abuse
has satisfied the test. Wihongi comes close to identifying a class of
defendants who will ordinarily receive reduced sentences.1009 As
a Court of Appeal case, Wihongi is binding on lower courts and has been
followed on this point in Rihia. Wihongi includes commentary on
relevant principles and parliamentary debates that indicate that the legislature
envisaged that victims of
“severe and prolonged abuse” would be a
class of offender for whom the presumption may be set aside.
The section
102 presumption has, however, not always been displaced in cases of this kind.
It was not addressed in R v Neale or R v Reti,1010
the other two murder convictions in our case review. These cases preceded
Wihongi and Rihia, but given they comprise half of the murder
convictions in our case review, it is necessary to consider whether they affect
the
precedential value of the later cases in terms of section 102. It appears
that Neale and Reti are distinguishable on the basis they are not
so readily amenable to a primary victim/predominant aggressor analysis. In
Reti, for example, the relationship involved violence, but there was
also
1004 R v Nelson [2012] NZHC 3570.
1005 R v McNaughton [2012] NZHC 815; upheld in R v Cunnard [2014] NZCA 138. There is a second case with similar facts that also resulted in a finite term at sentencing (R v Innes [2014] NZHC 2780), but the conviction was overturned on appeal: R v Baker [2015] NZCA 306.
1006 R v Reid HC Auckland CRI 2008-090-2203, 4 February 2011.
1007 For discussion of the principles and approach applicable to the provisions governing murder sentencing, see R v Williams [2004] NZCA 328; [2005] 2 NZLR 506 (CA) at [30]–[34] and [45]–[68]; and R v Gottermeyer [2014] NZCA 205 at [71]–[86] (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court declined: Gottermeyer v R [2014] NZSC 115).
1008 See, for example, R v Gottermeyer (CA), above n 1007, at [93]–[95].
1009 R v Wihongi, above n 963, at [69]–[73] and [83]–[88].
1010 As we noted in Chapter 9, notwithstanding that Ms Neale’s case
post-dated enactment of the Sentencing Act, the sentencing
Judge said that life
imprisonment was “the maximum, and indeed the mandatory” sentence
for murder. However there appears
to have been no suggestion that the s 102
presumption might have been displaced in Ms Neale’s case. See R v
Neale, above n 985.
172 Law Commission Report
evidence the defendant was generally the aggressor.1011 Thus, it
appears tenable to conclude that, in light of Wihongi, there is at least
an emerging trend towards displacement of the section 102 presumption in cases
where a primary victim of family
violence kills their abuser. The Family
Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC) made a similar observation in its
submission, albeit
with the rider that, in its view, the starting point for the
finite sentences imposed in these cases is still “very
high”.
Finite sentence length
11.58
11.59
11.60
11.61
11.62
The Court of Appeal in Wihongi, relying in large part on fresh
evidence about Ms Wihongi’s risk of reoffending, increased the sentence
from eight to 12 years.
In Rihia, the Judge adopted a 12-year starting
point, based on similarities to Wihongi. After a two-year guilty plea
discount, Ms Rihia was sentenced to a 10-year finite term of
imprisonment.
As we have already said, some commentators have expressed
concern about the length of the sentences imposed in these cases and argued
that, given the history of abuse the defendants suffered before the homicides,
even finite sentences of 12 and 10 years are too high.
This concern is
premised partially on a comparison with sentences imposed in manslaughter
cases. As noted in Chapter 9, our review
of the cases suggests the murder
convictions tended to follow evidence of more serious offending than in the
manslaughter cases,1012 with stronger evidential bases for
intention and less clearly self-defensive elements.1013 We are
therefore sceptical of comparing sentences in manslaughter and murder cases,
although we acknowledge there may not always be
a significant culpability gap
between murder and manslaughter. In Paton, for example, the Judge
considered the offending was “only a very short way from
murder”1014 but sentenced Ms Paton to five years and three
months’ imprisonment.
