You are here:
NZLII >>
Databases >>
New Zealand Law Commission Reports >>
2022 >>
[2022] NZLCR 147
Database Search
| Name Search
| Recent Documents
| Noteup
| LawCite
| Download
| Help
Ko ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā Pūtea Tautiringa. Class actions and litigation funding [2022] NZLCR 147
New Zealand Law Commission Reports
[Index]
[Search]
[Download]
[Help]
Ko ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā Pūtea Tautiringa. Class actions and litigation funding [2022] NZLCR 147 (27
June 2022)
Last Updated: 27 June 2022
Haratua | May 2022
Te Whanganui-a-Tara, Aotearoa
Wellington, New Zealand
Pūrongo | Report 147
Ko
ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā Pūtea Tautiringa
Class
Actions and Litigation Funding
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is an independent, publicly funded,
central advisory body established by statute to undertake
the systematic review,
reform and development of the law of Aotearoa New Zealand. Its purpose is to
help achieve law that is just,
principled and accessible and that reflects the
values and aspirations of the people of Aotearoa New Zealand.
Te Aka Matua in the Commission’s Māori name refers to the parent
vine that Tāwhaki used to climb up to the heavens.
At the foot of the
ascent, he and his brother Karihi find their grandmother Whaitiri, who guards
the vines that form the pathway
into the sky. Karihi tries to climb the vines
first but makes the error of climbing up the aka taepa or hanging vine. He is
blown
violently around by the winds of heaven and falls to his death. Following
Whaitiri’s advice, Tāwhaki climbs the aka matua
or parent vine,
reaches the heavens and receives the three baskets of knowledge.
Kia whanake ngā ture o Aotearoa mā te arotake motuhake
Better law for Aotearoa New Zealand through independent
review
The Commissioners are:
Amokura Kawharu – Tumu Whakarae | President
Claudia Geiringer – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner
Geof Shirtcliffe – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner
The Hon Justice Christian Whata – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner
The Māori language version of this report’s title was developed
for Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission by Kiwa Hammond
and Maakere Edwards,
of Aatea Solutions Limited. The title was finalised in conjunction with the
Commission’s Māori Liaison
Committee.
Kei te pātengi raraunga o Te Puna Mātauranga o Aotearoa te
whakarārangi o tēnei pukapuka.
A catalogue record for this title is available from the National Library of
New Zealand.
ISBN 978-0-9951291-8-4 (Print)
ISBN 978-0-9951291-7-7 (Online)
ISSN 0113-2334 (Print)
ISSN 1177-6196 (Online)
This title may be cited as NZLC R147. This title is available on the internet
at the website of Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission:
www.lawcom.govt.nz
Copyright © 2022 Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International licence. In essence, you are free to copy, distribute
and adapt
the work, as long as you attribute the work to Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission and abide by other licence terms.
To view a copy of this licence,
visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
|
|
Tumu Whakarae | President
Amokura Kawharu FRSNZ
Kaikōmihana | Commissioners
Claudia Geiringer FRSNZ
Geof Shirtcliffe
The Hon Justice Christian Whata
|
Hon Kris Faafoi
Minister Responsible for the Law Commission
Parliament Buildings
WELLINGTON
|
27 May 2022
|
|
Tēnā koe Minister
|
|
NZLC R147 – Ko ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā
Pūtea Tautiringa | Class Actions and Litigation Funding
I am pleased to submit to you the above report under section 16 of the Law
Commission Act 1985.
Nāku noa, nā
Amokura Kawharu
Tumu Whakarae | President
Foreword
Significant financial, social and other barriers currently undermine access to
civil justice in Aotearoa New Zealand. This is a risk
to democracy as legal
rights provide little protection without meaningful access to institutions that
can uphold them.
Improving access to civil justice requires a coordinated effort across many
different areas. While class actions and litigation funding
do not offer a
panacea, they can both make important contributions.
We recommend the creation of a statutory class actions regime, including a new
Class Actions Act as the principal source of class
actions law. The increasing
number of large representative proceedings in Aotearoa New Zealand demonstrates
a clear need for a group
litigation mechanism that can resolve claims justly and
efficiently. It has also exposed the inadequacies of the current procedure
and
the cost and delay it entails for all parties and the courts. A modern
well-designed class actions regime will enable claimants
to overcome some of the
difficulties in accessing civil justice and help to ensure that multiple claims
can be managed, to the benefit
of all parties and the courts, in an efficient
way.
We also recognise that litigation funding can help to address problems created
by the burgeoning costs of legal advice and litigation
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Our recommendations on litigation funding complement our proposals for a
statutory class actions regime. Class actions do not always
require funding.
However, the high costs of class action litigation mean that many cases will not
be possible without it. Our recommendations
include a range of measures and
protections to manage concerns about the provision of litigation funding, in
both class actions and
ordinary litigation. We also propose that a public class
action fund be created to address funding gaps, for example in public interest
litigation.
We thank everyone who has taken the time to discuss these challenging and
wide-ranging issues with us during our review. While we
see this review as one
part of broader efforts to improve access to civil justice in Aotearoa New
Zealand, we are confident that
our recommendations will have a meaningful impact
in this context.
-
- Amokura
Kawharu
- Tumu Whakarae |
President
Acknowledgements
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission gratefully acknowledges the
contributions of the many individuals and organisations who have
assisted us in
the course of our review.
In particular we wish to acknowledge the generous contributions made by our
Expert Advisory Group. These individuals provided guidance
as we identified
issues, developed policy proposals, considered feedback and developed reform
recommendations. Members of the Group
were:
- Nikki
Chamberlain
- Michael
Heard
- Jack Hodder
QC
- Matthew Smith
(nominated by Ngā Ahorangi Motuhake o te Ture | New Zealand Bar
Association)
- Tim Stephens
(nominated by Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society)
- Adina Thorn
- Dr Bridgette
Toy-Cronin
We are grateful to the members of the legal profession and litigation funders
who have discussed aspects of the project with us and
provided helpful
information to us during the course of our review. We have also benefitted from
discussions with several overseas-based
academics working in the areas of class
actions and litigation funding. We thank in particular Associate Professor
Jasminka Kalajdzic,
Dr Michael Legg, Professor Vince Morabito, Professor Rachael
Mulheron QC and Professor Vicki Waye. We acknowledge and appreciate
the feedback
we received from the Commission’s Māori Liaison Committee, Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society and members of the
judiciary. We thank in particular the Hon Justice Cooke for coordinating
responses from the judiciary
on issues and questions we raised with them. We
also wish to thank all those who submitted on our two Issues Papers, responded
to
our online survey of group members in representative actions, and attended
our class actions consultation workshops. We emphasise
nevertheless that the
views we express in this report are those of the Commission and not necessarily
those of the people who have
assisted our work.
Nō reira, ko tēnei mātou e mihi nei ki a koutou, kua whai wā
ki te āwhina i a mātou. Tēnā
koutou, tēnā koutou,
tēnā koutou katoa.
The Commissioner responsible for this project is Amokura Kawharu. The legal
and policy advisers who worked on this project are Jenny
Ryan, Catherine Helm,
Rebecca Garden, Nick Gillard and Jesse Watts. Cathy Rodgers, Parliamentary
Counsel at Te Tari Tohutohu Pāremata
| Parliamentary Counsel Office,
drafted the legislative provisions for both the Supplementary Issues Paper and
this report. We acknowledge
the assistance provided by law clerks who have
worked on this project. We also acknowledge the earlier contributions by former
Commissioners
Sir Douglas White and Belinda Clark. Helen McQueen was a Law
Commissioner at the time this report was considered and approved by
the
Commission’s Board. While Claudia Geiringer has held a warrant as a Law
Commissioner since 2 May 2022, she did not participate
in the project or in
reviewing this report as the report was largely completed prior to that
date.
Contents
Glossary
0BAdverse costs
|
This is where the court orders an unsuccessful party to pay costs to a
successful party in a proceeding or interlocutory application
to reimburse them
for their legal costs. Adverse costs rules are sometimes also referred to as
‘loser pays’, ‘costs
follow the event’ or ‘costs
shifting’ rules.
|
1BAfter-the-event insurance
|
After-the-event insurance is purchased after a legal dispute has arisen, to
indemnify the insured in the event the court makes an
adverse costs order.
|
2BAggregate litigation
|
A form of group litigation which involves multiple individual claims being
determined in the same proceeding.
|
3BAggregate monetary relief
|
Aggregate monetary relief involves the court assessing monetary relief on
an aggregate basis and granting an order for relief based
on the aggregate
amount. The monetary relief is calculated by proving the damage sustained by the
class as a whole, without calculating
individual class member entitlements.
|
4BAlternative distribution
|
An order for alternative distribution is where the court orders some or all
of an award of aggregate monetary relief to be paid to
an organisation or
charity associated with the claim because it is impossible or impracticable to
distribute the relief to individual
class members. This is often referred to as
cy-près relief in other jurisdictions.
|
5BAustralian Parliamentary Inquiry
|
On 13 May 2020, Australia’s House of Representatives referred an
inquiry into litigation funding and the regulation of the class
action industry
to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. The
committee published its report in
December 2020.
|
6BCertification
|
Certification is a preliminary stage where the court decides whether the
case can proceed in class action form.
|
7BChamperty
|
Champerty is a tort (and in some jurisdictions, a crime) where a person who
is not a party to, and has no interest in, the litigation
provides financial
assistance to a party to a civil action in return for a share of any recovery.
Champerty is a form of maintenance
(defined below).
|
8BClass member
|
A person who has opted into a class action or has not opted out by the
required date. A class member is not a party to the litigation,
unless they are
the representative plaintiff.
|
9BConcurrent class action
|
A class action proceeding that has the same or similar issues in dispute as
another class action proceeding currently before the court,
as well as at least
one common defendant. In other jurisdictions, this is known as a competing class
action.
|
10BConditional fee
|
A conditional fee is a fee agreement where some or all of the
lawyer’s fees and expenses are payable only if there is a successful
outcome. In Aotearoa New Zealand, a conditional fee may include a premium to
compensate the lawyer for the risk of not being paid
at all and for the
disadvantages of not receiving payment on account, provided it is not calculated
as a proportion of the amount
received by the client.
|
11BContingency fee
|
A contingency fee is a fee arrangement where, if there is a successful
outcome, the lawyer’s fee will be calculated as a proportion
(usually a
percentage) of any sum recovered. If the matter is unsuccessful, the lawyer will
be paid nothing. This form of fee arrangement
is not permitted in Aotearoa New
Zealand.
|
12BCost sharing order
|
Cost sharing orders are orders which provide for the legal and funding
costs of a class action to be equitably spread among all class
members, even if
they have not signed up to a litigation funding agreement.
|
13BD&O insurance
|
Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) is a form of
insurance designed to protect company directors and senior
employees against
personal loss arising from liabilities incurred in the performance of their
duties. D&O insurance also provides
cover for the reasonable costs of
defending a claim.
|
14BGroup litigation
|
Group litigation is a term to describe forms of civil litigation where a
group of claimants seek redress collectively. It includes
class actions and
representative actions, as well as civil procedure techniques such as joinder
and consolidation and mechanisms
applying to specific areas of the law.
|
15BGroup member
|
A person who is a member of a representative action. A group member is not
a party to the litigation, unless they are the representative
plaintiff or
defendant.
|
16BHCR 4.24
|
Rule 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016. HCR 4.24 enables a plaintiff (or a
defendant) in Aotearoa New Zealand to sue (or be sued)
on a representative
basis.
|
17BLitigation funding
|
Litigation funding is where a person who is not a party to, and has no
interest in, the litigation agrees to fund some or all of a
party’s costs,
in exchange for a share of any sum recovered.
|
18BMaintenance
|
Maintenance is a tort (and in some jurisdictions, a crime) where a person
who is not a party to and has no interest in the litigation,
assists a party to
a civil action to bring or defend the action, without lawful justification, and
this causes damage to the other
party.
|
19BOpt-in
|
Opt-in is an approach to determining class membership in a representative
action or class action. Under this approach, potential class
members must
affirmatively opt into the litigation by taking a prescribed step by a certain
date in order to be bound by any judgment
on the common issues in the
proceeding, or by a settlement.
|
20BOpt-out
|
Opt-out is an approach to determining class membership in a representative
action or class action. Under an opt-out approach, all
people who fall within
the description of the class are bound by the judgment on common issues or
settlement unless they take a prescribed
step by a certain date to exclude
themselves from the proceeding.
|
21BRepresentative action
|
A representative action permits a person to sue (or be sued) on behalf of
other people who share the same interest in the subject
matter of a legal
proceeding. In Aotearoa New Zealand, a representative action can be brought
under HCR 4.24.
|
22BRepresentative plaintiff
|
The representative plaintiff represents the other class members in
representative actions and class actions. Unlike other class members,
they are a
party to the litigation.
|
23BRules Committee
|
Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee is a statutory
body which has responsibility for procedural rules in the
Supreme Court, Court
of Appeal, High Court and District Court.
|
24BRules of conduct and client care for lawyers
|
The Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules
2008.
|
Executive
summary
INTRODUCTION
- Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission has undertaken a review of class actions
and litigation funding. The review has taken place
within a wider context of
ongoing and pressing concern about financial, social and other barriers to
accessing civil justice in Aotearoa
New Zealand.
- At
present, Aotearoa New Zealand does not have class actions legislation. Rule 4.24
of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) allows a person
to sue (or be sued) on behalf
of, or for the benefit of, all persons with the same interest in the proceeding.
This rule is increasingly
being used to bring large, complex cases which are
similar in nature to class actions. However, the representative action procedure
was not designed for litigation of this kind. As a result, there has been
extensive litigation on procedural issues, which has caused
delay for parties
and required considerable court resources. We have concluded that a statutory
class actions regime will be clearer,
more certain and more accessible. This in
turn will improve access to justice for New Zealanders.
- Aotearoa
New Zealand also currently lacks specific regulation of litigation funding. The
torts of maintenance and champerty, which
have historically prohibited
litigation funding, remain part of our law. Consequently, there is uncertainty
about when and how litigation
funding may be provided. This may impact on the
availability and affordability of litigation funding and provide insufficient
protection
for funded plaintiffs. We have concluded that specific regulation is
desirable to address these issues and to assure the integrity
of the court
system. With specific regulation in place, the torts of maintenance and
champerty should be abolished.
STATUTORY REGIME FOR AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND
- Existing
methods of group litigation in Aotearoa New Zealand, including the
representative actions rule in HCR 4.24, are insufficient.
We recommend the
creation of a class actions regime, including a Class Actions Act as the
principal source of law in relation to
class actions. In addition, specific
class actions rules in the High Court Rules will be necessary to address more
detailed matters
of procedure. We explain our view that class actions will
improve access to justice and allow multiple claims to be managed in an
efficient way and recommend these should be the statutory objectives of class
actions. We also discuss the potential disadvantages
of class actions and
explain how many of these can be mitigated by the design of the regime.
- In
developing our proposals, we have been guided by the principles that a class
actions regime should:
- Consider
the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.
- Safeguard
the interests of class members.
- Consider
the principle of proportionality, meaning that the time and cost of litigation
should be proportionate to what is at stake.
- Strike
an appropriate balance between flexibility and certainty.
- Be
appropriate for contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand.
- Recognise
and reflect relevant tikanga Māori.
- Not
adversely impact on other methods of group litigation.
- Provide
clarity on issues arising in funded litigation.
- We
recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should
consider amending the representative actions rules
in HCR 4.24 and District
Court Rule 4.24 to provide they should not be used when a class action would be
a more appropriate procedure.
This is to avoid the risk of these rules being
used to circumvent the protections of a class actions regime.
- While
some jurisdictions have provided for defendant class actions, we recommend the
Class Actions Act should only apply to plaintiff
class actions.
KEY ACTORS IN A CLASS ACTION
Class members
- A
defining feature of a class action is the presence of class members. They are
not parties to the litigation and have little control
over how the class action
is conducted but will be bound by the outcome. It is therefore essential that a
class actions regime includes
safeguards to protect the interests of class
members and many features of the class actions regime we recommend provide for
this.
The representative plaintiff
- In
a class action, the plaintiff is a representative plaintiff. There are two
important dimensions to the representative plaintiff’s
role. First, the
representative plaintiff, like an ordinary plaintiff, is a party to the
proceeding and has a claim against the defendant.
Second, the representative
plaintiff represents the other class members.
- We
recommend the representative plaintiff should be responsible for making
decisions about the conduct of the class action and giving
informed instructions
to the lawyer acting for them and the class. We prefer this to the approach of
governance and decision-making
in a class action being vested in a group such as
a litigation committee.
- We
consider a representative plaintiff should have an overarching duty to act in
what they believe to be the best interests of the
class. This duty should be
specified in the Class Actions Act. We recommend the Act also specify the
representative plaintiff does
not owe fiduciary duties to class members. There
are a number of responsibilities associated with the role of representative
plaintiff,
such as taking the steps necessary to progress the class action and
meeting any order for adverse costs. These responsibilities arise
primarily from
being a party to the proceeding, but their extent is amplified because they are
bringing the litigation on behalf
of a large group of class members as well as
themselves.
- The
role of representative plaintiff is significant, and we have accordingly
identified some ways of supporting a person in the role.
The Class Actions Act
should provide the representative plaintiff with a statutory immunity from
claims by a class member with respect
to their duty unless they have acted
recklessly or in wilful default or bad faith. We also recommend a proposed
representative plaintiff
must receive independent legal advice on the duty and
responsibilities of the role.
The defendant
- The
role of a defendant in a class action does not differ substantially from normal
litigation. However, the nature of a class action
can give rise to challenges in
responding to the litigation and can increase the financial risks and potential
liability for defendants.
We recommend some measures to respond to these issues,
such as enabling a defendant to obtain information on class members who have
opted in or opted out and a presumption that in funded class actions, a
litigation funder will provide security for costs.
The court
- The
court will have a more active role in class actions than in most other
litigation to ensure the interests of class members are
adequately protected.
Stages of a class action that require additional court oversight include the
requirement for a proceeding to
be certified in order to proceed as a class
action, court approval of notices to class members and court approval of
settlement.
The need for this oversight may require extensive judicial
resources. We have accordingly made various recommendations to allow the
court
to manage class actions in an efficient way.
COMMENCING A CLASS ACTION
- We
recommend the Class Actions Act should not restrict class actions to certain
areas of the law or type of claim and that class actions
should be able to be
commenced in Te Kōti Matua | High Court with respect to claims where the
High Court has existing jurisdiction.
We do not recommend class actions be
available in the District Court, Environment Court or Māori Land Court.
However, we recommend
the Government consider developing class actions rules for
the employment jurisdiction.
- To
commence a class action, we recommend there must be a proposed representative
plaintiff acting on behalf of a class comprising
at least two other class
members. Each claim must raise a common issue of fact or law, to ensure a
single judgment will determine
an issue for all class members and prevent
disparate claims from being grouped together.
- We
recommend the representative plaintiff should be a class member, in accordance
with normal standing rules. There are benefits to
having a representative
plaintiff who has their own claim at stake, including demonstrating that the
class action is supported by
a genuine claimant who is motivated by a desire to
resolve their legal claim. We think a state entity should be able to bring a
class
action as representative plaintiff either where it is a class member or
where another Act enables it to do so.
- When
a class action is commenced, we recommend the limitation periods applying to the
claim of each person falling within the proposed
class should be suspended. The
Class Actions Act should specify a list of circumstances that will lead to
limitation periods starting
to run again.
CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS
- Having
concurrent (or competing) class actions relating to the same dispute is
generally undesirable as this may lead to increased
costs for all parties,
inefficient use of court resources, increased burden on defendants, confusion
for class members and the risk
of inconsistent court rulings on the same issue.
We recommend there should be a 90-day deadline to commence a concurrent class
action,
which will enable the court to consider the certification applications
of concurrent class actions together. If more than one concurrent
class action
meets the certification test, we recommend the court must decide which of those
class actions will be certified. When
making its decision, we recommend the
court should consider which approach will best allow class member claims to be
resolved in
a just and efficient way. If more than one concurrent class action
is certified, the court should have the power to make orders for
the efficient
management of those proceedings.
CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTIONS
- We
recommend the Class Actions Act should require a proceeding to be certified in
order to proceed as a class action. While class
actions may provide improved
access to justice, they also place a significant burden on defendants and the
court system as they are
usually expensive and lengthy. Class actions also risk
insufficient protection of class members’ interests. We therefore think
it
is appropriate for a proceeding to have to meet a certification test before it
is allowed to proceed as a class action.
- We
recommend that in order for a proceeding to be certified as a class action, the
court must be satisfied that:
- The
proceeding discloses a reasonably arguable cause of action.
- There
is a common issue of fact or law in the claim of each class member.
- The
representative plaintiff is suitable and will fairly and adequately represent
the class.
- Class
action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of
the claims of class members.
- The
opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an appropriate means
of determining class membership.
- We
consider that both opt-in and opt-out class actions should be allowed in
Aotearoa New Zealand. We consider there are advantages
and disadvantages to both
forms of class action and our proposed certification test will allow flexibility
to determine which is
appropriate for a particular case.
THE CLASS
Rules for particular class members
- We
recommend additional rules for certain categories of class members. First, we
think that people who reside outside Aotearoa New
Zealand should only be able to
join a class action if they opt in. This approach responds to the difficulty in
providing adequate
notice of an opt-out class action to those outside Aotearoa
New Zealand. It may also facilitate recognition and enforcement of the
court’s judgment in other jurisdictions.
- Ministers
of the Crown and government departments should only become a class member if
they opt in. A key rationale for opt-out class
actions is to provide access to
justice. However, this is unlikely to apply to the Crown because it has
sufficient resources for
litigation.
- We
also recommend rules on class members who are minors or who are considered to
lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect
to a particular step. We
do not favour a rule where a litigation guardian must be appointed for
such a class member as we think it will depend on the class member involved and
the consequences of taking, or not
taking, a particular step. We therefore
recommend that class members (and potential class members) are not required to
have a litigation
guardian solely because they are under the age of 18 years or
are considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect
to a
step in a class action proceeding (unless the court orders otherwise). However,
the court should have a power to make any order
it considers appropriate to
protect the interests of such class members.
The relationship between the lawyer and class
members
- We
consider that, after certification, the representative plaintiff’s lawyer
should be regarded as the lawyer for the class.
As the lawyer will be carrying
out legal work on behalf of the entire class, they should not be regarded as
solely the representative
plaintiff’s lawyer. Class members will be bound
by the outcome of the litigation and they should be able to rely on the lawyer
to conduct the litigation in a way that advances their interests and complies
with ethical and professional obligations.
- We
think the lawyer-class relationship that arises upon certification needs to be
prescribed by legislation and recommend the Lawyers
and Conveyancers Act 2006
should be amended to mandate this relationship. We also recommend that Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS)
consider what
amendments may be needed to the Rules of conduct and client care for
lawyers to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in class actions.
STEPS DURING A CLASS ACTION
Notice to class members
- Class
members need to be notified of particular stages in a class action in order to
make informed decisions about their participation.
We recommend a list of events
that should require notice to class members, with the court retaining a
discretion to order that notice
is not required. The initial notice in a class
action will inform potential class members that a class action has been
certified
and there is an opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class
action. We make detailed recommendations about the contents of this
notice. We
also recommend the court should approve the contents of notices before they are
sent to class members and should have
a broad discretion to order any method of
notice that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
Case management and discovery
- Class
actions will need close case management to ensure they proceed efficiently and
in a way that protects the interests of class
members. We recommend the Rules
Committee consider developing a schedule to the High Court Rules listing the
matters to be discussed
at case management conferences for class actions.
- We
consider it would be desirable to have a specific rule empowering the court to
order one or more class members to provide discovery.
We do not think the
non-party discovery rule is well suited to class members, as it is designed to
apply to persons who are not part
of the litigation. We also recommend a
defendant should be able to seek an order for information resulting from the
opt-in or opt-out
process, such as the number of class members.
Sub-classes
- We
recommend the Class Actions Act should empower a court to order a sub-class to
be created in two situations. The first category
is where there is a conflict of
interest between different groups of class members, such as where the relief
sought by some class
members could harm the interests of other class members. In
this case, we think a sub-class representative plaintiff will usually
be needed
and they should instruct a lawyer in relation to sub-class issues. The second
category is where there is an additional
issue shared by a group of class
members, but it does not give rise to a conflict.
Staged hearings
- In
a class action, there will generally be both common and individual issues to
resolve. It will often be appropriate for the court
to have staged hearings,
with common issues considered together and individual issues considered
together. We recommend the Class
Actions Act should empower the court to make
orders for the efficient hearing of a class action, including an order that the
hearing
should be heard in stages and an order as to which issues should be
determined at each stage.
Determining individual issues
- If
the representative plaintiff obtains a successful judgment on the common issues,
the individual issues in the proceeding will need
to be determined. We think the
Class Actions Act should empower the court to determine issues on an individual
basis and to give
directions with respect to determination of those issues. We
think it is desirable for the court to have flexibility as to how individual
issues are determined to ensure this occurs in a fair and efficient way. This
could include appointing an expert to enquire into
individual issues, giving
directions as to the way or form in which evidence on individual issues may be
given and ordering individual
issues to be determined through a non-judicial
process.
COST SHARING ORDERS
- In
an opt-out class action, a problem can arise where only some class members are
contractually required to contribute to the costs
of the proceeding, but all
class members benefit from any settlement or damages award. To mitigate this, we
recommend the court should
have the power to order that the litigation costs of
a class action (including the legal fees and funding commission) be equitably
spread among all class members, even if they have not signed up to the
litigation funding agreement. We call this a cost sharing
order.
- We
consider the court should have flexibility as to the terms of the cost sharing
order. This will allow the court to either require
all class members to
contribute a share of their settlement or damages award to cover the costs of
the proceeding, or to give a share
of their settlement or damages award to class
members who have signed a funding agreement with the funder.
- To
limit the risk of cost sharing orders facilitating windfall profits for funders,
we think the court should also be empowered to
set a provisional funding
commission (or range of commissions) when granting an application for a cost
sharing order that enables
the funder to receive a funding commission from class
members who have not signed a litigation funding agreement. The court should
also have the power to vary that funding commission at a later date to ensure it
is fair and reasonable in light of the actual costs
and circumstances of the
class action.
CLASS ACTION JUDGMENTS, RELIEF AND APPEALS
Class action judgments
- The
ability of a judgment on common issues to bind all class members is a central
feature of a class actions regime. If class members
were not bound by this
judgment, the common issues would not be resolved, and the efficiencies of a
class actions regime would not
be achieved. We recommend the Class Actions Act
should specify that a judgment is binding on class members, with respect to the
common
issues as set out in the certification order.
Aggregate monetary relief
- Where
there are many class members, it may not be practicable or efficient for the
court to assess each class member’s claim
for damages individually. We
therefore recommend the court should have the power to make an aggregate
assessment of the monetary
relief to which the class is entitled and make an
order for this amount. In order for the court to make an aggregate assessment of
monetary relief, it should be satisfied it can make a reasonably accurate
assessment of the amount, but it should be not necessary
for an individual class
member to establish the amount of loss or damage they have suffered.
- We
recommend the court should have the power to make any orders for the
distribution of an award of aggregate monetary relief that
it considers
appropriate, including appointing an administrator to distribute the award. We
also recommend a distribution outcome
report should be filed with the court once
the process has been completed.
Alternative distribution
- In
some jurisdictions, monetary relief may be paid to an organisation or charity
associated with the claim rather than to class members.
This is known overseas
as cy-près damages, but we prefer the term ‘alternative
distribution’.
- We
think it is preferable for relief, where possible, to be distributed to class
members. We recommend alternative distribution should
only be available where it
is not practical or possible to distribute the amount to individual class
members or the costs of doing
so would be disproportionate. If the court orders
alternative distribution of an award, it should usually be paid to a eligible
charity
or organisation whose activities are related to the claims in the class
action and whose activities are likely to directly or indirectly
benefit class
members.
Appeal rights in class actions
- Some
aspects of a class action proceeding are unique and require tailored appeal
rules. One is the court’s decision on certification.
We recommend the
plaintiff and defendant should be able to appeal this decision as of right as
the implications of certification
will be significant to both. However, we
recommend that leave should be required to appeal a decision not to certify more
than one
concurrent class action. We also recommend the parties should be able
to appeal a court’s decision declining to approve a settlement
with leave
of the court.
- We
do not think class members should have any rights of appeal. While an individual
class member may disagree with the representative
plaintiff’s decision not
to appeal a decision, allowing them to bring an appeal could have significant
consequences for other
class members. However, we recognise the importance of
the judgment on common issues to class members. If the representative does
not
appeal this judgment, or abandons the appeal, we recommend a class member should
be able to apply to replace the representative
plaintiff for the purpose of
bringing an appeal.
SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION
- We
consider court approval should be required in order for the settlement of a
class action to be binding. This should apply whether
the class action is opt-in
or opt-out and whether the settlement is reached before or after certification.
Court approval of settlement
is an important part of the court’s
supervisory role to protect the interests of class members, who are unlikely to
be involved
in negotiating the settlement but will be bound by its terms and
conditions.
- When
a court is deciding an application to approve a class action settlement, we
recommend it consider whether the settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the
interests of the class. In applying the test, we recommend the court consider
the following factors:
- The
terms and conditions of the proposed settlement.
- Any
legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief
paid to class members.
- Any
information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks,
costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
- Any
views of class members.
- Any
steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
- Any
other factors it considers relevant.
- We
recommend class members should have an opportunity to file a written objection
to the settlement. In addition, the court should
have a power to appoint a court
expert or counsel to assist if it considers this will assist it to determine
whether to approve a
settlement.
- We
do not recommend a general right for class members to opt out of a settlement as
this could cause significant uncertainty and prevent
class actions from being
settled. Instead, we recommend a class member should only be able to opt out of
a settlement where this
is permitted by the settlement agreement, or the court
considers the interests of justice require it. We also recommend a potential
class member should only be able to opt into a settlement on these same grounds.
- We
consider the court should retain jurisdiction to oversee the administration and
implementation of the settlement, as part of its
ongoing role to protect the
interests of class members. As part of this, the court should have a power to
make any orders it considers
appropriate for the administration and
implementation of a class action settlement. We also recommend a settlement
outcome report
be filed with the court within 60 days of the settlement
implementation process being completed, or at a later time if allowed by
the
court.
- The
defendant may also want to reach a settlement with an individual class member.
We recommend two protections with respect to individual
settlements. First, if a
defendant wishes to communicate with class members about individual settlements
after certification, we
think the defendant should be required to include some
court-approved standard text about the class action in that communication.
Second, we recommend the defendant must seek approval of individual settlements
reached after certification where the number of settlements
means there is a
realistic prospect that they will effectively dispose of the class action.
Discontinuance of a class action
- When
a class action is discontinued it will bring the proceeding to an end for class
members and so we consider court approval should
be required. A discontinuance
will not extinguish class members claims like a settlement will and so we
consider a lesser threshold
is appropriate. We recommend the court consider
whether discontinuing a class action would prejudice the interests of class
members.
ADVERSE COSTS
- We
consider the usual adverse costs rule should apply to class actions, which means
the successful party in a proceeding or interlocutory
application will normally
be entitled to an award of costs. While the risk of adverse costs may be a
barrier to litigants wanting
to commence a class action, we are not convinced
that removing the adverse costs rule from class actions is likely to make class
action proceedings more feasible.
- The
representative plaintiff will be liable for any adverse costs award in favour of
the defendant since they are a party to the litigation.
We anticipate a
representative plaintiff would generally obtain an indemnity for adverse costs,
such as from a litigation funder.
Class members will generally not be liable for
costs since they are not a party to the litigation. We consider it would be
desirable
for the High Court Rules to provide clarity on the limited situations
when a class member could be ordered to pay costs.
ABOLISHING MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY
- We
think litigation funding is desirable for Aotearoa New Zealand in principle.
While litigation funding is not a ‘silver bullet’
for the
significant access to justice issues facing Aotearoa New Zealand, it has an
important role to play in improving access to
justice. It can allow plaintiffs
to bring claims they could not, or would not, have brought for financial or
other reasons. It can
also help to level the playing field in litigation against
well-resourced defendants. In our view, the statutory class actions regime
we
recommend would have limited practical utility without litigation funding.
- We
think the law should clarify that litigation funding is permitted by abolishing
the torts of maintenance and champerty. These torts,
which have historically
prohibited litigation funding, act as an impediment to access to justice. The
policy rationales for the torts,
to protect members of society from malicious
litigation and to assure the integrity of the courts, remain important but can
be addressed
in other ways. For example, through appropriate and transparent
regulation of litigation funding, and the court’s general powers
to stay
or dismiss proceedings that are an abuse of its process.
MODELS FOR REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF LITIGATION FUNDING
- There
is a need for further regulation and oversight of litigation funding in Aotearoa
New Zealand. Currently, litigation funding
is not specifically regulated and
there is uncertainty about the extent to which it is permitted. This may reduce
the availability
and affordability of litigation funding, and increase the risk
of challenges to funding agreements. It may also mean that plaintiffs
are not
adequately protected against the risks that can arise in funded proceedings. For
example, in relation to funder control of
litigation, conflicts of interest,
funder profits and funder capital adequacy. We consider the need for further
regulation and oversight
of litigation funding is strongest in the class actions
context.
- We
think the objectives for permitting and regulating litigation funding should be
improving access to justice, while assuring the
integrity of the court system.
In developing our recommendations, we were guided by the following
principles:
- To
facilitate access to courts, the litigation funding market should be
sustainable, competitive and promote consumer confidence.
- To
ensure substantively just outcomes in class actions, the costs of litigation
funding to representative plaintiffs and class members
and the terms of
litigation funding agreements should be fair and reasonable.
- To
assure the integrity of the court system, and recognise defendant concerns in
funded proceedings, the involvement and role of litigation
funders in funded
proceedings should be appropriate and transparent.
- We
discuss various models for regulation and oversight, including industry
self-regulation and oversight, or licensing requirements
overseen by an
appropriate regulator. However, we conclude that the concerns with litigation
funding can best be addressed through
regulation and court oversight of funding
agreements in class actions, alongside professional regulation of lawyers acting
in funded
proceedings and changes to strengthen the security for costs
mechanism. We think this approach is the most practical and proportionate
response to the concerns with litigation funding.
Disclosure of funding agreements
- In
all funded proceedings, we think there should be a requirement for plaintiffs to
disclose their funding agreement to the court
and the defendant, with redactions
to protect privileged matters or those which might confer a tactical advantage
on the defendant.
This will assist the defendant to make informed choices about
whether to apply for security for costs, or a stay of proceedings on
abuse of
process grounds. Transparency will also provide greater assurance in the
integrity in the court system.
SECURITY FOR COSTS
- In
response to defendant concerns about litigation funding, we make a number of
recommendations to strengthen the security for costs
mechanism in funded
proceedings. A funder’s failure to maintain adequate capital may mean a
successful defendant is left with
a significant loss if the funder and the
funded plaintiff are unable to meet an adverse costs order. This risk is
greatest for defendants
in class actions, as class actions tend to be
significantly more expensive and protracted than ordinary proceedings.
- We
do not think the existing security for costs mechanism in HCR 5.45 adequately
protects defendants in funded proceedings or promotes
efficiency and economy in
litigation. Security is currently ordered at the discretion of the courts, and
only if sought by the defendant.
If the funder is based overseas, a successful
defendant may be put to the additional expense, risk and inconvenience of
litigation
in a foreign jurisdiction to enforce the security provided. Further,
HCR 5.45 only empowers the court to order a plaintiff to provide
security, which does not accurately reflect the dynamics of some funded
proceedings. In class actions, for example, the
funder is usually contractually
responsible for paying the full costs of the litigation including any security
for costs. We think
defendants, particularly in funded class actions, need
greater certainty that capital will be available to cover their costs in the
event they are successful.
- We
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a rebuttable presumption that
funded representative plaintiffs will provide security
for costs in class
actions. We also recommend a rebuttable presumption that security for costs, in
all funded proceedings, will be
provided in a form that is enforceable in
Aotearoa New Zealand. Finally, we recommend that the court, in all funded
proceedings,
should be expressly empowered to order costs, including security
for costs, directly against the litigation funder.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN FUNDED PROCEEDINGS
Lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest
- The
relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client is an essential
tool for safeguarding the plaintiff’s interests
in litigation. However
litigation funding can complicate that relationship, because while the lawyer
owes duties to the plaintiff,
the lawyer’s fees are paid by the funder.
- Conflicts
of interest between a lawyer and funded plaintiff can arise where the lawyer has
(or wants to cultivate) an ongoing relationship
with the funder, owes duties to
both the funder and the plaintiff, or where the funder exerts control over the
litigation. Conflicts
may also arise from any commercial ties between the lawyer
and the funder. Conflict-prone stages of funded litigation include determining
the litigation strategy and deciding whether to settle a claim. During these
stages, the lawyer may be incentivised to protect or
promote their own interests
by advising or persuading the plaintiff to adopt the funder’s preferred
course of action. Conflicts
can arise in any funded case and are not limited to
funded class actions.
- To
address these concerns, we recommend NZLS consider amending the Rules of
conduct and client care for lawyers to clarify how conflicts of interest
should be avoided and managed in funded proceedings, including conflicts arising
from a lawyer
or law firm having financial or other interests in a funder that
is financing the same matter in which they are acting.
Plaintiff’s potential liability for unpaid
costs
- A
funder’s failure to fulfil its financial obligations may mean the
plaintiff is left with a substantial and unexpected liability
for any unpaid
legal costs or adverse costs in excess of any security provided. This risk is
particularly concerning in class actions,
as the legal costs will be
disproportionate to the value of the representative plaintiff’s own claim,
and to the risks that
other class members carry.
- We
recommend NZLS should consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care
for lawyers to prohibit lawyers from claiming unpaid legal fees and expenses
from the representative plaintiff. We think a prohibition will protect
representative plaintiffs, and may also encourage best practice. For example, it
may incentivise lawyers to ensure that any expert
fees, and their own fees, are
paid up front or in regular instalments by the funder. It may also encourage
lawyers to only recommend
funders to their clients that, in their assessment,
are competent and financially stable.
COURT OVERSIGHT OF FUNDING AGREEMENTS AND COMMISSIONS
- We
recommend litigation funding agreements should be subject to court approval in
class actions. This responds to concerns about funder
control of litigation,
conflicts of interest between the funder and the representative plaintiff, and
excessive funder profits that
may significantly diminish returns to the class.
We think court approval will protect the interests of the representative
plaintiff
and class members, and ensure that litigation funding provides
meaningful access to justice. It also will provide assurance in the
integrity of
the court system, and improve transparency and funder accountability in class
actions.
- Given
the often commercial nature of other funded proceedings, we consider that most
individual funded plaintiffs are likely to be
sophisticated and able to protect
their interests when negotiating funding agreements. Therefore we do not
recommend court approval
of funding agreements outside the class actions
context.
- We
recommend that court approval of the funding agreement should occur early in the
class action, and the funder should be unable
to enforce the funding agreement
against the representative plaintiff or class members unless the agreement has
been approved. The
court may only approve a funding agreement if it is satisfied
that the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice
on the
funding agreement and the agreement as a whole is fair and reasonable. We
discuss various factors the court may consider when
assessing the fairness and
reasonableness of the funding terms and the funding commission. We also
recommend a power for the court
to appoint an expert if this will assist it to
determine whether a funding commission is fair and reasonable.
REDUCING BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CLASS MEMBERS
- Throughout
this review, we have discussed some of the access to justice barriers for
potential representative plaintiffs and class
members. The costs of litigation,
especially legal fees, mean that seeking redress through the courts is beyond
the means of most
New Zealanders. The adverse costs rule may also act as a
barrier to accessing the courts.
- While
litigation funding can remove or reduce these barriers in some cases, it is only
likely to be available in cases that are sufficiently
profitable for a
litigation funder. It is unlikely to be available in public interest litigation,
or where the relief sought is non-monetary.
- We
consider a public class action fund could have significant access to justice
benefits, particularly given the pressures on the
legal aid system and the fact
that legal aid is unlikely to be available for many of the individual claims
that make up a class action.
We discuss how a class action fund could be
administered and funded.
- We
also recognise that, while class members have a largely passive role in the
litigation, there are certain stages where they can
take an active step in the
litigation, such as deciding whether to opt in or opt out and considering
whether to object to a settlement.
Class members need sufficient understanding
of these stages to be able to participate in them and may need assistance to
take particular
steps. We recommend Te Tāhu o te Ture | Ministry of Justice
consider producing a clear and accessible online guide to assist
class members
to understand the class action process. It could also explore options for
providing free legal advice to class members,
for example through support for a
class actions law clinic.
Recommendations
CHAPTER 2: A CLASS ACTIONS REGIME FOR AOTEAROA NEW
ZEALAND
- R1 A
new statute called the Class Actions Act should be enacted as the principal
source of law in relation to class actions.
- R2 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing new High Court Rules for class actions.
- R3 The
statutory objectives of class actions should be improving access to justice and
managing multiple claims in an efficient way.
- R4 The
Class Actions Act should clarify that it only applies to class actions and not
to other forms of litigation.
- R5 The
Rules Committee should consider amending High Court Rule 4.24 to provide that it
should not be used where a proceeding is more
appropriately brought as a class
action.
- R6 The
Rules Committee should consider amending District Court Rule 4.24 to provide
that it should not be used where a proceeding is
more appropriately brought in
Te Kōti Matua | High Court as a class action.
- R7 The
Class Actions Act should only apply to plaintiff class actions and not defendant
class actions.
CHAPTER 3: KEY ACTORS IN A CLASS ACTION
- R8 The
representative plaintiff should be responsible for making decisions about the
conduct of the class action and giving informed
instructions to their lawyer. Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society should consider amending
the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008
to clarify who a lawyer should take instructions from in a class action.
- R9 The
representative plaintiff should have a duty to act in what they believe to be
the best interests of the class. This duty should
be specified in the Class
Actions Act. The Act should also specify that the representative plaintiff does
not owe fiduciary duties
to class members.
- R10 The
Class Actions Act should provide the representative plaintiff with immunity from
claims by a class member with respect to their
statutory duty to act in what
they believe to be in the best interests of the class, unless the representative
plaintiff has acted
recklessly or in wilful default or bad faith.
- R11 A
proceeding should not be certified under the Class Actions Act as a class action
unless the proposed representative plaintiff has
received legal advice on the
duty and responsibilities of the role from an independent lawyer who is not
associated with the class
action.
- R12 Te
Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of Judicial Studies should consider whether to
produce resources for judges on class actions.
CHAPTER 4: COMMENCING A CLASS ACTION
- R13 The
Class Actions Act should not be limited in its application to certain areas of
the law or types of claim.
- R14 The
Class Actions Act should specify that class actions may be commenced in Te
Kōti Matua | High Court, with respect to claims
where the High Court has
existing jurisdiction.
- R15 The
Government should consider developing class action rules for the employment
jurisdiction.
- R16 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a class action may be commenced by a
proposed representative plaintiff on behalf of a proposed
class of persons if
all claims raise a common issue of fact or law. The proposed class must comprise
at least two persons, in addition
to the representative plaintiff.
- R17 The
Class Actions Act should require the representative plaintiff to be a class
member, except in the case of a state entity. The
Act should allow a state
entity to bring a class action as a representative plaintiff if it is a class
member or if another statute
authorises it to do
so.
- R18 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if a class action is commenced against
multiple defendants:
- There
must be a representative plaintiff and at least two other class members with a
claim against each defendant.
- It is
not necessary for each representative plaintiff or each class member to have
claim against all defendants.
- R19 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a class action is commenced, the
limitation periods applying to the claim of each person
falling within the
proposed class definition are suspended.
- R20 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if a person subsequently becomes eligible
to be a class member as the result of a change
to the class definition, the
limitation period applying to their claim is suspended from the date at which
they become eligible to
join the class action.
- R21 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the limitation period applying to the
claim of a class member or potential class member
begins running again if and
when:
- The
court dismisses an application for certification or decertifies the class
action.
- The
court makes an order that has the effect of removing or excluding the claim from
the proceeding.
- In an
opt-in proceeding, the potential class member does not opt into the class action
by the date specified in the opt-in notice.
- In an
opt-out proceeding, a potential class member opts out of the class action by the
date specified in the opt-out notice.
- The
proceeding is dismissed without an adjudication on the merits.
- The
proceeding is abandoned or discontinued.
If there is a
right of appeal in any of these situations listed, then the limitation period
should not begin running until the expiry
of any appeal period or until any
appeal has been finally disposed of.
CHAPTER 5: CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS
- R22 The
Class Actions Act should define a concurrent class action proceeding as a class
action proceeding that has in common with another
class action proceeding that
is currently before the court:
- The
same or substantially similar issues in dispute; and
- At
least one defendant.
- R23 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule to require a proposed representative
plaintiff to
file a Summary of Class Action form when commencing a class action that provides
the following information:
- The
proposed defendant or defendants.
- The
proposed class definition.
- Whether
it is proposed that class membership would be determined on an opt-in or opt-out
basis.
- A
summary of the circumstances giving rise to the claims, including any relevant
time periods.
- The
causes of action.
- The
relief sought.
- Whether
the applicant is aware of any concurrent class action that has been filed.
- The
lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff and the class.
- Details
of any website with further information about the class action.
- R24 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should create a class actions
webpage within ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts
of New Zealand website and
be responsible for keeping this updated. The information on this webpage should
include:
- A
public register of class actions that contains a list of class actions that have
been commenced, the date on which the class action
was published on the public
register and a Summary of Class Action form for each class action.
- An
option to subscribe to email updates of new class actions added to the public
register of class actions.
- R25 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a concurrent class action proceeding must
be commenced within 90 days of the date on which
notice of the first of the
concurrent class action proceedings is given on the class actions register, or
with the leave of the Court.
- R26 The
Class Actions Act should require the court to consider the applications for
certification of concurrent class action proceedings
together.
- R27 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a court is considering the
applications for certification of concurrent class action
proceedings:
- The
court should first consider whether each concurrent proceeding meets the test
for certification.
- If
more than one concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for
certification the court must decide whether all, or if not
all, which of those
proceedings will be certified.
- For
any concurrent class action proceeding that the court decides will not be
certified, although it meets the test for certification,
the application for
certification must be dismissed.
- If
the court decides that more than one class action proceeding will be certified,
it may make orders for the efficient management
of those proceedings, including
orders that:
- the
class actions be case managed together;
- the
class actions be consolidated;
- the
class actions be heard together or successively; or
- one
or more of the class actions be temporarily stayed.
- R28 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a court is deciding which concurrent
class actions will be certified, it must consider
which approach will best allow
class member claims to be resolved in a just and efficient way. In making this
assessment, the court
should be able to consider:
- How
each case is formulated.
- The
preferences of potential class members.
- Litigation
funding arrangements.
- Legal
representation.
- Any
other factor it considers relevant.
CHAPTER 6: CERTIFICATION
- R29 The
Class Actions Act should require a proceeding to be certified to proceed as a
class action and prescribe a certification test.
- R30 The
certification test should require the proceeding to disclose one or more
reasonably arguable causes of action.
- R31 The
certification test should require a common issue of fact or law that applies to
the claim of each member of the proposed class.
- R32 The
certification test should require the court to be satisfied there is at least
one representative plaintiff who is suitable and
will fairly and adequately
represent the class. When the court is making this assessment:
- It
should consider whether there is, or is likely to be, a conflict of interest
that could prevent them from properly fulfilling the
role of representative
plaintiff.
- It
should consider whether the person has a reasonable understanding of the nature
of the claims and the duty and responsibilities
of the representative plaintiff,
including their potential liability for costs.
It should be satisfied the person has received independent legal advice on
the duty and responsibilities of the role.
If the proposed representative plaintiff will be representing members of
their hapū or iwi, the court should be able to consider
the tikanga of the
hapū or iwi as relevant to representation in the proceeding.
It should also be able to take into account any other factors it considers
relevant.
- R33 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the representative plaintiff may only
withdraw from the role with the leave of the court.
The Act should also empower
the court to substitute the representative plaintiff if:
- It
grants the representative plaintiff leave to withdraw from the role; or
- It
considers the representative plaintiff is no longer able to fairly and
adequately represent the class.
- R34 The
certification test should require a class action proceeding to be an appropriate
procedure for the efficient resolution of the
claims of class members. The test
should specify that the court must consider the following factors when making
this assessment:
- The
proposed class definition.
- The
potential number of class members.
- The
nature of the claims.
- The
nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined once the
common issue is resolved.
- Whether
the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the remedies
sought.
- Whether
there is another procedure available to class members that would be a more
appropriate means of dealing with their claims.
- Any
other factors it considers relevant.
- R35 The
certification test should require the opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for
the proceeding to be an appropriate means of determining
class membership in the
circumstances of the proceeding. The test should specify the court may consider
the following factors when
making this assessment:
- The
potential size of the class and how potential class members will be
identified.
- The
characteristics of the class.
- The
nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of individual
claims.
- Whether
class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings.
- Whether
a particular class mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in running
its defence.
- Any
other factors it considers
relevant.
- R36 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court must certify a proceeding as a
class action if it considers the certification
test is met, unless more than one
concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for certification.
- R37 The
Class Actions Act should require an application for an order certifying the
proceeding as a class action and appointing one or
more persons as the
representative plaintiff(s) to be filed at the same time as the proceeding is
commenced. The application should
be supported by an affidavit from the proposed
representative plaintiff.
- R38 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a proceeding is certified as a class
action, the court must make a certification order
that includes:
- The
class definition.
- The
name of the representative plaintiff(s).
- A
description of the causes of action that are pleaded.
- The
relief sought by the class.
- The
common issues of law or fact.
- Whether
the class action has been certified on an opt-in or opt-out
basis.
- R39 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may amend a certification
order.
- R40 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should publish certification
orders on the class actions webpage on Ngā Kōti
o Aotearoa | Courts of
New Zealand website.
- R41 If
the court is satisfied the certification criteria are no longer met, the Class
Actions Act should empower the court to make an
order decertifying the
proceeding or any other order it considers appropriate. A party or a class
member should be able to apply
for such an order with the leave of the court. A
court should also be able to make such an order of its own
motion.
CHAPTER 7: THE CLASS
- R42 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, in both opt-in and opt-out class actions,
a person who resides outside Aotearoa New Zealand
can only become a class member
if they opt in.
- R43 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, in both opt-in and opt-out class actions,
a Minister of the Crown or government department
should only become a class
member if they opt in.
- R44 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule to specify that, unless the
court orders otherwise,
a class member (or potential class member) does not require a litigation
guardian solely because they:
- Are
under the age of 18 years; or
- Are
considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a step in
a class action proceeding.
- R45 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to specify that
where there is an opportunity or requirement for
a class member (or potential
class member) to take a step in the proceeding, the court may make any order it
considers appropriate
to protect the interests of a class member
who:
- Is
under the age of 18 years; or
- It
considers lacks sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to that step.
- R46 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to specify that
where a court needs to determine whether a class
member (or potential class
member) has sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a step in the
proceeding, it should consider
whether the person is able to:
- Understand
information relevant to the step.
- Retain
that information to the extent necessary to make decisions relevant to that
step.
- Use
or weigh that information as part of the process of making those decisions.
- Communicate
those decisions.
- R47 The
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 should be amended to specify that when a
proceeding is certified as a class action, the representative plaintiff’s
lawyer is
regarded as the lawyer for the class and is considered to have a
relationship with the class.
- R48 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society should consider what
amendments may be needed to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct
and Client Care) Rules 2008 to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in
class actions.
- R49 When
considering what changes may be required to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
(Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 for class actions, NZLS should
consider a rule that after certification, the defendant’s
lawyer should
direct any class communications to the lawyer for the
class.
CHAPTER 8: STEPS DURING A CLASS ACTION
- R50 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule that would require notice
to class members of the
following events (unless the court considers this is not necessary to protect
the interests of class members):
- When
an individual has an opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class
action.
- Where
the representative plaintiff seeks to discontinue the class action.
- Where
the representative plaintiff applies to withdraw as the representative
plaintiff.
- Where
individual participation of class members is required.
- When
the court issues a judgment determining the common issues.
- When
the representative plaintiff intends to abandon an appeal on the common
issues.
- A
proposed or approved settlement.
- Any
other situation where the court considers that notice is appropriate.
- R51 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to require court
approval of the contents of notices to class members.
- R52 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on the contents of
an opt-in or opt-out notice to class members.
This could require notices to
contain:
- General
information about what a class action is.
- An
explanation of the proceeding, including who it has been brought against and the
remedies sought.
- The
class definition and any criteria a person must fulfil to be part of the class.
- What
a class member must do to opt into or opt out of the class action (as
appropriate), and the date by which they must do so.
- An
explanation of the binding effect of a class action judgment or a settlement on
class members.
- The
identity of the representative plaintiff, including a brief explanation of their
role and duty to the class.
- The
identity of the lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff and the class,
including a brief explanation of their role and
obligations to the class.
- An
explanation of when class member participation may be required and the
circumstances where adverse costs may be ordered.
- In a
funded case, the identity of the funder and information on how the funding
commission will be calculated.
- Who
to contact if the class member would like any further information on the class
action.
- Anything
else the court considers appropriate.
- R53 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a sample opt-in or opt-out notice to
be included in Schedule 1 to the High Court Rules.
It may wish to draw on the
expertise of communications professionals and experts in accessible
communication when developing a sample
notice.
- R54 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule empowering the
court to order any method of giving notice to class
members that it considers
appropriate in the circumstances, and to require a report on the outcome of that
notice.
- R55 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to order the defendant to disclose the names
and contact details of
potential class members to the representative plaintiff or to assist with giving
notice to class members.
Where the defendant is required to disclose
information about potential class members, the Rule could require the
representative
plaintiff to only use that information for the purposes of the
proceeding.
- R56 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to make orders with respect to the costs of
providing notice.
- R57 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a class member may opt into or opt out of
a class action:
- In
the time and manner specified in the opt-in or opt-out notice; or
- According
to a specific direction of the court.
- R58 The
Class Actions Act should empower the court to order that a class member should
be given an additional opportunity to opt out of
a class action where it
considers the interests of justice require it.
- R59 The
Class Actions Act should empower the court to order that a potential class
member should be given an additional opportunity to
opt into a class action
where the interests of justice require it.
- R60 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a schedule to the High Court Rules
listing issues to be addressed at pre-certification
and post-certification case
management conferences for class action
proceedings.
- R61 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to order one or more class members to provide
discovery. This rule could
provide that the following matters are relevant when determining whether a class
member or members should
be required to provide discovery and the extent of that
discovery:
- The
stage of the class action and the issues to be determined at that stage.
- Whether
discovery is necessary in all the circumstances of the case, including the
discovery that can be obtained from parties to
the proceeding.
- Whether
discovery would result in unfairness or undue burden or expense for a class
member.
- Any
other matter the court considers relevant.
- R62 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule that requires the
representative plaintiff to maintain a list of
persons who have opted into the
class action or opted out of the class action. The rule could enable the
defendant to seek an order
requiring the representative plaintiff to provide it
with information about class members who have opted in or opted out.
- R63 The
Class Actions Act should empower the court to order a sub-class to be created in
the following cases:
- There
is, or is likely to be, a conflict between the interests of different groups of
class members. In such a case, a sub-class representative
plaintiff should
usually be appointed and they should instruct a lawyer in relation to sub-class
issues.
- There
is an issue common to a group of class members and it would assist with the
efficient management and resolution of that issue.
In such a case, a sub-class
representative plaintiff should only be required if the representative plaintiff
would be unable to fairly
and adequately represent the sub-class.
- R64 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to make orders to promote efficiency in the
hearing of a class action,
including:
- An
order that the hearing should be heard in stages.
- An
order as to which issues should be determined at each stage.
- R65 The
Class Actions Act should empower the court to determine issues applying to
individual class members and to give directions with
respect to determination of
the individual issues, including:
- Appointing
an expert to inquire into individual issues.
- Giving
directions as to the way or form in which evidence on individual issues may be
given.
- Ordering
individual issues to be determined through a non-judicial process, where the
participants agree to that.
CHAPTER 9: COST SHARING ORDERS
- R66 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may make a cost sharing order
enabling the litigation costs of a class action (including
the legal fees and
funding commission) to be spread equitably among all class members, on the
application of the representative plaintiff.
- R67 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if the court makes a cost sharing order
that enables a litigation funder to receive a funding
commission from class
members who have not signed an agreement with it, it may:
- Set a
provisional funding commission (or range of commissions) when making the cost
sharing order; and
- Vary
the funding commission at a later date.
CHAPTER 10: JUDGMENTS, RELIEF AND APPEALS
- R68 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a judgment on a common issue binds every
class member, but only to the extent the judgment
determines a common
issue:
- Is
set out in the certification order;
- Relates
to a cause of action described in the certification order; and
- Relates
to relief sought by class members as stated in the certification order.
- R69 The
Class Actions Act should require a judgment on a common issue to
include:
- The
class definition.
- A
description of the common issue of law or fact.
- A
description of the causes of action that were pleaded.
- The
relief sought by the class.
- R70 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a judgment on a common issue is not
binding between a party to the class action proceeding
and:
- A
person who was eligible to opt into the proceeding but did not do so.
- A
person who has opted out of the proceeding.
- R71 The
Class Actions Act should specify that:
- The
court may make an aggregate assessment of the monetary relief to which a class
is entitled if it is satisfied it can make a reasonably
accurate assessment of
this amount.
- For
the purpose of the court’s assessment of the aggregate monetary relief, it
is not necessary for any individual class member
to establish the amount of loss
or damage suffered by them.
- The
court may make an award in the amount assessed as the aggregate monetary
relief.
- R72 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may make any orders for the
distribution of an award of aggregate monetary relief that
it considers
appropriate, including orders:
- That
the defendant must distribute the award directly to class members.
- Appointing
a person as the administrator to distribute the award to class members.
- Approving
the process for class members to establish their entitlement to a share of the
award.
- Directing
how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be distributed, including by making
an order for alternative distribution.
- Directing
how the costs of the distribution are to be met.
- R73 The
Class Actions Act should require an administrator or the parties (if the court
has not appointed an administrator) to file a report
with information about the
process and outcome of the distribution of the award within 60 days of the
distribution process being
completed, or at a later time if allowed by the
court.
- R74 Te
Kōmiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule on the requirements for
a distribution outcome
report. This rule could require the report to include the best available
information on the following matters:
- The
total number of class members.
- The
number of class members who received a payment from the award of aggregate
monetary relief.
- The
number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for
this.
- The
cost of administering the distribution of the award of aggregate monetary
relief.
- The
amount of any unclaimed funds and how this is proposed to be distributed.
- Any
amounts paid to a litigation funder.
- R75 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should make distribution outcome
reports available on the class actions webpage
of Ngā Kōti o Aotearoa
| Courts of New Zealand website, subject to any confidentiality orders made by
the court.
- R76 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may order alternate distribution of
all or part of an award of aggregate monetary relief
where:
- It is
not practical or possible for all or part of the award to be distributed to
individual class members; or
- The
costs of distributing all or part of the award to individual class members would
be disproportionate to the amount they would
receive.
- R77 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, where the court makes an order for
alternative distribution, it must be paid to:
- An
entity whose activities are related to claims in the class action proceeding and
whose activities are likely to directly or indirectly
benefit some or all class
members; or
- An
entity prescribed by regulations as eligible to receive an alternative
distribution award.
- R78 The
Class Actions Act should specify that:
- Where
the court decides to grant certification, or to decline certification on the
basis that the certification test is not met, the
parties may appeal the
decision as of right.
- Where
more than one concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for
certification and the court decides that more than one will
be certified, the
defendant may appeal this decision with the leave of the court.
- Where
more than one concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for
certification and the court decides that one or more of
those proceedings will
not be certified, an unsuccessful applicant may appeal this decision with the
leave of the court.
- The
parties may appeal a decision declining to approve a settlement with the leave
of the court.
- R79 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if the representative plaintiff does not
bring an appeal against the judgment on common
issues or gives notice they
intend to abandon an appeal against the judgment on common issues:
- A
class member can apply to replace the representative plaintiff for the purpose
of appealing this judgment. The application to replace
the representative
plaintiff must be made within 20 working days from the date on which notice of
the judgment on common issues or
notice of the intention to abandon an appeal
against the common issues judgment is given.
- If
the court grants the class member’s application to replace the
representative plaintiff, the class member will have 20 working
days from the
date of the court’s decision to file a notice of appeal or an amended
notice of appeal against the judgment on
common issues.
- R80 The
Class Actions Act should specify that class members have a right of appeal
against any individual determination that relates to
them.
CHAPTER 11: SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION
The Class Actions Act
should require court approval in order for the settlement of a class action
proceeding to be binding. This should
apply whether the class action is opt-in
or opt-out and whether the settlement is reached before or after certification.
- R82 The
Class Actions Act should specify that any application for approval of a class
action settlement must be made by the representative
plaintiff or proposed
representative plaintiff.
- R83 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule on what should be included
in an affidavit in
support of an application for the approval of a class action settlement. The
rule should refer to the type of
information that may assist the court to assess
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class. This
could include:
- The
terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
- The
type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of any
monetary relief.
- How
the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members.
- If
the settlement proposes to treat class members differently, the reasons for
this.
- The
proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.
- Any
steps a class member will need to take to benefit from a settlement.
- The
proposed method of settlement distribution and administration, including a
proposal for dealing with any unclaimed monetary relief.
- Any
legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from the
relief paid to class members.
- The
likely cost and duration of the class action if the litigation continues.
- Any
risks associated with continuing the litigation.
- The
potential relief that could be awarded if the case is successful.
- Whether
any steps have been taken to manage potential conflicts of
interest.
- R84 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on the contents of
a notice of proposed settlement. It could require
the notice to
contain:
- A
statement that class members have legal rights that may be affected by the
proposed settlement.
- A
brief description of the class action, including the legal basis for the claims,
the remedies sought and the current stage of the
litigation.
- The
class description.
- A
summary of the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including
information about how individual entitlements will be
determined.
- Information
about any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from
payments to class members if the settlement
is approved.
- An
explanation of the settlement approval process, including the time and location
of any hearing to consider the settlement.
- How a
class member may express their opposition to the settlement and the deadline for
doing so.
- How a
class member may obtain further information about the settlement, including
contact details for the lawyer for the class or
any counsel to assist that has
been appointed.
- R85 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on the process for
class members to object to a proposed settlement.
This rule could:
- Require
a class member who wishes to object to file a written objection with the court
by the date specified in the notice of proposed
settlement.
- Require
a class member to obtain the leave of the court in order to appear at the
settlement approval hearing.
- R86 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should consider developing a
template form for class member objections that could
be provided on the class
actions webpage of ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand
website.
- R87 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may appoint a counsel to assist the
court or a court expert if it considers this will
assist it to determine whether
the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class. The Act
should specify the court
may order that one or more parties must pay part of or
all of the costs of the counsel or expert.
- R88 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a court must approve the settlement of a
class action if it is satisfied the settlement
is fair, reasonable and in the
interests of the class.
- R89 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court must consider the following
factors when determining whether a settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the
interests of the class:
- The
terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
- The
type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of any
monetary relief.
- How
the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members.
- Whether
class members are treated equitably in relation to each
other.
- The
proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.
- Any
steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement.
- The
proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement
amounts.
- Any
legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief
payable to class members.
- Any
information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks,
costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
- Any
views of class members.
- Any
steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
- Any
other factors it considers relevant.
R90 The Class Actions
Act should specify that if the court approves a settlement, it must describe
which class members are bound by the
settlement. The Act should specify that the
settlement is binding on the parties to the settlement and the class members
described
by the court on and from the date of the court’s approval.
- R91 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may order that a class member
may opt out of a settlement where:
- This
is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or
- It
considers the interests of justice require it.
- R92 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may order that a person who was
eligible to become a class member but did not
do so may opt into a settlement
where:
- This
is permitted by the settlement agreement; or
- It
considers the interests of justice require it.
- R93 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if a settlement of a class action
proceeding is reached prior to certification, the following
process applies:
- The
proposed representative plaintiff must file an application for approval of the
settlement.
- The
court must consider whether the proceeding meets the requirements of the
certification test, with any necessary modifications.
If it does, the court
must, for the purposes of settlement, certify the proceeding and appoint one or
more representative plaintiffs.
- The
court must then consider the application for approval of the settlement.
- R94 The
Class Actions Act should specify that:
- The
court retains jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of a
class action settlement.
- The
court may make any orders it considers appropriate for the administration and
implementation of the settlement.
- R95 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may appoint a person as an
administrator to implement the settlement.
- R96 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the settlement administrator or the
parties (as appropriate) should file a settlement outcome
report with
information on the process and outcome of settlement implementation within 60
days of the settlement implementation process
being completed (or at a later
time if allowed by the court).
- R97 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule on the contents of a settlement
outcome report.
This could require the report to provide the best available information on the
following matters:
- The
total amount to be distributed.
- The
total number of class members (or an estimate if this is unknown).
- The
number of class members who received a payment from the settlement.
- The
number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for
this.
- The
size of payments received by class members (which could be provided in
bands).
- The
implementation of any non-monetary aspects of the settlement.
- The
cost of administering the settlement.
- The
amounts paid to litigation funders.
- The
amounts paid to the lawyer acting for the class.
- The
amount of unclaimed funds and how this was distributed.
- R98 The
Ministry of Justice should make settlement outcome reports available on the
class actions webpage of Ngā Kōti o Aotearoa
| Courts of New Zealand
website, subject to any confidentiality orders made by the court.
- R99 The
Class Actions Act should specify that any defendant communication with an
individual class member about settlement of their individual
claim must include
a statement about the class action that has been approved by the court.
- R100 The
Class Actions Act should require the defendant to seek court approval of
individual settlements with potential class members that
are reached after
certification when there is a realistic prospect of the settlements effectively
disposing of the class action.
In determining whether to approve individual
settlements, the court should apply the class action settlement approval test
with any
necessary modifications.
- R101 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if the representative plaintiff wishes to
settle their individual claim, they must first
seek leave to withdraw as the
representative plaintiff.
- R102 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a representative plaintiff must obtain
court approval to discontinue a class action. When
considering whether to
approve the discontinuance of a class action, the court should consider whether
discontinuance will prejudice
the interests of class members.
- R103 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the provisions on settlement approval
apply where there is an agreement between the representative
plaintiff and one
or more defendants that will have the effect of extinguishing some or all class
member claims.
CHAPTER 12: ADVERSE COSTS IN CLASS ACTIONS
- R104 The
existing costs provisions in the High Court Rules should apply to class
actions.
- R105 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
amendments to Schedule 3 of the High Court Rules to provide
a specific time
allocation for certification.
- R106 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule specifying that the
court may not order a class member (other than
the representative plaintiff) to
pay costs except:
- With
respect to the determination of an individual issue applying to the class
member.
- With
respect to the determination of sub-class issues, where the class member has
been appointed as the sub-class representative plaintiff.
- Where
the class member is the applicant or respondent with respect to an interlocutory
application or is otherwise granted leave to
appear in the class action, with
respect to that application or appearance.
CHAPTER 13: ABOLISHING MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY
- R107 The
torts of maintenance and champerty should be abolished.
CHAPTER 14: MODELS FOR REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF LITIGATION
FUNDING
- R108 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule to require a funded plaintiff
to disclose their
litigation funding agreement to the court and to the defendant, with redactions
of privileged matters or information
that may confer a tactical advantage.
Disclosure of the funding agreement could occur when the statement of claim is
filed or, if
the funding agreement is entered after the statement of claim has
been filed, as soon as practicable after the funding agreement
has been entered
into.
CHAPTER 15: SECURITY FOR COSTS
- R109 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing High Court Rules to:
- Create
a rebuttable presumption that funded representative plaintiffs will provide
security for costs in funded class actions.
- Create
a rebuttable presumption that security for costs, in all funded proceedings,
will be provided in a form that is enforceable
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
- Expressly
empower the court, in all funded proceedings, to make orders directly against
the litigation funder for the provision of
security for costs and payment of
adverse costs.
CHAPTER 16: PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN FUNDED
PROCEEDINGS
With respect to all
funded proceedings, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society
should consider amending the Lawyers
and Conveyancers (Lawyers: Conduct and
Client Care) Rules 2008 to clarify how conflicts of interest should be avoided
and managed
in funded proceedings, including conflicts arising from a lawyer or
law firm having financial or other interests in a funder that
is financing the
same matter in which they are acting.
- R111 NZLS
should consider amending the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and
Client Care) Rules 2008 to prohibit a lawyer acting in a class action from
claiming any unpaid legal expenses
from a funded representative plaintiff if the
funder fails to meet its financial commitment to pay those
expenses.
CHAPTER 17: COURT OVERSIGHT OF FUNDING TERMS AND
COMMISSIONS
- R112 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, in a funded class action, a litigation
funding agreement (including any amendment to an
existing agreement) is
enforceable by a funder only if it is approved by the court.
- R113 The
Class Actions Act should require the representative plaintiff in a funded class
action to apply for court approval of the litigation
funding agreement. The
timing for seeking court approval should be:
- If
settlement occurs prior to certification, together with the application for
settlement approval.
- If
the agreement is entered into before certification, as soon as practicable
following certification.
- If
the agreement is entered into after certification, as soon as practicable after
the agreement is entered into.
- If
the terms of an approved litigation funding agreement are amended, as soon as
practicable after that amendment.
- R114 While
the defendant should not be a respondent to the application for funding
approval, they should be notified of the application
and the outcome of the
application. Te Kōmiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee
should consider whether any amendments
to the High Court Rules 2016 are
necessary to achieve this.
- R115 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court must not approve a litigation
funding agreement unless it is satisfied that:
- The
representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the agreement;
and
- The
agreement is fair and reasonable.
- R116 When
determining whether a litigation funding agreement is fair and reasonable, the
court may consider:
- The
circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the agreement.
- Whether
the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative plaintiff to
instruct their lawyer or control the litigation,
or otherwise impair the
lawyer-client relationship.
- Any
process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative plaintiff,
and class members, including disputes about settlement
and termination of the
agreement.
- Whether
the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement is the law
of Aotearoa New Zealand.
- If
the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and extent of
that indemnity.
- The
fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission.
- Any
other matters the court considers are
relevant.
The Class Actions Act should specify that, when determining whether the
funding commission is fair and reasonable, the court may consider:
- The
type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary
relief.
- The
number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief.
- The
estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful.
- The
complexity and likely duration of the case.
- The
estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate variation
in the factors identified above in (a)-(d).
- Any
other matters the court considers are relevant.
The Class Actions Act should specify that the court may:
- Appoint
an expert at any stage of a funded class action if it considers that will assist
the court’s consideration of the fairness
and reasonableness of a funding
commission; and
- Order
that one or more of the representative plaintiffs or the litigation funder pay
part or all of the costs of the expert.
- R119 The
Class Actions Act should specify that in opt-in class actions that proceed to
judgment, the court may vary the funding commission
that is to be deducted from
any damages award to the extent that the funding commission is materially in
excess of the estimated
returns provided to the court as part of the
court’s approval of the litigation funding agreement.
CHAPTER 18: REDUCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE BARRIERS FOR CLASS
MEMBERS
- R120 The
Government should consider creating a public class action fund that can
indemnify the representative plaintiff in a class action
for adverse costs and
provide funding towards legal fees, disbursements and security for costs. The
fund’s main objective should
be to improve access to justice.
- R121 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should consider:
- Producing
a clear and accessible online guide to assist class members to understand the
class action process; and
- Exploring
options that would enable free legal advice to be provided to class members,
such as supporting a class actions law clinic.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
- 1.1 Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission has undertaken a review of class actions
and litigation funding. The review has taken
place within a wider context of
ongoing and pressing concern about financial, social and other barriers to
accessing civil justice
in Aotearoa New Zealand. This report sets out our
findings from the review and makes recommendations for reform. These include our
recommendations for a new Class Actions Act and measures for the regulation and
oversight of litigation funding.
- 1.2 At present,
Aotearoa New Zealand does not have class actions legislation. Rule 4.24 of the
High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) allows
a person to sue (or be sued) on behalf of, or
for the benefit of, all persons with the same interest in the proceeding. The
number
of claims being initiated as representative actions under HCR 4.24 is
increasing. However, the representative action procedure was
not designed for
claims of the scale or complexity of recent cases. As a result, there has been
extensive litigation on procedural
issues, which has caused delay for parties
and required considerable court resources. We have concluded that a specific
class actions
regime will be clearer, more certain and more accessible. This, in
turn, will improve access to justice for New Zealanders.
- 1.3 Aotearoa New
Zealand also currently lacks specific regulation of litigation funding. The
torts of maintenance and champerty, which
have historically prohibited
litigation funding, remain part of our law. Consequently, there is uncertainty
about when and how litigation
funding may be provided. This may impact on the
availability and affordability of litigation funding and provide insufficient
protection
for funded plaintiffs. We have concluded that specific regulation is
desirable to address these issues and to assure the integrity
of the court
system. With specific regulation in place, the torts of maintenance and
champerty should be abolished.
- 1.4 There are
risks and costs associated with both class actions and litigation funding. Class
actions can be expensive and time-consuming
for the parties. They are
resource-intensive for courts to manage, especially given the procedural steps
that are required to ensure
class member interests are not overlooked.
Litigation funding can give rise to conflicts of interest between a
representative plaintiff
and the funder and between the representative plaintiff
and their lawyer. Funding commissions can also diminish returns to plaintiffs
and class members, impacting the ability of class action litigation to achieve
substantively just outcomes.
- 1.5 In making
our recommendations, we recognise the law in these areas should enable the
advantages of class actions and litigation
funding to be realised and at the
same time manage their risks and costs.
OUR REVIEW
Terms of reference
- 1.6 We
published terms of reference for the review in December 2019. They required us
to consider whether and to what extent the law
should allow class actions and
whether and to what extent the law should allow litigation funding with
particular regard to the torts
of maintenance and champerty. Our review was
designed to ensure the law in these areas supports an efficient economy and a
just society
and is understandable, clear and practicable.
- 1.7 If we
concluded that class actions should be provided for, the terms of reference also
required us to consider how they should
be regulated. This included the criteria
and process for commencing a class action, how class actions should be managed,
and the
issues of damages, costs and settlement.
- 1.8 The terms of
reference also required us to consider the role of the courts in overseeing
litigation funding arrangements and whether
and to what extent litigation
funders and funding arrangements should be regulated.
Matters not addressed in this report
- 1.9 A
class action is a procedural device that provides a mechanism for bringing
claims together that might otherwise be brought as
individual proceedings.
Although encouraged by some submitters to do so, we have not reviewed
substantive rights and obligations
that often give rise to class actions such as
continuous disclosure laws in the context of financial markets. Any issues
arising
from the enhanced enforceability of substantive laws as a result of a
new class actions regime should be the subject of separate
consideration.
- 1.10 There are
several other issues that relate to matters addressed in our review but fall
outside the terms of reference. These
include whether lawyers should be able to
charge contingency fees, whether the law relating to assignments of bare causes
of action
should be reformed and whether the interests of third parties who may
be associated with or support litigation (for example, insurers)
should be
subject to the same oversight as litigation funders. Our proposals for reform
with respect to class actions and litigation
funding may promote separate
consideration of these issues in the future. In accordance with the terms of
reference, civil legal
aid also falls outside the scope of this review.
OUR PROCESS
Overseas comparisons and other studies
- 1.11 There
are now around 40 countries with class actions
regimes.0F[1] We have considered, in
particular, approaches taken in the United States, Australia (federal and state
jurisdictions) and Canada
(in particular Ontario). These jurisdictions are
relevant comparators given each of them began with a rule on representative
actions
similar to that provided by HCR 4.24. The class actions regime in the
United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal has also provided
a useful
comparator, as it allows for both opt-in and opt-out class actions. While
overseas jurisdictions use a variety of terms
for their class actions regimes,
for simplicity we refer to class actions and class members throughout.
- 1.12 Class
actions and litigation funding have also been the subjects of several law reform
exercises, to some extent in Aotearoa
New Zealand and more widely overseas.
Where relevant we draw on findings and take account of overseas experiences in
this report.
Engagement
- 1.13 During
the review we met with a number of stakeholders, including government agencies,
members of the legal profession and litigation
funders. We published an Issues
Paper in December 2020 that invited feedback on 60 questions about class actions
and litigation funding.1F[2] In the
Issues Paper, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of class actions and
expressed the preliminary review that it
would be desirable to have a class
actions regime for Aotearoa New Zealand. We also discussed the scope of a class
actions regime
and some key design features such as whether to have a
certification test, how a class should be formed and who could fulfil the
role
of representative plaintiff. We asked whether litigation funding is desirable in
principle and whether any of the identified
concerns about litigation funding
warrant a regulatory response. We expressed the preliminary view that litigation
funding is desirable
in principle as long as concerns with the provision of
litigation funding can be adequately managed.
- 1.14 In
September 2021, we published a Supplementary Issues Paper that outlined our
preliminary conclusions on class actions and sought
feedback on detailed aspects
of a class actions regime.2F[3] We
invited feedback on 54 questions and some draft statutory provisions. We held
four consultation workshops in October 2021 to discuss
the proposals in the
Supplementary Issues Paper. The consultation workshops were attended by around
40 people, including representatives
from law firms, business and community
organisations, barristers, litigation funders, participants in representative
actions and
academics. As agreed with attendees, we do not attribute comments
arising from the consultation workshops to any individuals.
- 1.15 We received
51 submissions in response to the Issues Paper and 32 submissions in response to
the Supplementary Issues Paper.
All submitters are listed in Appendix Two to
this report. Submitters include government entities, business and community
organisations,
Te Hunga Rōia Māori o Aotearoa | Māori Law
Society, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS),
law
firms, barristers, litigation funders, members of the public and academics. When
we refer to or summarise submissions received
on the Issues Paper and
Supplementary Issues Paper, we use the submitter’s language as much as
possible with minor edits if
needed for
readability.3F[4]
- 1.16 In addition
to these engagements, we undertook an online survey of group members in
representative actions under HCR 4.24. The
survey was accessible via a weblink.
We contacted lawyers who have acted for representative plaintiffs and asked them
to distribute
the link. The purpose of the survey was to gain a better
understanding of the experiences and understanding of people who have been
involved in group litigation, including funded group litigation. We received
responses from 409 people. While it is only a snapshot
of views from people
involved in a small number of representative actions, the feedback we received
through the survey has been useful
and informative.
- 1.17 Throughout
our review we have been supported by an Expert Advisory Group, received guidance
from the Commission’s Māori
Liaison Committee and discussed certain
aspects of the review with members of the judiciary, NZLS and Te Kōmiti
mō ngā
Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee.
OUR REPORT
- 1.18 We
make 121 recommendations in this report, addressing a wide range of matters.
- 1.19 In Chapters
2 to 12, we set out our recommendations for class actions, including our
principal recommendation for a new Class
Actions Act. We recognise that to be
effective a comprehensive class actions regime will require new procedural rules
and professional
regulation. We therefore also recommend the Rules Committee may
wish to consider developing new High Court Rules to address detailed
matters of
class actions procedure. Further, we suggest NZLS may wish to consider
amendments to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 to clarify lawyers’
obligations when acting in a class action.
- 1.20 In Chapters
13 to 18, we address the need for regulation and oversight of litigation
funding. We begin by explaining why, on
balance, we think the torts of
maintenance and champerty no longer serve a useful purpose and should be
abolished. We make recommendations
on security for costs in funded proceedings,
the regulation of lawyers acting in funded proceedings and court approval of
litigation
funding agreements in class actions. In our final chapter we
recommend the creation of a public class action fund and other measures
to
further reduce barriers to access to justice for class members.
- 1.21 We have
provided draft legislative provisions on some of our key recommendations to aid
readers in understanding these recommendations
and how they could be given
effect. Further drafting will be required to produce a complete bill. We
indicate throughout the report
other matters that will need to be addressed in
the Class Actions Act as well as matters that will need to be addressed in the
High
Court Rules. Specific draft provisions are set out at the end of the
chapter they relate to. The complete set of draft provisions
is set out in
Appendix One.
CHAPTER 2
A class actions regime for Aotearoa New Zealand
INTRODUCTION
- 2.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Group litigation and its benefits.
(b) Current methods of group litigation in Aotearoa New Zealand and their
limitations.
(c) Potential advantages of class actions.
(d) Potential disadvantages of class actions.
(e) Why Aotearoa New Zealand should adopt a statutory class actions regime.
(f) Our proposed objectives for class actions.
(g) Principles for designing a class actions regime.
(h) Retaining the representative actions rule.
(i) Defendant class actions.
GROUP LITIGATION
- 2.2 Group
litigation enables many people to have a legal issue determined by the court in
one proceeding. Some forms of group litigation
enable individual claims to be
combined to form a larger claim, which we refer to as aggregate litigation.
Other forms of group litigation
involve the determination of a single claim that
impacts on a wider group.
- 2.3 From the
perspective of plaintiffs, group litigation can improve access to justice by
enabling legal costs to be shared among
a large group of claimants and by
reducing the social and psychological barriers that can prevent individuals from
bringing a legal
action on their own. It may be easier to attract litigation
funding for group litigation because the size of the claim is typically
larger.
Group litigation may also be more efficient for the defendant and the court
system because it can avoid a series of individual
cases.
- 2.4 Our work has
focused on one particular form of group litigation, the class action. A class
action is a procedure that enables
a group or class of people with similar
claims to have those claims determined in a single proceeding. This is normally
achieved
through the selection of one class member to act as a representative
plaintiff on behalf of the class. All class members are bound
by the decision on
common issues but generally do not take an active part in the litigation. A
class action is a form of aggregate
litigation.
- 2.5 Key features
of class actions include:4F[5]
(a) Preliminary court approval before the case can proceed as a class action,
usually known as certification.
(b) The requirement for one or more common issues.
(c) The existence of a representative plaintiff or representative defendant.
(d) The existence of a class of represented persons.
(e) A mechanism to determine membership of the class, such as
‘opt-in’ or
‘opt-out’.5F[6]
(f) The decision on the common issues binds the class.
(g) A method of determining individual issues.
(h) Active court supervision of proceedings.
(i) The requirement for the court to approve any settlement.
(j) Typically, funding by a lawyer or litigation funder.
- 2.6 In some
jurisdictions it is possible for class actions to be brought against a defendant
class, although defendant class actions
are rare. Later in this chapter, we
recommend that the class actions regime for Aotearoa New Zealand provide only
for plaintiff class
actions, not defendant class actions.
GROUP LITIGATION IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND
- 2.7 Aotearoa
New Zealand does not currently have a class actions regime. Proceedings that
might be taken as a class action in comparable
jurisdictions may be able to be
pursued as a representative action under Rule 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016
(HCR). There are
also other methods of bringing group litigation.
Representative actions
- 2.8 A
representative action permits a person to sue (or be sued) on behalf of other
people who share the same interest in the subject
matter of a legal proceeding.
The representative action was developed in the Courts of Chancery in the late
17th and early 18th century.6F[7]
- 2.9 A
representative actions rule has been in place in Aotearoa New Zealand since
1882. The current provision is HCR 4.24, which states:
- One or more
persons may sue or be sued on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons with
the same interest in the subject matter
of a proceeding—
- (a) with the
consent of the other persons who have the same interest; or
- (b) as directed
by the court on an application made by a party or intending party to the
proceeding.
- 2.10 We are
aware of 47 cases in which Te Kōti Matua | High Court has allowed a case to
proceed under HCR 4.24 (or its predecessor
rules), with the majority of these
filed after 2000.7F[8] In the Issues
Paper we grouped these into the following broad categories of case: government,
investor, shareholder, general commercial,
consumer, trusts and estates, and
environmental.8F[9]
- 2.11 In the
absence of a class actions regime in Aotearoa New Zealand, the law on
representative actions has been incrementally developed
to include many of the
features of a class actions
regime.9F[10] Te Kōti Mana Nui
| Supreme Court has said that “so long as the concern not to work
injustice is kept in mind, r 4.24 should
continue to be interpreted to meet
modern requirements”.10F[11]
In the Issues Paper we noted that many recent representative actions have
similar characteristics to cases brought as class actions
in other
jurisdictions.11F[12]
Problems with using HCR 4.24 for group litigation
- 2.12 In
the Issues Paper we identified several problems with using HCR 4.24 to bring
claims that are similar in nature to class actions.
We observed there has not
been a comprehensive public policy process to consider whether a class actions
regime is desirable for
Aotearoa New Zealand and, if so, the design and scope of
a regime. We noted that representative actions were proceeding without the
benefit of procedural rules to specify how they should be managed and that the
lack of certainty and clarity is causing delay and
expense. The lack of rules
has also led to debate about whether HCR 4.24 and the High Court’s
inherent jurisdiction are sufficient
to regulate all aspects of representative
actions. Finally, we suggested that the current procedural framework for
representative
actions might be preventing or limiting group litigation in
relation to some issues or areas of the law, including consumer cases
and
compensation claims following regulatory
action.12F[13]
- 2.13 We asked
submitters what problems they had encountered when relying on HCR 4.24 for group
litigation. We received 18 submissions
on this
question.13F[14] Most submitters
considered that HCR 4.24 does not provide sufficient certainty and clarity as to
the procedures to be followed. Issues
that were said to result from this
included:
(a) The uncertainty invites interlocutory applications and subsequent appeals,
which can increase cost and delay.
(b) Case law is slow to develop, and occurs in a ‘piecemeal way’.
Some significant issues have not received judicial
consideration to date because
they have not yet arisen in a particular case.
(c) Courts sometimes take inconsistent approaches in different cases.
(d) It does not comply with access to justice or rule of law values.
(e) Lawyers face difficulties advising clients on representative actions.
- 2.14 Several
submitters also pointed to some more specific issues they had experienced with
the current representative actions regime.
These included:
(a) Inefficiencies caused by a poorly defined common issue or differentiated
class of plaintiffs.
(b) The common interest test being too permissive.
(c) A lack of certainty on limitation rules as they relate to representative
actions.
(d) Practical issues not being considered at the outset of proceedings, such as
how the plaintiff will practically advance their
claims and how the
defendant’s rights to procedural fairness will be recognised.
(e) Plaintiffs not being required to provide particulars, which can prejudice a
defendant’s right to bring third party claims.