Bearing in mind that murder involves the
intentional taking of life other than in self-defence, a reasonably lengthy
finite sentence
is likely to be appropriate even in highly unusual mitigating
circumstances. Further, the sentences in Wihongi and Rihia are
among the lowest ever imposed for murder in New Zealand. The only case we have
identified in which a person has received a sentence
of less than 10
years’ imprisonment for murder is R v Law, the euthanasia
case.1015
Each case also turns on its own facts. In
Wihongi, the Court of Appeal had considerable fresh evidence on
reoffending risk, and the sentence increase was based on that evidence and
the
Court’s concern the finite term should address the sentencing purposes of
denunciation and deterrence. This is apparent
from the Court of Appeal’s
judgment:1016
In our view, in the particular circumstances of this case, the sentencing
principle of community protection is better met by a
longer finite sentence,
providing a longer period of imprisonment (during
1011 R v Reti, above n 980, at [30].
1012 Putting aside the manslaughter cases that appeared to follow from a successful claim of provocation.
1013 See paragraph [9.41].
1014 R v Paton, above n 973, at [12].
1015 The sentence imposed in R v Law, above n 1003, was 18 months' imprisonment. The Court held that the circumstances of the offence were such that life imprisonment was manifestly unjust (at [51]), and accepted the defence submission that the full range of sentencing options under the Act were available (at [52]). Mitigating factors were the offender’s age, health, motives, guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and previous good character (at [53]). The sentencing Judge went on to say, at [62]:
Plainly, you do not represent any risk to the community but that is not the
only matter to be considered. While there are substantial
factors which argue
for a compassionate approach, those important considerations must be tempered by
the high value which the Courts
and the community rightly attach to the sanctity
of human life. The taking of a human life, even for the highest and best
motives,
is not permitted under our law and, for good reason, murder is
ordinarily regarded as the most serious crime in our statute books.
According
to the evidence, there are many persons in our community suffering from
Alzheimer’s disease and other forms of dementia.
The Court would be
sending the wrong message to the community if it were prepared to allow the
deliberate killing of someone suffering
from such a disease or other affliction
to go unpenalised, even in the tragic circumstances of a case like this.
1016 R v Wihongi above n 963, at [98].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 173
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
11.63
11.64
11.65
11.66
which treatment can be provided to Ms Wihongi with a view to reducing future
risk). It would also provide a longer period during which
some supervision with
the possibility of recall is available. A longer finite term also assuages the
concern that a sentence of eight
years’ imprisonment does not adequately
meet the sentencing purposes of denunciation of a crime involving the taking of
a
life and deterrence.
When it declined Ms Wihongi leave to appeal
further the Supreme Court emphasised the case’s particularity, noting that
the issues
the Court of Appeal addressed and on which its decision was based
were “very fact-specific”.1017 Thus, it seems plausible
that a shorter finite term could be imposed in a case with a minimal risk of
reoffending (such as Wickham, if that case had resulted in a murder
verdict), although Wihongi was a Solicitor-General’s appeal and so
the range of the appropriate finite term may have extended beyond the 12 years
actually
imposed.1018
It is also helpful to consider penalties
for other crimes against the person. For example, the maximum sentences for
“wounding
with intent” or “aggravated wounding or
injury” are 14 years, and for “injuring with intent”, the
maximum penalty is 10 years. As for manslaughter, in Whiu, the conviction
resulted in a sentence of seven and a half years, even with a discount for
psychological disturbance from family
violence. This suggests that a finite term
of 10 or 12 years, or even slightly more,1019 is broadly in the range
that could be expected for murder. To the extent there remains a difference
between sentences for murder and
sentences for manslaughter (with Paton
perhaps the clearest example in our review), the seriousness of a murder
conviction should not be discounted. Further, where the presumption
of life
imprisonment (which is not engaged for manslaughter) is displaced, that will, in
itself, be a material recognition of reduced
culpability even before the length
of the finite term arises.1020
Finally, returning to
Wihongi, it is relevant the Court of Appeal declined to impose a minimum
period of imprisonment. The 12-year finite term equates to a non-parole
period
of four years under the Parole Act 2002.1021 The Court of Appeal
considered whether a longer minimum term was required and decided not to impose
one. Ms Wihongi has now appeared
before the Parole Board three times, first in
June 2014, and has not yet been released. We have had the benefit of reviewing
the
notes of the Parole Board for each of the hearings. The Parole Board has
reached the view that further reintegration planning is
required before Ms
Wihongi is released. At none of the hearings has her legal representative sought
release.
For these reasons, we are satisfied that a close review of
Wihongi and Rihia does not demonstrate there is a problem with
the sentences in those cases. What it does demonstrate is that, in sentencing,
judges
are required to balance a range of matters. Mitigating factors must, in
particular, be weighed against community protection and deterrence
and
denunciation of serious crime.
The impact of the repeal of provocation
11.67
In Chapter 9, we considered whether the repeal of provocation has adversely
affected the position of victims of family violence who
commit homicide in terms
of trial outcomes. We concluded there is at present insufficient evidence to
say that it has.
1017 R v Wihongi [2012] NZSC 12 at [3].
1018 Per the principle, that “[u]pon a successful appeal by the Solicitor-General a sentence is adjusted by no more than the minimum extent necessary to remove the element of manifest inadequacy”: Sipa v R [2006] NZSC 52, (2006) 22 CRNZ 978 at [9] per Blanchard J. See also R v N [1998] 2
NZLR 272 (CA) at 290; and Jeffries v R [2013] NZCA 188 at [251].
1019 As noted above, the “range” disclosed by Wihongi, above n 963, and Rihia, above n 964, may extend beyond 12 years if the Court of Appeal’s decision on the length of the finite sentence in Wihongi reflected the principles usually applied to sentence appeals brought by the Solicitor- General.