(f) Potential group members being confused about the process, including
uncertainty about competing representative actions or concern
about the risk of
adverse costs.
(g) Lack of clarity on the role of a lawyer in a representative action.
- 2.15 Some
submitters indicated that the lack of rules for representative actions had not
been problematic. Omni Bridgeway commented
that the current representative
actions regime had worked well to date, with the court having the flexibility to
approach procedural
issues on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless it supported a
clear and more detailed legislative regime as this would be more likely
to
create certainty for all parties on how the case would proceed.
- 2.16 We also
asked submitters which kinds of claims were unlikely to be brought under HCR
4.24 and why. We received 10 submissions
on this
question.14F[15] Submitters
identified consumer claims, compensation claims following regulatory action,
lower value claims and claims involving significant
factual differences or
different types of loss as being inhibited by the current regime.
- 2.17 The current
lack of certainty and clarity around HCR 4.24 was seen as a key reason why
claims were not being brought. This included
the uncertainty about whether
claims could be brought on an opt-out basis prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ross v Southern Response. It was also suggested that
plaintiffs and funders might be more willing to risk this uncertainty where they
had higher-value claims.
Associate Professor Kate Tokeley (Te Herenga Waka |
Victoria University of Wellington) acknowledged that not all of the barriers
to
bringing a consumer representative action would be resolved by a class actions
regime such as lack of awareness of consumer rights,
difficulty in finding a
motivated consumer representative and lack of resourcing. Meredith Connell
commented that, if there had been
a statutory regime in place, more claimants
would have participated in proceedings to date and a greater number of
proceedings would
have been filed.
- 2.18 Omni
Bridgeway said it had not experienced barriers to bringing any particular kinds
of claim under HCR 4.24. Similarly, Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance
Council of New Zealand said it was difficult to envisage any type of claim that
was unlikely to be
brought under HCR 4.24, given how broad and general the rule
was.
Other means of bringing group litigation
- 2.19 A
representative action under HCR 4.24 is not the only means of bringing group
litigation in Aotearoa New Zealand. We outlined
some alternative procedures for
group litigation in the Issues Paper, including some limitations of these
approaches.15F[16]
- 2.20 General
techniques for bringing group claims include joining multiple plaintiffs to a
claim, seeking an order to consolidate
proceedings under HCR 10.12, bringing a
test case and obtaining a representation order under HCR 4.27. Some of these
approaches may
work best when there are relatively few plaintiffs.
- 2.21 There are
also some specific group litigation procedures in the Companies Act 1993, Health
and Disability Commissioner Act 1994,
Human Rights Act 1993, Privacy Act 2020
and Employment Relations Act 2000. Some of these mechanisms are very rarely
used.
- 2.22 Both Te
Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission and Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko |
Financial Markets Authority have powers that
enable them to seek compensation on
behalf of individuals.16F[17] In the
Issues Paper we noted that regulators must prioritise their enforcement
activities and cannot bring proceedings against every
possible defendant who is
alleged to have caused loss to a group. We also observed that, while private
litigants are likely to have
compensation as a key goal of proceedings,
regulators are likely to have broader aims, such as encouraging compliance with
the law,
deterring misconduct, clarifying the law and ensuring public
safety.17F[18]
- 2.23 Group
litigation can also involve a single claim that will affect a wider group. An
example is a judicial review claim brought
on behalf of a group. This type of
group litigation serves a slightly different purpose from aggregate litigation
such as class actions,
which involve multiple individual claims being grouped
into a single proceeding.
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF CLASS ACTIONS
- 2.24 In
the Issues Paper we identified three primary advantages of class actions:
improving access to justice, enabling economy and
efficiency of litigation and
strengthening incentives for compliance with the law. We asked submitters what
they saw as the advantages
of class actions and to what extent class actions
would realise the three advantages we identified. We received 34 submissions on
this question.18F[19] In the
following sections we discuss each of these potential advantages and
submitters’ feedback on them.
Access to justice
- 2.25 The
state’s fundamental obligations to provide access to justice and enable
citizen participation in legal institutions
are central to the rule of law and
underpin our democracy. As we discussed in the Issues Paper, Aotearoa New
Zealand is facing significant
issues with respect to access to civil justice,
with many individuals unable to afford to bring civil
proceedings.19F[20]
- 2.26 Access to
justice is about enabling people to have their legal rights determined and
upheld through a process that is fair, efficient
and transparent. In the Issues
Paper we drew on the holistic concept of access to justice in class actions
developed by Canadian
academic Associate Professor Jasminka Kalajdzic
(University of Windsor). Rather than simply focusing on access to the courts and
lawyers, Kalajdzic proposes four components of access to justice: access to the
courts, a fair and transparent process, meaningful
participation rights for
class members and a substantively just
result.20F[21] This broader
conception of access to justice means the focus is not simply on class actions
improving access to the court system
but also considers whether the entire
process from commencement to resolution meaningfully achieves a fair and just
result for class
members. It also requires consideration of the
defendant’s access to justice rights and the interests of the wider public
and
the court system.
Improving access to the courts
- 2.27 Class
actions may improve access to the courts by helping to overcome financial,
social and psychological barriers to litigation.
The costs of bringing a legal
claim mean that it is uneconomic to resolve a claim through the court system
unless the claim seeks
a significant amount. Some have estimated a claim needs
to be at least $100,000 to be economic to pursue through the court system,
while
others have put the figure even
higher.21F[22] By grouping many
claims together, a class action increases the size of the claim amount and
enables the legal costs to be shared
by many litigants. The larger claim size
may also make the case more attractive to litigation funders.
- 2.28 Social and
psychological barriers can also limit access to the courts. For example,
claimants may not know they have a possible
claim, be unfamiliar with the legal
system, doubt that litigation will be worthwhile, fear possible reprisals or
feel shame or embarrassment
about the circumstances giving rise to the claim. By
grouping claimants together, a class action can help individuals overcome some
of the stresses and difficulties posed by individual litigation. A class action
may also help redress any power imbalance felt by
individuals when litigating
against a large and powerful
defendant.22F[23]
- 2.29 Class
actions are only likely to improve access to the courts in certain kinds of
cases. Whether a class action is feasible will
depend on the substantive basis
for the claim, the remedy sought, the size of the potential class, how similar
the individual claims
are, the evidence that would be required and the
availability of litigation funding, among other factors.
- 2.30 Most of
those who submitted on access to justice considered that class actions would
improve access to courts, although this
view was sometimes qualified. Several
submitters commented that class actions would enable claims to be brought that
would not be
financially viable to bring
individually.23F[24] Some submitters
also commented on the financial barriers currently experienced by New Zealanders
in bringing legal proceedings.
- 2.31 Submitters
also commented on ways that class actions could address barriers to accessing
the courts.24F[25] These included:
(a) Redressing the power imbalance between the plaintiff and defendant or
‘levelling the playing field’.
(b) Removing or reducing claimants’ costs exposure (particularly where a
litigation funder is involved).
(c) Reducing the risk and uncertainty that claimants experience in the
litigation process.
(d) Allowing class members to benefit from litigation without significant
involvement.
(e) Providing class members with better access to legal advice and
representation.
(f) Addressing issues such as social barriers and limited knowledge of rights.
- 2.32 Some
submitters commented on the types of claims that class actions could enable,
with consumer class actions being cited by
several. Other submitters suggested a
class actions regime could enable claims by investors, shareholders, prisoners,
children and
young people, and environmental groups.
- 2.33 Some
submitters acknowledged that class actions would not be useful for all types of
case. For example, Professor Vicki Waye
(University of South Australia) said
while class actions have their place, they are very expensive and some disputes
could be resolved
more efficiently and economically by other methods of
collective redress. Dr Michael Duffy (Monash University) said class actions
could assist where there are systemic or common problems across groups of
people, including employment law, migration law, consumer
rights, welfare law
and product liability. He noted that many legal problems did not raise common
issues across a class and might
not involve a claim being brought (for example,
an individual may require assistance with defending a claim, representation or
negotiation).
There were important areas of the law where class actions have
probably not increased access to justice, including criminal law,
family law,
estate law, neighbour disputes, defamation and personal insolvency.
- 2.34 Michael
Duffy and Gilbert Walker commented that class actions would likely lead to more
litigation, but this did not necessarily
mean improved access to justice. The
Insurance Council and Tom Weston QC expressed some scepticism about the extent
to which class
actions would improve access to justice.
Procedural access to justice
- 2.35 If
there is a fair and transparent process and meaningful participation rights, a
class action can provide procedural access
to justice for class members. In the
Issues Paper we said procedural access to justice should not be assessed solely
from the perspective
of the plaintiff and class members – it must also
include consideration of the interests of the defendant and the public at
large.25F[26]
- 2.36 Several
submitters agreed that access to justice should be considered from the
perspective of the defendant as well as the
plaintiff.26F[27]
- 2.37 Chapman
Tripp commented that justice is achieved when meritorious claims can be heard
and resolved in a cost-effective and timely
manner.
Substantive access to justice
- 2.38 A
final aspect of access to justice in class actions is obtaining a substantively
just result.27F[28] This can be
achieved if the litigation adequately compensates class members for any harm
they have experienced. We noted in the Issues
Paper there was limited evidence
from other jurisdictions on the extent to which class members achieve
compensation or other forms
of substantive justice through class
actions.28F[29]
- 2.39 We consider
the tikanga Māori concept of ea, which indicates a state of balance and the
restoration of relationships, is
relevant to this aspect of access to
justice.29F[30] Te Hunga Rōia
Māori o Aotearoa | Māori Law Society (Te Hunga Rōia) suggested
the concept of ea could be highly
relevant to a class actions regime. It
referred to Tā Hirini Moko Mead’s framework of take-utu-ea for
redressing breaches of tikanga or responding to harm and attaining a state of
balance. Under this framework, there is a take
or cause that requires a
resolution of some kind and there is often an appropriate utu or
recompense or other gesture given to the wronged party. The desire is to reach a
resolution that satisfies all parties so the matter
is resolved and a state of
ea is achieved.30F[31] Te
Hunga Rōia commented that central to this framework was not only
considering who was implicated in the breach and the reasons
for it, but also
which relationships need to be restored to reach a state of ea and what process
would achieve resolution for all
involved. We think the concept of ea supports a
view of access to justice that is broader than simply access to the courts and
also
considers what the substantive outcome is for those involved. A class
action promotes the achievement of ea for a wider group of
people than would be
possible if claims could only be taken individually.
- 2.40 Several
submitters questioned whether class members would receive substantive access to
justice if the litigation funder and
lawyer receive a significant proportion of
any award.31F[32] For example,
Gilbert Walker commented “...if the litigation represents claims being
harvested from unknowing participants,
generating profits for the lawyers and
funders with no meaningful return to the participants, one may fairly question
whether the
litigation genuinely services access to justice”. Similarly,
Tom Weston QC commented there was little to suggest that class
actions provide
real returns to claimants and many simply result in wealth transfers from
defendants to funders. However, Professor
Vicki Waye noted that because class
actions were driven by private lawyers and funders, the emphasis was on
compensation. This could
be contrasted with regulator action which was generally
driven by other agendas such as deterrence.
Enabling economy and efficiency of litigation
- 2.41 In
the Issues Paper we suggested that class actions may enable efficiency and
economy of litigation by allowing the court to
hear multiple claims together,
which can free up judicial
resources.32F[33] Where individual
class member claims are economically viable to litigate separately, a class
action can avoid what would otherwise
be multiple individual proceedings. In
such a case, a class action is likely to be much more efficient for a court and
a defendant.
However, such cases are likely to be rare and class actions are
more likely to consist of claims by individuals who would otherwise
be
practically unable to bring their own claim. The counterfactual to a class
action in such a circumstance is therefore likely to
be no claims rather than
multiple claims, so, in that sense, a class action would increase the burden on
the court system. Despite
this, a class action can still be regarded as an
efficient use of court time given how many individual claims may be resolved in
one proceeding. Class actions can also contribute to greater efficiency and
economy of litigation by reducing the risk of inconsistency
from multiple
judgments.
- 2.42 Some
submitters considered class actions could alleviate the burden on court
resources by avoiding unnecessary multiplicity of
court
proceedings.33F[34] Submitters also
noted that class actions could reduce the risk of inconsistent judgments on the
same issue.34F[35] Several
submitters suggested class actions could have efficiency and cost benefits for
defendants by allowing multiple claims to
be defended at the same
time.35F[36]
- 2.43 Other
submitters critiqued the idea that class actions would improve the economy and
efficiency of litigation.36F[37]
These submitters noted that class actions were complex, time-consuming and
expensive, judgments would often be subject to appeal
and introducing a class
actions regime was unlikely to result in fewer cases overall. Some submitters
commented that if competing
class actions were not adequately managed, this
might undermine the efficiency and economy advantages of class actions.
Strengthening incentives for compliance with the
law
- 2.44 In
the Issues Paper, we explained that class actions can play a role in enforcing
the law and ensuring defendants internalise
the costs of their wrongdoing. This
may result in the defendant modifying its behaviour, as well as other potential
wrongdoers being
deterred by the prospect of a class action. We noted there was
some debate as to whether behaviour modification and deterrence should
be an
objective of class actions or simply a by-product, with compensatory redress as
the main goal.37F[38]
- 2.45 A number of
submitters saw deterrence as a potential benefit of class
actions.38F[39] Some noted that
paying compensation and legal costs and suffering reputational harm could
sanction wrongdoers and lead to a higher
standard of corporate behaviour. One
commented that deterrence is consistent with access to justice, as preventing
behaviour in the
first place would be even better than having to come to court.
- 2.46 Other
submitters doubted that class actions would have a deterrent effect, said that
any deterrent effect would only be incidental
or did not see this as an
appropriate role for class
actions.39F[40] Some submitters
commented that their clients took their compliance obligations seriously and
pointed to existing incentives for compliance
with the law. Several submitters
said deterrence was not an appropriate role for class actions, with some
commenting that ensuring
compliance with the law was the role of regulators
rather than private legal action.
- 2.47 Hīkina
Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), while not
specifically commenting on deterrence,
said that class actions could improve the
effectiveness of regulatory regimes. It agreed there was a role for both class
actions
and regulatory action when defendants are alleged to have caused harm to
a group. The Commerce Commission considered that class actions
could complement
regulatory action and that enhanced access to redress could deter breaches of
the law. However, it also said that
class actions could hamper regulatory
enforcement if they discouraged parties from reporting breaches to regulators or
settling with
regulators.
- 2.48 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) said it was
inherently difficult to measure whether class actions
strengthened incentives
for compliance with the law. If so, this would be a positive effect of a class
actions regime, but it should
not be a driving principle behind a class actions
regime. Michael Duffy noted that optimum deterrence might not be achieved if
class
actions targeted defendants with “deep pockets” or who were
insured rather than wrongdoers and those most culpable.
POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF CLASS ACTIONS
- 2.49 In
the Issues Paper we identified four potential disadvantages of a class actions
regime:40F[41]
(a) Negative impacts on the court system.
(b) Negative impacts for defendants, including pressure to settle claims and
increased costs.
(c) Broader negative impacts on the business and regulatory environment.
(d) Insufficient protection of class member interests.
- 2.50 We asked
submitters whether they had any concerns about class actions, including the four
issues we identified. We received 26
submissions on this
question.41F[42]
Negative impacts on the court system
- 2.51 In
the Issues Paper we said one criticism of class actions is the risk of a
‘flood’ of cases that could overload
the courts and cause delays for
other litigation. Class action litigation is also likely to be time-consuming
for judges because
of the size and complexity of class actions and the
court’s role in ensuring that class member interests are protected.
However,
we noted that in overseas jurisdictions class action cases make up a
relatively small proportion of all cases. We also suggested
that criticising a
class actions regime because it may increase the amount of litigation missed the
point that class actions aim
to facilitate greater access to justice.
- 2.52 We noted
there are overseas examples of class actions litigating what might seem like
trivial individual claims and that this
might not be an effective use of the
court system. However, we suggested the risk of trivial claims is likely to be
lower in Aotearoa
New Zealand, including because of the smaller population size
(which means such class actions may not be economically feasible) and
the
adverse costs regime.
- 2.53 Some
submitters did not consider that class actions would pose a significant burden
on the court system.42F[43] Other
submitters acknowledged that class actions may increase the courts’
workload but saw this as justified by access to justice
considerations and/or
considered the impacts on courts could be
mitigated.43F[44] A third group of
submitters expressed concern about the impact of class actions on the court
system, with some noting that additional
court resources would be
required.44F[45]
Negative impacts on defendants
- 2.54 In
the Issues Paper we said the negative impacts of class actions would be felt
most keenly by defendants and their insurers.
A defendant will incur legal costs
regardless of whether it is ultimately found to be liable. There will also be
indirect costs such
as the time spent defending the litigation and potential
reputational harm.
- 2.55 We noted
that defendants in class actions may face strong incentives to settle because of
the high transaction costs and the
potential for a large and uncertain financial
liability. While a high settlement rate may simply indicate a rational response
to
litigation risk, it is possible that defendants will feel compelled to settle
meritless class actions or that they will overpay in
settlement because the
risks and costs of class actions are so high.
- 2.56 We also
noted that the impact of a settlement or damages award on a defendant would
depend on the size of the payment, the defendant’s
financial position and
any insurance arrangements. We also noted that the legal position of defendants
is determined by the existing
right to compensation and obligations to redress,
not the procedures for enforcing those rights.
- 2.57 Several
submitters noted the significant impact of class actions on defendants,
including cost, time and effort in defending
proceedings, increased insurance
costs (or loss of cover), banks withdrawing credit and negative reputational
harm.45F[46] However, several
submitters commented that a class action could be an efficient way for
defendants to deal with a legal issue that
affects a number of
people.46F[47]
- 2.58 Some
submitters expressed concern about meritless or large and amorphous class
actions being filed to pressure a defendant and
their insurer into a
settlement.47F[48] Submitters
suggested this risk could be combated through rigorous case management, adverse
costs awards (including increased or indemnity
costs), certification, adequately
particularised pleadings and strike-out
applications.48F[49] However, Carter
Holt Harvey said in practice, plaintiffs sometimes framed claims in ways that
precluded a defendant from seeking
strike-out or summary judgment and that
courts sometimes discouraged defendants from seeking strike-out of novel claims.
Tom Weston
QC said courts were reluctant to strike out representative actions.
Professor Vicki Waye and the Association of Litigation Funders
of Australia
thought the risk of defendants being pressured into settling meritless claims
was low, noting this had not been the
Australian experience. The Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia commented that company directors owe fiduciary
duties to
act in the best interests of the company and to act with due care,
skill and diligence, and it was highly unlikely that an insurer
would consent to
settling a “flimsy suit”.
Negative impacts on the business and regulatory environment
- 2.59 In
the Issues Paper we discussed several ways in which the risk of class action
litigation could have a broader impact on the
business and regulatory
environment. These included potential impacts on the insurance market,
difficulties in recruiting directors,
risk aversion and the impact on the
overall business environment.
Potential impacts on the insurance market
- 2.60 In
Australia, stakeholders such as insurers, brokers and company directors have
claimed the increase in shareholder class actions
has had a significant impact
on the pricing and availability of directors’ and officers’
liability insurance (D&O
insurance). In the Issues Paper we commented that
we had not yet seen robust evidence in support of claims that funded class
actions
were contributing to a hardening of the insurance
market.49F[50]
- 2.61 A number of
submitters expressed concern about the impact of class actions on the
availability and cost of
insurance.50F[51] Insurance broker
Marsh submitted that the market was not currently in a position to sustain
multiple class actions within a single
policy period. It said a material
increase in class actions following implementation of a new class actions regime
could lead to
higher retention levels, lower limits, increased premiums and
potentially more insurers exiting the D&O insurance market. The
Insurance
Council said losses arising from D&O claims had exceeded the total insurance
market premium pool by a significant margin,
which meant insurers were having to
increase D&O premiums. It also predicted that class action litigation would
contribute to
ongoing increases.
- 2.62 Other
submitters considered that class actions had not led to a decrease in the
availability or cost of D&O insurance or
that there were other contributing
factors.51F[52] These included
significant regulatory action, capital markets activities, historical
underpricing of D&O insurance and global
trends in the corporate insurance
market. The Association of Litigation Funders of Australia said there was reason
to think that
class actions are separately priced by insurers. It said if there
was concern about the impact of securities class action settlements
on D&O
insurance, insurers could offer this cover separately.
Potential to deter directors
- 2.63 Several
submitters expressed concern that class actions could cause difficulties in
recruiting or retaining
directors.52F[53] Some suggested
difficulties in obtaining appropriate D&O insurance might play a role in
this.
Risk aversion
- 2.64 In
the Issues Paper we commented that the fear of a class action might cause
defendants to become overly risk averse. For example,
if Government agencies
fear class actions and become more risk averse this could slow down decision
making or cause a retreat from
certain areas of regulation. We also commented
that the cost of class actions against the government would ultimately be borne
by
the public.
- 2.65 Johnson
& Johnson submitted that class actions have had a “chilling
effect” on companies’ willingness to
innovate and take risks. The
International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee said there was a risk
that businesses would
treat the potential for a class action as a cost of doing
business, which might lead them to overcompensate such as with higher pricing
to
consumers or more stringent terms and conditions. However, it did not think this
factor should be heavily weighted because businesses
would also be likely to
factor in regulatory or compliance risk, reducing the incentive to tax
specifically for class actions.
Impact on business and regulatory environment
- 2.66 In
the Issues Paper we commented that where businesses face greater exposure to
litigation, this may create additional compliance
and legal costs. Class actions
could therefore negatively impact the overall business environment. Conversely,
class actions might
have a positive impact on the business environment because
stricter enforcement could lead to greater transparency and integrity
of the
market.
- 2.67 Claims
Resolution Service raised concerns that class actions might deter people from
engaging in business activities. BusinessNZ
commented that class actions can
create considerable uncertainty for businesses. There was also concern that
recent changes to continuous
disclosure rules would make it much easier to bring
claims against listed
companies.53F[54] NZX cautioned
against adopting a class actions regime similar to Australia, which it said had
a negative effect on defendants and
the broader market without significantly
improving investor protection. It was concerned about the effects on issuers and
the economy
if the class actions regime was not correctly calibrated. NZX said
the impact on defendants may be exacerbated in Aotearoa New Zealand
because a
number of corporate and securities liability offences are strict liability
offences, which was sometimes necessary to ensure
the efficient operation of
capital markets.
- 2.68 Other
submitters considered that class actions could have a positive impact on the
business and regulatory environment such as
leading to greater corporate
responsibility and market integrity. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
commented that the economic
impact of class actions made up a very small
proportion of economic activity overall. It noted that, in 29 years, over AU$4
billion
had been recovered in class actions settlements or judgments,
representing approximately 0.01 per cent of total economic activity
in that
period. Omni Bridgeway submitted there is no credible, independent evidence that
class actions are having a negative impact
on the economy in Aotearoa New
Zealand or Australia.
Insufficient protection of class member interests
- 2.69 In
the Issues Paper we said that if a class actions regime was poorly designed,
there was a risk that class actions would insufficiently
protect class member
interests.54F[55] One issue is that
class members will be bound by the outcome of a case, potentially even in
circumstances where they were unaware
of the litigation. Even where class
members are aware of the class action, they may have limited knowledge of the
case and few opportunities
to meaningfully participate in the litigation.
Another issue is that conflicts of interest may arise in class actions, whether
between
class members, with the representative plaintiff or between the class
and the lawyer or litigation funder.
- 2.70 Issues
raised by submitters included class member compensation being diminished by
payments to lawyers and funders, the risk
of class members being bound to a
decision they are unaware of, the potential for conflicts of interest and
uncertainty and delay
for class members. Several submitters indicated that class
member interests could be protected by a properly designed class actions
regime,
which included court supervision. Issues relating to class member interests were
also raised in response to other questions
in the Issues Paper.
A STATUTORY CLASS ACTIONS REGIME FOR AOTEAROA NEW
ZEALAND
- 2.71 In
the Issues Paper we expressed the preliminary view that it would be desirable to
have a statutory class actions regime in
Aotearoa New Zealand. We confirmed this
view in the Supplementary Issues
Paper.55F[56]
- 2.72 We asked
submitters whether Aotearoa New Zealand should have a statutory class actions
regime and why. We received 39 submissions
on whether Aotearoa New Zealand
should have a statutory class actions regime, with 35 of those in
favour.56F[57] Key reasons for
supporting a statutory class actions regime included:
(a) It would be preferable to relying on HCR 4.24, which was seen as inadequate
for modern group litigation.
(b) It would result from a more considered policy and legislative process,
rather than piecemeal judicial development.
(c) It would provide greater clarity and certainty.
(d) Class actions have the potential to increase access to justice.
(e) In modern society, where there is the potential for mass harm, there must be
a procedural mechanism through which such harms
can be addressed.
(f) Regulatory action alone may be an insufficient response to harm caused to a
large group.
(g) A regime could be designed in a way that mitigates many of the potential
disadvantages of class actions.
- 2.73 Carter Holt
Harvey and Joint Action Funding were opposed to a statutory class actions
regime.57F[58] Carter Holt Harvey
doubted that good design could mitigate the substantial risks of class actions.
Joint Action Funding preferred
retaining HCR 4.24 and the body of case law that
had developed under it, noting the flexibility provided by the rule.
- 2.74 While most
submitters were in favour of a statutory class actions regime, this did not mean
all of these submitters thought class
actions were desirable. As noted earlier
in this chapter, some submitters were sceptical of the potential benefits of
class actions
and highlighted potential disadvantages. These submitters tended
to support a statutory class actions regime because it would be
preferable to
relying on the representative actions rule. Some submitters indicated that their
support for a statutory class actions
regime was conditional on certain risks
being effectively managed, such as conflicts of interest and meritless
litigation.
Recommendations
- R1 A
new statute called the Class Actions Act should be enacted as the principal
source of law in relation to class actions.
- R2 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing new High Court Rules for class actions.
- 2.75 We consider
that Aotearoa New Zealand should have a statutory class actions regime, with a
Class Actions Act as the principal
source of law in relation to class actions.
As we discuss in Chapter 4, we consider the High Court will generally be the
appropriate
court to hear class actions. Given the complexity of class action
proceedings, we think specific class actions rules in the High
Court Rules are
also needed to address more detailed matters of procedure.
- 2.76 Our key
reasons for a statutory class actions regime are:
(a) Group litigation is beneficial but current mechanisms and alternatives are
inadequate.
(b) Class actions will improve access to justice.
(c) Class actions can be an efficient way of managing multiple claims.
(d) Many of the potential disadvantages of class actions can be mitigated by the
design of the regime.
(e) A statutory regime will be clearer, more certain and more accessible than
the existing law based on HCR 4.24.
Group litigation is beneficial but current mechanisms and
alternatives are inadequate
- 2.77 Group
litigation can enable the courts to deal with an issue affecting a large group
of people at the same time and allow the
costs of litigation to be shared among
a larger group. It can therefore have benefits of access to justice and
efficiency.
- 2.78 We consider
that current mechanisms for group litigation are insufficient for contemporary
Aotearoa New Zealand. The overwhelming
feedback we received was that HCR 4.24 is
not suitable for modern group litigation because the lack of rules leads to
uncertainty,
additional cost and delay. While there are some alternative
mechanisms for aggregating claims, some are more suitable where there
is a small
number of claims (such as joinder of plaintiffs) and others are rarely
used.58F[59] We think it is
desirable to have a class actions regime to provide a clear set of rules for
bringing group litigation that can be
used for a wide variety of cases.
- 2.79 While
regulators do have some powers to bring group litigation, this does not remove
the need for a class actions regime. These
powers are limited to certain
legislation, and regulators are constrained by their resources. In addition, the
objective of regulatory
action will often be different to that of private
litigants. For example, it may focus on deterrence rather than compensation.
Class actions will improve access to justice
- 2.80 We
consider that class actions will improve access to justice by allowing claims to
be litigated that would not be economically
viable for an individual litigant to
bring. Class actions can also help to address social and psychological barriers
that may prevent
individuals from coming to the courts.
- 2.81 Class
actions will not increase access to justice for all types of legal problems.
There will need to be a substantive legal
claim and a common issue of fact or
law shared by a large group of people. Another significant limitation is that
many class actions
will be unable to proceed without litigation funding. In the
Issues Paper we discussed how litigation funders select cases to fund
and noted
that fewer than 10 per cent of cases considered by litigation funders proceeded
to a due diligence phase.59F[60]
Because class actions are likely to be expensive to run, the total claim size
may need to be significant to attract a litigation
funder. This may require
either a very large class or each individual claim being a substantial size. In
Chapter 18 we recommend
that a class action fund be established. We envisage
this could provide funding for legal costs and an indemnity against adverse
costs for claimants in cases of public interest. The fund would be able to
select meritorious cases that are unlikely to proceed
without funding and should
enable a greater range of class actions to be brought.
- 2.82 In
Australia, consumer class actions are now the most common type of new class
action, and we expect to see consumer class actions
also being brought in
Aotearoa New Zealand.60F[61] A
number of consumer representative actions have been brought under HCR
4.24.61F[62] Surveys of unmet legal
needs have found that consumer issues are the most prevalent legal problem
experienced by New Zealanders but
people are less likely to seek help in
resolving these issues than other legal
issues.62F[63] Consumers currently
face barriers to enforcing their legal rights, including lack of knowledge of
rights, power imbalances and the
low value of individual
claims.63F[64] Bringing a consumer
claim as a class action can help to address some of these issues as it does not
rely on an individual consumer
being motivated to enforce their rights
themselves.
- 2.83 We also
expect that a class actions regime will result in funded shareholder and
investor class actions being brought, based
on the experience of other
jurisdictions and the representative actions that have been brought to
date.64F[65] Some shareholder and
investor claims will involve class members with significant individual claims,
including institutional shareholders.
Such litigants may not face barriers to
bringing their own claim so class actions may not provide an access to justice
benefit. However,
many of these will also involve ‘mum and dad
investors’ who have lost significant savings and in practice would be
unable
to bring a claim without a class action.
- 2.84 A class
actions regime may also enable compensatory claims following regulatory action,
sometimes known as ‘follow on’
or ‘piggyback’
claims.65F[66] For example, where
there is a finding of breach in a case brought by a regulator and this finding
can be relied on in subsequent
proceedings.66F[67]
- 2.85 We note all
these types of cases can currently be brought as representative actions under
HCR 4.24. However, as discussed above,
the lack of detailed rules for
representative actions leads to increased expense and delay, which is likely to
deter some cases from
being brought. We think the increased procedural certainty
provided by a statutory class actions regime will make it easier to bring
claims
and to attract litigation funding.
- 2.86 We do not
anticipate that class actions are likely to be brought with respect to some
areas of legal need, including tenancy,
welfare, family, immigration and debt
issues. Nor do we expect class actions to be used in proceedings involving a
single claim brought
on behalf of a collective rather than numerous individual
claims. For these types of claims, there are existing procedures that are
likely
to be more straight-forward and involve less cost and delay. For this reason, we
think it is unlikely that class actions will
commonly be used for Māori
collective litigation, which often involve a single claim on behalf of an iwi or
hapū.67F[68] However,
individual Māori litigants may benefit from class actions. Class actions
could also be useful in a Māori context
to enable iwi or hapū
litigation without the need for a corporate body to represent claimants or to
avoid difficult questions
concerning the legal standing of iwi and
hapū.68F[69]
- 2.87 Because of
the limitations on the types of class action that will be brought, we think it
is important to view class actions
as only one tool among many for improving
access to justice in Aotearoa New Zealand. We also anticipate that as a class
actions regime
becomes more familiar and the law becomes more settled, lawyers
and funders may be willing to bring a broader range of claims. In
Australia,
while consumer and securities cases have been dominant, recent class actions
have included claims in relation to recovery
of wages for indigenous
workers.69F[70]
- 2.88 As we have
discussed earlier in this chapter, access to justice is more than access to the
courts. To improve access to justice,
a class actions regime also needs to
provide a fair and transparent process for all parties, provide meaningful
participation rights
for class members and facilitate substantively fair
results. A number of features of our proposed class regime are designed to
achieve
this.
Class actions can be an efficient way of managing multiple
claims
- 2.89 The
aggregation of claims based on a common issue can promote the efficient use of
judicial resources. This efficiency argument
is clear with respect to class
actions that would otherwise be brought as hundreds of individual claims,
although we think such class
actions are likely to be rare. In many cases, no
litigation would be brought absent a class actions regime because of the
barriers
faced by individual litigants. We think class actions can still be
considered an efficient use of court time in such cases because
a number of
claims can be determined in a single proceeding.
Many of the potential disadvantages can be mitigated by the
design of the regime
- 2.90 Class
actions may increase the courts’ workload in two respects. First, they may
result in an increase in the number of
cases being brought. Given that class
actions are designed to increase access to the court system, it is hard to avoid
this impact.
However, we note that class actions are likely to make up a very
small proportion of civil litigation
overall.70F[71] Second, class
actions are resource-intensive to manage. They include significant steps such as
certification and court approval of
notices and settlements to make sure that
class member interests are not overlooked.
- 2.91 It will be
important to understand the impact of class actions on the court system. We
suggest Te Tāhū o te Ture |
Ministry of Justice collect data on the
numbers of class actions filed and the judicial resources needed for each
proceeding to allow
analysis of the impact of class actions on the court
system.
- 2.92 We consider
that having a class actions regime with clear rules will minimise interlocutory
applications, although we anticipate
there may be some initial litigation about
how the Class Actions Act should be interpreted. Our proposed regime is designed
to allow
the court to manage class actions in an efficient way. For example, the
court may decline to certify a case as a class action if
not satisfied that a
class action would be an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of
class member claims. When the
court decides whether to certify concurrent class
actions, we recommend it should consider which approach would best allow class
member claims to be resolved in a just and efficient way. We have also proposed
powers for the court to appoint experts, counsel
to assist the court and an
administrator to assist with judgment distribution or settlement implementation
to support parties and
the court at different stages of proceedings.
- 2.93 Some
submitters expressed a concern that defendants would face meritless class
actions and feel pressure to settle them. We think
the risk of meritless claims
is low given the expense of bringing a class action and our recommendations for
court supervision. Several
of our recommendations are intended to deter
meritless actions, including the recommendations to have class actions certified
(which
will require a reasonably arguable cause of action to be disclosed) and
to retain the adverse costs rule for class actions. In addition,
most class
actions will require litigation funding and there is little incentive for
funders to fund meritless litigation. We also
recommend a rebuttable presumption
that funded representative plaintiffs will provide security for costs in funded
class actions.
- 2.94 The class
actions regime is a procedural device, and it is ultimately the underlying
substantive law that will give rise to a
class action against a defendant. If
there are concerns about certain types of class action being brought then these
would be better
addressed by reforms to the substantive area of law. While some
submitters urged us to consider changes to continuous disclosure
laws, as noted
in Chapter 1, this is outside the scope of our project.
- 2.95 We do not
consider class actions are likely to have a significant negative impact on the
overall business and regulatory environment.
Feedback from regulators was that
class actions may complement and strengthen existing regulatory regimes. We have
reflected on the
concern expressed by insurers that an increase in class actions
may have negative impacts on the insurance market, particularly in
relation to
D&O insurance. As we noted in the Issues Paper, there are other factors that
may be contributing to changes to the
insurance market such as increased
regulatory activity and historic under-pricing of this type of
insurance.71F[72] In our view, the
potential impact of class actions on the insurance market is not a compelling
argument against class actions provided
there are mechanisms in place to
discourage meritless litigation. Any impact class actions have on the insurance
market will then
arise primarily from meritorious cases that are presently being
hindered by current barriers to access to justice. We discuss the
impact of
litigation funding specifically in relation to D&O insurance in Chapter 13
and reach the same conclusion.
- 2.96 If a class
actions regime or litigation funding does correlate to increased pressure on the
D&O market and a reluctance to
take on directorship roles, this does not
necessarily mean it is a disadvantage directly attributable to class actions or
litigation
funding. Barriers to access to justice may have operated to hinder
the effective enforcement of current liability settings. If it
appears that
those liability settings are untenable because of the impact they have on
companies and their directors, the principled
response is to review those
liability settings rather than remove a means of bringing claims.
- 2.97 Some
disadvantages of a class actions regime may not be apparent until the regime is
underway.72F[73] Several submitters
suggested there could be a review mechanism in the
legislation.73F[74] The Ministry of
Justice may wish to consider reviewing the operation of the Class Actions Act at
an appropriate interval. Te Komiti
mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules
Committee will also be able to consider any issues that arise with respect to
class actions
provisions in the High Court Rules. Although some submitters
suggested a statutory requirement for Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
to
review class actions legislation, we do not recommend this because of the
inflexibility of statutory review
clauses.74F[75]
A statutory regime will be clearer, more certain and more
accessible
- 2.98 A
key advantage of having a statutory class actions regime is that it will be
clearer, more certain and more accessible than
the existing law based on HCR
4.24. We think this will minimise interlocutory applications, which should
reduce costs for the parties
and reduce the burden on the courts.
- 2.99 We
recommend a Class Actions Act as the principal source of law on class actions,
rather than having all of the class actions
regime contained in the High Court
Rules. This will appropriately reflect the policy significance of the class
actions regime and
avoid the possibility of aspects of it being declared ultra
vires. In Canada, the Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended that
a class
actions regime be enacted through statute rather than through civil procedure
rules.75F[76] One reason was the
risk that class actions rules could be challenged as ultra vires because of the
extent to which they make substantial
alterations to the existing law, such as
those dealing with certification, aggregate assessment and distribution of
monetary relief,
statistical evidence and costs. Further, class actions raised
many important and controversial issues that needed to be fully debated
by
Parliament. In Victoria, Australia, the class actions regime was initially
introduced through civil procedure
rules.76F[77] It was then challenged
as being ultra vires because of a provision enabling the court to award damages
on an aggregate basis.77F[78] This
led to the Victorian class actions regime being inserted into the Supreme Court
Act 1986 as Part 4A.
- 2.100 The
Legislation Guidelines published by the Legislation Design and Advisory
Committee set out matters that should generally
be addressed in primary
legislation. These include matters of significant policy; the granting or
changing of appeal rights; and
procedural matters if they, in effect, set the
fundamental policy of a legislative
scheme.78F[79] Matters that may be
appropriate for secondary legislation include the mechanics of implementing an
Act, technically complex matters,
subject matter that requires flexibility or
updating in light of technological developments and material that requires input
from
experts or key
stakeholders.79F[80]
- 2.101 In light
of this guidance, we think aspects of a class actions regime that should be in
statute include:
(a) The certification test.
(b) Provisions relating to suspension of limitation periods.
(c) The court’s powers with respect to concurrent class actions.
(d) The binding effect of a class action judgment on class members.
(e) The power to assess and order monetary relief on an aggregate basis.
(f) The power to order alternative distribution of monetary relief.
(g) Appeal rights.
(h) Requirements for approval of a settlement.
(i) The requirement for court review of a litigation funding agreement.
- 2.102 It will be
necessary to have some aspects of a class actions regime in the High Court
Rules, particularly those dealing with
detailed procedural matters or those that
may need to be regularly updated. These include the requirements for notices to
class members,
pleadings requirements (such as the contents of an application
for certification or settlement approval), matters to be considered
at a case
management conference and costs schedules. The Rules Committee may wish to
consider having a class actions part of the
High Court Rules.
- 2.103 In our
recommendations, where applicable, we indicate whether we envisage a
recommendation being implemented in the Class Actions
Act or the High Court
Rules.
OBJECTIVES OF CLASS ACTIONS
- R3 The
statutory objectives of class actions should be improving access to justice and
managing multiple claims in an efficient way.
- 2.104 As we
outlined in the Supplementary Issues Paper, we consider that the objectives of
class actions should be improving access
to justice and managing multiple claims
in an efficient way. We see these as equal objectives rather than access to
justice being
the primary
objective.80F[81]
- 2.105 We do not
consider strengthening incentives for compliance with the law (or
‘deterrence’) should be an objective
of class actions, although it
may be a beneficial effect. We think it is more appropriate for this objective
to sit with regulators,
with class actions primarily serving a compensatory
role. If strengthening incentives for compliance with the law was an objective
of class actions, there is a risk that this would dilute the other objectives.
For example, it might allow a class action to be certified
where the main
benefit would be strengthening a defendant’s incentives to comply with the
law but the class action would result
in very minimal compensation to class
members and would be lengthy and expensive to r un.
- 2.106 We suggest
that improving access to justice and managing multiple claims in an efficient
way should be reflected as the stated
objectives of class actions in the Class
Actions Act. The purpose of the Act would be to provide a clear framework for
enabling class
actions consistent with these objectives.
PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING A CLASS ACTIONS REGIME
- 2.107 In
the Issues Paper we proposed a list of principles to guide development of a
class actions regime. We refined these principles
slightly in the Supplementary
Issues Paper following the feedback we received from
submitters.81F[82]
- 2.108 We
consider that a statutory class actions regime should:
(a) Consider the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.
(b) Safeguard the interests of class members.
(c) Consider the principle of proportionality, meaning that the time and cost of
litigation should be proportionate to what is at
stake.
(d) Strike an appropriate balance between flexibility and certainty.
(e) Be appropriate for contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand.
(f) Recognise and reflect relevant tikanga Māori.
(g) Not adversely impact on other methods of group litigation.
(h) Provide clarity on issues arising in funded litigation.
- 2.109 These
principles have influenced our work in developing proposals for a class actions
regime.
The interests of both plaintiffs and defendants
- 2.110 A
class actions regime needs to be fair to all parties in the proceeding. In the
Issues Paper we commented that a class actions
regime should enable groups with
meritorious legal claims to bring them before the court, while protecting
defendants from meritless
or vexatious
claims.82F[83]
- 2.111 We asked
submitters which features of a class actions regime are essential to ensure the
interests of plaintiffs and defendants
are balanced. There were 20 submissions
addressing this question.83F[84]
Submitters agreed with the importance of this principle. Many submitters focused
on features to protect defendants, particularly
those which might prevent
meritless or vexatious
litigation.84F[85] Other submitters
identified features that could protect the interests of
plaintiffs,85F[86] or of both
parties.86F[87]
- 2.112 Both
plaintiffs and defendants have an interest in ensuring that multiple claims are
managed in an efficient way. We have considered
the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants when developing our recommendations. For example, the certification
test we recommend
seeks to prevent meritless class actions from proceeding while
ensuring that the test is not so onerous that it deters legitimate
class action
claims. It is inevitable that either plaintiffs or defendants will dislike some
individual aspects of a class actions
regime. However, taken as a whole, we
consider the regime we recommend strikes a fair balance between the interests of
plaintiffs
and defendants.
Safeguarding class member interests
- 2.113 In
the Issues Paper we said that a class actions regime must contain safeguards to
protect the interests of class members. We
referred to the role of courts in
protecting class member interests as well as the role of lawyers and the
representative plaintiff.
We identified several mechanisms for protecting class
members, including notice requirements, the opportunity to opt into or opt
out
of the claim and court approval of
settlement.87F[88]
- 2.114 We asked
submitters which features of a class actions regime were essential to ensure
that class member interests are protected.
Twenty-two submitters addressed this
question directly.88F[89] Issues
relating to class member interests also came up in submitters’ responses
to other questions. Many submitters agreed
with the importance of protecting
class member interests and made suggestions about how that could be done at
various stages of the
litigation. Some key themes in submissions were:
(a) Active court supervision is an important way of protecting class member
interests.
(b) Clarity is needed on the role of lawyers with respect to class members.
(c) There needs to be mechanisms to manage potential conflicts of interest,
whether with the representative plaintiff, lawyer or
funder.
(d) Class members need adequate information that is clearly and effectively
communicated to them.
- 2.115 The
feedback we received on our survey of group members in representative actions is
also relevant. The main problem identified
by group members – by a wide
margin – was the long and slow process. Other problems raised by group
members included:
a concern that lawyers and funders would take a large share of
any compensation; the confusing process and legalistic information;
lack of
control and direct involvement in proceedings; lack of information,
communication and transparency; and uncertainty of outcome
and returns.
- 2.116 It is
essential that a class actions regime protects the interests of class members,
given that the litigation is being brought
on their behalf and for their
benefit. Active court supervision is an essential part of this, and the courts
have already recognised
their important supervisory role in representative
actions. There are several points at which court supervision can occur,
including
the requirement for a class action to be certified in order to
proceed, judicial approval of notices to class members, case management
and
judicial approval of settlement. Lawyers have a key role to play in protecting
class member interests, and we recommend that
rules be developed on the
obligations of lawyers towards the class. Similarly, we make recommendations
about the obligations of the
representative plaintiff towards class members. We
also think it is essential that class members have adequate information that is
clearly and effectively communicated to
them.89F[90]
Proportionality
- 2.117 In
the Issues Paper we explained that the overarching goal of our civil procedure
system, as reflected in HCR 1.2, is to achieve
the “just, speedy and
inexpensive determination” of proceedings and applications. This objective
may require consideration
of proportionality in litigation, meaning that the
time and expense of litigation should be proportionate to what is at
stake.90F[91] The Rules Committee
has subsequently proposed that proportionality should be added to HCR
1.2.91F[92] We noted that in some
jurisdictions, proportionality is relevant to whether a matter should be allowed
to proceed as a class action.
In other jurisdictions, proportionality is
relevant to the way in which proceedings are
conducted.92F[93]
- 2.118 We asked
submitters whether proportionality was an appropriate principle for a class
actions regime and, if so, what features
of a regime could help to achieve that.
Fifteen submitters addressed this
question,93F[94] with 12 of these
agreeing that proportionality was an appropriate principle for a class actions
regime.94F[95] Some referred to
proportionality as “essential”. The other three submitters did not
express a clear view or indicated
some limitations of a proportionality
requirement.
- 2.119 We think
it is important to ensure that the cost and burden of a class action is
proportionate to the potential benefits. However,
a focus on proportionality
should not come at the expense of other important interests, such as
safeguarding rights. We note that
HCR 1.2 refers to proceedings being determined
in a way that is “just” as well as speedy and inexpensive.
- 2.120 The
clearest reflection of proportionality in the class actions regime we recommend
is in the certification test, which would
require the court to consider whether
the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the remedies
sought. Another
example is our approach to concurrent class actions, where we
recommend the court consider which approach would best allow class
member claims
to be resolved in a just and efficient way.
Balancing flexibility and certainty
- 2.121 We
noted in the Supplementary Issues Paper that several submitters had referred to
the need to ensure a court has flexibility
and discretion when dealing with
class actions. At the same time, many submitters were critical of the
uncertainty caused by HCR
4.24 and said that a class actions regime should
provide clarity and certainty. We suggested that the appropriate degree of
flexibility
or prescription would depend on the aspect of the class actions
regime at issue.95F[96]
- 2.122 We think
the class actions regime should be flexible enough to accommodate different
kinds of claims. We have also considered
the appropriate degree of flexibility
and prescription required with respect to each aspect of the proposed regime.
For example,
we consider the certification requirements should be prescribed in
legislation so that potential plaintiffs can assess the prospects
of a case
being certified. Our proposed certification test still allows some flexibility,
for example, by providing discretionary
factors that a court may consider when
determining whether the proposed mechanism for determining class membership is
appropriate.
Appropriate for contemporary Aotearoa New
Zealand
- 2.123 In
the Issues Paper we said a class actions regime needs to be appropriate for
contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand so care is
needed when considering features of
overseas regimes. We noted relevant features of Aotearoa New Zealand, including
the role of tikanga
Māori and our small population size. We also referred
to aspects of our procedural and substantive law that would affect class
actions
such as the adverse costs rule, the inability to bring personal injury claims
and the existence of specialist courts and
tribunals.96F[97]
- 2.124 We asked
submitters whether there are any unique features of litigation in Aotearoa New
Zealand that need to be considered when
a class actions regime is designed.
Eight submitters directly addressed this
question.97F[98] Many of these
referred to implications of Aotearoa New Zealand’s small population size
such as fewer class actions being economically
viable, less likelihood of
competing class actions and a smaller insurance premium pool. Other features
identified by submitters
included the existence of other ‘class
action’ mechanisms for certain areas of the law, more conservative damages
awards
due to the lack of civil jury trials, inability to bring personal injury
claims, adverse costs rules and tikanga Māori.
- 2.125 When
considering each aspect of a class actions regime, we have considered what might
be appropriate for contemporary Aotearoa
New Zealand. While we have drawn on
other jurisdictions, we have not modelled our entire regime on one particular
jurisdiction. Rather,
we have considered each aspect of a regime on a
case-by-case basis. For example, our recommended approach to concurrent class
actions
draws on the Canadian and Australian approaches, while our proposed
lawyer-class relationship draws on the “lawyer for the
class”
approach used in the United States.
Tikanga Māori
- 2.126 In
the Issues Paper we suggested that core tikanga Māori could be engaged by a
class actions regime. We identified the
tikanga concepts of whanaungatanga
(relationships), kaitiakitanga (guardianship/stewardship) and mana (spiritually
sanctioned authority)
as being potentially
relevant.98F[99] We suggested that
whanaungatanga might emphasise the interests of all class members and their
responsibilities towards each other.
Relatedly, kaitiakitanga might oblige the
class (and the representative plaintiff in particular) to act in the collective
interest
of the class. We suggested the representative plaintiff should have
sufficient mana to bring the claim on behalf of the class and
undertake the
relational responsibilities of the
role.99F[100]
- 2.127 We asked
submitters to what extent and in what ways tikanga Māori should influence
the design of a class actions regime.
Eleven submitters addressed this question,
with most seeing tikanga as relevant to the development of a class actions
regime.100F[101] The most
extensive submission we received on this question was from Te Hunga Rōia,
which submitted that tikanga should play
a central role in the design of a class
actions regime. Te Hunga Rōia agreed with our preliminary view that
whanaungatanga,
kaitiakitanga and mana were likely to be particularly relevant.
In addition, it considered that the tikanga concepts of utu and ea
could be
relevant to the design of a class actions regime.
- 2.128 We have
considered how tikanga might be incorporated in a class actions regime. One
option would be to refer to tikanga Māori
in the Class Actions Act as a
general guiding principle. However, there are some potential risks and
difficulties with this approach,
including:
(a) Introducing uncertainty. This is undesirable because one of the reasons for
developing a class actions regime is to provide greater
certainty and clarity.
It may also lead to additional litigation, an issue raised by one submitter.
(b) The potential for inconsistencies between class actions and other civil
litigation, given the lack of general reference to tikanga
Māori in the
High Court Rules.
(c) It may be less meaningful than giving specific consideration to which
elements of a class actions regime might engage tikanga
Māori.
(d) The risk of tikanga Māori being inappropriately raised by litigants in
order to win procedural points.
(e) Making it the responsibility of individual litigants to consider tikanga
Māori rather than making tikanga an integral part
of the policy process in
the development of the legislation.
- 2.129 We think
the preferable approach in this context is for tikanga Māori to be
considered as an integral part of the policy
process, and this is the approach
we have followed in our work. The aspect of the statutory class actions regime
that we think most
engages tikanga Māori is who can fulfil the role of the
representative plaintiff. We discuss how the Class Actions Act should
recognise
and reflect tikanga in relation to this issue in Chapter 6.
Avoiding adverse impacts on other forms of group
litigation
- 2.130 In
the Issues Paper we said a class actions regime should not conflict with other
means of bringing group litigation or make
other legal claims more difficult to
run. We gave the examples of Māori collective legal claims and judicial
review proceedings.
We also said it was important to consider whether a class
actions regime would have any detrimental impact on regulatory
action.101F[102]
- 2.131 We asked
submitters whether they had any concerns about how a class actions regime could
impact on other kinds of group litigation
or regulatory action and how any
concerns could be managed. We received 16 submissions on this
issue.102F[103] Submitters did not
indicate any significant concerns about the way in which class actions might
impact on other group litigation.
Submitters also made suggestions about how any
issues could be managed. These included judicial supervision and case
management,
retaining existing group-based litigation procedures, allowing the
court to determine the appropriate procedure for group litigation
regardless of
how it was commenced and ensuring that class actions legislation clearly
identifies the scope and applicability of
the class actions regime.
- 2.132 Several
submitters expressed concern about the potential impact of having regulatory
action and a class action over the same
matter.103F[104] Suggestions for
managing this included giving the court a power to stay the class action until
the regulatory action is completed,
allowing the court to hear the claims
together, allowing the regulator to be heard on a certification application or
addressing the
issue in the regulatory regime.
- 2.133 MBIE said
it was important that a class actions regime did not affect existing powers that
allow regulators to act on behalf
of other persons. The Commerce Commission
commented that follow-on class action litigation might reduce the incentive on
businesses
to proactively report contraventions or potential breaches to
regulators and to reach settlements with regulators. The Commission
explained it
currently operates a leniency programme where the first party to report cartel
conduct can request leniency from Commission-initiated
civil proceedings and its
recommendation that the Solicitor-General grants immunity from criminal
prosecution. However, this would
not prevent customers or other parties from
taking civil proceedings such as a class action against the party who
self-reports. It
recommended that any statutory class actions regime provide
appropriate protections for leniency applicants, self-reporting entities
and
parties entering into settlements.
Recommendation
- R4 The
Class Actions Act should clarify that it only applies to class actions and not
to other forms of litigation.
- 2.134 We do not
think the detailed requirements we have developed for class actions should apply
to other types of group litigation
without express consideration of whether this
is appropriate. We recommend that the Class Actions Act clarify that it only
applies
to class actions proceedings and not to any other forms of
litigation.104F[105]
- 2.135 Where
there is a class action and regulatory action over the same matter, the
appropriate response will depend on the case.
We do not think it would be fair
to class members to have a general presumption that the class action must be
stayed pending the
regulatory action, as this could cause considerable delay.
However, in some situations a plaintiff might prefer to seek a stay of
the class
action until there is a decision in the regulatory proceedings. For example,
section 46 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 provides
that a finding of a breach of
the Act in regulatory proceedings may be used as evidence in subsequent
proceedings. It may be more
efficient to stay a class action pending the outcome
of regulatory action if a finding of breach from the regulatory action could
be
relied upon in the class action.
- 2.136 The
Commerce Commission submitted that class actions legislation should enable the
use of findings of breaches of the Commerce
Act 1986, Credit Contracts and
Consumer Finance Act 2003, Telecommunications Act 2001 and Fuel Industry Act
2020 in follow on civil
proceedings. While we acknowledge the benefits of
provisions such as section 46 of the Fair Trading Act, we think it would be
preferable
to address this in the substantive legislation rather than through
class actions legislation.
- 2.137 We
acknowledge the Commerce Commission’s concern that a class actions regime
could reduce incentives on businesses to
self-report or to reach settlements
with regulators because of the risk that this could lead to a class action. In
our view, it would
be inappropriate to address this issue through the Class
Actions Act and we are not aware of other jurisdictions taking this approach.
Our proposed class actions regime is procedural and designed to enable groups of
litigants to bring claims they could otherwise bring
as an individual
proceeding. If it is desirable to limit the possible civil consequences of being
a cartel informant, we think it
would be more appropriate to provide for this in
substantive legislation such as the Commerce Act. This would enable
consideration
of whether any limitations should apply to other forms of civil
action.
Providing clarity on issues arising in funded
litigation
- 2.138 In
the Issues Paper we said that if litigation funding continues to be available in
Aotearoa New Zealand, a class actions regime
should provide some clarity on
issues associated with litigation funding. We suggested what these issues might
include and asked
submitters which issues arising in funded cases needed to be
addressed in a class actions regime. Fourteen submissions addressed
this
question directly.105F[106] Many
submitters also identified issues arising in funded class actions in other parts
of their submissions, or in response to our
questions specifically on litigation
funding. We discuss these matters in detail in Chapters 13–17.
RETAINING THE REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS RULE
- 2.139 In
the Issues Paper we asked submitters whether the representative actions rule
should be retained and, if so, for which types
of
cases.106F[107] In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we discussed the submissions we had received on this
issue and explained our conclusion that HCR
4.24 should be
retained.107F[108]
Results of consultation
- 2.140 Two
submitters on the Supplementary Issues Paper commented on our conclusion. Omni
Bridgeway said that retaining HCR 4.24 may
lead to confusion and it would be
preferable for the court to have a general power to make whatever orders it
thinks fit in the circumstances
of the case. Gilbert Walker agreed with our
conclusion.
Recommendations
- R5 The
Rules Committee should consider amending High Court Rule 4.24 to provide that it
should not be used where a proceeding is more
appropriately brought as a class
action.
- R6 The
Rules Committee should consider amending District Court Rule 4.24 to provide
that it should not be used where a proceeding is
more appropriately brought in
Te Kōti Matua | High Court as a class action.
- 2.141 We confirm
our view that the representative actions rule in HCR 4.24 should be retained. We
anticipate there will be cases that
are unsuitable to be brought as a class
action, but where it would still be efficient for the court to consider multiple
claims together.
We also consider that rule 4.24 of the District Court Rules
(DCR) should be retained for this reason, although we acknowledge the
provision
has not been used in Te Kōti-ā-Rohe | District Court to
date.108F[109]
- 2.142 One
category of cases that may be efficient to bring under HCR 4.24 is defendant
representative actions, given our conclusion
that defendant class actions should
not be allowed. Overseas jurisdictions that do not allow defendant class actions
have generally
retained a representative actions
rule.109F[110] The Australian Law
Reform Commission recommended the rule should be retained to enable defendant
representative actions to be brought
in appropriate
circumstances.110F[111] It may
also be appropriate to use HCR 4.24 to appoint representative respondents. In
Re Halifax New Zealand Ltd, the Court appointed representative
respondents to represent different classes of
investor.111F[112] Two submitters
mentioned Re Halifax as an example of the value of the representative
actions rule.112F[113]
- 2.143 The
representative actions rule might also be used in cases involving a small number
of group members. There are examples of
representative actions brought on behalf
of a small group, such as trusts and estates cases, and it would seem
unnecessary to bring
these types of cases as class
actions.113F[114] As part of the
certification test we recommend, when the court considers whether a class action
is an appropriate procedure for the
efficient resolution of class member claims,
it must consider the potential number of class members. It must also consider
whether
there is another procedure available to class members that would be a
more appropriate means of dealing with their
claims.114F[115] We anticipate
there may be cases with small classes that the court declines to certify on the
basis that a representative action
would be more appropriate.
- 2.144 A
representative action might also be more appropriate than a class action in a
case involving a non-monetary remedy such as
an injunction or declaration. Such
a case might be more straight-forward, and it may be unnecessary to rely on the
detailed requirements
of a class actions regime such as provisions for
determining individual issues, aggregate monetary relief and settlement
distribution.
- 2.145 However,
we also want to ensure that the representative actions rule cannot be used as a
parallel regime by litigants wanting
to avoid the requirements and protections
of the class actions regime. This includes our proposed requirement for
litigation funding
agreements to be subject to court approval in class actions,
which we discuss in Chapter 17.
- 2.146 If a class
actions regime is introduced, we think it is relatively unlikely that litigants
will attempt to bring claims seeking
monetary relief on behalf of a large number
of people as a representative action. Submitters expressed a strong desire for a
statutory
class actions regime to avoid the uncertainty caused by relying on HCR
4.24, and the resulting expense and delay. The experience
of other jurisdictions
that have retained a representative actions rule indicates that litigants prefer
to use the class actions
regime.115F[116]
- 2.147 At the
same time, to avoid the risk of the representative actions rule being used to
circumvent the protections of a class actions
regime, we think it would be
desirable for HCR 4.24 and DCR 4.24 to be amended to provide they should not be
used when a proceeding
is more appropriately brought as a class action.
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
- 2.148 Defendant
class actions involve a plaintiff bringing a case against a group of potential
defendants who are represented by a
representative
defendant.116F[117] In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we discussed the feedback we had received on this
issue and explained our conclusion that a class
actions regime should not
provide for defendant class
actions.117F[118]
Results of consultation
- 2.149 Two
submitters on the Supplementary Issues Paper commented on defendant class
actions. Gilbert Walker agreed with our conclusion
that a class actions regime
should not provide for defendant class actions. Professor Vince Morabito (Monash
University) disagreed
with our conclusion, which he thought treated such cases
as an inferior category of group litigation that would be regulated by an
inferior regime. He said there should be additional legislative provisions to
deal with the special features of defendant class actions.
Recommendation
- R7 The
Class Actions Act should only apply to plaintiff class actions and not defendant
class actions.
- 2.150 We confirm
our view that the Class Actions Act should only apply to plaintiff class actions
and not defendant class actions.
A class action involving a representative
defendant serves a different purpose to a plaintiff class action. A central
reason for
allowing a representative plaintiff to act on behalf of a class is to
improve access to justice by overcoming barriers to accessing
the courts that
would otherwise exist for individual class members. We think defendant class
actions are less likely to widen the
group of claimants who can access the court
system.
- 2.151 There are
significant differences between plaintiff class actions and defendant class
actions which mean a single class actions
regime cannot easily apply to both.
These differences
include:118F[119]
(a) A representative defendant is usually selected by the plaintiff and may be
unwilling to perform the role.
(b) Defendant class members are likely to opt out if given the option.
(c) Proceedings against a representative defendant expose class members to
liability, including orders to pay damages.
(d) The effect of any suspension of limitation periods applying to
claims.119F[120] In a plaintiff
class action, the suspension of the limitation period operates for the benefit
of class members. In a defendant class
action, the suspension of the limitation
period benefits the plaintiff rather than defendant class members.
- 2.152 If
defendant class actions were allowed, it would be necessary to develop some
specific provisions for them, particularly with
respect to commencement and
certification.120F[121] However,
we are not convinced this would be justified, since the experience of overseas
jurisdictions that allow defendant class
actions is that such cases are
rare.121F[122] We think it would
be preferable for cases against a representative defendant to proceed under HCR
4.24, which will enable courts
to have flexibility with respect to procedure.
CHAPTER 3
Key actors in a class action
INTRODUCTION
- 3.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) The role of class members.
(b) The role of the representative plaintiff.
(c) The role of a defendant in a class action.
(d) The court’s supervisory role in a class action.
THE ROLE OF CLASS MEMBERS
- 3.2 A
defining feature of a class action is the presence of class members. They are
not parties to the litigation and have little
control over how the class action
is conducted but will be bound by the outcome. In an opt-out class action, all
persons who fall
within the class definition become class members unless they
actively opt out. It is possible in such cases that a class member will
become
bound by a proceeding they are unaware of.
- 3.3 It is
essential that a class actions regime includes safeguards to protect the
interests of class members. There are many features
of our recommended class
actions regime that provide this, including:
(a) A statutory duty on the representative plaintiff to act in what they believe
to be the best interests of the class, which we
discuss later in this
chapter.
(b) The representative plaintiff’s lawyer becoming the lawyer for the
class upon certification.
(c) The requirement to give notice to class members at certain stages in a class
action.
(d) Court approval of settlement, which requires the court to consider whether a
settlement is fair, reasonable and in the best interests
of the class.
(e) Clarifying that a class member does not have adverse costs liability, except
in limited circumstances.
(f) Requiring court approval of litigation funding agreements in class actions.
- 3.4 While class
members generally have a passive role in the litigation, at certain stages there
are opportunities, or requirements,
to take an active step in the litigation.
The key stages are:
(a) The opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class action.
(b) Where the court requires a class member to provide discovery.
(c) The ability for a class member to apply to replace the representative
plaintiff.
(d) When class member participation is required to determine an individual
issue, such as giving evidence at a hearing.
(e) The opportunity for class members to object to a settlement.
(f) Where a class member must take steps to receive a benefit from the
settlement.
THE REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF
Role of the representative plaintiff
- 3.5 In
every class action, as in ordinary litigation, there is a plaintiff. In a class
action, the plaintiff is a representative plaintiff.
There are two important
dimensions to the representative plaintiff’s role. The first is that the
representative plaintiff,
like an ordinary plaintiff, is a party to the
proceeding and has a claim against the defendant. As such, they commence and
conduct
the proceeding and carry liability for adverse costs. Second, the
representative plaintiff also represents the other class members.
- 3.6 Decisions
that the representative plaintiff makes in relation to the proceeding will
inevitably impact on class members. For this
reason, in some jurisdictions, the
role of the representative plaintiff carries fiduciary
obligations.122F[123] In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we said it would be desirable to clarify the
obligations of the representative plaintiff and suggested
the role should carry
the following
obligations:123F[124]
(a) Acting in the best interests of class members, including by avoiding any
conflicts of interest that may prevent them from properly
fulfilling their
role.
(b) Ensuring the case is properly prosecuted, which is likely to include
retaining and instructing a lawyer and meeting any evidential
obligations.
(c) Being liable for adverse costs or ensuring that an indemnity is in place.
(d) Making decisions on any settlement, including applying for court approval of
settlement.
- 3.7 We
acknowledged these may be substantial obligations and discussed ways of
supporting representative plaintiffs to meet them.
These included having a
litigation committee to assist with governance of the class action, ensuring the
representative plaintiff
understands the role, and paying an honorarium to
recognise the time spent undertaking
it.124F[125]
- 3.8 We asked
submitters what obligations the representative plaintiff should have and whether
these obligations should be set out
in statute. We also asked how a
representative plaintiff could be supported to meet their obligations.
Representative plaintiff model
- 3.9 Some
of the feedback we received raised a more fundamental question about whether the
representative plaintiff should be responsible
for governance and
decision-making in a class action, or whether this should be vested in a group
such as a litigation committee.
This is an issue that goes to the heart of the
class action model. We therefore discuss this issue first, before considering
the
obligations of the representative plaintiff.
Results of consultation
- 3.10 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) suggested we
consider the conceptual footing of a class action.
It said instead of focusing
on the status and obligations of the representative plaintiff, we should
identify the following roles:
(a) The lead plaintiff, whose name appears first on court documents. Their case
might be considered the most representative or to
be a suitable test case.
(b) The person or persons responsible for conducting the litigation, who would
be responsible for managing the claim.
(c) The person or persons responsible for funding the litigation, who may be
responsible for adverse costs orders and paying security
for costs.
(d) The lawyers engaged to run the claim, who should receive instructions from
those responsible for conducting the litigation but
owe duties to the class as a
whole.
(e) The class as a whole, who benefit from the class action but are not
generally involved in making decisions relating to the litigation.
- 3.11 NZLS said
we should consider whether the lead plaintiff should be solely responsible for
conducting the litigation. It said this
might result in the lead plaintiff being
someone with time and organisational skill, rather than the person with the
best-placed
claim, which may not be strategically advantageous overall. It was
also concerned the heavy responsibilities of the representative
plaintiff role
may be a disincentive to taking it on.
- 3.12 It proposed
the class actions statute create a statutory concept of a person or persons
responsible for conducting a class action.
In some cases, this might be a
litigation committee. It said a litigation committee should include at least one
class member but
could include non-class members (although this might only be
appropriate in unusual or exceptional cases). However, a litigation
funder
should not be part of the litigation committee (or other group responsible for
conducting a class action) because it would
have a contractual arrangement with
it. The duties owed by the person or persons responsible for conducting the
litigation should
be set out fully in the legislation as a code so there was no
confusion or ambiguity as to what those duties are.
- 3.13 NZLS saw
its proposal as preferable to having a representative plaintiff delegate their
decision-making responsibility through
a web of non-public side agreements or
understandings. It said it would be more efficient and transparent to create a
litigation
committee that could have an express relationship with lawyers and
funders as well as direct accountability to the court. It said
traditional
concerns about “officious intermeddling” should be weighed against
the reality that a large-scale modern
class action would likely be too
overwhelming for a plaintiff to run without assistance.
- 3.14 To ensure
that the persons with responsibility for conducting the class action had
authority to represent the class, it proposed:
(a) In an opt-in class action, the authority could be approved by agreement of
the class members.
(b) In opt-out class actions, the court would need to confer this authority.
- 3.15 Several
other submitters raised related points. In its submission on the Issues Paper,
Meredith Connell said there was an important
distinction between the
representative plaintiff (who should effectively represent the common factual
and legal issues in dispute)
and the governance arrangements of the class. It
said the class actions regime should distinguish between the role of the
representative
plaintiff and governance arrangements for the class and permit
the responsibilities and risks of those two roles to be separated.
Simpson
Grierson said the primary role of a litigation committee should not be assisting
the representative plaintiff to meet their
obligations but acting in a
governance capacity.
- 3.16 Gilbert
Walker said in its experience, the role of the litigation committee was not
merely to “support” the representative
plaintiff in their
decision-making role but to replace them. In opt-in representative actions, the
litigation committee was constituted
under the agreement each class member
signed when opting in, which meant each group member gave the litigation
committee decision-making
authority on the conduct and settlement of the claim.
It said there was nothing inherently objectionable in someone other than a
plaintiff having decision-making authority in relation to a claim and every
subrogated claim involved this dynamic. If class actions
were to have a
governance structure involving litigation committees, questions arose as to the
scope of the powers, duties and liabilities
of committee members. It said it
seemed wrong for the responsibilities to fall solely on the plaintiff for
actions of a committee,
particularly where the plaintiff was not a member of the
committee.
- 3.17 In her
submission on the Issues Paper, Professor Vicki Waye (University of South
Australia) identified governance as a key issue
for plaintiffs and class members
in Australia and said a representative plaintiff was often out of their depth
when managing a multimillion-dollar
class action. She said a possible issue with
the Australian class actions regime was the presumption that a lead plaintiff is
needed
and that the existence of a plaintiff committee can be a factor in favour
of allowing a competing class action to proceed.
- 3.18 Chapman
Tripp said a representative plaintiff should not delegate the decision-making
required. They may and should take advice
from legal counsel and suitable
experts, but the decisions required to instruct the lawyer should be
non-delegable. It said the interests
of justice were not well served if the
representative plaintiff is acting as a figurehead, with decision-making
delegated to legal
counsel or experts. It said establishing a litigation
committee did not remove or reduce a representative plaintiff’s
obligations.
- 3.19 The
conceptual framework for class actions was also discussed at our consultation
workshops. Some participants preferred a model
where the decision-making and
governance role of a class action would be vested in a body like a litigation
committee rather than
a single representative plaintiff. Reasons given
included:
(a) In reality, the lawyer and/or litigation funder drives the case rather than
the representative plaintiff.
(b) The burden is too heavy for representative plaintiffs, who may be in a
vulnerable position themselves. Taking on fiduciary obligations
exposes the
representative plaintiff to risk and may lead to conservatism.
(c) Representative plaintiffs can be out of their depth with respect to managing
class actions and giving instructions so it may
be difficult for them to act in
the best interests of the class.
(d) The focus should be on ensuring that litigation is being run properly and
the best interests of all class members are considered.
Imposing fiduciary
duties and costs liability on a single representative plaintiff is inconsistent
with this.
(e) Matters such as understanding the legal issues and negotiating with
litigation funders are best done by those with expertise.
The litigation
committee is best able to hold the lawyer to account, negotiate a favourable
deal with litigation funders and act
in the best interests of the class.
- 3.20 Other
participants thought the decision-making and governance role should remain with
the representative plaintiff. Reasons given
included:
(a) The representative plaintiff has ‘skin in the game’ and
consequently will best preserve the interests of the class.
(b) There are many representative plaintiffs who take their responsibilities
seriously and perform their job well, even when ‘unskilled’.
We
should not underestimate people.
(c) A litigation committee can lead to unfairness if it can make decisions
without having responsibility for adverse costs.
Recommendation
- R8 The
representative plaintiff should be responsible for making decisions about the
conduct of the class action and giving informed
instructions to their lawyer. Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society should consider amending
the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008
to clarify who a lawyer should take instructions from in a class action.
- 3.21 We have
carefully considered the proposal that responsibility for the conduct of the
litigation should be held by an entity such
as a litigation committee rather
than a representative plaintiff. However, we consider this responsibility should
remain with the
representative plaintiff, supported by their lawyer. While a
litigation committee may be an effective way of supporting the representative
plaintiff in their role, we do not favour transferring responsibility for the
conduct of the class action to the committee and leaving
the representative
plaintiff with a more nominal
role.125F[126] We recommend the
representative plaintiff should be responsible for making decisions about the
conduct of a class action and giving
informed instructions to their lawyer. We
think this should be reflected in the Rules of conduct and client care for
lawyers. We recommend NZLS consider what amendments may be required to
provide clarity on who a lawyer should take instructions from in a
class action.
This falls within the broader recommendation we make in Chapter 7 that NZLS
should consider what amendments may be
needed to the Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act 2006 and the Rules to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in
class actions.
- 3.22 We do not
support an approach that would vest responsibility in non-class members to make
decisions and give instructions about
a class action. In Chapter 4, we recommend
the representative plaintiff must be a class member. We consider this approach
will ensure
the class action is supported by a genuine claimant who is motivated
by a desire to resolve their legal issue and has similar motivations
to other
class members. In our view, it would be a significant departure from normal
standing rules to have a person or organisation
without its own claim to act as
representative plaintiff. It is also possible that a non-class member
representative plaintiff would
have different objectives to class members such
as clarifying the law or deterring a
defendant.126F[127] As we
explained in Chapter 2, we do not think that deterrence should be an objective
of class actions. We think it is more appropriate
for this objective to sit with
regulators, with class actions primarily serving a compensatory role. Allowing a
litigation committee
with non-class members to be responsible for conduct of the
litigation would have the same risks as allowing non-class member representative
plaintiffs. There is also a risk of conflicts of interest if the litigation
committee includes a representative of the litigation
funder, who has a
financial interest in the litigation.
- 3.23 We see a
class action as a procedure that can enable claimants to resolve an issue of
importance to them. While we acknowledge
that it will sometimes be the lawyer
and the funder who seek to find a representative plaintiff for a potential class
action they
have identified, rather than the other way around, we think the
plaintiff must still be at the centre of the
proceeding.127F[128] We do not
favour a model of class action litigation where the lawyer, funder and
litigation committee are responsible for the conduct
of the proceeding and the
representative plaintiff is relegated to a nominal role. We consider that
claimants can and should make
decisions about their litigation rather than those
without their own claim. Our conception of access to justice includes meaningful
participation rights for class
members.128F[129] We think this
will be enhanced by having a representative plaintiff, who is themselves a class
member, is engaged in the litigation
and is not just a nominal plaintiff.
- 3.24 As a party
to the litigation, the representative plaintiff will have liability for adverse
costs (although they may be indemnified
for this by a litigation funder). We
think it would be problematic if a litigation committee could make decisions
about the litigation,
but the representative plaintiff ultimately had to bear
the responsibility for those decisions because of their liability for adverse
costs. Similarly, we do not favour a model in which a litigation committee makes
decisions about any settlement, without having their
claims extinguished by that
settlement. The representative plaintiff will also have obligations to meet
discovery and other requirements
(such as responding to interrogatories or a
notice to admit facts) and cannot delegate these obligations to a litigation
committee.
- 3.25 Members of
a litigation committee, if chosen for their expertise, may expect to be
remunerated for their time at a professional
rate.129F[130] Any expenses
associated with the committee would then have to be deducted from compensation
awarded to class members. If the committee
membership is approved by the court,
as suggested by NZLS for opt-out class actions, this would also add further time
and cost to
the proceeding.
- 3.26 We
acknowledge it will not always be easy to find a suitable representative
plaintiff and the facts of the person’s case
as well as their aptitude for
the role will be relevant. However, given that class actions typically involve
hundreds or thousands
of class members, we do not see this task as
insurmountable. In other jurisdictions, selecting an appropriate representative
plaintiff
is a normal part of class action litigation, and litigation committees
are not commonly used. We do not think a representative plaintiff
necessarily
needs to have legal or financial expertise to carry out the role. Lawyers are
regularly required to take informed instructions
from clients without this kind
of expertise. Later in this chapter, we discuss ways to support the
representative plaintiff in their
role and the possibility of having multiple
representative plaintiffs in the same case.
Duty and responsibilities of the representative plaintiff
- 3.27 In
this section we discuss the duty and responsibilities of the representative
plaintiff and whether these should be set out
in statute.
Results of consultation
- 3.28 As
noted above, in the Supplementary Issues Paper we proposed the representative
plaintiff should have certain obligations towards
the class. We received 16
submissions on what obligations a representative plaintiff should
have.130F[131] There were 10
submitters who broadly agreed with our proposed obligations, with some
suggesting additional
obligations.131F[132] The other
submitters commented on aspects of the obligations without expressing an overall
view on our proposal.
- 3.29 Bell Gully
said our proposed obligations were an important protection for class members,
particularly in opt-out class actions.
From the defendant’s perspective,
it was important that claims were brought in a responsible manner and it was
clear who had
costs liability and authority to settle.
- 3.30 Some
submitters drew attention to obligations they saw as important for the
representative plaintiff to have,
including:132F[133]
(a) Having sufficient knowledge of the facts of the case and seeking appropriate
legal and expert advice so they can make the necessary
decisions and give
informed instructions.133F[134]
(b) Making decisions in the class action and not delegating this
responsibility.
(c) Ensuring the class is adequately informed, such as on the key facts and the
conduct of the class action.
(d) Ensuring there is a workable plan for the proceeding.
(e) Fairly and adequately representing the interests of the class.
(f) Acting in the best interests of the class.
(g) Avoiding conflicts of interest.
(h) Being liable for any adverse costs order.
- 3.31 Simpson
Grierson said there should be clarity around what “acting in the best
interests of the class” and “ensuring
the case is properly
prosecuted” mean in practice. Tom Weston QC said while our proposed
obligations were good in theory, it
was important to consider how they would
work in practice. In reality, the litigation would be run by the lawyer and
litigation funder
and a representative plaintiff may have little knowledge of
the matter and no real control. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
suggested the representative plaintiff’s obligations should only arise
with respect to the common issue.
- 3.32 Several
submitters commented on whether the representative plaintiff should be regarded
as having fiduciary obligations. Philip
Skelton QC saw the representative
plaintiff as having a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the class
as a whole.134F[135] Gilbert
Walker agreed it was likely that the representative plaintiff’s role has a
fiduciary aspect to it and also probably
imports a duty of care. However, it
said the difficulty was identifying the scope of the duties and ensuring the
representative plaintiff
understands and can fulfil them. Carter Pearce did not
consider the representative plaintiff’s duty to act in the best interests
of the class was fiduciary.
- 3.33 Simpson
Grierson said it was important to clarify what recourse class members or the
defendant would have if the representative
plaintiff did not comply with their
obligations, such as whether they could apply to remove or replace the
representative plaintiff.
Gilbert Walker asked whether plaintiffs would be
permitted to limit their liability for breach of duties to class members and
suggested
this could only be done by statute in an opt-out class action. In a
joint submission, Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce
said if the
obligations were breached, the appropriate remedy was for the court to make
orders under its supervisory jurisdiction
to decertify the class action or
remove or substitute the representative plaintiff.
- 3.34 Seven
submitters were in favour of putting the obligations of a representative
plaintiff in statute.135F[136]
Reasons given by submitters were:
(a) This will assist the representative plaintiff to be aware of their
obligations.
(b) The obligations are a central aspect of the class actions regime and should
not be left to case law development. It is undesirable
to have potentially
parallel common law fiduciary duties.
(c) It would provide clarity on the obligations.
(d) The statute can confirm the obligations take priority over contractual
commitments.
- 3.35 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter
Pearce (in a joint submission) disagreed
with having the obligations in
statute.136F[137] Reasons given
were:
(a) The obligations exist independently of statute.
(b) The court should have flexibility to manage issues that arise with respect
to a representative plaintiff’s obligations
by considering the
circumstances of the case.
(c) It could lead to litigation over the relationship between the obligations
and contractual commitments.
(d) The list of obligations may become outdated if the obligations are reframed
over time.
(e) The obligations should not be overly prescriptive as this could deter
plaintiffs from taking on the role. The Australian experience
suggests it is not
necessary to identify and formulate each obligation with clarity.
Recommendation
- R9 The
representative plaintiff should have a duty to act in what they believe to be
the best interests of the class. This duty should
be specified in the Class
Actions Act. The Act should also specify that the representative plaintiff does
not owe fiduciary duties
to class members.
- 3.36 In our
view, it is helpful to conceptualise the role of the representative plaintiff as
involving both an overarching duty to
the class and some key responsibilities.
We discuss the responsibilities further below.
- 3.37 We think
the representative plaintiff should have a duty to act in what they believe to
be the best interests of the class. We
also think it is desirable for this duty
to be specified in the Class Actions Act. It is an important safeguard for class
members,
and it is desirable to make this duty clear.
- 3.38 Providing
this clarity will help to ensure that:
(a) The representative plaintiff is aware of the duty before agreeing to take on
the role.
(b) A lawyer can advise the representative plaintiff on what is required by the
duty.
(c) When the court considers an application for certification, it can consider
whether the representative plaintiff has received
independent legal advice on,
and demonstrated an understanding of, this aspect of its role.
(d) Litigation funding agreements can be drafted in a way that avoids
conflicting with the representative plaintiff’s overarching
duty to the
class.
- 3.39 The duty we
recommend has a subjective element to it, “to act in what they [the
representative plaintiff] believe to be
the best interests of the class”,
which allows focus on the exercise of judgement by the representative plaintiff.
The duty
means a representative plaintiff should:
(a) Avoid any conflicts of interest that could prevent them from fulfilling this
duty, or ensure any conflicts are properly managed
(for example, by supporting
the appointment of a sub-class representative plaintiff).
(b) Carry out their responsibilities diligently and with reasonable care.
(c) Consider the interests of the class when fulfilling their role and
responsibilities, including when making decisions about the
conduct of the class
action, giving instructions to their lawyer or entering into legal or funding
arrangements.
- 3.40 We have not
limited the duty to apply only while the representative plaintiff is carrying
out their role and the responsibilities
that attach to it. We recommend that it
should apply generally so that, for example, providing information to the
defendant to assist
the defendant’s case could constitute a breach. Some
aspects of the duty will also survive the representative plaintiff ceasing
to
hold that role. For example, if a representative plaintiff is replaced during
proceedings, they should provide all relevant information
about the proceedings
to the new representative plaintiff. They should not disclose the information to
the defendant, or to any other
person if that would be contrary to the interests
of the class.
- 3.41 We think it
is likely that the relationship between the representative plaintiff and class
members has a fiduciary aspect to
it. When a representative plaintiff
participates in a class action, they are doing so on behalf of themselves as
well as class members.
While class members have little control over the class
action, they will be affected by decisions made by the representative plaintiff
about the class action and will be bound by any judgment or settlement. An
analogy can be drawn to a trustee who is also a beneficiary
under a trust. While
we highlight the potential fiduciary nature of this relationship, this is
ultimately not something we need to
resolve given our recommendation to create a
statutory duty on the representative plaintiff. However, for the sake of legal
certainty,
we think the Class Actions Act should specify that the representative
plaintiff does not owe fiduciary duties to class members.
Key responsibilities of the representative plaintiff
- 3.42 The
representative plaintiff’s responsibilities primarily arise from being a
party to the proceeding. However, the extent
of their responsibilities is
amplified because they are bringing the litigation on behalf of a large group of
class members as well
as themselves. For this reason, it is important for the
representative plaintiff to carry out their responsibilities diligently and
with
reasonable care, in accordance with their overarching duty to act in what they
believe to be the best interests of the class.
- 3.43 We consider
that a representative plaintiff’s key responsibilities are to:
(a) Enter into any necessary arrangements for legal representation and
funding.
(b) Give informed instructions to their lawyer as to the conduct of the
proceeding.
(c) Progress the case as plaintiff in the proceedings.
(d) Meet any order for adverse costs (or arrange an adequate indemnity for any
adverse costs, such as from a litigation funder or
class members).
(e) Make decisions in relation to any settlement of the class action and be a
party to the settlement agreement.
- 3.44 We think it
is unnecessary to set out the responsibilities of a representative plaintiff in
statute, given these largely arise
from being a party to litigation. It is also
not possible to set out the responsibilities of the representative plaintiff
entirely,
as the steps a plaintiff needs to take in litigation will differ in
each case. This is why we have referred to the “key
responsibilities”
of the representative plaintiff. Later in this chapter
we recommend an intending representative plaintiff should receive independent
legal advice on the overarching duty and responsibilities of the role so they
are fully informed before agreeing to become representative
plaintiff.
Arrangements for legal representation and funding
- 3.45 The
representative plaintiff’s responsibilities will include entering into any
necessary arrangements for legal representation.
We think it would be highly
undesirable for a representative plaintiff to be self-represented, given that
class members’ legal
claims are at stake. If the representative plaintiff
intends to be self-represented, this could lead the court to decline to certify
the proceeding as a class action on the basis there is not a suitable
representative plaintiff who will fairly and adequately represent
the
class.137F[138]
- 3.46 The costs
of bringing a class action will include legal fees, court fees and disbursements
such as expert witness fees. We think
the representative plaintiff’s
responsibilities should include ensuring there are arrangements in place to meet
these costs.
This does not mean the representative plaintiff must enter into an
agreement with a litigation funder. Alternatives might include
a lawyer agreeing
to act pro bono, class members all agreeing to share the costs, the case being
funded through donations, or obtaining
funding from a class action
fund.138F[139]
Informed instructions
- 3.47 In
ordinary litigation, a lawyer is required to obtain and follow a client’s
informed instructions on significant decisions
in the conduct of the litigation
(subject to their overriding duty to the
court).139F[140] In a class
action, we think these instructions should come from the representative
plaintiff.140F[141] Significant
decisions in a class action will include whether to make certain interlocutory
applications, whether to appeal an interlocutory
or final decision and whether
to accept a settlement offer.
- 3.48 In order to
provide informed instructions, the representative plaintiff will need to have a
general understanding of the facts
and issues involved in the class action. When
instructions are needed on a particular decision in the class action, the
representative
plaintiff will need to understand what the options are and the
consequences of each for the
class.141F[142] The lawyer
for the class will need to ensure the representative plaintiff is appropriately
advised so they can make the necessary
decisions and give informed instructions.
Progress the case as plaintiff in the proceedings
- 3.49 As
a party to the litigation, the representative plaintiff will need to meet
obligations such as providing discovery, answering
interrogatories and
responding to a notice to admit facts.
- 3.50 The
representative plaintiff also needs to ensure the class action is being
progressed, which requires a range of active steps
to be taken. Many of these
are the standard steps required of a plaintiff in any civil litigation, such as
ensuring documents are
filed and giving evidence to prove their case. There are
also some steps specific to class actions, such as providing the defendant
with
information on class members who have opted into or out of the
proceeding.142F[143] In many
cases, the representative plaintiff will simply need to give instructions to
their lawyer (such as to confirm that a document
can be filed). However, there
may be situations where the representative plaintiff must take a certain action
themselves, such providing
an undertaking as to damages when an interlocutory
injunction is sought or attending a judicial settlement
conference.143F[144]
Liability for adverse costs
- 3.51 The
general rule in Aotearoa New Zealand is that the unsuccessful party must pay
costs to the successful party in a proceeding
or interlocutory application
(adverse costs).144F[145] In
Chapter 12 we recommend this rule should apply in class actions, which means
that the representative plaintiff will normally be
liable for a costs order in
favour of the defendant if the claim is unsuccessful. Because of the scale of a
class action, the representative
plaintiff’s potential liability is likely
to be considerably larger than in individual litigation. We think it is
essential
for a representative plaintiff to understand their potential adverse
costs liability. Accordingly, our proposed certification test
requires the
representative plaintiff to demonstrate an understanding of their potential
liability for costs. As we discuss in Chapters
12 and 15, in funded litigation a
representative plaintiff would usually obtain an indemnity for adverse costs
from a litigation
funder.145F[146]
We also recommend establishing a public class action fund, which could provide a
representative plaintiff with an indemnity against
adverse
costs.146F[147]
Being a party to any settlement
- 3.52 The
representative plaintiff is responsible for giving instructions as to whether to
settle a class action with the defendant
and will be a party to any settlement
agreement. Our draft settlement provision requires the representative plaintiff
to make the
application for court approval of a settlement. If the settlement is
approved, the agreement will bind class members as well as the
parties.
Supporting the representative plaintiff
- 3.53 In
this section we discuss how the representative plaintiff can be supported to
fulfil their duty to class members and the responsibilities
of their role. We
received 12 submissions on this
issue.147F[148]
Results of consultation
- 3.54 As
discussed above, we do not support the idea of litigation committees having
statutory functions as proposed by some submitters.
However, other submitters
discussed a different role for litigation committees of supporting the
representative plaintiff.
- 3.55 Several
submitters commented that litigation committees can be useful in some cases but
thought they should be
optional.148F[149] It was noted
that establishing a litigation committee would not remove or reduce a
representative plaintiff’s
obligations.149F[150] Dr Michael
Duffy (Monash University) suggested the court should have the power to appoint a
litigation committee, including of its
own motion. Similarly, Johnson &
Johnson said it should not be up to a representative plaintiff and their lawyer
whether a litigation
committee was needed and pointed to the risk of a
“compliant’’ representative plaintiff being selected by
lawyers.
Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce (in a joint
submission) noted an alternative to a litigation committee was for class
members
to provide support and guidance to the representative plaintiff.
- 3.56 Omni
Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson did not think it was necessary to have
legislative rules on litigation committees. Chapman
Tripp did not think
legislative rules were needed on the establishment and process of litigation
committees, but supported minimum
statutory requirements, such as a requirement
to hold quarterly meetings. One Crown agency preferred clarifying the role and
limits
of a litigation committee in the High Court Rules 2016
(HCR).150F[151] In its submission
on the Issues Paper, Ross Asset Management Investors’ Group said there
should be rules to ensure the selection
of a litigation committee occurred in an
open and transparent manner.
- 3.57 Several
submitters noted the importance of ensuring the representative plaintiff
understands their
obligations.151F[152] Consumer NZ
suggested there could be guidance for lawyers on this. Gilbert Walker suggested
a proposed representative plaintiff could
be required to confirm in an affidavit
that they understood and agreed to comply with a basic list of obligations.
Alternatively,
the representative plaintiff’s lawyer could certify that
the obligations had been explained. Bell Gully and Chapman Tripp agreed
with our
proposal for the court to consider whether the representative plaintiff
understands their obligations. However, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia said it did not support the representative plaintiff having their
suitability and understanding
of the role scrutinised by a court as part of
certification.
- 3.58 Several
submitters referred to the role of the lawyer in supporting the representative
plaintiff.152F[153] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia also thought the representative plaintiff
would be supported by the court exercising its
supervisory and case management
powers in a just, flexible and efficient way.
- 3.59 Some
submitters supported paying an honorarium to the representative plaintiff, to
recognise the time spent on the
role.153F[154] Bell Gully and
Chapman Tripp did not support a representative plaintiff receiving an additional
payment at settlement because of
the risk this might create a conflict of
interest.154F[155] Other
submitters were comfortable with the representative plaintiff receiving a
payment as part of
settlement.155F[156] Shine Lawyers
commented that payments are relatively modest in comparison to the time and
energy spent representing the class, so
they are unlikely to lead to a conflict
of interest during settlement negotiations.
Recommendations
- R10 The
Class Actions Act should provide the representative plaintiff with immunity from
claims by a class member with respect to their
statutory duty to act in what
they believe to be the best interests of the class, unless the representative
plaintiff has acted recklessly
or in wilful default or bad faith.
- R11 A
proceeding should not be certified under the Class Actions Act as a class action
unless the proposed representative plaintiff has
received legal advice on the
duty and responsibilities of the role from an independent lawyer who is not
associated with the class
action.
- 3.60 We
recognise that a plaintiff in ordinary civil litigation does not have a
statutory duty to act in the interests of others in
the manner we have proposed
for representative plaintiffs in class actions. We also recognise that the
responsibilities of a representative
plaintiff are more extensive than a
plaintiff would face in normal litigation. While the representative
plaintiff’s individual
claim may be modest, they may have to give
instructions on a multi-million-dollar claim. Their potential costs exposure,
and exposure
to publicity, could be significant. Given this, some submitters
expressed concern that it would not be possible to find a class member
who would
be willing to fulfil the role of representative plaintiff.
- 3.61 The
experience of other jurisdictions indicates that it is possible to find persons
who are willing and able to fulfil the role,
despite the greater burden. There
are several factors that can motivate a person to become the representative
plaintiff. The person
might only be able to get funding for their case if taken
on behalf of a class, or they might genuinely feel the defendant should
also
have to answer to others who have suffered the same
loss.156F[157] It has been noted
that while few class actions make economic sense to the individual plaintiff,
people do come forward for the role
“whether motivated by politics,
principle, litigiousness, crankiness or desire for fame or
empowerment”.157F[158]
- 3.62 We discuss
below some ways of supporting the representative plaintiff that we think will
encourage suitable class members to
take on the role.
Statutory immunity from liability
- 3.63 It
is possible the risk of facing a legal claim from a class member might deter a
person from agreeing to become the representative
plaintiff. We think it is
undesirable to have another disincentive to taking on what is a voluntary and
largely unpaid role, which
already carries the risk of being ordered to pay
adverse costs if the class action is unsuccessful.
- 3.64 The
proposed statutory duty to act in what the representative plaintiff believes to
be the best interests of the class is intended
to clarify an uncertain area of
the law. It is intended to make it clear for prospective representative
plaintiffs what is expected
of them and help ensure the right people take on the
role. While submitters supported this clarity, none expressly suggested it was
needed to facilitate legal claims by class members against representative
plaintiffs. For these reasons, we recommend a representative
plaintiff should have statutory immunity from claims by class members for breach
of their statutory duty.
- 3.65 At the same
time, class members should not be without recourse against a representative
plaintiff who fails to act in their best
interests through dishonesty, careless
disregard for the consequences of their actions or inactions or taking
significant and unjustified
risks. We therefore recommend an exception to the
statutory immunity where the representative plaintiff has acted recklessly or in
wilful default or bad faith. A class member could also apply to have the
representative plaintiff substituted with another class
member if they are not
adequately fulfilling their
role.158F[159] The court’s
supervisory role will also help to protect class members if the representative
plaintiff has not acted in their
best interests. For example, even if the
representative plaintiff has entered into an agreement to settle the class
action, the court
could decline to approve the settlement if it is not satisfied
the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class.
The role of the lawyer and need for independent legal
advice
- 3.66 When
a person is considering becoming a representative plaintiff, it is important
they receive advice on the duty and responsibilities
of the role. The advice
needs to come from a lawyer independent of the class action. This is because the
lawyer working on the class
action has an incentive to have a person agree to
become the representative plaintiff, as otherwise the case cannot go ahead as a
class action. They may also have been working with a funder to develop the class
action. An independent lawyer will be able to give
advice about whether it is
appropriate for the proposed representative to fulfill the role considering
solely the interests of that
person. We envisage the cost of this advice will be
modest relative to the other litigation costs
involved.159F[160]
- 3.67 In Chapter
6, we recommend that the Class Actions Act require a proceeding to be certified
to proceed as a class action. We recommend
that, as part of the certification
test, the court must be satisfied the proposed representative plaintiff has
received independent
legal advice on the duty and responsibilities of the role.
This is an important protection for the intended representative plaintiff
and
will help ensure they make an informed decision about whether they should take
on the role. It may also assist them, at an early
stage, to anticipate and
manage any potential conflicts of interest, including conflicts of interest that
may arise in their relationships
with any other representative plaintiffs, the
lawyer acting for them in the class action, any litigation funder or class
members.
- 3.68 We also
recommend in Chapter 6 that as part of the certification test, the court should
consider whether the proposed representative
plaintiff has a reasonable
understanding of the duty and responsibilities attached to being the
representative plaintiff. The proposed
representative plaintiff could state in
their affidavit whether they have had the duty and responsibilities of the role
explained
to them by an independent lawyer. This will assist the court, for the
purpose of deciding whether to certify the class action, to
assess the proposed
representative plaintiff’s understanding of their role.
- 3.69 As well as
advising on the duty and responsibilities of the role, the independent lawyer
could advise the intending representative
plaintiff on the implications for
their own individual claim and on the terms of any retainer agreement or
litigation funding agreement
they have been asked to enter
into.160F[161] Once the person has
decided to become the representative plaintiff, they would be represented by the
lawyer acting in the class action
and work with them to prepare the application
for certification.
- 3.70 In Chapter
7, we recommend the representative plaintiff’s lawyer and the lawyer for
the class should be the same person
and have a duty to act in the best interests
of the class. The roles of the representative plaintiff and lawyer for the class
are
therefore broadly aligned. A lawyer’s professional obligations will
provide protection for the representative plaintiff. For
example, the lawyer
must take informed instructions on significant decisions, which requires them to
inform their client of the nature
of the decisions to be made and the
consequences of
them.161F[162]
- 3.71 The
representative plaintiff’s lawyer will also significantly reduce the
burden on the representative plaintiff because
practically speaking, it is the
lawyer who will carry out most of the tasks required to prosecute the
litigation. The lawyer can
also advise the representative plaintiff of any steps
they need to take such as complying with discovery obligations.
Supervisory role of the court
- 3.72 The
court’s supervisory role in a class action will assist the representative
plaintiff. As part of the certification test
we recommend in Chapter 6, the
court needs to consider whether the proposed representative plaintiff is
suitable for the role and
will fairly and adequately represent the class. This
will include consideration of whether the person understands the duty and
responsibilities
of the role, including their potential liability for
costs.
- 3.73 A key
aspect of the court’s supervisory role is to ensure that the interests of
class members are protected, which provides
an important check on decisions made
by the representative plaintiff. For example, in Chapter 11 we recommend the
court must approve
any settlement of a class action, which will involve
consideration of whether the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests
of the class.
- 3.74 In Chapter
17 we recommend that litigation funding agreements in class actions must be
subject to court approval. This will also
provide protection for a
representative plaintiff. We recommend that a court must not approve a
litigation funding agreement unless
it is satisfied that the representative
plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the agreement and that the
agreement is
fair and reasonable.
Indemnity for adverse costs
- 3.75 While
liability for adverse costs will normally fall on the representative plaintiff,
in funded class actions the litigation
funder will generally provide the
representative plaintiff with an indemnity against this
liability.162F[163] In Chapter 15,
we recommend a presumption in funded class actions that the litigation funder
will provide security for costs, which
will provide some reassurance to the
representative plaintiff as well as the
defendant.163F[164]
- 3.76 In Chapter
18, we recommend a new class action fund which could provide funding for a class
action as well as indemnify a representative
plaintiff against adverse costs.
Honorarium
- 3.77 We
consider the representative plaintiff should be able to receive payment for
carrying out their role in a class action. The
role may be time-consuming and
prevent the person from taking up other paid opportunities. We think a
representative plaintiff should
be entitled to receive modest compensation for
the role, but it should not be set at a level that causes the role to be viewed
as
a money-making venture. We also think it is preferable for periodic payments
to be made during the class action, rather than being
paid as a lump sum at
settlement. This is because of the risk of a conflict of interest, since the
representative plaintiff stands
to receive an additional benefit from the
settlement.164F[165]
Having multiple representative plaintiffs
- 3.78 Our
draft commencement and certification provisions allow for the possibility of
multiple representative plaintiffs. Multiple
representative plaintiffs will be
required in some class actions because of our recommendation that there must be
a representative
plaintiff with a claim against each
defendant.165F[166] It is also
likely to be desirable to have multiple representative plaintiffs where there
are issues that apply to some, but not all,
claims.166F[167] This will allow
the representative plaintiffs’ individual claims to be used as a vehicle
for determining those issues at the
initial hearing. Having multiple
representative plaintiffs may also allow the duty and responsibilities of the
role to be shared
among representative plaintiffs.
- 3.79 However,
difficulties may arise in proceedings with multiple representative plaintiffs if
there is a disagreement among them
on what instructions to give to the lawyer.
We suggest it will be important for a dispute resolution process to be agreed at
the
outset, and before a person decides to become a representative
plaintiff.167F[168] Earlier in
this chapter we recommend that an intended representative plaintiff receive
independent legal advice on the duty and responsibilities
of the role. In
proceedings with multiple representative plaintiffs, the advice should also
address the risk of disputes and the
proposed dispute resolution process.
Litigation committee
- 3.80 A
practice has developed in Aotearoa New Zealand of using litigation committees to
assist with the conduct of representative
actions. In some cases, these include
non-class members with relevant expertise. Submitters indicated that litigation
committees
are sometimes appropriate but will not be necessary in all cases. Our
research has indicated that litigation committees are not commonly
used in
overseas class actions.
- 3.81 Earlier in
this chapter, we explained why we think the representative plaintiff should not
simply have a nominal role, with the
litigation committee having responsibility
for decision making and giving instructions. We consider this should be the role
of the
representative plaintiff since they are a party to the litigation, have a
duty to act in what they believe to be the best interests
of the class and
ultimately bear the risk of adverse costs. While it would be less problematic to
have class members on a litigation
committee making decisions since they have
their own claim, they would not have the same obligations as a representative
plaintiff
or liability for adverse costs.
- 3.82 We think
litigation committees can serve a useful advisory role. They can help the
representative plaintiff to make the best
decisions possible and give informed
instructions to the lawyer. They could also assist with matters such as keeping
class members
updated of progress in the proceeding or obtaining class member
views on issues. We see the role of a litigation committee as supporting
and
advising the representative plaintiff in their role rather than taking on the
duty and responsibilities we have outlined. For
these reasons, we consider that
litigation committees should be permitted but do not recommend any rules about
how they should function.
THE ROLE OF A DEFENDANT IN A CLASS ACTION
- 3.83 The
role of a defendant in a class action does not differ substantially from normal
litigation. However, the nature of a class
action can give rise to challenges in
responding to the litigation and can increase the financial risks and potential
liability for
defendants, as we discuss in Chapter 15.
- 3.84 The
defendant may not know the identity of all class members or have details of
their claims. This can make it difficult for
a defendant to quantify their
potential liability, identify possible defences or third-party claims and make
decisions about settlement.
We recommend some measures to respond to this issue,
including enabling a defendant to obtain information on class members who have
opted in or opted out and an express provision in the High Court Rules on class
member discovery.168F[169] We also
suggest it may be relevant for a court to consider whether a defendant would be
unfairly prejudiced in running its defence
by either an opt-in or opt-out
mechanism when considering the appropriate mechanism for determining class
membership.169F[170]
- 3.85 The
defendant and their lawyer may be unsure whether they can contact individual
class members directly, given that many class
members will not have signed a
legal retainer with the lawyer for the representative plaintiff. We make some
recommendations to provide
clarity on this issue. In Chapter 7, we recommend the
representative plaintiff’s lawyer should become lawyer for the class
once
a proceeding is certified as a class action, and that a defendant’s lawyer
then should direct class member communications
to the lawyer for the class.
While we consider a defendant itself should be able to communicate with
individual class members about
settlement, we recommend the communication must
include standard text about the class action that has been approved by the
court.170F[171]
- 3.86 If the
defendant is successful in defending a class action, there is a presumption they
will be entitled to an order for costs.
While liability for adverse costs will
normally fall on the representative plaintiff, an individual is unlikely to have
the means
to meet a substantial adverse costs order in a class action. In
Chapter 17, we recommend a court’s review of a litigation funding
agreement should consider the extent of any adverse costs indemnity provided to
the representative plaintiff. We also recommend a
presumption in funded class
actions that a litigation funder will provide security for costs and that a
court may order non-party
costs directly against a
funder.171F[172] These measures
will provide some protection to the defendant in funded class actions. Where a
class action is not supported by a
litigation funder, a defendant could seek an
order for security for costs against the representative plaintiff under the
existing
security for costs
provisions.172F[173]
THE COURT’S SUPERVISORY ROLE IN A CLASS ACTION
Recommendation
- R12 Te
Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of Judicial Studies should consider whether to
produce resources for judges on class actions.
- 3.87 The court
will have a more active role in class actions than in most other litigation,
because of the need to ensure the interests
of class members are adequately
protected.173F[174] In Chapter 2,
we explained that active court supervision is an important way of safeguarding
the interests of class members. As we
discuss later in this report, features of
our proposed class actions regime that involve additional court oversight
compared to other
litigation include:
(a) Requiring a proceeding to be certified in order to proceed as a class
action.
(b) Court approval of notices to class members.
(c) Court approval of settlement.
(d) Court approval of litigation funding agreements.
- 3.88 The
recommended active supervision will, in many cases, require extensive judicial
resources. In this report we make various
recommendations to allow the court to
manage class actions in an efficient way. We also envisage that the courts will
develop creative
processes for managing class actions and will be able to draw
on techniques used in other complex litigation. It may be useful to
provide
guidance that can be drawn on by the judiciary when managing class actions, such
as in the Senior Courts Bench Book. We note
that in the United States, the
Federal Judicial Center has developed a guide for judges on managing class
action litigation.174F[175] We
recommend Te Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of Judicial Studies consider
whether to produce guidance for judges on class actions.
CHAPTER 4
Commencing a class action
INTRODUCTION
- 4.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) The desirability of having a general class actions regime.
(b) Which courts a class actions regime should apply to.
(c) Our proposed requirements for commencing a class action.
(d) Limitation periods and class actions.
- 4.2 At the end
of this chapter, we set out some draft legislative provisions that could give
effect to our recommendations for commencing
a class action.
A GENERAL CLASS ACTIONS REGIME
- 4.3 Many
class actions regimes apply across all substantive areas of law, including those
in the United States, Canada and
Australia.175F[176] Other
jurisdictions have chosen to apply their class actions regime to certain sectors
only, such as the United Kingdom regime, which
only applies to competition law
claims.176F[177] In the Issues
Paper we expressed the preliminary view that a general rather than sectoral
class actions regime would be preferable
for Aotearoa New Zealand. We noted that
the representative actions rule is general in its application and that a
sectoral approach
to class actions is unlikely to address all the issues that
have been identified with the status quo. Given Aotearoa New Zealand’s
small size, it would be difficult to build up a body of case law if class
actions were restricted to one area of the
law.177F[178]
- 4.4 In the
Issues Paper we also explained that a general class actions regime could
expressly exclude certain types of legal claims.
For example, in Australia a
federal migration proceeding may not be brought as a class
action.178F[179] We discussed
whether judicial review claims should be excluded from a class actions regime,
given that judicial review is designed
to be a straightforward and efficient
process. However, we expressed the preliminary view this was unnecessary and
suggested a court
could consider this issue when deciding whether a claim should
be certified as a class
action.179F[180]
Results of consultation
- 4.5 We
asked submitters whether a class actions regime should be general in scope or
whether it should be limited to particular areas
of the law. Twenty-three
submitters addressed this
issue.180F[181]
- 4.6 Eighteen
submitters supported a general
regime.181F[182] Reasons
included:
(a) There is no principled basis or compelling reason for creating a distinction
between which claims can be run as a class action.
(b) Access to justice will be better enhanced by a general regime.
(c) A sectoral approach could lead to arguments over whether a particular
proceeding is within the scope of the class actions regime.
It could also cause
a plaintiff to frame their claim in an artificial way.
(d) Claims are often pleaded with several causes of action and difficulties may
arise if only some can be brought as a class action.
(e) Given the size of Aotearoa New Zealand, a general class actions regime will
mean the jurisprudence on the framework develops
more quickly.
- 4.7 Two
submitters suggested a sectoral approach to class actions should be considered
further. Bell Gully said class actions could
be limited to areas where there
might be efficiencies in grouping smaller claims together, such as consumer law.
Professor Samuel
Becher (Te Herenga Waka | Victoria University of Wellington)
suggested an incremental approach, where class actions could first be
introduced
in certain markets or contexts.
- 4.8 Several
submitters commented on whether judicial review claims and other claims for
non-monetary relief are suitable to bring
as a class action. Te Kāhui Ture
o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society said existing group litigation procedures
that are working
well may not need to be captured by any class actions regime,
citing judicial review as an example. Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa
|
Insurance Council of New Zealand said a requirement for a class action to be the
preferable procedure would be essential if judicial
review claims were included
in the class actions regime. It also proposed that the objective of a class
actions regime should be
to allow claims that are primarily compensatory in
nature. Gilbert Walker suggested a class actions regime should apply to private
law actions for damages and that other forms of group action such as judicial
review or iwi claims could continue under HCR 4.24.
Recommendation
- R13 The
Class Actions Act should not be limited in its application to certain areas of
the law or types of claim.
- 4.9 In our view,
the Class Actions Act should not be limited in its application to certain areas
of the law or types of claim. We
think a sectoral class actions regime would be
very limiting and would not sufficiently address the problems we have identified
with
current group litigation procedures. There was little support from
submitters for a sectoral class actions regime. While not all
claims are
suitable to be brought as a class action, we think this can be addressed through
the certification test we recommend.
As part of this test, a court will need to
consider whether there is another procedure that would be a more appropriate
means of
dealing with class member claims and whether the likely time and cost
of a class action is proportionate to the remedies sought.
- 4.10 We have
considered whether a class actions regime should be limited to claims seeking
damages or other monetary relief. Given
many class actions will require the
support of a litigation funder, which will generally be paid a commission from
any damages or
settlement sum, there is unlikely to be a significant number of
class actions seeking solely non-monetary relief. In addition, other
procedures
may be more appropriate for a claim seeking only non-monetary relief. For
example, a claim seeking a declaration could
be brought as an ordinary judicial
review proceeding or a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908. It
would be unnecessary
to resort to the expense and complexity of a class actions
regime in such a case.
- 4.11 Although we
think class actions seeking solely non-monetary relief would be rare, we do not
recommend restricting class actions
to claims seeking damages or other monetary
relief. A class action could be an efficient way of seeking non-monetary
remedies such
as specific performance or relief from an obligation on behalf of
a large group. While it is unlikely to be necessary to bring a
class action to
obtain a declaration or injunction which would have a general effect regardless
of who is part of the proceeding,
a class action might be appropriate where a
remedy would be more narrowly confined to class
members.182F[183] Although our
research has found few Australian or Canadian class action cases where an
injunction has been granted, we would not
want to rule out this possibility
entirely.
- 4.12 None of our
main comparator jurisdictions prevent class actions seeking non-monetary relief.
In Australia, class actions regimes
provide that a class action may be commenced
whether or not the relief includes equitable relief or
damages.183F[184] The United
States regime has a specific category for class actions seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief.184F[185] The
Canadian regimes do not prohibit claims seeking non-monetary relief, although
the relief sought may be relevant to whether the
class actions would be the
preferable procedure.185F[186]
Under the certification test we recommend, a court could decline to certify a
class action seeking a non-monetary remedy if it considers
a class action is not
an appropriate procedure for the resolution of class member
claims.186F[187]
APPROPRIATE COURTS FOR CLASS ACTIONS
- 4.13 In
the Issues Paper we said Te Kōti Matua | would be the primary court for
class action proceedings, as with representative
actions. However, we said it
might also be appropriate for class actions to be available in other
courts.187F[188]
- 4.14 We noted
that while civil cases can be brought in Te Kōti-ā-Rohe | District
Court, they make up a very small proportion
of the Court’s workload. It is
possible to bring a representative action in the District Court under rule 4.24
of the District
Court Rules (DCR), but we were not aware of this ever having
occurred. We noted that the District Court has a jurisdictional threshold
of
$350,000 and many class action claims would exceed this. Claims below $350,000
are also unlikely to attract litigation funding.
For all these reasons, we
anticipated that if class actions were available in the District Court, such
proceedings would be
rare.188F[189]
- 4.15 In the
Issues Paper we noted that representative actions may be brought in Te Kōti
Take Mahi | Employment Court, relying
on HCR 4.24. We said that cases had taken
different approaches as to whether HCR 4.24 applies on its own, by analogy or in
combination
with other provisions in the Employment Relations Act 2000, and that
it may be beneficial to clarify the law. We said a class action
may be an
efficient way to deal with an employment issue affecting many employees and that
in overseas jurisdictions, employment
class actions are common.
- 4.16 We observed
that only one representative action had been brought in Te Kōti Taiao |
Environment Court (relying on DCR 4.24)
and said this may indicate a lack of
demand for this kind of procedural device in this court. We noted that group
claims in the Environment
Court are often brought by an incorporated society and
that the outcome of proceedings in this court will generally affect a wide
group
without needing to have a class of people bound by the judgment.
- 4.17 In the
Issues Paper we expressed the preliminary view that it would be inappropriate
for a class actions regime to apply in Te
Kooti Whenua Māori | Māori
Land Court. We noted the Māori Land Court already has the power to
determine the most appropriate
representatives of a class or group of
Māori. We expressed concern that class actions could interfere with current
approaches
to determining representation and said we were not aware of any
demand for a class actions regime in the Māori Land Court.
Results of consultation
- 4.18 We
asked if a class actions regime should be available in the District Court,
Employment Court, Environment Court or Māori
Land Court, in addition to the
High Court. We received 13 submissions on this
question.189F[190]
- 4.19 Four
submitters said class actions should only be available in the High
Court.190F[191] Reasons for this
included the procedural complexity of class actions; the existing expertise that
High Court judges have with managing
group litigation; and the High
Court’s inherent jurisdiction, which can provide additional assistance
when addressing procedural
issues. Another submitter said class actions
commenced in other courts should be transferred to the High Court, which could
have
specialist expertise in class actions.
- 4.20 LPF Group
submitted that while the High Court was the most suitable court for class
actions, there was no reason not to allow
class actions in other courts or
tribunals where that was the appropriate jurisdiction to bring the
claim.
District Court
- 4.21 Six
submitters said class actions should not be available in the District
Court.191F[192] Reasons given by
submitters included:
(a) It would not be economic or cost efficient to have class actions in the
District Court.
(b) Because of its extensive criminal jurisdiction and use of jury trials, the
District Court may lack the capacity to manage class
actions without significant
additional resourcing.
(c) There would be an additional layer of appeals, which would make a class
action commenced in the District Court more expensive
and less efficient.
(d) If a procedure is required for small claims, the representative actions rule
in DCR 4.24 could be retained.
- 4.22 At a
consultation workshop, it was suggested that the District Court’s current
workload is high and it may not have the
resourcing capacity for class actions.
- 4.23 Jennifer
Braithwaite supported class actions in the District Court. She considered this
could benefit children and young people,
whose disputes are more likely to
involve smaller sums of money. She gave the example of students bringing a class
action against
a university or training establishment, involving individual fees
of under $5,000. In addition, LPF Group was generally supportive
of class
actions being brought in other courts, where appropriate.
Employment Court
- 4.24 Five
submitters were opposed to having class actions in the Employment
Court.192F[193] Chapman Tripp said
large collective claims are likely to be brought by a union and otherwise the
representative actions procedure
is sufficient. Simpson Grierson said there were
likely to be relatively few employment class actions, so developing a specific
framework
or rules is not warranted.
- 4.25 Five
submitters were more supportive of allowing class actions in the Employment
Court.193F[194] Associate
Professor Barry Allan (Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo | University of Otago)
said there was a high likelihood of unmet
need, given only a small proportion of
Employment Court litigation was brought with union support. He suggested
employment class
actions could be useful in cases involving mass redundancies,
workplace related harm to mental health and health and safety issues
where the
desired outcome is a change in employer behaviour. Jennifer Braithwaite said
employment class actions could benefit young
people, who are often vulnerable
employees and may not have the confidence to challenge an employer. She noted
many young people
are employees of large retail and hospitality companies, and
it was easy to see the potential for an employer’s actions to
affect a
large group. Nikki Chamberlain (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland)
said specific consideration of the use of
class actions in the Employment Court
was needed, including the interaction with relevant provisions in the Employment
Relations
Act 2000.
- 4.26 Some
participants at our consultation workshops considered it could be beneficial to
have class actions in the Employment Court,
because an employment issue can
sometimes affect many employees. Other participants queried whether it would be
difficult for a court
to manage class actions without the use of the inherent
jurisdiction.
Environment Court
- 4.27 Four
submitters said class actions should not be available in the Environment
Court.194F[195] Simpson Grierson
noted that the Environment Court was mostly a de novo decision maker on
resource consent and district appeals, as well as having an enforcement
function, and it did not grant compensatory
relief. It also noted group
proceedings were possible under the Resource Management Act (RMA) because
incorporated and unincorporated
bodies (such as residents’ associations)
could initiate and participate in proceedings. It considered current law and
practice
adequately provided for ‘class actions’ in the Environment
Court, although it noted the current RMA reform process that
was underway. Nikki
Chamberlain thought class actions should be available in the Environment
Court.
Māori Land Court
- 4.28 Six
submitters said a class actions regime should not be available in the Māori
Land Court.195F[196] Some of these
submitters said it was unnecessary to change existing practice for determining
representation in the Māori Land
Court.
Tribunals
- 4.29 Te
Mana Mātāpono Matatapu | Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC)
suggested a class actions regime could expressly
include a mechanism for
specialist jurisdictions, such as Te Taraipiunara Mana Tangata | Human Rights
Review Tribunal, to adopt certain
aspects to supplement its own procedures as
necessary and appropriate. If there was a statutory class actions regime with
access
to justice as a guiding principle, the OPC was likely to draw on it when
determining the best way to proceed with a representative
privacy complaint. The
OPC said a statutory class actions regime could provide a useful benchmark by
which the Privacy Act 2020 representative
complaints regime could be assessed
and further developed, if necessary.
- 4.30 Nikki
Chamberlain noted the Privacy Act allows an “aggrieved individual”
to bring a proceeding on behalf of a class
in the Human Rights Review Tribunal.
She said the procedure used in the Tribunal should be consistent with the class
actions regime.
Recommendations
- R14 The
Class Actions Act should specify that class actions may be commenced in Te
Kōti Matua | High Court, with respect to claims
where the High Court has
existing jurisdiction.
- R15 The
Government should consider developing class action rules for the employment
jurisdiction.
- 4.31 We consider
the High Court will generally be the appropriate court to hear class actions. To
commence a claim as a class action,
the High Court must have jurisdiction over
that type of claim. A class action is a procedural device and should only enable
claims
that could otherwise be brought as individual proceedings in the High
Court. We recommend the Class Actions Act specify that class
actions may be
commenced in the High Court, with respect to claims where the High Court has
existing jurisdiction.196F[197]
District Court
- 4.32 We
do not recommend class actions be available in the District Court and note there
was little support from submitters for this.
Given the costs of bringing a class
action and the District Court’s current jurisdictional limit of $350,000,
we think class
actions are unlikely to be economic in this jurisdiction. While a
class action in the District Court could simply seek a declaration
of liability,
followed by individual claims for damages (each under $350,000), we think this
approach is likely to be time-consuming
and may not be an efficient way of
managing multiple claims. Later in this report, we recommend mechanisms to avoid
a court having
to determine issues on an individual basis, including the ability
to order aggregate monetary
relief.197F[198]
- 4.33 Class
actions are generally complex and time-intensive. We are concerned about the
impact class action litigation would have
on the District Court, which primarily
hears criminal cases.198F[199] If
class actions were allowed in the District Court, there might also be
disagreement about whether a case should be removed to the
High
Court.199F[200]
- 4.34 Litigants
will still have the option of bringing a claim as a representative action in the
District Court under DCR 4.24 and
we do not recommend this rule should be
repealed. In Chapter 2, we recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti |
Rules Committee
consider amending DCR 4.24 to clarify that it should not be used
where a class action would be more appropriate.
Employment Court
- 4.35 We
consider there is merit in enabling class actions for employment claims, given
that an employment issue could affect many
individuals working for the same
employer. Allowing employment class actions could improve access to justice,
particularly where
there is a significant power imbalance between employee and
employer.200F[201] Employment
class actions are common in other jurisdictions. There are a number of examples
of employment cases being taken on a representative
basis in Aotearoa New
Zealand.201F[202]
- 4.36 We think
further consideration is needed of how class actions could work in the
employment jurisdiction. The policy behind the
Employment Relations Act is to
favour quick and informal dispute resolution, with a focus on
mediation.202F[203] The Employment
Relations Authority is the first instance decision maker in many
cases.203F[204] It is an
investigative body with extensive control over its own procedures, and many of
the detailed rules we propose for class actions
would be
inappropriate.204F[205] While
class actions rules might be more appropriate for the Employment Court, this
sits in an appellate role for many employment
disputes and is only a first
instance decision maker in some
situations.205F[206] It would be a
significant policy shift to require all class actions to start in the Employment
Court. The further policy consideration
required on this issue is outside the
scope of our project. We therefore recommend the Government should consider
whether class actions
rules should be developed for the employment
jurisdiction.
Environment Court and Māori Land Court
- 4.37 We
do not think it is desirable for class actions rules to apply to the Environment
Court or Māori Land Court. We think
this would disrupt existing practices
for bringing group litigation. We are unaware of any demand or support for class
actions in
those jurisdictions.
COMMENCEMENT REQUIREMENTS
- 4.38 In
the Issues Paper we discussed who should be allowed to commence a class action.
This included whether a representative plaintiff
must be a class member and
whether government entities could bring class
actions.206F[207]
- 4.39 The
Supplementary Issues Paper discussed the submissions we had received on these
issues and set out draft commencement
provisions.207F[208] Key features
of our proposed commencement provisions were as follows:
(a) There must be two or more class members represented by a representative
plaintiff.
(b) Each class member must have their own claim, reflecting the fact that a
class action is a form of aggregate litigation. Each
claim must have a common
issue, but class members do not need to have the same cause of action.
(c) The representative plaintiff should ordinarily be a class member.
(d) A state entity can be representative plaintiff where it is a class member or
where another statute provides it with the ability
to bring a proceeding on
behalf of two or more people.
(e) There must be at least one representative plaintiff with a claim against
each defendant. It is not necessary for each class member
or representative
plaintiff to have a claim against every defendant.
Results of consultation
- 4.40 We
asked submitters whether they agreed with our draft commencement provisions and
if not, how they should be amended.
- 4.41 We received
15 submissions on this
question.208F[209] Eleven
submitters indicated broad agreement with the provisions as drafted or suggested
only limited amendments.209F[210]
The other four submitters commented on more limited aspects of the commencement
provisions.210F[211] Most of the
participants at our consultation workshops indicated general agreement with our
commencement provisions.
- 4.42 We discuss
the feedback we received on specific issues below.
Claims with a common issue
- 4.43 Four
submitters commented on the requirements that each class member must have their
own claim and that the claims must have
a common
issue.211F[212] There were two
suggestions for change. The International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust
Committee suggested a more detailed definition
of “common issue,”
such as “the same, similar or related issues of fact and
law”.212F[213] Chapman Tripp
said there may be cases involving claimants whose claims are sufficiently
related on factual or legal issues to justify
one class action, even if there is
not strictly a common issue across sub-classes.
Minimum class size
- 4.44 Six
submitters commented on the requirement to have two or more class members (in
addition to the representative
plaintiff).213F[214] Three
submitters agreed with our proposed minimum class size, with one (Gilbert
Walker) noting that the wider group interest in the
proceeding should still be
considered at
certification.214F[215] Two
submitters thought the minimum class size was too small. Johnson & Johnson
said three people was not a class in the ordinary
sense and it was difficult to
see why the benefits (and detriments) of a class actions regime should be
afforded to such a small
group of claimants. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia thought setting a minimum class size of three could create
inefficiencies
and practical problems. It suggested a minimum of five
persons.
- 4.45 Consultation
workshop participants did not express any real concern about the minimum class
size, with some noting that commercial
concerns would dictate what class size
would be viable.
Representative plaintiff must be a class member
- 4.46 Five
submitters addressed this
issue.215F[216] Of these, four
agreed that the representative plaintiff should be a class
member.216F[217] The IBA Antitrust
Committee said without this requirement, there was a risk of speculative claims
being brought by special purpose
vehicles, litigation funders or representatives
who may not have an incentive to act in the best interests of the class.
- 4.47 Professor
Vince Morabito (Monash University) considered ideological plaintiffs should be
allowed and disagreed that requiring
a representative plaintiff to have a claim
against the defendant would protect class member interests. He noted that in
Australia,
a class action proceeding can be brought where a person has
legislative standing, even where they have no special interest in the
litigation
in question and their rights have not been affected by the challenged conduct.
He noted this had enabled several worthy
class actions to be filed. He commented
that if none of the victims of illegal conduct were willing to assume the
onerous role of
representative plaintiff, no class action would be brought. This
was most likely to occur where potential class members were disadvantaged
and
vulnerable.
- 4.48 Some
consultation workshop participants suggested that ideological plaintiffs such as
consumer organisations or trade unions
should be able to bring class
actions.
State entity as representative plaintiff
- 4.49 Three
submitters addressed this
issue.217F[218] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson agreed with our proposal
for allowing state entities to fulfil the
role of representative plaintiff.
However, Simpson Grierson thought caution was needed with respect to any
suggestion that the state
entity would be responsible for funding the class
action or for any adverse costs award.
- 4.50 Te Mana
Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA) raised the following issues
that could result from allowing the FMA
to commence or take over a class action
as representative plaintiff:
(a) It would not realise benefits of a class action such as sharing legal costs,
resources and adverse costs risk as the FMA would
likely carry these costs and
risks rather than obtaining litigation funding or sharing costs with class
members.
(b) Running a class action would be a complicated way for the FMA to achieve
compensation for affected parties and there are simpler
ways for it to do
this.
(c) Bringing a claim as a class action would likely mean the FMA would have less
freedom in how it runs the claim because of the
obligations of a representative
plaintiff.
(d) Allowing the FMA to bring class actions could signal a willingness for
government to advance and fund claims on behalf of private
interests, which
could lead to claimants failing to look after their own interests. There could
be pressure on the FMA to step in
where class actions have become economically
unviable.
- 4.51 The FMA
submitted it should not be included by default in a class actions framework and
that detailed and targeted policy analysis
was needed. It suggested the proposed
class action framework could, for the time being, make it clear that the FMA is
not able to
commence or take over class actions beyond what is specified in the
Financial Markets Authority Act 2011 and financial markets legislation.
- 4.52 At the
consultation workshops, it was noted that regulators have finite resources, and
it may be an area that is best left to
private claims. If regulators did have a
power to bring a class action, it was unlikely to be exercised very
often.
A representative plaintiff must have a claim against each
defendant
- 4.53 Four
submitters commented on this issue.
218F[219] They all agreed
that for each defendant there should be at least one representative plaintiff
with a claim against the defendant.
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
thought this approach would give the parties certainty, while allowing for
nuances in
different claims. The Insurance Council thought it would give the
defendant greater certainty about the case it was facing. It also
agreed it
would be overly burdensome to require every class member or representative
plaintiff to have a claim against every defendant.
Recommendations
- R16 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a class action may be commenced by a
proposed representative plaintiff on behalf of a proposed
class of persons if
all claims raise a common issue of fact or law. The proposed class must comprise
at least two persons, in addition
to the representative plaintiff.
- R17 The
Class Actions Act should require the representative plaintiff to be a class
member, except in the case of a state entity. The
Act should allow a state
entity to bring a class action as a representative plaintiff if it is a class
member or if another statute
authorises it to do so.
- R18 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if a class action is commenced against
multiple defendants:
- There
must be a representative plaintiff and at least two other class members with a
claim against each defendant.
- It is
not necessary for each representative plaintiff or each class member to have
claim against all defendants.
Documents to be filed when commencing a class action
- 4.54 As
with other civil proceedings, a class action proceeding will be commenced by
filing a statement of claim and notice of
proceeding.219F[220] The statement
of claim should meet the general requirements of the High Court Rules (HCR), as
well as outlining how it meets the
commencement requirements we recommend in
this section.220F[221]
- 4.55 In other
chapters of this report, we recommend a representative plaintiff should also
file the following documents when commencing
a class action:
(a) An interlocutory application for an order certifying the proceeding as a
class action and appointing one or more representative
plaintiff, with a
supporting affidavit.221F[222]
(b) A ‘Summary of Class Action’ form, to enable other lawyers and
funders to know whether another proceeding would be
considered a concurrent
class action.222F[223]
Two or more class members
- 4.56 We
recommend a class action may be commenced by a proposed representative plaintiff
on behalf of a class comprising at least
two other class
members.223F[224] Only two
submitters disagreed with this aspect of the proposal, on the basis that it
would be inefficient to have a class action
with only three claimants. We agree
that having a class action with a very small number of class members is unlikely
to be consistent
with the objectives of improving access to justice and managing
multiple claims in an efficient way. However, we consider it is better
for the
class size to be considered as part of the certification test, rather than
specifying an arbitrary number as part of commencement
requirements. Under the
certification test we recommend, when the court considers whether a class action
is an appropriate procedure
for the efficient resolution of class member claims,
it must consider the potential size of the
class.224F[225] We think this
approach will allow the court to give more nuanced and case-specific
consideration to class size and is preferable
to specifying a particular number.
We discuss the certification test in Chapter 6.
Each class member must have a claim with a common issue
- 4.57 A
class action is a form of aggregate litigation, which can provide an efficient
way for a court to consider multiple claims
at the same time. Therefore, each
class member must have an individual claim that will be determined by the class
action. We do not
consider it is necessary to use the class action procedure for
litigation involving a single claim that will affect a large group.
- 4.58 We consider
that each class member’s claim should raise a common issue of fact or law
as this is the thread that ties all
the class member claims
together.225F[226] Requiring a
common issue means that a single judgment will determine an issue for all class
members and prevents disparate claims
from being grouped together. The feedback
we received on sub-classes indicated there was little support for class actions
that did
not have a common issue applying to each
claim.226F[227]
- 4.59 We do not
consider that class members must have the same cause of action. There may be
situations where small differences in
factual circumstances lead to class
members having different causes of action and it would still be efficient to
consider the claims
together.227F[228] However, if the
inclusion of multiple disparate causes of action would make a class action
unwieldy and difficult to run, the court
might decline certification on the
basis that a class action would not be an appropriate procedure for the
efficient resolution of
the claims of class members.
- 4.60 We note
that a class member’s claim may include multiple causes of action. While
the common issue must apply to each class
member’s claim, it does not
necessarily have to apply to each cause of action.
Representative plaintiff must be a class member
- 4.61 We
recommend a representative plaintiff must be a class member (subject to an
exception for state entities, which we discuss
below).228F[229] Allowing
non-class member representative plaintiffs such as advocacy organisations would
be a significant departure from normal standing
rules, and we are not satisfied
that it is necessary to ensure access to justice or the efficient management of
multiple claims.
Our consultation did not indicate significant support for this
wider approach. We note almost all representative actions under HCR
4.24 have
been brought by representative plaintiffs who are class
members.229F[230] None of the
submissions we received on difficulties with using HCR 4.24 for group litigation
identified that needing to find a class
member plaintiff was preventing claims
from being brought.
- 4.62 We think
there are benefits to having a representative plaintiff who has their own claim
at stake, including demonstrating that
the class action is supported by a
genuine claimant who is motivated by a desire to resolve their legal claim. A
class member representative
plaintiff will also have similar motivations to
class members, which will be beneficial at critical points such as settlement. A
non-class member representative plaintiff might have a broader objective such as
clarifying the law and could be less willing to
settle than class members.
- 4.63 Having a
class member representative plaintiff can provide some clarity and specificity
to the defendant about the case it is
facing. Where the claim is brought by a
class member, their personal claim can be detailed in the statement of claim and
determined
at the stage one
hearing.230F[231] It also ensures
the defendant will be entitled to discovery from at least one class member.
- 4.64 We
considered the approach used in some Canadian provinces, where a non-class
member can be the representative plaintiff if this
is necessary to avoid a
substantial injustice to the
class.231F[232] In Canada, such
cases are rare.232F[233] While
this approach would provide courts with flexibility to consider whether a
non-class member representative plaintiff is necessary
in the circumstances, it
would also introduce uncertainty as to when this would be allowed. If a similar
threshold such as “substantial
injustice” was adopted, it is likely
that few cases would
qualify.233F[234]
- 4.65 We
acknowledge the concern that it may be difficult to find an appropriate
representative plaintiff in some cases. In Chapter
3, we discussed measures that
may mitigate the burden on a representative plaintiff. In a case where all class
members are children
or persons considered to lack sufficient decision-making
capacity with respect to the decisions required of a representative plaintiff,
it may be appropriate to appoint a litigation guardian to act for the proposed
representative plaintiff.234F[235]
We are aware of Australian class actions where a representative plaintiff has
commenced a claim through their litigation
guardian.235F[236]
State entity as representative plaintiff
- 4.66 Our
draft provision on commencement of a class action allowed a state entity with
the power under another Act to bring proceedings
on behalf of two or more
persons could commence a class
action.236F[237] It also provided
that commencing a proceeding would be subject to any limits or requirements in
the empowering Act.237F[238] This
would include, for example, the public interest criteria that the FMA must
consider before exercising a person’s right
of
action.238F[239]
- 4.67 We have
reconsidered our proposal in light of the feedback we have received,
particularly that provided by the FMA. The Supplementary
Issues Paper had
identified the FMA as an agency that would be able to use our proposed provision
to bring a class action if it considered
this was appropriate.
- 4.68 We remain
of the view that allowing a state entity to bring a class action is an
appropriate exception to the rule that a representative
plaintiff must be a
class member. Some regulators have existing powers to seek compensation for
affected individuals and allowing
a regulator to bring a class action in these
circumstances would simply provide another procedural tool rather than expanding
their
mandate. Having a state entity as a representative plaintiff might allow
class actions to go ahead where a litigation funder would
not consider them to
be economically viable. Many submitters on the Issues Paper were comfortable
with state entities fulfilling
the role of representative plaintiff, although
some stressed this should not be
obligatory.239F[240]
- 4.69 We do,
however, recommend some changes to the approach proposed in the Supplementary
Issues Paper. On reflection, we consider
that it was too general and could cause
confusion about the interaction between the empowering Act and the requirements
of the Class
Actions Act. In some cases, it could be unclear whether a provision
enables a state entity to bring proceedings on behalf of two
or more persons. An
example is section 43 of the Fair Trading Act 1993, which enables any person to
seek compensation orders on behalf
of others but does not specifically refer to
the person acting on a representative
basis.240F[241]
- 4.70 There could
also be uncertainty as to whether procedures in the Class Actions Act or the
empowering Act would take precedence.
For example, the Financial Markets
Authority Act 2011 provides that where the FMA takes over a proceeding, it
cannot be settled,
compromised or discontinued without court
approval.241F[242] In the only
case where this has occurred, the court considered the proposed settlement
against the FMA’s public function and
its objective of promoting and
facilitating the development of fair, efficient and transparent financial
markets.242F[243] There could be
uncertainty as to how these considerations would interact with the settlement
test in the Class Actions Act we recommend
in Chapter 11.
- 4.71 Therefore,
we recommend that a state entity should be able to bring a class action as
representative plaintiff where it is a
class member or where another Act
authorises it to bring a class
action.243F[244] This will ensure
there is specific policy consideration of whether it is necessary and
appropriate to allow a state entity to bring
a class action under a particular
Act. It will also enable clarification of how any procedural requirements of
that Act will interact
with requirements of the Class Actions Act.
Class actions against multiple defendants
- 4.72 We
consider the approach to class actions involving multiple defendants outlined in
the Supplementary Issues Paper is appropriate.
Submitters did not raise any
concerns with our proposal.
- 4.73 Where a
claim is brought against multiple defendants, we recommend that for each
defendant there must be a representative plaintiff
with a claim against
them.244F[245] This will help to
provide some clarity to a defendant about the claim against them and will ensure
a defendant is entitled to obtain
discovery from at least one class
member.245F[246] We also think the
interests of all class members are likely to be better represented when there is
at least one representative plaintiff
with a claim against each defendant.
- 4.74 It should
not be necessary for class members or representative plaintiffs to have a claim
against every defendant.246F[247]
We think that would be too restrictive and could prevent a class action in
situations where it might be an efficient way of dealing
with multiple claims.
However, there should be at least one representative plaintiff and two class
members with a claim against each
defendant.247F[248] There should
also be a common issue that applies to all class member claims, even if there
are different defendants.
LIMITATION PERIODS
- 4.75 In
ordinary litigation, a plaintiff must commence a proceeding before any relevant
limitation period expires. In the Supplementary
Issues Paper, we said a class
actions regime should provide some clarity on how limitation periods will apply
to class members, who
do not technically commence a proceeding
themselves.248F[249]
- 4.76 We outlined
two possible approaches. One option was for the limitation periods applying to
all proposed class members to be suspended
when a class action is filed,
regardless of whether the class action is
certified.249F[250] A narrower
approach would only apply the suspension of limitation periods to certified
class actions. This would mean if the class
action is not certified, none of the
proposed class members would have the benefit of suspension of limitation
periods.250F[251]
- 4.77 Our
preference was for the suspension of limitation periods to apply to all class
actions that are commenced, not just those
that are ultimately certified. We
said the latter approach would cause considerable uncertainty and could lead to
potential class
members filing their own individual claims as a precaution.
There could be a considerable delay between a proceeding being commenced
and a
court releasing its decision on certification, and a class member will likely
have little control over these
timeframes.251F[252]
- 4.78 We also
said a class actions regime should specify when a limitation period would start
running again for individual class members.
We suggested a limitation period
should start running again when any of the following
applies:252F[253]
(a) The court declines to certify a class action.
(b) The court makes an order that has the effect of removing or excluding a
class member’s claim from the proceeding.
(c) A class member decides not to opt into an opt-in class action.
(d) A class member decides to opt out of an opt-out class action.
(e) The proceeding otherwise ends without an adjudication on the merits, for
example if the plaintiff discontinues the claim.
- 4.79 If there is
a right of appeal from any of these circumstances, we said the suspension period
should continue to run until the
appeal period has expired or the appeal has
been finally disposed of.
Results of consultation
- 4.80 We
asked submitters whether they agreed that the limitation periods applying to all
proposed class members should be suspended
when a class action is commenced. We
also asked which events should start the limitation period applying to a class
member running
again. We received 12 submissions that addressed limitation
periods.253F[254]
When should limitation periods be suspended?
- 4.81 Nine
submitters agreed with our proposal that limitation periods applying to proposed
class members should be suspended when
a class action is commenced, even if the
class action is not ultimately
certified.254F[255] The Insurance
Council commented that this approach would provide certainty for the parties and
was the fairest approach for class
members, particularly if the class action was
not certified. Shine Lawyers said this approach would be particularly relevant
where
there were competing class actions that might take months to resolve.
- 4.82 Two
submitters thought a narrower approach to suspension of limitation periods was
desirable. Bell Gully submitted that limitation
periods should only suspend for
class members if the class action is certified. It said the potential
uncertainty for class members
needs to be weighed against the uncertainty for
defendants who have no control over the timing and merit of any class action.
- 4.83 Chapman
Tripp considered it would be unfair to defendants to allow limitation periods to
be suspended in all cases and not just
those ultimately certified, and that this
would undermine the policy of the Limitation Act 2010. Nonetheless, it
acknowledged that
it could be inefficient if class members filed their own
claims as a precaution in case the class action was not certified. It said
suspension of limitation periods should only apply to people who were within the
potential class when the class action was commenced
but ultimately were not
class members, either because the case was not certified or they opted out or
did not opt in. Chapman Tripp
considered that suspension of limitation periods
was not required beyond the point where it had become clear that the proceedings
had been properly brought and on whose behalf.
When should limitation periods start running again?
- 4.84 Seven
submitters agreed with our proposed list of circumstances that should start
limitation periods running
again.255F[256] Two submitters
broadly agreed with the list but disagreed that limitation periods should start
running again after discontinuance.
Chapman Tripp said if a class action is
brought within a limitation period, class members should be bound by the result
of those
proceedings, including any decision of the representative plaintiff to
discontinue the case. Simpson Grierson said limitation periods
should not begin
running again if the representative plaintiff discontinues the claim due to a
settlement that compromises the claims
of the representative plaintiff and class
members.
- 4.85 Bell Gully
said that if limitation periods are only suspended where a class action is
certified, limitation periods would only
need to recommence if a class member
opted out (or did not opt in) or the claim is discontinued without a settlement.
Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia disagreed with the approach of having
a specific list and preferred the more general Australian approach to enable
flexibility.256F[257]
Other limitation issues
- 4.86 Tom
Weston QC raised the issue of how limitation periods would work with competing
class actions. He asked whether the first
class action filed would suspend the
limitation period for everyone, including those covered by competing class
actions. Similarly,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said it was
unclear how the limitation would interact with other procedural steps such
as
certification. For example, if the court declined to certify one class action
but other competing claims had been stayed pending
certification, it asked
whether the limitation period on the competing claims would begin to run. It
also queried how limitation
periods would interact with the proposal that
additional class members could opt into a proceeding at settlement. Maurice
Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia also suggested that information about
limitation periods should be provided in class member notices.
- 4.87 Shine
Lawyers submitted that courts should have a general discretion to order that a
general limitation defence does not apply,
such as where the class member
definition is amended at a late stage to include additional class members. It
also said the parties
should be entitled to agree not to raise a limitation
defence.
- 4.88 Gilbert
Walker commented on the impact of limitation rules on contribution claims. It
said contribution claims could be lost
or seriously prejudiced when many years
have passed between the acts or omissions on which the claim is based and the
defendant’s
ability to bring a contribution claim. A defendant may be
unable to bring a contribution claim or put a third party on notice until
the
identity of the claimants is known. In the meantime, a third party might take
steps to render a contribution claim difficult
or impossible.
Recommendations
- R19 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a class action is commenced, the
limitation periods applying to the claim of each person
falling within the
proposed class definition are suspended.
- R20 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if a person subsequently becomes eligible
to be a class member as the result of a change
to the class definition, the
limitation period applying to their claim is suspended from the date at which
they become eligible to
join the class action.
- R21 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the limitation period applying to the
claim of a class member or potential class member
begins running again if and
when:
- The
court dismisses an application for certification or decertifies the class
action.
- The
court makes an order that has the effect of removing or excluding the claim from
the proceeding.
- In an
opt-in proceeding, the potential class member does not opt into the class action
by the date specified in the opt-in notice.
- In an
opt-out proceeding, a potential class member opts out of the class action by the
date specified in the opt-out notice.
- The
proceeding is dismissed without an adjudication on the merits.
- The
proceeding is abandoned or discontinued.
If there is a
right of appeal in any of these situations listed, then the limitation period
should not begin running until the expiry
of any appeal period or until any
appeal has been finally disposed of.
- 4.89 When a
class action is commenced, we recommend that the limitation periods applying to
claims of proposed class members should
be suspended, regardless of whether the
proceeding is ultimately certified as a class action. There was little support
for only allowing
the limitation periods to be suspended where the class action
is ultimately certified. We think such an approach would cause considerable
uncertainty and may lead to potential class members filing their own individual
claims as a precaution. This does not seem consistent
with the objectives of
improving access to justice and managing multiple claims in an efficient way.
- 4.90 If the
class definition is amended after a class action is commenced and this results
in additional persons falling within the
class definition, we consider that
limitation periods applying to those persons should be suspended only from the
date they fall
within the class (and not from the date the class action was
commenced). A change in the definition of the class should not be able
to
resurrect claims where the limitation period has already expired. Our approach
is broadly consistent with that of the Limitation
Act, which requires
proceedings to be filed within the applicable limitation period.
- 4.91 To provide
clarity, we recommend the Class Actions Act should specify the situations which
will lead to limitation periods starting
running again. We think suspension of
limitation periods should continue during the class action until one of the
prescribed situations
arises. Given that a class action can be lengthy,
limitation periods might otherwise expire during a class action, leaving an
individual
class member with no recourse if a class action ends without an
adjudication on the merits or a full and final settlement. An example
might be
where a litigation funder decides to withdraw from funding the class action,
which leads to the representative plaintiff
discontinuing the
litigation.257F[258] In this
situation, an individual class member might wish to bring their own individual
proceeding after the class action is discontinued.
- 4.92 We think
limitation periods should start running again in the following
situations:
(a) When the court dismisses an application for certification or decertifies the
class action.
(b) When the court makes an order that has the effect of removing or excluding a
claim from the proceeding. An example would be where
the court makes an order
that narrows the class definition or strikes out a cause of action.
(c) In an opt-in proceeding, where a potential class member does not opt into
the class action by the date specified in the opt-in
notice. Limitation would
start running from the date specified in the opt-in notice as the last date for
opting in.
(d) In an opt-out proceeding, where a potential class member opts out of the
class action by the date specified in the opt-out notice.
Limitation would start
running from the date the class member opts out.
(e) When the proceeding is dismissed without an adjudication on the merits.
(f) When the proceeding is abandoned or discontinued.
- 4.93 This list
includes the court dismissing an application for certification. This will occur
where either the court finds the certification
test is not met, or where the
court decides that one or more concurrent class actions will not be certified.
If the court decides
that more than one concurrent class action will be
certified and temporarily stays one of them (for example, so the other can be
run as a test case), we propose that limitation periods will remain
suspended.258F[259] In addition,
we have added decertification of a class action to (a) to reflect our
recommendation in Chapter 6 that the court should
have a power to decertify a
class action if it no longer meets the certification criteria.
- 4.94 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we referred to the proceeding otherwise ending
without an adjudication on the merits, instead
of specifically referring to a
proceeding being dismissed, abandoned or discontinued. For clarity, we have
decided to spell these
out.259F[260] We have not included
a settlement in this list as it will result in class member claims being
extinguished.260F[261] To the
extent a settlement does not extinguish a claim (such as where a settlement is
only with some defendants or a sub-class),
the litigation will continue and it
is not necessary for limitation periods to start running again.
- 4.95 If there is
the ability to appeal in any of the situations listed, the limitation period
should not begin running until the expiry
of any appeal period or until any
appeal has been finally disposed of.
DRAFT COMMENCEMENT PROVISIONS
- 4.96 Below
we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect to our
recommendations on commencement.
1 Commencement of class action in High Court
(1) A person may commence a class action proceeding
against 1 or more defendants as the proposed representative plaintiff—
(a) on behalf of a proposed class; and
(b) if the claims of the members of the proposed class all raise a common issue.
(2) A proceeding under subsection (1) may be commenced by more than 1
proposed representative plaintiff.
(3) A State entity may commence a class action proceeding against 1 or more
defendants as the proposed representative plaintiff on
behalf of a proposed
class if—
(a) it is itself a member of the proposed class and the claims of the members of
the proposed class all raise a common issue; or
(b) another Act authorises it to bring a class action proceeding.
(4) This section does not itself confer jurisdiction on the court to hear a
proceeding, which must otherwise be within the jurisdiction
of the court.
(5) In this section,—
class means,—
(a) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (1), at least 2
persons together with the proposed representative plaintiff, who must also be a
class member:
(b) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (3), at least 2
persons in addition to the State entity
common issue means a common issue of fact or law.
2 Multiple defendants
(1) If a class action proceeding is commenced under
section 1(1) against more than 1 defendant,—
(a) for each defendant there must be a proposed representative plaintiff and at
least 2 other persons with a claim against that defendant:
(b) if there are 2 or more proposed representative plaintiffs, it is not
necessary for each of them to have a claim against all of
the defendants:
(c) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is
commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.
(2) If a class action proceeding is commenced under section 1(3)
against more than 1 defendant,—
(a) for each defendant there must be at least 2 persons with a claim against
that defendant:
(b) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is
commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.
3 Application for certification of class action
When a class action
proceeding is commenced, it must be accompanied by an application for an order
certifying the proceeding as a
class action proceeding and appointing 1 or more
representative plaintiffs for the proceeding.
CHAPTER 5
Concurrent class actions
INTRODUCTION
- 5.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) The need for a process to manage concurrent class actions.
(b) Defining concurrent class actions.
(c) The deadline for filing concurrent class actions.
(d) The timing of a hearing on concurrent class actions.
(e) The court’s powers to manage concurrent class actions.
(f) Criteria to apply when assessing concurrent class actions.
(g) Defendant participation in concurrent class action hearings.
- 5.2 At the end
of this chapter, we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect
to our recommendations on concurrent
class actions.
THE NEED FOR A PROCESS TO MANAGE CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS
- 5.3 As
we observed in the Supplementary Issues Paper, having competing class actions
relating to the same dispute is generally undesirable.
It can cause increased
costs for all parties, inefficient use of court resources, an increased burden
on defendants, confusion for
class members and the risk of inconsistent court
rulings on common issues.261F[262]
This was echoed in many of the submissions we received. A small number of
submitters suggested competing class actions could have
the benefits of lowering
funding commissions and providing choice for class members.
- 5.4 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we discussed the approaches taken by other
jurisdictions to managing competing class actions.
We suggested that Aotearoa
New Zealand should have a legislative provision setting out a process to
determine how competing class
actions should be
managed.262F[263] The experience
of other jurisdictions indicated that without an express provision, the process
of addressing competing class actions
could be costly and drawn out. Although
Aotearoa New Zealand is likely to have fewer competing class actions than other
jurisdictions
due to its smaller size, we remain of the view that it is
desirable to have a clear process for managing any instances of competing
class
actions that occur. Many submitters were supportive of having a legislative
provision to manage competing class actions.
- 5.5 Some
submitters queried whether the term “competing” class actions is
appropriate. For example, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia commented
that this term can be an unhelpful or pejorative description of what might be
better described as overlapping
class actions.
- 5.6 We accept
that referring to multiple class actions as “competing” will not
always be accurate or helpful. We therefore
prefer the term “concurrent
class actions” and this is the term we use in our draft legislative
provisions and recommendations.
However, this chapter uses the language of
“competing class actions” when discussing what we said in the
Supplementary
Issues Paper and the submissions we received.
DEFINING CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS
- 5.7 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said the class actions legislation should
define what would be regarded as competing class
actions and discussed two
approaches.263F[264] One approach
is to require some overlap in the class definition so that at least some people
are members of more than one class.
A wider definition would also include class
actions with respect to the same legal dispute or subject matter where none of
the class
members overlap.
- 5.8 We thought a
wide definition of competing class actions was appropriate as it would allow the
court to respond to multiple class
actions on the same issue, even if there was
no overlap in class membership. We proposed the following definition of
competing class
actions:264F[265]
- Two or more
class actions with respect to the same or substantially similar issues filed
against the same defendant by different
representative
plaintiffs.
Results of consultation
- 5.9 We
asked submitters whether they agreed with our proposed definition of competing
class actions. Fifteen submitters addressed
this
question.265F[266]
- 5.10 Eleven
submitters agreed with our proposed
definition.266F[267] Submitters
commented that it would give the court sufficient flexibility to manage multiple
class actions appropriately to avoid
inefficiencies.
- 5.11 Four
submitters preferred a different approach to the
definition.267F[268] Two of these
submitters queried whether it is necessary for the class actions to be against
the same defendant. Dr Michael Duffy
(Monash University) noted there may be
cases where one class action names an auditor or financial advisor as a
defendant and another
class action does not. The International Bar Association
(IBA) Antitrust Committee supported a wide approach, that focused on the
dispute
or subject matter rather than the identity of the defendants. At consultation
workshops, it was noted that there could be
two class actions on the same
matter, where one is brought against the company and the other is brought
against the directors.
- 5.12 Omni
Bridgeway disagreed with our proposed definition and said it should be limited
to a situation where more than one representative
plaintiff seeks to represent
the same class members. It said two class actions that do not have overlapping
class membership are
not in competition with each other. Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia preferred giving the court flexibility to
determine
whether class actions are competing on a case-by-case basis. It said
the court might benefit from the guidance in the Federal Court
of Australia
Practice Note on this
issue.268F[269]
- 5.13 Submitters
also raised the issue of how to manage multiple cases on the same issue, where
only one is a class action. Gilbert
Walker referred to the recent situation of
two cases against James Hardie going to trial, with one brought as a multi-party
case
and the other as a representative action. It noted these cases traversed
the same issue in succession and involved many hearing weeks
and the same
experts on both sides, which was an inefficient use of court resources. At our
consultation workshops, we were told
that having a representative action or
multi-party proceeding as well as a class action on the same issue could be
burdensome for
the defendant and the courts.
Recommendation
- R22 The
Class Actions Act should define a concurrent class action proceeding as a class
action proceeding that has in common with another
class action proceeding that
is currently before the court:
- The
same or substantially similar issues in dispute; and
- At
least one defendant.
- 5.14 We remain
of the view that a wide definition of a concurrent class action is appropriate
and that it should not be limited to
class actions that involve overlapping
class membership. We think having more than one class action about the same
matter is likely
to be inefficient and burdensome for the courts and the
defendant, and may cause confusion for class members, even if there is no
overlap in class membership. Although a wide definition could capture class
actions that are only peripherally related, this is something
the court can
consider when determining how the class actions should be managed.
- 5.15 At the same
time, we think the definition needs to provide sufficient certainty for
litigants as to what will be considered a
concurrent class action. This is
especially important because of our recommendation later in this chapter that
any concurrent class
action must be filed within 90 days of the first class
action being commenced. For this reason, we do not think it should be simply
left up to the courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether two class
actions are concurrent.
- 5.16 We have
considered whether it is necessary to refer to cases being against the same
defendant or whether the definition could
simply refer to class actions being on
the same dispute, matter or issue. However, we consider this latter approach
would be too
wide, could lead to preliminary disputes about whether class
actions are concurrent, and may not give potential litigants enough
clarity
about which class actions need to be filed within the 90-day timeframe. A key
reason for regulating concurrent class actions
is to reduce the burden on
defendants of having to respond to the same issues in multiple proceedings. The
requirement for the same
defendant also means that one party will be aware of
the existence of concurrent class actions and can bring this to the
court’s
attention at a case management conference.
- 5.17 We
acknowledge that class actions could be brought against multiple defendants, and
that two class actions might not share all
the same defendants. We have
therefore amended our proposed definition of concurrent class actions to require
at least one common
defendant. We have also amended our definition to require
the first class action to be currently before the court. If a proceeding
is
filed, but later dismissed, abandoned or discontinued, this should not prevent
further class actions from being brought on the
same or similar issues against
the same defendant.
- 5.18 We
recommend a concurrent class action be defined
as:269F[270]
- A class action
proceeding that has the following in common with another class action proceeding
currently before the court:
- (a) the same or
substantially similar issues in dispute; and
- (b) at least
one defendant.
- 5.19 Our
definition only refers to class action proceedings. It will not prevent cases
being brought as representative actions or
as ordinary proceedings with numerous
plaintiffs. We agree with submitters that having multiple proceedings that
traverse the same
matters is unlikely to be efficient for the court and for a
defendant. However, given our recommendation in Chapter 2 that the Class
Actions
Act should only apply to class actions, our provision on concurrent class
actions can only address the issue of multiple
class actions. This reflects the
principle for developing a class actions regime that there should not be adverse
impacts on other
forms of group litigation.
- 5.20 We
therefore think it would be preferable to manage this issue through other
mechanisms in the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR). The
court has powers to order two
or more proceedings to be consolidated, tried at the same time or tried
successively, or to stay one
proceeding until another is
heard.270F[271] We also recommend
in Chapter 2 that Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee
consider amending Rule 4.24 of the
High Court Rules and Rule 4.24 of the
District Court Rules to provide they should not be used where a proceeding is
more appropriately
brought as a class action. This could include situations
where a plaintiff seeks to bring a representative action as a means of avoiding
the concurrent class action rules.
DEADLINE FOR FILING CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS
- 5.21 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we discussed whether a deadline for filing any
competing class action was
desirable.271F[272] The Australian
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) favoured an approach where any competing class
action would need to be filed within a
defined period, such as 90 days from when
the first class action is commenced. It preferred this being in a Practice Note
so the
court would have some flexibility as to the
timeframe.272F[273] In Ontario,
any competing class action must be filed within 60 days of the initial class
action being filed (or with the leave of
the
court).273F[274]
- 5.22 We said it
would be desirable to have a time limit for filing any competing class actions,
otherwise new class actions could
be filed after the first proceeding had been
certified.274F[275] We proposed
that any competing class actions should be filed within 90 days of the first
class action being commenced. After that
date, we proposed that any competing
class action could only be commenced with the leave of the court. We suggested
that whether
the parties are aware of any competing class actions could be a
matter discussed at the initial case management conference. We anticipated
this
conference would occur prior to the certification hearing.
- 5.23 If there
was a time limit for filing a class action, we said it was important that other
lawyers and funders were aware that
the first class action had been
filed.275F[276] We suggested there
could be a publicly available list of current class actions on Ngā
Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand
website, with an ability to sign up
for email notifications of any new class actions. It might also be necessary to
make the statement
of claim publicly available.
Results of consultation
- 5.24 We
asked submitters whether a competing class action should be filed within 90 days
of the first class action being filed (or
with the leave of the court) and how
information about new class actions could be made available to lawyers and
funders. We received
17 submissions on this
question.276F[277]
Timeframe for filing competing class actions
- 5.25 Fifteen
submitters agreed that competing class actions should be filed within 90 days
(or with leave of the
court).277F[278] Reasons given by
submitters included:
(a) There would be ongoing uncertainty unless there was a time limit.
(b) A 90-day period would allow sufficient flexibility to ensure the process is
fair for all parties.
(c) In most cases, it should allow sufficient time for actions to be
investigated properly and also provide certainty for the participants
and the
court at an early stage of the proceedings.
(d) Having a timeframe is consistent with ensuring fairness to defendants and
the efficient case management of proceedings.
(e) It will avoid subsequent class actions after a proceeding has been
certified, resulting in multiple class actions proceeding
by default.
(f) It aligns with the objective of increasing efficiency and reducing the
burden on the court.
(g) If there are going to be competing class actions, it will be important to
promptly deal with the challenges they present.
- 5.26 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia preferred a more flexible approach than a
90-day time period, with the question left
to the court to determine. It said
that, if the court has a range of powers, which might include allowing two
proceedings to run
in parallel, there is no reason why a potentially competing
claim must be filed within 90 days. If a statutory timeframe is necessary,
it
suggested six months would be appropriate. It said this would be long enough to
avoid a de facto ‘first to file’ rule,
but not so long that
proceedings are unduly delayed.
- 5.27 Michael
Duffy suggested the 90-day period may be too short and should perhaps be
extended. The IBA Antitrust Committee said the
timeframe needed to be long
enough to give litigants the opportunity to commence proceedings without causing
undue unfairness or
allowing court processes to substantively run. It said 90
days seemed appropriate, as did 120 days.
- 5.28 Bell Gully
and LPF Group suggested the 90-day period could begin once there is public
notice of the first class
action.278F[279] Michael Duffy
suggested any time limit should not start until after the notice of commencement
and right to opt-out has gone to class
members.
- 5.29 Chapman
Tripp said leave should only be granted to bring a competing class action
outside of the 90-day period in limited circumstances.
The IBA Antitrust
Committee said leave should only be granted in extenuating circumstances to
ensure certainty and suggested a rebuttable
presumption that leave would not be
granted.
Publicising new class actions
- 5.30 Many
submitters supported the use of a register of class actions on a platform such
as the Courts of New Zealand website, with
the ability to sign up for email
notifications of new class
actions.279F[280] Submitters noted
that class actions typically attract substantial media attention, which will
alert lawyers and funders. It was also
suggested that information about new
class actions could be published in legal publications such as Kōrero
Mō te Ture | Law Talk. The IBA Antitrust Committee noted that while
Aotearoa New Zealand does not currently have established plaintiff class action
law
firms, that will likely change with the introduction of a class actions
regime and a notification system that relies on notice being
given to firms
could soon be workable.
- 5.31 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia questioned whether statements of claim should
be made publicly available, as this
could encourage unwanted strategic behaviour
by competing firms to “one-up” the first-filed proceeding.
Conversely, Omni
Bridgeway supported statements of claim being available online
to enable lawyers and funders to establish whether their claim will
compete with
an existing proceeding. The IBA Antitrust Committee suggested directions could
be made about the form of disclosure
required, which would result in a
“book” of disclosures being made available for browsing by
interested parties.
Recommendations
- R23 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule to require a proposed representative
plaintiff to
file a Summary of Class Action form when commencing a class action that provides
the following information:
- The
proposed defendant or defendants.
- The
proposed class definition.
- Whether
it is proposed that class membership would be determined on an opt-in or opt-out
basis.
- A
summary of the circumstances giving rise to the claims, including any relevant
time periods.
- The
causes of action.
- The
relief sought.
- Whether
the applicant is aware of any concurrent class action that has been filed.
- The
lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff and the class.
- Details
of any website with further information about the class action.
- R24 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should create a class actions
webpage within Ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts
of New Zealand website and
be responsible for keeping this updated. The information on this webpage should
include:
- A
public register of class actions that contains a list of class actions that have
been commenced, the date on which the class action
was published on the public
register and a Summary of Class Action form for each class action.
- An
option to subscribe to email updates of new class actions added to the public
register of class actions.
- R25 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a concurrent class action proceeding must
be commenced within 90 days of the date on which
notice of the first of the
concurrent class action proceedings is given on the class actions register, or
with the leave of the Court.
- 5.32 We consider
the Class Actions Act should specify a time period for filing any concurrent
class actions. This will provide some
degree of certainty to litigants and allow
the court to consider how to manage concurrent class actions at an early stage.
A deadline
is particularly important because we recommend a certification stage.
We think it would be undesirable to have additional class actions
filed once a
class action has been certified.
- 5.33 The
appropriate timeframe needs to be long enough to allow other lawyers and funders
sufficient time to assess whether a concurrent
class action would be viable and
to commence proceedings. This would include analysing potential legal claims,
identifying an appropriate
representative plaintiff (including ensuring the
person has received independent legal advice), preparing a statement of claim
and
application for certification and ensuring that suitable legal
representation and funding has been arranged. However, given the first
class
action cannot be significantly progressed until it is known whether there are
any concurrent class actions, the timeframe should
not be longer than necessary.
- 5.34 We consider
that 90 days is an appropriate period. We think this should be sufficient time
for other lawyers and funders to consider
whether to bring another class action,
while not causing significant delay to the first class action. In some
situations, other lawyers
and funders will have been aware of the circumstances
giving rise to the first class action (such as regulatory action) or that a
law
firm has been seeking registrations of interest for a potential class action.
They may have already undertaken some initial consideration
of whether to bring
a class action before the first class action is published on the public
register. Most of the submissions we
received on this issue considered that 90
days was appropriate. This included some submissions from plaintiff lawyers and
litigation
funders with experience in assessing potential group actions.
- 5.35 While 90
days is not a lengthy period, our intention is to provide a fair opportunity for
any concurrent class actions to be
filed, rather than to encourage concurrent
class actions. In Chapter 14, we acknowledge the benefits of competition in
funded litigation,
including its potential to lower funding commissions.
However, this needs to be balanced against the efficiency objective of the
class
actions regime. We note that in Ontario, which is a larger jurisdiction with
greater likelihood of concurrent class actions,
subsequent class actions on the
same or a similar issue with some overlap in class membership must be filed
within 60 days.280F[281]
- 5.36 Once the
90-day period has ended, we recommend a concurrent class action should only be
able to be commenced with the leave of
the
court.281F[282] We think this
provides an important safeguard to prevent any unfairness. We propose leaving
the circumstances where leave would be
granted to the court’s discretion.
However, we envisage that leave would only be granted in limited circumstances.
An example
might be where the concurrent class action is only peripherally
related to the first class action and it was not clear that it should
have been
commenced within the 90-day period.
- 5.37 We
acknowledge the policy concern that having a time limit essentially imposes a
strict limitation period on those who might
otherwise wish to bring a concurrent
class action to resolve their claims. While our proposal is designed to allow
multiple claims
to be managed in an efficient way, it may impact on our other
objective of improving access to justice. However, we consider our
recommendation strikes the appropriate balance between these objectives. Our
conception of access to justice is wider than simply
access to the courts.
Having multiple class actions about the same issue may be unfair to defendants,
cause delay for other court
users and be confusing for class members. The 90-day
period would not be an absolute bar to bringing claims before the court, only
to
bringing them as a concurrent class action. Individual claims could still be
brought, or a non-concurrent class action could be
brought (such as against a
different defendant). The court could also grant leave to allow claims to be
commenced outside the 90-day
period if it considers this appropriate.
- 5.38 We consider
the 90-day period should begin from the time of public notification that a class
action has been filed. We recommend
Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of
Justice create a class actions webpage on the Courts of New Zealand website. We
envisage
this would contain a class actions register with a list of class
actions that have been commenced and the date they were added to
this register.
There should be a function to subscribe to email updates of new cases added to
the class actions register, similar
to the ability to subscribe to judgments of
public interest.
- 5.39 It will
also be necessary to provide some information about the class action on the
webpage so that lawyers and funders can see
whether another class action would
be considered concurrent. Our consultation has indicated some concerns about
having the statement
of claim made available by default, as it may contain
confidential information. There may also be some unfairness in allowing
competitors
to have automatic access to legal documents that considerable work
has gone into. Instead, we think specific information should be
provided about
the class action.
- 5.40 We
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a High Court Rule to require a
proposed representative plaintiff to file
a Summary of Class Action form when
commencing a class action proceeding, which the Ministry of Justice would make
available on the
class actions webpage. The Rules Committee could consider
developing a standard form for this, to be included in a schedule to the
High
Court Rules. We consider the Summary of Class Action should include:
(a) The proposed defendant or defendants.
(b) The proposed class definition.
(c) Whether it is proposed that class membership would be determined on an
opt-in or opt-out basis.
(d) A summary of the circumstances giving rise to the claims, including any
relevant time periods.
(e) The causes of action.
(f) The relief sought.
(g) Whether the applicant is aware of any concurrent class action that has been
filed.
(h) The lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff and the class.
(i) Details of any website with further information about the class action.
- 5.41 Some
lawyers or funders may choose to make the statement of claim available on a
website promoting the class
action.282F[283] Other lawyers or
funders could also apply to the court for access to documents on the court file,
following the usual processes for
this. However, we do not consider there should
be a requirement to proactively publish a statement of claim as the information
in
our proposed Summary of Class Action should be sufficient to enable other
litigants to understand whether a contemplated class action
would be considered
concurrent.
TIMING OF HEARING ON CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS
- 5.42 The
Supplementary Issues Paper discussed when the court should consider how to
manage competing class
actions.283F[284] We identified
three options. The court could have a separate hearing on competing class
actions, prior to certification. This would
prevent multiple plaintiffs from
having to incur the cost of a certification hearing. However, it might involve a
court considering
substantially similar issues at two different hearings. There
would also be a risk of considerable delay, particularly if there was
an appeal
from the court’s decision on competing class actions. It could also lead
to a situation where one class action is
selected to proceed, but then fails at
certification.
- 5.43 Alternatively,
competing class actions could be considered at certification. While this would
require multiple plaintiffs to
incur the expense of a certification hearing, it
would prevent the relitigation of issues at certification. It would also avoid
the
delay caused by having separate hearings, judgments and appeals.
- 5.44 A third
option was for the court to have discretion as to whether it considers competing
class actions at certification or prior.
This would give the court flexibility
to consider what would be most efficient in a particular case but could also
cause uncertainty
and delay.
- 5.45 Our
preferred approach was for the court to consider the issue of competing class
actions at the same time as certification,
as we thought it would be the most
efficient option for the parties and the court.
Results of consultation
- 5.46 We
asked submitters when the court should determine the issue of competing class
actions. We received 17 submissions on this
issue.284F[285]
- 5.47 Thirteen
submitters thought the court should consider competing class actions at the same
time as certification.285F[286]
Reasons given by submitters included:
(a) It is the most efficient option for the parties and the court, and will
minimise expense and/or delay.
(b) If the issue of competing class actions is resolved prior to certification,
there is a risk that the ‘chosen’ class
action is not certified.
(c) While it will require multiple parties to incur the cost and expense of a
certification hearing, plaintiffs commence a class
action on the understanding
that such a hearing will be required.
(d) There is likely to be an overlap in some of the factors considered in the
tests for competing class actions and certification.
- 5.48 Nicole
Smith suggested there should be a requirement for the lawyers acting for the
competing class actions to go to mediation
to see whether the classes can be
combined.
- 5.49 Two
submitters favoured the court determining the issue of competing class actions
prior to certification. LPF Group said this
would provide a plaintiff with
certainty that a class action can proceed. Shine Lawyers said it would be
onerous to expect a defendant
to prepare for a certification hearing with
respect to multiple proceedings. Requiring multiple plaintiffs to prepare for
certification
would increase uncertainty and risk, which could increase funding
commissions or act as a significant impediment to class actions
being commenced.
It also said that determining competing class actions prior to certification
would reduce the complexity of any
appeal arising out of a certification
decision.
- 5.50 Two
submitters proposed other options. Zane Kennedy said there is little point in
the court considering how to manage competing
class actions until after each has
been certified. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia thought the court
should have discretion
to determine the issue of competing class actions at any
stage, based on the circumstances of the case. It said that, if competing
class
actions and certification were considered at the same time, it could become an
“omnibus procedural hearing”. It
said it could be unnecessarily
costly for a defendant to have to prepare detailed submissions on multiple class
actions.
Recommendation
- R26 The
Class Actions Act should require the court to consider the applications for
certification of concurrent class action proceedings
together.
- 5.51 We
recommend the issue of how to manage concurrent class actions should be resolved
at the same time as certification. To achieve
this, we recommend the Class
Actions Act should require the court to consider the applications for
certification of concurrent class
actions
together.286F[287] We consider
this is likely to be more efficient than having a concurrent class actions
hearing prior to certification. There is some
overlap between the certification
test we recommend and the factors we propose a court should consider when
deciding which of the
concurrent class actions it will certify. For example,
whether the representative plaintiff seeks to bring an opt-in or opt-out class
action will be considered by the court as part of the certification test and
will also be relevant when considering how concurrent
class actions are
formulated. Requiring a separate hearing on concurrent class actions prior to
certification could cause considerable
delay, particularly if there is an
appeal.
- 5.52 While our
approach will require multiple parties to prepare for a certification hearing,
this will be a known cost of bringing
a class action. This cost will not
necessarily be wasted as the court may decide that multiple class actions can
proceed. While some
submitters raised concerns about the cost for defendants of
responding to multiple certification applications, submissions that focused
on
defendant perspectives did not express concern about this issue. We discuss the
issue of costs for certification in Chapter 12,
including where there are
concurrent class actions.
THE COURT’S POWERS TO MANAGE CONCURRENT CLASS
ACTIONS
- 5.53 The
Supplementary Issues Paper discussed what powers the court should have to manage
competing class actions.287F[288]
One option was for the court to select one class action to progress and stay the
other proceedings, which is the approach taken in
Canada.
- 5.54 Alternatively,
the court could be empowered to make a wider range of orders when managing
competing class actions, as in Australia.
This could include consolidating the
proceedings, ordering them to be tried simultaneously or successively, selecting
one class action
as a test case with the other proceedings temporarily stayed,
or requiring amendments to class definitions.
- 5.55 A middle
ground approach could involve a presumption that only one class action will
proceed, subject to the overriding discretion
of the court to order
otherwise.
- 5.56 We
expressed the view that in most cases, it will be desirable for only one class
action to proceed. However, this will not
always be the case, particularly if
the class actions are managed and heard together.
Results of consultation
- 5.57 We
asked submitters whether a court should be required to select one class action
to proceed and stay the other proceedings,
or whether the court should have a
broader range of powers available to it. We received 17 submissions on this
question.288F[289]
- 5.58 Three
submitters thought only one class action should be allowed to proceed. Bell
Gully said allowing two class actions to go
ahead would not enhance access to
justice and would cause unnecessary cost and confusion. It said the other
proceedings should be
dismissed, as leaving other class actions effectively
“hanging” through a stay would create issues of res judicata
and a potential “long tail of risk” for defendants. Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council commented that
allowing competing class
actions taking different approaches would be inefficient for courts and costly
for defendants. Michael Duffy
supported only allowing one class action to
proceed but considered that other lawyers should be able to represent individual
class
members in relation to individual issues.
- 5.59 Thirteen
submitters supported the court having a broader range of powers to manage
competing class actions.289F[290]
Several submitters said this would allow the court flexibility to deal with the
circumstances of individual cases. Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia
said only allowing one class action to proceed would make the competing class
actions hearing the defining event
of the proceedings and a
“winner-takes-all” contest. It said this approach might lead to
inappropriate strategic behaviour
such as a race to the courthouse with claims
being inadequately investigated and prepared, overbroad pleadings designed to
exaggerate
case value or appear to represent the biggest class, unsubstantiated
public commentary by lawyers and funders about the value of
claims, unrealistic
litigation budgets and tactical delay.
- 5.60 Some
submitters supported a presumption in favour of a single proceeding, with the
court having discretion to allow multiple
class actions in appropriate
circumstances.290F[291] Nikki
Chamberlain (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland) suggested multiple
class actions could be allowed where it would
be against the interests of
justice to order otherwise and any efficiency concerns are outweighed by
proportionality in light of
the claim value. Chapman Tripp said that, in rare
cases it might be appropriate to have multiple class actions that would be heard
together, such as cases on similar issues with a slightly different focus or
class definition.