1020 Tolmie notes this point in connection with the sentences imposed in Wihongi, above n 963, and Rihia, above n 964, albeit in support of an argument that “a sentencing discretion for murder does not make murder a neutral alternative to a manslaughter conviction based on a provocation defence”: Tolmie, above n 978, at 667.
1021 Parole Act 2002, s 84.
174 Law Commission Report
11.68
When it comes to sentencing, we have already observed that it is problematic
to compare pre- repeal cases (like R v Suluape and R v King) with
post-repeal cases (like R v Rihia). We do not repeat that discussion
here but record the following statement of the Court of Appeal in R v
Hamidzadeh,1022 made by reference to the section of the Law
Commission’s 2007 Report that we referred to in Chapter
10:1023
We do not discern any Parliamentary intention to diminish the high threshold necessary to establish manifest injustice under s 102. Indeed, the Law Commission specifically rejected the adoption of any lower standard in its report which led to the abolition of the provocation defence. We see no reason to depart from the general approach adopted in Rapira, recently endorsed in Wihongi, that manifest injustice under s 102 is likely to be established only in exceptional circumstances. It necessarily follows from the abolition of the defence that a conviction for murder is no longer to be treated as manslaughter where provocation is established. Sentencing for murder must therefore be approached on the footing that the killing was intentional or, where applicable, that the offender intended to inflict
injury known to be likely to cause death but was reckless as to whether
death ensued or not.
SENTENCING FOR MANSLAUGHTER
11.69
11.70
11.71
The maximum sentence for manslaughter is life imprisonment. There is no
minimum sentence, and sentencing is highly fact dependent.
Where
manslaughter results from the deliberate infliction of injury, an established
approach is for the judge to begin with the bands
for grievous bodily harm
established in R v Taueki.1024 This reflects the fact that
manslaughter is inadvertent killing and, as such, the focus should be on the
action that caused the death
and not only the result. For example, in R v
Leuta the Court of Appeal stated:1025
In sentencing in cases of violent offending the element of deterrence must be
directed towards the aspect of the conduct of the offender
which was intentional
and which created the risk of serious harm or death. In the case of manslaughter
the likely deterrent effect
of sterner sentences must be measured against that
aspect, not against the unintended consequence of death.
This ensures a
level of consistency in how manslaughter offending is treated compared with the
position if the same action had not
resulted in death. There have been
exceptional cases where following a guilty plea, an offender has been discharged
without conviction.1026 At the other end of the spectrum, cases of
severe child abuse leading to death commonly result in terms of over
10
years’ imprisonment and, in one case, 16 years’
imprisonment.1027
THE THREE STRIKES PROVISIONS
11.72
The Sentencing Act was amended in 2010 to introduce provisions commonly known
as the three strikes law. These are contained in sections
86A–86I of the
Act. These amendments significantly curb sentencing discretion for violent
offences. Under the three strikes
law, people convicted of a first strike
offence must be given a warning about the effects of a second
strike
1022 R v Hamidzadeh [2012] NZCA 550, [2013] 1 NZLR 369.
1023 At [58], discussing Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation (NZLC R98, 2007) (footnotes omitted).
1024 R v Taueki, above n 967. For comments on this approach, see R v Tae [2010] NZCA 598 at [11]–[23]; and Ioata v R [2013] NZCA 235 at
[24]–[31].
1025 R v Leuta [2001] NZCA 283; [2002] 1 NZLR 215 (CA) at [63].
1026 For example R v X [2015] NZHC 1244, in which a mother inadvertently caused the death of her 16-month-old son after leaving him unattended in a car on a hot day. She had been working late several days in a row and forgot he was in the car, as her husband usually dropped him at childcare in the morning.
1027 R v Witika [1992] NZCA 496; [1993] 2 NZLR 424 (CA). The courts have also made
it clear that, if a particular manslaughter is at “the top end of
conceivable culpability”,
the maximum sentence of life imprisonment may be
imposed: R v Lory [2004] NZCA 190; [2005] 1 NZLR 462 (CA) at [12].
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 175
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
offence. If they are convicted of a second strike offence, they will be
required to serve the full term of imprisonment rather than
being eligible for
parole. On a third strike, they must serve the maximum penalty available, also
without parole, unless that would
be manifestly unjust. Strike offences include
a range of sexual and violent offending. There are specific provisions for
murder committed
as a second or third strike offence and for manslaughter
committed as a third strike offence, which we discuss below.
Murder convictions under the three strikes law
11.73
11.74
11.75
Under the second and third strike murder provisions in section 86E, the
offender will be required to serve a life sentence without
parole, although
the prohibition on parole can be departed from if the court is satisfied that
life without parole would be “manifestly
unjust”.