- 5.61 Consultation
workshop participants had a range of views on this question. Some supported a
presumption that only one case will
go ahead and noted the inefficiency of
having multiple class actions on the same issue. Other participants noted that
competing class
actions could encourage more competitive legal costs and funding
commissions, which could benefit class members. Competing class
actions could be
framed differently and class members should have the choice to join the class
action that best suits their position.
There could also be an issue with class
members not falling within the class that is allowed to proceed but being unable
to join
another class action. Some participants asked whether limitation periods
would begin running again for class actions that have not
been selected to
proceed.
Recommendation
- R27 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a court is considering the
applications for certification of concurrent class action
proceedings:
- The
court should first consider whether each concurrent proceeding meets the test
for certification.
- If
more than one concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for
certification the court must decide whether all, or if not
all, which of those
proceedings will be certified.
- For
any concurrent class action proceeding that the court decides will not be
certified, although it meets the test for certification,
the application for
certification must be dismissed.
- If
the court decides that more than one class action proceeding will be certified,
it may make orders for the efficient management
of those proceedings, including
orders that:
- the
class actions be case managed together;
- the
class actions be consolidated;
- the
class actions be heard together or successively; or
- one
or more of the class actions be temporarily stayed.
- 5.62 While in
general terms we think it is undesirable to have multiple class actions on the
same issue, ultimately it will depend
on the circumstances of the case.
Therefore, we do not recommend a statutory presumption in favour of only
allowing one case to proceed.
- 5.63 We consider
the Class Actions Act should set out the procedure a court should apply when
considering the certification applications
of concurrent class actions. We
recommend the court should assess whether each concurrent class action meets the
certification test.
If a proceeding does not meet the certification test, the
court will necessarily be required to decline the application for certification.
In a situation where only one case meets the certification test, the court will
not need to consider the issue of concurrent class
actions further.
- 5.64 Where more
than one concurrent class action meets the certification test, we recommend the
court should then consider whether
to certify more than one class
action.291F[292] If (for example)
there are two concurrent class actions, the court could either decide to certify
both or to only certify one of
those. In a situation where three concurrent
class actions have been filed and all meet the certification test, the court
could decide
to certify either one, two or three of these class actions. If the
court decides a class action will be certified, it should grant
the application
for certification for that class action and make a certification
order.292F[293]
- 5.65 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify that if the court decides a concurrent
class action will not be certified (even though
it meets the certification
test), the application for certification must be
dismissed.293F[294] In Chapter 10,
we recommend the unsuccessful applicant should only be able to appeal this
decision with the leave of the
court.294F[295] In
Chapter 4 we recommend that limitation periods should begin to run again when an
application for certification is dismissed.
- 5.66 In some
situations, the court might determine that more than one concurrent class action
should be certified. While we discuss
the criteria the court should apply in the
next section of this chapter, situations where it could be appropriate to
certify more
than one class action might include:
(a) Cases where there is relatively little overlap between the legal issues
and/or the class definition.
(b) Cases where the parties have proposed an efficient way of progressing both
proceedings together.
(c) Cases where there is a particular reason for class members retaining the
ability to choose between class actions. For example,
where the subject matter
of the case involves sensitive matters such as allegations of abuse and class
members must feel comfortable
disclosing information to their lawyer.
- 5.67 The
court’s decision to certify more than one class action could be
conditional on one or more of the parties amending
their certification
application. For example, the proposed class definition could be amended to
avoid overlap between the class actions
and provide greater clarity for class
members. The parties could also agree to bring the class action on an opt-in
rather than opt-out
basis. As we explain in Chapter 6, we do not think the court
should be able to certify a proceeding on a different basis to how it
was
commenced without the applicant’s consent. However, the court could allow
applicants an opportunity to amend their applications.
Where there are
concurrent class actions, the court could grant an adjournment to allow the
applicants to confer as to how the proposed
proceedings could be amended to
allow both to be certified.
- 5.68 If the
court decides that more than one class action should be certified, it is
important they can be managed in a way that is
efficient for the court and the
parties and does not unduly duplicate costs. We recommend the court should be
able to make any orders
it considers appropriate for the efficient management of
the proceedings, including orders
that:295F[296]
(a) The class actions be case managed together.
(b) The class actions be consolidated.
(c) The class actions be heard together or successively.
(d) One or more of the class actions be temporarily stayed (such as where one
proceeding will be heard as a test
case).296F[297]
- 5.69 In some
cases, the applicants might confer and put forward a proposal to the court as to
how both class actions could proceed
in an efficient manner.
CRITERIA TO APPLY WHEN ASSESSING CONCURRENT CLASS
ACTIONS
- 5.70 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said class actions legislation should provide
an overarching test for courts to apply when
considering how competing class
actions should be managed. A list of relevant factors could also be provided for
courts to consider
when applying this
test.297F[298]
- 5.71 We proposed
the court should consider which approach to competing class actions would best
allow class member claims to be resolved
in a just and efficient way. We
suggested the following factors might be relevant when the court is applying
this test:
(a) How each case is formulated. This might include the nature and scope of the
causes of action, what the common issues are, how
manageable the individual
issues will be to resolve once common issues are determined, the relief sought,
the class definition and
likely class size, and whether the plaintiff seeks to
bring the claim as an opt-in or opt-out class action.
(b) The preferences of potential class members, to the extent these can be
ascertained. We did not think that the number of class
members signed up to each
class action and litigation funder should be taken as a clear preference of
class members for one class
action over another.
(c) The funding arrangements for each class action. This would involve
consideration of whether litigation funding has been secured
and on what basis,
including the estimated return to the litigation funder.
(d) Whether there is appropriate legal representation.
- 5.72 We did not
consider there should be a rule or presumption in favour of the first class
action to be filed, as this might encourage
hastily drafted claims. Nor did we
think the court should consider the prospects of success of each class action,
as there was a
risk of this turning into a burdensome preliminary merits
test.
Results of consultation
General test
- 5.73 We
asked submitters whether the court should consider which approach to competing
class actions would best allow class member
claims to be resolved in a just and
efficient way. We received 12 submissions on this
question.298F[299]
- 5.74 Eight
submitters agreed with our proposed
test.299F[300] Nikki Chamberlain
commented that our test is preferable to a narrow approach that looks primarily
at efficiency and cost-effectiveness
and said the inclusion of
“just” will allow the court to consider matters such as legal
representation.
- 5.75 Three
submitters supported a modified version of our proposed test. Bell Gully
suggested the court undertake a two-step analysis
where it considers (i) which
approach will allow class member claims to be resolved in a just and efficient
way and (ii) whether
that approach unjustly compromises the interests of
defendants over another possible approach. Chapman Tripp said the “just
and efficient” analysis should not just include the perspective of class
members but also the defendant’s interests and
court resources. It
proposed the court should consider what approach will best allow the claims to
be resolved in a way that is just
and efficient for the parties. Similarly, the
IBA Antitrust Committee considered that “just and efficient way”
should
be interpreted as in the interests of both parties.
- 5.76 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia supported any approach where the interests of
class members would be paramount. Similarly,
Woodsford Litigation Funding
suggested the court should consider which class action would best represent the
interests of the class.
Relevant factors
- 5.77 We
also asked submitters what factors should be relevant to the court’s
consideration of which approach would best allow
class member claims to be
resolved in a just and efficient way. In particular, we asked whether the court
should consider how each
case is formulated, the preferences of potential class
members, litigation funding arrangements or legal representation. Eighteen
submitters addressed this
question.300F[301]
How cases are formulated
- 5.78 Thirteen
submitters agreed that the court should consider how each case is
formulated.301F[302] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said the parties should have to explain
certain key aspects of the pleading, such as the
time period, which will
discourage “extravagant pleadings” that exaggerate the value of the
claim. It also said the parties
should identify the work done to investigate and
analyse the case, and that parties should be discouraged from filing a claim
that
simply copies and pastes from the first-filed claim. Michael Duffy
commented that courts have an obligation to try to bring the real
issues
forward, but this does not necessarily mean picking the most strongly formulated
claim. Omni Bridgeway thought case formulation
should be given primacy to
encourage proper investigation and careful preparation, rather than a rush to
file.
- 5.79 Two
submitters noted potential risks of this factor. Simpson Grierson cautioned that
it should not extend to an overall assessment
of the merits of the case, since
our proposed certification test only requires a claim to disclose a reasonably
arguable cause of
action. Nicole Smith said this factor might lead to cases
being put forward on a “shopping list” basis with every possible
cause of action pleaded. She thought it would be preferable to focus on the
likely efficiency of each proposed strategy.
Preferences of potential class members
- 5.80 Ten
submitters agreed the preferences of potential class members are
relevant.302F[303] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia considered this factor is particularly
important and said class members are not agnostic.
It said in cases involving
property damage, investment losses or traumatic circumstances, the relationship
between a class member
and their lawyer could become highly personal and may be
a key determinant of a person’s willingness to participate in a class
action. In shareholder class actions, class members are often well placed to
evaluate and discriminate between competing proposals,
particularly
institutional class members.
- 5.81 Bell Gully
did not support this factor. It said a court should have regard to the best
interests of class members but their expressed
preferences may not be a reliable
indicator of this and might reflect which case was commenced first or how cases
were advertised.
Shine Lawyers queried how the court could practically take this
factor into account if it could not take into account book building
by a
particular firm or
funder.303F[304]
Litigation funding arrangements
- 5.82 Sixteen
submitters thought litigation funding arrangements are relevant to which class
action should proceed.304F[305]
The Insurance Council said funding arrangements are of paramount importance,
particularly whether a funder can provide security for
costs and/or meet an
adverse costs award and whether the funder’s commission is fair, just and
reasonable. Michael Duffy noted
the impact on courts of a case collapsing
midstream due to lack of funding. Similarly, MinterEllisonRuddWatts referred to
recent
cases where the terms of funding arrangements allowed cases to be brought
to trial that were then abandoned.
- 5.83 However,
Simpson Grierson commented that the court should not become too involved in the
specific litigation funding arrangements
and said it was preferable to encourage
competition between funders.
Legal representation
- 5.84 Twelve
submitters agreed that legal representation is a relevant
factor.305F[306] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia suggested the parties should address the
experience of the law firms and lawyers in running
class actions of the kind at
issue as well as the resources available for pursuing the claims. Similarly,
Michael Duffy saw experience,
resources and fees as relevant. Johnson &
Johnson observed that choice of counsel for plaintiffs may be limited in
Aotearoa New
Zealand because the lack of personal injury litigation means there
are few large well-resourced firms that normally act for plaintiffs.
‘First to file’ presumption
- 5.85 Seven
submitters commented there should not be a ‘first to file’
presumption.306F[307] The
Insurance Council said it is more important for plaintiffs to take the time to
properly formulate their case to avoid unnecessary
legal costs and delay later
in the proceeding.
- 5.86 Bell Gully
said any evidence that a class action has been more fulsomely developed or more
efficiently pursued should be relevant
to the court’s consideration.
Michael Duffy commented that the first case filed might still be a relevant
factor, even if not
a presumption.
Prospects of success
- 5.87 Three
submitters agreed the court should not consider the relative prospects of
success of the class
actions.307F[308] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said there is a risk this would turn into a
burdensome preliminary merits test at an early
stage and noted that class
actions are dynamic and complex proceedings in which issues evolve over
time.
- 5.88 Chapman
Tripp saw this as a relevant factor, consistent with its view that a merits
review should be part of certification. The
IBA Antitrust Committee also saw
this as relevant, noting the overlap between considering how a case is
formulated and its prospects
of success.
Other factors
- 5.89 Several
submitters suggested the factors should be non-exhaustive so the court can take
into account other factors it considers
relevant.308F[309]
- 5.90 Chapman
Tripp said the defendant’s preferences should be a relevant consideration,
noting that all parties have an interest
in the just and efficient resolution of
the claims.
- 5.91 Woodsford
Litigation Funding suggested the factors developed by Canadian courts may be
relevant when determining which class
action best represents the interests of
the class.309F[310]
Recommendation
- R28 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a court is deciding which concurrent
class actions will be certified, it must consider
which approach will best allow
class member claims to be resolved in a just and efficient way. In making this
assessment, the court
should be able to consider:
- How
each case is formulated.
- The
preferences of potential class members.
- Litigation
funding arrangements.
- Legal
representation.
- Any
other factor it considers relevant.
Overarching test
- 5.92 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify that when the court is deciding which
concurrent class actions will be certified,
it must consider which approach will
best allow class member claims to be resolved in a just and efficient
way.310F[311] This test reflects
our proposed objectives for class actions and most submitters on this issue
agreed with this approach.
- 5.93 Some
submitters suggested the test should also refer to the interests of defendants
and the court system. The test we recommend
requires consideration of how the
claims can be resolved in a just and efficient way, which we do not see as
limited to the perspective
of class members. As outlined in the Issues Paper and
Supplementary Issues Paper, our conception of access to justice is broader
than
simply access to the courts and includes procedural access to justice for all
participants and a substantively fair
result.311F[312] Resolving claims
in a just and efficient way is beneficial for all parties, other court users and
the court system. We therefore
think the proposed amendment is unnecessary.
- 5.94 While two
submitters suggested the test should make the interests of class members
paramount, we prefer an approach that allows
the court broad discretion to
consider considerations of justice and efficiency. The interests of class
members will be an important
part of this, but the interests of defendants and
the need to ensure multiple claims are managed in an efficient way will also be
relevant.
Relevant factors
- 5.95 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify factors a court may consider when
determining which approach will best allow claims
to be determined in a just and
efficient way.312F[313] In our
view, the following factors are likely to be relevant:
(a) How each case is formulated.
(b) The preferences of potential class members.
(c) Litigation funding arrangements.
(d) Legal representation.
- 5.96 We agree
with the point made by some submitters that the factors should not be
exhaustive, and the court should be able to consider
any other factors it
considers relevant in a particular case.
Formulation of the case
- 5.97 A
court’s consideration of how each case is formulated might include:
(a) Which causes of action are pleaded.
(b) To what extent the case has been developed.
(c) The class definition and likely class size.
(d) The common issues and individual issues to be determined.
(e) Whether the claim is brought as an opt-in or opt-out class action.
(f) The relief sought.
- 5.98 We do not
think this factor should involve a preliminary merits assessment, in line with
our recommendation that this should
not be part of the certification test.
- 5.99 There is a
degree of overlap between this factor and the certification test we recommend,
particularly the requirements for the
proposed opt-in or opt-out mechanism to be
an appropriate means of determining class membership and for a class action to
be an appropriate
procedure for the efficient resolution of class member claims.
This reinforces our conclusion that the certification applications
for
concurrent class actions should be considered at the same time.
- 5.100 We do not
anticipate this factor will lead to overly broad or inflated pleadings, as a
court will not necessarily prefer the
broadest possible class action. In some
cases, a class action that is narrower but more straight-forward to manage could
be preferable.
When comparing how cases are formulated, it is also possible a
court will find there is little overlap, and it would be just and
efficient to
allow both cases to be certified.
Preferences of potential class members
- 5.101 We
see the preferences of potential class members as a relevant consideration,
although we acknowledge in some cases it will
be different to ascertain this.
The court’s assessment of this factor might indicate that one class action
is preferable, or
it might indicate that potential class members should be given
a choice of class action.
- 5.102 While we
do not think the court should be prevented from considering how many class
members have signed up to each class action
(through ‘book
building’), we think this should be given limited weight as it may simply
indicate which class action
was commenced first or how the case was advertised.
In appropriate cases, affidavit evidence could be filed by potential class
members
to explain why they prefer a particular class action. While this may not
always be possible, there are likely to be some cases where
potential class
members have a clear preference or a reason for wanting a choice of class
actions and are willing to give affidavit
evidence.
Litigation funding arrangements
- 5.103 When
assessing this factor, the court could consider how the representative plaintiff
intends to fund the litigation. For example,
whether litigation funding has been
secured and on what basis. Having appropriate funding arrangements in place will
help to ensure
the case can proceed to resolution and mitigate the risk that the
class action may be abandoned mid-proceeding due to lack of funding.
Where a
litigation funding agreement has been entered into, the respective funding
commission will also be relevant, although we
do not think the class action with
the lowest funding commission should automatically be preferred.
- 5.104 In Chapter
17, we recommend the court must approve litigation funding agreements in class
actions in order for them to be enforceable
by the funder. We suggest that the
court must be satisfied the funding agreement, including the funding commission,
is fair and reasonable
and that the representative plaintiff has received
independent legal advice on the agreement. We note that the court will be
assessing
the concurrent class actions prior to approving any litigation funding
agreement. We therefore anticipate the court’s consideration
of this
factor will be conducted at a relatively high-level that focuses on the
availability of funding and comparing key factors
like the proposed funding
commissions, rather than the detailed matters it will need to consider as part
of court approval of a litigation
funding agreement.
- 5.105 In Chapter
18, we recommend a class action fund should be established. This could be an
alternative means of funding a concurrent
class action.
Legal representation
- 5.106 We
agree with the sentiment expressed at one of our consultation workshops that
judges should not conduct a broad assessment
of who is the more competent
counsel. We think this factor could involve a relatively high-level
consideration of whether there is
appropriate legal representation for each
class action. This could include whether legal representation has been secured,
whether
the lawyer or law firm has the experience and resources to bring a class
action and the basis upon which fees will be charged. Relevant
expertise could
include experience in running complex litigation or experience in the
substantive area of law at issue. We would
not want this factor to be
interpreted as requiring prior expertise in class actions or representative
actions.313F[314]
Other factors
- 5.107 We
remain of the view that it is not appropriate to have a presumption in favour of
the first class action filed, as this might
encourage hastily prepared
statements of claim. Submitters did not indicate support for such a
presumption.
- 5.108 We also
confirm our view that the prospects of success of the respective class actions
should not be a factor, given our view
that a preliminary merits test should not
be part of the certification test.
DEFENDANT PARTICIPATION IN CONCURRENT CLASS ACTION
HEARINGS
- 5.109 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper we noted that a hearing on competing class
actions might include discussion of case strategy
or funding arrangements that
plaintiffs do not want disclosed to defendants. For this reason, the ALRC
recommended a defendant should
not be involved in any hearing to decide which
competing class action should proceed, except on the issue of security for
costs.314F[315]
- 5.110 We
expressed the view that defendants should not be prevented from attending a
hearing on competing class actions, as this would
offend the open court
principle and a defendant would likely want to make submissions on how competing
class actions should be managed.
We thought courts had the necessary powers to
manage any confidentiality issues that might arise.
Results of consultation
- 5.111 We
asked submitters whether they had any concerns about defendants gaining a
tactical advantage from a competing class action
hearing and how any concerns
should be managed. We received 11 submissions on this
question.315F[316]
- 5.112 Nine
submitters considered a defendant should be entitled to attend a hearing to
determine how competing class actions should
be
managed.316F[317] Reasons given
included:
(a) It would be contrary to the principles of access to justice and open justice
for a defendant to be excluded.
(b) The outcome of the hearing will impact on the defendant.
(c) The defendant’s involvement may assist the court on issues such as
commonality, the relief sought and evidence required.
(d) It would not give the defendant a tactical advantage, or any advantage would
only be fleeting.
(e) Courts have the necessary powers to manage any confidentiality issues that
arise.
- 5.113 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said a defendant should not attend a
competing class actions hearing as it would
be inconsistent with the interests
of justice to allow defendants to choose their plaintiffs. It said redacting
documents would likely
be inadequate and would be cumbersome and costly.
- 5.114 Two
submitters considered the defendant should have to provide information to
balance the information it obtained from a competing
class actions hearing.
Shine Lawyers said that, if a defendant played a role in any competing class
action hearing, it should have
to disclose any external funding arrangement and
its estimate of legal fees. Nicole Smith suggested the defendant be required to
respond to a notice to admit facts early in the proceeding.
Defendants should not be excluded from concurrent class
action hearing
- 5.115 We
consider it would be unfair to exclude a defendant from aspects of a
certification hearing which consider whether more than
one concurrent class
action should be certified. A defendant should have the ability to make
submissions on how concurrent class
actions should be managed, including on
whether it is just and efficient to allow more than one class action to be
certified. While
we agree that a defendant should not be able to ‘choose
its plaintiff’, it is the court rather than the defendant that
will
ultimately decide which class action(s) can proceed.
- 5.116 It may
also be practically difficult to exclude a defendant from aspects of the
certification hearing that consider concurrent
class actions, given the degree
of overlap between the certification criteria and the factors relevant to
concurrent class actions.
Nor are we convinced that a defendant will gain any
significant tactical advantage from hearing discussions on how to manage the
concurrent class actions. One factor that may raise confidentiality issues is
litigation funding arrangements. In Chapter 14 we recommend
that funded
plaintiffs should disclose their litigation funding agreement to the court and
to the defendant, with redactions of privileged
matters or information that may
confer a tactical advantage. If confidentiality issues arise with respect to
other information provided
by a proposed representative plaintiff, we think the
court can manage this on a case-by-case basis, including allowing appropriate
redactions in information given to the defendant.
DRAFT CONCURRENT CLASS ACTION PROVISIONS
- 5.117 Below
we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect to our
recommendations on concurrent class actions.
5 Commencement of concurrent class actions
(1) A concurrent class action proceeding must be
commenced—
(a) within 90 days of the date on which notice of the first of the concurrent
class action proceedings is given on the Class Actions
Register; or
(b) at a later time with the leave of a court.
(2) In this Act,—
Class Actions Register means a register of class action proceedings
published on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Ministry of
Justice
concurrent class action proceeding means a class action proceeding
that has the following in common with another class action proceeding that is
currently before the
court:
(a) the same or substantially similar issues in dispute; and
(b) at least 1 defendant.
6 Procedure for certification of concurrent class
actions
(1) The applications for
certification of concurrent class action proceedings must be considered by a
court together.
(2) If the court considers that more than 1 of the proceedings meets the test
for certification under section 4, it must decide whether all, and if not
all which, of those proceedings will be certified.
(3) When deciding which of the proceedings will be certified, the court must
consider what approach will best allow the claims of
class members to be
resolved in a just and efficient way.
(4) When assessing which approach is best under subsection (3), the
court may consider—
(a) how each proceeding is formulated:
(b) the preferences of potential class members:
(c) any litigation funding arrangements for each proceeding:
(d) the legal representation for each proceeding:
(e) any other factors the court considers relevant.
(5) If the court decides under subsection (2) that a proceeding will
not be certified, the application for certification must be dismissed.
(6) If the court decides that more than 1 of the proceedings will be
certified, it may make further orders for the management of those
proceedings,
including orders that—
(a) the proceedings be case managed together:
(b) the proceedings be consolidated:
(c) the proceedings be heard together or successively:
(d) 1 or more of the proceedings be temporarily stayed.
CHAPTER 6
Certification
INTRODUCTION
- 6.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Requiring certification of class actions.
(b) The test for certification of a class action.
(c) Procedural matters relating to certification.
- 6.2 At the end
of this chapter, we set out a draft legislative provision that could give effect
to our recommendations on the certification
test.
REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTIONS
- 6.3 Most
overseas jurisdictions with class actions regimes require the court to approve a
case proceeding in class action form, which
is generally known as
certification.317F[318] A notable
exception to this is Australia, where none of the class actions regimes have a
certification
requirement.318F[319]
- 6.4 In the
Issues Paper we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of certification and
asked submitters whether a class actions
regime in Aotearoa New Zealand should
require proceedings to be
certified.319F[320] In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we summarised the feedback we received on this
question and explained our conclusion that a class
actions regime should have a
certification stage.320F[321]
Results of consultation
- 6.5 In
response to the Issues Paper, we received 29 submissions on whether a class
actions regime should have a certification stage.
We also received 22
submissions on the Supplementary Issues Paper that addressed the topic of
certification. Although this second
consultation paper was focused on the design
of a certification test and did not expressly ask submitters whether
certification was
desirable, some submitters provided feedback on this point. In
total, we received submissions on certification from 36 different
submitters.321F[322]
- 6.6 Nineteen
submitters expressly supported having a certification stage as part of a class
actions regime.322F[323] Three
submitters appeared to support certification (by indicating agreement with our
proposed provision).323F[324]
- 6.7 Benefits of
certification identified by submitters included the following:
(a) Preventing meritless, frivolous or vexatious claims and filtering claims
that are unsuitable to proceed as a class action.
(b) Allowing the court to consider the interests of the plaintiff, defendant and
class members.
(c) Placing the onus on a plaintiff to show that a claim has been properly
brought, rather than leaving it to the defendant to raise
any issues.
(d) Requiring the plaintiff to be thoughtful about how the litigation will be
run.
(e) Enabling the early identification and management of issues. This includes
ensuring claims are properly pleaded, proactively managing
conflicts of
interest, and ensuring the representative plaintiff is appropriate.
(f) Providing an opportunity to manage concurrent class actions.
(g) Ensuring a level of court oversight at an early stage.
(h) Avoiding the need for multiple interlocutory applications. Certification
could lower the overall cost for litigants and provide
a degree of certainty at
an early stage.
- 6.8 Nine
submitters disagreed with having
certification.324F[325] Key themes
in submissions opposed to certification were as follows:
(a) Certification could be cumbersome and costly and may restrict access to
justice.
(b) The Australian approach of having powers to discontinue a class action is
preferable and has not led to a proliferation of unsuitable
class actions.
(c) There are other mechanisms that can protect class member interests,
including the right to opt out, notification rights and the
ability to apply to
substitute the representative plaintiff.
(d) The risk of adverse costs deters vexatious or meritless claims. Defendants
have other tools to challenge such claims, such as
a strike-out or summary
judgment application.
- 6.9 Other
submitters commented on aspects of certification without expressing a clear
preference as to whether certification is
desirable.325F[326]
Recommendation
- R29 The
Class Actions Act should require a proceeding to be certified to proceed as a
class action and prescribe a certification test.
- 6.10 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should require a proceeding to be certified to
proceed as a class action and prescribe a certification
test. Although class
actions may provide improved access to justice for plaintiffs and class members,
they also place a significant
burden on defendants and the court system as they
are usually expensive and lengthy. Class actions also risk insufficient
protection
of class member interests. We therefore think it is appropriate for
the court to consider whether a case is suitable to bring as
a class action.
Requiring certification may deter meritless or vexatious class actions, although
we think the risk of such class
actions is relatively low because of the cost of
class actions and the risk of being ordered to pay costs.
- 6.11 Certification
will provide an early opportunity for the court to consider issues such as
whether class membership should be determined
on an opt-in or opt-out basis and
whether there is a suitable representative plaintiff. It will also allow the
court to consider
how to respond to concurrent class actions at an early
stage.326F[327] The certification
process may help to refine a plaintiff’s case, such as by identifying any
causes of action that are not arguable
and ensuring there is a suitable class
definition.
- 6.12 We
acknowledge the concerns that certification could cause additional cost and
delay for parties, require considerable judicial
resource and make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to commence class actions. However, we think these
concerns are outweighed by
the benefits of certification we have identified. If
the proposed elements of our certification test are not considered at
certification,
they may need to be decided in multiple interlocutory
applications instead. One consultation workshop participant said that, in
Australia
plaintiffs could be “tortured in a drip feed fashion”,
with the issues being dragged out over a long period rather than
being resolved
at one certification hearing. If this occurred in Aotearoa New Zealand, this
would be burdensome for both the parties
and the court. Certification will allow
a number of preliminary issues to be dealt with at the same time.
- 6.13 While the
certification process creates an upfront test for the representative plaintiff
to meet, we do not think the requirements
of our proposed certification test are
overly onerous. As we discuss below, we have rejected aspects of a certification
test that
could make it particularly difficult for a plaintiff, such as a
preliminary merits test and a requirement to establish that common
issues
predominate. We note preliminary court approval is required before cases can
proceed as a representative action under rule
4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016
(HCR) (unless there is consent from all persons with the same interest) and
submitters did not
point to this requirement as a significant barrier for
litigants.
THE TEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS ACTION
- 6.14 In
Chapter 10 of the Issues Paper, we discussed possible elements of a
certification test for Aotearoa New Zealand, based on
the tests that apply in
other jurisdictions. These included: a minimum number of class members
(numerosity), sufficient commonality
among claims, requiring a class action to
be the preferable or superior procedure for resolving class member claims, a
preliminary
merits assessment, a cost-benefit assessment, a litigation plan and
assessment of funding
arrangements.327F[328] We asked
submitters whether these different elements were appropriate for a certification
test in Aotearoa New Zealand.
- 6.15 In Chapter
11 of the Issues Paper, we asked submitters whether the court should consider
the representative plaintiff’s
suitability for the role as part of
certification and, if so, what the test should be. Possible criteria included
being able to adequately
represent the class, having no conflicts of interest,
understanding the role, having sufficient financial resources and having a
claim
that is typical of the
class.328F[329] We also discussed
whether tikanga Māori should inform who could be the representative
plaintiff in Māori collective
action.329F[330] In Chapter 12 of
the Issues Paper, we asked whether membership of a class action should be
determined on an opt-in or opt-out basis,
or whether multiple approaches should
be available.
- 6.16 We set out
the feedback we received on these questions in the Supplementary Issues Paper,
explained our conclusions on each aspect
of the certification test and provided
a draft legislative
provision.330F[331] Key features
of our proposed certification test were:
(a) The statement of claim must disclose a reasonably arguable cause of
action.
(b) Each class member’s claim should raise a common issue of fact or law
that is of significance to the resolution of the claim.
(c) There must be a suitable representative plaintiff who would fairly and
adequately represent class members.
(d) The opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding must be an
appropriate means of determining class membership in the
circumstances of the
case.
(e) A class action must be an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution
of class member claims.
Results of consultation
- 6.17 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we asked submitters whether they agreed with our
draft provision on certification and, if
not, how it should be amended. There
were 20 submissions on this
question.331F[332] Of these, 11
submitters agreed or broadly agreed with our draft
provision.332F[333]
- 6.18 Five
submitters commented on aspects of our test without indicating overall agreement
or disapproval of our proposed certification
provision.333F[334] Three
submitters commented on aspects of our certification test but remained opposed
to requiring
certification.334F[335]
- 6.19 In the
sections below, we discuss the feedback we received on specific aspects of our
proposed certification test and our recommendations
on each.
REASONABLY ARGUABLE CAUSE OF ACTION
- 6.20 The
Supplementary Issues Paper explained we did not favour a preliminary merits
assessment as part of certification. Our preferred
approach was to require the
statement of claim to disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action, with the
same test applying as
for a strike-out
application.335F[336]
Results of consultation
- 6.21 Six
submitters commented on this
issue.336F[337] Three of these
submitters agreed with requiring the statement of claim to disclose a reasonably
arguable cause of action.337F[338]
Dr Michael Duffy (Monash University) commented that the requirement to disclose
a cause of action applies in normal litigation and
Australian lawyers must
certify this in federal class
actions.338F[339] Gilbert Walker
agreed that certification should not involve any further detailed consideration
of the merits, to avoid cost and delay.
Simpson Grierson said it should be clear
that where the plaintiff pursues multiple causes of action only those causes of
action that
are reasonably arguable should be allowed to proceed.
- 6.22 Omni
Bridgeway said our proposed test shifted the burden of showing a reasonably
arguable cause of action from a defendant filing
a strike-out application onto
the plaintiff in every class action, which would add additional cost and delay
in every case.
- 6.23 Two
submitters supported a stricter test. Chapman Tripp preferred a merits review,
which it said could discourage meritless or
speculative class
actions.339F[340] Rhonson Salim
(Aston University) suggested the threshold of a preliminary merits test could be
higher in opt-out cases.
- 6.24 Some
consultation workshop participants did not support requiring a reasonably
arguable cause of action, commenting that it was
a higher hurdle than ordinary
proceedings and could inhibit access to justice. It was suggested that requiring
a defendant to bring
a strike-out application was preferable. A concern was also
expressed that a defendant could have ‘two bites at the cherry’
by
arguing there was no reasonably arguable cause of action and then subsequently
filing a strike-out application. Other consultation
workshop participants agreed
with the requirement to have a reasonably arguable cause of action and saw this
as preferable to a preliminary
review of the merits which could turn into a
mini-trial. A small number of participants supported having a preliminary merits
test.
Recommendation
- R30 The
certification test should require the proceeding to disclose one or more
reasonably arguable causes of action.
- 6.25 We consider
the certification test should include a requirement for a class action to
disclose one or more reasonably arguable
causes of
action.340F[341] Given the time
and expense involved with a class action, we do not think it would be in the
interests of the parties, class members
or the court for a class action without
any reasonably arguable causes of action to be allowed to proceed. While we
recognise this
is a requirement that does not apply to ordinary litigation, the
same can be said of the entire certification test. We think it is
justified to
require a representative plaintiff to establish there is a reasonably arguable
cause of action as a prerequisite of
bringing a class action on behalf of
others.341F[342]
- 6.26 It would
also be undesirable if the court made its decision on certification and then had
to consider whether there was a reasonably
arguable cause of action as part of a
separate strike-out application. In our view, it would be preferable to consider
this issue
as part of certification.
- 6.27 We do not
think the requirement to establish one or more reasonably arguable causes of
action will be onerous. We have deliberately
used the language that applies to a
strike-out application and consider that the same test should apply. That is, a
court would only
find this aspect of the certification test is not met where all
the causes of action are “so clearly untenable that they cannot
possibly
succeed”.342F[343] We also
envisage the court’s assessment would proceed on the basis that the
pleaded facts are true, except if the pleaded allegations
are entirely
speculative and without
foundation.343F[344] We discuss
the evidential standard for the certification test later in this chapter.
- 6.28 A similar
approach applies in the Ontario certification test, which requires the pleadings
to disclose a cause of
action.344F[345] This aspect of
the test does not appear to have posed an insurmountable barrier for litigants.
Analysis by the Law Commission of
Ontario (LCO) has found that certification
occurred by consent in 37 per cent of Ontario cases. Where certification was
contested,
the plaintiff’s application for certification was successful in
around 73 per cent of cases. The LCO’s limited review
of unsuccessful
certification applications found that it was rare for certification to fail on
one factor alone. The aspects of the
test most commonly responsible for a
plaintiff failing at certification were the requirements for a common issue and
for the class
action to be the preferable
procedure.345F[346]
- 6.29 We prefer
the approach of requiring one or more reasonably arguable causes of action to a
preliminary merits test. We do not
think the court should be assessing the
prospects of the plaintiff’s case at an early stage without the plaintiff
having the
benefit of obtaining information from the defendant through discovery
and being able to present its case fully. This approach could
also lead to a
certification hearing turning into a ‘mini-trial’, with a plaintiff
having to bring evidence to show the
class action has sufficient prospects of
success, causing considerable delay and expense.
- 6.30 We think it
is unnecessary for all the pleaded causes of action to be reasonably arguable.
Where the court determines that only
some pleaded causes of action are arguable,
it should certify the case on the basis of the arguable causes of action only.
The plaintiff
would need to meet the other aspects of the certification test
(such as a common issue) with respect to this more limited
case.346F[347] As outlined later
in this chapter, we consider the court should make a certification order when it
certifies a case, which would
include the confirmed causes of action and the
common issue(s).
- 6.31 If the
court finds there is a reasonably arguable cause of action at certification, we
think it would be undesirable for the
defendant to be able to relitigate the
point in a subsequent strike-out application. While interlocutory decisions do
not generally
give rise to issue estoppel, “it is generally undesirable
for an issue decided by an interlocutory ruling to be relitigated
in the same
proceeding”.347F[348] This
principle is reflected in HCR 7.52, which provides that a party that fails on an
interlocutory application must not apply again
for the same or similar order
without leave, which is only to be granted in special circumstances. While this
rule is unlikely to
apply directly (because it envisages a scenario where a
party has made two consecutive applications) the principle behind it is
relevant.
There may, however, be limited situations where it would be
appropriate to have a subsequent strike-out application, such as a significant
development in case law that means the plaintiff may no longer have a reasonably
arguable cause of action. There are also grounds
for striking out a claim other
than “no reasonably arguable cause of action”, including where the
case is likely to cause
prejudice or delay or is otherwise an abuse of the
court’s process.348F[349]
- 6.32 That being
said, we think a defendant is unlikely to make a strike-out application (absent
any material change) after a case
is certified, since the court will have
already reached a view on whether there is a reasonably arguable cause of action
and whether
the case is appropriate to bring as a class action. It is more
likely a defendant would seek to appeal the certification decision.
We therefore
think it is unnecessary to have a specific rule to prohibit strike-out
applications.
- 6.33 In some
cases, it is possible a strike-out application would be heard prior to an
application for certification, such as where
the proceeding is alleged to be
frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the court’s process.
COMMON ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW
- 6.34 The
Supplementary Issues Paper explained that our preferred approach to commonality
was that each class member’s claim
should raise a common issue of fact or
law that is of significance to the resolution of each claim. We preferred a
significance requirement
over a test that required the common issues to
predominate over individual issues, as we considered the latter might frustrate
the
objective of improving access to justice by making it too hard for
plaintiffs to bring class
actions.349F[350]
Results of consultation
- 6.35 Eight
submitters commented on the common issue
requirement.350F[351] Two of these
submitters agreed with our proposed
test.351F[352]
- 6.36 Three
submitters agreed with our conclusion that the commonality test should not
require the common issues to predominate over
individual
issues.352F[353] Nikki Chamberlain
(Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland) and Omni Bridgeway recommended
the certification provision clarify
that common issues are not required to
predominate over individual issues. Bell Gully preferred a predominance test but
accepted
we had reached a different conclusion.
- 6.37 The
International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee suggested there should
be a definition of common issues, such as
“the same, similar or related
issues of fact or law”, which is the definition used in the United Kingdom
(UK) Competition
Appeal Tribunal
Rules.353F[354] It also said it
was unclear what was meant by “significance” and the absence of
guidance may lead to disputes over this
factor. This point was also made by some
participants at our consultation workshops. The IBA Antitrust Committee
suggested there
may be some duplication between the significance requirement in
the commonality test and the analysis required under our proposed
factor of
whether a class action is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution
of class member claims.
- 6.38 Several
submitters commented on whether the common issue should apply to each claim.
Nikki Chamberlain proposed the common issue
of fact or law should be of
significance to “at least one of” a class member’s claims,
instead of “each of
the claims”. This would reflect the fact that
all class members may not have the same common issue of fact or law in relation
to each of their claims. Bell Gully suggested referring to “the claims of
each member of the proposed class”. Chapman
Tripp said there may be groups
of claimants whose claims are sufficiently closely related on factual or legal
issues for them to
proceed as one class action, even if strictly there may not
be a common issue across all the sub-classes.
- 6.39 Bell Gully
submitted the reasonably arguable cause of action must raise a common issue of
fact or law of significance to the
resolution of the claims of each member of
the proposed class. It said a plaintiff should not be able to satisfy the
criteria by
bringing one cause of action that has merit and another cause of
action that has no merit but raises common issues.
Recommendation
- R31 The
certification test should require a common issue of fact or law that applies to
the claim of each member of the proposed class.
- 6.40 We
recommend the certification test should require a common issue of fact or law
that applies to the claim of each member of
the proposed
class.354F[355] While the common
issue should apply to each class member’s claim, we do not think it
necessarily has to apply to each cause
of action within a class member’s
claim.355F[356]
- 6.41 The
benefits of a class action can only be realised if the case will resolve a
common issue for a group. Resolving a common issue
for each class member in a
single proceeding can improve access to justice for a wide group, as well as
being an efficient way of
managing multiple claims. Our comparator jurisdictions
all require a common issue of fact or law, although they have taken different
approaches to the extent of commonality
required.356F[357]
- 6.42 We remain
of the view that the common issue(s) should not have to predominate over
individual issues. We consider this standard
is too strict and could frustrate
the objective of improving access to justice. It could also frustrate the
objective of managing
multiple claims in an efficient way, by requiring claims
with common issues that do not predominate to be brought as individual
proceedings
or as representative actions.
- 6.43 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed the common issue(s) must be significant
to the resolution of each class member’s
claim. Having reflected on the
feedback we received, we no longer consider it is necessary for the provision to
contain a significance
requirement. One of the factors relevant to the
appropriate procedure test (which we discuss below) is the extent of the other
issues
that would need to be determined once the common issue is resolved. If
the common issue is not significant to the resolution of class
member claims, it
is unlikely this factor will be met. In Australia, there was a considerable
amount of litigation over the meaning
of a “substantial” common
issue, which ultimately led to the term being “watered
down”.357F[358] We are
concerned that a reference to a significant common issue could similarly lead to
uncertainty and litigation over the meaning
of the term. While the common
issue(s) must be sufficiently central to the claims to justify bringing the case
as a class action,
we think it is preferable for the court to consider this
issue as part of the inquiry into whether a class action is an appropriate
procedure.358F[359] A similar
approach is taken by most Canadian
jurisdictions.359F[360] We also
note the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules simply require a common
issue.360F[361]
- 6.44 We have
considered the suggestion that a definition of common issues should be provided.
In the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal
Rules, common issues are defined as
“the same, similar or related issues of fact or
law”.361F[362] The Ontario
legislation defines common issues
as:362F[363]
- (a) common but
not necessarily identical issues of fact, or
- (b) common but
not necessarily identical issues of law that arise from common but not
necessarily identical facts.
- 6.45 We think
including “related issues” may be too broad a definition of common
issues and prefer an approach that includes
“the same or similar
issues” or “common but not necessarily identical issues”.
However, we think it is unnecessary
to provide a statutory definition of common
issues. This can be left to the courts to determine as it will ultimately depend
on the
facts of the matter.
REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF
- 6.46 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we outlined our conclusion that the court should
consider, as part of the certification test,
whether there is a suitable
representative plaintiff who is able to fairly and adequately represent the
class.363F[364] We said relevant
factors might include:
(a) Whether there are any conflicts of interest that could prevent the person
from properly fulfilling their role as representative
plaintiff.
(b) Whether the person has a general understanding of the nature of the claims
and their obligations as representative plaintiff,
including their liability for
adverse costs.
(c) In a case where the person seeks to represent members of their hapū or
iwi, tikanga on representation.
Results of consultation
- 6.47 Six
submitters commented on our proposed requirement for a suitable representative
plaintiff who will fairly and adequately represent
class
members.364F[365] Four broadly
agreed with our approach, with some suggesting
amendments.365F[366] Bell Gully
agreed that adequacy of representation is fundamental to the operation of a
modern class actions regime and said a person
should not lightly be able to
bring claims on behalf of potentially thousands of others. Te Kāhui Inihua
o Aotearoa | Insurance
Council of New Zealand said the suitability of the
representative plaintiff is so important that our proposed factors should be
mandatory
rather than permissive.
- 6.48 Other
matters that submitters proposed a representative plaintiff should need to
establish were:
(a) They have the means to meet an adverse costs
award.366F[367]
(b) They understand class action proceedings and their rights and obligations
under any funding
arrangements.367F[368]
(c) A method of notifying class members of progress in the class
action.368F[369]
(d) Governance and consultation procedures for the
class.369F[370]
- 6.49 Nicole
Smith queried how the court would practically assess the three factors we
proposed. For example, who will raise the issue
of a conflict of interest and
how can a court assess whether a person has a reasonable understanding of the
nature of the claims
and the responsibilities of representative plaintiff?
- 6.50 Te Tari
Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office submitted that difficulties could arise if
a litigant in person could bring a class
action on behalf of others. Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society and some consultation
workshop participants suggested
we should reconsider the role of the
representative plaintiff. We considered these issues in Chapter 3.
Recommendations
- R32 The
certification test should require the court to be satisfied there is at least
one representative plaintiff who is suitable and
will fairly and adequately
represent the class. When the court is making this assessment:
- It
should consider whether there is, or is likely to be, a conflict of interest
that could prevent them from properly fulfilling the
role of representative
plaintiff.
- It
should consider whether the person has a reasonable understanding of the nature
of the claims and the duty and responsibilities
of the representative plaintiff,
including their potential liability for costs.
- It
should be satisfied the person has received independent legal advice on the duty
and responsibilities of the role.
- If
the proposed representative plaintiff will be representing members of their
hapū or iwi, the court should be able to consider
the tikanga of the
hapū or iwi as relevant to representation in the proceeding.
- It
should also be able to take into account any other factors it considers
relevant.
- R33 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the representative plaintiff may only
withdraw from the role with the leave of the court.
The Act should also empower
the court to substitute the representative plaintiff if:
- It
grants the representative plaintiff leave to withdraw from the role; or
- It
considers the representative plaintiff is no longer able to fairly and
adequately represent the class.
- 6.51 We think
the court should consider the proposed representative plaintiff’s
suitability for the role as part of the certification
test. The representative
plaintiff has an important role in protecting the interests of class members,
who are not parties to the
proceeding, and we think the court should be
satisfied the person is able to fulfil that role.
- 6.52 We
recommend the certification test should require the court to be satisfied there
is at least one representative plaintiff who
is suitable and will fairly and
adequately represent the
class.370F[371] It is important
that a representative plaintiff can fairly and adequately represent the class
because they will be making decisions
on their behalf. Whether the proposed
representative plaintiff can fairly and adequately represent the class is part
of the certification
tests in Canada, the United States and the UK Competition
Appeal Tribunal.371F[372] We have
included “suitability” as well as fairly and adequately because it
allows for considerations that are slightly
broader than their representation of
the class, such as whether they have received independent legal advice and
whether they understand
their own potential costs liability.
Relevant factors
- 6.53 We
consider several factors are relevant to the court’s analysis of whether a
proposed representative plaintiff is suitable
and will fairly and adequately
represent the class. We recommend the certification test should provide that
when the court is making
this assessment:
(a) It should consider whether there is, or is likely to be, a conflict of
interest that could prevent them from properly fulfilling
the role as
representative
plaintiff.372F[373]
(b) It should consider whether they have a reasonable understanding of the
nature of the claims and the duty and responsibilities
of a representative
plaintiff, including their potential liability for
costs.373F[374]
(c) It should be satisfied the person has received independent legal advice on
the duty and responsibilities of the
role.374F[375]
(d) If they will be representing members of their hapū or iwi, the court
should be able to consider the tikanga of the hapū
or iwi as relevant to
representation in the
proceeding.375F[376]
- 6.54 We discuss
each of these factors below. We also recommend the court should be able to take
into account any other factors it
considers relevant, to allow flexibility to
consider the circumstances of a particular
case.376F[377] For example, a
proposed representative plaintiff not having legal representation could be a
relevant factor.
- 6.55 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed the court “may” take into
account the factors we identified. On reflection,
we consider some of these
factors should be mandatory considerations.
Conflicts of interest
- 6.56 Having
a conflict of interest may prevent a representative plaintiff from adequately
fulfilling their role. This could include
a conflict or likely conflict relating
to the common issues in the case, a relationship with the defendant or the law
firm acting,
or involvement in another associated legal
proceeding.377F[378] We therefore
think the court should consider whether there is, or is likely to be, a conflict
of interest that could prevent the
proposed representative plaintiff from
properly fulfilling the role of representative plaintiff.
- 6.57 We
acknowledge it will not always be apparent at certification whether there is (or
is likely to be) a conflict of interest,
given the uncertainty about who will
ultimately be a class member. The court’s consideration will necessarily
be limited to
any information available at the certification stage about actual
or potential conflicts of interest. We envisage that, in an affidavit
in support
of the certification application, the proposed representative plaintiff would
detail any conflict of interest or potential
conflict of interest they are aware
of. Alternatively, they could state they are unaware of any conflicts of
interest. The affidavit
could also outline whether the proposed representative
plaintiff has had any dealings with the lawyer, litigation funder or defendant
other than in connection with the case or the matters giving rise to the case.
- 6.58 If a
potential or actual conflict of interest came to light later in the proceeding,
it could give rise to an application to
replace the representative plaintiff.
Alternatively, a conflict of interest could be managed through sub-classes. We
discuss sub-classes
in Chapter 8.
Understanding of the case and duty and responsibilities of role
- 6.59 In
order to properly represent class members, the representative plaintiff needs to
have a reasonable understanding of the claims
being pursued in the class action.
It will be difficult for a plaintiff to provide instructions and make decisions
about matters
such as settlement without this knowledge. However, we do not
think a representative plaintiff must have a detailed knowledge of
the facts and
the law as this could pose too high a
bar.378F[379] The proposed
representative plaintiff’s affidavit could provide information on how they
have developed an awareness of the
case. This might include being briefed on the
case by the lawyer acting in the class action and reading the statement of
claim.
- 6.60 The
representative plaintiff also needs to understand the duty and responsibilities
of their role, which we discussed in Chapter
3. This will include their
potential liability for adverse costs. The applicant’s affidavit should
state whether they have
received independent legal advice on these matters.
Requiring a court to consider whether the representative plaintiff has a
reasonable
understanding of the duty and responsibilities of the role can help
to ensure the representative plaintiff is entering into the role
with an
informed understanding of what is expected of them.
- 6.61 We think
this factor should be a mandatory consideration. We do not think a person should
be appointed as representative plaintiff
unless they have a reasonable
understanding of the case and the duty and responsibilities of the role.
Independent legal advice
- 6.62 In
Chapter 3 we recommend a representative plaintiff must receive independent legal
advice on the duty and responsibilities of
the role. To ensure that this occurs,
we consider the certification test should require the court to be satisfied a
person has received
this independent advice.
Tikanga on representation
- 6.63 Where
a person seeks to bring a class action on behalf of members of their hapū
or iwi, we think the tikanga of the hapū
or iwi on representation may be
relevant to a court’s consideration of whether the person is a suitable
representative plaintiff
who can fairly and adequately represent the claims of
those members. Our intention is that this factor should support existing tikanga
regarding representation and the determination of who has responsibility for
upholding collective interests. It is not intended to
be an additional hurdle
that makes it more difficult for Māori litigants to bring a class action.
We have not made this a mandatory
consideration as there may be cases where it
is unnecessary, such as where the person is clearly recognised as having a
mandate.
- 6.64 In a case
where this factor appears relevant, the court could receive evidence of the
tikanga of the iwi or hapū on representation
and any tikanga process that
has been undertaken with respect to the proposed representative plaintiff.
- 6.65 One
submitter queried whether a certification application would need to be provided
to the hapū or iwi in case the issue
of representation was disputed. We do
not think this is necessary as a matter of course. However, in cases where a
certification
application does not provide sufficient evidence about the
person’s mandate to bring the case or there appears to be some dispute
over representation, the court could consider whether to make directions on who
should be given notice of the certification application.
Replacing the representative plaintiff
- 6.66 A
proceeding will be certified on the basis of a particular representative
plaintiff, who the court has determined is able to
fairly and adequately
represent the class. For this reason, we recommend the Class Actions Act should
specify that the representative
plaintiff may only withdraw from the role with
the leave of the court.
- 6.67 One
situation where it may be necessary to replace the representative plaintiff is
where a person no longer wishes to continue
in the role. A class action can only
proceed if it has a suitable representative plaintiff and so we think a person
should only be
able to withdraw from the role with the leave of the
court.379F[380] Otherwise there
may be a risk of a defendant seeking to settle an individual representative
plaintiff’s claim to try and prevent
the class action from
continuing.380F[381]
- 6.68 A situation
could also arise where the representative plaintiff is no longer able to fairly
and adequately represent the
class.381F[382] In this situation,
we anticipate that another class member would file an application to be
substituted as representative plaintiff.
If there is no one else able to fulfil
the role, it may lead to the proceeding being
decertified.382F[383]
- 6.69 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should empower the court to substitute the
representative plaintiff in these two situations.
Later in this chapter we
recommend that a certification order should include the name of the
representative plaintiff. This will
need to be amended if the representative
plaintiff is replaced.
CLASS ACTION MUST BE AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE
- 6.70 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed that a court should consider whether
a class action is an appropriate procedure
for the efficient resolution of class
member claims. This would enable the court to assess whether another procedure
would be a more
appropriate means of resolving claims without requiring the
class action to be the preferable or superior
procedure.383F[384] We suggested
the court should be able to consider the following factors when determining
whether a class action would be an appropriate
procedure:
(a) The number or potential number of class members.
(b) The nature of the claims.
(c) The extent of the other issues that will need to be determined once the
common issue is resolved.
(d) Whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the
remedies sought.
(e) Whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be
a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims.
(f) Any other factors it considers relevant.
Results of consultation
- 6.71 Seven
submitters commented on our proposed “appropriate procedure”
requirement.384F[385] Simpson
Grierson indicated its agreement with this aspect of the certification
test.385F[386] The IBA Antitrust
Committee noted that our provision referred to the “efficient resolution
of the claims of class members,” while the Ontario certification
provision requires a class action to be the preferable procedure for the
resolution of the common
issues.386F[387] It
agreed with the focus on claims because it would encourage a holistic assessment
of the class action, allowing the court to consider
whether a class action makes
sense for the parties and the court, particularly in light of residual
issues.
- 6.72 The
Insurance Council said the factors should be mandatory rather than permissive,
because it is important to carry out a full
assessment of whether a class action
is an appropriate procedure in every case.
- 6.73 Bell Gully
suggested “the extent of the other issues that will need to be determined
once the common issue is resolved”
should be amended to “the
nature and extent of...” It also suggested the court should
consider whether there is a real prospect that class members may be adversely
affected by the order and the need for, and number of, sub-classes.
- 6.74 The IBA
Antitrust Committee suggested the appropriate procedure aspect of the
certification test could involve duplication with
the proposed requirement for a
common issue of fact or law of significance to the resolution of each claim. It
suggested that the
appropriate procedure analysis may be the better place to
consider whether the common issue lends itself to a class action. Omni
Bridgeway
said it should be made clear that consideration of the extent of the other
issues that will need to be resolved once the
common issues are resolved is not
akin to a predominance test. This point was also made by consultation workshop
participants.
- 6.75 Two
submitters commented on the proposed factor of whether the likely time and cost
of the proceeding is proportionate to the
remedies sought. Shine Lawyers said
the court should exercise caution with this factor at early stages of the
proceeding. It said
a significant benefit of class actions is making small
individual claims against large defendants viable, so any cost-benefit analysis
should not deny access to justice for individuals and should not solely focus on
economic considerations. It said the court could
exercise other powers to ensure
a proportionate response, such as making a cy-près award of damages
(which we have termed
alternative
distribution).387F[388] Tom Weston
QC suggested clarifying whether this factor could mean that a proceeding might
not be certified where it involves a large
number of class members with each
having a very small claim, so the only real financial benefit is to a litigation
funder.
- 6.76 A
consultation workshop participant questioned whether an appropriate procedure
test was robust enough and thought a superiority
test would be better.
- 6.77 Gilbert
Walker suggested the appropriateness test could consider whether regulatory
action (either concluded or in progress)
might count against
certification.
Recommendation
- R34 The
certification test should require a class action proceeding to be an appropriate
procedure for the efficient resolution of the
claims of class members. The test
should specify that the court must consider the following factors when making
this assessment:
- The
proposed class definition.
- The
potential number of class members.
- The
nature of the claims.
- The
nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined once the
common issue is resolved.
- Whether
the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the remedies
sought.
- Whether
there is another procedure available to class members that would be a more
appropriate means of dealing with their claims.
- Any
other factors it considers relevant.
- 6.78 We consider
the certification test should require a class action proceeding to be an
appropriate procedure for the efficient
resolution of the claims of class
members.388F[389] This requirement
will allow the court to make a holistic assessment of whether the claims are
suitable to bring as a class action,
without requiring a plaintiff to establish
that a class action would be superior to other procedures for resolving the
claims. We
think it would be unduly burdensome if the plaintiff had to
demonstrate that a class action was superior to every alternative means
of
bringing a claim and this might frustrate the objective of improving access to
justice. Further, there will often be a range of
ways of proceeding with a claim
and we think a plaintiff should have some choice as to the procedure.
- 6.79 This aspect
of our recommended test focuses on whether a class action would be an efficient
way of resolving class member claims,
rather than simply resolving the common
issues. Even if a class action could be an efficient way of resolving the common
issues,
the proceeding might not be suitable to bring as a class action if there
will be real difficulty in determining individual issues
for a large group of
class members and there is another procedure that could more easily resolve
those claims.389F[390]
- 6.80 We
recommend the certification test should specify the court must consider the
following factors when determining whether a class
action is an appropriate
procedure:390F[391]
(a) The proposed class definition.
(b) The potential number of class members.
(c) The nature of the claims.
(d) The nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined
once the common issue is resolved.
(e) Whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the
remedies sought.
(f) Whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be
a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims.
(g) Any other factors it considers relevant.
- 6.81 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we suggested these factors should be discretionary.
On reflection, we now consider they should
be mandatory. The existence of these
factors has been key to the design of other aspects of the certification test we
recommend.
For example, we have decided against a strict numerosity threshold
because the number of class members will be considered as part
of the
court’s consideration of whether a class action is an appropriate
procedure. Similarly, we have removed “significance”
from the common
issue requirement because the court will consider the nature and extent of the
other issues that will need to be
determined once the common issue is resolved.
Our conclusion that class actions should not be restricted to claims for damages
is
based on the assumption that a court will consider whether there is another
procedure available to class members that would be a
more appropriate means of
dealing with their claims. Our policy intent may be undermined if the court is
not required to consider
each of the factors relevant to the appropriate
procedure requirement. We think these factors should be considered in every
case.
- 6.82 We discuss
each factor below. Some of these factors are likely to overlap, for example, the
nature of the claims and whether
there are other procedures available for
resolving them.
Proposed class definition
- 6.83 We
have added a requirement for the court to consider the proposed class
definition, as this will affect the size, scope and
manageability of a class
action. Having a clear class definition is important because it allows potential
class members to determine
whether they are covered by a class action, affects
the notice arrangements that will be needed, and provides a defendant with some
clarity as to the nature and scope of their exposure. The class definition is
particularly important in opt-out class actions, because
potential class members
who fall within the definition and do not opt out will be bound by the outcome.
- 6.84 The way a
class has been defined might mean the proceeding is not appropriate to bring as
a class action. One issue that has
arisen in other jurisdictions is
‘over-inclusive’ class definitions, where the class definition may
encompass some class
members without a cause of action against the
defendant.391F[392] One response
to over-inclusive class definitions is allowing subjective class definitions,
which limit the class to those who have
suffered injury or who will ultimately
have a successful cause of
action.392F[393] Although
subjective class definitions can prevent the inclusion of class members without
a cause of action against the defendant,
they can be problematic. They can be
circular and may require subjective issues to be decided, involve a preliminary
consideration
of the merits, unduly narrow the class and impede finality for the
defendant.393F[394] They may also
make it difficult for potential class members to determine whether they fall
within the class.
- 6.85 Consideration
of the class definition is also part of the certification test in other
jurisdictions. In Ontario, the certification
test includes a requirement for an
“identifiable class” of two or more
people.394F[395] Case law has held
that class membership must be defined by objective criteria that are rationally
related to the common issues and
not dependent on the outcome or merits of the
litigation.395F[396]
- 6.86 The
certification criteria applied by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal includes a
requirement that claims are “brought
on behalf of an identifiable class of
persons”.396F[397] The
Tribunal’s Guide to Proceedings recommends that subjective or
merits-based class definitions should be avoided, and the class should be
defined as narrowly as possible
without arbitrarily excluding people. It must be
possible to say for any particular person, using an objective definition of the
class, whether or not the person falls within the
class.397F[398]
- 6.87 Some United
States courts have considered ‘ascertainability’ or
‘definiteness’ of the class to be an
implicit certification
requirement in class actions seeking
damages.398F[399] Courts will
consider whether the class can be ascertained by objective criteria. A class
definition that depends on subjective criteria
such as a class member’s
state of mind will be rejected for lack of
definiteness.399F[400] In
addition, some courts have considered whether a class definition is
“administratively feasible”, so the process of
identifying class
members will be manageable and require little, if any, individual factual
inquiry.400F[401]
- 6.88 In
Australia, where there is no certification requirement, an application
commencing a class action must describe or otherwise
identify the class members
to whom the proceeding
relates.401F[402]
- 6.89 A class
action is a procedural device that is intended to provide an efficient way of
bringing multiple individual claims. It
should not be used to confer a right of
action on individuals who would not otherwise have
one.402F[403] Defining the class
in a way that does not use inappropriate subjective criteria but is not
over-inclusive involves a delicate balancing
act and will ultimately depend on
the case at issue. We do not propose any rules for class definition and think
this is a matter
for the courts to determine.
- 6.90 There may
be cases where the court is only prepared to certify the class action if the
proposed class definition is amended.
In such a case, the court could consider
adjourning the certification hearing to give the representative plaintiff an
opportunity
to amend their application.
Potential number of class members
- 6.91 As
discussed in the Supplementary Issues Paper, we consider a nuanced approach to
numerosity is preferable to a threshold such
as “seven or more
persons”. Our draft commencement provision only requires a representative
plaintiff and two other
persons.403F[404] We think the
size of the class is better considered as part of the court’s assessment
of whether a class action is an appropriate
procedure. Where the estimated class
size is large, this may be a factor in favour of a class action.
- 6.92 We envisage
the affidavit filed by the proposed representative plaintiff would contain
information on the potential size of the
class. In some cases, it will be
straightforward to obtain this information, such as the number of shareholders
on a share register.
In other cases it will be more difficult to accurately
estimate the potential class size prior to discovery, such as in consumer
class
actions. In such a case, the affidavit could provide an estimated range of class
size and information as to how this estimate
has been obtained.
Nature of the claims
- 6.93 We
see the nature of the claims as being relevant, including which area of law is
involved and the nature of the relief sought.
In Chapter 4, we explained we did
not consider class actions should be prevented with respect to particular areas
of the law or types
of relief. However, we said this could be considered as part
of certification. For example, a judicial review claim seeking only
a
declaration is likely to be less appropriate to bring as a class action than a
private law claim seeking damages.
Nature and extent of the other issues to be determined
- 6.94 This
factor requires the court to consider which issues will need to be resolved once
the common issues are determined, and whether
a class action will still be
appropriate in light of this. As one commentator has
noted:404F[405]
- No matter how
significant the common issues may be, if resolution of the leftover individual
issues is going to degenerate into an
“unmanageable monster”, those
common issues will not be “big enough” to sustain a class
action.
- 6.95 We see this
exercise as not simply a numerical comparison of the number of common and
individual issues, but as an assessment
of how manageable it will be to
determine the individual issues. We have therefore amended this factor to refer
to the “nature
and extent” of the other issues. This will allow the
court to consider, for example, whether the remaining issues would require
individual determination or could be determined by using sub-groups. We do not
see this factor as requiring common issues to predominate.
Proportionality
- 6.96 We
consider the court should assess whether the time and expense of a class action
is proportionate to the remedies sought. It
reflects our objectives for class
actions of improving access to justice and managing multiple claims in an
efficient way. We do
not think a class action will be consistent with those
objectives if it is lengthy and expensive to run and results in very small
individual payments to class members. While such a class action might still
involve the defendant paying a significant award and
result in a change to its
behaviour, we have not recommended ‘strengthening incentives for
compliance with the law’ as
an objective for class actions.
- 6.97 As
discussed in Chapter 4, we do not think class actions should be limited to
proceedings seeking damages, so this assessment
should not be limited to an
economic calculation. The cost and expense of a class action could be justified
by non-monetary relief
that will be significant for individual class members.
- 6.98 To allow
the court to assess this factor, we envisage the affidavit filed in support of
the certification application will need
to include some information about:
(a) The potential duration of the class action, such as the likely number of
witnesses and estimated hearing duration.
(b) The likely expenses of the proceeding, such as anticipated legal fees,
project management fees and disbursements.
(c) The estimated range of individual claims.
- 6.99 Some of
this information may be confidential and we anticipate a court might approve
some redactions of material that is provided
to the defendant. We acknowledge
that it may be difficult to provide an accurate estimate of these matters at an
early stage of proceedings,
so we envisage the court’s consideration would
be at a fairly high-level. Nonetheless, we expect that lawyers and litigation
funders will have undertaken considerable due diligence before bringing a class
action and will have developed estimates of the potential
costs of the
proceeding and individual claim sizes.
Other procedures for resolving individual claims
- 6.100 This
factor requires the court to consider whether there are other avenues available
to class members that would be more appropriate
for resolving their claims,
without requiring the plaintiff to establish that a class action is superior to
all alternative procedures.
For example, in a case seeking a non-monetary
remedy, the court could consider whether the case would be more appropriately
brought
as a judicial review or representative action proceeding or through an
application under the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908.
- 6.101 This
factor refers to other procedures available to class members because we do not
think the possibility of regulatory action
on the same issue should prevent a
class action. In Chapter 2, we suggest that where there is a class action and a
regulatory action
over the same matter, courts could manage this using their
general case management powers.
CLASS MEMBERSHIP
- 6.102 The
Supplementary Issues Paper explained our conclusion that both opt-in and
opt‑out class actions should be available,
with no default
approach.405F[406] We proposed the
court should consider whether the opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the
proceeding was an appropriate means
of determining class membership in the
circumstances of the case. We suggested considerations that may be relevant to
this assessment,
but did not include them as factors in our proposed
certification test.
- 6.103 We also
expressed the view it was unnecessary to provide for universal or compulsory
class actions.406F[407] This is
where a class action is brought on behalf of all members of a defined class
without first obtaining their consent or providing
any opportunity for them to
remove themselves from the
proceedings.407F[408] We said the
situations in which a universal class action might be appropriate would be
relatively rare and the individual autonomy
of litigants supported giving class
members an opportunity to either opt in or opt out of a class action.
Results of consultation
- 6.104 We
received 10 submissions on this aspect of our proposed certification
test.408F[409]
Whether to have opt-in and opt-out class actions with no
default
- 6.105 Several
submitters commented on our conclusion that both opt-in and opt-out proceedings
should be available, with no default
approach. Three submitters agreed that both
opt‑in and opt-out proceedings should be
available.409F[410] The Insurance
Council expressed concern about opt-out class actions being allowed, while
Professor Vince Morabito (Monash University)
disagreed with having a
discretionary opt-in/opt-out
model.410F[411]
- 6.106 Simpson
Grierson agreed with having a case-by-case assessment of the appropriate class
mechanism, rather than a default approach.
Gilbert Walker said that, if both
opt-in and opt-out class actions were permitted, a case-by-case approach was
preferable to having
a default mechanism. Two submitters preferred having a
default mechanism. Bell Gully said the default should be opt-in and an applicant
should have the burden of establishing that an opt-out class action is more
appropriate. Johnson & Johnson suggested a rebuttable
presumption that class
membership should be opt-out.
- 6.107 Rhonson
Salim suggested that overseas class members should only be able to join a class
action by opting in. Bell Gully said
the court should not certify a class action
on an opt-out basis if the class would include foreign
residents.411F[412]
- 6.108 The joint
submission by Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce questioned our
conclusion that universal class actions
are not required and pointed to
significant public law cases where it would have been infeasible to provide an
ability to opt out.
Whether test should specify factors
- 6.109 Several
submitters thought greater guidance would be desirable on when an opt-in or
opt-out procedure would be an appropriate
means of determining class membership.
Nikki Chamberlain suggested adding factors that a court may consider when
determining whether
a class action should be opt-in or opt-out. Bell Gully
proposed that the court apply the ‘appropriate procedure’ factors
when assessing whether an opt-out mechanism is more appropriate than
opt-in.412F[413] Rhonson Salim
agreed the court should have broad discretion to consider the circumstances of a
particular case but suggested a guiding
principle such as “the sound
administration of justice”. He also considered the strength of the claim
should be a relevant
factor when an opt-out class action is proposed.
- 6.110 Simpson
Grierson thought the considerations we identified as relevant to whether a class
action should be allowed on an opt-in
or opt-out basis were appropriate. Gilbert
Walker commented that conducting class actions on an opt-out basis is
particularly challenging
where there are many individual issues, and where
defendants want to join other parties.
Recommendation
- R35 The
certification test should require the opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for
the proceeding to be an appropriate means of determining
class membership in the
circumstances of the proceeding. The test should specify the court may consider
the following factors when
making this assessment:
- The
potential size of the class and how potential class members will be
identified.
- The
characteristics of the class.
- The
nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of individual
claims.
- Whether
class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings.
- Whether
a particular class mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in running
its defence.
- Any
other factors it considers relevant.
- 6.111 We confirm
our preliminary conclusion that opt-in and opt-out class actions should both be
available, with no default mechanism.
- 6.112 There are
advantages and disadvantages to both forms of class action, as we discussed in
detail in the Issues
Paper.413F[414] An opt-in class
action ensures that class members have actively consented to the proceedings.
This removes the risk of a person being
bound by a proceeding they are unaware
of and enables class members to actively sign up to a legal retainer and
litigation funding
arrangements. It also means the size and identity of the
class is clear, which can help the defendant to calculate its potential
liability and allow them to identify any contributory claims. A key disadvantage
of opt-in class actions is they typically involve
a smaller class size, which
may limit the extent to which they improve access to justice, make it more
difficult to attract litigation
funding, increase the risk of multiple
individual proceedings being brought and provide less finality for
defendants.
- 6.113 Opt-out
class actions are likely to have a greater impact on improving access to justice
because class members do not need to
take any active steps to become part of the
class action. In addition, as opt-out class actions generally involve a larger
class
size than opt‑in class actions, they may make more cases economic to
bring as a class action. They may also help to provide
greater finality for a
defendant since the outcome will be binding on a larger number of people. A
disadvantage of opt-out class
actions is that individuals are automatically part
of a class action without their consent. If class members are unaware of the
opportunity
to opt out of the class action, they will be bound to the outcome of
the proceedings without having any knowledge of it.
- 6.114 The
implications of these potential advantages and disadvantages will differ
depending on the type of case. For example, the
implications of binding a class
member to the outcome of a proceeding they are unaware of may differ depending
on the value of individual
claims and the subject matter. The access to justice
benefits of an opt-out class action could be particularly important in a case
where individual claims are modest and it is difficult to identify potential
class members, such as a consumer claim involving a
defective product. By
contrast, the benefits of an opt-out class action may be less pronounced in a
shareholder class action where
potential class members can be easily identified
through the share register. We think the best approach is to allow both opt-in
and
opt-out class actions, to allow for a case-by-case assessment of which is
appropriate.
- 6.115 Because we
think the advantages and disadvantages of both forms of class action will differ
depending on the case, rather than
one being generally preferable, we do not
recommend a default approach. In our view the starting point should be the
mechanism for
determining class membership proposed by the representative
plaintiff, given that the case will have been formulated on a particular
basis.
We recommend the certification test require the mechanism proposed for the
proceeding to be appropriate means of determining
class membership in the
circumstances of the
proceeding.414F[415] We think
“appropriate” is the right threshold rather than the court having to
decide which is the best way of determining
class membership. It may be that
either opt-in or opt-out would be appropriate in some cases.
- 6.116 Unless the
representative plaintiff agrees, we do not think a class action should be
certified on a different basis to that
sought by the representative plaintiff,
as it may not be feasible for them to continue with the litigation on that
basis.415F[416] If the
representative plaintiff is prepared to proceed with the litigation on the basis
of another class mechanism, the application
for certification could be brought
in the alternative. Alternatively, the court could provide the representative
plaintiff with the
opportunity to amend their certification application if the
court is likely to decline certification on the basis of the proposed
approach
to class
membership.416F[417]
Relevant factors
- 6.117 As
suggested by some submitters, we recommend the certification test provide
guidance on the factors a court can consider when
determining whether a class
mechanism is appropriate. This will provide greater certainty and avoid the risk
of litigation over whether
the factors courts have developed with respect to
representative actions should apply to class actions.
- 6.118 We
recommend the certification test specify the court may consider the following
factors when making its
assessment:417F[418]
(a) The potential size of the class and how potential class members will be
identified.
(b) The characteristics of the class.
(c) The nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of
individual claims.
(d) Whether class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings.
(e) Whether a particular class mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant
in running its defence.
(f) Any other factor it considers relevant.
- 6.119 This
approach will provide some guidance to parties and the court, while still
allowing flexibility to consider the circumstances
of an individual case. We
considered the suggestion made by one submitter that the same factors should
apply to the court’s
assessment of the proposed mechanism for determining
class membership and its assessment of whether a class action is an appropriate
procedure, and we acknowledge the overlap between these factors. However, given
there are some factors unique to each inquiry, we
prefer to keep these as
separate lists of factors.
Potential size of the class and how potential class members
will be identified
- 6.120 Te
Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court has said an opt-in approach may be preferable
where the class size is small and there
is a natural community of interest or
pre-existing connection.418F[419]
In such a case, it is likely to be easier to contact class members. However, it
said class size will not necessarily be
determinative.419F[420] We also
think it is relevant to consider how easy or difficult it will be to identify
class members, regardless of class size. Even
where the class is large, opt-in
could still be appropriate if it is easy to identify and contact potential class
members.
Characteristics of the class
- 6.121 The
characteristics of the class may also be relevant, including whether the class
is predominantly made up of individuals under
18 years old or individuals who
may be considered to lack decision-making capacity with respect to a step in a
class action. As we
discuss in Chapter 7, there are arguments in favour of both
opt-in and opt-out in such cases, and we think a case-specific approach
is
appropriate.
- 6.122 We also
discuss the issues of class members who live outside Aotearoa New Zealand and
the Crown as a class member in Chapter
7. We recommend in both cases, the class
member should have to opt into a class action to become a class member, even if
the class
action is opt-out. If the class predominantly comprises foreign
residents or government entities, this could be a factor favouring
an opt-in
approach.420F[421]
Nature of the claims
- 6.123 It
may be relevant for a court to consider the nature of the claims, including the
subject matter and the size of individual
claims. Claims involving personal or
sensitive subject matter or allegations of lack of consent may be less
appropriate to bring
as opt-out class actions. It may be appropriate for a case
involving individual claims of significant size to be brought as an opt-in
class
action, given that it may be economic for potential class members to bring their
own individual proceedings. An opt-out class
action might be preferable where a
case involves claims of modest value.
Whether class members could be adversely affected by the
proceedings
- 6.124 If
there is a real risk that class members could be adversely affected by
participating in a class action, it may be more appropriate
for the class action
to be brought on an opt-in basis. An example might be where the defendant has
brought a counterclaim, or there
is a real prospect of this
occurring.421F[422] The opt-in
notice could contain information on the counterclaim (or other possible adverse
effect) so that individuals are fully
informed before they decide whether to
become a class member.
Whether class mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant
in running its defence
- 6.125 It
may be relevant to consider whether the defendant will be unfairly prejudiced in
its ability to respond to a class action
if the class action is brought on a
particular basis. For example, whether the defendant would be unable to identify
applicable defences,
or to make any contributory claims within a limitation
period, due to uncertainty about the scope of the class or the particulars
of
the claims. In the Supplementary Issues Paper, we noted that bringing
contributory claims within the applicable limitation period
is not normally an
issue because the Limitation Act 2010 allows a defendant to bring a contribution
claim up to two years after their
liability was quantified. However, case law
has diverged on whether the requirement to bring claims under the Building Act
2004 within 10 years applies to contribution
claims.422F[423]
- 6.126 We do not
intend this factor to encompass a defendant’s general preference for
opt‑in over opt-out proceedings or
a difficulty in assessing the extent of
liability because the exact class size is unknown. In Chapter 8, we make
recommendations
to enable the defendant to obtain information on class member
claims, which we think will assist to provide some clarity as to the
case
against it.
Universal class actions
- 6.127 We
think the individual autonomy of litigants supports giving class members an
opportunity to either opt into or opt out of
a class action. In our view, it is
unnecessary for a class actions regime to provide for universal or compulsory
class actions, where
there is no opportunity to opt in or opt out.
- 6.128 The
Canadian, Australian and UK Competition Appeal Tribunal class actions regimes do
not provide for universal class actions.
The Ontario Law Reform Commission had
recommended the court should have a discretion in each case to determine whether
class members
should be permitted to exclude themselves from a class action,
with criteria to guide the
decision.423F[424] However, the
legislature rejected this approach, and the Ontario legislation includes a right
to opt-out in all
cases.424F[425]
- 6.129 We think
the strongest argument for allowing universal class actions relates to class
actions seeking a declaration or injunction
that would apply to all, given the
difficulty in practically opting out of such a remedy. In the United States,
there is no requirement
to provide a right to opt out of such
cases.425F[426]
- 6.130 However,
we think it would be unnecessary to bring a case seeking a declaration or
injunction that will have general effect
as a class action. We see class actions
as a form of aggregate litigation that enables many individual claims to be
brought together.
Whether it is necessary to bring claims as a class action will
depend on whether individuals need to be class members to benefit
from the
court’s decision. Where the remedy sought is a declaration or injunction
that will have general effect, we think it
is unlikely to be necessary to bring
the case as a class action. The case can be brought as an ordinary proceeding
and individuals
will benefit from the court’s decision without needing to
be class members.
- 6.131 Alternatively,
such a proceeding could be brought as a representative action under HCR 4.24. We
note the declaratory or injunctive
relief class action in the United States has
been described as “the closest incarnation” to the English
representative
action
rule.426F[427] Many of the class
action provisions we recommend are designed to deal with the complexities of a
case involving an opt-in or opt-out
procedure where monetary relief is sought.
It seems unnecessary to rely on these provisions for a case without any opt-in
or opt-out
procedure that is simply seeking a declaration or injunction of
general effect.
- 6.132 A class
action may be more appropriate where it is seeking an order or injunction that
will only apply to those who are part
of the class action. We discuss this issue
in Chapter 4.
OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CERTIFICATION TEST
- 6.133 In
this section we discuss:
(a) Whether to require a litigation plan at certification.
(b) The interaction between review of litigation funding arrangements and the
certification test.
(c) The effect of the certification requirements being met.
(d) Whether the Class Actions Act should specify matters that will not prevent a
case from being certified.
(e) The evidential standard for certification.
Litigation plan
- 6.134 The
Supplementary Issues Paper explained that we did not think a litigation plan
should be required as part of
certification.427F[428] Two
submitters commented on this. Chapman Tripp said the plaintiff should have to
outline a litigation plan and how individual issues
would be managed at
certification. It noted that substantial class actions can take a long time and
saw benefit in setting appropriate
expectations about the process and likely
timeframes. Johnson & Johnson said the representative plaintiff should
ensure a workable
plan for the proceeding is produced but did not specify this
should be part of the certification test.
- 6.135 Some
consultation workshop participants thought a litigation plan could ensure the
plaintiff has a clear idea of how they will
bring and prove their case and could
be particularly useful where claims require detailed scientific evidence. Others
cautioned that
discussing how a plaintiff will prove their case might get close
to discussing the merits of the case at certification. It was also
suggested the
information provided to support the proportionality assessment might be
sufficient and that litigation plans might
fit better as part of case
management.
- 6.136 A
plaintiff will need to provide some information about how the case will be run
as part of their certification application,
particularly to allow the court to
assess whether the time and expense of a class action will be proportionate to
the remedies sought.
However, we do not consider there should be a separate
requirement to provide a litigation plan. We think this could require too
many
detailed issues to be discussed at an early stage of proceedings. A litigation
plan would be better considered as part of case
management, if the case is
certified. In Chapter 8 we recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti |
Rules Committee consider
developing a list of matters to be discussed at class
actions case management conferences in the High Court Rules.
Litigation funding
- 6.137 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we indicated we had not yet formed a view on
whether the court should consider litigation
funding arrangements when a class
action is commenced, but if it should, this would likely need to be in a
separate provision rather
than in the certification
test.428F[429]
- 6.138 Nikki
Chamberlain suggested an additional clause in the certification provision that
the court must approve the terms of any
litigation funding arrangement. Three
submitters supported the court carrying out an assessment of litigation funding
arrangements
at the same time as certification, without specifying whether this
should be part of the certification
test.429F[430] Zane Kennedy agreed
with our view that the process of considering funding arrangements should be
separate from the certification
test, and said there would be little point in
the court considering funding arrangements if it then declined to certify the
class
action. Some consultation workshop participants said it would be efficient
to consider litigation funding arrangements at the same
time as
certification.
- 6.139 In Chapter
17, we recommend that litigation funding arrangements in class actions should
only be enforceable by funders if they
are approved by the court and set out
factors the court should consider when deciding whether to approve a funding
agreement in a
class action. We suggest that the funded representative plaintiff
should generally seek approval of the funding agreement shortly
after
certification.430F[431] There are
several reasons why we consider this should be in a separate provision rather
than in the certification test:
(a) While many class actions will be litigation funded, this is not a
requirement of bringing a class action.
(b) It would not make sense for the court to review a litigation funding
arrangement unless it has decided to certify the class action.
(c) If the court has certified the class action on a slightly different basis to
that initially sought (for example, by narrowing
the class definition or only
allowing it to proceed on an opt-in basis), the representative plaintiff and
funder may need to review
the litigation funding arrangements.
(d) In some cases, litigation funding could be obtained part-way through
proceedings, or the litigation funding arrangements could
change during the
proceedings.
Effect of certification requirements being met
- 6.140 Our
draft certification provision stated that a court “may” certify a
proceeding if the test was met. The IBA Antitrust
Committee queried whether a
residual discretion was intended, contrasting the Ontario provision which states
the court “shall”
certify a class action if satisfied that the
criteria are met. Bell Gully suggested the certification provision state the
court may
certify a proceeding “only if” satisfied the certification
criteria are met, so it is clear that the provision is a code
for
certification.
Recommendation
- R36 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court must certify a proceeding as a
class action if it considers the certification
test is met, unless more than one
concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for certification.
- 6.141 We do not
consider a court should have a residual discretion to decline to certify a
proceeding as a class action if the criteria
are met. This would create a high
degree of uncertainty for litigants and undermine the specific criteria in the
certification test.
We therefore recommend the Class Actions Act should specify
that the court must certify a proceeding as a class action if it considers
the
certification test is
met.431F[432] This should be
subject to an exception where there is more than one concurrent class action
proceeding that meets the certification
test and the court decides that not all
of them will be certified. For any concurrent class action that the court
decides will not
be certified, we recommend the Class Actions Act specify the
application for certification must be dismissed. We discuss this issue
in
Chapter 5.
Whether to specify matters that do not prevent certification
- 6.142 The
Ontario legislation provides that a court shall not refuse to certify a
proceeding as a class action solely on any of the
following
grounds:432F[433]
(a) The relief sought includes a damages claim that would require individual
assessment after the common issues have been determined.
(b) The relief sought relates to separate contracts involving different class
members.
(c) Different remedies are sought for different class members.
(d) The number of class members or the identity of each class member is not
known.
(e) The class includes a subclass with claims or defences that raise common
issues not shared by all class members.
- 6.143 The IBA
Antitrust Committee noted the Ontario provision and suggested a similar
provision may be helpful in Aotearoa New Zealand.
- 6.144 This
provision was included in the Ontario legislation to remove what had been
impediments to bringing a representative
action.433F[434] As discussed in
the Issues Paper, English case law took a restrictive approach to what could
proceed as a representative action and
this approach influenced other
jurisdictions, including Canada, and provided impetus for the development of
class actions regimes.434F[435]
While Ontario courts had been moving away from the position that a
representative action should be barred where individual assessments
of damages
may be required or the relief arose out of separate contracts, the OLRC
recommended a statutory provision “to put
these matters beyond
doubt”.435F[436]
- 6.145 It is 30
years since the Ontario legislation was enacted and the law on representative
actions has evolved considerably in that
time. Courts in Aotearoa New Zealand
have rejected the earlier restrictive approach to representative actions in
favour of a liberal
and flexible
approach.436F[437] For example, it
is now well established that a representative action is not precluded where
damages will need to be determined on
an individual
basis.437F[438] We therefore think
it is unnecessary to have a provision similar to Ontario that provides a list of
matters that do not preclude
certification.
Evidential standard for certification
- 6.146 We
have considered what evidential standard should apply when the court assesses
whether the certification test is met. This
was an issue we noted briefly in the
Issues Paper.438F[439] It was also
raised in one submission we received on the Supplementary Issues Paper.
- 6.147 One option
is for the ordinary civil standard of proof to apply, which would require the
proposed representative plaintiff to
prove the certification test is met on the
balance of probabilities.439F[440]
The joint submission from Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce
cautioned against requiring the court to determine the
certification test to an
evidentiary standard, with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff. They
said this would require the
plaintiff to bring evidence affirmatively showing
that every aspect of the certification criteria is met, could lead to defendants
contesting the minutiae of the test and may require discovery, briefs of
evidence and cross-examination.
- 6.148 Another
option is for a lesser evidentiary standard to apply. In Ontario, the plaintiff
needs to show “some basis in fact”
for each of the certification
requirements (except for the requirement that the pleadings disclose a cause of
action, which has its
own standard of
proof).440F[441] This standard
does not require the court to resolve conflicting facts and evidence at the
certification stage.441F[442] It
does not involve determining the merits of the proceeding, “nor does it
involve such a superficial level of analysis into
the sufficiency of the
evidence that it would amount to nothing more than symbolic
scrutiny”.442F[443]
- 6.149 In its
2019 report, the Law Commission of Ontario (LCO) considered whether a more
stringent evidential standard should be required.
It identified several concerns
with moving from a “some basis in fact” standard to a “balance
of probabilities”
standard, including needing more evidence at
certification and a more merit-focused discussion of the certification criteria.
It
concluded that the evidentiary standard for certification should not be
amended.443F[444] The LCO noted
similar evidentiary standards are applied in other Canadian jurisdictions. In
Alberta and British Columbia, courts
favour an “air of reality”
standard, while in Saskatchewan a “plausible standard” applies at
certification
that requires the plaintiff to show an “authentic”
cause of action.444F[445] In the
United States, while courts have applied divergent approaches, there has been a
trend towards requiring a plaintiff to prove
the certification requirements by a
preponderance of the
evidence.445F[446]
- 6.150 A third
option is to apply the standard that applies to a strike-out application, with
the court proceeding on the basis that
the pleaded facts are true (unless the
pleaded allegations are entirely speculative and without
foundation).446F[447] The
strike-out standard was supported by Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter
Pearce. Their joint submission said matters alleged
in the statement of claim
should be taken to be true (for the purposes of certification) unless they are
entirely speculative and
without foundation or are shown to be untrue by
affidavit evidence that is indisputable. Some consultation workshop participants
thought most of the certification requirements could be met on the pleadings
with little evidence required.
- 6.151 We
consider there must be some basis in fact for each of the certification
requirements, except for the requirement for a reasonably
arguable cause of
action. As we explain in our discussion of this element of the certification
test, we think the strike-out standard
should apply to this requirement so the
court would proceed on the basis that the pleaded facts are true, except if the
pleaded allegations
are entirely speculative and without foundation.
- 6.152 The
plaintiff should be required to provide affidavit evidence to support other
aspects of the certification test, rather than
the court simply relying on what
is in the pleadings. For example, if the pleadings assert there is a potential
class of 100,000
people, this should be supported by an affidavit explaining the
basis for this figure. If the certification application states that
a proposed
representative plaintiff has a reasonable understanding of the claim and the
duty and responsibilities of the role, the
affidavit could outline the steps
taken to develop this understanding. We think it would be too low a standard for
a court to determine
certification on the pleadings without any evidence
provided by the representative plaintiff. However, we consider requiring a
plaintiff
to meet a balance of probabilities standard would be too high and
could mean that briefs of evidence and cross-examination are required
for
certification, which would cause unnecessary cost and delay.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS RELATING TO CERTIFICATION
- 6.153 In
this section we consider the following procedural aspects of
certification:
(a) The certification application.
(b) The certification hearing.
(c) The certification order.
(d) The court’s powers when certification criteria are no longer met.
- 6.154 As we did
not address the certification hearing or the court’s powers when the
certification criteria are no longer met
in the Supplementary Issues Paper,
submitters did not comment on these matters.
Certification application
- 6.155 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed that when a class action is
commenced it must be accompanied by an application
for an order certifying the
proceeding as a class action and an order appointing one or more representative
plaintiffs for the
proceeding.447F[448]
Results of consultation
- 6.156 Several
submitters raised questions about what must be filed in support of a
certification application and when:
(a) The IBA Antitrust Committee said it was unclear when the representative
plaintiff must file evidence in support of certification
and what the manner,
scope and timing of any evidential requirements are. It noted that in Ontario, a
proceeding would be initiated
by filing a statement of claim and an application
would subsequently be filed for orders certifying the proceeding and appointing
a representative plaintiff.
(b) Shine Lawyers said that, given the certification criteria will likely
require considerable evidence from the plaintiff, it would
be premature to
require the plaintiff to seek a certification order at commencement. It said
this is particularly so given the proposed
90-day time frame for filing a
competing class action.
(c) Omni Bridgeway said certification should be able to be determined on the
pleadings, except for the requirement for the representative
plaintiff to
demonstrate they have a reasonable understanding of the nature of the claims and
their obligations. This could be dealt
with by way of a brief affidavit.
(d) Two submitters queried how a plaintiff could prove aspects of the
certification test, such as how they would fairly and adequately
represent the
class or that a class action is an appropriate
procedure.448F[449] The joint
submission by Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce noted that
opinion evidence from the plaintiff or their
counsel would be inadmissible.
Recommendation
- R37 The
Class Actions Act should require an application for an order certifying the
proceeding as a class action and appointing one or
more persons as the
representative plaintiff(s) to be filed at the same time as the proceeding is
commenced. The application should
be supported by an affidavit from the proposed
representative plaintiff.
- 6.157 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should require an intending representative
plaintiff to file an interlocutory application
for an order certifying the
proceeding as a class action and appointing a representative plaintiff. This
should be filed when the
proceeding is
commenced.449F[450] We also
recommend the application should be supported by an affidavit from the proposed
representative plaintiff. As discussed in
the preceding section, such an
affidavit will allow the court to determine whether there is some basis in fact
for the certification
requirements.
- 6.158 While we
acknowledge the difficulty of filing an interlocutory application and affidavit
within the 90-day timeframe applying
to concurrent class actions, we do not
think a class action proceeding should be commenced unless full consideration
has been given
to the certification requirements. We note the High Court Rules
require an affidavit in support of an interlocutory application to
be filed at
the same time as the application and we do not favour a different approach for
class actions.450F[451] Our
recommendations on concurrent class actions are designed to provide an
opportunity for any concurrent class action to be filed
but are not intended to
encourage multiple class actions. We have also recommended the court retain a
discretion to grant leave to
file a class action proceeding outside the 90-day
timeframe.451F[452]
- 6.159 A notice
of opposition to an interlocutory application must normally be filed and served
within 10 working days of being served
with the application, along with any
affidavit in support.452F[453]
This may be insufficient time to respond to a certification application, which
is likely to be more complex than a standard interlocutory
application, and an
extension to this timeframe may be
needed.453F[454]
The certification hearing
- 6.160 We
envisage it will usually be necessary to hold a hearing to determine whether a
case should be certified as a class action.
In Chapter 5, we recommend that a
class actions webpage be developed on ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts of
New Zealand website
and that details of new class actions be listed on it. We
suggest Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice make details
of
upcoming certification hearings available on the webpage. This would allow
interested persons, including potential class members,
to attend the hearing or
to seek leave to intervene in the proceedings. We do not think it is necessary
to specify any rights of
intervention in certification hearings, as Te Kōti
Matua | High Court has the necessary powers to permit this where
appropriate.454F[455]
- 6.161 In some
cases, it could be possible to determine the certification application on the
papers, particularly where the defendant
consents. Regardless of whether a
hearing is held, the court will still need to consider whether each aspect of
the certification
test is met.
- 6.162 The
Ontario legislation allows the court to adjourn an application for certification
to permit the parties to amend their materials
or pleadings or to permit further
evidence.455F[456] This is based
on a recommendation of the Attorney-General’s Advisory Committee on Class
Action Reform that determining certification
should not be a “forced
choice between certification or no
certification”.456F[457]
- 6.163 We can
envisage scenarios where the court might consider it can only certify a class
action on a slightly different basis to
how it has been brought. These
include:
(a) Where the court considers the class definition should be amended from that
pleaded in the statement of claim.
(b) Where one or more of the causes of action is not reasonably arguable.
(c) Where the plaintiff has sought to bring a class action on an opt-out basis
and the court considers it can only be certified on
an opt-in basis.
- 6.164 In these
situations, it might be appropriate for the court to provide an applicant with
the opportunity to amend their pleadings
rather than declining certification.
The court already has the power to adjourn the hearing of an interlocutory
application and we
think a certification-specific power is
unnecessary.457F[458]
Certification order
- 6.165 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said if the court decides to certify a
proceeding as a class action it should make a formal
certification
order.458F[459] We suggested the
matters specified in the order could include:
(a) A description of the class.
(b) The name of the representative plaintiff (or plaintiffs).
(c) The nature of the claims asserted on behalf of the class.
(d) The relief sought by the class.
(e) The common issues of law or fact.
(f) Whether the class action has been certified on an opt-in or opt-out basis.
Results of consultation
- 6.166 We
received 10 submissions that commented on certification
orders.459F[460] There was general
agreement that the list of matters we proposed should be included in a
certification order.
- 6.167 Bell Gully
suggested the certification order should also list the date by which class
members must opt into or opt out of the
class action and state whether and when
the representative plaintiff must provide security for costs. Carter Pearce said
the certification
order should identify the plaintiff’s solicitors as
lawyer for the class. Several submitters said the court should have a power
to
amend the certification order to allow for issues evolving as the case
progresses.460F[461]
- 6.168 At our
consultation workshops, there was general agreement that clarity around the
class definition and common issues is important.
However, concern was raised
about common issues being fixed by a certification order as it was considered
necessary to have flexibility
to amend claims during the class action.
Recommendations
- R38 The
Class Actions Act should specify that when a proceeding is certified as a class
action, the court must make a certification order
that includes:
- The
class definition.
- The
name of the representative plaintiff(s).
- A
description of the causes of action that are pleaded.
- The
relief sought by the class.
- The
common issues of law or fact.
- Whether
the class action has been certified on an opt-in or opt-out
basis.
- R39 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may amend a certification
order.
- R40 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should publish certification
orders on the class actions webpage on ngā Kōti
o Aotearoa | Courts of
New Zealand website.
- 6.169 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that when a proceeding is
certified as a class action, the court must make
a certification order. The
benefits of having a certification order include helping to establish the common
issues that will be determined
in the class action, providing clear information
to class members about the nature and scope of the class action, and assisting
the
appellate court in the event the certification decision is
appealed.461F[462]
- 6.170 We
recommend the terms of a certification order should include:
(a) The class definition.
(b) The name of the representative plaintiff(s).
(c) A description of the causes of action that are pleaded.
(d) The relief sought by the class.
(e) The common issues of law or fact.
(f) Whether the class action has been certified on an opt-in or opt-out basis.
- 6.171 We do not
see this list as exhaustive and think the court should have flexibility to
include any other matter it considers appropriate
in the certification
order.
- 6.172 We have
made some small amendments to our earlier list. We now refer to the class
definition, rather than the class description,
which aligns with our
certification test. We also refer to a description of the causes of action
rather than the claims.
- 6.173 We see the
purpose of a certification order as clarifying the scope of the claim and the
basis on which the proceeding has been
certified. For this reason, we do not
think it needs to contain matters such as the opt-in or opt-out date, security
for costs or
the lawyer for the class.
- 6.174 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify that the court may amend a certification
order, in order to provide flexibility as
a case develops. Situations where this
might be necessary include where an amended statement of claim is filed or where
the representative
plaintiff is substituted. Without the power to amend a
certification order, a representative plaintiff could be constrained by the
way
the case was framed in the initial statement of claim, including with respect to
the common issues. Identifying additional common
issues to be determined could
be in the interests of both access to justice and managing multiple claims in an
efficient way.
- 6.175 We
recommend the Ministry of Justice should publish certification orders on the
class actions webpage of the Courts of New Zealand
website. This would enable
potential class members to access information about the scope of the class
action and assist other litigants
to determine whether another proceeding would
be considered a concurrent class action.
Court’s powers when certification criteria are no
longer met
- 6.176 It
is possible that a change in circumstances during a class action will mean the
certification criteria are no longer met.
For example, a representative
plaintiff may no longer be able to fairly and adequately represent the class, or
there may no longer
be a common issue applying to the class. In other
jurisdictions with a certification stage, courts have powers they can exercise
if the certification criteria are no longer met:
(a) In Ontario, if it appears to the court that the certification requirements
are no longer satisfied, it may amend the certification
order, decertify the
proceeding or make any other order it considers
appropriate.462F[463] If the court
decertifies a proceeding, it may permit the proceeding to continue as one or
more proceedings between different
parties.463F[464]
(b) The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal can make an order varying or revoking the
certification order or staying the class action.
In doing so, it must consider
whether the certification criteria continue to be met, whether the
representative plaintiff still meets
the criteria, and whether the Tribunal has
given them permission to withdraw as representative
plaintiff.464F[465]
(c) In the United States, a court may alter or amend its class certification
decision at any time before final
judgment.465F[466] This can
include decertifying or modifying a class action that was initially approved if,
during the litigation, the class action
fails to meet the certification
requirements.466F[467]
- 6.177 Australian
courts also have powers to order that a proceeding not continue as a class
action, although these powers serve as
an alternative to requiring
certification.467F[468]
Recommendation
- R41 If
the court is satisfied the certification criteria are no longer met, the Class
Actions Act should empower the court to make an
order decertifying the
proceeding or any other order it considers appropriate. A party or a class
member should be able to apply
for such an order with the leave of the court. A
court should also be able to make such an order of its own motion.
- 6.178 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify that if the court is satisfied the
certification criteria are no longer met, it may
make an order decertifying the
proceeding or any other order it considers appropriate. An example of another
order that may be appropriate
is an order appointing an alternative
representative
plaintiff.468F[469]
- 6.179 We
consider that either a party or a class member should be able to apply for an
order to have a proceeding decertified (or
other order), although this should
require the leave of the court to prevent misuse of this power. We also think
the court should
be able to make decertification or other orders on its own
motion.
DRAFT CERTIFICATION PROVISION
- 6.180 Below
we set out a draft legislative provision that could give effect to our
recommendations on the certification test.
4 Certification of class action
(1) Subject to section 6 (which relates to
the certification of concurrent class actions), a court must certify a
proceeding as a class action proceeding
if it is satisfied that—
(a) the proceeding discloses 1 or more reasonably arguable causes of action;
and
(b) there is a common issue of fact or law in the claim of each member of the
proposed class; and
(c) there is at least 1 representative plaintiff that is suitable and will
fairly and adequately represent the class; and
(d) a class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient
resolution of the claims of class members; and
(e) the opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an
appropriate means of determining class membership in the circum‐
stances
of the proceeding.
(2) When assessing the suitability of a proposed representative plaintiff and
whether they will fairly and adequately represent the
proposed class under
subsection (1)(c), the court—
(a) must co nsider whether there is or is likely to be a conflict of interest
that could prevent them from properly fulfilling the
role as representative
plaintiff:
(b) must consider whether they have a reasonable understanding of the nature of
the claims and the duty and responsibilities of a
representative plaintiff,
including potential liability for costs:
(c) must be satisfied that they have received independent legal advice on the
duty and responsibilities of a representative plaintiff:
(d) if they will be representing members of their hapū or iwi, may consider
the tikanga of the hapū or iwi as relevant
to representation in the
proceeding:
(e) may consider any other factors it considers relevant.
(3) When assessing under subsection (1)(d) whether a class action proceeding
is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution
of the claims of class
members, the court must consider—
(a) the proposed class definition:
(b) the potential number of class members:
(c) the nature of the claims:
(d) the nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined
once the common issue is resolved:
(e) whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the
remedies sought:
(f) whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be
a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims:
(g) any other factors it considers relevant.
(4) When assessing under subsection (1)(e) whether the mechanism proposed
for the proceeding is an appropriate means of determining
class membership, the
court may consider—
(a) the potential size of the proposed class and how potential class members
will be identified:
(b) the characteristics of the proposed class:
(c) the nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of
indi‐ vidual claims:
(d) whether class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings:
(e) whether the mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in run‐
ning their defence:
(f) any other factors it considers relevant.
CHAPTER 7
The class
INTRODUCTION
- 7.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Whether special rules are needed for certain categories of class member.
(b) The relationship between the lawyer and class members.
(c) Communications between the defendant’s lawyer and class members.
SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CLASS MEMBER
- 7.2 In
this section we discuss whether special rules are needed for the following
categories of class member:
(a) Class members who reside outside Aotearoa New Zealand.
(b) Ministers and government departments.
(c) Minors and people who are considered to lack sufficient decision-making
capacity with respect to a particular step.
Class members who reside outside Aotearoa New
Zealand
- 7.3 Two
submitters raised the issue of class members who reside outside the
jurisdiction. Bell Gully proposed the court should not
certify a class action on
an opt-out basis if the proposed class would include foreign residents. Rhonson
Salim (Aston University)
said non-resident class members should only be able to
join a class action by opting in.
- 7.4 We agree
this issue needs addressing. Difficulties could arise if class members who
reside outside Aotearoa New Zealand are included
in an opt-out class action,
including ensuring class members receive notice of the class action and
uncertainty as to whether a class
action judgment would be recognised in a
foreign jurisdiction.
Overseas approaches
- 7.5 Jurisdictions
have developed a variety of approaches for dealing with the issue of
non-resident class
members.469F[470]
- 7.6 Foreign-resident
class members must opt into all class actions in the United Kingdom (UK)
Competition Appeal Tribunal, including
opt-out class
actions.470F[471] Two Canadian
provincial regimes also require non-resident class members to opt into class
actions.471F[472]
- 7.7 In Ontario,
courts will consider at certification whether it has jurisdiction to certify a
class action that includes foreign
class members. A key consideration is whether
there is a “real and substantial connection” between the court and
the
subject matter.472F[473]
- 7.8 In the
United States, whether overseas courts would recognise the binding effect of the
judgment may be a factor considered by
the court at
certification.473F[474] Parties
often bring expert evidence on the likelihood that a foreign court would grant
binding effect to a judgment as part of certification
and courts conduct a
country-by-country
analysis.474F[475] Commentary
notes it is rare for a court to deny certification on this basis, as the court
can exclude individual class members whose
home country would not recognise the
binding effect of the judgment or manage the issue through
sub-classes.475F[476]
- 7.9 In
Australia, generally speaking, if the relevant court has jurisdiction, there is
no legal requirement to limit class membership
to persons within the
jurisdiction.476F[477] Given that
class members are not parties, the issue to consider is whether the court has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant
and subject-matter jurisdiction over
the claims, rather than whether the court has personal jurisdiction over class
members.477F[478] However, the
Victorian regime does allow the court to order that a person ceases to be, or
does not become, a class member if they
do not have sufficient connection with
Australia to justify their inclusion as a class
member.478F[479]
- 7.10 Other
possible approaches to non-resident class members include:
(a) Class actions legislation could expressly allow opt-out classes consisting
of both resident and non-resident class
members.479F[480]
(b) Class actions legislation could give the court discretion to require
non-resident class members to opt into the class
action.480F[481]
Recommendation
- R42 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, in both opt-in and opt-out class actions,
a person who resides outside Aotearoa New Zealand
can only become a class member
if they opt in.
- 7.11 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify that, in both opt-in and opt-out class
actions, a person who resides outside Aotearoa
New Zealand should only be able
to join a class action if they opt in. This follows the approach used by the UK
Competition Appeal
Tribunal, which also allows both opt-in and opt-out class
actions. For the following reasons, we think this approach best responds
to the
challenges with notice requirements and the uncertainty as to whether a class
action judgment would be recognised in a foreign
jurisdiction.
- 7.12 An
essential protection of opt-out class actions is adequate notice to potential
class members, which informs them they will
be bound by the judgment if they do
not opt out by the required date. It is likely to be more difficult and costly
to provide notice
to overseas class members, particularly where they reside in
multiple countries. There is a risk that overseas class members will
not receive
the notice advising of their right to opt out. Even where overseas class
members receive the notice, they may not understand
it because of language
difficulties or because the concept of class actions is unknown to
them.481F[482] If overseas class
members are required to opt in, they can provide contact details which should
make any further notice more straightforward.
- 7.13 We think
this approach will provide greater certainty and clarity about the class
membership status of individual foreign residents.
It may also facilitate
recognition and enforcement of the court’s judgment in other
jurisdictions. Although the principles
on when a foreign judgment will be
recognised will differ among jurisdictions, there is a strong argument for a
court recognising
the binding effect of a class action judgment upon a foreign
resident class member who has opted into the class action. This is because
they
have affirmatively indicated their desire to be bound by the class action
judgment. The common law principle of submission recognises
that the court has
jurisdiction over parties who submit to its
jurisdiction.482F[483] While class
members are not parties, we think this principle may be relevant by analogy. In
other jurisdictions, the case for requiring
foreign resident class members to
opt in has been premised on the basis that this would result in a judgment
having a binding effect
on those class members in their home
country.483F[484]
- 7.14 In Chapter
6 we recommend that the characteristics of the class should be included in the
list of relevant factors a court may
consider when deciding whether the
mechanism for determining class membership is appropriate. In a case where many
class members
will be foreign residents, it may be appropriate for the case to
be opt-in for all class
members.484F[485] Where a lesser
proportion of class members will be foreign residents, we do not think it would
be problematic to have an opt-out
class action where foreign resident class
members must opt in.
Ministers and government departments
- 7.15 In
the Issues Paper and Supplementary Issues Paper, we discussed the issue of when
a state entity should be able to fulfil the
role of representative plaintiff. We
have identified an additional issue of whether the Crown should be required to
opt in to become
a class member.
- 7.16 The
Australian class actions regimes require certain categories of potential class
members (which can be broadly termed government)
to give written consent before
becoming a class member.485F[486]
This was recommended by the Australia Law Reform Commission (ALRC) on the basis
that the activities of government agencies and officials
are subject to
legislative and other restraints that mean it may not be appropriate to commence
proceedings on their behalf without
consent.486F[487]
Results of consultation
- 7.17 We
sought feedback from Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office on this issue.
It submitted the Crown should only be able
to become a class member by opting
in, for the following reasons:
(a) The Crown must be deliberate about the litigation it brings. It needs to be
cognisant of the power imbalance between the Crown
and private litigants, and
the use of public money.
(b) Any class action where the Crown is a class member would be caught by the
Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business
2016 and the
Attorney-General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation. However, the
plaintiff class would have their own lawyers
and potentially a litigation funder
and plaintiff committee, which could remove control of the litigation from the
Crown. The plaintiff
class might also be pursuing a different litigation
strategy to the Crown.
(c) The Crown’s interests are likely to be different from those of private
plaintiffs.
(d) There may be important policy reasons against filing a claim in a particular
case.
(e) The scale of the Crown’s claim will often be much larger than other
class members, which could result in a power imbalance
within the class.
Recommendation
- R43 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, in both opt-in and opt-out class actions,
a Minister of the Crown or government department
should only become a class
member if they opt in.
- 7.18 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that, in both opt-in and opt-out
class actions, a Minister of the Crown or
government department should only
become a class member if they opt in. A key rationale for opt-out class actions
is to provide access
to justice, including by overcoming psychological and
social barriers to litigation. This access to justice rationale is unlikely
to
apply to the Crown because it has sufficient resources for litigation.
- 7.19 Core Crown
legal matters must be conducted consistently with the Attorney-General’s
Values for Crown Civil
Litigation.487F[488] These include
dealing with litigation promptly and efficiently and without causing unnecessary
delay or expense, not contesting matters
it accepts as correct and not taking
unmeritorious points for tactical
reasons.488F[489] A Crown class
member may have little control over how a class action is run, so it may be
difficult to ensure these values are
upheld.489F[490] A class action
might also take a legal position contrary to that espoused by the Crown in other
litigation, making it difficult to
maintain a “single and
consistent” Crown
view.490F[491]
- 7.20 Although
the Crown could opt out of a class action, this would require it to maintain an
awareness of new class actions, consider
whether it might fall within the class
definition of each and take steps to opt out by the required date. There is a
risk of the
Crown becoming a class member because it was unaware of a class
action or failed to realise it fell within the class
definition.491F[492] We therefore
think it is preferable to provide that the Crown only becomes a class member if
it opts in.
- 7.21 A key
reason for our recommendation is to avoid conflict with current obligations
about how Crown legal business is conducted.
Therefore, we propose the opt-in
requirement should apply to Ministers of the Crown and all government
departments, as they are subject
to the Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of
Crown Legal Business. These directions define government departments
as:492F[493]
departments of the public service as specified in the First Schedule to the
State Sector Act 1988, the New Zealand Police, the New
Zealand Defence Force,
and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service; and includes
bodies, decision-makers, office holders or employees within those departments
- 7.22 Bodies such
as Crown entities, state-owned enterprises and local authorities are not subject
to the Cabinet Directions for the
Conduct of Crown Legal
Business.493F[494] Following this
same approach, we do not propose these bodies should fall within the opt-in
requirement for class actions.
Minors and people who are considered to lack sufficient
decision-making capacity with respect to a particular step
- 7.23 We
have also identified the additional issue of whether rules are needed with
respect to class members who are minors or who
are considered to lack sufficient
decision-making capacity with respect to a particular step.
High Court Rules
- 7.24 The
High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) provide that a person under 18 years old (“a
minor”) must have a litigation guardian
as their representative in any
proceeding, unless the court orders otherwise or an Act requires or permits them
to conduct a proceeding
without
one.494F[495]
- 7.25 An
“incapacitated person” must have a litigation guardian as their
representative in any proceeding, unless the court
orders
otherwise.495F[496] The High Court
Rules define “incapacitated person”
as:496F[497]
- a person who by
reason of physical, intellectual, or mental impairment, whether temporary or
permanent, is—
- (a) not
capable of understanding the issues on which his or her decision would be
required as a litigant conducting proceedings;
or
- (b) unable to
give sufficient instructions to issue, defend, or compromise
proceedings.
- 7.26 The
provisions on minors and “incapacitated persons” are primarily
directed at a situation where the person would
be a party to the
litigation.497F[498] The
definition of an “incapacitated person” refers to being a
“litigant conducting proceedings” and to giving
instructions to
issue, defend or compromise proceedings. The role of a litigation guardian is to
conduct a proceeding in the name
of, or on behalf of, a minor or
“incapacitated
person”.498F[499]
- 7.27 Class
members do not have the status of parties. Although these rules seem clearly
directed at situations where a minor or “incapacitated
person” is a
party to a proceeding, the language of the rules requires a litigation guardian
as the person’s representative
“in any
proceeding”.499F[500] For
the avoidance of doubt, we think it is desirable for a class actions regime to
clarify whether these rules apply to a situation
where a minor or a person
falling within the definition of an “incapacitated person” is a
class member.
Overseas approaches
- 7.28 Some
overseas class actions regimes have specific provisions relating to class
members who are minors or who are considered to
lack capacity.
- 7.29 In
Australia, it is not necessary for a “person under disability”
(which is defined to include a minor) to have a
litigation guardian to be a
class member. However, a class member who is “under disability” may
only take a step in the
proceeding through their litigation
guardian.500F[501] This follows
the recommendation of the ALRC, which said persons under a disability may be
disadvantaged if a litigation guardian
must be appointed before proceedings are
commenced. It could also prevent the defendant from obtaining the benefit of a
common binding
decision for all class members. The ALRC thought a litigation
guardian should be appointed if a class member under disability wants
to take a
step in the proceedings, such as opting out, assuming conduct of individual
issues or expressing a view on a settlement
offer.501F[502]
- 7.30 In Ontario,
an opt-out notice and a notice of proposed settlement must be served on the
Public Guardian and Trustee if there
is a reasonable possibility that it may be
authorised to act for one or more class
members.502F[503] If the class
might include minors, the court may direct the notice of proposed settlement to
be served on the Children’s
Lawyer.503F[504] These provisions
followed recommendations of the Law Commission of
Ontario.504F[505]
- 7.31 The Alberta
class actions legislation deals with this issue through its provision on the
binding effect of a judgment. A judgment
is not binding on a person who has
opted out of the class action. If a person did not opt out within the specified
time “by
reason of mental disability”, the court may allow that
person to be treated as if they opted
out.505F[506]
- 7.32 When the UK
Competition Appeal Tribunal grants certification, it may make directions
regarding any class member who is a child
or a person who lacks
capacity.506F[507]
Recommendations
- R44 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule to specify that, unless the
court orders otherwise,
a class member (or potential class member) does not require a litigation
guardian solely because they:
- Are
under the age of 18 years; or
- Are
considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a step in
a class action proceeding.
- R45 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to specify that
where there is an opportunity or requirement for
a class member (or potential
class member) to take a step in the proceeding, the court may make any order it
considers appropriate
to protect the interests of a class member
who:
- Is
under the age of 18 years; or
- It
considers lacks sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to that step.
- R46 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to specify that
where a court needs to determine whether a class
member (or potential class
member) has sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a step in the
proceeding, it should consider
whether the person is able to:
- Understand
information relevant to the step.
- Retain
that information to the extent necessary to make decisions relevant to that
step.
- Use
or weigh that information as part of the process of making those decisions.
- Communicate
those decisions.
Litigation guardian not required as a matter of course
- 7.33 We
do not consider a class member, or potential class member, should be required to
have a litigation guardian solely because
they are under the age of 18 years or
are considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a
step in a class
action proceeding. This means a person should not automatically
require a litigation guardian before they can become a class member
or take any
steps in a class action. Rather, we think it is better to focus on the step at
issue to see whether the court needs to
make any orders to protect the interests
of a class member.
- 7.34 While a
litigation guardian may be necessary where a person is a party to litigation, a
class member’s role in litigation
is very
different.507F[508] A party to
litigation must make decisions about the conduct of the litigation, meet
evidential obligations, instruct lawyers and
meet any adverse costs award. In a
class action, these responsibilities are generally fulfilled by the
representative plaintiff and
class members can take a largely passive role in
the litigation. A class member does not need to understand all of the issues
involved
in the litigation or be able to give instructions to a lawyer about
conduct of the class action.
- 7.35 In
addition, the class actions regime we recommend has safeguards that are designed
to protect the interests of all class members.
These include a representative
plaintiff who must act in what they believe to be the best interests of the
class, a certification
test that requires consideration of whether a class
action is an appropriate procedure for resolving class member claims and court
approval of settlement.
- 7.36 We also
consider practical difficulties may arise if a litigation guardian is required
before certain categories of person can
become a class member, given that it may
not be apparent at the outset of a class action whether any potential class
members would
fall within these categories.
- 7.37 We
recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should
consider developing a High Court Rule specifying
that, unless the court orders
otherwise, a class member (or potential class member) who is under the age of 18
or who is considered
to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to
a step in a class action proceeding is not required to have a litigation
guardian. This will avoid any doubt as to whether Part 4, Subpart 7 of the High
Court Rules requires a litigation guardian to be
appointed for class members.
While we do not think a litigation guardian should be required as a matter of
course, that does not
mean it would never be appropriate to appoint one. The
approach we recommend will allow the court to take a case-specific
approach.
Support with steps in a class action
- 7.38 There
are several stages in a class action where a class member can take an active
role:
(a) They can exercise an initial right to either opt into or opt out of the
class action.
(b) They can bring an application to substitute the representative plaintiff.
(c) They can file an objection to a proposed settlement.
(d) Their participation may be needed when issues are determined on an
individual basis (such as giving evidence).
(e) They may need to take an active step to participate in a settlement.
- 7.39 In some
cases, class members who are under the age of 18 years or who are considered to
lack sufficient decision-making capacity
with respect to one of those steps may
require additional support with the step. We do not favour a rule that a
litigation guardian
must be appointed in these situations, as we think it
will depend on the class member involved and the consequences of taking, or not
taking,
a particular step. We think it would be preferable for the court to have
a broad discretion to make any orders it considers appropriate.
This might
include appointing a litigation guardian in appropriate cases, although we
envisage this would be tied to certain steps
in the proceeding. It could also
include orders with respect to notice, such as ensuring it is provided in
accessible formats and/or
to a third party.
- 7.40 We
recommend the Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to
specify that where there is an opportunity or
requirement for a class member (or
potential class member) to take a step in the proceeding, the court may make any
order it considers
appropriate to protect the interests of a class member
who:
(a) Is under the age of 18 years; or
(b) It considers lacks sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to that
step.
- 7.41 We envisage
the court could make an order either upon application or its own motion, where
it considers this is appropriate.
In some cases it may be apparent at the outset
that there are class members who are under the age of 18 or who may be
considered
to lack decision making capacity with respect to a step in the
proceeding, such as where a class action is brought on behalf of children
or
persons receiving dementia care. In other cases, it may not be apparent until
later in the proceeding. Whether the parties are
aware that orders may be needed
with respect to persons under 18 years or class members who are considered to
lack sufficient decision-making
capacity with respect to a step could be a
matter discussed at case management conferences.
Determining whether a person has sufficient decision-making
capacity with respect to a step
- 7.42 We
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a High Court Rule on the
matters a court should consider when determining
whether a class member (or
potential class member) has sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to
a step in the proceeding.
The rule could require the court to consider whether
the person is able to:
(a) Understand information relevant to the step.
(b) Retain that information to the extent necessary to make decisions relevant
to that step.
(c) Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making those
decisions.
(d) Communicate those decisions.
- 7.43 We prefer
this approach, rather than mirroring the language of HCR 4.29, which refers to a
person who is not capable of understanding
issues or giving instructions due to
a physical, intellectual or mental
impairment.508F[509]
Interaction with certification requirements
- 7.44 In
Chapter 6, we suggested the characteristics of the proposed class may be a
relevant consideration when the court is considering
whether a proposed opt-in
or opt-out mechanism is an appropriate means of determining class membership. It
may be relevant for the
court to consider whether the class includes persons
under 18 years old and/or persons who are considered to lack sufficient
decision-making
capacity with respect to a step in the proceeding, to the extent
this is known. We do not think there should be a presumption in
favour of either
opt-in or opt-out in such cases. An opt-out class action can ensure that class
members are not excluded from obtaining
access to justice because they did not
understand how to opt in. On the other hand, an opt-in class action can avoid
the risk of
a person being inadvertently bound by a court judgment. Ultimately,
we think it comes down to a case-by-case assessment.
- 7.45 If the
entire class consists of persons under 18 years old or who are considered to
lack sufficient decision-making capacity
with respect to steps in the
proceeding, the issue of who can fulfil the role of representative plaintiff
will arise. In this situation,
the person will have the role of a party and the
High Court Rules relating to minors and “incapacitated persons” will
apply. We envisage it would generally be appropriate to appoint a litigation
guardian for a class member who is fulfilling the role
of representative
plaintiff, given the duty and responsibilities of a representative
plaintiff.509F[510] This is an
issue the court can consider at certification, when determining whether there is
a suitable representative plaintiff who
can fairly and adequately represent the
class.
LAWYER-CLASS MEMBER RELATIONSHIP
- 7.46 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we explained that as the law stands in Aotearoa
New Zealand, the representative plaintiff
in a class action would be in a
lawyer-client relationship with their lawyer. The lawyer would also have a
lawyer-client relationship
with any class member who had entered into a retainer
with them. We said the nature of the relationship between the lawyer and any
other class members was unclear, although case law suggested it was not a
lawyer-client
relationship.510F[511]
- 7.47 We
discussed the approaches taken in our comparator jurisdictions to the
lawyer-class member relationship and proposed three
options for
reform:511F[512]
(a) The status quo could be maintained. The lawyer would only have a
lawyer-client relationship with class members who have signed
a retainer. The
lawyer would likely owe lesser obligations to class members who have not signed
a retainer.
(b) The lawyer could be regarded as having a lawyer-client relationship with
each individual class member.
(c) The lawyer could have a lawyer-client relationship with the class as a whole
(lawyer for the class), with specific duties created.
- 7.48 We
indicated our preference for option (c) and said this recognised and reflected
the unique nature of the relationship between
the lawyer and the class. We noted
the difficulty of having individual lawyer-client relationships with hundreds or
thousands of
class members, including in opt-out cases where the identity of
some class members may be unknown.
- 7.49 We asked
submitters whether they agreed the representative plaintiff’s lawyer
should be regarded as the lawyer for the
class after certification and, if so,
what duties the lawyer should owe the class.
Results of consultation
- 7.50 We
received 17 submissions on this
issue.512F[513]
Submissions in favour of lawyer for the class
- 7.51 Eleven
submitters agreed the representative plaintiff’s lawyer should be
considered the lawyer for the
class.513F[514] Reasons given by
submitters included:
(a) It would be unworkable to apply the obligations of a traditional
lawyer-client relationship to a class where some class members
have yet to be
identified.
(b) It is illogical to suggest there is a retainer with an unknown class member
who has not consented to the lawyer’s services
or their fees.
(c) The lawyer acts for the representative plaintiff in proving common issues
for the class (but not necessarily individual issues
unless specifically
instructed).
(d) The lawyer is carrying out the instructions of the representative plaintiff,
who conducts the litigation on behalf of the class
and is obliged to act in the
interests of the class as a whole.
(e) Class members are bound by outcomes achieved by the representative
plaintiff’s lawyer, so they ought to enjoy the incidents
of a
lawyer-client relationship.
(f) There should not be a distinction in the relationship between the lawyer and
class members who have opted into the class versus
those who have not.
- 7.52 Most of
these submitters thought the lawyer-class relationship should arise after
certification.514F[515] Nikki
Chamberlain (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland) thought the
relationship should arise once the opt-in or opt-out
process was complete, but
that the lawyer should owe a general duty to act in the best interests of the
class before this point.
- 7.53 Submitters
suggested that the lawyer for the class could owe the following duties:
(a) A duty to act in the best interests of the
class.515F[516]
(b) A duty to avoid or manage conflicts that affect representation of the class
as a whole.516F[517] If a conflict
of interest does arise, counsel could seek direction from the
court.517F[518]
(c) A duty to promptly disclose all information that the lawyer has, or
acquires, that is relevant to the
matter.518F[519]
(d) A duty to provide information at key stages of the class action, including
an explanation of the legal consequences of key steps
in the class action and
any necessary steps to be taken by class
members.519F[520]
(e) A duty to keep class members informed about the progress of the class
action.520F[521]
(f) A duty to ensure the representative plaintiff understands their obligations
and has sufficient information and advice to provide
informed instructions on
the case.521F[522]
(g) A duty to act on the instructions of the representative plaintiff, provided
the instructions are consistent with the lawyer’s
other duties. Where
there is a conflict, the lawyer should seek the direction of the
court.522F[523]
- 7.54 Most of the
submitters who favoured this option thought the nature of the lawyer-class
relationship could or should be clarified
in legislation or in the Rules of
conduct and client care for
lawyers.523F[524] Carter
Pearce did not support the lawyer’s obligations being codified in statute
and said the general principles were clear
in the case law.
- 7.55 At our
consultation workshops, there was a high degree of support for our proposal that
the lawyer should be regarded as the
lawyer for the class after certification.
Participants indicated a desire for clarity about who owes duties to whom and
said it would
be unworkable to owe obligations to individual class members in an
opt-out case. It was suggested that class members should not be
prevented from
obtaining independent advice, and that a lawyer should be protected if they act
in accordance with the representative
plaintiff’s instructions.
Submissions favouring other approaches
- 7.56 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia preferred maintaining the status quo. It said
in Australia it is accepted that the
representative plaintiff’s lawyer
owes some obligations to the class, and there is no evidence to suggest that
class members
are treated unfairly by this approach or that lawyers cannot act
in the best interests of class members while acting for the representative
plaintiff. It said prescriptive rules are unnecessary and that the court’s
inherent jurisdiction, its powers under the High
Court Rules and lawyers’
existing professional obligations are adequate to respond to issues. It said
imposing class-wide obligations
on the representative plaintiff’s lawyer
could deter lawyers from conducting class actions or oppressively burden those
who
do.
- 7.57 Nicole
Smith considered a lawyer’s duties as an officer of the court and ethical
obligations should provide sufficient
protection. She noted that lawyers have
anti-money laundering obligations, so it would be inappropriate for a lawyer to
be in a lawyer-client
relationship with anyone who has not signed a retainer.
- 7.58 Philip
Skelton QC preferred the status quo and said it is undesirable for a statute to
impose a lawyer-client relationship with
the class as a whole. He supported
statutory recognition that the plaintiff’s lawyer has to act in the best
interests of the
class but thought this is better viewed as part of the
lawyer’s duty to act consistently with the plaintiff’s fiduciary
duty to act in the best interests of the class as a whole. If a conflict arose,
he considered the plaintiff’s lawyer would
have a duty to raise the matter
with the court and seek directions under the court’s supervisory
jurisdiction over class actions.
- 7.59 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) suggested class
actions legislation could create the concept of
a person or persons responsible
for conducting a class action (which in some cases might be a litigation
committee). It said this
approach would help define and confine lawyers’
professional responsibilities, including the source of a lawyer’s
instructions
and who a lawyer owed professional duties
to.524F[525] It noted several
professional responsibility issues that would need to be considered:
(a) The possibility of multiple conflicting duties, where the lawyer owes
conflicting duties to different categories of class member.
It said that, if a
lawyer has professional responsibilities to persons they do not have a retainer
with, the extent of those duties
should be defined and prescribed in rules.
(b) Who lawyers must provide information about the principal aspects of client
service and disclose and communicate information to.
(c) Who a lawyer owes duties of confidentiality to, and which communications are
privileged.
(d) Whether the defendant’s lawyer can communicate with individual class
members.
Recommendations
- R47 The
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 should be amended to specify that when a
proceeding is certified as a class action, the representative plaintiff’s
lawyer is
regarded as the lawyer for the class and is considered to have a
relationship with the class.
- R48 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society should consider what
amendments may be needed to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct
and Client Care) Rules 2008 to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in
class actions.
Lawyer for the class
- 7.60 We
consider the representative plaintiff’s lawyer should be regarded as the
lawyer for the class and be considered to have
a relationship with the class.
The lawyer is carrying out legal work on behalf of the entire class, so they
should not be regarded
solely as the representative plaintiff’s lawyer.
Class members will be bound by the outcome of the litigation, and they should
be
able to rely on the lawyer to conduct the litigation in a way that advances
their interests and complies with ethical and professional
obligations. We
therefore think it is appropriate that a lawyer has obligations to the class,
including a duty to act in the best
interests of the class. We prefer to simply
refer to “relationship” because there is a particular set of
obligations
that currently attaches to the lawyer-client relationship. We think
it is preferable for the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to
specify the obligations that will attach to the lawyer-class relationship, as we
discuss later in this chapter.
- 7.61 Given that
a lawyer will not necessarily know the identity of all class members or be able
to enter into a retainer with them,
we think it is preferable to conceive of the
lawyer as owing duties to the class as a whole rather than to individual class
members.
Where a sub-class is created because there is a conflict of interest
between groups of class members, it will usually be appropriate
for the
sub-class to have separate legal representation. We discuss this issue in
Chapter 8.
- 7.62 We prefer
this approach to the lawyer having a lawyer-client relationship with each
individual class member whether or not they
have signed a retainer. This option
was not supported by submitters. Many of the traditional obligations of the
lawyer-client relationship
are inappropriate for a class action involving
hundreds or thousands of class members, particularly in an opt-out class action
where
the identity of many class members is unknown. A significant feature of a
class action is that class members generally have a passive
role, with the
representative plaintiff making decisions about the litigation on their behalf.
Obligations such as obtaining informed
instructions and disclosure and
communication of information to clients may not be workable in a class action if
they apply to each
individual class member. Under our proposed approach, the
duties and obligations of the lawyer for the class can be tailored to ensure
they are appropriate and workable in the context of a class action.
- 7.63 Several
submitters preferred the status quo, which would allow the nature of the
lawyer-class relationship and a lawyer’s
duties to the class to develop
through the case law. We consider this approach will lead to a high degree of
uncertainty about the
role of a lawyer in a class action and think it is
preferable for lawyers to understand their obligations to the class before they
agree to act in a class action. In Australia, which has not prescribed the role
of the lawyer in a class action, a lawyer’s
duties toward the class appear
to be somewhat uncertain.525F[526]
Relationship should arise upon certification
- 7.64 We
have considered when the representative plaintiff’s lawyer should become
the lawyer for the class. In our view, this
relationship should arise upon
certification rather than the point a class member opts in or the close of the
opt-out date. The class
comes into existence upon certification, even if the
individual members are not finalised until the opt-in or opt-out process is
complete. Because we have proposed that the lawyer has obligations to the class,
we do not think it is necessary to wait until each
individual class member has
decided whether to opt in or opt out for these obligations to take effect.
However, this does not preclude
potential class members from seeking independent
legal advice during the opt-in or opt-in period, such as on whether to join the
class action or to accept an individual settlement offer.
Relationship should be prescribed by statute
- 7.65 We
think the lawyer-class relationship that arises upon certification should be
prescribed by statute. This is a unique relationship
that is not contemplated by
the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 or the Rules of conduct and client care
for lawyers. An illustration of this point is seen in Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd, where Te Kōti Matua | High Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that once leave to bring a
representative action was
granted, their lawyer also represented the class,
which meant the ‘no-contact rule’ would
apply.526F[527] The Court
commented that the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers were
developed in a jurisdiction that had no tradition of opt-out representative
actions and that the no-contact rule did not naturally
speak into that
situation.527F[528] It was not
persuaded there was such a similarity between overseas certification regimes and
the leave requirement under HCR 4.24
to make it appropriate for the courts to
impose a solicitor-client relationship between the plaintiffs’ lawyers and
class members
for the purposes of the ethical
rules.528F[529]
- 7.66 The
lawyer-class relationship could be prescribed in the Class Actions Act. However,
we think it would be preferable for the
relationship to be mandated by the
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, so that regulatory requirements for lawyers
are not split between two statutes. It would also enable the “lawyer for
the class”
approach to be extended to other legal procedures involving a
representative plaintiff if that is considered appropriate (although
that is
outside the scope of our review). We recommend the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
2006 should be amended to specify that when a proceeding is certified as a class
action, the representative plaintiff’s lawyer is
regarded as the lawyer
for the class and is considered to have a relationship with the class.
Duties and obligations of the lawyer for the class
- 7.67 We
recommend NZLS consider what amendments may be needed to the Rules of conduct
and client care for lawyers to clarify the duties and obligations of lawyers
acting in class actions. We recognise NZLS is better placed to undertake the
necessary
policy work in this area, so we simply provide some general comments
as to how these rules may need to be amended for class
actions.529F[530] We think it is
desirable for any amendments to come into effect at the same time as the
provision mandating the lawyer-class relationship,
so there is clarity about the
obligations that flow from the relationship.
- 7.68 We think
the key duties of the lawyer for the class would be to act in the best interests
of the class and to avoid conflicts
of interest that affect representation of
the class as a whole. However, if our recommendation that the lawyer should be
regarded
as acting for the class is adopted, we think it will be necessary to
consider whether each of the duties and obligations in the Rules of conduct
and client care for lawyers should apply to the lawyer-class relationship.
- 7.69 While we
have not considered the implications of each rule, we consider that the various
duties and obligations in the rules
can be grouped into four categories with
respect to their application to class actions.
- 7.70 The first
category covers a lawyer’s broader ethical and professional obligations
and does not specifically refer to clients.
Examples are the obligation to use
legal processes only for proper purposes, and the obligation to report
misconduct.530F[531] These can be
applied to lawyers acting in class actions without requiring any amendment.
- 7.71 The second
category relates to the process of retaining and instructing a lawyer. This
includes the requirement to provide information
on the principal aspects of
client service, the duty to complete a retainer, the right to terminate a
retainer and the duty to provide
a client with an estimate of fees and inform
the client if this will be
exceeded.531F[532] If these rules
are applied to class actions, it may be desirable to clarify that references to
the “client” in these
rules mean the representative plaintiff (and
other class members who have entered into a retainer) rather than the class as a
whole.
- 7.72 The third
category could be applied to the lawyer-class relationship if the phrase
“client” is understood for this
purpose as including the class.
However, amendments would be needed to reflect that there is no retainer between
the lawyer and the
(client) class. Examples of rules in this category
are:
(a) In providing regulated services to a client, a lawyer must always act
competently and in a timely manner consistent with the
terms of the retainer and
the duty to take reasonable
care.532F[533]
(b) The duty to protect and hold in strict confidence all information concerning
a client, the retainer and the client’s business
and affairs acquired in
the course of the professional
relationship.533F[534]
(c) The obligation not to communicate with another lawyer’s
client.534F[535]
- 7.73 The final
category of rules would be inappropriate to apply to the lawyer-class
relationship without amendment. One example is
the rules on conflicts. It would
be unworkable for a lawyer to consider whether there is a conflict with respect
to each class member.
We think a lawyer’s obligation should be to avoid
conflicts of interest that affect representation of the class as a whole.
It
would also be desirable to clarify how a lawyer should manage a situation where
a conflict arises between the representative plaintiff
and class members.
- 7.74 Another
example is the rule on disclosure and communication of information to
clients.535F[536] We think it is
unrealistic to require a lawyer to promptly disclose all relevant information to
individual class members. It is also
unnecessary, given that the representative
plaintiff will be making decisions about the litigation. We think it is
preferable for
our recommended notice regime to govern disclosures to class
members.
- 7.75 A third
example is a lawyer’s duties to act in the best interests of their client
and to obtain and follow a client’s
informed instructions on significant
decisions in respect of the conduct of litigation (subject to the lawyer’s
overriding
duty to the
court).536F[537] We consider the
first reference to “client” should be understood as including the
class as well as the representative
plaintiff, so the lawyer has a duty to act
in the best interests of the class as a whole. However, the second reference to
“client”
should only refer to the representative plaintiff. The
lawyer should obtain and follow the representative plaintiff’s informed
instructions on significant decisions in respect of the conduct of litigation.
There should be an exception where the representative
plaintiff gives
instructions that conflict with the lawyer’s duty to act in the best
interests of the class.537F[538]
We think this situation would be rare because the representative plaintiff also
has a duty to act in what they believe to be the
best interests of the class, as
we discussed in Chapter 3. A lawyer could not act on instructions that are
contrary to the duty to
act in the best interests of the class. If the
representative plaintiff was unwilling to reconsider the instructions, we
suggest
the lawyer would need to advise they could not continue acting in the
class action.
Duties prior to certification
- 7.76 We
have proposed that the lawyer-class relationship should arise upon
certification. Prior to certification, we think the lawyer
should still act in
the interests of the potential class as a whole. For example, we think this
would include ensuring public statements
about the class action are accurate as
this could affect decisions made by potential class members (such as whether to
accept an
individual settlement
offer).538F[539] A lawyer may also
choose to enter into individual retainers with class members prior to
certification, particularly in an opt-in
class action.
Lawyer acting for individual class member
- 7.77 The
lawyer for the class will act for the entire class, which will include (unless
other arrangements are made) acting in relation
to resolution of individual
issues. However, there may be circumstances where an individual class member
wishes to retain their own
lawyer. One situation is where an issue arises that
only relates to one class member (such as whether a particular class
member’s
claim is time-barred) and it is not practicable for the lawyer
for the class to appear for the class member. A class member is also
likely to
retain their own legal representation where they want to object to a settlement
or apply to replace the representative
plaintiff. We envisage the class
member’s lawyer would notify the lawyer for the class they are acting for
the individual class
member and advise that communications about the class
action should be directed to
them.539F[540]
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT’S LAWYER AND CLASS
MEMBERS
- 7.78 As
discussed above, we recommend NZLS consider how each of the duties and
obligations in the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers should
apply to the lawyer-class relationship. In this section we make a specific
recommendation with respect to one of these rules,
on which we sought feedback
in the Supplementary Issues Paper. This is the rule that a lawyer acting in a
matter must not communicate
directly with a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by another lawyer in that matter, except as authorised by the
rule.540F[541] This is sometimes
known as the “no-contact rule”.
- 7.79 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we said that if the representative plaintiff’s
lawyer becomes the lawyer for the class
upon certification, the
defendant’s lawyer should then be unable to contact class members directly
(unless allowed by the rule).
However, we did not think the defendant’s
lawyer should be prohibited from communicating with a potential class member
prior
to certification (unless that person has signed a retainer with a
lawyer).541F[542]
- 7.80 We asked
submitters whether they agreed that communications between the defendant’s
lawyer and class members should be
directed to the representative
plaintiff’s lawyer after certification.
Results of consultation
- 7.81 We
received 10 submissions on this
question.542F[543] Six submitters
agreed that after certification, the defendant’s lawyer should only
communicate with class members through the
representative plaintiff’s
lawyer/lawyer for the
class.543F[544]
- 7.82 Nicole
Smith commented that it may also be appropriate for this rule to apply prior to
certification. If the lawyer and funder
are engaged in book building before
certification, they will be disclosing information to potential class members.
- 7.83 Chapman
Tripp considered the plaintiff’s lawyer should have a duty to pass on
communications from the defendant’s
lawyer. It said a lawyer should be
able to seek directions from the court if required. In some cases, the court
might direct it is
appropriate for the defendant’s lawyer to communicate
directly with members of the plaintiff class.
- 7.84 Bell Gully
said the defendant itself should still be free to contact class members
directly, and the defendant and class members
should not be more restricted in
this regard than in any other proceeding.
- 7.85 Two
submitters indicated a more case-specific approach might be appropriate. Shine
Lawyers submitted that communications between
the defendant’s counsel and
class members should be governed by a protocol and/or court supervision,
particularly where they
relate to settlement. Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa |
Insurance Council of New Zealand said it would be most appropriate for the
defendant’s lawyer to communicate with the representative
plaintiff’s lawyer post-certification. However, given the complexities
created by opt-out proceedings, it said it would be preferable for the court to
make directions at certification, rather than having
a blanket rule about
communication that applies in all cases.
Recommendation
- R49 When
considering what changes may be required to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
(Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 for class actions, NZLS should
consider a rule that after certification, the defendant’s
lawyer should
direct any class communications to the lawyer for the class.
- 7.86 In light of
our recommendation that the representative plaintiff’s lawyer should
become lawyer for the class upon certification,
we consider that the
defendant’s lawyer should direct any class communications to the lawyer
for the class after
certification.544F[545] We think
it would be too broad for the no-contact rule to apply prior to certification,
except with respect to class members who
have entered into individual retainer
agreements with the representative plaintiff’s lawyer or their own lawyer.
- 7.87 We see no
good reason why a defendant’s lawyer should not have to comply with the
no-contact rule that applies in other
litigation once the representative
plaintiff’s lawyer is deemed to be representing the class. We acknowledge
that in some cases
it may be difficult for a defendant’s lawyer to know
whether a person is a class member. In an opt-out case, the identity of
all
class members may be unknown to the plaintiff’s lawyer as well. However,
we note that the no-contact rule only prohibits
direct communication with a
person “who the lawyer knows is represented by another lawyer in that
matter”.545F[546] In Chapter
8, we recommend a defendant should be able to seek an order that the
representative plaintiff provide it with information
on class members who have
opted in or opted out, which will assist it to determine who is a class member.
- 7.88 We have
considered the suggestion that the lawyer for the class should have a duty to
pass on communications from the defendant’s
lawyer. As discussed above, we
suggest NZLS consider how the rule on disclosure and communication of
information to clients should
apply in class
actions.546F[547] A blanket
requirement to pass on all communications from the defendant’s lawyer to
the entire class could be expensive and
burdensome, particularly in an opt-out
class action where the identity of all class members is unknown. Given that the
representative
plaintiff is responsible for making decisions in the litigation
on behalf of the class, it may not be necessary for all communications
to go to
all class members. We think communications to all class members should generally
be governed by notice requirements, which
we discuss in Chapter 8.
- 7.89 On the
other hand, where the defendant’s lawyer sends a communication that
relates to a specific class member who the lawyer
for the class is able to
contact, it would seem reasonable to expect the communication to be passed on.
Whether a rule is required
to this effect could be considered as part of any
assessment of how the disclosure and communication of information requirements
should apply in class actions.
- 7.90 We
acknowledge the concern expressed by some submitters that the defendant should
not be prevented from contacting class members
as they may have an ongoing
business relationship. Our recommendation only restricts the defendant’s
lawyer from communicating
directly with class members and will not prevent the
defendant from contacting class members directly themselves. The only situation
where direct communications by a defendant may be restricted is when it relates
to individual settlements. We discuss this issue
in Chapter 11.
CHAPTER 8
Steps during a class action
INTRODUCTION
- 8.1 In
this chapter, we discuss the following steps that may occur during a class
action:
(a) Notice to class members.
(b) The opt-in or opt-out process.
(c) Case management of class actions.
(d) Discovery and other requirements to provide information.
(e) Appointing sub-classes.
(f) Staged hearings of class actions.
(g) Determining individual issues in a class action.
NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS
- 8.2 Class
members need to be notified of particular events in a class action in order to
make informed decisions about their participation.
In this section we discuss
the events that should trigger notice to class members, the contents of notices,
the method of notice
and whether the defendant should have any obligations with
respect to notice.
When class members should be given notice
- 8.3 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said the most critical stages for notice are
when class members have an initial opportunity
to opt into or opt out of a class
action, and when there is a settlement. However, we said notice should generally
be required where
an event would affect class member
interests.547F[548]
- 8.4 We said
that, at minimum, the following events should trigger notice:
(a) When a class action has been certified and an individual can elect whether
to opt into or opt out of the class action.
(b) Where the representative plaintiff seeks to discontinue either the class
action or an appeal against the judgment on common issues.
(c) Where the representative plaintiff applies to withdraw as the representative
plaintiff.
(d) Where individual participation of class members is required.
(e) When the court issues a judgment determining the common issues.
(f) A proposed or approved settlement.
- 8.5 We also said
the court should have a general power to order notice in any other case.
- 8.6 We asked
submitters whether they agreed with our proposed list of events that should
trigger notice to class members.
Results of consultation
- 8.7 We
received 11 submissions on this
issue.548F[549] Submitters largely
agreed with our proposed list of events that should trigger notice. Shine
Lawyers thought certification should
not necessarily trigger notice and it may
be more appropriate for the initial opt-in or opt-out notice to go out once the
class action
had progressed further, such as following
evidence.549F[550]
- 8.8 Additional
events that submitters thought could trigger notice were:
(a) An appeal of a judgment on the common
issues.550F[551]
(b) A material change to the legal retainer or funding agreement, or a change of
interest in respect of the lawyer or
funder.551F[552]
(c) Where a defendant applies to strike out the case for want of prosecution or
other default by the
plaintiff.552F[553]
- 8.9 Two
submitters commented that the importance of notice had to be balanced against
the cost and practicalities. Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia said the
court should have a discretion not to order notice where “it is just to do
so”, to provide
a protection against notices that are overused, costly or
unnecessary in the circumstances. It said notice should be limited to
non-trivial
matters that affect the legal rights and interests of class members,
particularly stages in the proceeding that invite or require
class members to
take an active step. It said overdisclosure to class members could confuse class
members and information about the
proceeding would always be available from the
lawyer for the class. Shine Lawyers said a balance was necessary so significant
cost
and delay was not incurred through multiple rounds of
notice.
Recommendation
- R50 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule that would require notice
to class members of the
following events (unless the court considers this is not necessary to protect
the interests of class members):
- When
an individual has an opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class
action.
- Where
the representative plaintiff seeks to discontinue the class action.
- Where
the representative plaintiff applies to withdraw as the representative
plaintiff.
- Where
individual participation of class members is required.
- When
the court issues a judgment determining the common issues.
- When
the representative plaintiff intends to abandon an appeal on the common
issues.
- A
proposed or approved settlement.
- Any
other situation where the court considers that notice is appropriate.
- 8.10 Notice to
class members is a critical safeguard of a class actions regime. There are
several stages in a class action where a
class member must take an active step
to benefit from the class action, such as signing up to an opt-in class action
or providing
the necessary documentation to receive a settlement payment. There
are also steps where a class member has an opportunity to participate
in the
class action, such as filing an objection to a proposed settlement or seeking to
be substituted as the representative plaintiff.
A class member can only
participate in these stages of a class action if they are aware of them. We
discuss below the events we think
should trigger notice, as well as our
recommendation that a court should have a discretion to order that notice is not
required.
When an individual has an opportunity to opt into or opt out of
the class action
- 8.11 It
is essential for individuals to be given notice of the opportunity to opt into
or opt out of a class action. Where a class
action is brought on an opt-in
basis, individuals cannot benefit from a class action unless they take steps to
opt into it. In an
opt-out class action, individuals will be bound by a class
action and unable to bring their own individual proceedings unless they
opt out
of the class action. The initial opt-in or opt-out notice can inform class
members about the consequences of their decision
on whether to participate in
the class action. We discuss the contents of the opt-in or opt-out notice later
in this chapter.
- 8.12 While we
referred to notice of certification in the Supplementary Issues Paper, we now
refer to notice that an individual has
an opportunity to opt into or opt out of
the class action. While this notice will go out after certification, it is the
court setting
the opt-in or opt-out date that will determine when notice should
go out, rather than the certification date. There may be appeals
of
certification or issues such as approval of a funding agreement that need to be
resolved before notice can go out, so there may
be a long period between
certification and the opt-in or opt-out notice to class members. However, we
think it should go out as soon
as practicable after a matter is certified and
think it is unlikely to be appropriate to wait until after evidence is filed.
Where the representative plaintiff seeks to discontinue a class
action
- 8.13 We
consider class members should be given notice when the representative plaintiff
applies to discontinue a class action. In
Chapter 11 we recommend a class action
may only be discontinued with the leave of the court. A class member should have
notice of
this proposed discontinuance in case they wish to seek leave to be
heard on the application or to apply to replace the representative
plaintiff.
When the representative plaintiff applies to withdraw as
representative plaintiff
- 8.14 Having
a representative plaintiff is an essential requirement for a class action. Class
members should be notified if the representative
plaintiff seeks to withdraw
from the role because the matter cannot continue as a class action without a
suitable representative
plaintiff. Receiving notice will enable class members to
decide whether to seek to be substituted as the representative plaintiff.
Where individual participation of class members is required
- 8.15 A
class member should be notified when they are required to participate in the
class action, such as giving discovery or giving
evidence in relation to their
individual claim. In some cases, it will not be possible to prove a class
member’s claim without
their individual participation. If there is any
possibility of adverse costs being awarded, the class member should be advised
of
this.553F[554] The notice could
advise class members whether they should consider obtaining their own legal
representation or whether the lawyer
for the class will be assisting them with
this step.
Where the court issues a judgment determining the common
issues
- 8.16 The
court’s judgment on the common issues is a significant event in a class
action. It involves the substantive determination
of the common issues in the
proceeding and will generally establish whether the defendant is liable to the
class. All class members
are bound by the decision on common issues. Given the
significance of this judgment, we think it should trigger a requirement to
give
notice.
- 8.17 We suggest
the notice should not go out to class members until the period for filing any
appeals has concluded. This will enable
the notice to advise class members of
the next step in the proceeding, for example:
(a) If the plaintiff was successful and no appeal has been filed by the
defendant, the matter will proceed to determination of stage
two issues (if
there has been a staged
hearing).554F[555]
(b) If the unsuccessful party has appealed, the likely time frames for the
appeal process.
(c) If the proceeding was unsuccessful and no appeal has been filed, the
proceeding is at an end. As we discuss in Chapter 10, a
class member will only
be able to bring an appeal if they successfully apply to replace the
representative plaintiff.
- 8.18 We prefer
this approach to requiring a separate notice that an appeal has been filed,
given that an appeal will generally be
filed within a short time of the judgment
on common issues.
Where the representative plaintiff intends to abandon an appeal
on common issues
- 8.19 We
also recommend class members be given notice if the representative plaintiff
intends to abandon an appeal against the judgment
on common issues, as this will
bring the class action to an end. It also ensures class members have the
opportunity to apply to replace
the representative plaintiff for the purposes of
the appeal.555F[556] We do not
think notice should be required where the representative plaintiff abandons an
appeal of any other decision, given there
could be many appeals of interlocutory
issues during a proceeding.
Where there is a proposed or approved settlement
- 8.20 We
consider class members should be given notice of a proposed settlement, so they
can lodge an objection to the settlement if
they wish. In some cases, notice of
an approved settlement will also be necessary. We discuss this in more detail in
Chapter 11.
Any other situation where the court considers notice is
appropriate
- 8.21 Rather
than list all the situations where notice may be needed, we think the court
should have discretion to order notice in
any other situation where it considers
it appropriate.
- 8.22 We have
considered the suggestion that notice of changes to funding or legal
representation should trigger notice. We think it
is difficult to prescribe the
exact situations where such changes might require notice, but notice could be
ordered under the court’s
general discretion where the court considers it
appropriate. This may include where the representative plaintiff is seeking
reapproval
of a litigation funding agreement because the terms have been
amended.556F[557]
- 8.23 We have
also considered whether there should be a requirement to provide notice where
the defendant applies to strike out the
case for want of prosecution or other
default by the representative
plaintiff.557F[558] We think
notice is likely to be appropriate where there is a genuine risk of the
proceedings being struck out and class members could
take steps to seek to
remedy the situation, such as applying to replace the representative plaintiff
or providing security for costs.
However, we suggest this could be dealt with
under the court’s general discretion to require notice in appropriate
cases. There
may be some cases where it is not necessary, such as where class
members were advised that the proceeding may be struck out in an
earlier notice.
Court discretion to order that notice is not required
- 8.24 We
recommend the court have discretion to order that notice of a particular event
is not required where it considers this is
unnecessary to protect the interests
of class members. We envisage this discretion will be exercised sparingly. Some
situations where
notice may not be required are as follows:
(a) Where the court has declined to approve a settlement and the parties submit
a new application to approve a settlement with very
similar terms, except for a
small adjustment that will benefit class members (such as a decrease in a
funder’s rate of commission).
It may be unnecessary to give class members
a second notice of proposed settlement.
(b) Where the court has approved a settlement, it may be unnecessary to give
notice of an approved settlement if there was extensive
notice of the proposed
settlement and the defendant can distribute money directly to class
members.558F[559]
(c) Where there are multiple representative plaintiffs and one seeks to
withdraw. If there is no real impact on representation of
the class and it is
not proposed to substitute another representative plaintiff, it may not be
necessary to provide notice of the
withdrawal of the representative
plaintiff.
(d) Where a settlement is reached prior to certification, there will be a single
notice advising of the proposed settlement and the
right to opt in or opt out,
rather than two separate
notices.559F[560]
The contents of notice
- 8.25 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said notices should use clear language that
class members can easily understand. We proposed
relatively detailed
requirements for opt-in and opt-out notices so that class members would have
sufficient information to make an
informed decision about whether to participate
in the class action. We suggested these notices should
include:560F[561]
(a) The identity of the representative plaintiff, including a brief explanation
of their role and obligations to the class.
(b) The identity of the lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff,
including a brief explanation of their role and obligations
to the class.
(c) A description of the class action, including the class description and the
identity of the defendants.
(d) What a class member must do to opt into or opt out of the claim (as
appropriate), and the date by which they must do so.
(e) An explanation of the binding effect of a class action judgment on class
members.
(f) Who to contact if the class member would like further information about the
class action.
(g) Disclosure of any potential conflicts of interest.
(h) Anything else the court considers appropriate.
- 8.26 We
suggested notice requirements could be set out in the High Court Rules 2016
(HCR) and that consideration could also be given
to developing a standard
opt-in/opt-out notice that could be added to the forms in Schedule 1 of the High
Court Rules.
- 8.27 We asked
submitters whether they agreed with our proposed requirements for an
opt-in/opt-out notice.
Results of consultation
- 8.28 We
received 15 submissions on the contents of the opt-in/opt-out notice, with
submitters generally agreeing with our proposed
requirements for this
notice.561F[562] Chapman Tripp and
Consumer NZ indicated that this would provide an appropriate level of detail to
enable class members to make an
informed decision about whether to
participate.
- 8.29 Some
submitters suggested the notice should also include the key terms of any
litigation funding agreement or the funder’s
identity.562F[563] This could
include the legal fees and funding commission that would be deducted from any
return, the process of agreeing to a settlement
and the funder’s ability
to withdraw from the proceeding. The International Bar Association (IBA)
Antitrust Committee suggested
the notice should include details of the legal
retainer.
- 8.30 Several
submitters supported developing a standard opt-in/opt-out
notice.563F[564] However, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers also noted the importance
of the court exercising its discretion
to determine the appropriate form of
notice in a particular case. The IBA Antitrust Committee suggested a
contradictor should be
required to approve the terms of any opt-in/opt-out
notice.
- 8.31 Four
submitters referred to the need to use clear language in
notices.564F[565] Shine Lawyers
noted that class demographics vary so class member communications need to be
appropriately tailored. For example, communicating
with shareholders in a
securities class action is very different to communicating with remote
indigenous communities about a human
rights class action. It encouraged a
flexible and progressive approach to make notices easy to understand and said
audio-visual notices
could be appropriate in some cases. Similarly, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said the content of notices should be
informed
by class member attributes such as literacy levels, language spoken and
disability.
Recommendations
- R51 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to require court
approval of the contents of notices to class
members.
- R52 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on the contents of
an opt-in or opt-out notice to class members.
This could require notices to
contain:
- General
information about what a class action is.
- An
explanation of the proceeding, including who it has been brought against and the
remedies sought.
- The
class definition and any criteria a person must fulfil to be part of the class.
- What
a class member must do to opt into or opt out of the class action (as
appropriate), and the date by which they must do so.
- An
explanation of the binding effect of a class action judgment or a settlement on
class members.
- The
identity of the representative plaintiff, including a brief explanation of their
role and duty to the class.
- The
identity of the lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff and the class,
including a brief explanation of their role and
obligations to the class.
- An
explanation of when class member participation may be required and the
circumstances where adverse costs may be ordered.
- In a
funded case, the identity of the funder and information on how the funding
commission will be calculated.
- Who
to contact if the class member would like any further information on the class
action.
- Anything
else the court considers appropriate.
- R53 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a sample opt-in or opt-out notice to
be included in Schedule 1 to the High Court Rules.
It may wish to draw on the
expertise of communications professionals and experts in accessible
communication when developing a sample
notice.
Court approval of notices
- 8.32 We
recommend the court approve the contents of notices before they are sent to
class members, to ensure the notices appropriately
communicate the required
information to class members and will not be misleading. Court review of notices
is required in our main
comparator
jurisdictions.565F[566]
- 8.33 Notices
should use clear, concise language and be designed to effectively communicate
with the intended audience. Many concepts
in a class action are likely to be
unfamiliar to class members and will need to be carefully explained, without
using ‘legalese’
or jargon. In the United States, the opt-out notice
is expressly required to be stated in “plain, easily understood
language”.566F[567]
- 8.34 In
some cases, it will be appropriate to make notices available in te reo
Māori or other languages, or to provide accessible
formats of notices such
as easy read, large print or braille. It may also be desirable to make notices
available in audio or video
format, including in New Zealand Sign Language. The
overarching goal should be to ensure that notice is effective, in light of the
intended audience.
- 8.35 As well as
the language used in notices, their visual design can have a significant impact
on how easy they are for class members
to understand,
including:567F[568]
(a) Having a carefully crafted headline to get the reader’s attention.
(b) Avoiding excess capitalisation and small fonts.
(c) Using headings and sub-headings to organise information.
(d) Ensuring the design of any envelope distinguishes it from junk mail.
(e) Using graphics and diagrams (and including accessible alternative text for
any graphics, diagrams and images).
(f) Leaving plenty of white space.
(g) Using a Q&A format or bullet points.
Contents of opt-in or opt-out notice
- 8.36 Given
the importance of the opt-in or opt-out stage and settlement, we think it is
desirable to have specific guidance on the
requirements of these notices in the
High Court Rules. We discuss the contents of settlement notices in Chapter 11.
- 8.37 The opt-in
or opt-out notice needs to provide enough information to class members to enable
them to understand the consequences
of participating in the class action and
what steps they need to take. At the same time, the notice should not overwhelm
the reader
with information. We discuss below a list of matters we think should
be contained in an opt-in or opt-out notice. We also recommend
the court should
have discretion to require any other information to be provided in the notice,
to allow notices to be tailored to
the circumstances of a particular case.
- 8.38 Te Komiti
mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee may wish to consider developing
a sample opt-in or opt-out notice
to be included in Schedule 1 to the High Court
Rules. This could provide helpful guidance for litigants, although the exact
language
of the notice will need to be tailored to the particular class action.
The Rules Committee may wish to draw on the expertise of communications
professionals and experts in accessible communication when developing a sample
notice.568F[569] We think it would
be desirable for the sample notice to comply with any relevant accessibility
guidelines or standards.569F[570]
General information about a class action
- 8.39 We
recommend the notice contain some general information on what a class action is,
before discussing the particular class action
at issue, as the concept of a
class action may be unfamiliar to many people. If, as we recommend in Chapter
18, Te Tāhū
o te Ture | Ministry of Justice develops a guide to assist
class members to understand the class action process, it may also be appropriate
for the notice to direct potential class members to that guide for further
information.
Description of the proceeding
- 8.40 The
notice needs to provide potential class members with basic information about the
class action. This should include the facts
giving rise to the class action, the
nature of the legal claims, the remedies sought and who the claim is brought
against. This information
can help potential class members to understand whether
they may benefit from participating in a class action.
Class definition
- 8.41 The
notice should refer to the class definition as set out in the court’s
certification order. It should also inform potential
class members of any
criteria they need to satisfy to fall within this class definition, such as
purchasing a product within a certain
time period or experiencing a particular
kind of harm. In an opt-in class action, the notice should explain if the class
definition
requires class members to sign a legal retainer or litigation funding
agreement.
What a class member must do to opt in or opt out
- 8.42 Potential
class members should be advised what they must do to opt into or opt out of the
class action and the date by which
they must do so. There should be clarity on
the deadline, such as advising that a form must be completed on a website by 5pm
New
Zealand standard time or post-marked by a certain date. Later in this
chapter we recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that
a class member
may opt into or out of a class action in the time and manner specified in the
notice (or according to a specific direction
of the court).
Binding effect of a judgment or settlement
- 8.43 The
notice should explain that a judgment on common issues or a settlement of the
class action will be binding on all class members,
which will limit their
ability to bring their own proceedings against the defendant. It should explain
that if a person does not
wish to be bound by a judgment on common issues or a
settlement, they should not opt into the class action or should opt out of the
class action.
Information about the representative plaintiff and lawyer
- 8.44 The
notice should identify the representative plaintiff and explain what their role
involves, such as giving instructions to
the lawyers and making decisions about
settlement. The notice should explain the representative plaintiff’s duty
to act in
what they believe to be the best interests of the class. If the
representative plaintiff will be supported by a litigation committee,
the
committee’s role should be explained.
- 8.45 Class
members should also be informed of the identity of the lawyer acting for the
representative plaintiff and the class and
their role. The notice should explain
the lawyer’s duty to act in the best interests of the class and advise
where class members
can find a more detailed explanation of the obligations of
the lawyer for the class (such as on Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New
Zealand
Law Society website).
- 8.46 We have
removed ‘disclosure of conflicts of interest’ from our list of
requirements, as we think it is more meaningful
for a class actions regime to
prevent or effectively manage conflicts of interest. We recommend measures to
achieve this, such as
assessing whether a representative plaintiff may have a
conflict of interest as part of the certification test. However, the notice
should explain that a representative plaintiff’s duty to the class
requires them to avoid, or manage, any conflicts of interest
that may affect
their role.
Class member participation and liability for adverse costs
- 8.47 We
recommend the notice should explain the circumstances in which a class member
may need to actively participate in the class
action. It could explain that
while the representative plaintiff and the lawyer will have responsibility for
the conduct of the class
action, it may be necessary for a class member to
provide evidence or information to support their claim or to give discovery. It
could also explain that a class member’s participation may be required
when individual issues are determined.
- 8.48 The notice
should also explain that the representative plaintiff will generally be liable
for any adverse costs with respect
to the common issues and outline the
circumstances in which a class member could be liable for adverse costs. We
discuss this issue
in Chapter 12.
Litigation funding
- 8.49 Where
a class action is litigation funded, the notice should identify the funder and
explain how the funding commission will
be calculated. If the court has made a
cost sharing order the notice should include an explanation of that
order.570F[571] We do not suggest
requiring notices to explain key funding terms, as this could make notices
overly long and deter potential class
members from reading them. However, they
should advise class members how they can obtain a copy of the funding
agreement.
Contact for further information
- 8.50 The
notice should advise class members how they can obtain further information about
the class action. We envisage this would
include contact details for the lawyer
for the class and details of any class action website.
Method of notice
- 8.51 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said the court should have a power to
determine how notice must be given to class members,
and there should not be a
presumption in favour of any particular method of notice. The appropriate means
of notice would depend
on factors such as the size and nature of the class and
whether all class members are
known.571F[572]
Results of consultation
- 8.52 While
we did not specifically ask a question on the appropriate method of class member
notice, some submitters provided feedback
on this issue. GCA Lawyers said the
focus must be on whether notice is effective. It said some cases might require
more than one
round of communication, or methods such as radio or television
advertisements or targeted social media. The submission from Philip
Skelton QC,
Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce said the court should consider what is the best
and most efficient (including cost-efficient)
way of ensuring notices are
brought to the attention of class members.
- 8.53 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said print media communications may not reach
the intended class due to demographic
preferences in media and information
consumption. It said in these circumstances, using social media may be critical
to effectively
communicating with the class, particularly where they are young
or in remote or isolated communities. It said a multi-layer strategy
to
distribute notices may be required, which could include direct mail, website and
email, print media and social media (such as
targeted Facebook and digital
platform advertising).
- 8.54 These
submissions underscore the importance of carefully considering the most
effective way of giving notice to class members
in the circumstances of a
particular case.
Recommendation
- R54 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to order any method of giving notice to class
members that it considers
appropriate in the circumstances, and to require a report on the outcome of that
notice.
- 8.55 We
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a High Court Rule that would
empower the court to order any method of notice
to class members that it
considers appropriate in the circumstances. We think it is undesirable for the
rule to be prescriptive as
to the form of notice, as the most suitable method of
communicating with class members will differ depending on the nature of the
class action, the type of notice and the demographics of class
members.572F[573] A broad
discretion will also allow methods of notice to change with technological
developments. The focus should be on ensuring that
notice is effective in
reaching as many class members as possible, while also being cost-effective. A
combination of direct notice
and advertising will often be required. To
determine whether notice has been effective, we recommend the court should have
a power
to require a report on the outcome of notice, such as the proportion of
messages that were opened or a click-through rate to a class
action
website.573F[574] If necessary,
the court could order additional methods of notice.
- 8.56 Notice
should be sent directly to class members or potential class members where
possible.574F[575] One option is
to send notices by post. Disadvantages of this approach include difficulty in
obtaining up-to-date addresses for class
members and the inability to tell
whether mail has been received or opened. Postal notice can be effective where
there is a registered
address for each class member (such as on a share
register). It may be less effective at reaching groups who tend to move
frequently,
such as university students or renters, or where many class members
have recently relocated (for example, because of a natural
disaster).575F[576]
- 8.57 In some
cases, email notice will be appropriate. The costs of this are likely to be
minimal and it enables the sender to get
information about which emails have
been opened and any that have bounced. There is a risk that emails will be
caught by spam filters,
although careful design can help to mitigate this.
Another option is contacting class members via text message with a link to an
online notice, although there is the risk that recipients will be suspicious of
a legal message sent in this way. Text message and
email notice will also rely
on having accurate contact details for potential class members.
- 8.58 Advertising
may be needed instead of or in addition to individual notice, particularly where
the identity and contact details
of some class members are unknown. Various
methods of advertising might be appropriate depending on the characteristics of
class
members.
- 8.59 Newspaper
and magazine advertising is one option, although declining print readership may
limit its effectiveness at reaching
some class
members.576F[577] In some cases
there may be a specialist publication that is widely read by class members. For
example, a notice in Kōrero Mō te Ture | Law Talk might reach
many lawyers and a notice in an in-flight magazine could be an effective way of
reaching airline passengers. Print media
notices may have greater reach if they
are also made available on digital platforms.
- 8.60 Radio and
television advertisements are another avenue for notice, although viewership and
listenership may be low among some
groups and the cost of advertising may be
high. As with print media, using digital versions to advertise notices may
improve their
reach. Considering the demographics of the class may also help to
make radio or television advertising more likely to reach the target
audience.577F[578]
- 8.61 The
internet could also be used to facilitate notice to class members, including
through banner and pop-up advertisements on
websites, notices placed on a
defendant company’s website, advertisements that appear when a person
searches for certain key
words, or websites dedicated to the class
action.578F[579] Social media
platforms could be used to send direct messages to class members or post
material on relevant pages, or the court could
require the defendant to post
information.579F[580] Advantages
of using the internet to facilitate notice to class members include being
cheaper than other forms of advertising, reaching
a larger and more diverse
audience, lasting longer and allowing greater interaction (such as allowing
immediate feedback from class
members).580F[581]
- 8.62 There may
be other creative options for bringing notice to the attention of class members.
For example, in one United States
case, an abbreviated notice was required to be
printed on the defendant’s milk
cartons.581F[582]
Defendant’s obligations with respect to
notice
- 8.63 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we noted that in some circumstances the
defendant will be in a better position than the representative
plaintiff to
identify and contact class members, such as where class members are current
customers of the defendant. We said that
in such a case, it may be appropriate
for a defendant to facilitate notice to class members or to provide a list of
class members
to the representative
plaintiff.582F[583] We observed
this has already occurred in representative actions in Aotearoa New Zealand and
that in other jurisdictions, courts have
powers to require the defendant to
assist with notice to class
members.583F[584]
- 8.64 We proposed
the court should have a power to order the defendant to provide relevant
information or to assist in giving notice
to class members. This would allow the
court to decide whether this is appropriate in the circumstances of a particular
case.
Results of consultation
- 8.65 We
received 13 submissions on the defendant’s obligations with respect to
notice.584F[585]
Providing contact details to the representative plaintiff
- 8.66 Ten
submitters supported the court having a power to order the defendant to disclose
names and contact details of potential class
members to the representative
plaintiff.585F[586] Reasons given
by submitters included:
(a) A representative plaintiff cannot easily discharge their duty to act in the
best interests of the class without knowing the identity
of class members and
being able to communicate with them.
(b) The defendant will often have the best source of class member contact
details. In some cases, the defendant will be the only
party with information
about the class.
(c) There is often asymmetry of information between the representative plaintiff
and defendants.
(d) It can be efficient, minimise legal costs and be more effective in ensuring
group members are contacted directly.
(e) In previous cases, defendants have raised concerns about breaches of the
Privacy Act 2020. It is desirable to have a statutory
obligation to disclose
contact details so the “required by law” exception in the Privacy
Act can apply.
- 8.67 Two
submitters did not support the defendant providing the names and contact details
of potential class members to the representative
plaintiff. Te Kāhui Inihua
o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand said disclosure of customer
information to the representative
plaintiff would likely breach obligations in
the Privacy Act, as it is not one of the reasons for which the information was
collected.
It would require amending disclosure statements, which would be
costly and negatively impact customer relationships. It said there
were other
effective ways for a representative plaintiff to contact a class that would not
impact on obligations to customers and
commercially sensitive information.
Simpson Grierson said the privacy and confidentiality interest of both potential
class members
and defendants needs to be protected. It said it would be better
for the representative plaintiff to contact potential class members
through
advertising, public notices and media reporting.
- 8.68 Johnson
& Johnson said a defendant should only be required to provide class member
names where it has that information and
is not restricted from providing it to
the plaintiff. Shine Lawyers acknowledged that in some cases, such as
those involving financial institutions, the defendant may be subject to privacy
considerations.
Giving notice directly to class members
- 8.69 Ten
submitters supported the court having a power to order a defendant to give
notice directly to class
members.586F[587] Reasons
included:
(a) In many cases only the defendant will have the systems in place for
communicating with class members and the resources to do
so.
(b) Defendants have greater financial capacity to support this administrative
exercise. The burden of notice may otherwise dissuade
class actions.
(c) In some instances, notice will be less intrusive and more even-handed if the
defendant communicates with class members, such
as where class members are
ongoing customers of the defendant.
(d) It can keep legal costs down and be more effective in ensuring group members
are contacted directly.
(e) The defendant could engage a third party provider to contact group members.
- 8.70 Several
submitters were less supportive of requiring the defendant to give notice
directly. Simpson Grierson said it is not the
defendant’s role to assist
the representative plaintiff to recruit class members. While the defendant might
consent to giving
notice in some cases, this is likely to be rare. Johnson &
Johnson said that, while defendants should participate in reviewing
notices,
they should not be involved in processes such as organising mailouts to class
members. GCA Lawyers thought it would seldom
be appropriate for the defendant to
arrange for notice in isolation, given its conflict of interest. Shine Lawyers
acknowledged there
may be cases where it would not be appropriate for the
defendant to have any contact with class members, such as cases about
institutional
abuse.
Other points made by submitters
- 8.71 Some
submitters thought the court’s powers to order the defendant to provide
class member information or assist with giving
notice should only be exercised
in limited cases. Bell Gully opposed a presumption that the defendant must
assist with notice. It
said the defendant should only be required to disclose
information on class members or assist in giving notice where it agrees or
where
the plaintiff satisfies the court there is a good reason for requiring it.
Chapman Tripp said that, in most cases, the defendant
should not need to be
involved in identifying or contacting class members.
- 8.72 Several
submitters thought the court should be able to order the representative
plaintiff to meet the defendant’s reasonable
costs in assisting with
notice.587F[588] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said the court should be empowered to make
orders that appropriately apportion the costs
of notice, noting that costs could
be significant. It suggested the defendant should bear the cost of distributing
notice where it
has class member contact information, particularly where its
database systems mean it can distribute notices at lower cost.
Recommendations
- R55 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to order the defendant to disclose the names
and contact details of
potential class members to the representative plaintiff or to assist with giving
notice to class members.
Where the defendant is required to disclose information
about potential class members, the Rule could require the representative
plaintiff to only use that information for the purposes of the proceeding.
- R56 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to make orders with respect to the costs of
providing
notice.
Power to order the defendant to provide contact details or
assist with notice
- 8.73 We
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a High Court Rule to empower
the court to order the defendant to provide
class member contact details to the
representative plaintiff. This will ensure a defendant will not be in breach of
its obligations
under the Privacy Act 2020 with respect to disclosure when it
provides this
information.588F[589] Where the
representative plaintiff receives information about class members from the
defendant, we propose that it should be restricted
to using this information for
the purposes of the proceeding. A similar restriction applies with respect to
documents obtained through
discovery.589F[590]
- 8.74 In some
cases, the potential distress to class members from having their contact details
passed on to the representative plaintiff
will militate against the use of this
power, such as in cases involving sensitive allegations.
- 8.75 We
recommend the rule should also empower the court to order the defendant to
assist with giving notice to class members. This
assistance could involve
sending notice directly to class members or placing the notice on its website.
- 8.76 Notice is
an essential element of a class actions regime, and in some cases the defendant
will have much better information about
potential class members than the
representative plaintiff. Requiring the defendant to assist with notice could
avoid the need for
an expensive and broad advertising campaign. In some cases,
it will be in the defendant’s interest to ensure that class members
are
notified, such as in an opt-out class action where notice may result in class
members opting out. We do not think it will be
necessary or appropriate to
involve the defendant in all cases. We envisage this will be a case-specific
inquiry, so we think it
is preferable to for the court to have a wide
discretion.
Costs of notice
- 8.77 In
some cases, the cost of providing notice will be considerable. We have
considered who should bear those costs.
- 8.78 In
Australia, the court may make an order relating to the costs of
notice.590F[591] The general rule
is that the costs of giving notice of the right to opt out should be borne by
the representative plaintiff unless
there are special reasons to justify
departing from that rule.591F[592]
Similarly, the Ontario regime allows the court to make an order it considers
appropriate with respect to the costs of notice, including
an order apportioning
costs among parties.592F[593] The
normal rule is that the representative plaintiff has to bear the costs of the
certification notice, but in an appropriate case
it can order the costs to be
shared or that the defendant should bear the costs
entirely.593F[594] In the United
States, the default rule is that the plaintiff should meet the costs of the
certification notice, but there are circumstances
where courts will order the
defendant to bear these
costs.594F[595]
- 8.79 We consider
the court should have a power to make any orders it considers appropriate with
respect to the costs of notice. We
think that, in most cases, the starting point
should be that the representative plaintiff will meet the costs of notice, given
that
it has chosen to bring the proceeding as a class action. However, there may
be some circumstances where it would be appropriate for
the defendant to meet
some or all of the costs of
notice.595F[596] We envisage this
will depend on the event that has triggered notice and the circumstances, so we
favour the court having a broad
discretion.
OPT-IN OR OPT-OUT PROCESS
- 8.80 In
this section we discuss several additional issues that we have identified in the
course of developing our recommendations.
These are:
(a) When a class member should be considered to have opted into or opted out of
a class action.
(b) Who should be responsible for managing the opt-in or opt-out process.
(c) Whether the court should have a discretion to allow a class member an
additional opportunity to opt in or opt out in limited
circumstances.