If the
“manifestly unjust” threshold is met, the court must order a
minimum period of imprisonment of at least 20 years
for a third strike offence
and at least 10 years for a second strike offence. The 20-year minimum period of
imprisonment for a third
strike offence can be departed from if the court
considers it would be manifestly unjust. In all circumstances, the minimum
period
of imprisonment is 10 years. There is no scope to impose a finite
sentence. This applies to both second and third strike murder
convictions.
To understand the effect of the three strikes law for
murder, it is necessary to return to the discussion of section 102 of the
Sentencing Act. Section 102 provides that those who are convicted of murder will
be required to serve a sentence of life imprisonment
with a minimum period of
imprisonment of 10 years unless this is manifestly unjust. Under the three
strikes provisions, offenders
who would otherwise have met the “manifestly
unjust” threshold (including victims of family violence who kill their
abusers) will now be required to serve a life sentence with a 10-year minimum
period of imprisonment. Section 102 was amended when
the three strikes law
passed to provide that it is subject to new section 86E(2),1028 so
there is no room to read down the three strikes provisions that do not permit
discretion in cases of manifest injustice.
Manslaughter convictions under the three strikes
law
11.76
11.77
If a second strike offence is manslaughter, the offender will be required
to serve the full term imposed without parole, but the
court retains discretion
as to the duration of the term imposed (that is, it need not be life).1029
This is a significant difference between second strike manslaughter and
second strike murder.
However, if manslaughter is a third strike offence,
a similar approach applies as for murder,1030 though with a more
lenient starting point. A life sentence must be imposed with a minimum period of
imprisonment of no less than 20
years. This can be reduced to a minimum period
of no less than 10 years if the court finds that a minimum period of 20 years
would
be manifestly unjust.1031 As with a second or third strike
murder conviction, there is no ability to depart from the life sentence even in
circumstances of
manifest injustice.
1028 Section 86E(2) of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides that, if s 86E applies, which it will if the offender is convicted of murder as a second or third strike offence, the court must (a) sentence the offender to imprisonment for life for that murder; and (b) order that the offender serve that sentence of imprisonment for life without parole unless the court is satisfied that, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, it would be manifestly unjust to do so.
1029 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86C.
1030 See the discussion in Warren Brookbanks “Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand” in Alan Reed and Michael Bohlander (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 271 at 289–290. The author notes that “[i]n terms of the minimum penalty that must be imposed upon a second or third strike conviction for either murder or manslaughter, both offences are now in an undifferentiated category” (at 289).
1031 Sentencing Act 2002, s 86D.
176 Law Commission Report
11.78
As mentioned above at [11.68], in sentencing decisions in manslaughter cases
that involve deliberate injury, the courts have followed
the guideline for
grievous bodily harm sentencing in Taueki. The three strikes legislation
cuts across this approach. It requires courts to focus solely on the fact of the
manslaughter conviction
and not on the seriousness of the action that caused
death.
The effect of mandatory life sentences
11.79
A minimum period of imprisonment has a very different effect when the
offender is serving a life sentence rather than a finite sentence.
In the case
of a finite sentence, the minimum period of imprisonment is the minimum portion
of the sentence that must be served,
and on release, the offender will be
subject to parole conditions for the remaining duration of the finite term. When
a person is
sentenced to life imprisonment, they are subject to parole
conditions until they die and can be recalled to prison if they breach
their
parole conditions at any stage in the future. There is also no guarantee that
the offender will ever be released on parole
– the assessment is
undertaken with regard to community safety and the offender’s
rehabilitation progress and reintegration
prospects.
“Manifestly unjust” and the three strikes
law
11.80
11.81
At the time of writing, there have been four homicide convictions under the
three strikes law – all for murders committed as
second strike
offences.1032 In each of the four cases, the judge has taken the
view that it would be manifestly unjust to require the defendants to serve
sentences
of life imprisonment without parole. The earlier two cases, R v
Harrison and R v Turner, are awaiting hearing by the Court of Appeal,
the Solicitor-General having appealed against the sentences on the basis of the
“manifestly
unjust” question.1033 Given these two
appeals, we make no specific comment on the cases. However, we make some general
observations about the three strikes
law and the exceptions provided through the
“manifestly unjust” proviso.
The term “manifestly
unjust” is used in the Sentencing Act as follows:
.
Section 102, allowing the judge to depart from the default sentence
of life imprisonment with
a 10-year minimum period for murder. If this threshold is met, the judge may
impose a finite sentence with a minimum period of one
third of the finite
sentence.
. Section 104, allowing the judge to depart from
the default 17-year minimum period of
imprisonment where the murder has certain aggravating features. If this
threshold is met, the judge may impose a minimum period of
between 10 and 17
years.
. Section 86E, allowing the judge to depart from the
default sentence of life imprisonment
without parole for a second strike murder. If this threshold is met, the
judge may impose a minimum period of no less than 10 years,
bringing it in line
with the default sentence for murder under section 102.
.
Section 86E, allowing the judge to depart from the default sentence
of imprisonment for
life without parole for third strike murder. If this threshold is met, the
judge may impose a minimum period of no less than 20 years.