(d) Whether arbitration clauses could prevent class members from becoming part
of a class action.
Recommendations
- R57 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a class member may opt into or opt out of
a class action:
- In
the time and manner specified in the opt-in or opt-out notice; or
- According
to a specific direction of the court.
- R58 The
Class Actions Act should empower the court to order that a class member should
be given an additional opportunity to opt out of
a class action where it
considers the interests of justice require it.
- R59 The
Class Actions Act should empower the court to order that a potential class
member should be given an additional opportunity to
opt into a class action
where the interests of justice require it.
Manner of opting in or opting out
- 8.81 Once
the initial notice has gone to potential class members, there needs to be a
process by which individuals can exercise their
right to opt into or opt out of
the class action.
- 8.82 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify that a person may opt into or opt out of
the class action in the manner specified
in the opt-in or opt-out notice, or as
otherwise directed by the court. The initial notice to class members should
clearly specify
what a class member must do to opt into or opt out of the class
action and when they must do this by. For example, a class member
might need to
fill in and sign the opt-in or opt-out form and email it to the lawyer for the
class by a certain date and time. Earlier
in this chapter, we recommend the
opt-in or opt-out notice should advise potential class members what they must do
to opt into or
opt out of the class action and the date by which they must do
so.
- 8.83 We think
this approach will provide greater flexibility than specifying a standard opt-in
or opt-out procedure in the Class Actions
Act or High Court Rules. For example,
there may be opt-in class actions where signing a litigation funding agreement
is part of
the opt-in requirements. Earlier in this chapter we recommend the
court should approve the contents of notices to class members,
which means the
court will approve the procedure for opting into or opting out of the class
action.
- 8.84 We prefer
this approach to specifying the opt-in or opt-out procedure in the certification
order. The opportunity to opt in or
opt out might occur a long time after
certification, particularly if there is an appeal. Having the opt-in or opt-out
process specified
in the notice to class members will ensure it is up to date
and avoids the need to amend the certification order.
Responsibility for managing the process
- 8.85 The
IBA Antitrust Committee raised the issue of who should be responsible for
managing the opt-in or opt-out process. It said
there was no reason why the
representative plaintiff should be responsible for managing class member forms
and that this could be
done by the court registry, as in Australia.
- 8.86 We consider
the representative plaintiff should be responsible for receiving opt-in or
opt-out forms, rather than the court.
We think it would be a significant burden
on the court registry if it had to receive opt-in or opt-out forms and field
queries from
class members. It may also be necessary for a class member to sign
up to funding arrangements as part of an opt-in process or to
clarify with the
lawyer whether they fall within the class definition. In practice, we envisage
the lawyer for the class would manage
the opt-in or opt‑out process. This
is consistent with the recommendation we make later in this chapter that the
representative
plaintiff should maintain a list of persons who have opted into
or out of the class action. We also recommend the defendant should
be able to
seek an order for the representative plaintiff to provide this information.
Subsequent opt-in or opt-out opportunity
- 8.87 In
Chapter 11, we explain that we no longer think class members should have a
general right to opt out of a settlement once it
has been approved. Instead, the
court should have a discretion to order that specific class members be given an
opportunity to opt
out. As we discuss in that chapter, we envisage this will be
limited to cases where a real unfairness could arise if a particular
class
member (or category of class members) is required to be bound by a settlement.
We also recommend the court should have a discretion
to allow specific class
members an additional opportunity to opt in at settlement, such as where they
did not have sufficient capacity
to understand the initial notice.
- 8.88 However, we
think the court’s discretion to allow a class member a second opportunity
to opt in or opt out should not be
restricted to the settlement stage. If there
are circumstances that mean it would be unfair to require a person to remain in
a class
action, the court should be able to exercise its power to allow them to
opt out at any stage of the proceeding. For example, if a
person was unaware of
the class action or did not have sufficient capacity to decide whether to opt
out, it may be unfair for them
to be bound by a judgment. Similarly, if some
real unfairness would arise if a person could not opt into the proceeding after
the
initial opt-in date, the court should be able to consider the issue at any
stage.
- 8.89 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should empower the court to order that a class
member (or potential class member) may have
an additional opportunity to opt
into or opt out of the class action where the interests of justice require it.
We envisage such
an order would only be granted in limited circumstances, and it
would require more than a class member simply changing their mind.
If the court
does allow a class member to opt out, any limitation periods applying to their
claim will no longer be suspended. We
also think a court should only allow a
person to opt in if the limitation period for their claim has not already
expired. A class
actions regime should not be used as a way of enabling a claim
where a limitation period has
expired.596F[597]
Whether arbitration clauses could prevent potential class
members from being part of a class action
- 8.90 We
have considered whether potential class members could be prevented from opting
into a class action (or be required to opt
out of a class action) by the terms
of a contract. A practice has developed in the United States in which a class
action waiver clause
is included in a contract alongside an arbitration clause.
The combined effect of these provisions is to preclude a contracting party
from
taking part in a class action against the other contracting party and instead
having to proceed with their claim through arbitration.
These clauses have been
used in particular by corporate defendants in their standard terms and
conditions with consumers. This has
been sharply criticised, as it can have the
practical effect of denying access to justice for claimants who cannot afford to
initiate
arbitration
proceedings.597F[598]
- 8.91 We doubt
the practice will take hold in Aotearoa New Zealand, given the legislative
framework for arbitration in this jurisdiction
and the social utility of class
action litigation. There is a risk the arbitration clause would be deemed
contrary to public policy
and therefore not
enforceable.598F[599] Courts are
generally reluctant to find that a matter is not capable of settlement by
arbitration, including where the impediment
to arbitration is alleged
impecuniosity. However, the leading case law deals with commercial transactions.
Claims that are more amenable
to the class action procedure have not been
examined for their arbitrability. In addition, the Arbitration Act 1996 contains
special
protections for consumers. An arbitration agreement with a consumer is
only enforceable against the consumer if they agree in writing
to be bound after
a dispute has arisen.599F[600] The
Act does not specify a monetary limit for consumer transactions. The evident
policy is to discourage consumer arbitration, given
the likelihood of inequality
of bargaining power, standard form contracts, and the absence of true
consent.600F[601] Unless all
consumers agree to be bound by the arbitration clause in accordance with this
requirement, a defendant will face the prospect
of proceedings in multiple fora.
Other legislation limits the availability of arbitration in
employment601F[602] and insurance
contexts.602F[603]
CASE MANAGEMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS
- 8.92 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said class actions would need close case
management to ensure they proceed efficiently
and in a way that protects the
interests of class
members.603F[604] We outlined some
options for promoting the efficient case management of class actions.
- 8.93 The court
could be given a general power to make any orders necessary for the just and
efficient conduct of a class action, as
in some overseas class actions regimes.
However, we preferred relying on specific powers as much as possible and said
the court’s
existing powers would be sufficient to manage situations that
were not provided for.604F[605] We
also discussed the options of having specific class action rules for case
management conferences, rules to streamline interlocutory
applications and a
dismissal for delay
provision.605F[606]
- 8.94 We asked
submitters whether the court had adequate powers to ensure the efficient
management of class actions or whether specific
provisions were
needed.
Results of consultation
- 8.95 We
received 14 submissions on this
question.606F[607]
General power to make necessary orders
- 8.96 Four
submitters supported the court having an express power to make orders necessary
in a class action.607F[608]
Reasons for this included:
(a) Class actions are complex and can raise unique issues. It is impossible for
a class actions regime to fully predict all issues
that may arise and the court
needs the ability to address these.
(b) The court is sometimes hesitant to use the inherent jurisdiction in novel
circumstances, so a specific empowering provision is
necessary.
(c) It would give the court the flexibility to respond to the circumstances of
individual cases and to ensure class actions proceed
as efficiently and fairly
as possible.
(d) A general power could be worded to avoid the issues that have arisen in
Australia. Providing express powers (as well as a general
power) could also help
to avoid these issues.
- 8.97 Seven
submitters did not consider the court needed a general power to make any orders
necessary in a class action, noting the
High Court Rules and the court’s
inherent jurisdiction provide sufficient flexibility to manage class
actions.608F[609] The joint
submission by Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce noted that a
general power to make orders is more important
in a court such as the Federal
Court of Australia, which is created by statute. By contrast, Te Kōti Matua
| High Court is a
court of inherent jurisdiction and necessarily has broad
inherent powers to make orders necessary to exercise that jurisdiction.
Shine
Lawyers said the court should have a general power to make orders required to
progress a class action, whether in statute or
pursuant to the inherent
jurisdiction.
Case management conferences
- 8.98 Chapman
Tripp and the Insurance Council supported having specific provisions on class
actions case management conferences. Other
submitters suggested this could be
dealt with in a Practice
Note.609F[610] Gilbert Walker and
Simpson Grierson thought it was unnecessary to have special rules for case
management conferences in class actions.
Interlocutory applications
- 8.99 Submitters
suggested more efficient management of interlocutory applications could be
achieved by:
(a) Including guidance on expediting interlocutory applications in a Practice
Note.610F[611]
(b) Determining interlocutory applications on the papers unless the complexity
and importance of the application means a hearing
is
necessary.611F[612]
(c) Using judicial settlement conferences more frequently to resolve
interlocutory
applications.612F[613]
- 8.100 Gilbert
Walker thought special rules were unnecessary for interlocutory applications in
class actions. Simpson Grierson did
not think interlocutory applications in
class actions were unique and said some would be suitable to be dealt with on
the papers
or in an expedited way, and others would not. Tom Weston QC commented
that interlocutory applications in class actions will usually
be complex so it
is unlikely they could be disposed with on the papers.
Automatic dismissal
- 8.101 The
Insurance Council thought a class action that has not been progressed within six
months should be automatically dismissed.
Simpson Grierson supported an express
provision empowering the court to dismiss a class action if genuine efforts had
not been made
to progress the proceeding. Three submitters thought it was
unnecessary to have an automatic dismissal
provision.613F[614] Submitters
noted delays can be managed through case management and timetabling procedures,
along with the court’s jurisdiction
to stay or dismiss a proceeding for
want of prosecution.
Other suggestions
- 8.102 Some
submitters made other suggestions for ensuring the efficient case management of
class actions. Chapman Tripp and the IBA
Antitrust Committee said a class action
could be managed by the same judge
throughout.614F[615] Tom Weston QC
suggested it may be appropriate for all interlocutory applications in class
actions to be heard by a judge rather than
an associate judge. Johnson &
Johnson suggested the court should be able to direct the parties to attend
mediation. Nicole Smith
said the court should be able to propose mediation of
competing class actions.
Recommendation
- R60 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a schedule to the High Court Rules
listing issues to be addressed at pre-certification
and post-certification case
management conferences for class action proceedings.
- 8.103 We do not
think the court needs an express power to make any orders necessary in a class
action. Our preference has been to
make recommendations on specific class
actions rules, which we think will help to provide certainty to parties as to
the procedure
to be followed. We acknowledge some situations will arise that are
not contemplated by class actions rules. However, we consider
the court will be
able to make orders it considers appropriate by relying on the existing High
Court Rules and its inherent
jurisdiction.615F[616] As practice
on class actions develops, the Rules Committee may wish to consider developing
additional rules to manage class actions.
- 8.104 We
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a schedule to the High Court
Rules listing the issues to be addressed at
case management conferences that are
held before and after certification. We note there is a separate schedule
listing matters to
be addressed at case management conferences in judicial
review proceedings.616F[617] The
initial stages of a class action will proceed quite differently to other
litigation because of the additional steps required.
The first case management
conference in a class action is likely to focus on the certification hearing and
whether there are any
concurrent class actions. It would not make sense to
discuss many of the matters that would normally be discussed at a first case
management conference in ordinary
litigation.617F[618] Matters to be
discussed at a post-certification case management conference might include
whether there is an application for approval
of a funding agreement, for a cost
sharing order, for the approval of notice to class members and for security for
costs.
- 8.105 We do not
consider rules on streamlining interlocutory applications in class actions are
needed and think the nature of the
application will determine whether a hearing
is required. Nor do we recommend a provision requiring automatic dismissal of
class
actions that are not progressed in a timely way. We think the
court’s usual case management powers and the power to dismiss
or stay a
proceeding for want of prosecution will be sufficient to manage this
issue.618F[619]
- 8.106 While we
agree it is likely to be efficient for the same judge to case manage a class
action proceeding throughout, this is
ultimately a matter of judicial resourcing
and we do not make any recommendations on this.
DISCOVERY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
- 8.107 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we explained that we envisaged the general rules
relating to discovery and inspection, interrogatories
and notices to admit facts
would apply to class actions, as with other civil
litigation.619F[620]
- 8.108 We noted
the representative plaintiff is a party to the proceeding and will have an
obligation to meet discovery requirements.
However, the situation of class
members differs as they are not parties to the proceeding. We said a class
actions regime could specify
a procedure for obtaining discovery against class
members, but we did not think it was necessary given the ability to seek an
order
for non-party
discovery.620F[621]
- 8.109 Where the
defendant does not know the identity of all class members or have sufficient
details of the circumstances of individual
claims, this can make it difficult to
assess the merits of a class action and to work out how to respond. We suggested
a representative
plaintiff should be required to keep a list of class members
who have opted into or out of a class action. We proposed the defendant
should
be able to request a list of persons who have opted into the class action or the
number of persons who have opted out of the
class
action.621F[622]
- 8.110 We asked
submitters whether current rules for discovery and information provision are
adequate for class actions or whether
specific rules are required. In
particular, we asked whether there should be a specific rule permitting
discovery by class members
or whether the defendant should be entitled to any
information about class member claims.
Results of consultation
- 8.111 We
received 14 submissions on discovery and other requirements to provide
information.622F[623]
Class member discovery
- 8.112 Five
submitters supported having a specific rule allowing the court to order
discovery from class
members.623F[624] Their reasons
included the following:
(a) The non-party discovery rule was developed to recognise the burden of
imposing discovery obligations on a person who has no interest
or role in the
litigation. This is not true of class members, who stand to benefit from the
class action and who have either opted
in or had the option of opting out.
(b) The party seeking discovery usually pays the reasonable costs of non-party
discovery. It would be inappropriate for a defendant
to pay the costs of class
member discovery.
(c) It would be better to have clear rules rather than leave it to the court. It
would avoid the time and cost of an application
for non-party discovery.
- 8.113 Some
submitters thought the rule should allow class member discovery at stage two of
the proceedings (when individual issues
are considered), while others thought
class member discovery might also be appropriate at the common issues stage.
Bell Gully supported
the factors that Canadian courts must consider when
deciding whether to grant an application for class member
discovery.624F[625]
- 8.114 Six
submitters thought it is unnecessary to develop a specific rule on class member
discovery.625F[626] Reasons for
this included:
(a) The current rules are adequate.
(b) Discovery from class members is unnecessary at the common issues stage.
(c) It would add unnecessary cost and delay.
(d) In most instances the defendant will know more about the class members than
the representative plaintiff.
(e) Discovery against class members should be the exception, rather than the
rule. A judge should carefully consider any request
for class member
discovery.
(f) Class members may be deterred from joining a class action due to the
potential cost of complying with discovery orders. The defendant
could also use
discovery to intimidate class members into abandoning their claims.
- 8.115 In their
joint submission, Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce suggested the
court should have discretion to order
discovery by class members in appropriate
circumstances but they did not have a view on whether a new rule was
required.
Register of class members
- 8.116 Six
submitters thought the representative plaintiff should keep a register of class
members who opt in or opt out and should
provide the defendant with this
information on request.626F[627]
Reasons given by submitters were:
(a) It is important that those organising class actions keep good records of
class numbers at any given point in time, both as a
protection for class members
and so the parties know the size and scope of the claim.
(b) It is fundamental to the administration of justice for the defendant to know
the size of the claim against it.
(c) Having this information may help to facilitate settlement.
- 8.117 The IBA
Antitrust Committee thought the court should receive opt-out notices and could
provide the parties with information
on the number and identity of those who
have opted out. It said defendants may be unable to settle individual claims
without confirming
that the person has opted out of the class action. It also
supported an express obligation on the plaintiff to provide information
on the
estimated size of the class.
- 8.118 Three
submitters did not think the defendant should generally be entitled to
information on the identity of class
members.627F[628] However, two of
these submitters thought the court should have the power to consider this on a
case-by-case basis.628F[629]
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said in many instances the defendant
will hold more information about the class than the
representative plaintiff. It
did not think ensuring the defendant has sufficient information about class
members was a significant
issue, unless this was needed for genuine settlement
purposes. Shine Lawyers said there is often a power imbalance between class
members and a defendant, and in some cases the identity of class members needs
to remain confidential. It also said many institutional
clients will not
participate in a shareholder class action if there is a risk their identity will
be disclosed without their written
consent and this could lead to potential
class actions being stifled.
Other feedback on information requirements
- 8.119 Some
submitters suggested other information requirements:
(a) In opt-in cases, the defendant should be provided with the estimated value
of each class member’s
claim.629F[630]
(b) The defendant should be entitled to other information gathered from class
members during the opt-in
process.630F[631]
(c) There should be a requirement to provide an estimate of the class size at
certification and an obligation to update this estimate
as the claim
progresses.631F[632]
(d) There should be rules on obtaining particulars and discovery from class
members in opt-out class
actions.632F[633]
(e) The defendant should have to provide critical information at an early stage.
The main problem with discovery in class actions
is the expense and delay
associated with defendant discovery, with insufficient attention to producing a
focused set of documents
at an early
stage.633F[634]
Recommendations
- R61 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to order one or more class members to provide
discovery. The rule could
provide that the following matters are relevant when determining whether a class
member or members should
be required to provide discovery and the extent of that
discovery:
- The
stage of the class action and the issues to be determined at that stage.
- Whether
discovery is necessary in all the circumstances of the case, including the
discovery that can be obtained from parties to
the proceeding.
- Whether
discovery would result in unfairness or undue burden or expense for a class
member.
- Any
other matter the court considers relevant.
- R62 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule that requires the
representative plaintiff to maintain a list of
persons who have opted into the
class action or opted out of the class action. The rule could enable the
defendant to seek an order
requiring the representative plaintiff to provide it
with information about class members who have opted in or opted
out.
Class member discovery
- 8.120 We
agree with submitters that the non-party discovery rule is not well suited to
class member discovery, because it is designed
to apply to persons who are not
part of the litigation. While class members are not parties, the proceeding is
brought on their behalf
and the outcome will be binding upon them. Additionally,
the costs rule for non-party discovery presumes that the party seeking discovery
will meet the reasonable costs of the
non-party.634F[635] This seems
inappropriate in a situation where discovery is sought from someone involved in
the litigation.
- 8.121 Accordingly,
we recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a new High Court Rule to
empower the court to order one or
more class members to provide discovery. We
consider applications for class member discovery should be as confined as
possible, and
it will not generally be appropriate for a class member to have to
provide standard discovery. We have identified several factors
that might be
relevant for the court to consider when deciding whether to order a class member
to provide discovery and the extent
of that
discovery.635F[636]
- 8.122 First, we
think the stage of the class action and the issues to be determined at that
stage will be highly relevant. Discovery
against class members should generally
be limited to the stage of proceedings where individual issues are considered.
However, we
do not recommend excluding the possibility of ordering class member
discovery at the common issues stage, as there may be circumstances
where this
is appropriate. For example, it could be that a particular class member has
documents relevant to a common issue that
are not held by the representative
plaintiff.
- 8.123 Second, we
suggest the court could consider whether discovery is necessary in all the
circumstances of the case, including the
discovery that can be obtained from
parties to the proceeding. In our view, it is preferable to seek discovery from
the representative
plaintiff and any sub-class representative plaintiffs rather
than from class members. In some cases, it may be that limited discovery
from a
small group of class members is sufficient.
- 8.124 Third, we
think the court could consider whether discovery would result in unfairness or
undue burden or expense for class members.
A class action is designed to require
minimal participation for class members, and it is undesirable for burdensome
discovery obligations
to disincentivise participation in class actions.
Therefore, we think it is relevant for a court to consider the breadth of a
discovery
request and the time and cost involved in complying with it. We also
think the court should have discretion to take into account
any other matter it
considers relevant.
- 8.125 We think
the costs of class member discovery, such as the costs incurred by the lawyer
for the class in responding to the application,
should generally be met by the
representative plaintiff or class member, depending on whether discovery is
sought for a common or
individual issue. However, if this would be manifestly
unjust, the court should be able to order the defendant to meet some or all
of
those costs.636F[637]
Class member particulars
- 8.126 Earlier
in this chapter, we said the representative plaintiff should be responsible for
receiving opt-in or opt-out notices,
rather than the court. We recommend the
Rules Committee consider developing a High Court Rule requiring the
representative plaintiff
to maintain a list of persons who have opted into or
opted out of the class action.
- 8.127 We have
considered whether there should be an obligation to provide this information to
the defendant on request. While we think
a defendant should generally be
entitled to this information, we have decided it is preferable for the court to
decide the exact
parameters of the information to be provided and when.
Therefore, we think it would be desirable to have a High Court Rule enabling
the
defendant to seek an order that the representative plaintiff provide it with
information about class members who have opted in
or out.
- 8.128 In an
opt-out case, the defendant should be entitled to know the number of class
members who have opted out, at minimum. We
do not think the names of those who
have opted out should be provided to the defendant as a matter of course. While
someone who has
opted into a class action can reasonably expect that the
defendant will be informed of this, the same cannot be said of someone who
has
decided not to be involved in the class action. However, there may be cases
where it is appropriate for a defendant to be given
the names of class members
who have opted out. An example is where the identity of all potential class
members is known (such as
in a shareholder class action where the potential
class can be identified through the share
registry).637F[638] A defendant
might also seek confirmation that specified persons have opted out, in order to
respond to individual proceedings against
them or finalise a settlement.
- 8.129 In an
opt-in case, it will generally be appropriate for the defendant to be given a
list of class members who have opted in.
In some cases, the court might consider
the defendant is entitled to information above and beyond the names of class
members. For
example, in a class action alleging damage to residential
properties, the court might consider the defendant should be given the
addresses
of the properties in question.
SUB-CLASSES
- 8.130 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said it may be necessary to have sub-classes
in a class action.638F[639] We
identified three situations where sub-classes had been used in other
jurisdictions:
(a) Where groups of class members have conflicting interests.
(b) Where all class members share a common issue, but there are additional
issues that are not common to all class members. In this
situation, sub-classes
may assist to make litigation more efficient and manageable.
(c) Where there is no issue common to all class members, but there are several
related sub-classes.
- 8.131 Our
preliminary view was that sub-classes may be appropriate in the first two
situations, but not the third. We thought it was
important to have a common
issue across all class
members.639F[640] We asked
submitters when sub-classes should be allowed.
Results of consultation
- 8.132 We
received 10 submissions on this
issue.640F[641] All of those
submitters agreed that a class actions regime should allow for sub-classes in
some circumstances. Reasons included:
(a) Defendants may otherwise be unable to exercise defences that only apply to
some class members and not others.
(b) Sub-classes can divide large and complex claims into manageable pieces and
allow the proceeding to be managed and progressed
more efficiently and cost
effectively. They can avoid what would otherwise be separate but similar class
actions.
(c) Sub-classes can reduce the potential for artificially inflated class
actions, with meritless claims “hiding” among
claims with more
merit.
- 8.133 Four
submitters supported sub-classes where there is a conflict of interest among
class members.641F[642] An example
given was a class that contained both injured class members (who sought generous
immediate payments) and class members
who might only manifest an injury in the
future (who sought an ample, inflation-protected fund for the
future).642F[643] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said if the conflict is such that separate
legal representation is required, it may be
inappropriate to bring the claims as
a class action because of the inefficiency and cost involved.
- 8.134 Seven
submitters thought sub-classes are appropriate where there is a common issue
across all class members, as well as additional
issues shared only by a
sub-group.643F[644] An example is
creating sub-classes for different time periods in a class action that covers a
significant date range.
- 8.135 Chapman
Tripp thought sub-classes could be appropriate where there is no common issue
across the class, but the factual or legal
issues are sufficiently related to
justify them proceeding together. Other submitters said sub-classes would not be
appropriate in
this
situation.644F[645] Reasons for
this view included the following:
(a) The common issue principle is central to a class actions regime and
sub-classes should not be used to get around this. If there
is no common issue
across class members, the case should not be certified.
(b) The benefits of class actions are more able to be realised where there is a
common issue across all the claims.
(c) Without a common issue, managing numerous sub-classes would lead to
increased cost and delay.
(d) It would create uncertainty for defendants and could complicate settlements.
- 8.136 Omni
Bridgeway thought the court should have discretion to order sub-classes where
appropriate in a particular case, relying
on a general power to make orders in
class actions.
- 8.137 Other
comments made by submitters on sub-classes:
(a) Sub-classes should not need their own representative plaintiff. This is
overly prescriptive and may lead to unnecessary expense.
Instead, issues in
relation to the sub-class may be dealt with through sample class members giving
evidence at trial or could be
addressed following the initial
trial.645F[646]
(b) A class actions statute does not need to provide for sub-classes, as the
court can consider these as part of its general case
management
powers.646F[647]
(c) The court should have a power to create sub-classes at any stage of the
proceeding, not just at
certification.647F[648]
(d) The court should only create a sub-class if the issue meets the
certification requirement that a class action is an appropriate
procedure for
the efficient resolution of class member
claims.648F[649]
Recommendation
- R63 The
Class Actions Act should empower a court to order a sub-class to be created in
the following cases:
- There
is, or is likely to be, a conflict between the interests of different groups of
class members. In such a case, a subclass representative
plaintiff should
usually be appointed and they should instruct a lawyer in relation to sub-class
issues.
- There
is an issue common to a group of class members and it would assist with the
efficient management and resolution of that issue.
In such a case, a sub-class
representative plaintiff should only be required if the representative plaintiff
would be unable to fairly
and adequately represent the
sub-class.
- 8.138 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should empower a sub-class to be created in two
situations. The first category is where there
is, or is likely to be, a conflict
between the interests of different groups of class members. The second category
is where there
is an additional issue shared by a group of class members, but it
does not give rise to a conflict. There are different rationales
underlying
these two types of sub-class, so they should be treated differently.
- 8.139 While
sub-classes will be beneficial in some cases, they may require a separate
sub-class representative plaintiff and legal
representation, which will add to
the expense and complexity of the class action. Therefore, careful consideration
should be given
to whether a sub-class is necessary in a situation.
Conflict of interest sub-classes
- 8.140 A
sub-class may be appropriate where the interests of groups of class members
conflict, such as where the relief sought by some
class members could harm the
interests of other class members. Examples of where an intra-class conflict
might arise include where
the class is made up of both former and current
franchisees, former and current shareholders, or class members with present
injuries
and class members with possible future
injuries.649F[650] Where there is
a conflict of interest, the purpose of a sub-class is to ensure that all class
members are fairly and adequately represented.
- 8.141 In some
cases, the conflict will be apparent at the outset of litigation. If a sub-class
is not created, it might prevent the
case from being certified on the basis that
the proposed representative plaintiff cannot fairly and adequately represent
both groups
of class members. In this case, the court could appoint a sub-class
representative plaintiff when it certifies the class action.
There may also be
situations where a conflict is not apparent until after certification, such as
after the class has been formed
or when a settlement is proposed. In this case,
a separate application could be made to appoint a sub-class representative
plaintiff.
- 8.142 A
sub-class will not always be needed where there is a conflict of interest. For
example, it may not be necessary if the conflict
is minor or only hypothetical.
There may be alternative ways of managing a conflict without creating a
sub-class, such as having
a series of hearings to determine
relief.650F[651]
- 8.143 If a
sub-class is created because of a conflict between groups of class members, we
think it will generally be necessary to
appoint a separate sub-class
representative plaintiff. The existence of a conflict will make it difficult for
one representative
plaintiff to adequately represent both groups of class
members. We think a sub-group representative plaintiff should have to meet
the
same test as for the representative plaintiff. This means they must be suitable
and able to fairly and adequately represent the
sub-class. In Chapter 12, we
propose that a sub-class representative plaintiff can be liable for adverse
costs for issues determined
on a sub-class basis.
- 8.144 Because we
propose the lawyer for the class should take instructions from the
representative plaintiff, we think it will generally
be necessary to have
separate legal representation for the sub-class in relation to sub-class issues.
Additional issue sub-classes
- 8.145 A
sub-class might also be appropriate where there are additional issues that apply
to a group of class members but where no
conflict of interest arises. This might
include defences that apply to some class members and not others. Using a
sub-class where
there are additional issues can help the litigation to proceed
in an efficient and manageable way.
- 8.146 A
sub-class representative plaintiff will not necessarily be required when this
type of sub-class is created, given there is
no conflict of interest. It will
depend on whether the representative plaintiff is able to fairly and adequately
represent sub-class
members with respect to the additional issues. There could
be cases where a representative plaintiff has insufficient understanding
of the
sub-class issues and is unable to give informed instructions to the lawyer for
the class about those issues. In such a case,
it might be appropriate to appoint
a sub-class representative plaintiff, although we do not think separate legal
representation would
be required because of the lack of conflict.
- 8.147 An
alternative approach is to have a ‘sample class member’ give
evidence on sub-class issues, without that person
fulfilling the role of
sub-class representative
plaintiff.651F[652]
Common issue still required
- 8.148 Our
commencement and certification provisions require the claims of class members to
have a common issue of fact or law. We
do not propose any exception to this
where there are related sub-classes, as the benefits of class actions are better
realised where
there is a common thread across each class member’s claim.
There was little support for allowing a class action to proceed
where there is
no issue common to all class members, but there are several related sub-classes.
In this situation, we think it would
be preferable for separate proceedings to
be brought. The court could exercise its case management powers to ensure the
proceedings
are managed and heard in an efficient way, such as consolidating the
proceedings or hearing them together.
Reflecting sub-classes in legislation
- 8.149 For
simplicity, our draft legislation refers to classes rather than sub-classes
throughout. We think a more developed version
of the Class Actions Act should
reflect the possibility that a class action will also have sub-classes. One
option would be to have
a provision specifying that the provisions of the Class
Actions Act apply to sub-classes with any necessary modifications.
Alternatively,
specific provisions could refer to a sub-class as well as to a
class.
STAGED HEARINGS
- 8.150 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper we explained that a common method of managing
common and individual issues in class actions
is to have staged hearings (also
known as split trials). Typically, the stage one hearing will determine common
issues (and sometimes
the entirety of the representative plaintiff’s
claim) and the stage two hearing will determine individual
issues.652F[653]
- 8.151 We
suggested a class actions regime should have a provision on staged hearings,
with a presumption they will be appropriate.
We envisaged the first hearing
determining the common issues as well as any individual issues relating to the
representative plaintiff.
However, we favoured the court having some flexibility
as to which issues would be determined at each
hearing.653F[654]
- 8.152 We asked
submitters whether they agreed with our proposed approach.
Results of consultation
- 8.153 We
received 13 submissions on this
issue.654F[655] Eight submitters
agreed with a presumption in favour of staged
hearings,655F[656] while three
submitters preferred the court having a general flexibility to determine whether
and how to determine the
issues.656F[657] Comments made by
submitters included:
(a) Staged hearings will be sensible in most class actions.
(b) Staged hearings are a useful mechanism, but the court should still be able
to order a single trial if appropriate.
(c) Each class action should be managed according to its particular needs.
(d) Whether staged hearings will be efficient and reduce costs will depend on
the circumstances of the case. A Practice Note could
provide a non-exhaustive
list of circumstances in which staged hearings should be considered.
- 8.154 The
Insurance Council thought the presumption in HCR 10.15 in favour of a single
trial should apply because staged proceedings
can increase the parties’
legal costs without improving efficiency. Gilbert Walker commented this
presumption is not hard to
displace, particularly in large cases, and that the
debate was more often over which issues would be determined at each trial.
- 8.155 Submitters
generally agreed with the need to have flexibility as to which issues are
determined at each hearing. Simpson Grierson
favoured a presumption that the
stage one hearing would determine the representative plaintiff’s case in
its entirety as well
as all common issues, with the stage two hearing
determining all remaining individual issues.
Recommendation
- R64 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to empower the
court to make orders to promote efficiency in the
hearing of a class action,
including:
- An
order that the hearing should be heard in stages.
- An
order as to which issues should be determined at each stage.
- 8.156 The
feedback we received indicates that it will often be appropriate to have staged
hearings in class actions, with common issues
considered together and individual
issues considered together. However, it is important to ensure the court has
sufficient flexibility
to address the circumstances of each case.
- 8.157 We
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a High Court Rule to empower
the court to make orders to promote efficiency
in the hearing of a class action.
This could include an order that the hearing should be heard in stages and an
order as to which
issues should be determined at each stage. The court could,
for example, order that the common issues should be heard together, sub-class
issues should be heard together and individual issues should be heard together.
However, the court’s powers should not be limited
to grouping the issues
in this way. For instance, there may be a sub-set of individual issues that
would be efficient to determine
at stage one.
- 8.158 The power
we recommend will ensure parties do not have to overcome the presumption in
favour of a single hearing in HCR 10.15.
An express provision also reflects the
importance of ensuring that class actions are efficiently managed.
DETERMINING INDIVIDUAL ISSUES IN A CLASS ACTION
- 8.159 If
the representative plaintiff obtains a successful judgment on the common issues,
the individual issues (such as loss suffered)
will need to be determined.
Determining individual issues can be challenging if the class is large, so it is
important to consider
how such issues can be resolved in a just and efficient
way.657F[658]
- 8.160 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we said the court should have some flexibility as to
how to determine individual
issues.658F[659] We suggested the
court’s powers could include the following:
(a) Appointing a court expert who could report back to the court on particular
issues. The expert would not necessarily determine
individual issues, but they
might be able to simplify the court’s task, for example by categorising
individual claims into
groups.
(b) Directing individual issues to be determined through a non-judicial
procedure, where the parties agree (for example, a determination
process run by
a former judge or a senior lawyer).
(c) Giving directions with respect to the form or way in which evidence on
individual issues may be given. The parties might agree
to a particular form of
evidence, such as standardised forms.
- 8.161 We asked
submitters how individual issues in a class action could be determined in an
efficient way, such as through the court
powers we suggested.
Results of consultation
- 8.162 We
received 11 submissions on this
issue.659F[660] Most submitters
agreed with the court having flexibility as to how individual issues should be
determined, including the mechanisms
we suggested. Comments made by submitters
included:
(a) It is unlikely to be feasible to require each class member to give evidence
on individual issues.
(b) It is important that individual issues can be determined fairly and
efficiently, without overwhelming the courts.
(c) Our proposed mechanisms may streamline the process.
(d) There is a balance to be struck between precision of assessment and
efficiency. It is for the court to consider how the balance
is achieved,
empowered by wide powers.
(e) The process for determining individual issues should be considered at an
early stage in the proceeding, preferably at certification.
- 8.163 Submitters
also identified some additional mechanisms for determining individual issues,
including:
(a) The use of sub-classes.
(b) Tiered dispute resolution processes, which could include establishing
standardised approaches for assessing damages and causation
issues.
(c) A power for the court to direct mediation to occur.
(d) Using standard forms and digital cross-checking of information.
(e) Orders limiting the parties to a single expert for each discrete topic.
(f) The parties seeking to settle the remaining issues amongst themselves after
a decision in favour of the representative plaintiff
at stage one.
- 8.164 While
Chapman Tripp supported the court having flexibility in how individual issues
are determined, it said it is important
that issues are properly determined on
appropriate evidence. It said the plaintiff’s decision to use the class
action procedure
should not prejudice the defendant, and there should not be a
risk of the defendant having to pay unsubstantiated claims.
Recommendation
- R65 The
Class Actions Act should empower the court to determine issues applying to
individual class members and to give directions with
respect to determination of
the individual issues, including:
- Appointing
an expert to inquire into individual issues.
- Giving
directions as to the way or form in which evidence on individual issues may be
given.
- Ordering
individual issues to be determined through a non-judicial process, where the
participants agree to that.
- 8.165 For the
sake of clarity, we recommend the Class Actions Act should empower the court to
determine issues on an individual
basis.660F[661] We also recommend
the court have a power to give directions with respect to determination of
individual issues, to ensure this can
occur in a fair and efficient way.
- 8.166 It would
be a significant burden on the court to hold numerous stage two hearings, with
large numbers of class members giving
individual evidence. This could undermine
the efficiency objective of class actions and lead to significant
expense.661F[662] At the same
time, alternative methods of determining individual issues must be fair to the
parties and should not allow individuals
to recover when they could not have
succeeded in individual proceedings. While the court does have existing powers
to make directions
as to the conduct of hearings, an express power will help to
ensure the parties turn their mind to how individual issues can be efficiently
determined.
- 8.167 The
provision could list some of the directions that could be given, but we do not
think these should be exclusive. The court
should have flexibility to consider
what will be appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
- 8.168 One option
is for the court to appoint an expert to inquire into individual issues. The
expert would not necessarily determine
individual issues, but they may be able
to simplify the court’s task, such as by categorising individual claims
into groups.
The appropriate expert would depend on the type of case and could
include a lawyer, accountant or building expert. It may also be
possible for
experts engaged by the plaintiff and defendant to confer and agree on the
categorisation of groups of class members.
We envisage the parties would meet
the cost of the expert rather than the court.
- 8.169 Another
option is for the court to give directions as to the form or way in which
evidence on individual issues may be given.
An example might be standardised
forms, which could avoid the need for each class member to give oral evidence.
It may also be possible
for an expert witness to give evidence with respect to a
formula for determining individual damages
awards.662F[663]
- 8.170 We think
the approach of having a selection of individual class members giving evidence
that is then extrapolated to other class
members is less likely to be
appropriate. It would be difficult to establish that the selected individuals
are truly representative
and that their evidence can fairly be applied to other
class members.663F[664] However,
the court’s findings on a selection of individual cases might help to
facilitate settlement of remaining claims.
- 8.171 A third
option is for the individual issues to be determined through a non-judicial
process. Although some submitters thought
this should not require the
parties’ consent, we think it would be preferable to have the participants
agree to any non-judicial
process for determining individual issues. Parties and
class members should remain entitled to have the class action resolved by
judicial determination unless they agree to an alternative process. A process
such as mediation is also more likely to be successful
where the participants
are wiling to take part in it. We note that the High Court Rules enable a judge
“with the consent of
the parties” to make an order directing the
parties to attempt to settle a dispute by mediation or other alternative dispute
resolution process “agreed to by the
parties”.664F[665]
- 8.172 In Chapter
7, we noted that in some cases a class member may retain their own lawyer with
respect to individual legal issues.
Whether this is necessary may depend on how
individual issues will be determined. If separate legal representation is
needed, it
could simply involve helping a class member to fill out a
standardised form that is being used instead of oral evidence. While the
lawyer
for the class could assist with this, it may not be practicable to provide
individual assistance to a large number of class
members. In Chapter 18 we
recommend that options for providing free legal advice to class members should
be explored, such as creating
a class actions law clinic.
CHAPTER 9
Cost sharing orders
INTRODUCTION
- 9.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) The ‘free-rider’ problem in opt-out class actions.
(b) The use of cost sharing orders to address this problem.
THE ‘FREE-RIDER’ PROBLEM IN OPT-OUT CLASS
ACTIONS
- 9.2 In
an opt-in proceeding, signing an agreement with a litigation funder may be a
condition of joining the class action. However,
in an opt-out proceeding a class
member does not need to take any steps to become a class member. While the
representative plaintiff
will often have signed an agreement with a litigation
funder, there will be many class members who have not. This may lead to
unfairness
since all class members could benefit from any settlement or damages
award, while only those who have signed the litigation funding
agreement will be
required to contribute to costs under that agreement, including the
funder’s commission. This situation where
only some class members are
contractually required to contribute to the costs of the opt-out class action is
often referred to as
a ‘free-rider’ problem.
Common fund orders and funding equalisation orders in
Australia
- 9.3 In
Australia, mechanisms have been developed to manage the ‘free-rider’
problem, including common fund orders and
funding equalisation
orders.665F[666] These mechanisms
provide a way of sharing the costs of bringing a class action between all class
members, regardless of whether they
have signed the funding agreement.
- 9.4 A common
fund order requires all class members to contribute a proportion of their
proceeds from a settlement or judgment to the
costs of the litigation, including
the litigation funder’s commission, even if they have not signed up to the
litigation funding
agreement.666F[667] An application
for a common fund order is often made at an early stage of the proceedings but
can also be made at a later stage (for
example, at settlement).
- 9.5 A key
feature of common fund orders is that the court will approve the funding
commission that can be deducted. Where the court
makes a common fund order at an
early stage, it may defer setting the funding commission until later in the
proceedings, such as
when approving settlement or before damages are
distributed. The court may also indicate a maximum commission that the funder
may
be paid.
- 9.6 Common fund
orders can improve the economics of opt-out class actions for litigation
funders, as it means the funder does not
need to engage in book building —
the process of identifying class members and signing them up to the litigation
funding agreement.
Book building may be an expensive process, although it is not
inevitably so. In the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said that without
common
fund orders we would expect funders to prefer opt-in class actions, where
signing up to funding arrangements can be a requirement
of the opt-in
process.
- 9.7 A funding
equalisation order deducts an amount from the settlement or damages award paid
to non-funded class members that is equivalent
to the funding commission
deducted from funded class members’ payments. The amount deducted from
non-funded class members is
pooled and distributed pro rata to all class
members. This ensures class members are treated equally. However, it does not
have the
benefit of making a class action more viable for a litigation funder,
because the amount deducted from non-funded class members is
redistributed to
the class rather than being paid to the funder. The funder is only entitled to
be paid a funding commission from
class members it has entered into an agreement
with. This means a funder is incentivised to book build to ensure a class action
has
sufficient funded class members to be economically viable. Another feature
of Australian funding equalisation orders, which differs
from common fund
orders, is that the court does not assess the reasonableness of the funding
commission.
- 9.8 The
Australian experience shows that considerable uncertainty can result from
relying on a court’s general powers to provide
for common fund orders. A
common fund order was first made by the Federal Court of Australia in
2016.667F[668]
Subsequently, common fund orders became a standard feature of Australian
class actions.668F[669] However,
in BMW v Brewster, a majority of the High Court of Australia held that
the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to make a common fund order under
its general power in section 33ZF of the Federal Court of Australia Act
1976.669F[670] In some subsequent
cases, the Federal Court has expressed the view that the High Court’s
decision does not preclude common
fund orders at the settlement stage or
following judgment, relying instead on the court’s power to make orders
with respect
to the distribution of any money paid under a
settlement.670F[671] The
Australian Parliamentary Inquiry and the Australian Law Reform Commission have
recommended legislative clarity in this
area.671F[672]
Cost sharing in Aotearoa New Zealand representative
actions
- 9.9 Courts
in Aotearoa New Zealand have not yet had to determine an application for a
common fund order in relation to representative
proceedings under rule 4.24 of
the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR). A common fund order was sought in Ross v
Southern Response, but the application was adjourned while the issue of
whether the case could proceed on an opt-out basis was
determined.672F[673] Te Kōti
Pira | Court of Appeal said it would be inappropriate to comment on the
availability of a common fund order under HCR
4.24 given that the application
remained to be determined in Te Kōti Matua | High Court. However, it was
confident the High
Court had the necessary tools to address any real unfairness
that arose in this context, whether under the High Court Rules or through
exercising its inherent
powers.673F[674] The High Court
declined an application by the representative plaintiffs to require the
defendant to set aside 15 per cent of any
settlement reached with an individual
class member until the application for a common fund order was
determined.674F[675] The parties
settled the litigation before the High Court could determine the application for
a common fund order.675F[676] We
are aware of another representative action where the plaintiffs have applied for
a common fund
order.676F[677]
CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
- 9.10 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we asked whether the court should have an
express power to make common fund orders or funding
equalisation orders. If
common fund orders should be available, we asked submitters when in a proceeding
they should be made. For
example:677F[678]
(a) At an early stage of the proceedings, with the court setting a fixed rate at
this stage.
(b) At an early stage of the proceedings, with the court indicating a
provisional or maximum rate at this stage and setting the final
rate at a later
stage.
(c) After the common issues have been determined.
(d) At a late stage of the proceedings, such as at settlement or before damages
are distributed.
RESULTS OF CONSULTATION
Express power to make cost sharing orders
- 9.11 Submitters
generally supported clarity in this area. Eighteen submitters supported the
courts having an express power to make
common fund
orders.678F[679] Of those, nine
also supported the court having a power to make funding equalisation
orders.679F[680] Three submitters
did not support the courts having the ability to make common fund
orders.680F[681] Bell Gully
supported an express power for the courts to make funding equalisation orders
but not common fund orders. Gilbert Walker
thought any provision for common fund
orders or funding equalisation orders should be expressly provided for in
legislation, but
did not comment on whether either or both of those mechanisms
should be available.
- 9.12 Some
submitters in favour of common fund orders in opt-out actions said such orders
will improve the economics of opt-out class
actions for funders — for
example, by providing greater certainty for funders and removing the need for
book building.681F[682] This in
turn will improve access to
justice.682F[683] Shine Lawyers
said the availability of common fund orders in Australia has reduced the risks
of funding class actions, which has increased
market competition and placed
downward pressure on funding commissions. Others noted that common fund orders
address the ‘free-rider’
problem and achieve fairness as between
class members.683F[684]
- 9.13 Submitters
who did not support common fund orders, or were not persuaded they were
necessary or desirable, said:
(a) It is not the role of the courts to improve the economics of class actions
for funders.684F[685]
(b) They result in windfall profits for funders, despite very few class members
having actually signed up to the class
action.685F[686]
(c) While funding equalisation orders can be seen as in the interests of
fairness between class members by spreading costs, common
fund orders are purely
for the benefit of funders by improving the economics of opt-out class
actions.686F[687]
(d) Funders appear to be managing without common fund
orders.687F[688]
- 9.14 Submitters
who supported funding equalisation orders said they can address the
‘free-rider’ problem and achieve fairness
as between class
members.688F[689] They can also
avoid the problem of funders potentially receiving windfall profits under a
common fund order.689F[690]
- 9.15 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Russell Legal were critical of funding
equalisation orders when compared to common
fund orders. While not expressly
opposing the availability of funding equalisation orders, Russell Legal noted
they adversely affect
the market for funding and access to justice
because:
(a) Funding equalisation orders fail to meet funders’ concern that their
costs will not be met, which means funders are still
required to book
build.
(b) They do not incentivise claimants to sign the litigation funding
agreement.
(c) They will cause funders to charge higher commissions to reflect “the
greater risk associated with compensation uncertainty”.
- 9.16 Some
submitters considered both common fund orders and funding equalisation orders
should be available.690F[691]
Reasons given were that both orders ensure those who benefit from the class
action are required to contribute to the costs, and that
the court should have
the discretion and flexibility to make the most appropriate order in the
circumstances of the case.
- 9.17 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia supported the availability of funding
equalisation orders, but cautioned against preferring
them over common fund
orders. It said funding equalisation orders incentivise book-building, which
increases the overall costs of
the proceeding. It also suggested factors the
court could consider when determining which order would be most
appropriate.691F[692]
- 9.18 Some
submitters considered the court’s power to make cost sharing orders should
not be confined to the mechanisms that
have developed in Australia. In their
joint submission, Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce said the
court should have
sufficient flexibility to develop and make any cost sharing
order it likes, without being tied to the common fund order or funding
equalisation order approach. Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society (NZLS) also supported the availability of both
orders, but said they may
not need different names, given that both aim to ensure funding is made on a
fair and equal basis.
- 9.19 We also
discussed common fund orders and funding equalisation orders at our consultation
workshops on the Supplementary Issues
Paper. Like submitters, participants
expressed a range of views, including support for legislation to clarify the
uncertainty.
Timing of cost sharing orders
- 9.20 We
received 13 submissions on when common fund orders, if available, should be
made.692F[693]
- 9.21 Ten of
these submissions supported common fund orders being made at an early stage of
the proceedings,693F[694] with the
funding rate being set at that
stage,694F[695] or a provisional
funding rate being set at that stage and finalised later in the
proceedings.695F[696] Those who
attended our consultation workshops generally also favoured common fund orders
being made at an early stage. The main reason
for this view was that it will
provide funders and class members with greater certainty and transparency at the
outset. Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand also
said it will ensure potential class members have the necessary information
to
decide whether to opt out of the class action, and assist defendants to assess
their potential costs exposure.
- 9.22 Submitters
who favoured a provisional rate being set at an early stage and finalised at a
later stage considered this will strike
the right balance between certainty and
transparency for funders and class members. It will also give the court
flexibility to determine
a fair and reasonable funding commission once it has
better information (for example, the number of class members, the quantum of
the
claim and the actual costs).
- 9.23 Two
submitters favoured common fund orders being made at a later stage in the
proceedings.696F[697] Bell Gully
said such orders should be made at settlement or before damages are distributed,
to encourage funders to book build and
to ensure the court has all the
information it needs before it “effectively improve[s] the returns for
funders”.
- 9.24 Two
submitters thought the court should have a discretion to make common fund orders
at any stage in the proceedings, rather
than being too
prescriptive.697F[698] Carter
Pearce said this will enable the parties and the court to experiment with
different funding approaches and discover those
that best satisfy the goals of
the statutory class actions regime as the regime matures.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- R66 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may make a cost sharing order
enabling the litigation costs of a class action (including
the legal fees and
funding commission) to be spread equitably among all class members, on the
application of the representative plaintiff.
- R67 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if the court makes a cost sharing order
that enables the litigation funder to receive a
funding commission from class
members who have not signed an agreement with it, it may:
- Set a
provisional funding commission (or range of commissions) when making the cost
sharing order; and
- Vary
the funding commission at a later date.
Power to make cost sharing orders
- 9.25 We
recommend the court should be expressly empowered to order that the litigation
costs of a class action (including the legal
fees and funding commission) be
equitably spread among all class members, even if they have not signed up to the
funding agreement
(a cost sharing order). This will allow the court to address
‘free-rider’ problems in class actions.
- 9.26 We consider
the court should have flexibility as to the terms of the cost sharing order.
This will allow the court to either
require all class members to contribute a
share of their settlement or damages award to cover the costs of the proceeding,
or to
give a share of their settlement or damages award to class members who
have signed a funding agreement with the litigation funder.
- 9.27 However, we
do not think it is necessary for Aotearoa New Zealand to be constrained by the
dichotomy of common fund orders and
funding equalisation orders that has
developed in Australia. Those two orders reflect Australia’s particular
class actions
history. We contemplate a broader power for the court to make any
order it sees fit to ensure the costs of a class action, including
the funding
commission, are spread equitably between all class members who benefit from the
action. The broader language we propose
provides flexibility for cost sharing
approaches to develop as the class actions regime matures.
- 9.28 If a court
determines it is appropriate to make a cost sharing order, we think it should
consider what form of cost sharing order
is most appropriate to enable the legal
and funding costs of a class action to be spread equitably among all class
members. In some
instances the representative plaintiff may apply for an order
similar in form to a funding equalisation order, because it may result
in a
lower total sum being deducted from class members. However, in some instances a
cost sharing order more akin to a common fund
order will be more appropriate.
For instance, this may be the case where only the representative plaintiff has
entered into the funding
agreement, as a funding equalisation-type order in that
scenario could mean a funder is not reasonably compensated for the risk they
incurred.698F[699]
- 9.29 When
considering what form of cost sharing order to make, we think relevant
considerations could include:
(a) The distribution and weighting of losses between funded and unfunded class
members.699F[700]
(b) Whether the funding agreement entitles the funder to recover from the
‘grossed up’ amount redistributed to funded
class members from
unfunded class members
recoveries.700F[701]
(c) Whether the funding agreement includes other expenses that would be levied
on unfunded class members under a funding equalisation-type
order but not
necessarily a common fund-type
order.701F[702]
- 9.30 These
factors may favour an order more similar to a common fund order or to a funding
equalisation order, depending on the particular
circumstances of the case and
its funding arrangements. The court should also consider the representative
plaintiff’s wishes.
- 9.31 While
Australian cost sharing orders can provide a useful reference point for the
courts, the broader power we propose is intended
to provide flexibility so the
courts can respond to the circumstances of each class action.
- 9.32 We have not
limited the ability to apply for a cost sharing order to opt-out class actions.
There may be occasions where a representative
plaintiff in an opt-in class
action would want to seek an order that the costs of an opt-in class action be
shared equitably among
class members. We anticipate that these occasions would
be rare, however, given that signing a litigation funding agreement can be
a
condition of opting into a class action.
Power to set provisional funding commission
- 9.33 A
cost sharing order that enables the litigation funder to receive a funding
commission from those who have not signed an agreement
with it will make the
class action more profitable for the funder. Some submitters thought it is not
the role of courts to make class
actions more economic for funders and that this
could result in windfall profits for funders. While it is not the court’s
role
to assist funders to make profits, if some class actions are not
economically viable for funders (for example, because they have
to book-build)
then it will limit the range of class actions that can be brought and ultimately
impact on access to justice.
- 9.34 To limit
the risk of cost sharing orders facilitating windfall profits for funders, we
think the court should be empowered to
set a provisional funding commission (or
range of commissions) when granting an application for a cost sharing order that
enables
the funder to receive a funding commission from class members who have
not signed a funding agreement. We think this should occur
at the same time the
court considers the representative plaintiff’s application for approval of
the funding agreement (usually
immediately after
certification).702F[703] As part
of approving the funding agreement, we have recommended that the court should
consider the estimated returns to the funder
in a range of scenarios. We
anticipate that the funding commission (or range of commissions) approved by the
court will then become
the provisional basis for any cost sharing order. We
discuss the risk of excessive funder profits, and further recommendations to
mitigate this risk, in Chapter 17.
Power to vary funding commission
- 9.35 If
the court makes a cost sharing order that enables the litigation funder to
receive a funding commission from those who have
not signed an agreement with
it, we think the court should also have the power to vary the funding commission
at a later date (for
example when damages are determined, or before damages are
distributed). This will allow the court to be satisfied that the funding
commission is fair and reasonable in light of the actual costs and circumstances
of the class action.
- 9.36 For
instance, it might be appropriate for the court to vary the funding commission
if, during the class action, there has been
a material change in the factors
that formed the basis for the court’s approval of the funding agreement
and the provisional
funding commission (or range of commissions) set out in the
initial cost sharing order.
CHAPTER 10
Judgments, relief and appeals
INTRODUCTION
- 10.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Class action judgments, including their binding effect on class members.
(b) The court’s powers to assess and order relief on an individual and
aggregate basis.
(c) Appeal rights in class actions.
- 10.2 We also set
out draft legislative provisions that could give effect to our recommendations
on class action judgments and the
court’s powers to assess and order
relief.
CLASS ACTION JUDGMENTS
- 10.3 Judgments
are generally only binding between the parties. A key feature of a class action
is that the court’s decision
on the common issues is also binding on class
members, who are not parties to the
litigation.703F[704]
- 10.4 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we discussed several principles relevant to the
binding effect of judgments:
(a) The doctrine of res judicata, which precludes a litigant from
accessing the courts where they seek to reopen a dispute that has already been
determined.704F[705]
(b) The court’s power to stay a proceeding that is an abuse of process.
This power protects against conduct that, left unchecked,
“would strike at
the public confidence in the Court’s
processes”.705F[706] Abuse
of process can take a number of forms, but is usually concerned with frivolous
claims brought for an improper purpose or claims
that seek to improperly
relitigate matters already
determined.706F[707]
(c) The rule in Henderson v Henderson. Under this rule, unless there are
special circumstances, parties are required to bring forward their whole case
and will be prevented
from litigating issues that should have been raised in
previous litigation.707F[708]
- 10.5 We said a
judgment on common issues should be binding on class members, otherwise the
common issues would not be resolved and
the efficiencies of a class action would
not be achieved. However, we also said a class actions regime should safeguard
the interests
of class members, who have little control over the class action
and may not even be aware of it. We suggested it was desirable for
a class
actions regime to provide clarity on the binding effect of judgments on class
members and set out a draft provision.
- 10.6 We proposed
that class members should be bound by a judgment to the extent it determines a
common issue that is set out in the
certification order, relates to a claim
described in the certification order, and relates to relief sought in the
certification order.708F[709]
Class members would only be bound by a common issues judgment if they had opted
in or had not opted out of the
proceeding.709F[710]
- 10.7 We asked
submitters whether they agreed with our draft provision and, if not, how it
should be amended.
Results of consultation
- 10.8 We
received 10 submissions on the binding effect of a class action
judgment.710F[711]
- 10.9 Most
submitters agreed class members should be bound by the judgment on common
issues.711F[712] Submitters said
this was a central purpose of class actions, a key way of achieving efficiency,
and that it was important to have
clarity on who is bound and on what basis.
Nikki Chamberlain (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland) suggested a
minor amendment
to clarify that, where a class action judgment deals with issues
not common to the entire class, class members are still bound by
the issues that
are relevant to them.
- 10.10 Several
submitters agreed the binding effect should be limited to the common
issues.712F[713] Reasons
included:
(a) Class member interests need to be protected as they have little
control over the proceeding and may not be aware of the proceeding.
(b) The simplicity of the proposed provision will be undermined if class members
can be bound by additional issues that should have
been raised and dealt with in
the litigation.
(c) This is the approach adopted in Ontario and Australia.
- 10.11 Chapman
Tripp submitted it was important to have clarity about who is bound by a
judgment and supported a provision that was
expressed not to apply to those who
opted out or did not opt in to the class proceeding. Nicole Smith queried
whether it was appropriate
for the binding effect of a judgment to extend to
relief. She was concerned that a class action that seeks damages would preclude
a class member from pursuing an injunction or specific performance in a
subsequent proceeding.
- 10.12 Some
submitters indicated that the binding effect of a judgment should be wider than
the common issues. Bell Gully thought class
members should be precluded from
bringing subsequent proceedings on issues that could have been raised in the
class action. It said
limiting the binding effect to the common issues raised
would create indeterminate liability and undermine the efficiency of the
class
actions regime. Gilbert Walker did not think it was unfair for a class member to
be subject to the rule in Henderson v Henderson. It said, under this
rule, class members would only be prohibited from bringing subsequent
proceedings raising an issue that could
have been addressed in the class action
if this would amount to an abuse of process.
- 10.13 Three
submitters commented on which class members the provision should apply to.
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
agreed the judgment should not bind
those who have opted out of the class action or did not opt in. However, Te
Kāhui Inihua
o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand said class
members who opt out of a class action should be bound by the judgment on
common
issues unless they bring their own proceeding. Rhonson Salim (Aston University)
said it is important to have a clear opt-out
date and limitation rules, so the
defendant knows who is bound by the judgment.
- 10.14 Some
submitters discussed whether the binding effect of a judgment should be tied to
the certification order:
(a) Chapman Tripp thought the binding effect of a class action judgment is
better dealt with in the judgment itself. The risk of
relying on the
certification order as the foundation for the binding effect of a judgment is
that it would not accurately reflect
the evolution of the issues as the case
progressed.
(b) Gilbert Walker queried whether it would be feasible to set out the common
issue, claim and relief in the certification order.
It said attempting this at
the outset would be contentious and onerous, and it is inevitable the claim will
be amended.
(c) Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said that, if proceedings must be
certified (which it did not support), it is logical
to link back to the
certification order. This would make it easy for class members to establish
whether a judgment would be binding
on a given issue.
(d) Simpson Grierson said that, if the court gives judgment on common issues not
listed in the certification order, class members
should still be bound by those
issues.
- 10.15 Concern
about locking the common issues into the certification order was also raised at
our consultation workshops. Some participants
suggested it may be better to have
the common issues set out in the judgment, rather than the certification
order.
Recommendations
- R68 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a judgment on a common issue binds every
class member, but only to the extent the judgment
determines a common issue
that:
- Is
set out in the certification order;
- Relates
to a cause of action described in the certification order; and
- Relates
to relief sought by class members as set out in the certification order.
- R69 The
Class Actions Act should require a judgment on a common issue to
include:
- The
class definition.
- A
description of the common issues of law or fact.
- A
description of the causes of action that were pleaded.
- The
relief sought by the class.
- R70 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a judgment on a common issue is not
binding between a party to the class action proceeding
and:
- A
person who was eligible to opt into the proceeding but did not do so.
- A
person who has opted out of the proceeding.
- 10.16 The
ability of a judgment on common issues to bind all class members is a central
feature of a class actions regime. If class
members were not bound by this
judgment, the common issues would not be resolved, and the efficiencies of a
class actions regime
would not be achieved. We think the Class Actions Act
should seek to uphold, to the extent possible, the principle that there should
be finality in litigation.
- 10.17 The key
issue is the extent to which the judgment on common issues should bind class
members. We think the fairest approach
is to restrict the binding effect to the
common issues as set out in the certification order. We recommend the Class
Actions Act
should specify a judgment on a common issue binds every class member
but only to the extent the common issue is set out in the certification
order,
relates to a cause of action described in the certification order and relates to
relief sought by class members as set out
in the certification
order.713F[714]
- 10.18 We think
tying the binding effect of a judgment to the common issues set out in the
certification order will provide clarity
and certainty for class members. As we
explained in Chapter 6, one purpose of the certification order is to provide
clear information
to class members about the nature and scope of the class
action so they can decide whether they wish to be part of it. As the
certification
order establishes the common issues that will be determined in a
class action, we think it is logical for it to determine the extent
of the
binding effect of a class action judgment on class members.
- 10.19 We agree
with submitters it is important to ensure the common issues can evolve during
the class action and are not restricted
to those in the initial certification
order. In Chapter 6 we recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that a
court may amend
a certification order. We also recommend the Class Actions Act
should require a judgment on a common issue to include the class definition,
a
description of the common issues of law or fact, a description of the causes of
action that were pleaded, and the relief sought
by the class. This description
of the common issues of law or fact will reflect any amended version of the
certification order.
- 10.20 We do not
recommend the binding effect of a judgment on common issues should extend to
expressly precluding class members from
bringing proceedings with respect to
issues that could have been brought in the class action. We acknowledge this
means a class member
may be able to bring further litigation on issues that were
not raised in the proceeding, even if they could have
been.714F[715] This means the
defendant may not always know the full extent of their liability to a class
member in one proceeding. However, given
class members’ lack of control
over the class action, we do not think they should be statutorily bound to more
than the common
issues determined in the judgment. A court could still exercise
its powers to rule that a subsequent proceeding amounts to abuse
of
process.715F[716]
- 10.21 For the
avoidance of doubt, we also recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that
a judgment on a common issue is not
binding between a party to the class action
proceeding and (a) a person who was eligible to opt into the proceeding but did
not do
and (b) a person who opted out of the
proceeding.716F[717]
Other powers relating to judgment
- 10.22 We
have considered whether a class actions regime needs to provide the court with
any other powers in relation to judgment.
Section 33Z(1) of the Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 provides the court with specific powers to make certain
determinations and orders in its
judgment.717F[718]
- 10.23 We do not
think it is necessary for the Class Actions Act to contain a judgment provision
such as this. In Aotearoa New Zealand,
many of the powers similar to those
contained in section 33Z(1) are already held by Te Kōti Matua | High Court
or contemplated
elsewhere in our proposed regime. For example, we recommend the
court have the power to assess and order aggregate monetary relief,
assess and
determine individual issues and create sub-classes. There are also similarities
between the powers in section 33Z(1) and
provisions in the High Court Rules 2016
(HCR). For example, HCR 11.2 provides that a judgment may (among other matters)
“deal
with any question or issue” and “order any accounts,
inquiries, acts or steps that the court considers necessary”.
Draft judgment provision
- 10.24 Below
we set out a draft legislative provision that could give effect to our
recommendations on the binding effect of a judgment
on a common issue on class
members.
9 Effect of judgment on common issue
(1) A judgment on a common issue binds every class
member, but only to the extent that the judgment determines a common issue
that—
(a) is set out in the certification order; and
(b) relates to a cause of action described in the certification order; and
(c) relates to relief sought by class members as stated in the certification
order.
(2) A judgment on a common issue is not binding between a party to the class
action proceeding and—
(a) a person who was eligible to opt in to the proceeding but did not do so:
(b) a person who has opted out of the proceeding.
RELIEF IN CLASS ACTIONS
- 10.25 If
the court finds the defendant is liable to class members, it will need to
consider whether class members may be entitled
to relief. In this section we
discuss:
(a) The court’s powers to assess and order individual relief.
(b) The court’s powers to assess and order aggregate monetary relief.
(c) Distribution of aggregate monetary relief.
(d) Alternative distribution.
Individual relief
- 10.26 In
some cases, after the representative plaintiff obtains a successful judgment on
the common issues in a class action, relief
may need to be assessed and ordered
on an individual basis. In a class action, the relief sought will generally be
damages or other
monetary relief. However, in Chapter 4 we recommend that class
actions should not be restricted to claims seeking monetary relief,
so it is
possible individual non-monetary relief may be sought.
- 10.27 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we explained that individual assessment of monetary
relief will likely be appropriate where
the class is small and/or there is a
simple method available for calculating the amount. It may also be necessary
where individual
issues must be determined to address quantum, including
contributory negligence, mitigation and the extent of the
damage.718F[719]
- 10.28 In Chapter
8 we recommend the Class Actions Act should empower the court to determine
issues applying to individual class members
and to give directions with respect
to those issues. This could include orders with respect to determination of
individual relief.
For example, the court could appoint an expert to give
evidence on an appropriate formula for determining the quantum of individual
damages awards.719F[720] If
satisfied with that evidence, the court could then order individual relief on
that basis.
Aggregate monetary relief
- 10.29 Aggregate
assessment of monetary relief is a technique where the total amount of the
monetary relief that a class or subclass
is entitled to is assessed on an
aggregate basis, without calculating individual class member entitlements. It
can be an efficient
way of calculating monetary relief where the damage
sustained by the class can be proved for the class as a whole.
- 10.30 There are
a variety of situations where it may be appropriate for the court to make an
aggregate assessment of monetary relief.
For example:
(a) Where the total number of class members and their individual loss is
relevant to the aggregate quantum, but it can be proved
without requiring
individual class member participation. An example of this is where a defendant
has overcharged class members, and
the total liability can be calculated from
the defendant’s records without any need for class member
involvement.720F[721] In this
scenario, the representative plaintiff would prove the aggregate overcharge, but
not the amounts to which each individual
class member is entitled.
(b) Where the aggregate quantum can be established without knowing the number of
class members or each class member’s loss
or damage. An example of this is
Allapattah Services v Exxon Corp, a case where the class members alleged
Exxon Corp had engaged in an intentional and systematic scheme to overcharge
them for petrol.721F[722] In that
case, the jury verdict established damages on a cents per gallon basis. The
representative plaintiff sought aggregate monetary
relief, calculated by
multiplying the cents per gallon amount by the annual gallons of petrol sold by
the defendant.
(c) Where the size of the class is large but can be determined on an approximate
basis and the individual losses are small and fairly
uniform. An example of this
is ACCC v Golden Sphere Intl Inc, a case brought by class members who had
invested in the defendant’s bonds and lost
money.722F[723] Class members had
different amounts of loss because some had onsold their bonds. The
representative plaintiff based its aggregate
calculations based on loss of $50
per class member, because not all class members had suffered the maximum loss of
$150. This was
multipled by a rounded number of class members (11,000), reaching
an aggregate total of $550,000. The ACCC called a number of witnesses
with
varying degrees of loss and gave the names of all other class members. The
respondent, while disputing the number, called no
evidence in response. The
court found ACCC’s assessment was reasonably accurate.
- 10.31 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we expressed the view that aggregate monetary relief
should be available for class actions
in Aotearoa New Zealand. We preferred the
term “relief” to “damages”, to ensure all forms of
monetary relief
are available in a class
action.723F[724]
- 10.32 Our draft
provision on aggregate monetary relief provided that the court may award this
form of relief if it is satisfied that
it can make a reasonably accurate
assessment of the total amount of monetary relief owed to class members and if
no further question
of fact or law must be determined to establish the amount of
the defendant’s
liability.724F[725]
- 10.33 We asked
submitters whether they agreed aggregate monetary relief should be available in
class actions and whether they had
comments on our draft provision.
Results of consultation
- 10.34 We
received 19 submissions on aggregate monetary
relief.725F[726]
- 10.35 Seventeen
submitters supported a power to award aggregate monetary relief in a class
action.726F[727] Reasons for this
included:
(a) It may not be possible to assess damages on an individual basis.
(b) It can avoid a potentially expensive process of assessing relief
individually.
(c) It can be an efficient way to resolve claims.
(d) It can provide all parties with finality, and this may otherwise be
difficult to achieve in some class actions.
(e) It will give the court flexibility when dealing with issues of monetary
relief.
(f) It will assist the court to determine quantum of damages on a global basis.
- 10.36 Bell Gully
noted its concern that aggregate damages can be inflated. It cautioned that the
basis for aggregate damages should
reflect the overall compensatory objective of
damages in the class actions regime, rather than serving a deterrent function.
- 10.37 Several
submitters addressed our proposed test. Six submitters agreed with the
requirement that a “reasonably accurate
assessment” of the total
amount of damages should be
made.727F[728] Nikki Chamberlain
and Gilbert Walker agreed the court should also be satisfied that no question of
law or fact remains to be determined.
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
queried whether the “no question of fact or law” limb is necessary,
because
this will be the position if the “reasonably accurate
assessment” test has been met.
- 10.38 Several
submitters proposed alternative tests or additional requirements, for
example:
(a) Aggregate monetary relief should only be available where individual
assessment of loss is not possible or
practicable.728F[729]
(b) Aggregate monetary relief should be available when it can reasonably be
determined without proof by individual class
members.729F[730]
(c) There should be a presumption that monetary relief is assessed on an
individual basis.730F[731]
(d) The court should retain the ability to assess monetary relief on an
individual basis if the class is relatively
small.731F[732]
- 10.39 Some
submitters addressed issues relevant to the application of our proposed test,
such as the existence of defences. Gilbert
Walker said it is unclear how
individual defences, such as contributory negligence or contribution claims,
will apply when aggregate
monetary relief is awarded under our proposed
provision. Simpson Grierson said aggregate damages would not be appropriate
where a
defendant has defences against some class members but not others, or
where there is a dispute about quantum amongst class members.
In contrast,
Andrew Barker QC thought the existence of defences would not necessarily
preclude aggregate monetary relief and could
be taken into account when
calculating quantum. The International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee
suggested we consider
clarifying the availability of aggregate damages where a
class includes both injured and uninjured class members.
- 10.40 Tom Weston
QC submitted there would be very few cases where aggregate damages would be
appropriate in practice. He said there
are likely to be few cases where a
reasonably accurate assessment of the total amount of monetary relief owed to
class members can
be made.
Recommendation
- R71 The
Class Actions Act should specify that:
- The
court may make an aggregate assessment of the monetary relief to which a class
is entitled if it is satisfied it can make a reasonably
accurate assessment of
this amount.
- For
the purpose of the court’s assessment of aggregate monetary relief, it is
not necessary for any individual class member
to establish the amount of loss or
damage suffered by them.
- The
court may make an award in the amount assessed as the aggregate monetary relief.
- 10.41 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the court may make an
aggregate assessment of monetary relief to which
a class is entitled and make
orders accordingly.732F[733] We
prefer the term “monetary relief” over “damages”, to
ensure all forms of monetary relief are available
in a class
action.733F[734] As we explained
in the Supplementary Issues Paper, a class action might seek monetary relief
other than damages. For example, a
restitutionary claim is not easily
conceptualised as a claim for ‘damages’ as the amount recoverable is
determined by
the defendant’s unjust enrichment, rather than the
plaintiff’s loss.734F[735]
- 10.42 We think
empowering the court to assess and order aggregate monetary relief will further
the objectives of improving access
to justice and managing multiple claims in an
efficient way. In some cases, it will not be feasible or cost-effective to
assess relief
on an individual basis. Aggregate assessment of monetary relief
can also help to ensure a class action achieves finality for all
parties in a
single judgment.
- 10.43 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the court may only assess
monetary relief on an aggregate basis if it
is satisfied it can make a
reasonably accurate assessment of the total amount to which class members are
entitled.735F[736] The reference
to “reasonably accurate” acknowledges that absolute precision in
assessing the total amount may be impossible,
particularly in an opt-out class
action if the total number of class members is unknown. However, the court needs
to be satisfied
there is a sufficient basis on which to calculate the aggregate
amount. We do not think a power to assess aggregate monetary relief
should allow
a person to be granted relief that they would not otherwise be
entitled.736F[737] For example,
aggregate monetary relief will be inappropriate where the determination of
relief is individualistic and dependent on
factors unique to each class
member.737F[738] We also think it
is unlikely the court could make a reasonably accurate aggregate assessment if
limitation or contributory negligence
issues still need to be determined.
However, if such concerns were not relevant to the entire class, it could be
appropriate to use
sub-classes so relief can be calculated for some class
members on an aggregate basis, and others individually.
- 10.44 We no
longer think it is necessary to include a requirement that no question of fact
or law remains to establish the amount
of the defendant’s liability, as we
think this requirement is duplicative of the “reasonably accurate
assessment”
test.738F[739] A
court will not be able to make a reasonably accurate assessment of the amount to
which class members are entitled unless the defendant’s
liability has been
determined. For example, the power cannot be used where the fact of damage
remains to be proved.
- 10.45 We also
recommend that the Class Actions Act should specify that, where the court makes
an aggregate assessment, individual
class members should not need to establish
the amount of loss or damage
suffered.739F[740] The
representative plaintiff should be able to prove the aggregate amount without
requiring individual class member participation.
- 10.46 Once the
court has made an aggregate assessment of monetary relief, we consider it should
have a power to grant relief in the
aggregate amount. We therefore recommend
the Class Actions Act should specify the court may make an award in the amount
assessed
as the aggregate monetary
relief.740F[741]
Distribution of aggregate monetary relief
- 10.47 If
the court makes an award of aggregate monetary relief, it may need to give
orders on how that relief should be distributed.
- 10.48 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we explained that in other class actions regimes,
courts generally have a wide discretion
to determine the appropriate method of
distribution of aggregate monetary relief. Potential methods of distribution
include distribution
by the defendant, use of a fund and distribution by a third
party.741F[742] We suggested the
court should have a wide discretion as to the appropriate method of distributing
monetary relief to class members,
including the power to appoint an
administrator to distribute class member
entitlements.742F[743] We also
proposed a reporting requirement and said a report with information about the
process and outcome of the distribution of
the award should be filed within 60
days of the distribution process being completed.
- 10.49 We noted
that part of an aggregate award might be left unclaimed by class members and
that overseas jurisdictions have dealt
with this issue in various ways.
Unclaimed funds could be distributed pro rata to class members, paid towards the
costs of proceedings,
paid to an organisation or charity associated with the
claim, revert to the defendant or be forfeited to the government. We said
the
court should have a discretion to make any orders it considers appropriate for
managing unclaimed monetary relief and proposed
the court’s power to make
orders with respect to distribution should extend to unclaimed monetary
relief.743F[744]
- 10.50 Our draft
provision on aggregate monetary relief included a power to make orders with
respect to distribution. We asked submitters
whether they had any comments on
our draft provision.
Results of consultation
- 10.51 Eight
submitters commented on distribution of aggregate monetary
relief.744F[745]
- 10.52 Several
submitters commented on our proposed power for the court to make orders relating
to distribution. Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia said the court
should retain discretion and flexibility in deciding the method of distribution.
Gilbert Walker
said it is unclear how any agreement between class members and
parties about distribution would interact with the court’s orders
on
distribution. Nicole Smith asked whether individual claimants would be required
to prove their entitlement to a share of the aggregate
award. Shine Lawyers
suggested the distribution power may sit better as a standalone provision so it
can apply to any award of monetary
relief, not just aggregate monetary relief.
- 10.53 Two
submitters commented on reporting requirements. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia was unsure whether one formal
reporting requirement was sufficient. It
suggested further oversight or reporting at regular intervals may be necessary
where administration
is complex. Gilbert Walker suggested that, if distribution
is expected to take a long time, the administrator should be required
to file
interim reports.
- 10.54 Six
submitters commented on distribution of unclaimed monetary relief, with
submitters supporting divergent
approaches.745F[746] Consumer NZ
said pro rata distribution to class members who had made a claim will be
preferable in most instances. However, Chapman
Tripp did not support this,
saying damages are intended to compensate class members and not to off-set legal
costs or funding commissions.
- 10.55 Several
submitters thought the default position should be that unclaimed damages are
returned to the
defendant.746F[747] Other
submitters took a different view. Nikki Chamberlain disagreed with reversion to
the defendant and supported alternative distribution
of unclaimed damages. She
said a desirable consequence of class action litigation is deterrence and this
consequence should be reinforced
by the legislation. Nicole Smith supported
unclaimed monetary relief being paid to a fund that assists with access to
justice or
other alternative distribution. Bell Gully suggested our draft
provision should clarify that any unclaimed damages can be distributed
by way of
alternative distribution.
Recommendations
- R72 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may make any orders for the
distribution of an award of aggregate monetary relief that
it considers
appropriate, including orders:
- That
the defendant must distribute the award directly to class members.
- Appointing
a person as the administrator to distribute the award to class members.
- Approving
the process for class members to establish their entitlement to a share of the
award.
- Directing
how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be distributed, including by making
an order for alternative distribution.
- Directing
how the costs of the distribution are to be met.
- R73 The
Class Actions Act should require an administrator or the parties (if the court
has not appointed an administrator) to file a report
with information about the
process and outcome of the distribution of the award within 60 days of the
distribution process being
completed, or at a later time if allowed by the
court.
- R74 Te
Kōmiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule on the requirements for
a distribution outcome
report. This rule could require the report to include the best available
information on the following matters:
- The
total number of class members.
- The
number of class members who received a payment from the award of aggregate
monetary relief.
- The
number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for
this.
- The
cost of administering the distribution of the award of aggregate monetary
relief.
- The
amount of any unclaimed funds and how this is proposed to be distributed.
- Any
amounts paid to a litigation funder.
- R75 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should make distribution outcome
reports available on the class actions webpage
of ngā Kōti o Aotearoa
| Courts of New Zealand website, subject to any confidentiality orders made by
the court.
- 10.56 If the
court makes an order for aggregate relief, it will likely need to order how that
award will be distributed. We recommend
the Class Actions Act should specify the
court may make any orders for the distribution of an award of aggregate monetary
relief
that it considers
appropriate.747F[748] Our proposed
provision sets out some examples of the types of orders a court may make, but
these are not exclusive.
- 10.57 We also
recommend the Class Actions Act should require an administrator or the parties
(if an administrator has not been appointed)
to file a report with information
about the process and outcome of the distribution of the aggregate monetary
relief within 60 days
of the distribution process being completed or at a later
time if allowed by the
court.748F[749]
- 10.58 We discuss
the orders and steps we envisage may occur in a distribution process below.
Orders on how the award will be distributed
- 10.59 The
court may need to make orders to facilitate the distribution of the aggregate
award to class members. It will need to be
clear who is responsible for
distributing relief to class members, and what steps (if any) class members need
to take to establish
their entitlement. The orders made by a court will depend
on the circumstances of a case and might include:
(a) An order that the defendant must distribute the award directly to class
members. This may be appropriate where the defendant
has class member details,
such as through a share register or a customer database.
(b) An order appointing a person as administrator to distribute the award to
class members. This may be necessary where it is not
possible for the defendant
to make a direct payment or where the class member must take steps to establish
their entitlement. We
consider the court should have discretion as to whether to
appoint an administrator and who should fulfil that role. We think a range
of
people could fulfil the role, such as a barrister, accountant or a corporate
trustee. The appropriate person will depend on the
circumstances of the case.
(c) An order approving a process for class members to establish their
entitlement to a share of the award. For example, the court
might approve a
process which requires class members to provide their sales receipt to establish
their entitlement. Such an order
will not always be necessary, such as when an
aggregate award is based on the defendant’s records, and those records
show the
individual losses.
Orders on how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be
distributed
- 10.60 It
may not always be possible to distribute the entire aggregate award to class
members, such as where some class members cannot
be located or fail to submit a
claim. We think the court should have discretion to make any orders it considers
appropriate with
respect to unclaimed funds.
- 10.61 We think
the discretion should be exercised consistently with the objective of improving
access to justice. This means it may
be appropriate for the court to make
further orders to facilitate payment of these unclaimed funds to the class
members who are entitled
to them. For example, the court could extend the period
for claiming relief or order further notice to be given. In scenarios where
the
unclaimed relief exists because class members could not be located or did not
submit a claim, we think alternative distribution
(discussed below) will
generally be more consistent with access to justice than alternatives such as
pro rata distribution to known
class members. If alternative distribution is
used, non-claiming class members will at least receive an indirect benefit and
class
members who have already claimed will not receive more than they are
entitled to.
Orders on how the costs of distribution are to be met
- 10.62 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should enable the court to make orders as to how
the costs of the distribution are to be
met, such as the costs of appointing an
administrator or producing a distribution outcome report. We consider the court
should have
discretion in this regard, including the ability to order that costs
be paid out of the aggregate award.
Distribution outcome report
- 10.63 In
the Issues Paper, we noted there was limited evidence on the extent to which
class members achieve compensation or other
forms of substantive justice through
participating in a class
action.749F[750] We think it is
desirable for the court and public to have information about the outcome of the
distribution of aggregate monetary
relief to class members. This will improve
transparency and enable the court to develop its expertise regarding the
effectiveness
of distribution procedures. We therefore think the administrator
or the parties (if an administrator has not been appointed) should
be required
to file a distribution outcome report with the court.
- 10.64 We think
it would be desirable for the parties to have guidance on what a distribution
outcome report should contain. We recommend
Te Kōmiti mō ngā
Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on
the requirements
for a distribution outcome report. This rule could require the
report to include the best available information on the following
matters:
(a) The total number of class members, if known, or an estimate of the total
number of class members.
(b) The number of class members who received a payment from the award of
aggregate monetary relief.
(c) The number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for
this.
(d) The cost of administering the distribution of the award of aggregate
monetary relief.
(e) The amount of any unclaimed funds and how this is proposed to be
distributed.
(f) Any amounts paid to a litigation funder.
- 10.65 Some
submitters suggested interim reports could be appropriate. We do not think this
needs to be a requirement as the court
could order this under its general power
to make orders for distribution.
- 10.66 We think
distribution outcome reports should be made available to class members and to
the wider public. We recommend Te Tāhū
o te Ture | Ministry of Justice
should make distribution outcome reports available on a class actions webpage of
ngā Kōti
o Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand website, subject to any
confidentiality orders made by the
court.750F[751] We think there is
a broader public interest in knowing the extent to which class actions fulfil
the goals of improving access to
justice and managing multiple claims in an
efficient way. The number of class members who submit a claim to be paid from an
award
of aggregate relief and the amount they receive will be relevant to that
assessment. If there is a cost sharing order, funding commissions
will be
deducted from the aggregate relief. Transparency around the returns to class
members and litigation funders may help to facilitate
a competitive litigation
funding market.
- 10.67 Unlike a
settlement outcome report (which we discuss in Chapter 11), there are fewer
confidentiality concerns with a distribution
outcome report because the
aggregate monetary relief award will be made public in a judgment. However, if
confidentiality is necessary
(for example, to ensure the privacy of individual
class members), the court could make appropriate confidentiality orders. We
anticipate
this will be rare.
Alternative distribution
- 10.68 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we explained that in some jurisdictions,
monetary relief may be paid to an organisation or
charity associated with the
claim rather than to class members. This is typically done when distributing
compensation to individual
class members is impossible or impracticable. This is
known overseas as cy-près damages, but we prefer the term
“alternative
distribution”.
- 10.69 Alternative
distribution can be useful where it is difficult to identify class members or
where the costs of distribution would
be disproportionate to the small size of
the individual awards. We said alternative distribution could be available for
an entire
award of aggregate monetary relief or could be limited to distributing
unclaimed funds.
- 10.70 We
explained that deterrence is a key rationale for cy-près awards in other
jurisdictions and these awards help to ensure
the defendant pays the full cost
of any harm they have caused. Both Canada and the United States, which allow
full cy-près
damages, have deterrence as an objective of their class
actions regimes. As we have concluded that deterrence should not be an objective
for class actions in Aotearoa New Zealand, we thought alternative distribution
would need to be justified on the basis of improving
access to justice or on
efficiency grounds. We said alternative distribution could be seen as providing
indirect compensation to
class members if there is a close nexus between the
beneficiary of the funds and the class claims.
- 10.71 We
proposed alternative distribution should be available where it is not
practicable or possible for monetary relief to be distributed
to individual
class members. We also said an alternative distribution award should usually be
paid to a charity or organisation whose
activities are related to the class
action and are likely to directly or indirectly benefit class members. Where
that is not possible,
regulations could specify an eligible charity or
organisation, such as a charity or an organisation that is associated with
improving
access to justice.
- 10.72 We asked
submitters whether the court should be able to order alternative distribution of
monetary relief and in what circumstances.
Results of consultation
- 10.73 We
received 14 submissions on alternative
distribution.751F[752]
- 10.74 Eleven
submitters supported the court having some ability to order alternative
distribution.752F[753] Of these,
three submitted it should only be available for unclaimed
damages.753F[754]
- 10.75 Eight
submitters agreed (or generally agreed) with our proposal that alternative
distribution should be permitted only where
it is not practical or possible for
monetary relief to be distributed to individual class
members.754F[755] Reasons given in
support of our proposal were:
(a) Alternative distribution will help to achieve the objective of compensation
in an indirect way.
(b) Alternative distribution should be limited because of our conclusion that
deterrence should not be an objective of class actions
and it is preferable for
class members to be compensated directly, where possible.
(c) It will still operate to deter corporate and government wrongdoing.
(d) Alternative distribution is preferable to the other options for unclaimed
funds, such as reversion to the defendant or pro-rata
distribution amongst class
members.
- 10.76 Chapman
Tripp said alternative distribution should be available, though it expected the
court would use the power
rarely.755F[756] Appropriate
situations could be where individual losses are very low and the administrative
costs would be very high, or where class
members are unlikely to participate in
the distribution process.
- 10.77 Shine
Lawyers submitted alternative distribution should be available when it was
“in the interests of justice to not compensate
class members
directly”. It said alternative distribution would have greater utility
where there is a small amount of unclaimed
damages and the cost of distribution
to individual class members would be greater than the amount of money each class
member would
receive.756F[757]
- 10.78 Two
submitters commented on the recipient of an alternative distribution award.