However, if the
20-year minimum period would also be manifestly unjust, the judge may impose a
minimum period of no less than 10
years, bringing it in line with the default
sentence for murder under section 102.
1032 These cases are R v Harrison [2014] NZHC 2705 (in which the offender’s first strike offence was an indecent assault); R v Turner [2015] NZHC
189 (in which the offender’s first strike offence was wounding with intent); R v Kingi [2016] NZHC 139 (in which the offender’s first strike offence was robbery); and R v Herkt [2016] NZHC 284 (in which the offender’s first strike offending was also robbery).
1033 We understand that the Court of Appeal is scheduled to hear appeals by
the Solicitor-General against the sentences imposed
on Mr Harrison and Mr
Turner, with an appeal by Mr Harrison’s co-offender to be heard at the
same time, on 9 and 10 June 2016.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 177
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
. Section 86D, allowing the judge to depart from the default sentence of imprisonment for life with a minimum period of 20 years for third strike manslaughter. If this threshold is met, the judge can impose a minimum period of no less than 10 years, bringing it in line with the default sentence for murder under section 102.
. Section 86D, allowing the judge to depart from the requirement to impose the maximum
sentence with no parole for third strike offences other than murder and
manslaughter. If this threshold is met, the judge may allow
parole but cannot
impose a lesser sentence.
11.82
11.83
11.84
For each section, the judge must consider whether the default sentence under
the statute would be manifestly unjust. Under sections
102 and 104, if the
threshold is met, the judge will then determine the sentence in accordance with
the ordinary principles of the
Sentencing Act. Under the three strikes
provisions, the judge is able to depart from the presumptive sentence of life
imprisonment
without parole for murder or the presumptive sentence of life
imprisonment with a 20 year minimum period for manslaughter but cannot
impose a
finite sentence and cannot impose less than a 10-year minimum
period.
This means it is possible that some offenders who would have
received a finite sentence prior to the three strikes law will now receive
a
sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 10 years.
However, somewhat anomalously, an offender who
previously would have received a
life sentence for murder with a minimum period of 10 years may not receive any
uplift under the
three strikes law.
This is particularly problematic for
third strike manslaughter convictions and, in the section below, we consider
how this might
apply to some of the cases we have reviewed. It is apparent that
there could be a substantial disparity between manslaughter sentences
imposed
where the offender has two prior qualifying convictions compared with a similar
offending not caught by the three strikes
provisions.
Effect on victims of family violence who commit
homicide
11.85
11.86
11.87
The effect of the three strikes provisions on victims of family violence who
kill their abusers will depend on the number of previous
strikes and whether
the conviction is for murder or manslaughter. The requirement to impose a life
sentence could arise if:
. an offender is convicted of murder
after having already committed one or two strike
offences; or
. an offender is convicted of
manslaughter after having committed two strike offences.
In each
case, the most lenient result possible is a life sentence with a minimum
period of imprisonment of 10 years. This would
put any such case at the very
highest end of the cases identified in our case review.1034 We
consider below the potential sentencing uplifts that could apply. It is
significant that this could easily arise for a manslaughter
conviction as well
as in cases, less common in our review, involving murder convictions.
A
range of offences could qualify as a first or second strike. These are
specified in section
86A. Most sexual offences are included together with most violent offences
other than low-level assault. Offences against property
where a weapon is
involved are also included. The list of qualifying offences includes some
offences that span a considerable range
of seriousness, such as “wounding
with intent to injure” and “aggravated
burglary”.
1034 Sentences of life imprisonment with minimum non parole periods of 10
years were imposed in both R v Reti, above n 980, and R v Neale,
above n 985, although both pre-date Wihongi.
178 Law Commission Report
11.88
11.89
11.90
11.91
11.92
11.93
Within our case review of 20 convictions, we have identified three cases in
which prior offences might have been caught by the three
strikes law had they
occurred after it was enacted. Two of these cases involved manslaughter verdicts
and one case a murder verdict.
All involved guilty pleas. There may be other
cases in which the offender had a prior violent conviction that was not
mentioned in
the sentencing notes.
In R v Brown,1035
the offender killed her abusive partner during an argument and pleaded
guilty to manslaughter. The sentencing Judge noted a prior
conviction for
“injuring with intent”. Other prior convictions were alluded to but
not identified. If any of these
had been qualifying offences and the three
strikes law had applied, Ms Brown would have been sentenced to life imprisonment
with
a minimum period of imprisonment of 10 years as opposed to a finite
sentence of five years and six months with eligibility for
parole in the normal
course. This is a stark difference in outcome.