Nicole Smith supported paying unclaimed damages
to a fund that assists with
access to justice. Professor Vince Morabito (Monash University) said the judge
should approve the recipient,
bearing in mind any indirect benefits to class
members and
deterrence.757F[758]
- 10.79 Three
submitters were opposed to alternative distribution. Johnson & Johnson said
it could not be justified because deterrence
is not an objective of the regime.
Similarly, Simpson Grierson said any unclaimed damages should revert to the
defendant, as damages
are for the purposes of compensation, not general
punishment. Where it is not practical for class members to be identified or
damages
distributed, this may be an indication that the claim is not appropriate
to be brought as a class action. Tom Weston QC was opposed
to alternative
distribution and said such relief is not about access to justice, as it will
only benefit the funder or deter the
defendant.
Recommendations
- R76 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may order alternate distribution of
all or part of an award of aggregate monetary relief
where:
- It is
not practical or possible for all or part of the award to be distributed to
individual class members; or
- The
costs of distributing all or part of the award to individual class members would
be disproportionate to the amount they would
receive.
- R77 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, where the court makes an order for
alternative distribution, it must be paid to:
- An
entity whose activities are related to claims in the class action proceeding and
whose activities are likely to directly or indirectly
benefit some or all class
members; or
- An
entity prescribed by regulations as eligible to receive an alternative
distribution award.
- 10.80 We
consider the objective of improving access to justice will generally be best met
by direct compensation of class members,
as this will help class members to
obtain substantive access to justice. We therefore think it is preferable for an
award of aggregate
monetary relief be distributed to each individual class
member. However, there may be rare cases where individual payments to class
members would be so small that they will be outweighed by the cost of
distribution. There may also be circumstances where there are
some unclaimed
funds after the distribution process has been completed, such as where class
members cannot be located. In these circumstances
we think alternative
distribution should be available. Accordingly, we recommend the Class Actions
Act should specify that the court
may order an award of aggregate monetary
relief, or an unclaimed portion of it, to be paid to an appropriate organisation
in instances
where direct compensation is not practical, is not possible or is
disproportionate to the amount they will
receive.758F[759] This will ensure
that orders for alternative distribution are only made in limited
circumstances.
- 10.81 We also
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify who can receive an award if the
court makes an order for alternative
distribution.759F[760] We think it
is preferable for the award to be paid to a charity or organisation whose
activities are related to the class action
and are likely to directly or
indirectly benefit class members. However, as it will sometimes be difficult to
find a charity or organisation
whose activities align with the class action
claims, we also recommend eligible entities should be able to be prescribed by
regulation.
We envisage it could be an entity that improves access to justice,
which could include the class action fund we recommend in Chapter
18.
- 10.82 As we have
concluded that deterrence should not be an objective for class actions in
Aotearoa New Zealand, we have not relied
on it as a basis for alternative
distribution. Rather, we think alternative distribution can be justified in
limited circumstances
on the basis of improving access to justice and managing
multiple claims in an efficient
way.760F[761] Our conception of
access to justice includes obtaining a substantively fair
result.761F[762] Where there is no
better alternative, we think a substantively fair result can include an indirect
benefit to class members that
has some connection to their claim. For example,
in a successful class action for misleading advertising in relation to a
consumer
product, it may be appropriate to award the money to a consumer
advocacy organisation. The organisation’s activities are related
to the
class action and are likely to indirectly benefit class members.
- 10.83 There is
also a practical benefit to alternative distribution, which aligns with our
objective of managing claims in an efficient
way. It would not be efficient to
spend more on distribution than the claims are worth. While a proceeding is
unlikely to meet the
“appropriate procedure” limb of the
certification test where the cost of distribution would outweigh the likely
relief,
a development in the proceedings may result in the relief being much
smaller than anticipated.
Draft relief provisions
- 10.84 Below
we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect to our
recommendations on aggregate monetary relief and
alternative
distribution.
10 Aggregate assessment and distribution of monetary
relief
(1) A court may make an aggregate assessment of the
monetary relief to which a class is entitled (the aggregate monetary
relief) if it is satisfied that it can make a reasonably accurate assessment
of that amount.
(2) For the purpose of the court’s assessment of the aggregate monetary
relief, it is not necessary for any individual class
member to establish the
amount of loss or damage suffered by them.
(3) The court may make an award in the amount assessed as the aggregate
monetary relief.
(4) The court may also make any orders for the distribution of the award that
it considers appropriate, and these may include an order—
(a) that the defendant must distribute the award directly to class members:
(b) appointing a person as the administrator to distribute the award to class
members:
(c) approving the process for class members to establish their entitlement to a
share of the award:
(d) directing how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be distributed,
including by way of an alternative distribution under
section 11:
(e) directing how the costs of the distribution are to be met.
(5) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an
administrator) must file a report with information about the
process and outcome
of the distribution of the award within 60 days of the distribution process
being completed or at a later time
if allowed by the court.
11 Alternative distribution
(1) This section applies
if—
(a) it is not practical or possible for an award made under section 10 or
any portion of it to be distributed to individual class members; or
(b) the costs of distributing the award made under section 10 or any
portion of it to class members would be disproportionate to the amount they
would receive.
(2) The court may order that the award or any portion of it be paid instead
to an eligible charity or organisation.
(3) In this section, eligible charity or organisation means—
(a) an entity whose activities are related to claims in the class action
proceeding and whose activities are likely to directly or
indirectly benefit
some or all class members; or
(b) an entity prescribed by regulations as an eligible charity or organisation
for the purposes of this section.
APPEALS IN CLASS ACTIONS
- 10.85 In
this section we discuss the circumstances in which the parties and class members
should be able to appeal a judgment in a
class action.
Party appeal rights
- 10.86 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said existing appeal rules should apply in
class actions where possible, as many decisions
will not be materially different
to those in an ordinary
proceeding.762F[763] However, we
thought the court’s decisions on certification and settlement approval
were sufficiently different to require specific
consideration.
- 10.87 Given the
significant implications of a court’s decision on certification, we
suggested the plaintiff and defendant should
be able to appeal this as of right.
We said the parties should also be able to appeal a decision to decline to
approve a settlement
with the leave of the court. We asked submitters whether
they agreed with our conclusions on party appeal rights.
Results of consultation
- 10.88 We
received 12 submissions on party appeal
rights.763F[764]
- 10.89 Nine
submitters agreed both parties should be able to appeal a certification decision
as of right.764F[765] Several
submitters said this was merited given the significance of a certification
decision in a class action
proceeding.765F[766]
- 10.90 In their
joint submission, Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce thought only
the plaintiff should be able to appeal
a certification decision as of right.
They said that denial of certification will often mean the class claims cannot
be litigated.
However, since the defendant can still contest the proceedings on
the merits, certification is nothing like a final judgment and
a right of appeal
might lead to the defendant taking unnecessary appeals.
- 10.91 Seven
submitters agreed the parties should only be able to appeal a decision to
decline settlement approval with leave of the
court.766F[767] Points made by
submitters were:
(a) Since the settlement application is made by both parties, there will be no
party to appeal if the settlement is approved.
(b) Where a court declines approval, the parties will often be able to
renegotiate the settlement to address any matters noted by
the judge.
(c) Appeals should be limited in scope, in the style of judicial review, rather
than a full appeal on the merits.
(d) Unnecessary appeals will be problematic where a settlement occurs
immediately before or during trial.
- 10.92 Three
submitters thought the parties should be able to appeal a decision declining
settlement approval as of
right.767F[768] Reasons
included:
(a) A decision on settlement approval should be treated as any other decision
finally disposing of the proceeding.
(b) The parties should retain this right where there is an error of fact or law,
even though in some circumstances it may be preferable
to renegotiate a
settlement.
(c) Requiring leave would impose an unnecessary administrative burden. The leave
test will be met in nearly all cases because a successful
appeal would bring an
end to the proceedings and would affect both the parties and class members.
- 10.93 More
general comments on appeals made by submitters were as follows:
(a) The regime should impose specific time limits for party appeals and
decisions in such appeals. It should also allow specific
pathways for appeals,
such as ‘leap-frog’ appeals for certification and other key decision
points.768F[769]
(b) There should be an appeal as of right where a competing class action has
been stayed, while another has been
certified.769F[770]
(c) Parties should be able to appeal interlocutory applications as of right, due
to their significance.770F[771]
(d) The funder may have an interest in an
appeal.771F[772]
Recommendation
- R78 The
Class Actions Act should specify that:
- Where
the court decides to grant certification, or to decline certification on the
basis that the certification test is not met, the
parties may appeal the
decision as of right.
- Where
more than one concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for
certification and the court decides that more than one will
be certified, the
defendant may appeal this decision with the leave of the court.
- Where
more than one concurrent class action proceeding meets the test for
certification and the court decides that one or more of
those proceedings will
not be certified, an unsuccessful applicant may appeal this decision with the
leave of the court.
- The
parties may appeal a decision declining to approve a settlement with the leave
of the court.
- 10.94 Most
decisions in a class action proceeding will not be materially different to those
in an ordinary proceeding. With the exception
of the court’s decisions on
certification, concurrent class actions and settlement approval, we think the
appeal rules in the
Senior Courts Act 2016 should apply. This means that leave
will not be required to appeal a decision on the common or individual
issues or
a decision that a proceeding will be struck out or dismissed or that summary
judgment will be granted.772F[773]
An appeal against any other interlocutory decision will require
leave.773F[774] We think specific
appeal provisions are necessary with respect to certification, concurrent class
actions and settlement approval
as these stages are different to ordinary
litigation.
- 10.95 Where the
court makes a decision to grant certification or to decline to grant
certification, on the basis that the certification
test is met or not met, we
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the parties may appeal the
court’s decision
as of right. The implications of certification will be
significant. While the court’s decision that the certification test
is not
met and certification should be declined does not extinguish the claims, in
practice the representative plaintiff and class
members may be unable to proceed
further with their claims. If certification is approved, the defendant will
likely face a large
and complex claim.
- 10.96 Where
there is more than one concurrent class action proceeding which meets the
certification test, the court must determine
which class action proceedings will
be certified.774F[775] In doing
so, the court must consider which approach will allow the claims of class
members to be resolved in a just and efficient
way. We think the standard
approach to appeals of interlocutory applications should apply to this decision,
so leave should be required
to appeal a court’s decision on whether more
than one concurrent class action will be certified. We think the implications
of
a court’s decision as to which concurrent class action proceeding will be
certified are less significant, as class members
will still have the opportunity
to participate in a class
action.775F[776]
- 10.97 If the
court decides that more than one concurrent class action will be certified, the
defendant should be able to appeal this
decision with the leave of the court.
Where the court decides that a concurrent class action will not be certified
(although it meets
the certification test), the unsuccessful plaintiff should be
able to appeal this decision with the leave of the court. For clarity,
we
recommend this is specified in the Class Actions Act. We think the court’s
decision as to which concurrent class actions
will be certified (where more than
one meets the certification test) is an exercise of discretion. We therefore
envisage if leave
is granted, an appeal would only be successful if there is an
error of law or principle, the court took into account irrelevant considerations
or failed to take into account relevant considerations, or the decision was
plainly wrong.776F[777]
- 10.98 Where a
court decides an application for certification of a concurrent class action will
not be certified, our draft provision
provides the application for certification
must be dismissed. This consequential dismissal of an application for
certification should
not trigger any appeal rights.
- 10.99 We also
recommend the Class Actions Act should allow the parties to appeal the
court’s decision declining to approve a
settlement with leave of the High
Court. If the court declines to approve a settlement, this will have a
significant impact for the
parties as it will mean the litigation must continue.
However, we do not think this appeal should be available as of right. We think
settlement is likely to be more fact-specific than certification. As well, the
parties will still have the option of renegotiating
the settlement rather than
appealing the judgment. However, if there is an appealable error of law or fact
in the decision, we think
a party should be able to seek leave to appeal and not
feel compelled to renegotiate the settlement.
Class member appeal rights
- 10.100 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we explained that as class members are not
parties to the proceedings, it is not clear whether
they would be entitled under
general law to appeal
decisions.777F[778] We therefore
suggested any class member appeal rights should be provided in statute.
- 10.101 We
proposed that class members should be able to appeal the substantive judgment on
the common issues if the representative
plaintiff does not appeal or abandons an
appeal. We said such an appeal should be with leave and the class member should
have to
apply to the court to act as the representative plaintiff for the
purposes of the appeal.
- 10.102 We did
not think a class member should be able to appeal a decision on certification or
settlement approval given the delay
this would cause especially for those
wanting to proceed with implementation of an approved settlement. We
acknowledged it was very
unlikely the representative plaintiff or defendant
would appeal, given they had proposed the settlement to the court. However, we
thought the interests of class members would be sufficiently safeguarded by
their right to object to the settlement or opt out of
it, and by the fact that a
settlement would only be approved when it is “fair, reasonable and in the
interests of the class
as a whole”.
- 10.103 We asked
submitters whether they agreed that class members should be able to appeal a
substantive judgment on the common issues
with leave, and whether class members
should be able to appeal any other decisions.
Results of consultation
- 10.104 We
received 12 submissions on class member appeal
rights.778F[779]
- 10.105 Eleven
submitters addressed class member rights to appeal against the judgment on
common issues.779F[780] Nearly all
submitters agreed that class members should be able to appeal a substantive
judgment on common issues with
leave.780F[781] Reasons for this
were:
(a) A class member who no longer has any opportunity to opt out of the
litigation should have the opportunity to seek leave to appeal.
(b) The leave requirement ensures class members have an avenue for appeal if the
representative plaintiff does not bring one, but
also ensures appeals are only
taken for a legitimate reason.
(c) The requirements to seek leave and act as the representative plaintiff will
protect the parties and class members from the risk
of diverging or conflicting
interests between the (new) representative plaintiff and other class members.
(d) The leave requirement is appropriate since class members are not parties to
the proceeding.
- 10.106 Some
submitters raised practical matters. Shine Lawyers commented that in practice
class members would rarely exercise this
appeal right. Tom Weston QC noted it is
not clear what timeframe will apply to class members if they want to appeal the
judgment
on common issues and said the standard 20 working days is unlikely to
be sufficient.
- 10.107 Nicole
Smith said if the representative plaintiff does not appeal, a class member
wanting to appeal should be required to go
through an alternative dispute
resolution process with the representative plaintiff and the funder.
- 10.108 Several
submitters addressed whether the court’s decision on settlement approval
should be appealable by class members.
Omni Bridgeway said class members should
be able to appeal this decision as an alternative to opting out of the
settlement. Chapman
Tripp also supported an appeal as an alternative to opting
out of settlement but said the appeal should require leave and be limited
to the
grounds of appeal against a discretion. It said class members should only be
able to appeal if they objected to the settlement
and the appealing class member
should replace the representative plaintiff for the purposes of the appeal.
Vince Morabito supported
a class member right of appeal against the
court’s decision on settlement approval because such appeal rights play an
important
role in securing just settlements for class members. The Insurance
Council said class members should not be able to appeal against
the
court’s decision on settlement approval.
- 10.109 Bell
Gully did not support class members having any appeal rights. It said only the
representative plaintiff should be able
to appeal, as the court has determined
they are suitable to represent the class. If class members disagree with this
approach, they
should opt out of the class action. Allowing individual class
members to appeal would undermine the efficiencies of a class actions
regime.
- 10.110 Finally,
several submitters said they did not think any other decisions in a class action
require a class member appeal
right.781F[782] Reasons for this
were:
(a) Appeal rights would undermine the efficiency achieved by allowing a
representative plaintiff to bring a proceeding on behalf
of the class.
(b) The court’s involvement in certification and settlement is sufficient
to safeguard class member interests.
(c) Alternative options (such as opting out or seeking to be substituted as the
representative plaintiff) are a more suitable method
of protecting class
members.
Recommendations
- R79 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if the representative plaintiff does not
bring an appeal against the judgment on common
issues or gives notice they
intend to abandon an appeal against the judgment on common issues:
- A
class member can apply to replace the representative plaintiff for the purpose
of appealing this judgment. The application to replace
the representative
plaintiff must be made within 20 working days from the date on which notice of
the judgment on the common issues
or notice of the intention to abandon an
appeal against the common issues judgment is given.
- If
the court grants the class member’s application to replace the
representative plaintiff, the class member will have 20 working
days from the
date of the court’s decision to file a notice of appeal or any amended
notice of appeal against the judgment
on common
issues.
- R80 The
Class Actions Act should specify that class members have a right of appeal
against any individual determination that relates to
them.
Appeal rights against judgment on common issues
- 10.111 While
we recommend that class members are bound by the common issues judgment, it is
the representative plaintiff who is responsible
for making decisions about the
conduct of the class action and giving instructions. When a representative
plaintiff is deciding whether
to appeal a judgment on the common issues, they
will need to balance various considerations including the likely prospects of
success,
the risk of a cross-appeal by the defendant (where the claim was
successful in some respects), the cost of the appeal and the prospect
of adverse
costs. When considering these matters, the representative plaintiff will need to
act in what they believe to be the best
interests of the class. While an
individual class member may disagree with the representative plaintiff’s
decision not to appeal,
this does not mean the decision was wrong or that the
interests of the class have not been considered. If a class member can bring
an
appeal, this could also have significant consequences for other class members.
For example, the defendant may be prepared to agree
to a settlement in return
for an appeal not being pursued.
- 10.112 For these
reasons, we no longer think that class members should be able to appeal against
the judgment on common issues. However,
we also recognise the importance of this
judgment to class members. Accordingly, we recommend that, if the representative
plaintiff
does not appeal or abandons an appeal against the common issues
judgment, the Class Actions Act should specify a class member may
apply to
replace the representative plaintiff for the purpose of appealing. In doing so,
the class member will need to establish
that, in failing to bring or abandoning
the appeal, the representative plaintiff has failed to fairly and adequately
represent the
class. Where a representative plaintiff does not appeal, we
recommend a class member has 20 working days from the date on which notice
of
the judgment on the common issues is given to file any application to replace
the representative plaintiff for the purposes of
appealing. In Chapter 8 we
recommend that notice of the common issues judgment should be sent to class
members after the expiry of
the appeal period so it can include information on
any appeals. We think it is important this notice goes out promptly after the
appeal period ends, given it starts the timeframe for filing an application to
replace the representative plaintiff. We anticipate
the representative plaintiff
will notify the court and the defendant when notice has been given.
- 10.113 As this
application to replace the representative plaintiff will be filed after the
expiry of the appeal period, we think it
is necessary to provide a further
appeal right if the class member’s application is successful. We recommend
that, if the court
approves the class member’s application to replace the
representative plaintiff, the class member should then have 20 working
days to
lodge the appeal (as the representative plaintiff) in Te Kōti Pira | Court
of Appeal.
- 10.114 Where a
representative plaintiff wishes to abandon an appeal, we recommend any
application to replace the representative plaintiff
must be filed within 20
working days from the date on which notice of the intention to abandon the
appeal against the common issues
judgment is given. In Chapter 8, we recommend
that, if a representative plaintiff intends to abandon an appeal against the
common
issues judgment, notice should be given to class members. We anticipate
the representative plaintiff would also file a memorandum
in the Court of Appeal
explaining a notice of intention to abandon the appeal has been sent and, if no
application to replace the
representative plaintiff is filed or approved, a
notice of abandonment will be filed in due course.
- 10.115 In this
situation, if the application to replace the representative plaintiff is
successful, an appeal against the judgment
on common issues will still be
active. We recommend that, if the High Court approves the class member’s
application to replace
the representative plaintiff, the class member should
then have 20 working days to file any amended notice of appeal in the Court
of
Appeal.
- 10.116 We think
the ability to replace the representative plaintiff for the purposes of an
appeal should be limited to the judgment
on common issues. Many decisions such
as matters of procedure will not substantially affect class member interests.
For more substantive
decisions such as certification and settlement, there are
other steps class members can take to protect their interests. For example,
if
certification is declined because the representative plaintiff is unsuitable, it
may be more appropriate to recommence the class
action with a different
representative plaintiff. Similarly, if a class member disagrees with a
successful certification decision,
they could simply opt out of the proceeding
(or decide not to opt in). In settlement, class member interests are protected
by their
ability to object and the requirement for a court to consider whether a
settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the
class. We also think
it is desirable to avoid the delay an application to replace the representative
plaintiff would cause for the
parties wanting to proceed with implementation of
an approved settlement.
Appeal rights against individual issues
- 10.117 In
Chapter 8 we recommend the court should have the power to determine individual
issues. We think a class member should be
able to appeal a decision or judgment
that directly considers any individual issue that relates to them. Accordingly,
we recommend
the Class Actions Act should specify that class members have a
right of appeal against a determination of any individual issue that
relates to
them. This should not require leave of the court.
CHAPTER 11
Settlement of a class action
INTRODUCTION
- 11.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Requiring court approval of settlements in class actions.
(b) The process for court approval of a settlement.
(c) The test for approving a settlement.
(d) Finalising the class for settlement.
(e) Settlement administration and implementation.
(f) Settlements of individual claims.
(g) Discontinuance of a class action.
- 11.2 At the end
of this chapter, we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect
to our recommendations on settlement.
COURT APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENTS IN CLASS ACTIONS
- 11.3 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we explained that a key feature of overseas
class actions regimes is a requirement for court
approval of
settlements.782F[783] We observed
that settlement is a stage where class member interests require particular
protection. One reason is the “adversarial
void” that exists because
both the plaintiff and defendant are advocating for approval of the settlement.
Another reason is
the risk of conflicts of interest arising at settlement
because both the representative plaintiff and funder could financially benefit
from the litigation, potentially at the expense of class members.
- 11.4 We said
court approval of a settlement is particularly important in opt-out class
actions because of the risk that some class
members will be unaware of the class
action or the proposed settlement. However, there are good reasons for requiring
judicial approval
in opt-in class actions as well. The court still has an
important supervisory role to ensure the interests of class members are
protected.
Class members do not have the status of parties and may have little
contact with the lawyer for the class and no role in settlement
negotiations.
The adversarial void and risks of conflicts of interest at settlement are still
present. For these reasons, we thought
judicial approval of settlement should be
required in both opt-in and opt-out class actions.
- 11.5 We asked
submitters whether the court should be required to approve class action
settlements in both opt-in and opt-out proceedings.
Results of consultation
- 11.6 We
received 15 submissions on this
issue.783F[784]
- 11.7 Thirteen
submitters agreed the court should approve class action settlements in both
opt-in and opt-out cases.784F[785]
Reasons for this included:
(a) It is part of the court exercising its supervisory jurisdiction to protect
the interests of class members.
(b) There can be a significant divergence in interests at settlement, which can
be difficult for defendants and potentially prejudicial
for class members.
(c) Once a settlement is reached, the interests of the representative plaintiff
and defendant are usually aligned.
(d) In both opt-in and opt-out cases there is a power imbalance between a
litigation funder and class members, and a risk of their
interests
conflicting.
(e) It will assist lawyers, who may otherwise be facing conflicting duties due
to class members having differing claims or expectations.
(f) Settlement approval is an important procedural safeguard to maintain public
confidence in the integrity of the class actions
regime.
(g) It will result in fairer outcomes in terms of the share of the proceeds that
go to class members and a litigation funder respectively.
(h) The court could place emphasis on different matters depending on whether the
case is opt-in or opt-out.
- 11.8 Gilbert
Walker considered court approval of settlement is unnecessary in opt-in cases.
If the court is to have a role in these
cases, it should be limited to
protecting against a settlement that amounts to an abuse of the court’s
process.
- 11.9 Some
consultation workshop participants thought court approval should be required for
all class action settlements. They suggested
court approval will avoid the
difficulty of getting class members to agree to a settlement and protect the
lawyer if there are conflicts
between class members. Others thought court
approval of settlement may be unnecessary in opt-in cases and that an
alternative would
be class members agreeing to the settlement by majority vote.
Participants also told us settlement approval could involve significant
time and
cost.785F[786]
Recommendation
- R81 The
Class Actions Act should require court approval in order for the settlement of a
class action proceeding to be binding. This should
apply whether the class
action is opt-in or opt-out and whether the settlement is reached before or
after certification.
- 11.10 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should require court approval for the settlement
of a class action to be binding, in both
opt-in and opt-out class
actions.786F[787] This is an
important part of the court’s supervisory role to protect the interests of
class members, who are unlikely to be
involved in negotiating the settlement but
will be bound by its terms and conditions, including terms that extinguish some
or all
of their claims.
- 11.11 Class
member interests will not necessarily be aligned with those of other
participants at settlement because:
(a) The litigation funder is likely to benefit from settlement, because they
will get a proportion of the settlement amount and will
not have to pay any
further litigation costs.
(b) The lawyer may have a conditional fee agreement, where they can receive a
premium (in additional to their normal fee) if the
matter is successfully
resolved through a settlement.
(c) The defendant will have an interest in resolving the litigation at the
lowest cost possible.
(d) The representative plaintiff has an interest in settling their individual
claim, finishing their role and removing their liability
for adverse costs.
(e) The prospects of individual class member claims may differ, in which case
there is greater litigation risk for some class members
than others.
- 11.12 We
consider court approval of settlement should be required in both opt-in and
opt-out class actions because the risk of divergent
interests and a conflict of
interest at settlement is present in both. In opt‑out class actions, there
is the additional risk
that a class member did not receive notice of the class
action and is unaware of the proceeding or the settlement.
- 11.13 We
consider the requirement for the court to approve a settlement should also apply
to settlements reached before certification.
Such a settlement will still
involve binding persons who are not parties to the proceeding, and we think the
court needs to consider
the interests of those persons. Later in this chapter,
we discuss certification for the purposes of settlement in such cases.
- 11.14 Later in
this chapter, we recommend court approval should be required where there is a
realistic prospect that settlement of
individual claims will effectively dispose
of the class action.
- 11.15 The
process we recommend for settlement approval will take some time as it will
require notice to class members, an opportunity
for class members to lodge
objections to a settlement and, in some cases, a settlement approval hearing. We
acknowledge such a process
could be problematic if a settlement was reached
during a hearing, as it could require a lengthy adjournment. It may be desirable
to hold a judicial settlement conference prior to hearing to mitigate this risk.
PROCESS FOR COURT APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT
- 11.16 In
this section, we discuss the following procedural issues:
(a) Making an application for approval of a settlement.
(b) Giving notice to class members about the settlement.
(c) Class members’ ability to object to a proposed settlement.
(d) Other participants in the settlement approval process.
Application for approval of a settlement
- 11.17 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed an application for approval of a
class action settlement would be filed jointly
by the representative plaintiff
and defendant.787F[788] We
envisaged the court would normally hold a hearing to decide whether to approve
the settlement, although we did not rule out the
possibility of the application
being determined on the papers in some cases.
- 11.18 We said
guidance could be provided on the contents of an application to ensure the court
has enough information to assess the
proposed
settlement.788F[789] We suggested
that, at minimum, information should be provided about:
(a) The terms of the proposed settlement.
(b) Any legal fees or litigation funding commission that would be deducted from
the relief paid to class members.
(c) How the settlement meets the test for court approval of a class action
settlement.
(d) The intended method of notifying class members of the proposed settlement.
(e) The likely cost and duration of the class action if the litigation
continues.
(f) Any risks associated with continuing the litigation.
(g) The potential relief that could be awarded if the case is successful.
(h) The proposed method of settlement distribution and administration, including
any proposal for unclaimed monetary relief.
- 11.19 We
anticipated the supporting information would primarily be provided by the
representative plaintiff and could include an affidavit
by their lawyer and any
independent advice received on the settlement. We said it should be possible for
each party to provide information
to the court on a confidential basis where
appropriate, particularly where it relates to the prospects of the
litigation.
- 11.20 We asked
submitters whether they agreed with our proposed list of information that should
be provided in support of an application
to approve a class action
settlement.
Results of consultation
- 11.21 We
received nine submissions on this question, with submitters largely agreeing
with our proposed list of
information.789F[790]
- 11.22 Chapman
Tripp suggested the overarching consideration should be whether the information
will assist the court in determining
whether the approval test is met, and the
specific information we listed could be sub-sets of that. Bell Gully and Maurice
Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia thought the list should not be too
prescriptive, to allow sufficient flexibility.
- 11.23 Several
submitters highlighted the importance of being able to provide information on a
confidential basis.790F[791]
Chapman Tripp said confidentiality may be particularly important where there is
a prospect of a competing class action or other litigation
against the
defendant. Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand
said the parties need to be able to provide
separate confidential information on
the likely cost and duration of the class action if the litigation continued and
the potential
relief that could be awarded if the case was successful. Simpson
Grierson said any information provided to the court as part of the
application
for settlement approval (as well as the terms of settlement recorded in any
final judgment) should remain confidential
and marked accordingly on the court
file.
- 11.24 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said it would be inappropriate for the
application to be made jointly, as this would
give the defendant an
inappropriate and disproportionate degree of input. Rather, the application
should be made by the representative
plaintiff and the orders sought by consent.
The Insurance Council said it should be clear the primary responsibility for
preparing
the application rests with the representative plaintiff and noted the
parties may not be able to reach agreement on each of the factors
an application
needs to cover.
- 11.25 Chapman
Tripp suggested the settlement approval process should be undertaken by a
judicial officer who is not the trial judge,
as it may be inappropriate for the
trial judge to see evidence on the risks, costs and benefits of proceeding with
the litigation.
Recommendations
- R82 The
Class Actions Act should specify that any application for approval of a class
action settlement must be made by the representative
plaintiff or the proposed
representative plaintiff.
- R83 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule on what should be included
in an affidavit in
support of an application for the approval of a class action settlement. The
rule should refer to the type of
information that may assist the court to assess
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class. This
could include:
- The
terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
- The
type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of any
monetary relief.
- How
the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members.
- If
the settlement proposes to treat class members differently, the reasons for
this.
- The
proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.
- Any
steps a class member will need to take to benefit from a settlement.
- The
proposed method of settlement distribution and administration, including a
proposal for dealing with any unclaimed monetary relief.
- Any
legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from the
relief paid to class members.
- The
likely cost and duration of the class action if the litigation continues.
- Any
risks associated with continuing the litigation.
- The
potential relief that could be awarded if the case is successful.
- Whether
any steps have been taken to manage potential conflicts of
interest.
- 11.26 While we
had originally proposed there would be a joint application for approval of a
settlement by the representative plaintiff
and defendant, on reflection we think
the application should be made by the representative
plaintiff.791F[792] The
application will need to indicate the basis upon which the settlement approval
test is met, and we think the representative plaintiff
is better placed to do
this. It is not the defendant’s role to show that a settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the interests
of the class. The need for some evidence to
remain confidential from the defendant may also make it inappropriate to have a
joint
application.
- 11.27 We
envisage the document filed by the representative plaintiff would be a standard
interlocutory
application.792F[793] The
application should be supported by affidavit evidence to allow the court to
assess whether the test for settlement approval is
met. We anticipate this
evidence would primarily be given by the representative plaintiff. To address
matters such as the potential
risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the
litigation, their affidavit could provide a copy of legal advice they have
obtained
on the settlement from the lawyer for the class or from an independent
lawyer. This occurs in some other
jurisdictions.793F[794]
Confidentiality orders could be sought with respect to particular affidavit
evidence, if appropriate, such as where it contains the
advice of legal counsel
or evidence on the risks of continuing with the litigation. If evidence on
assessment of litigation risks
is disclosed to the defendant, it might
jeopardise the settlement or give the defendant a strategic advantage if the
settlement is
not approved and the case proceeds to hearing.
- 11.28 We think
it would assist the representative plaintiff to have guidance on the matters to
include in an affidavit in support
of an application for settlement approval. We
recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee consider
developing
a High Court Rule on what should be included in the affidavit.
- 11.29 We
consider the representative plaintiff should provide sufficient information in
support of an application for settlement approval
to allow the court to consider
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class.
While we do not favour
a mandatory list of information, we envisage the
supporting evidence would generally include:
(a) The terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
(i) The type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of
any monetary relief.
(ii) How the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class
members.
(iii) Whether the settlement proposes to treat class members differently and the
reasons for this.
(iv) The proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.
(v) Any steps a class member will need to take to benefit from a settlement.
(b) The proposed method of settlement distribution and administration, including
a proposal for dealing with any unclaimed monetary
relief.
(c) Any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from
the relief paid to class members.
(d) The likely cost and duration of the class action if the litigation
continues.
(e) Any risks associated with continuing the litigation.
(f) The potential relief that could be awarded if the case is successful.
(g) Whether any steps have been taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
- 11.30 We have
not included the intended method of notifying class members of the proposed
settlement in this list. Rather, this could
be addressed in an application for
court approval of a notice of proposed settlement to class members, which we
anticipate would
be filed along with the application for settlement approval.
- 11.31 The
defendant would be named as a respondent to the application for settlement
approval. We anticipate the defendant would file
a notice in support of the
application and, in some cases, a supporting affidavit. For example, the
defendant might provide its estimate
of the likely cost and duration of the
class action if it continued, its assessment of any risks associated with
continuing with
the litigation, or information on how the settlement would be
distributed to class members (if the defendant would be involved in
that).
Confidentiality orders may also be appropriate with respect to aspects of this
evidence.
Notice to class members about the settlement
- 11.32 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said class members should be given notice of
a proposed settlement. As class members’
legal rights would be affected by
the settlement, they should have an opportunity to consider the proposed terms
of the settlement
and express any objection or support for the
proposal.794F[795]
- 11.33 We
suggested that, at minimum, this notice should
include:795F[796]
(a) A statement that class members have legal rights that may be affected by the
proposed settlement.
(b) A brief description of the class action, including the legal basis for the
claims, the remedies sought and the current stage
of the litigation.
(c) The class description.
(d) A summary of the terms of the proposed settlement, including information
that will allow class members to estimate their individual
entitlement.
(e) Information about any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will
be deducted from payments to class members if the
settlement is approved.
(f) An explanation of the settlement approval process, including the time and
location of any hearing to consider the settlement.
(g) How a class member may express their opposition to, or support for, the
settlement.
(h) Information that if the settlement is approved, the court will set a date by
which class members can opt out of the settlement.
(i) How a class member may obtain further information about the settlement,
including contact details for the representative plaintiff’s
lawyer or any
counsel to assist that has been appointed.
- 11.34 Because we
proposed class members should have the right to opt out of a settlement once it
had been approved, we thought class
members should also be given notice of an
approved settlement.796F[797] We
suggested the notice could contain the following
information:797F[798]
(a) The court’s approval of a settlement that may affect their legal
rights.
(b) How to obtain further information about the settlement, including the
court’s judgment approving the settlement.
(c) How a class member may opt out of the settlement, and the deadline for doing
so.
(d) The consequences of failing to opt out of the settlement.
(e) Any steps a class member must take to submit a claim.
(f) Who has been appointed as the settlement administrator (if any) and how to
contact them.
- 11.35 We asked
submitters whether there should be a requirement to give class members notice of
a proposed or approved class action
settlement. We also asked whether
submitters agreed with the information we proposed should be contained in these
notices.
Results of consultation
When notice should be required
- 11.36 We
received 14 submissions on whether notice should be required when a class action
settlement is proposed and when it is
approved.798F[799]
- 11.37 Thirteen
submitters thought class members should be given notice of a proposed class
action settlement.799F[800]
Reasons for this included:
(a) Class members should have an opportunity to object to or support the
settlement.
(b) Class members should have the opportunity to seek independent advice.
(c) The degree of class member support is relevant to the court’s
consideration of whether to approve a settlement. Giving
notice will ensure any
feedback is generally representative of the class as a whole.
(d) The notice conveys critical information about class member claims and
rights. In an opt-out class action, it is possible that
some class members would
not be previously aware of this information.
- 11.38 Eleven
submitters thought class members should also be given notice of an approved
class action settlement.800F[801]
Several submitters thought this was necessary if there was a right to opt out of
the settlement.801F[802]
- 11.39 Shine
Lawyers did not think notice of an approved settlement should be required. It
said requiring two settlement notices would
add unnecessary cost and delay and
may lead to confusion. Instead, it proposed all the required information could
be provided in
a single notice of proposed settlement. If a settlement was
approved, it was in class members’ interests for settlement administration
to begin immediately, rather than being delayed by another notice. Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia thought there would
be circumstances where
notice of an approved settlement would not be necessary, or the cost would be
unduly burdensome and so favoured
judicial discretion with respect to this.
- 11.40 Gilbert
Walker said it could be cumbersome and expensive to give class members two
settlement notices, unless it could be done
through a website or other
electronic means. It said many defendants would find it highly undesirable to
give public notice of a
settlement that has not been approved.
- 11.41 Chapman
Tripp thought there should be flexibility to apply to the court for an order
that notice is not required. For example,
it may be onerous to bring the
settlement to the attention of every potential class member.
Contents of settlement notices
- 11.42 We
received nine submissions on the contents of a notice of proposed or approved
settlement.802F[803] Submitters
largely agreed with our proposed list of information to be included in notices,
but some suggested amendments.
- 11.43 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers thought the notice of
proposed settlement should not need to include
information that would allow
class members to estimate their individual entitlement. This information would
depend on individual
circumstances and could be difficult for the
plaintiff’s lawyer to provide, and an estimate could be misleading.
Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia suggested the notice could provide
information on how individual entitlements would be assessed. However, Shine
Lawyers thought even a general formula describing what might go into calculating
a settlement could mislead class members into significantly
overestimating or
underestimating their likely compensation.
- 11.44 Simpson
Grierson suggested the legal fees and litigation funding commission should be
expressed as a percentage and not just
an absolute amount, so class members
could understand their estimated net individual entitlement.
- 11.45 Some
submitters disagreed with referring to class members’ right to opt out of
a settlement in the notices. As we discuss
later in this chapter, many
submitters thought class members should not have the right to opt out of a
settlement.
- 11.46 Bell Gully
and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia thought the list should provide
guidance so the court would have sufficient
flexibility with respect to
notices.
Recommendation
- R84 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on the contents of
a notice of proposed settlement. It could require
the notice to contain:
- A
statement that class members have legal rights that may be affected by the
proposed settlement.
- A
brief description of the class action, including the legal basis for the claims,
the remedies sought and the current stage of the
litigation.
- The
class description.
- A
summary of the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including
information about how individual entitlements will be
determined.
- Information
about any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from
payments to class members if the settlement
is approved.
- An
explanation of the settlement approval process, including the time and location
of any hearing to consider the settlement.
- How a
class member may express their opposition to the settlement and the deadline for
doing so.
- How a
class member may obtain further information about the settlement, including
contact details for the lawyer for the class or
any counsel to assist that has
been appointed.
When a settlement notice should be required
- 11.47 In
Chapter 8, we make recommendations on the events that should trigger notice and
say this should include a proposed or approved
settlement. We also recommended
the court should have a discretion to order that notice is not required if it
considers this is not
necessary to protect the interests of class members. In
this section, we explain the circumstances in which we consider a notice
of
proposed or approved settlement would be required.
- 11.48 We think
it will usually be necessary to give class members notice of a proposed
settlement, because a settlement of the proceedings
will usually bring the
litigation to an end, extinguish class member claims and prevent class members
from bringing another proceeding
on the issue. Later in this chapter, we
recommend class members should be able to file an objection to the settlement
and any views
of class members should be a factor the court must consider when
deciding whether to approve the settlement. A class member needs
to be aware of
the proposed settlement to take up the opportunity to convey their views on it.
There may be occasional situations
where notice is not required, such as where
the court has declined a settlement because of one specific term and the parties
have
filed a new application for settlement approval that addresses that term.
In such situations, the court could exercise its discretion
to order that notice
is not required.
- 11.49 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we suggested notice of an approved settlement is
required so class members are aware of their
right to opt out of a settlement.
As we discuss later in this chapter, we no longer consider that class members
should have a general
right to opt out of a settlement. This removes a key
rationale for the notice of approved settlement. In cases where the defendant
will pay the settlement amount directly to class members, it is unlikely to be
necessary to provide class members with notice of
an approved settlement.
Requiring notice in such a case would cause additional expense and delay
settlement administration.
- 11.50 However,
we think notice of settlement approval will still be required in some cases. One
situation is where the parties have
agreed to provide class members with the
ability to opt out of a settlement. Another is where the court has made an order
that specific
individuals must be given the right to opt out. Notice may also be
required where a class member must take certain steps by a particular
date to
receive a benefit from the settlement. We therefore favour leaving it to the
court to determine whether notice of an approved
settlement is required in a
particular case.
Contents of settlement notices
- 11.51 As
we discussed in Chapter 8, it is important that notices to class members use
clear language and are designed to effectively
communicate with the relevant
audience.
- 11.52 We think
it is desirable to provide guidance on the contents of a notice of proposed
settlement. In our view, the notice should
usually include:
(a) A statement that class members have legal rights that may be affected by the
proposed settlement.
(b) A brief description of the class action, including the legal basis for the
claims, the remedies sought and the current stage
of the litigation.
(c) The class description.
(d) A summary of the terms of the proposed settlement, including information
about how individual entitlements will be assessed (we
agree with submitters
that it may be difficult to accurately provide information that will allow class
members to estimate their
individual entitlement).
(e) Information on any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be
deducted from payments to class members if the settlement
is approved.
(f) An explanation of the settlement approval process, including the time and
location of any hearing to consider the settlement.
(g) How a class member may express their opposition to the settlement and the
deadline for doing so.
(h) How a class member may obtain further information about the settlement,
including contact details for the lawyer for the class
or any counsel to assist
that has been appointed.
- 11.53 Ultimately
it should be up to the court to approve the contents of the notice, so we do not
think this content should be mandatory.
We recommend the Rules Committee
consider developing a High Court Rule on the contents of a notice of proposed
settlement and could
develop a sample notice to be included in a schedule to the
Rules.
- 11.54 Because we
think a notice of approved settlement will not always be required, it is less
important to develop guidance on the
contents of this notice. It will ultimately
depend on the reason why the notice is necessary, and what information has
already been
provided in the notice of proposed settlement. Where appropriate, a
notice of approved settlement might include information on:
(a) The court’s approval of a settlement and how it may affect class
members’ legal rights.
(b) How to obtain further information about the settlement, including the
court’s judgment approving the settlement.
(c) How a class member may opt out of a settlement and the deadline for doing so
(where the parties have agreed to provide an ability
to opt out of the
settlement or the court has ordered specific class members should have a right
to opt out).
(d) Any steps a class member must take to submit a claim and the deadline for
doing so.
(e) Who has been appointed as the settlement administrator (if any) and how to
contact them.
Class member objections to a proposed settlement
- 11.55 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said it is important to give class members an
opportunity to express any opposition to
the settlement, given they will be
bound by its terms if the settlement is
approved.803F[804] The court may
otherwise be unaware of those concerns given that both the representative
plaintiff and defendant will be supporting
the settlement.
- 11.56 We
proposed the court must set a date for any objections to the settlement to be
lodged by class members. We envisaged objections
would be made in writing and
filed with the court. In appropriate cases, the court could grant leave for a
class member to appear
at the settlement approval hearing.
- 11.57 We asked
submitters whether class members should be given an opportunity to object to a
proposed settlement.
Results of consultation
- 11.58 We
received 12 submissions on this
question.804F[805]
- 11.59 Ten
submitters thought class members should have an opportunity to object to a
settlement.805F[806] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia noted this will enable class members to
express genuine, well-founded concerns about the
proposed settlement. In
addition, the absence of objections will be a highly relevant consideration in
support of a settlement.
- 11.60 Some
submitters made suggestions on the process for objections:
(a) There should be a very short timeframe for lodging objections. It is
particularly important to have an efficient process when
a settlement is reached
mid-trial.806F[807]
(b) Class members could be given guidance on how and where to file an objection,
such as in a Practice
Note.807F[808]
(c) The objection should be filed with the court registry at the class
member’s own effort and expense. This will help protect
against
unmeritorious
objections.808F[809]
(d) Objections should be in writing, with leave required to appear at the
settlement approval
hearing.809F[810]
(e) There could be a standard form that is filed with the court and served on
the parties.810F[811]
(f) Objecting class members should have to particularise and evidence their
objections to the normal
standard.811F[812]
(g) Class members should be able to attend the hearing and raise objections
directly with the court. They may find the experience
cathartic and it may allow
any misunderstandings to be
clarified.812F[813]
(h) If objecting class members have legal assistance this can ensure objections
are well prepared and well founded. Class members
could be given information on
how to access legal assistance (such as through a free legal
clinic).813F[814]
(i) The objecting class member’s intention is a relevant consideration and
should inform the weight the court gives to any
objection.814F[815]
(j) Objections should occur through an alternative dispute resolution
process.815F[816]
- 11.61 Bell Gully
did not support class members having an opportunity to object to a settlement.
It said the court should conduct a
broad assessment rather than considering
individual issues raised by class members. When a class member elects to opt
into the class
action or fails to opt out, this includes accepting any
settlement reached on their behalf. Allowing class member objections would
undermine the reasons for the court certifying the class action in the first
place and would create additional delay and cost. It
would also create
uncertainty for a defendant, who will have fairly approached settlement
negotiations on the basis that the representative
plaintiff speaks for the
class.
Recommendations
- R85 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on the process for
class members to object to a proposed settlement.
This rule could:
- Require
a class member who wishes to object to file a written objection with the court
by the date specified in the notice of proposed
settlement.
- Require
a class member to obtain the leave of the court in order to appear at the
settlement approval hearing.
- R86 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should consider developing a
template form for class member objections that could
be provided on the class
actions webpage of ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand
website.
- 11.62 We
consider class members should have an opportunity to object to a settlement,
given that it affects their rights and interests.
Because both the
representative plaintiff and defendant will be advocating for the settlement,
this may provide the court with important
information on any potential
shortcomings of the settlement from the perspective of class members. Later in
this chapter we recommend
the views of class members should be a relevant factor
for the court to consider when assessing whether the settlement approval test
is
met. It will assist the court to consider the existence, or absence, of class
member objections when assessing that factor. We
also think the possibility of
class member objections will encourage the representative plaintiff and lawyer
for the class to consider
the interests of all class members when negotiating a
settlement and to keep class members well informed about how the settlement
has
been designed.
- 11.63 The notice
of proposed settlement should explain what a class member must do if they wish
to object to a settlement. We recommend
the Rules Committee consider developing
a High Court Rule on the process for objecting. We suggest a written objection
should be
filed with the court by a specified date. Although it is standard
practice for litigants to be required to serve court documents
on other parties,
we propose a class member should only have to file the notice of objection. The
court could then provide any objections
to the parties, and to any counsel to
assist or expert who the court been appointed. We think this departure from
usual practice
is justified because class members are not parties, may be
unfamiliar with court processes and be hesitant to communicate with the
representative plaintiff or defendant (or their lawyers).
- 11.64 We think
the objection process should be as straightforward as possible to enhance access
to justice. There could be a template
form on the class actions webpage of
ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand website that could
indicate the nature
of the information that a class member needs to provide in
their objection. Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice already
has
many template forms and guides available for users of courts and tribunals, and
we envisage the template form for objections
could be made available in the same
way.
- 11.65 The notice
of proposed settlement could also provide the timeframe for filing any
objection. The timeframe should give class
members a reasonable period to
consider the proposed settlement and prepare any objection (which could include
instructing a lawyer).
We acknowledge that it is undesirable to significantly
delay the settlement approval process, so the timeframe should not be
lengthy.
- 11.66 While it
would be desirable for class members to have legal representation to assist with
the objection process, we do not think
this should be required. In Chapter 18,
we recommend options for facilitating free legal advice to class members should
be explored,
such as creating a class actions law clinic. This could provide
class members with assistance in assessing proposed settlements and
preparing
appropriate objections.
- 11.67 We
recommend a class member should only be able to appear at the settlement
approval hearing with the leave of the court. This
will enable the court to
consider whether it would be assisted by hearing from a particular class member
(or their legal representative).
We think giving class members a right to appear
could risk significantly and unnecessarily prolonging the settlement approval
hearing.
- 11.68 Class
members may also want to convey their support for a settlement. This could be
conveyed through the evidence filed by the
representative plaintiff, such as the
results of a vote or survey of class members. We think it would be overly
burdensome for the
court to manage a large number of individual expressions of
support from class members.
Other participants in the settlement approval
process
- 11.69 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed a power for the court to appoint a
counsel to assist where it considers this
would assist it to determine whether
the settlement approval test is met. We said this may be one way of redressing
the adversarial
void that exists at the settlement approval stage. We also
proposed a power for the court to appoint an expert if it would assist
the court
to determine whether the test for settlement approval is met. We thought this
power could be particularly useful with respect
to litigation funding
commissions. We acknowledged the court already has general powers to appoint a
counsel to assist or an expert.
However, we thought a specific provision could
lead to more frequent appointments with respect to settlement approval. We said
the
court should be able to order the parties to meet the costs of a counsel to
assist or court
expert.816F[817]
- 11.70 It might
also be appropriate to allow an intervener to make submissions on settlement in
appropriate cases. However, we considered
it unnecessary to have an express
provision on this. An intervener is likely to represent its own or systemic
interests rather than
those of class members and might only wish to submit on
limited aspects of a
settlement.817F[818]
- 11.71 We asked
submitters whether there should be an express power to appoint a counsel to
assist the court or a court expert with
respect to settlement approval and
whether the court should be able to order one or more of the parties to meet the
cost of this.
Results of consultation
- 11.72 We
received 11 submissions on this
issue.818F[819] Seven submitters
favoured an express power to appoint a counsel to assist or a court
expert.819F[820]
- 11.73 Chapman
Tripp commented that the court should be empowered to get the assistance it
requires to be confident it is making an
appropriate decision. However, it said
it may not be necessary to appoint a counsel to assist or expert in every case
and it would
be relevant to consider whether this might delay the settlement
approval process. It also suggested it might be useful to appoint
a counsel to
represent the interests of the class earlier in the proceeding.
- 11.74 Simpson
Grierson thought the need for an independent counsel or expert on settlement is
most likely to arise when there are
potential conflicts of interest. It said it
is preferable for conflicts to be resolved in the context of contractual
arrangements
between the parties, which might involve appointing an independent
person to assess the suitability of the settlement with respect
to all class
members. If such a person is appointed by the parties, they would be able to
assist the court if required. However,
it also supported the court having a
residual ability to appoint an independent counsel or expert.
- 11.75 Bell Gully
did not think third parties needed to be involved in the settlement approval
process and said this could slow down
the process. It said the court would be
well equipped to apply its judgement as to whether to approve the settlement.
Omni Bridgeway
thought it was unnecessary to have an express power and noted
Australian courts could appoint a contradictor, costs assessor or other
expert
without an express power. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia noted the
existing powers available to the court to appoint
a court expert or amicus
curiae.
- 11.76 Several
submitters agreed with our proposal that the court should have a broad power to
order one or more parties to meet the
costs of the counsel to assist or court
expert.820F[821] Other suggestions
given by submitters were:
(a) A presumption that the representative plaintiff is responsible for these
costs.821F[822]
(b) A presumption that the defendant pays for these
costs.822F[823]
(c) That the costs should be shared equally between the
parties.823F[824]
- 11.77 Some
consultation workshop participants were supportive of an express power to
appoint an independent lawyer or expert to assist
the court at settlement
approval.
- 11.78 Three
submitters commented on the issue of interveners. Chapman Tripp agreed it is
unnecessary to have a specific provision
allowing the court to grant a third
party leave to intervene and said excessive intervention in settlement
evaluation was undesirable.
Nikki Chamberlain (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University
of Auckland) thought having a specific power to allow an intervener could
provide
clarity. Tom Weston QC commented that a litigation funder may wish to
intervene on an application to approve a settlement.
Recommendation
- R87 The
Class Actions Act should specify the court may appoint a counsel to assist the
court or a court expert if it considers this will
assist it to determine whether
the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class. The Act
should specify the court
may order that one or more parties must pay part of or
all of the costs of the counsel or expert.
- 11.79 As we have
discussed, there may be an adversarial void at settlement because both the
representative plaintiff and defendant
are advocating for the settlement to be
approved. While class members can object to a settlement, the experience of
other jurisdictions
indicates they may face barriers to doing so, such as a lack
of legal assistance, difficulty in understanding the settlement agreement,
and
the small value of their individual claim making it uneconomic to
object.824F[825]
- 11.80 In some
cases, the court may find it beneficial to have an independent lawyer provide
submissions to assist with its assessment
of whether the settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the interests of the class. We therefore think the court
should have an express
power to appoint a counsel to assist at settlement. This
is unlikely to be necessary in every case and might depend on matters such
as:
(a) Whether any class members have filed objections to the settlement and
whether those class members are legally represented.
(b) The complexity of the settlement, and whether there are any unusual features
or indications that a settlement might not be in
the interests of all class
members.
(c) Whether the class is comprised of persons who might find it particularly
difficult to consider the terms of a settlement or lodge
an objection.
- 11.81 The court
may also find it beneficial to have assistance from a court expert in some
cases. We envisage the expert might assist
the court on particular aspects of
the settlement, such as advising on a formula that has been developed to
allocate the settlement
proceeds. The appropriate expert would depend on the
issue but might include, for example, an accountant or auditor.
- 11.82 While the
court has existing powers to appoint a counsel to assist or an expert, we think
it is desirable to provide a specific
power in the class actions
regime.825F[826] We recommend the
Class Actions Act should specify the court may appoint a counsel to assist the
court or a court expert if it considers
this will assist it to determine whether
the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the
class.826F[827] We think this will
encourage the appointment of counsel or an expert in appropriate cases. We also
recommend the Class Actions Act
specify the court may order one or both of the
parties to meet the costs of a counsel to assist or court
expert.827F[828] This will also
ensure these costs do not have to be met by the
court.828F[829] We prefer the
court having discretion to decide the appropriate allocation of costs in a
particular case, rather than a presumption
that one party should pay these
costs.
APPROVING A SETTLEMENT
- 11.83 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said the test for judicial approval of a
settlement should be set out in legislation as
this would provide clarity and
certainty for the parties. We proposed the court should have to consider whether
a proposed settlement
is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class as a
whole. We said this should not mean a standard of perfection, as a settlement
agreement is necessarily the result of a compromise between the
parties.829F[830]
- 11.84 We also
proposed the class actions regime should specify factors the court must consider
when deciding whether to approve a
settlement, while allowing the court
discretion to consider any further relevant
matters.830F[831] We suggested
these factors should be:
(a) The terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, which should include:
(i) Any relief that will be provided to class members.
(ii) Whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other.
(iii) The proposed method of distributing any settlement amount to class
members.
(iv) The proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts.
(b) Any legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from
relief paid to class members.
(c) Potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
(d) The views of class members.
(e) The process by which the settlement was reached, including whether any
potential conflicts of interest were properly managed.
- 11.85 We asked
submitters whether they agreed with our proposed settlement test and list of
factors for the court to consider in applying
this test.
- 11.86 We also
discussed the court’s powers in approving settlement. We noted that in
other jurisdictions the court’s power
is generally limited to approving or
declining to approve a class action settlement and a judge cannot rewrite the
terms of the settlement
agreement. We thought this approach was generally
appropriate. A settlement will be the result of a negotiation between the
plaintiff
and defendant, and the agreement may not be acceptable to both parties
if a term or condition is changed. We said one exception may
be the litigation
funding commission payable in connection with a
settlement.831F[832] We asked
submitters whether the court should have an express power to amend litigation
funding commissions at settlement.
Results of consultation
- 11.87 We
received 11 submissions on the test for settlement approval, with 10 of those
agreeing with our proposed
test.832F[833] Bell Gully
commented that examining whether a settlement is “reasonable” allows
for the fact that a settlement involves
a compromise between the parties.
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said the proposed test is consistent
with the common
law test that has developed in Australia.
- 11.88 Chapman
Tripp preferred a test that would consider whether the settlement is fair and
reasonable. This assessment should consider
whether the settlement was (a) fair
and reasonable as between class members and the defendant and (b) fair and
reasonable as between
all class members. It did not think the test should also
include “the interests of the class as a whole” as the “fair
and reasonable” test would include whether class members are treated
equitably. It thought including “the interests of
the class as a
whole” was duplicative and was concerned the parties could try to give
this a more expansive effect than ensuring
fairness as between class members. If
this aspect of the test remained, it should not be amended to “best
interests”.
It agreed a range of fair and reasonable settlements may exist
and it should not be the court’s role to determine whether a
better
outcome may be possible.
Factors relevant to settlement approval
- 11.89 We
received 17 submissions on the factors a court should consider when applying the
settlement approval test.833F[834]
Terms and conditions of the settlement
- 11.90 Eight
submitters agreed the terms and conditions of the settlement should be a
factor.834F[835] Bell Gully
described this as the primary factor for a court to consider.
- 11.91 Bell Gully
and Chapman Tripp agreed it would be inappropriate for the settlement to include
an additional payment to the representative
plaintiff. However, Nikki
Chamberlain and Shine Lawyers thought it would be justified to allow an
additional payment to a representative
plaintiff at settlement. Shine Lawyers
noted the time and effort a representative plaintiff must spend on the
litigation and said
they could face public scrutiny and even abuse. It said a
payment would usually be modest in comparison to the time and effort spent
on
the litigation and is unlikely to lead to a conflict of interest during
settlement negotiations.
- 11.92 The IBA
Antitrust Committee commented on the requirement for the court to consider the
proposed method of distributing any settlement
amounts to class members,
including any unclaimed settlement amounts. It said immediate distribution of
settlement funds may not
be appropriate in all cases and that the lack of a
distribution plan should not preclude settlement approval. Chapman Tripp did not
think unclaimed settlement funds should be distributed pro rata to class members
rather than the defendant.
Legal fees and litigation funding commission
- 11.93 Eight
submitters agreed the court should consider any legal fees or litigation funding
commission that would be deducted from
class member
relief.835F[836]
- 11.94 Bell Gully
said this would be part of determining the net amount that individual class
members would receive and therefore whether
a settlement is fair, reasonable and
in the interests of the class as a whole. It would be particularly important in
opt-out class
actions, where class members may not have signed a legal retainer
or litigation funding agreement.
- 11.95 Chapman
Tripp said that, while the litigation funding commission should be a factor,
settlement approval should not be denied
solely on this basis. Simpson Grierson
said this factor should be limited to assessing what proportion of a settlement
sum would
be deducted in legal fees and litigation funding commission.
- 11.96 Gilbert
Walker was unclear about the relevance of a plaintiff’s legal fees if the
court did not have a power to adjust
them. It said that, if the court has
concerns about legal fees, it should be able to refer them to Te Kāhui Ture
o Aotearoa
| New Zealand Law Society or appoint an assessor to review them. In
practice, this would encourage settlement approval applications
to include
evidence supporting the reasonableness of the fees claimed. Simpson Grierson
said the court should not have the power
to vary legal fees and noted that
lawyers already have an obligation to charge a fair and reasonable fee.
- 11.97 MinterEllisonRuddWatts
suggested expert costs could be subject to court scrutiny at settlement if they
disproportionately reduce
the return to class members.
Potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the
litigation
- 11.98 Six
submitters agreed the court should consider any information that is readily
available to the court about the potential risks,
costs and benefits of
continuing with the
litigation.836F[837]
- 11.99 Bell Gully
said this factor should not be mandatory and that it should not involve a merits
assessment. Simpson Grierson said
the court should be careful not to make a
pre-emptive determination on any points in case the settlement was not approved.
Views of class members
- 11.100 Seven
submitters agreed the court should consider any views expressed by class
members.837F[838]
- 11.101 Bell
Gully did not think the court should invite the views of individual class
members. It said the views expressed might be
those of a vocal minority and not
representative of the views of the class as a whole. Chapman Tripp said that,
while the views of
class members are important, the views of a small sub-set of
the class should not prevent a settlement.
Process by which the settlement was reached
- 11.102 Seven
submitters agreed the court should consider the process by which the settlement
has been reached, including whether any
potential conflicts of interest have
been properly managed.838F[839]
Bell Gully agreed it was important to ensure a proper process was followed to
avoid or mitigate conflicts of interest.
- 11.103 Chapman
Tripp thought an independent evaluation of the settlement would only be
necessary if there is some concern about conflicts
in the process or perhaps if
there is some opposition by class members.
- 11.104 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said this factor has a potentially expansive
scope without a clear justification
of the harm it is designed to protect
against. It said it was unclear how this factor could be satisfied without
requiring the parties
to disclose privileged communications, without prejudice
communications, or strategically or commercially sensitive negotiations.
It
suggested we clarify the factor’s intended scope and purpose.
- 11.105 Simpson
Grierson was less persuaded this needed to be its own factor given the views of
class members must already be considered
and the court will retain an ability to
consider any other relevant factors.
Other factors
- 11.106 Eight
submitters agreed the court should have discretion to take into account any
other factor it considers
relevant.839F[840]
- 11.107 The
Institute of Directors said the court should consider whether the defendant has
been given a fair opportunity to access
justice and defend the claim.
Whether factors should be mandatory
- 11.108 Several
submitters did not favour having a list of mandatory factors for the court to
consider.840F[841] Reasons given
by submitters included:
(a) It is important for the court to have discretion and flexibility so it can
appropriately balance the factors without being overly
formulaic.
(b) The court should be able to consider any relevant factors as appropriate.
(c) The Australian and Canadian regimes do not have mandatory factors and there
is no evidence this has resulted in poor outcomes
for class members. The court
could draw on the principles developed in those jurisdictions.
(d) If the factors are discretionary, it is less likely settlements will be
challenged on the basis certain criteria were not considered
or given
appropriate weight.
- 11.109 Other
submitters supported setting out the factors in
legislation.841F[842] Nikki
Chamberlain said having a list of non-exhaustive factors the court must consider
would provide the parties with some clarity
and certainty. The Insurance Council
said statutory factors would give the parties certainty at the outset rather
than waiting for
jurisprudence to develop and the factors would also be helpful
for the parties when negotiating a settlement.
- 11.110 Chapman
Tripp supported an approach where the court considers the factors together and
is not required to conclude that every
factor supports a finding of fairness. It
said some factors might be given greater weight than others and ultimately it
should be
a discretionary exercise for the court. Similarly, Rhonson Salim
(Aston University) said the court should undertake a multi-factorial
balancing
exercise.
The court’s powers to vary litigation funding
commissions
- 11.111 The
question of whether the court should have the power to vary a litigation funding
commission when approving a settlement
is part of the broader issue of the
extent to which the court should have oversight of litigation funding
commissions. We therefore
discuss the feedback we received in response to this
question in Chapter 17. We conclude the court should not have a power to vary
funding commissions at settlement, except in the context of making a cost
sharing order that enables the funder to receive a funding
commission from class
members who have not signed a funding
agreement.842F[843]
Recommendations
- R88 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a court must approve the settlement of a
class action if it is satisfied the settlement
is fair, reasonable and in the
interests of the class.
- R89 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court must consider the following
factors when determining whether a settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the
interests of the class:
- The
terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
- The
type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of any
monetary relief.
- How
the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members.
- Whether
class members are treated equitably in relation to each other.
- The
proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.
- Any
steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement.
- The
proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement
amounts.
- Any
legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief
payable to class members.
- Any
information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks,
costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
- Any
views of class members.
- Any
steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
- Any
other factors it considers relevant.
- R90 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if the court approves a settlement, it
must describe which class members are bound by the
settlement. The Act should
specify that the settlement is binding on the parties to the settlement and the
class members described
by the court on and from the date of the court’s
approval.
Test for settlement approval
- 11.112 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the court must approve the
settlement of a class action if it is satisfied
the settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the interests of the
class.843F[844] This is similar to
the test we proposed in the Supplementary Issues Paper, which submitters
generally agreed with. We have made a
small amendment to our proposed test so it
refers to “the interests of the class” rather than “the
interests of
the class as a whole”. We are concerned “as a
whole” could be interpreted as requiring a focus on the overall relief
to
class members, regardless of how the settlement treats different groups of class
members. We think it is important for the court
to consider how the settlement
allocates relief to different groups of class members and whether class members
would be treated equitably.
- 11.113 We note
the Ontario legislation uses a similar test, where the court will consider
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable
and in the best interests of the class,
or sub-class members.844F[845] We
have not used the “best interests of the class” standard as we think
it could be too high. A settlement will necessarily
involve a compromise between
the parties and there will always be terms that could be more favourable to
class members.
- 11.114 We have
considered whether the test should expressly require the court to consider
whether the settlement is fair and reasonable
as between the defendant and the
class, and as between class members. In the Australian Federal Court, the Court
will consider these
two matters when assessing whether a settlement is a fair
and reasonable compromise of the claims of class
members.845F[846] Te Kōti
Matua | High Court took a similar approach in Ross v Southern Response
when considering an application to approve a “settling
discontinuance” of a representative
action.846F[847] The test applied
by the court was:847F[848]
- ...whether
discontinuance, on the terms of the settlement, will be a fair and reasonable
resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims
in the interests of the members as a
whole, both as between claimants and the defendant, and as between the claimants
themselves.
- 11.115 We think
our proposed test is broad enough for the court to consider the different
dimensions of whether a settlement is fair
and reasonable, and it is unnecessary
for a statutory test to direct the court to carry out these two inquiries. It is
also possible
a settlement might not be fair, reasonable and in the interests of
the class, even if it is fair as between the defendant and the
class, and as
between class members. An example is where the defendant has agreed to pay a
substantial sum to settle each class member’s
claim and class members are
treated equitably in the settlement, but a large proportion will be deducted in
litigation funding commission
and legal fees. We think it is preferable for the
overarching settlement approval test to be broad, with more specific
considerations
included as relevant factors.
Factors relevant to settlement approval test
- 11.116 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify the factors the court must
consider when determining whether a settlement
is fair, reasonable and in the
interests of the class.848F[849]
This will provide some certainty and clarity to litigants and is preferable to
waiting for factors to develop through case
law.849F[850]
- 11.117 We
propose the court must consider the following factors:
(a) The terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
(i) The type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of
any monetary relief.
(ii) How the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class
members.
(iii) Whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other.
(iv) The proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.
(v) Any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement.
(vi) The proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts.
(b) Any legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from
relief payable to class members.
(c) Any information that is readily available to the court about the potential
risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
(d) Any views of class members.
(e) Any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
(f) Any other factors it considers relevant.
- 11.118 We
consider these factors should be mandatory. The court will need to consider the
terms and conditions of a settlement in
every case, and this should not be a
discretionary factor. The other factors have some flexibility built in, such as
referring to
“any” views of class members and “any”
legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted,
to recognise
there may be cases where the factor is not applicable. We have also narrowed
factor (e) so it no longer refers to “the
process by which the settlement
was reached”, which we think will lessen concerns about this factor being
mandatory. We also
recommend the court have discretion to take into account any
other factors it considers relevant, which will allow flexibility to
consider
case-specific matters.
- 11.119 We
discuss each of the factors we recommend below.
Terms and conditions of the settlement
- 11.120 The
court will need to consider the terms and conditions of a settlement to assess
whether it is fair, reasonable and in the
interests of the class. We envisage
the proposed settlement agreement will be provided as an annexure to the
representative plaintiff’s
affidavit. In some jurisdictions, the parties
develop a separate document outlining how the settlement will be allocated and
distributed
to class members, which is known as a Plan of Allocation or a
Settlement Distribution Scheme.
- 11.121 We think
the court needs to have information about how a settlement will be allocated and
distributed to class members, so
it can assess whether the settlement is fair as
between class members and how difficult it will be for class members to obtain
relief.
Depending on the complexity of the arrangements, this information could
be provided in the settlement agreement itself or in an appendix
to the
agreement.
- 11.122 While we
anticipate some detailed or technical matters relating to settlement
distribution will need to be finalised after
settlement, we do not favour a
process where the court approves a settlement between the parties and then
separately considers how
the settlement is allocated and distributed to class
members.850F[851] We think it is
important for the court to consider how a settlement proposes to allocate funds
as between class members when assessing
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable
and in the interests of the class. We have slightly amended the list of
sub-factors a court
should consider when assessing the terms and conditions of a
settlement to clarify the aspects of settlement distribution a court
should
consider.
The type of relief to be provided to class members and the
total amount of monetary relief
- 11.123 A
key feature of the settlement agreement will be the relief the defendant has
agreed to provide to class members. This will
include the total amount of any
monetary relief to class members. A settlement could also include non-monetary
relief.
- 11.124 While we
do not propose limiting the types of relief that can be given to class members
in a settlement, we think careful scrutiny
is required in the following
circumstances:851F[852]
(a) Where class members will only receive non-monetary benefits such as vouchers
for the defendant’s product or discounts on
future purchases.
(b) Where the defendant will make a payment to a charity rather than to
individual class members. This type of payment should ordinarily
be limited to
cases where it would not be practical or possible to distribute payments to
individual class members or where the cost
of distribution would be
disproportionate to the amount a class member would
receive.852F[853]
How the benefits of the settlement will be allocated between
class members
- 11.125 We
think the court should consider how the total settlement sum will be allocated
to class members. Some settlements may have
a formula or ratio to determine the
proportion of a settlement that will go to different groups of class members. An
example of this
is in Re Strahl, where there was an agreement to settle a
representative action brought by a group of
investors.853F[854] A distribution
methodology was developed that classified investors as Class A or Class B (with
Class A claims seen as having a greater
likelihood of success) and weighted the
net settlement proceeds on a 75/25 per cent basis among the two groups.
Whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each
other
- 11.126 We
think the court should consider whether class members are treated equitably in
relation to each other, to ensure the interests
of one group of class members
have not been overlooked in favour of another. This should not prevent
principled distinctions between
class members, such as where one group of class
members would be more likely to succeed in establishing liability or a higher
quantum
of loss if the matter proceeded to trial. In Re Strahl, the Court
rejected the argument that anything other than a pro rata distribution would be
unreasonable, noting that if the claims
of one set of group members had less
prospect of success than those of other group members, this would typically be
reflected in
the agreed settlement
sum.854F[855] However, it
considered the 75/25 per cent weighting should be adjusted to 67/33 per
cent.855F[856]
- 11.127 We
consider that a settlement should not include an additional lump sum payment to
the representative plaintiff to compensate
them for their role in the
litigation. In Chapter 3, we concluded the representative plaintiff should be
eligible to be paid for
their role during the litigation. We think this is
preferable to a payment as part of a settlement because of the risk it could
cause
a representative plaintiff to agree to a settlement that is not in the
interests of the
class.856F[857]
The proposed method of determining individual class member
entitlements
- 11.128 We
think the court should consider how class member entitlements will be
determined, for example whether:
(a) Each class member will receive a fixed amount.
(b) A formula will be developed to calculate individual entitlements.
(c) There will be a process of individual assessment, such as by a settlement
administrator.
- 11.129 We do not
think the court needs to consider all the technical details of the process.
However, the court should have information
about which of these approaches will
be taken. Along with the next sub-factor, this will impact on how many class
members will ultimately
receive a benefit from the settlement.
Any steps a class member must take to benefit from the
settlement
- 11.130 We
think the court should consider what an individual class member would need to do
to receive a benefit from the settlement,
including:
(a) Whether the defendant will pay class members directly or whether a class
member would need to submit an individual claim.
(b) Where an individual claim is required, what kind of information a class
member would need to provide.
(c) The proposed time period for submitting an individual claim.
- 11.131 We
acknowledge some details of the individual claims process may need to be worked
out after the settlement is approved, but
we think the court should have some
general information as to the proposed process. We see this as relevant because
it will affect
how many class members actually receive a benefit from the
settlement. A claims process that is complex for individual class members
and
has a short time frame for claiming may result in few class members submitting a
claim. We also think close court scrutiny would
be required where a complex
claiming procedure is coupled with a proposal to return unclaimed funds to the
defendant.
- 11.132 When
considering this factor, the court could also compare the likely process that
would be involved if the claim proceeded
to trial. For example, a complex
claiming procedure may not count against settlement approval if a similar
procedure would be necessary
to establish an entitlement to damages because of
the nature of the claim.
The proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement
amounts
- 11.133 We
think the court should consider how the settlement proposes to deal with any
unclaimed settlement funds. Options
include:857F[858]
(a) Returning the money to the defendant.
(b) Distributing the money pro rata amongst class members who filed claims.
(c) Giving the money to a charity whose activities are related to the claim.
- 11.134 We do not
recommend that any method of dealing with unclaimed funds should be expressly
permitted or prohibited, although we
consider that a settlement should
facilitate payment of compensation to class members to the extent possible. If
only a small proportion
of class members claim compensation, it may be
appropriate for the court to consider whether any additional steps are desirable
before
unclaimed funds are distributed, such as further notice to class members.
This could be done using the power we propose for the court
to make any orders
it considers appropriate for the administration and implementation of the
settlement, which we discuss later in
this chapter.
Legal fees and litigation funding commission
- 11.135 When
the court is considering whether a settlement is fair, reasonable and in the
interests of the class, we think it is relevant
to consider the net amount class
members will receive. Therefore, we think the court should consider any legal
fees or litigation
funding commission that will be deducted from the relief
payable to class members. These payments may have a significant effect on
what a
class member actually receives from a settlement, and ultimately the extent to
which class members obtain a substantively
fair result from a class action. As
discussed in the Issues Paper, our conception of access to justice is broader
than simply access
to the
courts.858F[859] We do not think a
very small net payment to class members can automatically be equated with access
to justice on the basis that ‘something
is better than nothing’.
- 11.136 We do not
see it as the court’s role to approve or vary legal fees as part of
settlement approval. The situation is different
in jurisdictions where class
action lawyers act on a contingency fee basis and may be entitled to a
percentage of the settlement
sum. In Aotearoa New Zealand, lawyers have an
obligation to only charge a fee that is fair and reasonable for the services
provided.859F[860] Rather we think
the court’s role should be to consider whether a settlement, which
includes a particular payment of legal fees,
is fair and reasonable.
- 11.137 In
Chapter 9 we recommend the court should be able to vary a litigation funding
commission at settlement when it has granted
certain cost sharing orders. It is
necessary for the court to have this power where a cost sharing order allows the
litigation funder
to receive a funding commission from class members who have
not signed a funding agreement with it.
- 11.138 We also
recommend in Chapter 17 that a litigation funding agreement in a class action is
only enforceable by a funder if it
is approved by the court. As part of this, we
recommend the court consider whether the funding commission is fair and
reasonable
in light of various factors. These factors include the estimated
total amount of relief claimed, the number of people likely to be
entitled to a
share of any relief, and the estimated costs, complexity and duration of the
case. In addition, we suggest the court
should consider how the estimated
returns to the funder will accommodate variation in those factors, such as
variation between the
estimated and actual costs of the litigation. In other
words, the court may approve a range of funding commissions that will apply
in
different scenarios.
- 11.139 At
settlement approval, we anticipate the court would consider whether the funding
commission is appropriate given the rate
or range it initially approved. If the
court considers the proposed deductions are not in line with what it originally
approved,
the court could determine that the settlement is not fair, reasonable
and in the interests of the class, and decline to approve it.
Potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the
proceeding
- 11.140 When
the court is considering whether to approve a proposed settlement, we think it
is relevant to compare the outcome for
class members with the range of possible
outcomes if the litigation were to continue. This will include:
(a) Comparing the amount that class members can receive in the settlement with
the range of amounts they could be awarded if their
claim was successful.
(b) Considering the risks of proceeding to trial (or appeal) and the likelihood
that class members will be unsuccessful in obtaining
relief.
(c) How long it might take to resolve the proceedings through litigation and
whether this could cause any particular disadvantage
(such as where class
members are elderly or unwell and there is a risk they will be unable to give
evidence).
(d) The costs of continuing with the litigation and the impact for class members
in terms of the funding commission that would be
deducted from any relief.
- 11.141 We do not
think the court should conduct a preliminary merits assessment of the case or
predetermine any points. Rather, the
court’s consideration should be
primarily based on information filed by the parties, such as an assessment by an
independent
lawyer engaged by the parties. As noted earlier in this chapter, it
is likely that some of this information will need to be provided
on a
confidential basis to avoid prejudicing the parties. If the court declines to
approve the settlement and the matter goes to
hearing, it is likely to be
appropriate for a different judge to hear the matter. However, this is
ultimately a matter of judicial
resourcing and we do not make any
recommendations on this matter. We also think this situation will rarely arise.
In Australia, there
are relatively few reported examples of a court declining to
approve a settlement.860F[861]
Where settlement approval is declined, the court will identify the area(s) of
concern, which may lead to the parties reconsidering
the settlement to address
the issues of concern and resubmitting an application for settlement
approval.861F[862]
Views of class members
- 11.142 Earlier
in this chapter we recommend class members should have the ability to object to
a settlement. We think the court should
take any views of class members into
account when considering a settlement. This does not mean the views of a small
group of objectors
will inevitably derail the entire settlement. In fact, the
experience of other jurisdictions indicates it is rare for a class member
objection to result in the court declining to approve a
settlement.862F[863] Ultimately it
will depend on the nature and validity of the objection and the number of class
members who object.
- 11.143 The court
could also take into consideration the lack of any objections, although in some
cases this might simply reflect barriers
to objecting rather than support for
the settlement. It will also be relevant to consider any class member
expressions of support
for the
settlement.863F[864]
Any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest
- 11.144 As
noted above, we have amended this factor so it does not require the court to
consider the process by which the settlement
was reached. It now focuses on any
steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest. We think this factor is
much more specific
and will not require the parties to provide information on
the entire settlement process.
- 11.145 It will
be up to parties as to the information they provide to support this factor. The
type of information will depend on
the nature of any potential conflicts of
interest and how they were managed. Steps taken by the parties could include
obtaining an
independent valuation of the settlement or independent legal
advice.
Court’s powers when approving a settlement
- 11.146 We
think the court should either approve or decline to approve the proposed
settlement. It should not be able to rewrite the
terms of a settlement
agreement. If the court has concerns about a proposed settlement that prevents
it from approving the agreement,
it can record those concerns in its decision
declining to approve the settlement. The parties can then decide whether to
renegotiate
the agreement to address those concerns and resubmit an application
for settlement approval. We do not think the court should be
able to vary the
litigation funding commission that will apply to a settlement, except when there
is a cost sharing order in
place.864F[865]
- 11.147 If the
court decides to approve a settlement, it will need to make a formal order. In
Australia, the court usually specifically
approves the documents that make up
the settlement (such as the deed of settlement, settlement scheme or settlement
agreement).865F[866] Australian
courts also frequently make orders identifying the parties who will be bound by
the settlement and stating that the applicant
has the authority to bind class
members to the
settlement.866F[867]
- 11.148 We think
it is desirable to have clarity on which class members are bound by a
settlement. For example, the settlement may
only apply to class members who have
claims against a particular defendant or who are part of a sub-class. We
recommend the Class
Actions Act specify that if the court approves a settlement,
it must describe which class members are bound by the
settlement.867F[868] The Act
should also specify that the settlement is binding on the parties to the
settlement and the class members described by the
court on and from the date of
the court’s
approval.868F[869]
- 11.149 The court
may need to make other orders with respect to settlement approval, such
as:
(a) An order appointing a settlement administrator (which we discuss later in
this chapter).
(b) Further confidentiality orders.
- 11.150 We
envisage the representative plaintiff will file an application for leave to
discontinue the class action when filing the
settlement outcome report. The
court will then need to make an order granting leave to discontinue the class
action. We discuss discontinuance
at the end of this chapter.
FINALISING THE CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT
- 11.151 In
this section we discuss:
(a) Converting an opt-out class action to opt-in for the purposes of
settlement.
(b) Whether class members should have an ability to opt out of a settlement.
(c) Whether other potential class members should be able to opt in for
settlement.
(d) Certification for the purposes of settlement.
Converting a class action to opt-in for
settlement
- 11.152 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we noted that in an opt-out class action, the
identity of many class members and the circumstances
of their claims will likely
be unknown. This could inhibit settlement discussions as parties may be
reluctant to agree to settlement
proposals without knowing how many class
members could be eligible and the details of their claims. We noted that in
Australia, parties
have managed this issue by seeking a class closure order from
the court.869F[870]
- 11.153 We
proposed a representative plaintiff should be able to seek an order that an
opt-out class action be converted to an opt-in
class action for the purposes of
facilitating settlement.870F[871]
This could be sought at the outset of a mediation or other settlement
negotiation process or as part of the settlement approval process.
It would
require notice to class members and a sufficient opportunity to opt in. A class
member who did not opt in at settlement
would not be eligible to receive the
proceeds of settlement, but we did not think they should be bound by the terms
of the settlement
either.
- 11.154 We asked
submitters whether the court should have a power to convert an opt-out class
action into an opt-in class action for
the purposes of facilitating
settlement.
Results of consultation
- 11.155 We
received 12 submissions on this
issue.871F[872]
- 11.156 Eight
submitters agreed a representative plaintiff should be able to seek an order to
convert an opt-out class action to opt-in
for the purposes of
settlement.872F[873] Several
submitters indicated giving the parties certainty around class size could help
to facilitate settlement.
- 11.157 Some
submitters commented on when such an order might be appropriate. Bell Gully
said an order should not be available as
of right and it should be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. It said either the parties could agree to it, or the court
could make
an order on the application of either party if it determined it was
in the interests of justice. Simpson Grierson said the power
should be subject
to the views of the parties and the court should consider the individual
circumstances of the case.
- 11.158 Several
submitters discussed what should happen if the court granted an order to convert
a class action to opt-in for the purposes
of settlement and some class members
did not opt in. Chapman Tripp commented that a key factor driving settlement
from a defendant’s
perspective would be avoiding further litigation and
the proposed power would be of limited benefit if class members who did not
opt
in would not be bound. Tom Weston QC thought class members who did not opt in at
settlement should still be bound by the outcome
and said a defendant should have
the benefit of certainty. However, Shine Lawyers said class members should not
be bound by the settlement
if they did not register to participate.
- 11.159 Shine
Lawyers said that, if the settlement is not reached, the class should be opened
again. Simpson Grierson thought the parties
should be consulted on whether the
case should go back to opt-out.
- 11.160 Gilbert
Walker expressed some reservations about a power to convert an opt-out class
action to opt-in for the purposes of settlement.
It said that, if this power
were routinely exercised, it would undermine the rationale for allowing opt-out
class actions in the
first place. The better solution would be for such cases to
be commenced as opt-in. It said if the court was empowered to make an
order to
convert an opt-out class action to opt-in, it was hard to see why only the
plaintiff could apply for such an order.
Our view
- 11.161 We
have concluded a class actions regime should not include a power to convert an
opt-out class action to an opt-in class action
for the purposes of facilitating
settlement. We are not convinced that the benefits of having such a power will
outweigh the disadvantages.
- 11.162 By
certifying a class action on an opt-out basis, the court has concluded that
opt-out is an appropriate means of determining
class membership in the
circumstances of the case. Converting a case to opt-in for settlement is likely
to result in a much smaller
group of class members benefitting from the class
action, which means the benefits of certifying the case as an opt-out class
action
cannot be fully realised. If it is clear at the outset that it will be
practically difficult or impossible to settle a class action
on an opt-out
basis, it may be desirable for the proceeding to be brought as an opt-in class
action. Class closure orders may be
more appropriate in Australia, where the
class actions regimes do not strictly provide for opt-in class
actions.873F[874]
- 11.163 Complex
issues may arise if an opt-out class action can convert to opt-in for
settlement. If a settlement is not reached and
the case proceeds to hearing,
there is a question as to whether the case should remain as opt-in (which means
a smaller class benefitting
from the judgment) or revert back to opt-out (which
could cause confusion and complexity). Another issue is the impact on limitation
periods of converting an opt-out class action to opt-in for settlement,
particularly if there is the possibility of a case reverting
back to opt-out.
- 11.164 We think
a power to convert a case to opt-in for settlement may be of limited benefit to
defendants because the settlement
would only bind those who have opted in. We
remain of the view it would be unfair if class members who did not respond to
the opt-in
notice were bound by the settlement but could not receive any
benefits from it. We think a defendant may have greater finality from
an opt-out
settlement, which binds all class members. While this still carries the risk
that a class member will be bound by the
settlement without receiving any
benefits (because they fail to take the necessary steps, such as filing a claim
with a settlement
administrator), we envisage the settlement claims period would
be longer than any opt-in period. Later in this chapter we also recommend
the
court should be able to order additional notice to class members if settlement
take-up rates are low.
- 11.165 There may
be other ways of obtaining sufficient information about the class to enable a
settlement to be reached. If the parties
agree to a mediation or negotiation
process, it is also possible the representative plaintiff will volunteer to
provide the defendant
with information about class member claims to facilitate
settlement. Information could also be obtained through an order for class
member
discovery, which we discussed in Chapter 8.
Opting out of settlement
- 11.166 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed class members should be given an
opportunity to opt out of the class action
at settlement so they can decide
whether they prefer to settle their claim or preserve the ability to bring their
own proceedings.
We said a settlement may occur a long time after the initial
opportunity to opt into or out of the class action, and matters may
have changed
considerably since then. We suggested the opt-out date should be after the
settlement is approved.874F[875]
- 11.167 We asked
submitters whether class members should be able to opt out of a class action
settlement once approved.
Results of consultation
- 11.168 We
received 13 submissions on this
question.875F[876]
- 11.169 None of
these submitters supported a right for class members to opt out at
settlement.876F[877] Twelve
submitters disagreed with allowing class members to opt out of a settlement,
with some indicating they were strongly opposed
to our
proposal.877F[878] Gilbert Walker
said that, in some cases, it may be reasonable for a class member to opt out of
an approved settlement, but this should
not be available as of right. We discuss
the key concerns raised by submitters below.
- 11.170 Several
submitters said allowing class members to opt out of a settlement would
undermine the efficiencies gained through certifying
a proceeding as a class
action. It could also increase the burden on the court because of
interlocutory disputes (arising from an in-principle settlement being affected
by a decreased class size) or because it means a class action is not settled and
must go to hearing.
- 11.171 Some
submitters said protecting the interests of class members did not require a
second opportunity to opt out and pointed
to other measures that
exist:
(a) The original opt-out process, which is designed to allow class members to
make an informed and voluntary decision about whether
to participate in a class
action.
(b) The court’s role in ensuring the settlement agreement is fair,
reasonable and in the interests of the class.
(c) Class members can object to a settlement and seek leave to appeal.
- 11.172 Submitters
also noted the unfairness that could result if class members could opt out at
settlement. Comments made by submitters
included:
(a) It would allow class members to ‘free ride’.
(b) It would give class members undue protection against the risks of litigation
at the expense of the defendant.