In R v
Stone,1036 the offender killed her partner by a stab to the leg
during an argument and pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The Judge noted “a
past of violent convictions, two for assault and others for wilful trespass and
driving with an excess breath alcohol level”.1037 It is not
clear whether the assault charges referred to are common assault or more serious
offending that would be caught by the three
strikes law. The sentence in
Stone was three years’ imprisonment, which reflected the strange
circumstances of a wound to the leg resulting in death. Despite these
particular
circumstances, if her case had been caught by the three strikes legislation, Ms
Stone would have been required to serve
a life sentence with a minimum period of
imprisonment of
10 years.
The judge in Rihia noted a previous
conviction for assault by Ms Rihia against Mr Rihia. It was not stated whether
this was common assault or a more
serious offence. If this conviction resulted
from the incident described in the judgment in which Ms Rihia “attacked Mr
Rihia
repeatedly over the head with a table leg”,1038 it
could have been charged as “wounding with intent to injure” and
thereby qualify as a first strike offence. Similarly,
in Wihongi, while
prior convictions were not mentioned, the Judge referred to a previous episode
of violence in which Ms Wihongi injured her
partner.1039 Both Ms
Rihia and Ms Wihongi received finite terms. If, in the future, analogous
offending is caught by the three strikes law, the
possibility of finite terms of
imprisonment and the normal parole entitlements will be precluded.
There
is a strong case that the three strikes law could cause injustice to the
category of offender we are concerned with in this
review. It is only a matter
of time before a case comes before the court where an offender is convicted of
manslaughter or murder
and would have received a relatively short finite
sentence but for the three strikes law.1040
There are further
issues of potential relevance to victims of family violence who commit offences
against their abusers that are
worth noting. For example, there is no provision
for a judge to decline to issue a first or second strike warning if, in the
circumstances
of the offence, categorising the offending as a strike would be
manifestly unjust. Nor is there provision to
1035 R v Brown HC Napier CRI-2008-020-3130, 24 November 2009.
1036 R v Stone HC Wellington CRI-2005-078-1802, 9 December 2005.
1037 At [6].
1038 At [16].
1039 R v Wihongi, above n 963, at [47].
1040 We note that the first case to present problematic issues of
mandatory sentencing for culpable homicide under the three strikes
law may or
may not involve a victim of family violence. It could be a murder conviction for
one of the other categories of defendant
for whom life imprisonment has been
held to be manifestly unjust, or it could be a manslaughter case that would
otherwise be treated
with lenience. It might be a case that falls just outside
the boundaries of our terms of reference – such as in Whiu, above n
981, the motor manslaughter case, where the offender was a victim of family
violence but the homicide victim was a bystander.
As the courts have repeatedly
pointed out, manslaughter is an offence that captures a wide range of
culpability and for which sentencing
flexibility is, therefore, particularly
important.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 179
CHAPTER 11: Sentencing for homicide
depart from the mandatory maximum sentence for third strike offences except
for murder or manslaughter. The three strikes law may
bear heavily on victims of
family violence who injure their abusers in analogous situations to those in our
case sample but without
causing death.
A problem in need of a solution
11.94
11.95
Under the three strikes law the legislature made a deliberate policy
decision to impose mandatory life sentences for murder and
manslaughter
offenders who may otherwise have received finite sentences.1041 This
review has identified one group of offenders for whom this is likely to be
unjust, particularly if the prior qualifying offence
(or offences) is (or are)
similarly connected to or explained by a history of abuse. We have not
considered the position of other
offenders who may also be disproportionately
disadvantaged by the three strikes law. Doing so would take us well outside the
scope
of this review.
We are also mindful there are underlying questions
around the application of the three strikes law to homicide offences, given
that,
in all four murder cases to date, the sentencing judges have reached the
conclusion that a sentence of life imprisonment without
parole would be
manifestly unjust. As noted above, appeals in two of these cases are due to be
heard shortly by the Court of Appeal.1042 In the face of this
uncertainty around interpretation and the broader policy issues, we have not
developed recommendations for amendments
to the Sentencing Act. Instead, we
suggest that the Ministry of Justice considers the issues raised by the three
strikes legislation
for homicide offenders in exceptional circumstances. In
particular, we recommend that the Ministry of Justice consider how the
mandatory
life sentence could be dispensed with for victims of family violence
who kill their abusers in circumstances where the three strikes
regime would
otherwise mandate a life sentence.
RECOMMENDATION
R11
The Ministry of Justice should undertake further policy work to address the
issues noted in this Report in relation to sections 86D(4)
and 86E of the
Sentencing Act 2002 as they apply to homicide offenders in exceptional
circumstances, and specifically:
· consider the position of victims of family violence who kill their abusers in situations where the three strikes regime would mandate a life sentence; and
· consider how to amend the legislation to allow judges to
impose a finite sentence in deserving
cases.
1041 The mandatory life sentence for manslaughter was criticised at the time. See Warren Brookbanks and Richard Ekins “The Case against the Three Strikes Sentencing Regime” [2010] NZ L Rev 689 at 705. It was also subject to debate at the Committee stage. An amendment to exclude certain types of manslaughter was voted on and rejected: (18 May 2010) 663 NZPD 10901.
1042 See above at n 1033.
180 Law Commission Report
Appendices
APPENDIX A: Terms of reference
Appendix A
Terms of reference
VICTIMS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE WHO COMMIT HOMICIDE
Context
In 2001 the Law Commission published a report examining the legal defences
available to protect those who commit criminal offences
as a reaction to
domestic violence: “Some Criminal defences with Particular Reference to
Battered Defendants” LCR73.
Of particular note the Report recommended
repeal of the partial defence to murder of provocation, an amendment to the
defence of
self-defence and abolition of the mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment for murder.
In 2002 Parliament introduced discretionary sentencing in murder cases,
subject to a presumption in favour of life imprisonment.
In 2007 the Law Commission published a second Report: “The Partial
Defence of Provocation” LCR98. The Report again recommended
repeal of this
partial defence. The Commission concluded that its major deficiency was that the
partial defence of provocation had
been primarily used by violent offenders in
respect of unwelcome advances or slights against their honour. It was seldom
available
to victims of family violence. Given this conclusion, the Commission
re-examined whether the defence of self-defence should be amended
to ensure that
it is available to victims of family violence in appropriate cases. In
answering this question the Commission noted
the work undertaken as part of the
Government Response to the Commission’s 2001 Report. That work concluded
that amendment
to section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 (self-defence and defence of
another) was not required to meet the needs of battered defendants,
and might be
undesirable in light of the fact that the section is generally regarded as
working well. The Ministry reviewed recent
case law, which tended to suggest
that problems previously encountered were being ironed out in the courts; it
thus concluded that
the real problem previously was one of social awareness,
rather than of law. The Ministry found that overwhelmingly stakeholders
were
comfortable with letting matters take their course. The Commission stated:
“we are content at this stage to concur with
the Ministry’s
conclusions”.
In 2009 Parliament repealed section 169 of the Crimes Act 1961, which had
provided for the partial defence to murder of provocation.
Since the 2009 repeal, the Family Violence Death Review Committee has been
gathering data on all family violence homicides in New
Zealand. In its Fourth
Annual Report published in 2014, the Committee concluded that New Zealand is out
of step in how the criminal
justice system responds to victims of family
violence when they face criminal charges for killing their abusive partners. To
address
this, the Committee recommended that the Government re-examine the
options for amending the defence of self-defence and introducing
a targeted
partial defence to murder.
The Government has asked the Law Commission to conduct the re-examination recommended by the
Family Violence Death Review Committee.
182 Law Commission Report
Reference
The Law Commission will re-consider whether the law in respect of a victim of
family violence who commits homicide can be improved.
As part of this review the
Law Commission shall consider:
(a)
(b) (c)
Should the test for self-defence, in section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961,
be modified so that it is more readily assessable to defendants
charged with
murder who are victims of family violence; and
Whether a partial defence
for victims of family violence who are charged with murder is justified and if
so in what particular circumstances;
and
Whether current sentencing
principles properly reflect the circumstances of victims of family violence who
are convicted of murder?
Scope
The reference forms part of a broader range of initiatives relating to family
violence being undertaken by the Ministry of Justice.
It also forms part of two
other projects being undertaken by the Law Commission, being alternative trial
processes with particular
focus on sexual offence cases and whether a
separate offence of non-fatal strangulation is desirable.
Review Process
The reference will be undertaken by:
. Conducting preliminary research including a review of recent New Zealand cases and an
assessment of overseas experience and best practice;
. Consulting with targeted agencies within New Zealand including the Police, Judiciary, Ministry
of Justice, Family Violence Death Review Committee, New Zealand Law Society and other knowledgeable agencies;
. Engaging with an expert panel, made up of both public and non-public sector advisers, during the
reference; and
. Publishing a Report.
Revised Timing
The Law Commission will report to the Minister by the end of April
2016.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 183
APPENDIX B: List of submitters on the Issues Paper
Appendix B
List of submitters on the Issues Paper
. Auckland Coalition for the Safety of Women and Children
. Auckland Crown Solicitor’s Office
. Auckland District Law Society (Criminal Law Committee)
. Aviva Family Violence Services
. Brenda Midson (Faculty of Law, University of Waikato)
. Criminal Bar Association
. Crown Law
. Family Violence Death Review Committee
. Gilbert Elliot
. Jeremy Hammington
. JustSpeak
. Marita Leask
. Ministry for Women
. National Council of Women of New Zealand
. New Zealand Law Society (Criminal Law Committee, Youth Justice Committee and Family Law
Section)
. Nicola Wake (Faculty of Law, Northumbria University)
. Public Defence Service
. Sensible Sentencing Trust
. Women’s
Refuge
184 Law Commission Report
Appendix C Recommendations
CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING FAMILY VIOLENCE
R1 Judges should continue to receive education, including through the Institute of Judicial Legal
Studies, on the dynamics of family violence.
R2 Regular and ongoing education courses on the dynamics of family
violence should be made available to all criminal lawyers, including
Crown
prosecutors and defence counsel.
R3 Police should receive regular education on the dynamics of
family violence.
R4 Education recommended above should:
· reflect contemporary social science understanding of family violence and victims’
responses;
· explain the primary victim/predominant aggressor analysis in intimate partner violence;
and
· identify common misconceptions of family violence that
persist today and their implications in the criminal justice
system.
CHAPTER 7 PROPOSALS TO REFORM SELF-DEFENCE
R5 A new provision should be inserted into the Crimes Act 1961 to
ensure that, where a person is responding to family violence, section
48 may
apply even if that person is responding to a threat that is not
imminent.
R6 The Ministry of Justice should consider whether the term
“family violence” should be consistent with the definition
of
domestic violence in the Domestic Violence Act 1995, incorporating any
amendments that may be made following the Ministry of Justice’s
current
review of domestic violence legislation, or whether an inclusive definition of
family violence is preferred, including, but
not limited to, the definition of
domestic violence in the Domestic Violence Act 1995.
R7 The Evidence Act 2006 should be amended to include provisions based on sections 322J and
322M(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) to provide for a broad range of family
violence evidence to be admitted in support of claims of self-defence and to
make it
clear that such evidence may be relevant to both the subjective and
objective elements in section 48 of the Crimes Act
1961.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 185
APPENDIX C: Recommendations
CHAPTER 9 OBSERVATIONS FROM THE CASES
R8 The Solicitor-General should, when next reviewing the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution
Guidelines, consider whether they should include express reference
to the potential relevance of a defendant’s history as a victim
of
family violence.
CHAPTER 10 IS A PARTIAL DEFENCE JUSTIFIED?
R9 No new partial defence or separate homicide offence should be
introduced in New Zealand.
CHAPTER 11 SENTENCING FOR HOMICIDE
R10
R11
The Sentencing Act 2002 should be amended as follows:
· amending section 9(2)(c) to clarify that “conduct of the victim” includes prior family violence against the offender; and
· amending section 9(2)(e) to clarify that
“diminished intellectual capacity or understanding” includes any
impairment
resulting from being subject to family violence.
The Ministry
of Justice should undertake further policy work to address the issues noted in
this Report in relation to sections 86D(4)
and 86E of the Sentencing Act 2002 as
they apply to homicide offenders in exceptional circumstances and
specifically:
· consider the position of victims of family violence who kill their abusers in situations where the three strikes regime would mandate a life sentence; and
· consider how to amend the legislation to allow judges to
impose a finite sentence in deserving
cases.
186 Law Commission Report
Appendix D Glossary of terms
Terms and abbreviations commonly used in this Report have the meanings set
out below. Where appropriate we have adopted and summarised
the definitions of
key terms used by the Family Violence Death Review Committee in their Fourth
Annual Report.
Child abuse Includes all forms of physical and emotional
ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect and exploitation that results in actual or
potential
harm to the child’s health, development or dignity. Five
subtypes can be distinguished: physical abuse, sexual abuse, neglect
and
negligent treatment, emotional abuse and exploitation. May include exposure to
intimate partner violence.
Family violence
A broad range of controlling behaviours, commonly of a physical, sexual
and/or psychological nature, which typically involve fear,
intimidation and
emotional deprivation. It occurs within a variety of close interpersonal
relationships, such as between partners,
parents and children, siblings and in
other relationships where significant others are not part of the physical
household but are
part of the family and/or are fulfilling the function of
family.
Definition from the Taskforce on Violence Within
Families
<www.msd.govt.nz>.
FVDRC Family Violence Death Review Committee.
Intimate partner violence
Any behaviour within an intimate relationship (including current and/or
past live-in relationships or dating relationships) that causes
physical,
psychological or sexual harm to those in the relationship.
Intrafamilial violence
All forms of abuse between family members other than intimate partners or
parents of their children.
Issues Paper Law Commission Victims of family violence who commit homicide (NZLC IP39, 2015). Available to download from the Law
Commission website
<www.lawcom.govt.nz>.
Predominant aggressor
The person who is the most significant or principal aggressor in a
violent intimate partner relationship, and who has a pattern of
using violence
to exercise coercive control.
Primary victim
The person who (in the abuse history of the relationship) is experiencing
ongoing coercive and controlling behaviour from their intimate
partner.
VLRC Victorian Law Reform Commission.
2001 Report Law Commission Some Criminal Defences with Particular
Reference to Battered Defendants (NZLC R73, 2001). Available to download
from the Law Commission website
<www.lawcom.govt.nz>.
2007 Report Law Commission The Partial Defence of Provocation
(NZLC R98, 2007). Available to download from the Law Commission website
<www.lawcom.govt.nz>.
Understanding family violence: Reforming the criminal law relating to homicide 187
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