(c) It would prejudice the interests of all parties and undermine the certainty
and finality of settlements.
(d) Class members who take advantage of a collective process should be bound by
it.
(e) By the time a settlement is reached, the parties will have spent significant
time, effort and expense on the basis of the known
parameters of the class.
(f) Class members are not able to opt out after a judgment.
(g) Where a settlement is only with some defendants, an opportunity to opt out
could create chaos and unfairness.
- 11.173 Some
submitters said the risk of class members opting out would cause difficulties in
negotiating settlements:
(a) It would create considerable uncertainty about the class size while the
parties are negotiating settlement, which may impede,
discourage or delay
settlements.
(b) It might drive down aggregate monetary relief because of the difficulty in
meaningfully assessing aggregate loss during negotiations.
(c) Settlement should be negotiated based on the dispute being fully and finally
resolved for class members.
(d) It is likely to result in conditional settlements, based on the number of
opt-outs, which may have significant costs consequences
for the parties and the
court.
- 11.174 Submitters
also pointed to litigation funding difficulties that would arise if class
members could opt out of a settlement:
(a) It may allow class members to avoid contributing to the costs of the
proceeding.
(b) It could lead to inconsistencies with a class member’s contractual
obligations under a litigation funding agreement.
(c) It would undermine the certainty that an effective litigation funding market
requires.
(d) The funder needs to know who will be bound by a settlement at the outset.
(e) It could undermine commercial calculations that founded the decision to
support the class action and impact the viability of
the claim for funders.
- 11.175 Several
submitters addressed what should happen if a class actions regime did allow
class members to opt out of a settlement.
Gilbert Walker said it should require
the leave of the court so that any prejudice to other parties could be taken
into account.
It also said it should trigger a right for the defendant to
reconsider whether they wish to proceed with the settlement. Bell Gully
said the
amount of a settlement ought to be adjusted down proportionately. Chapman Tripp
said an ability to opt out should only be
available in exceptional
circumstances, such as in an opt-out class action where the class member can
demonstrate they were not aware
of the class action. It should not be available
in opt-in class actions.
- 11.176 Some
participants at our consultation workshops also expressed concern about class
members being able to opt out of a settlement.
It was suggested this could
create a “free rider problem” and that it may be preferable to allow
class members a narrow
right of appeal instead.
Recommendation
- R91 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may order that a class member
may opt out of a settlement where:
- This
is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or
- It
considers the interests of justice require it.
- 11.177 We have
reflected on the feedback we received on this issue and do not recommend a class
actions regime provide a general right
for class members to opt out of a
settlement. We agree this could cause significant uncertainty and prevent class
actions from being
settled. Because legal fees and litigation funding
commissions are usually recovered as a percentage of a class member’s
settlement
or damages award, it could allow class members to benefit from the
work carried out on their behalf without having to contribute
to the
costs.878F[879] The risk of class
members opting out of a settlement might deter litigation funding of class
actions. While it could be in the interests
of individual class members to allow
a right to opt out, we accept this is outweighed by the potential impacts for
the class as a
whole, the parties and the ability to obtain litigation funding.
- 11.178 We also
acknowledge the other safeguards that are provided for class members in the
class actions regime we recommend. The
initial opt-in or opt-out notice can
advise class members that they will be bound by a settlement or judgment if they
are part of
the class action. The representative plaintiff will need to consider
whether the proposed settlement is in what they believe to be
the best interests
of the class when agreeing to it. Class members can object to a proposed
settlement. The court will also consider
whether a settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the interests of the class.
- 11.179 While we
do not recommend a right for all class members to opt out of a settlement, we
think the Class Actions Act should specify
a court may order a class member can
opt out where this is permitted by the terms of the settlement
agreement.879F[880] In Australia,
it appears open to the parties to negotiate an opportunity for class members to
opt out.880F[881] In Ontario,
there is a case where the parties agreed to give class members an opportunity to
opt out of the settlement as more than
eight years had passed since the
proceedings began.881F[882] There
may be circumstances where the parties think it would be desirable to provide a
right to opt out, such as:
(a) Where there is a small group of class members who are very opposed to the
settlement. Allowing them to opt out might increase
the chances of the
settlement being approved or avoid the risk of class members having an ongoing
sense of grievance about being
bound to the settlement.
(b) Where the settlement is reached on a per individual basis rather than global
sum basis, so it is not necessary to determine an
aggregate amount when
negotiating the settlement.
- 11.180 We also
think the Class Actions Act should specify the court may order specific class
members should be given an opportunity
to opt out, where the interests of
justice require it.882F[883] We
envisage this would be limited to cases where real unfairness could arise if a
particular class member was required to be bound
by a settlement. An example
might be an opt-out class action where a class member can show they did not
receive notice of the class
action and would suffer some particular prejudice if
they could not opt out, or a class member may have lacked sufficient capacity
to
make the decision to opt out and will be prejudiced by having to settle their
claim. In one Australian case, the court granted
a limited second opt-out right
to 680 class members who had formally objected to the settlement on fairness
grounds. The case related
to unlawful debt collection by a government agency,
which many objectors said had profoundly negative and damaging effects on
them.883F[884]
- 11.181 In
addition, where a settlement is reached prior to the initial opt-out notice, the
potential class members will effectively
be given an opportunity to opt out of
the settlement. We discuss settlement prior to certification later in this
chapter.
Allowing other potential class members to opt in at
settlement
- 11.182 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we suggested other potential class members could
be given an opportunity to opt in at settlement,
but we did not think this
should be required. We did not consider there was any unfairness in excluding
someone from a settlement
who had decided not to be part of the class action at
an earlier stage. However, there could be cases where a defendant would want
a
settlement to bind the widest group possible and so would seek to provide an
additional opportunity for potential class members
to opt into a class action at
settlement.884F[885]
- 11.183 We asked
submitters whether other potential class members should have an opportunity to
opt in at settlement.
Results of consultation
- 11.184 We
received 11 submissions on this
question.885F[886]
- 11.185 Three
submitters agreed with allowing additional class members to opt in at
settlement.886F[887] Bell Gully
said this may be desirable in some cases so the settlement can bind the widest
group possible and minimise the risk of
further litigation on the issue.
Similarly, Chapman Tripp said this could create efficiencies by helping to avoid
further litigation.
It said the process for opting in would need to be
efficient, particularly if settlement is attempted mid-way through trial.
- 11.186 Johnson
& Johnson and Simpson Grierson said there should only be an additional
opt-in opportunity if the defendant consents.
- 11.187 Four
submitters disagreed with allowing an opportunity for other class members to opt
into a settlement.887F[888]
Reasons for this included:
(a) It will undermine the finality and certainty of a settlement.
(b) There will be uncertainty as to who will be bound by the settlement.
(c) It will undermine the ability to negotiate meaningful and binding
settlements.
(d) An increase in the class size might cause the settlement to fall over or
significantly diminish the returns of other class members.
(e) It will deter individuals from joining the class action at the beginning,
since they could wait and see if there is a settlement.
(f) It will undermine the certainty an effective litigation funding market
requires.
- 11.188 Gilbert
Walker said such a power is probably unnecessary since a defendant can always
choose to extend the settlement to other
potential class members if they
wish.
Recommendation
- R92 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may order that a person who was
eligible to become a class member but did not
do so may opt into a settlement
where:
- This
is permitted by the settlement agreement; or
- It
considers the interests of justice require it.
- 11.189 We do not
recommend a general right for other potential class members to opt in at
settlement. Potential class members will
have been given an opportunity to
participate in the class action through the initial opt-in or opt-out process.
If a class member
has chosen not to opt into the class action, or has opted out,
we do not think they should have a right to reverse their initial
decision. The
potential for the class size to expand once the settlement has been approved
could inhibit settlement.
- 11.190 However,
there may be circumstances where the parties wish to provide an opportunity for
additional persons to opt in, so the
settlement can bind the widest group
possible and provide finality to the parties. We think the Class Actions Act
should enable a
potential class member to opt into a settlement where this is
permitted by the settlement
agreement.888F[889]
- 11.191 We also
recommend the Class Actions Act specify the court may order a potential class
member to be given an opportunity to
opt into a settlement where the interests
of justice require it.889F[890] We
think it would be relatively rare for this situation to arise. One example might
be where the person did not understand the opt-in
or opt-out form, mistakenly
thought they were part of the class action and turned down an individual
settlement offer on this basis.
- 11.192 Where a
settlement is reached prior to the initial opt-in notice, potential class
members will effectively be given an opportunity
to opt into the settlement. We
discuss settlement prior to certification in the next section.
Process for settlements reached prior to certification
- 11.193 In
some cases, the parties will agree to settle a proceeding before it is certified
as a class action. In the Supplementary
Issues Paper, we proposed the court
should still be required to approve settlements in such
cases.890F[891] We said there
would need to be a process for certifying or approving the class for settlement,
so it is clear who the settlement
is binding
on.891F[892]
- 11.194 We
proposed the court should decide whether to certify the class for the purposes
of settlement. The court could apply the
usual certification test with any
necessary modifications. For example, the court would not need to consider
whether the likely time
and cost of a class action would be proportionate to the
remedies sought. A hearing may be required to determine whether a class
action
can be certified for the purposes of settlement, although we envisaged this
would be shorter than a normal certification hearing
as a defendant would likely
consent to certification for this
purpose.892F[893]
- 11.195 We asked
submitters whether, in cases where settlement is reached prior to certification,
the court should consider whether
to certify the proceeding for the purposes of
settlement.
Results of consultation
- 11.196 We
received eight submissions on this
question.893F[894]
- 11.197 Five
submitters agreed the court should consider whether to certify a proceeding for
the purposes of
settlement.894F[895] Bell Gully
noted this would help to ensure the class and claims subject to the settlement
are adequately defined. Simpson Grierson
suggested we adopt the Canadian
approach where certification is assessed against less rigorous criteria. Chapman
Tripp said the opt-in
date should be prior to the settlement approval hearing
and class members should not then be able to opt out after approval.
- 11.198 Two
submitters disagreed with the court certifying a proceeding for the purposes of
settlement. Omni Bridgeway said this would
be superfluous and unnecessarily
costly. Similarly, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said it would
result in significant
and avoidable additional costs for the parties in
preparing for a hearing on both certification and settlement. It would also be
inconsistent with the objective of obtaining the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of proceedings. In addition, it would
be practically difficult for
the court to consider some of the certification criteria while also resolving
the dispute, such as considering
whether the statement of claim discloses a
reasonably arguable cause of action.
- 11.199 Nicole
Smith was unsure whether the court should be involved, commenting that as a
class has not been formed, a settlement
would not prevent others from bringing a
claim.
Recommendation
- R93 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if a settlement of a class action
proceeding is reached prior to certification, the following
process
applies:
- The
proposed representative plaintiff must file an application for approval of the
settlement.
- The
court must consider whether the proceeding meets the requirements of the
certification test, with any necessary modifications.
If it does, the court
must, for the purposes of settlement, certify the proceeding and appoint one or
more representative plaintiffs.
- The
court must then consider the application for approval of the settlement.
- 11.200 In
ordinary litigation, a group of plaintiffs and a defendant are free to agree to
a settlement at an early stage of litigation.
A class action is unusual because
the parties seek to bind class members to the settlement. When a class action
proceeding has been
commenced but not yet certified, the class has not been
formed and the scope of the class is unclear. For a settlement to be binding
on
class members, the court needs to consider whether a class can be certified and
the scope of that class. There also needs to be
an opt-in or opt-out process to
allow class membership to be determined.
- 11.201 If
settlement of a class action proceeding is reached prior to certification the
proposed representative plaintiff will need
to file an application for approval
of the settlement.895F[896] In
Chapter 17 we also recommend that, if settlement occurs prior to certification,
the representative plaintiff should seek court
approval of any litigation
funding agreement at the same time as it applies for settlement approval.
- 11.202 Before
considering the application for settlement approval, we recommend the court
should consider whether to certify the class
action for the purposes of
settlement. The court should apply the certification test, with any necessary
modifications. For example,
it is unlikely to be relevant to consider whether a
class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution
of class member claims. Whether the statement of claim discloses a reasonably
arguable cause of action is also likely to be less
relevant, although it could
prevent the court from certifying and approving the settlement of a claim that
is so meritless that it
is an abuse of the court’s processes. We envisage
a hearing may not be necessary, given the defendant will have consented to
certification for the purposes of settlement.
- 11.203 If the
court considers the proceeding meets the requirements of the certification test
(with any necessary modifications),
it will need to certify the proceeding and
appoint a representative plaintiff for the purposes of settlement. We anticipate
the court
would approve a single notice to class members which would advise of
the proposed settlement and provide an opportunity to opt in
or opt out. The
court could then proceed to consider the application for approval of the
settlement.
SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
- 11.204 Once
a settlement is approved by the court, the terms and conditions of the
settlement will need to be implemented, including
paying any sums to class
members. In this section we discuss:
(a) Court oversight of settlement.
(b) Appointment of a settlement administrator.
(c) Requirements for reporting on the outcome of the settlement process.
Court oversight of settlement
- 11.205 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed the court should supervise the
administration and implementation of the settlement.
This would allow the court
to ensure class member interests are protected and respond to any issues that
arise.896F[897] We envisaged the
court’s supervisory role would vary depending on the
case.897F[898]
- 11.206 We also
said the court should have the power to make any orders it considers appropriate
with respect to the administration
and implementation of a settlement. For
example, if only a small proportion of class members claimed compensation under
the settlement,
the court could order further steps to be taken such as more
extensive notice or extending the claims
period.898F[899]
- 11.207 We asked
submitters whether the court should supervise the administration and
implementation of a class action settlement.
Results of consultation
- 11.208 We
received 11 submissions on this
issue.899F[900]
- 11.209 Eight
submitters agreed the court should supervise the administration and
implementation of
settlement.900F[901] The Insurance
Council said this is essential to ensure the ongoing protection of class member
interests.
- 11.210 Shine
Lawyers noted many issues arise during settlement administration that may not
have been provided for under the settlement
scheme (such as unexpected costs or
delays). To ensure the court’s continued supervision, it
suggested the class action should not be dismissed until the settlement scheme
has been administered.
- 11.211 Three
submitters thought court supervision of administration and implementation should
not be required in all cases. Bell Gully
said court supervision will be
appropriate in some cases, such as where there are highly individualised loss
assessments. In other
cases, ongoing supervision may be unnecessary and
inefficient. When the court decides whether to approve a settlement, it should
also decide its ongoing supervisory role (if any). Chapman Tripp said requiring
the court to supervise administration and implementation
of a settlement could
be a significant drain on court resources. It said that, if the parties require
assistance from the court,
they should be able to seek further orders as needed.
Omni Bridgeway said the court should not be actively involved in monitoring
the
administration of a settlement, but it should be able to hear and resolve any
disputes that arise in relation to administration.
- 11.212 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia commented on our proposed power for the court
to make “any other orders it
considers appropriate for the administration
and implementation of the settlement”. They contrasted this with the
Australian
provisions allowing the court to make “such orders as are
just” with respect to distribution. They suggested the term
“just” is preferable as it allows for consideration of the broader
interests of justice, while “appropriate”
invokes a more pragmatic
analysis.
Recommendation
- R94 The
Class Actions Act should specify that:
- The
court retains jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of a
class action settlement.
- The
court may make any orders it considers appropriate for the administration and
implementation of the settlement.
- 11.213 We
recommend the Class Actions Act specify that the court retains jurisdiction to
oversee the administration and implementation
of a class action settlement, as
part of its ongoing role to protect the interests of class
members.901F[902] The
court’s role in overseeing settlement administration and implementation
will differ according to the case. In some cases,
the court’s role might
be limited to ensuring a settlement outcome report is
filed.902F[903] In other cases,
the court may need to take steps such as requiring further notice to class
members or requiring further steps to
be taken before unclaimed funds are
distributed. In the Supplementary Issues Paper, we suggested the court should be
required to
“supervise” administration and implementation. However,
on reflection, we consider it is preferable to refer to the court
retaining
jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of a settlement.
In some cases, administration and implementation
will be straightforward and the
court will not need to supervise the process.
- 11.214 To allow
the court to carry out this oversight role, we consider the Class Actions Act
should specify the court may make any
orders it considers appropriate for the
administration and implementation of the
settlement.903F[904] We see this
power as serving a slightly different function to the Australian power to
“make such orders as are just”
with respect to
distribution.904F[905] While the
Australian provision enables the court to approve a settlement distribution
scheme, we think it is preferable for the court
to approve key aspects of
distribution as part of its power to approve a settlement. Our proposed power to
make orders for the administration
and implementation of the settlement will
involve more technical matters and so we think the standard of
“appropriate”
is suitable.
- 11.215 Earlier
in this chapter, we suggested a court would not make an order discontinuing a
class action until settlement implementation
has been completed. This is to
ensure the court retains jurisdiction throughout this process.
Appointment of a settlement administrator
- 11.216 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we suggested that, in some cases, it would be
appropriate to appoint an administrator to
carry out the process of assessing
individual claims and arranging payment to class members. This would not always
be necessary,
such as where the defendant can pay class members directly without
a claim being required. We said settlement administration needs
to be carried
out in a way that is accurate, efficient and
cost-effective.905F[906]
- 11.217 We
proposed a power for the court to appoint a settlement administrator but did not
think this should be mandatory. We suggested
the role could be performed by a
range of people, including a barrister, accountant or corporate trustee. In some
cases, the court
might consider it appropriate for the plaintiff’s law
firm to fulfil the role. We envisaged the parties would propose an administrator
and the court would consider whether that person is suitable for the role.
- 11.218 We asked
submitters whether the court should have a power to appoint a settlement
administrator and who would be appropriate
to fulfil that role.
Results of consultation
- 11.219 We
received nine submissions on this issue, with all submitters agreeing the court
should have a power to appoint a settlement
administrator in appropriate
cases.906F[907]
- 11.220 Suggestions
on who would be appropriate to fulfil the role included:
(a) Someone who is independent of the
parties.907F[908]
(b) An independent person who is not a
lawyer.908F[909]
(c) An entity with technical or subject matter
expertise.909F[910]
(d) An accounting firm or claims consultant, where the process involves
calculation and reviewing forms or supporting
documents.910F[911]
(e) A barrister or arbitrator, where it is necessary to triage or assess
claims.911F[912]
(f) The law firm engaged by the representative
plaintiff.912F[913] Shine Lawyers
said this will have knowledge of the litigation, may be the most efficient, and
can provide consistency to class members.
- 11.221 Some
submitters commented that it would depend on the nature of the settlement and
the circumstances as to who would be appropriate
for the role and suggested the
court should have discretion. Simpson Grierson suggested the parties could agree
on an administrator
or alternatively submit candidates to the court for
consideration.
- 11.222 Chapman
Tripp and Omni Bridgeway said the appointment of any administrator could be
considered at the same time as the application
for approval of a settlement.
Recommendation
- R95 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may appoint a person as an
administrator to implement the settlement.
- 11.223 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the court may appoint a
person as an administrator to implement the
settlement.913F[914] The court
should have discretion as to whether to appoint an administrator and who should
fulfil the role. We think a range of people
could fulfil the role and the
appropriate person will depend on the circumstances of the case. In some cases,
the administrator may
need sufficient expertise to assess and categorise
individual claims. In other cases, the role might be limited to receiving forms
and arranging payment. Ideally the parties would agree on an administrator and
the court would decide whether to approve the appointment.
We envisage a
settlement administrator would generally be appointed in cases where the parties
have proposed this, with the settlement
agreement providing how the costs of
this would be met. We do not think the court should have to meet the costs of a
settlement administrator.
Settlement outcome reports
- 11.224 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we said the court should be given information on
the outcome of settlement implementation,
including the extent to which class
members received compensation from the settlement and the costs incurred in
settlement administration.
This would improve the transparency, monitoring and
evaluation of settlements and enable the court to develop its expertise
regarding
the effectiveness of settlement distribution
procedures.914F[915]
- 11.225 We
proposed the court should be provided with a settlement outcome report within 60
days of the settlement implementation process
being completed. This could be
filed by the settlement administrator or by the parties if the court had not
appointed an administrator.
We outlined a list of information that could be
provided in the report.
- 11.226 We
suggested it would be desirable for settlement outcome reports to be made
available to class members as well as the wider
public. This would help to
foster transparency and provide valuable public policy information on the extent
to which class actions
enable substantive access to justice and allow potential
issues for reform to be identified. While we recognised that settlements
are
usually confidential in ordinary civil litigation, there are differences in
class actions that make it appropriate to have settlement
outcomes made publicly
available.
- 11.227 We asked
submitters whether there should be an obligation to provide a settlement outcome
report to the court and whether this
should be made publicly
available.
Results of consultation
- 11.228 We
received 11 submissions on this
question.915F[916] There were 10
submitters who agreed there should be an obligation to provide a settlement
outcome report to the
court.916F[917] Bell Gully said
this is consistent with the court’s supervisory role. Nicole Smith said it
will be particularly important if
there are leftover funds to be distributed by
the court. Chapman Tripp said it did not oppose settlement outcome reports being
provided
to the court but cautioned against a report in one case being used for
settlement approval in another case, as settlements are fact-specific.
- 11.229 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia raised several questions about how the
process would work, including the level of
detail required in a report, the
effect on the litigation and settlement if a reporting question is not
sufficiently answered, and
whether the 60-day deadline could be extended.
- 11.230 Several
submitters supported reports being publicly available, with some saying this
should be subject to any confidentiality
orders imposed by the
court.917F[918] Bell Gully
acknowledged there may be circumstances where it is beneficial to make the
report public but said it should be determined
on a case-by-case basis and there
should not be a presumption in favour of reports being publicly available.
Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia said reports should be available by
making a request to the court registry.
- 11.231 Gilbert
Walker thought public reporting should only be at a general statistical level
and said default publication of settlement
amounts could have a chilling effect
on settlements.
- 11.232 Simpson
Grierson did not think settlement outcome reports should be made public. It said
the ability to resolve a claim on
a commercially confidential basis is often a
driver in reaching a settlement and defendants may be less willing to settle if
settlement
terms are made public. The Insurance Council said the settlement
amount and amounts paid to lawyers should remain confidential. It
said the risk
of a class member disclosing this information is not the same as a publicly
distributed report setting out detailed
settlement figures. However, in the
interests of transparency, the percentages deducted by the funder and lawyer
could be disclosed,
along with the percentage received by class members.
Recommendations
- R96 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the settlement administrator or the
parties (as appropriate) should file a settlement outcome
report with
information on the process and outcome of settlement implementation within 60
days of the settlement implementation process
being completed (or at a later
time if allowed by the court).
- R97 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule on the contents of a settlement
outcome report.
This could require the report to provide the best available information on the
following matters:
- The
total amount to be distributed.
- The
total number of class members (or an estimate if this is unknown).
- The
number of class members who received a payment from the settlement.
- The
number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for
this.
- The
size of payments received by class members (which could be provided in
bands).
- The
implementation of any non-monetary aspects of the settlement.
- The
cost of administering the settlement.
- The
amounts paid to litigation funders.
- The
amounts paid to the lawyer acting for the class.
- The
amount of unclaimed funds and how this was
distributed.
- R98 The
Ministry of Justice should make settlement outcome reports available on the
class actions webpage of ngā Kōti o Aotearoa
| Courts of New Zealand
website, subject to any confidentiality orders made by the court.
- 11.233 In the
Issues Paper, we noted there is limited evidence on the extent to which class
members achieve compensation or other
forms of substantive justice through
participating in a class
action.918F[919] We think it will
be practically difficult to assess whether a class actions regime is meeting the
objective of improving access to
justice without having information on the
outcome of settlements. We therefore recommend the Class Actions Act require the
settlement
administrator or the parties (as appropriate) to file a settlement
outcome report within 60 days of the settlement implementation
process being
completed, or at a later time if allowed by the
court.919F[920]
- 11.234 We
recommend the Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule on
the contents of the settlement outcome report.
We think there should be a degree
of flexibility, as some information may not be available to a settlement
administrator. For example,
the rule could require the report to provide the
best information available on:
(a) The total amount to be distributed.
(b) The total number of class members (or an estimate if this is unknown).
(c) The number of class members who received a payment from the settlement.
(d) The number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for
this.
(e) The size of payments received by class members (which could be provided in
bands).
(f) The implementation of any non-monetary aspects of the settlement.
(g) The cost of administering the settlement.
(h) The amounts paid to litigation funders.
(i) The amounts paid to lawyers.
(j) The amount of unclaimed funds and how this was distributed.
- 11.235 We think
settlement outcome reports should be made available to class members and to the
wider public. We recommend the Ministry
of Justice should make settlement
outcome reports available on the class actions webpage of the Courts of New
Zealand website, subject
to any confidentiality orders made by the court. While
we recognise that settlements are often confidential in ordinary civil
litigation,
there are differences in class actions that make it appropriate to
have information on settlement outcomes made publicly available:
(a) The settlement process is less private and confidential. Class action
settlements must be approved by the court, unlike ordinary
civil litigation. In
addition, a potentially large number of class members will have information
about the settlement terms.
(b) There is a broader public interest in knowing the extent to which class
actions fulfil the goals of improving access to justice
and managing multiple
claims in an efficient way. Settlement outcome reports might also identify
issues requiring law reform.
(c) It is important to provide procedural access to justice for class
members.920F[921] Transparency
about settlement outcomes will help to achieve that.
(d) A class action settlement may include deductions in legal fees, litigation
funding commission and other costs in circumstances
where class members did not
expressly sign up to a legal retainer or funding agreement. Transparency may
help to facilitate a competitive
litigation funding market There is also a
broader public interest in knowing the extent to which litigation funding
achieves its
access to justice objective.
- 11.236 We
anticipate the court could make confidentiality orders with respect to a
settlement outcome report, where it considers this
is appropriate. Even where
confidentiality is necessary in a particular case, it may not be necessary to
make the entire report confidential.
For example, the total settlement figure
could be confidential but information about class member payments could be made
available
in bands. To the extent possible, we think settlement outcome reports
should be made publicly available.
SETTLEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS
- 11.237 In
this section we discuss the following issues relating to individual
settlements:
(a) Defendant communications with individual class members about settlements.
(b) When individual settlements could effectively dispose of the class
action.
(c) When the representative plaintiff may settle their individual claim.
Defendant communications about settlement
- 11.238 The
defendant may want to contact class members directly about settling their
individual claims. In the Supplementary Issues
Paper, we proposed that after
certification, any individual settlement communications to class members from a
defendant should be
reviewed by the court. We said there is a risk that the
defendant may seek to unfairly settle a claim quickly and cheaply with
uninformed
class members during the opt-in/opt-out period. If the opt-in/opt-out
notice required court approval, we thought it was fair for
the court’s
supervisory power to attach to communications of a similar nature between the
defendant and the class. We anticipated
the court’s role would be to check
the communication properly characterises the class action and is not otherwise
unfair or
misleading.921F[922]
- 11.239 We asked
submitters whether the court should review defendant communications with class
members about individual settlements
after certification.
Results of consultation
- 11.240 We
received 11 submissions on this
issue.922F[923]
- 11.241 Three
submitters agreed the court should be required to review defendant
communications about individual
settlements.923F[924] Nicole Smith
said defendants should not be able to “pick off and settle” what
they consider to be the stronger or higher
value claims. Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said court oversight and supervision is
needed because of the unique nature
of class actions, and the potential
prejudice to individual class members and the class as a whole if individual
settlements are
not reviewed.
- 11.242 Five
submitters did not think the court should review defendant communications about
individual settlements.924F[925]
Bell Gully said this was unnecessary and would restrict the rights defendants
would have in any other proceeding. Gilbert Walker
said requiring court review
of every communication with actual or potential class members is unnecessary and
could be unduly burdensome.
It said class members should be as free as any other
litigant to take an earlier offer of compromise if they wish to do so. If the
court is to have a role in reviewing defendant communications, it thought this
should be limited to ensuring they are not misleading
and said the court should
not decide for class members that they should not receive or accept an offer.
Simpson Grierson said that,
if the lawyer was regarded as lawyer for the class,
it was unnecessary for the court to review any settlement communications between
the defendant and individual class members, but it thought the court would still
need to approve any final resolution.
- 11.243 Some
submitters thought a preferable option is to require a defendant to disclose any
individual settlement offer to the representative
plaintiff’s solicitor,
who could then advise on the offer or seek court intervention if
necessary.925F[926] Johnson &
Johnson and Shine Lawyers suggested the court could establish a protocol for
defendant communications with class
members.926F[927] The Insurance
Council thought the issue should be considered by the court at certification but
cautioned against court review of
communications becoming an onerous or
time-consuming process.
Recommendation
- R99 The
Class Actions Act should specify that any defendant communication with an
individual class member about settlement of their individual
claim must include
a statement about the class action that has been approved by the court.
- 11.244 It is
unlikely that a class member could individually settle their claim with the
defendant once they have decided to opt into
the class action, or they have not
opted out by required date. This is because their claims will be determined as
part of the class
action and an individual settlement could not lead to a full
and final settlement of the individual class member’s
claim.927F[928]
- 11.245 Therefore,
it will generally be necessary for any individual settlements with a class
member to be concluded during the opt-in/opt-out
period, while they are deciding
whether to participate in the class action. Class members should be free to
settle their individual
claim during this period if they wish. The issue is how
a defendant may communicate with individual class members about settlement.
In
Chapter 7, we recommend that after certification, a defendant’s lawyer
must direct class member communications to the lawyer
for the class. This is
because the lawyer is representing the class as a whole and the no-contact rule
applies.928F[929] This rule does
not apply to the defendant itself.
- 11.246 While we
originally proposed the court should have to approve communications about
settlement between the defendant and individual
class members, we now think this
approach may be unworkable. The defendant may have different approaches to
settlement for different
groups of class members, which could require the court
to review multiple settlement communications. This could be inefficient and
burdensome for the court. It may also be inappropriate for the court to be aware
of the terms of a settlement the defendant is prepared
to offer while the
litigation is ongoing.
- 11.247 We do not
see the court’s role as approving individual settlements with potential
class members. Rather, the court’s
role should be to ensure a
defendant’s communications will not mislead or confuse potential class
members. We therefore think
it is sufficient to recommend the Class Actions Act
specify that any defendant communication with a potential class member about
settlement of their individual claim must include a statement about the class
action that has been approved by the court. The defendant
could bring a single
application to have this text approved. Ideally this would occur at the same
time as the court approves the
opt-in or opt-out notice, to ensure the two
communications are aligned and will not confuse class
members.929F[930]
Where individual settlements could dispose of the proceeding
- 11.248 We
have identified an additional issue relating to individual settlements. If the
defendant enters into individual settlement
agreements with a significant number
of class members after certification, this could effectively dispose of the
proceeding. It would
be undesirable if individual settlements could be used to
avoid the settlement approval provisions we recommend. In Australia, courts
have
suggested the settlement approval provision might apply where individual
settlements are reached with all class
members.930F[931]
Recommendation
- R100 The
Class Actions Act should require the defendant to seek court approval of
individual settlements with potential class members
that are reached after
certification when there is a realistic prospect of the settlements effectively
disposing of the class action.
In determining whether to approve individual
settlements, the court should apply the class action settlement approval test
with any
necessary modifications.
- 11.249 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that, once a class action is
certified, the defendant must seek court approval
when there is a realistic
prospect that individual settlements will effectively dispose of the class
action. This could occur where
settlements are reached with virtually all class
members, or where the number of settlements means there is a risk of the class
action
no longer meeting the certification test (and the defendant seeking
decertification). In particular, if the post-settlement class
size is very
small, it could mean a class action is no longer an appropriate procedure for
the efficient resolution of class member
claims.
- 11.250 When
approval is sought for a large number of individual settlements, we consider the
court should apply the settlement approval
test with any necessary
modifications. For example, it is unlikely to be necessary to consider the
proposed method of dealing with
unclaimed funds.
- 11.251 We do not
think it is necessary for a defendant to seek approval for individual
settlements that are reached prior to certification,
even if reached with the
entire proposed class. At this point, there is no class action to dispose of,
only a proposed class action.
- 11.252 While we
have recommended that court approval should be required of a class action
settlement reached pre-certification, this
is necessary because individual class
members are not parties to the agreement. Court approval is necessary to
determine whether
a settlement is in the interest of class members who have not
agreed to the settlement but will be bound by it. The court also needs
to
determine certification for the purposes of settlement so it is clear who will
be bound by the agreement. The same rationale does
not apply to an individual
settlement, which is agreed to by the potential class member and will only bind
the parties to the agreement.
Settling the representative plaintiff’s claim
- 11.253 Another
issue we have identified is whether the representative plaintiff should be
allowed to settle their individual claim.
In Australia, a representative
plaintiff may settle their individual claim at any stage of the proceeding with
the leave of the court.931F[932]
The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules allow a representative plaintiff to
settle their individual claim in an opt-in class action,
but not in an opt-out
class action.932F[933]
- 11.254 We think
it would be problematic for a representative plaintiff to settle their
individual claim, as the proceeding will have
been certified on the basis of a
particular representative plaintiff being suitable and able to fairly and
adequately represent the
class. If the representative plaintiff seeks to
withdraw from the role, there is a risk of the class action being decertified.
This
means a defendant may have an incentive to settle the representative
plaintiff’s individual claim, potentially on more favourable
terms than it
would be willing to settle with other class members. This can create a conflict
of interest because the representative
plaintiff is required to act in what they
believe to be the best interests of the class.
Recommendation
- R101 The
Class Actions Act should specify that if the representative plaintiff wishes to
settle their individual claim, they must first
seek leave to withdraw as the
representative plaintiff.
- 11.255 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that if the representative
plaintiff wishes to settle their individual claim,
they must first seek leave to
withdraw as the representative
plaintiff.933F[934] The court
would need to consider whether there is another suitable person who can replace
them as representative plaintiff. If the
court grants the person leave to
withdraw as representative plaintiff, we think the person would become an
ordinary class member.
They should then have the same ability to settle their
individual claim as other class members. This means they can settle their
individual claim and withdraw from the class action prior to the close of the
opt-in/opt-out date. After this point, they can only
opt out of the class action
with the leave of the court, which we have said should be limited to
circumstances where the interests
of justice require it. We think it would be
unfair if the representative plaintiff had a greater opportunity to settle their
individual
claim than other class members given their role is to act in what
they believe to be the best interests of the class.
COURT APPROVAL OF DISCONTINUANCE OF A CLASS ACTION
- 11.256 In
the Supplementary Issues Paper, we proposed court approval should be required to
discontinue both opt-in and opt-out class
actions, as this will bring the
proceedings to an end for class members. We thought there should be a separate
provision requiring
approval of a discontinuance because our proposed settlement
provisions included detailed procedures that would not be
applicable.934F[935]
- 11.257 We asked
submitters whether the court should be required to approve the discontinuance of
a class action.
Results of consultation
- 11.258 We
received ten submissions on this question, with all submitters agreeing court
approval of discontinuance should be
required.935F[936] Several
submitters noted that a decision to discontinue a class action will affect all
class members and that approval should be
required as with settlement.
- 11.259 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia discussed the test that should apply to
discontinuance and noted Australian courts
had taken two different approaches to
this test. It suggested our proposed settlement test could apply to
discontinuance, without
the list of factors. It also noted the legal consequence
of discontinuance is materially distinct to that of a settlement. Discontinuance
is a unilateral act that does not bind the class members for the purpose of
extinguishing rights but merely puts them back in their
original position.
Recommendations
- R102 The
Class Actions Act should specify that a representative plaintiff must obtain
court approval to discontinue a class action. When
considering whether to
approve the discontinuance of a class action, the court should consider whether
discontinuance will prejudice
the interests of class members.
- R103 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the provisions on settlement approval
apply where there is an agreement between the representative
plaintiff and one
or more defendants that will have the effect of extinguishing some or all class
member claims.
- 11.260 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that a representative plaintiff
must obtain court approval to discontinue
a class action. This is because the
discontinuance will bring the proceeding to an end for class members. In both
Australia and Canada,
court approval is required to discontinue a class
action.936F[937] Leave is also
required to discontinue a representative action in Aotearoa New Zealand, at
least in opt-out
proceedings.937F[938]
- 11.261 We have
considered what the appropriate test for discontinuance should be. In Australia,
one line of cases has considered whether
the proposed discontinuance is fair and
reasonable and in the interests of class members as a
whole.938F[939] Other cases have
considered whether the proposed discontinuance is unfair, unreasonable or
adverse to the interests of class
members.939F[940] The latter
approach has been described as considering whether class members will be
disadvantaged by a discontinuance, rather than
whether it will be positively in
their interests.940F[941] In
Ontario, the court’s key concern when considering an application to
discontinue a class action is whether the interests
of class members will be
prejudiced or whether any prejudice is mitigated. A discontinuance does not have
to be beneficial or in
the best interests of class
members.941F[942]
- 11.262 The
effect of a unilateral discontinuance of a class action is different to an
agreed settlement of a class action. As summarised
in one Australian case, when
a class action is unilaterally
discontinued:942F[943]
(a) Class members will be free to commence a new proceeding against the same
defendant if they wish.
(b) There is no agreement compromising the proceeding and so no merger of class
members’ rights.
(c) If there has not been a judicial determination, there will be no res
judicata or issue estoppel.
- 11.263 The legal
consequences of a settlement will be more significant for class members than
discontinuance, as it will be binding
on class members and will bar them from
bringing their own proceedings against the defendant on the same cause of
action.943F[944]
- 11.264 The
practical implications of the court declining to approve the application may
also differ. Where the parties are seeking
to have a settlement agreement
approved, the alternative will usually involve the parties continuing with the
litigation and proceeding
to a hearing. Where the representative plaintiff
applies to discontinue the class action, it may be practically unable to
continue
with the litigation, perhaps because it no longer has sufficient
resources. Therefore, the alternative may be for the proceedings
to be
abandoned.
- 11.265 Because
of these differences, we do not think the settlement test we recommend should
apply to a discontinuance. The representative
plaintiff should not have to
demonstrate that discontinuing the class action will be positively in the
interests of class members.
We think this would be too high a threshold. In many
cases it will be in class members’ interests for the class action to
continue,
but this may not align with realities such as an inability to continue
funding the litigation. Instead, we think the absence of disadvantage
to class
members is the relevant consideration, in line with the Ontario approach and
some of the Australian
authorities.944F[945] We
recommend the court consider whether discontinuing a class action would
prejudice the interests of class members. If a discontinuance
would prejudice
the interests of class members, the court could make orders to protect the
interests of class members. For example,
if the discontinuance is due to lack of
funding, the court might grant a stay of proceedings to see if alternative
funding could
be arranged. Alternatively, it could order further notice to class
members to provide them with information on the consequences of
the class action
being discontinued and the options open to them.
- 11.266 We
consider the discontinuance test should apply when a class action is being
discontinued without any agreement that would
have the effect of extinguishing
class member claims.
- 11.267 We
recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the settlement approval
provisions apply where there is an agreement
between the representative
plaintiff and one or more defendants that has the effect of extinguishing some
or all class member claims.
A settlement of a class action will not necessarily
extinguish all class member claims. In a case with multiple defendants, a
settlement
may be reached with only some class members. A settlement could also
be reached with a sub-class.
- 11.268 A
settlement agreement will generally have a term requiring the class action to be
discontinued. We do not consider the court
would need to separately apply the
discontinuance test given it has already determined the settlement is fair,
reasonable and in
the interests of the
class.945F[946]
DRAFT SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
- 11.269 Below
we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect to our
recommendations on settlement.
12 Settlement of class action
(1) The settlement of a class action proceeding is
not binding unless approved by a court.
(2) An application for approval of a settlement must be made by the
representative plaintiff or proposed representative plaintiff
if the application
is made prior to certification.
13 Settlement application before certification of
proceeding
(1) This
section applies if an application for approval of a settlement is made before
the certification of a class action proceeding.
(2) Before considering that application, the court must consider whether the
proceeding meets the requirements of section 4 (with any necessary
modifications), and if the court considers the application does so, for the
purposes of settlement it must—
(a) certify the proceeding as a class action proceeding; and
(b) appoint 1 or more representative plaintiffs.
14 Approval of settlement
The court must approve
the settlement if it is satisfied that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
in the interests of the class,
and when making that assessment the court must
consider—
(a) the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including—
(i) the type of relief that will be provided to class members, and if this
includes monetary relief, the total amount of that monetary
relief; and
(ii) how the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class
members; and
(iii) whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other;
and
(iv) the proposed method of determining the entitlement of individual class
members; and
(v) any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement; and
(vi) the proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts;
and
(b) any legal fees and funding commission that may be deducted from the relief
payable to class members; and
(c) any information that is readily available to the court about the potential
risks, costs, and benefits of continuing with the
proceeding; and
(d) any views of class members; and
(e) any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest; and
(f) any other factors it considers relevant.
15 Steps following approval of settlement
(1) If
the court approves a settlement under section 14, it—
(a) may order that a class member may opt out of the settlement, but only
if—
(i) opting out is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or
(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more
class members be given the opportunity to opt out of
the settlement; and
(b) may order that a person who was eligible to become a class member but did
not do so (an eligible person) may opt in to the settlement, but only
if—
(i) opting in is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or
(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more
eligible persons be given the opportunity to opt in
to the settlement; and
(c) must describe which class members will be bound by the settlement.
(2) A settlement is binding on the parties to the settlement and all class
members described by the court under subsection (1)(c) on and from the
date of the court order approving the settlement.
16 Administration and implementation of
settlement
(1) The court retains the
jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of a settlement it
approves under section 14.
(2) The court may appoint a person as an administrator to implement the
settlement.
(3) The court may make any other order it considers appropriate for the
administration and implementation of the settlement.
(4) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an
administrator) must file a report with information about the
process and outcome
of the implementation of the settlement within 60 days of the implementation
process being completed or at a
later time if allowed by the court.
17 Appointment of counsel to assist court or
expert
(1) The court may appoint
counsel to assist the court or a court expert if it considers this will assist
the court to assess whether
a settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the
interests of the class.
(2) The court may order that 1 or more of the parties pay part or all of the
costs of the counsel or expert.
CHAPTER 12
Adverse costs in class actions
INTRODUCTION
- 12.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Whether the adverse costs rule should apply in class actions.
(b) Costs liability for certification.
(c) Calculating costs in class actions.
(d) Class member liability for costs.
THE ADVERSE COSTS RULE
- 12.2 A
general principle of civil litigation in Aotearoa New Zealand is that the
unsuccessful party must pay costs to the successful
party in a proceeding or
interlocutory proceeding, which we refer to as adverse
costs.946F[947] In the Issues
Paper we discussed whether this rule should also apply to class actions.
- 12.3 We noted
that other jurisdictions have taken different approaches to this
issue:947F[948]
(a) Australia applies an adverse costs rule in civil litigation, including in
relation to its class actions regimes.
(b) A ‘no costs’ rule applies to class actions in the United States,
meaning the successful party is generally not entitled
to claim costs from the
unsuccessful party.
(c) The Canadian jurisdictions have taken different approaches, with several
provinces (including Ontario) retaining an adverse costs
rule for class actions
and other provinces (including British Columbia) adopting a no costs rule.
(d) While the United Kingdom (UK) Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules do not
specify that the unsuccessful party must pay adverse costs,
the Tribunal has
taken the approach that this should be its starting point.
- 12.4 In overseas
class actions regimes where adverse costs are payable, it is the representative
plaintiff who is liable for any costs
award rather than class
members.948F[949] Similarly, in
cases under rule 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR), the courts have said
it is the representative plaintiff who
has costs liability and individual group
members are generally not exposed to the risk of an adverse costs
order.949F[950]
- 12.5 An adverse
costs rule can have the benefits of compensating successful litigants for some
of their costs, encouraging parties
to settle, discouraging frivolous or
vexatious claims and discouraging inappropriate litigation
behaviour.950F[951] However,
having to bear the risk of adverse costs creates a significant financial
disincentive to taking on the role of representative
plaintiff and may deter
class actions. It might also affect litigation decisions, such as a plaintiff
deciding not to pursue certain
interlocutory applications or abandoning an
appeal in exchange for the defendant not pursuing costs. While in other
jurisdictions
a representative plaintiff generally obtains an indemnity for
adverse costs (such as from a litigation funder, law firm, after-the-event
insurer or public fund), this comes at a cost to the class in the form of an
increased fee or share of damages being paid to the
indemnifier.
- 12.6 In the
Issues Paper, we said if the adverse costs rule applies to class actions, the
representative plaintiff may be required
to provide security for those costs. We
also noted the issue of whether a class member could be required to contribute
to security
for
costs.951F[952]
- 12.7 The Issues
Paper identified several alternatives to, or variations on, the adverse costs
rule for class
actions:952F[953]
(a) A no costs rule, where the successful party is generally not entitled to
claim costs from the unsuccessful party. This could
be subject to limited
exceptions.
(b) A no costs rule for certain stages of the proceeding, such as
certification.
(c) A one-way costs shifting rule, where the defendant but not the plaintiff is
liable for adverse costs if they are unsuccessful.
(d) A different costs scale for class actions, or a power for the court to set a
maximum costs level.
(e) Specifying considerations that a court may take into account when
determining costs in a class action.
- 12.8 We also
noted that a public class action fund could provide an indemnity for adverse
costs to representative
plaintiffs.953F[954] We discuss
this option in Chapter 18.
- 12.9 We asked
submitters how the risk of adverse costs had impacted on representative actions.
We also asked if the adverse costs
rules should be retained for class actions or
whether reform is desirable.
Results of Consultation
Adverse costs in representative actions
- 12.10 Nine
submissions discussed how the risk of adverse costs has impacted on
representative actions.954F[955]
Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand said the risk
of adverse costs may have deterred meritless representative
actions from being
pursued. Tom Weston QC said adverse costs have created a fair balance between
plaintiffs and defendants. Bell
Gully and Simpson Grierson did not think the
risk of adverse costs has impacted on cases to date, because most have been
backed by
litigation funders that have provided a costs
indemnity.955F[956]
- 12.11 LPF Group
and Omni Bridgeway considered the adverse costs rule had negative effects for
representative actions by making it
difficult to bring
cases.956F[957] Nevertheless, Omni
Bridgeway supported retaining the adverse costs rule for class actions as it
deterred frivolous or meritless cases.
- 12.12 The
results of our survey of group members in representative actions indicates that
the lack of group member liability for adverse
costs is seen as a benefit of
this form of litigation over individual
proceedings.957F[958] However,
Meredith Connell referred to prospective group members declining to opt into a
representative action because of concern
about potential costs exposure, even
where the representative plaintiff had obtained an adverse costs indemnity.
Adverse costs in class actions
- 12.13 Thirteen
submitters favoured retaining the adverse costs rule for all stages of class
actions.958F[959] Reasons given by
submitters included:
(a) Adverse costs discourage frivolous, vexatious and speculative claims. They
also encourage plaintiffs to assess the merits of
their claim before
proceeding.
(b) Adverse costs discourage inappropriate litigation behaviour.
(c) There is no principled basis to treat class actions differently from any
other kind of civil proceeding.
(d) The risk of adverse costs can encourage parties to settle.
(e) Awarding adverse costs enables successful litigants to be compensated for
some of their costs.
(f) Adverse costs ensure the parties are treated equally and fairly,
particularly compared to a one-way costs rule.
(g) A defendant has no choice about whether they are part of litigation and is
not necessarily more able to pay costs than a plaintiff.
- 12.14 Some of
the submitters who supported adverse costs also thought some reforms to costs
rules were desirable, to reflect the special
nature of class actions. Several
submitters supported a new scale of costs for class actions, to reflect their
size and the increased
time it takes to complete each
step.959F[960] Nikki Chamberlain
(Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland) and Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia supported having
factors the court could consider when
deciding whether to award adverse costs. In addition, the Insurance Council
considered that
an exception to adverse costs could apply for public law class
actions that involve non-monetary claims. Carter Holt Harvey suggested
that in
funded class actions, the funder should be directly liable for costs on a full
indemnity for reasonable costs basis. In addition,
Bell Gully supported the
court being able to make a costs order against a litigation funder.
- 12.15 Several
submitters identified ways of mitigating the impact of adverse costs on a
representative plaintiff, including:
(a) The ability to access litigation funding or after-the-event
insurance.960F[961]
(b) Requiring litigation funding agreements to contain a complete costs
indemnity for the representative
plaintiff.961F[962]
(c) A ‘group costs order’ as in Victoria, where a lawyer acting on a
contingency fee basis is liable for adverse
costs.962F[963]
(d) A public class action fund that could indemnify representative
plaintiffs.963F[964]
- 12.16 There were
several submissions addressing security for
costs.964F[965] Nikki Chamberlain
said class members should not be liable for security for costs as they have no
obligation to pay adverse costs
and no control over the proceeding. Other
submitters referred to the importance of security for costs for protecting
defendants.
Submitters also provided feedback on security for costs in funded
proceedings in response to a separate question, which we discuss
in Chapter 15.
- 12.17 Associate
Professor Barry Allan (Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo | University of Otago)
preferred having no costs for certification,
but adverse costs applying after
this. Nicole Smith supported having no adverse costs at the initial stage of the
proceedings (until
court review of arrangements). Three submitters supported a
no costs regime, including because adverse costs could deter vulnerable
groups
from bringing class
actions.965F[966]
- 12.18 Although
the Supplementary Issues Paper did not ask any specific questions relating to
adverse costs in class actions, several
submitters made suggestions on costs,
including:
(a) Having a separate costs regime or provision for increases to existing scale
costs for class
actions.966F[967]
(b) Capping costs in class
actions.967F[968]
(c) Requiring the plaintiff to acknowledge they are aware of and understand
their costs obligations before the substantive proceeding
commences.968F[969]
(d) An express legislative power for a court to make a public interest costs
order, which could involve no costs, lower costs or
a cap on costs payable by
unsuccessful representative
plaintiffs.969F[970]
(e) Costs in concurrent class actions being
addressed.970F[971]
- 12.19 Issues
relating to costs were also raised by several consultation workshop
participants, including:
(a) Suggesting there should be a cap on the costs that could be claimed.
(b) Commenting that personal costs liability is a disincentive to taking on the
role of representative plaintiff.
(c) Proposing that a class actions regime should specify that class members are
generally not liable for costs (although other participants
thought this was
unnecessary).
Recommendation
- R104 The
existing costs provisions in the High Court Rules should apply to class
actions.
- 12.20 We
consider the adverse costs rule should apply to class actions. We acknowledge
the risk of adverse costs may be a barrier
to litigants wanting to commence a
class action. However, we are not convinced that removing an adverse costs rule
is likely to make
it feasible to bring a wider range of class action cases in
Aotearoa New Zealand. This is because potential claimants would still
need to
have a means of paying for legal fees and disbursements. We think this, rather
than the risk of adverse costs, is likely
to be the more significant barrier to
bringing a class action.971F[972]
In many cases, claimants will need to have litigation funding for a class action
to proceed and there is an established practice
of litigation funders providing
an indemnity for adverse costs.
- 12.21 Some
jurisdictions with class actions regimes allow lawyers to charge fees on a
contingency basis, where the lawyer will be
paid a percentage of any damages
award or settlement and will not be paid if the claim is unsuccessful. In Canada
and the United
States, contingency fees are the predominant method of funding
class actions.972F[973] Where
class actions are funded by contingency fees, removing an adverse costs rule
could make a greater impact on improving access
to justice. We expect the impact
would be much more limited in Aotearoa New Zealand because contingency fees are
not permitted.973F[974] There may
be cases where a lawyer is prepared to act on a pro bono or conditional fee
basis and so removing the risk of adverse costs
would enable a case to proceed.
However, given the high costs of running a class action, we do not expect it
will be common for lawyers
to provide legal representation on this basis.
- 12.22 There are
also benefits to applying an adverse costs rule to class actions, including
enabling successful litigants to be compensated
for some of their costs,
ensuring that plaintiffs and defendants are treated equally, deterring meritless
cases, facilitating settlements
and discouraging improper litigation behaviour.
The adverse costs principle is well established in Aotearoa New Zealand and
there
was little support from submitters for moving to a no costs rule or a
one-way costs shifting rule.
- 12.23 We have
considered whether a class actions regime should specify considerations that
should be taken into account when costs
decisions are made, such as access to
justice. We prefer to allow courts the flexibility to take into account any
matter they consider
relevant in the context of a particular case. We note the
High Court Rules allow a judge to make an order for no costs, or reduced
costs,
where the proceedings concern a matter of public
importance.974F[975]
Mitigating the impact on a representative plaintiff
- 12.24 Because
the representative plaintiff is a party to the class action (and class members
are not), they will be liable for any
adverse costs award made in favour of the
defendant. We have considered the impact of the adverse costs rule on the
representative
plaintiff and how to mitigate this. The costs consequences for
the representative plaintiff in a class action are unique by comparison
to other
civil litigation.975F[976] As
explained by the Victorian Law Reform Commission, “[t]he financial risks
that the representative plaintiff takes on are
disproportionate not only to the
risks borne by other class members, but also to the value of their own
claim”.976F[977] Having to
bear the risk of adverse costs creates a significant disincentive to taking on
the role of representative
plaintiff.977F[978]
- 12.25 This
report makes several recommendations that are designed to respond to this
concern. Our proposed certification test requires
the court to consider whether
the proposed representative plaintiff is aware of the duty and responsibilities
of the role, including
their potential liability for adverse costs. In Chapter
3, we recommend the representative plaintiff must receive independent legal
advice on the duty and responsibilities of the role.
- 12.26 Where a
class action is funded, we expect that a litigation funder would provide an
indemnity to the representative plaintiff
for adverse costs. In Chapter 17, in
the context of court approval of funding agreements, we recommend the court
should consider
the extent of any adverse costs indemnity provided to a
representative plaintiff as part of its review of whether a litigation funding
agreement is fair and reasonable. In Chapter 15, we recommend Te Komiti mō
ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court
Rule to create a rebuttable presumption in funded class actions that the
representative plaintiff will provide
security for costs (although in reality it
is likely to be the funder that meets this cost). We also recommend the Rules
Committee
consider developing a rule to expressly empower the court, in all
funded proceedings, to make orders directly against the litigation
funder for
the provision of security for costs and payment of adverse costs. This will help
to protect the representative plaintiff
as well as the defendant.
- 12.27 We also
propose a class action fund in Chapter 18. Where available, the fund would
enable a representative plaintiff to receive
an indemnity for adverse costs, as
well as funding for legal costs.
COSTS LIABILITY FOR CERTIFICATION
- 12.28 In
Chapter 6, we recommend the Class Actions Act should require certification
before a case can proceed as a class action. Because
of the unique and mandatory
nature of the certification stage, we have considered whether the normal adverse
costs rules should apply
to certification or whether a different approach is
appropriate, such as costs lying where they fall or costs in the cause.
- 12.29 We
discussed the issue of costs for certification briefly in the Issues
Paper.978F[979]
Costs lie where they fall approach
- 12.30 We
have considered whether costs should lie where they fall for certification,
which is the approach recommended by the Law
Commission of
Ontario.979F[980] This approach
would recognise that certification is very different to a normal interlocutory
application, because it is a threshold
requirement for a class action which is
required by the legislation. We do not favour this as a blanket rule because we
think the
benefits of an adverse costs rule, such as deterring meritless
litigation, are particularly important at certification. Having an
adverse costs
rule for certification will encourage a plaintiff (and their lawyer) to
carefully consider the merits of a case before
proceeding. It will also
encourage a defendant to consider how it responds to an application for
certification, including whether
to oppose it. We do not consider removing an
adverse costs rule for certification would have a significant impact on access
to justice,
because a plaintiff will still need to have a means of funding the
litigation and be able to pay any adverse costs ordered at other
stages of the
proceeding.
- 12.31 Where a
defendant does not oppose certification, we think costs should normally lie
where they fall. This is consistent with
the High Court Rules, which provide for
costs to be payable on opposed interlocutory
applications.980F[981] We also
note that in Ontario, a court may exercise its discretion to order no costs, or
costs in the cause, where the defendant consents
to certification or does not
oppose.981F[982]
- 12.32 Even where
a defendant does not oppose certification, the court will still need to be
satisfied that the certification test
is met and consider matters such as
whether there is a suitable representative plaintiff who would fairly and
adequately represent
the class. The plaintiff will therefore incur costs in
having a class action certified. However, we would expect the costs to be
lower
where an application is unopposed. In some cases, the court may be able to
determine an unopposed certification application
on the papers.
Costs in the cause approach
- 12.33 Where
an application for certification is opposed, we think it will usually be
appropriate for an award of costs to be made.
In cases where a certification
application is successful, a question arises as to whether costs should be
payable immediately or
deferred for
later.982F[983]
- 12.34 The court
could follow the usual approach to costs in opposed interlocutory applications,
where costs are fixed and payable
after the application has been determined
(unless there are “special reasons to the
contrary”).983F[984] This
approach reflects the fact that the merits of a particular interlocutory
application and the merits of the substantive proceedings
are different
matters.984F[985] The court can
subsequently reverse, discharge or vary an order for costs on an interlocutory
application if it considers the original
order should not have been
made.985F[986] If this approach is
applied, a plaintiff would be entitled to adverse costs following a
court’s decision to grant certification.
- 12.35 We have
considered whether a different approach would be appropriate for certification.
A benefit of having costs in interlocutory
applications immediately follow the
event is that it may discourage unnecessary applications and make parties face
the consequences
of applications that were unnecessarily made or opposed. This
policy rationale does not apply in the same way to certification, which
we
recommend should be a mandatory stage of the class actions
regime.986F[987] It may not be
desirable to discourage defendants from contesting certification, as the
court’s task in deciding on certification
may benefit from hearing from
both parties.987F[988]
- 12.36 The costs
of certification could be made ‘costs in the cause’. This would mean
the party who is ultimately unsuccessful
in the substantive proceeding is liable
to pay costs for
certification.988F[989] There are
numerous examples of courts in Aotearoa New Zealand making orders that costs on
particular applications are to be costs
in the
cause.989F[990]
- 12.37 This was
the approach taken by Te Kōti Matua | High Court in Strathboss Kiwifruit
v Attorney-General, which was a representative action under HCR 4.24. The
Court commented that if the defendant was subsequently successful in defending
the litigation, it might legitimately complain that it should not have faced
adverse costs for responding to preliminary steps that
were only required
because the plaintiffs chose to bring their case as a funded representative
action. It therefore deferred the
costs entitlement on the preliminary
applications and made them costs in the
cause.990F[991] In another
representative action, Ross v Southern Response, the costs of giving
notice to group members were held to be costs in the
cause.991F[992]
- 12.38 An
argument in favour of costs in the cause is that if a defendant is successful at
the substantive hearing, it may be unfair
that they have paid the
plaintiff’s costs for bringing their case in this way. It also recognises
the differences between certification
and other forms of interlocutory
application, as discussed above.
- 12.39 Factors
against taking a costs in the cause approach to certification include:
(a) An application for certification would be a requirement of the Class Actions
Act, rather than an application the plaintiff chooses
to bring.
(b) A plaintiff who is ultimately successful may have to wait several years to
claim their entitlement to costs for certification.
This means they are unable
to use this money for the costs of running the litigation.
(c) It may incentivise a defendant to challenge every point rather than
consenting to certification or conceding that some aspects
of the certification
test are met.
(d) Just because a plaintiff is ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, that
does not mean the case should never have been
certified.992F[993] A class action
may still have been an efficient way of resolving a legal issue that applies to
a large number of claimants and may
have even been of benefit to the defendant
compared to defending many individual claims.
- 12.40 We
consider the court should have a high degree of discretion as to costs awards in
class actions, as with other civil litigation.
This will allow courts to respond
to the needs and circumstances of a particular case.
- 12.41 We do not
favour a general rule in favour of certification costs being costs in the cause.
Such a rule may be unfair to plaintiffs,
lead to defendants opposing every
aspect of certification as a matter of course and unnecessarily fetter the
court’s discretion
with respect to costs. However, we do not rule out the
possibility that a ‘costs in the cause’ order may be appropriate
in
some cases. An example might be where the certification hearing largely focused
on whether there was a reasonably arguable cause
of action.
Costs where there are concurrent class actions
- 12.42 In
Chapter 5, we recommend that the court should consider the applications for
certification of concurrent class actions together.
We think the court should
have discretion as to how costs are allocated, to reflect the outcome of the
hearing. We anticipate the
court might take the following approach to costs:
(a) Where the court finds that a particular class action does not meet the test
for certification, the unsuccessful applicant may
face an order to pay costs to
the defendant.
(b) Where the court finds that two concurrent class actions meet the test for
certification but only one should be certified, the
defendant may face an order
to pay costs to the successful representative plaintiff. Costs could lie where
they fall with respect
to the unsuccessful representative plaintiff’s
application for certification.
(c) Where the court finds that two concurrent class actions meet the test for
certification and both should be certified, the defendant
may face an order to
pay costs to both representative plaintiffs.
CALCULATING COSTS IN CLASS ACTIONS
- R105 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
amendments to Schedule 3 of the High Court Rules to provide
a specific time
allocation for certification.
- 12.43 When an
adverse costs order is made in a class action, the court will need to determine
the allowable amounts. We consider that
the usual daily recovery rates and time
allocations should apply to class actions, as many steps in a class action will
be similar
to other types of civil
litigation.993F[994] We think it
is unnecessary to have a separate scale of costs for class actions. While class
actions will often be complex, the costs
rules provide for categorisation of
proceedings.994F[995] We see no
need for a special category just for class actions and think these cases will
often be similar in complexity to other category
3 proceedings. Although class
action hearings may take longer than other hearings, the schedule will allow for
this because the costs
allocation for appearing at a hearing is based on hearing
duration. The High Court also has flexibility to deal with situations where
scale costs do not cover a particular
step.995F[996]
- 12.44 We think
it would, however, be desirable to add a time allocation for certification to
the list in Schedule 3 of the High Court
Rules. We consider preparing for
certification is likely to be more involved than a usual interlocutory hearing,
so a specific allocation
is desirable. We do not think it is necessary to have a
specific time allocation for a settlement approval hearing. We envisage that
costs will normally lie where they fall for settlement approval, given that both
the plaintiff and defendant will be supporting the
application.
- 12.45 We
considered the suggestion that there should be a maximum level of costs payable
in class actions but concluded that would
be unfair to the successful party. A
party does not always have complete control over legal costs, as some will arise
from responding
to issues raised by the other party. We also think the system of
having time allocations for steps in civil litigation provides some
predictability as to the costs that can be ordered and discourages parties from
unnecessarily incurring costs.
CLASS MEMBER LIABILITY FOR COSTS
- 12.46 A
usual feature of a class action is that the representative plaintiff is liable
for any adverse costs award in favour of the
defendant since they are a party to
the litigation. Class members, who are not parties, are not generally liable for
adverse costs.
- 12.47 Courts in
Aotearoa New Zealand have held that group members in representative actions are
not exposed to the risk of an adverse
costs
award.996F[997] This is despite
the court having jurisdiction to make non-party costs
awards.997F[998] Nonetheless, some
submitters said that potential group members may be reluctant to join a
representative action because of a concern
that they may be liable for
costs.998F[999] We therefore think
it would be desirable for the class actions regime to provide clarity on class
member liability for costs.
- 12.48 In
Australia, class actions legislation provides that the court may not award costs
against a class member except in the case
of issues determined on a sub-group or
individual basis.999F[1000] The
Ontario legislation specifies that class members, other than the representative
plaintiff, are not liable for costs except with
respect to the determination of
their own individual
claims.1000F[1001] The purpose
of the provision is to insulate class members from the costs of stages in a
class action where they do not participate
as a matter of
course.1001F[1002] The court can
also award costs where it grants leave to a class member to participate in a
proceeding.1002F[1003] The UK
Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules provide that costs may not be awarded to or
against class members, except with respect to
issues determined on an individual
basis, applications made by a class member or issues determined on a sub-group
basis (in the latter
case, only the sub-group plaintiff is liable for
costs).1003F[1004]
Recommendation
- R106 The
Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule specifying that the
court may not order a class member (other than
the representative plaintiff) to
pay costs except:
- With
respect to the determination of an individual issue applying to the class
member.
- With
respect to the determination of sub-class issues, where the class member has
been appointed as the sub-class representative plaintiff.
- Where
the class member is the applicant or respondent with respect to an interlocutory
application or is otherwise granted leave to
appear in the class action, with
respect to that application or appearance.
- 12.49 We think
it would be desirable for the High Court Rules to expressly provide that a class
member cannot be liable for costs
except in three circumstances.
- 12.50 First,
where the court determines an issue that relates only to the claims of an
individual class member. This might be an issue
relating to causation or loss,
such as whether a misrepresentation induced the class member to enter into a
contract.1004F[1005] We imagine
it would be relatively unusual for a court to determine such issues on an
individual basis, given how time-consuming this
would be in a large class
action.1005F[1006] Individual
issues such as whether a particular person’s claim is limitation-barred
might also need to be
determined.1006F[1007]
- 12.51 Second,
where the class member is a sub-class representative plaintiff and the court is
determining an issue on a sub-class
basis. In this situation, the class member
is taking on the role of the representative plaintiff for the purposes of the
sub-class
issue and it is appropriate for them to have costs liability. In
Chapter 8, we expressed the view that a sub-class representative
plaintiff
should have to meet the requirement of being a suitable person who will fairly
and adequately represent the sub-class.
A relevant factor will be whether they
understand the duty and responsibilities of the role, including as to
costs.1007F[1008]
- 12.52 The third
situation is where a class member has brought an interlocutory application, is
the respondent to an application or
is otherwise granted leave to participate in
the proceeding. One example is where a class member is dissatisfied with the way
the
class action is being run and seeks an order from the court, such as an
order to replace the representative plaintiff. Another example
is where the
court grants leave to a class member to object at a settlement hearing. We do
not wish to suggest an objecting class
member should face adverse costs as a
matter of course, but there may be circumstances where this is appropriate, such
as where the
objection was meritless or vexatious.
- 12.53 In these
situations, the class member will have conduct of the application or issue
rather than the representative plaintiff,
so we think it is reasonable for them
to assume costs liability. We think the lawyer for the class (or any other
lawyer acting for
the class member) should advise the class member of the
possibility that adverse costs will be ordered against them.
- 12.54 As well as
clarifying the position in the High Court Rules, we consider the notice to class
members should clearly explain to
class members the circumstances in which they
can have costs
liability.1008F[1009]
Class member liability for security for costs
- 12.55 In
the Issues Paper we noted that courts in Australia have taken different
approaches to whether a class member can be required
to contribute to security
for costs. We noted the Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended amending the
Victorian class actions
regime to specify that the court may not order a class
member to provide security for
costs.1009F[1010]
- 12.56 We
anticipate that many class actions will be supported by a litigation funder. In
Chapter 15, we recommend the Rules Committee
consider developing a new High
Court Rule to create a rebuttable presumption that funded representative
plaintiffs will provide security
for costs in funded class actions. We also
recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a rule empowering the court to
order
costs, including security for costs, directly against a litigation funder.
If, as we recommend in Chapter 18, a class action fund
is established, the terms
of funding could include payment of any security for costs required. Therefore,
the issue of whether class
members should contribute to security for costs will
generally only arise in unfunded cases. This will include cases that are always
intended to be brought on an unfunded basis, as well as cases where a litigation
funder withdraws partway through the proceeding
and prior to paying security for
costs.
- 12.57 For a
class member to feel confident about joining a class action, they need to have
some certainty about the potential costs
implications. We think it would
undermine our recommendation that a costs order cannot be made against a class
member (except in
specific circumstances) if a class member faces the risk of a
security for costs order.
- 12.58 We
consider a security for costs order should only be available against a class
member in circumstances where they may have
liability for adverse costs (and
where the test for security for costs is met). This means security for costs
should not be ordered
against class members with respect to determination of the
common issues. In some circumstances it might be appropriate to order
security
for costs against a class member who is acting as sub-class representative
plaintiff or where a class member’s individual
issues are being
determined.
- 12.59 This does
not prevent class members from voluntarily agreeing to contribute to security
for costs. In an opt-in case, there
may be an agreement between class members
and the representative plaintiff as to how the costs of the proceeding will be
met, which
could include all class members contributing to security for costs.
Or in a situation where a litigation funder withdraws from a
case and there is a
security for costs order that must be met, class members might agree to
contribute to this security to ensure
the case can proceed.
CHAPTER 13
Abolishing maintenance and champerty
INTRODUCTION
- 13.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) The advantages and disadvantages of litigation funding.
(b) Our conclusion that litigation funding is desirable for Aotearoa New Zealand
in principle.
(c) Uncertainty in the law about whether litigation funding is permitted.
(d) Our recommendation that the torts of maintenance and champerty be abolished.
DESIRABILITY OF LITIGATION FUNDING IN PRINCIPLE
- 13.2 In
the Issues Paper, we identified potential advantages of litigation funding,
including:1010F[1011]
(a) Improving access to justice for plaintiffs by alleviating the costs of
litigation and “levelling the playing field”
in litigation against
well-resourced defendants.
(b) Reducing the financial risks of litigation for plaintiffs, particularly the
risk of an adverse costs order if the litigation
is unsuccessful.
(c) Allowing plaintiffs to stay focused on activities other than litigation, for
example allowing commercial plaintiffs to stay focused
on their core
business.
(d) Expanding financing options in respect of litigation.
(e) The availability of a funder’s litigation expertise and experience.
(f) Providing defendants with confidence that their costs will be met by the
funder if they are successful.
- 13.3 We also
discussed potential disadvantages of litigation funding, including:
(a) The risk that the court system may become burdened with an increase in
litigation, for example additional representative or class
actions.
(b) The risk of encouraging meritless litigation.
(c) Impacts on the availability and affordability of directors and officers
liability insurance (D&O insurance).
- 13.4 We
expressed the preliminary view that litigation funding is desirable in
principle, provided concerns about it (for example,
funder control, conflicts of
interest, funder profits and capital adequacy) can be adequately managed. We
expressed the view that
the advantages of litigation funding, particularly its
potential to improve access to justice, outweigh its potential disadvantages.
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER LITIGATION FUNDING IS
PERMITTED
- 13.5 In
the Issues Paper, we discussed the uncertainty in the law about whether
litigation funding is
permitted.1011F[1012] In the
absence of specific regulation of litigation funding, the courts in Aotearoa New
Zealand have adopted a cautiously permissive
approach to litigation
funding.1012F[1013] However,
uncertainty remains about whether and when litigation funding arrangements are
contrary to the policy behind the torts of
maintenance and champerty, which have
historically prohibited litigation funding and remain part of our
law.1013F[1014]
- 13.6 Maintenance
is where a person, without lawful justification, assists a party to a civil
action to bring or defend the action
and this causes damage to the other party.
Champerty is a form of maintenance where financial assistance is provided in
return for
a share of any recovery. The policy behind the torts is to protect
the defendant from malicious
litigation.1014F[1015] To some
extent, the policy is also to protect the integrity of the courts and those
whose litigation is being
maintained.1015F[1016]
- 13.7 Breach of
the torts can give rise to a claim for damages by the defendant against the
funder of the litigation. Where a breach
is established, the funding agreement
itself, being contrary to public policy, may also be unenforceable.
- 13.8 To our
knowledge, there are no examples in Aotearoa New Zealand of a successful claim
based on the torts, nor are there any examples
of a litigation funding agreement
being unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The courts have preferred to
address any issues
by relying on their wide powers to stay or dismiss
proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of
process.1016F[1017]
- 13.9 Today,
there is a tension between litigation funding and the policy underpinning the
torts of maintenance and champerty. Litigation
funding has an increasingly
important role to play in improving access to
justice.1017F[1018] The courts
in Aotearoa New Zealand have suggested that access to justice considerations may
necessitate a relaxation of the torts,
at least in the context of representative
and class actions.1018F[1019]
However, in her dissenting judgment in PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker
(PwC v Walker), Elias CJ cautioned that litigation funding still
carries a risk of oppression and considered “it is a matter of some
controversy”
whether and when litigation funding arrangements may offend
against the torts and the policy underpinning
them.1019F[1020]
- 13.10 To the
extent that litigation funding is permitted, the absence of any specific
regulation means the parameters within which
litigation funders should operate
are also unclear. As we discuss in Chapter 14, these uncertainties are
problematic because they
may impact on the availability and affordability of
litigation funding in Aotearoa New Zealand. In turn, this may diminish the
ability
of potential plaintiffs to access justice. The funder risks losing its
investment (and the possibility of a return on its investment)
if a funding
agreement is unenforceable, proceedings are stayed on abuse of process grounds
or damages are payable for breach of
the torts of maintenance and champerty
(particularly if this occurs after the funded proceeding has been brought to a
successful
conclusion). Uncertainty about acceptable litigation funding
arrangements may also increase the risk of challenges to funding arrangements,
adding cost and delay to the resolution of claims. More broadly, these
uncertainties raise rule of law concerns in the sense that
predictability and
transparency of laws that apply or may apply to litigation funding are currently
lacking.
CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
- 13.11 In
the Issues Paper, we asked submitters which of the potential advantages and
disadvantages of permitting litigation funding
are most important and why. We
also asked submitters if they consider litigation funding is desirable for
Aotearoa New Zealand in
principle.
- 13.12 With
respect to the torts of maintenance and champerty, we asked to what extent these
impact on the availability and pricing
of litigation funding in Aotearoa New
Zealand. We also asked if the courts should be left to clarify and develop the
law in relation
to maintenance and champerty or if the law should be reformed.
If reform is required, we asked submitters which option for clarifying
the law
they prefer and why.
- 13.13 We
discussed four options to address the tension between litigation funding and the
policy underpinning the torts of maintenance
and champerty, and to clarify the
permissibility of litigation
funding.1020F[1021] We set out
these options below.
Retain the torts and leave the courts to clarify and develop
the law
- 13.14 This
may be an appropriate option if the policy underpinning maintenance and
champerty remains sound and the torts do not cause
sufficient inconvenience to
necessitate reform. This approach can be seen to some extent in Canada and
Queensland,
Australia.1021F[1022]
Retain the torts subject to a statutory exception for
litigation funding
- 13.15 There
is already a statutory exception to maintenance and champerty in section 334 of
the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, which permits lawyers to enter into
conditional fee arrangements. In 2009, Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti
| Rules Committee
developed a Class Actions Bill, which would have created an
exception to the torts of maintenance and champerty for litigation funding
of
class actions. However, the Bill was never progressed.
Abolish the torts
- 13.16 Another
way to clarify the permissibility of litigation funding would be to abolish the
torts of maintenance and champerty altogether.
There have been no successful
claims founded on maintenance and champerty in Aotearoa New
Zealand.1022F[1023] This might
suggest that little would be lost by abolishing the torts. On the other hand,
the torts may function as a deterrent against
funding malicious
proceedings.1023F[1024] The
torts may have a wider impact that goes beyond litigation funding and abolishing
them may have unforeseen
consequences.1024F[1025]
- 13.17 Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law Commission considered whether the torts should be
abolished in its 2001 Report Subsidising Litigation. Although nearly all
submitters urged abolition, at the time the Commission favoured retaining the
torts.1025F[1026] In 2009, the
Rules Committee also considered whether the torts should be abolished in the
context of its work on the draft Class
Actions Bill. However, it did not reach a
consensus and considered the issue may be beyond the scope of its
work.1026F[1027]
Abolish the torts subject to a preservation
provision
- 13.18 A
variation on the above option would be to abolish the torts but retain the
courts’ ability to find a funding agreement
unenforceable on grounds of
public policy or illegality. For example, through legislation preserving
“any rule of law as to
the cases in which a contract is to be treated as
contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal” or words to similar effect
(a preservation provision).
- 13.19 The
torts of maintenance and champerty have been abolished in a number of comparable
jurisdictions such as England and Wales,
Singapore and the Australian states of
Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory and
Tasmania.1027F[1028] However,
most of these jurisdictions have enacted a preservation
provision.1028F[1029] In the Law
Commission’s 2001 Report, it rejected the option of abolishing the torts
subject to a preservation
provision.1029F[1030] The
Commission considered no great simplification of the law would be achieved by
following the United Kingdom and Australian precedents.
RESULTS OF CONSULTATION
Advantages of litigation funding
- 13.20 Thirty-one
submitters answered the Issues Paper question on the potential advantages and
disadvantages of permitting litigation
funding.1030F[1031] Of these, 24
identified
advantages,1031F[1032] 15
identified
disadvantages1032F[1033] and 10
identified both advantages and
disadvantages.1033F[1034]
Improving access to justice
- 13.21 Access
to justice was often considered to be an advantage or the most important
advantage of litigation funding, with 23 submitters
discussing this
benefit.1034F[1035] Several
submitters identified groups whose access to justice has been or may be improved
by litigation funding, such as homeowners
following the Christchurch
earthquakes, consumers with low-value claims, retail investors, and
community-led groups. Some submitters
said that, while profit may be the primary
motivation for litigation funders, access to justice can nevertheless result
from their
activity.1035F[1036]
Some noted that many class actions would not be feasible without litigation
funding.1036F[1037]
- 13.22 Other
access to justice benefits identified by submitters were that litigation funding
can “level the playing field”
(by overcoming the potential for a
defendant to win litigation by outspending the
plaintiff)1037F[1038] and reduce
the risks of litigation for plaintiffs (particularly the risk of an adverse
costs order).1038F[1039]
- 13.23 However,
some submitters challenged the assumption that litigation funding improves
access to justice or highlighted access
to justice
limitations:1039F[1040]
(a) Andrew Barker QC noted that, in the context of settlements, the exact terms
are usually confidential even if the broad nature
of the settlement is
explained. The amount received by litigants, in comparison to how much is
received by the funder and lawyers
is rarely divulged. In his view, the reality
is that the courts are providing a significant business opportunity for funders,
and
court oversight of funding agreements is necessary to protect funded
plaintiffs.
(b) Several submitters said funders only improve access to justice in cases that
meet their investment
criteria.1040F[1041] Dr Tony
Ellis commented that funders are unlikely to fund public law cases given the low
monetary awards, and Te Kāhui Inihua
o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New
Zealand said funders are unlikely to fund public interest cases.
(c) Tom Weston QC said access to justice is a slogan that deserves close
scrutiny. Such considerations provide only limited support
for class actions and
litigation funding, and the more difficult question is whether funded litigation
is socially or economically
useful. Similarly, the Insurance Council questioned
whether litigation funding promotes “worthwhile claims”, for example
claims where the aggregate amount is profitable for a funder but the individual
harm is negligible.
Funder expertise and evaluation of the merits of claims
- 13.24 Bell
Gully and the International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee said the
funder’s expertise and experience
in litigation can be an advantage of
litigation funding. For instance, the funder can provide valuable assistance
with organising
and managing the claim. The IBA Antitrust Committee said this
can be especially beneficial in class actions as the representative
plaintiff
may not have a sophisticated understanding of the law and the funder can play an
important role in facilitating the best
outcome for the class.
- 13.25 Several
submitters commented on whether litigation funding encourages, or discourages,
meritless claims. DLA Piper suggested
that, because litigation funders evaluate
the merits of a claim and only fund claims that they consider have good
prospects of success,
their involvement provides independent corroboration of
the merits of the case. Four other submitters doubted that litigation funding
encourages meritless claims as this would be detrimental to a funder’s
commercial interests, business model and
reputation.1041F[1042] Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) submitted that fears
about meritless claims are likely to be exaggerated
as the funder will often do
greater due diligence and be less personally involved in the litigation than the
plaintiffs themselves.
Other potential advantages
- 13.26 DLA
Piper commented on advantages of litigation funding for corporate plaintiffs. It
said litigation funding removes litigation
costs from a company’s balance
sheet. This enables plaintiffs to stay focused on activities other than
litigation and rewards
investors for taking on litigation risk. However, Chapman
Tripp said it is not aware of litigation funding being used to assist corporate
plaintiffs in this way. It considered this is unlikely to be a significant
driver of litigation funding in Aotearoa New Zealand in
future.
- 13.27 LPF Group
said litigation funding can deter unlawful conduct. Without it, many meritorious
cases could not be pursued, and defendants
would not be held to account. In
relation to corporate and shareholder claims, litigation funding serves to lift
the standards of
professional conduct of those in governance and advisory roles
and increases confidence across all areas of the business and investment
community and society.
- 13.28 Chapman
Tripp submitted that litigation funding can contribute to development of the
law, as funded litigants may be more willing
to test novel legal
principles.
- 13.29 Hīkina
Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment said class actions
and litigation funding may help
to improve the effectiveness of regulatory
regimes by incentivising consumers, creditors and other private parties to
exercise their
rights.
Disadvantages of litigation funding
The risk of an increase in meritless claims
- 13.30 Eleven
submitters discussed whether litigation funding may encourage some meritless
claims1042F[1043] or drive
settlements of meritless
litigation.1043F[1044] Most
considered this risk to be low or
manageable.1044F[1045] However,
three submitters thought litigation funding may drive settlements of meritless
litigation.1045F[1046] For
example, the Institute of Directors said defendants in Australia have been
compelled to settle claims they consider meritless
and defensible because of the
involvement of litigation funders. As the insurer funding the defence has
significant control in the
proceedings, it can drive settlements on financial
grounds, preventing organisations and directors from being able to clear their
names. The Insurance Council likewise suggested that a funder may fund a claim
on the assumption a well-resourced defendant will
pay a premium to end the
proceedings and avoid the higher irrecoverable cost of succeeding at trial. It
said this has been the case
with some litigation stemming from the Christchurch
earthquakes.
- 13.31 The IBA
Antitrust Committee said the reality is likely to be somewhere in the middle and
will depend on the culture of a particular
jurisdiction. Meritless claims are
likely to be less attractive in jurisdictions where adverse costs orders are
common. However,
it said the high rate of class action settlements in Australia
suggests defendants have little appetite to defend class actions,
including
potentially meritless claims.
Impact on directors and officers liability insurance
- 13.32 Submitters
were divided on the extent to which litigation funding is affecting the
insurance market. Four submitters said it
has reduced or may reduce the
availability and affordability of D&O
insurance,1046F[1047]
and other forms of insurance such as professional indemnity
insurance1047F[1048] or public
and product liability
cover.1048F[1049]
- 13.33 The
Insurance Council said entities perceived to be particularly exposed to
regulator or shareholder action can find it increasingly
difficult and expensive
to buy D&O insurance. It also said a rise in litigation funding is a risk
for D&O insurance and
general liability insurers, as it could incentivise
legal action due to large-scale catastrophe events and large-scale customer
remediation
by insureds as a result of regulator action. The D&O insurance
policy is effectively the cause of claims because the litigation
funder can
chase the policy where the action derives from a failure by officers.
- 13.34 The
Institute of Directors and Marsh emphasised the tougher insurance market
conditions in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand
in recent years. According to
Marsh, these include increased renewal premiums and retention
levels,1049F[1050] stricter
terms and a decrease in
coverage.1050F[1051] The
Institute of Directors said the volatile and restrictive insurance market has
caused some local and overseas insurers to cease
providing D&O insurance,
particularly to dual-listed companies.
- 13.35 Three
submitters commented on factors contributing to the hardening insurance
market.1051F[1052] The Institute
of Directors said class actions and litigation funding have contributed,
alongside the expanding role and responsibilities
of boards, policy-makers
targeting directors for personal liability when reforming regimes, more active
and well-resourced regulators,
and COVID-19. Marsh acknowledged it is difficult
to separate out the direct impact of class actions and litigation funding from
other
factors contributing to changes in the D&O insurance market but said
various sources have discussed a
correlation.1052F[1053]
- 13.36 By
contrast, three submitters were sceptical about the negative impact of
litigation funding on D&O
insurance.1053F[1054] They
indicated there is no robust evidence to support the claims that litigation
funding is causing higher D&O insurance premiums,
and said other factors are
also impacting on the
market.1054F[1055] Professor
Vicki Waye (University of South Australia) said the contribution of funded class
actions to the hardening D&O insurance
market is negligible among these
other factors, and suggested the concern is a red herring. Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
said it is too simplistic to assert that
litigation funding is the cause of an increase in D&O insurance
premiums. It said that elides the underlying issue – that it is the
corporate misconduct
of companies and their directors that results in
proceedings being issued (and not the mere availability of litigation funding).
Other potential disadvantages
- 13.37 Seven
submitters said excessive funder profits are a potential disadvantage of
litigation funding, as this comes at the expense
of those who have genuinely
suffered loss.1055F[1056] Four
submitters commented specifically on this risk in class actions or
representative
actions.1056F[1057] The
Insurance Council said the courts are reluctant to intervene to address funder
profits.
- 13.38 Four
submitters identified (or alluded to) the potential for conflicts of interest as
a disadvantage of litigation
funding.1057F[1058] The IBA
Antitrust Committee said this is the “most significant
disadvantage”, and the risk (arising from funder control
and relationships
between the funder and the lawyer) is structural and unavoidable without
adequate regulation and oversight.
- 13.39 Four
submitters commented on the potential for litigation funding to increase the
courts’ workload, but this did not appear
to be a significant
concern.1058F[1059] The IBA
Antitrust Committee said funding has a predictable but notable effect on the
functioning of the court system as a whole,
leading to slower case processing
and larger backlogs. It also said that, despite a mature litigation funding
market, the Australian
Federal Court is continuing to meet its efficiency
targets, which suggests any impact on the courts’ workload can be
mitigated.
Chapman Tripp acknowledged that an increase in litigation funding
will add to the courts’ workload but considered this can
be mitigated by
the introduction of a statutory class actions regime that will minimise
inefficient procedural applications. Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
said it may be simplistic to characterise an increase in filed proceedings as a
“disadvantage”
of litigation funding, as funding is intended to
facilitate access to justice.
- 13.40 Dr Michael
Duffy (Monash University) noted the risk of a funder becoming insolvent or
leaving the funded plaintiff exposed to
an adverse costs order. He said this may
be an issue where the funder has insufficient assets within the jurisdiction to
meet an
adverse costs order or where smaller funders do not have the financial
ability to see a case through to its conclusion.
- 13.41 Michael
Duffy also said litigation funding may lead to the securitisation of legal
claims and the emergence of a secondary market.
While this could have some
benefits for businesses (such as debt factoring and trading in book debts),
trading in actionable civil
claims may raise potential problems and ethical
issues such as the financial relationships between claim assignees and the
witnesses
needed to establish their claims.
Desirability of litigation funding for Aotearoa New
Zealand
- 13.42 We
received 24 submissions on the desirability of litigation
funding.1059F[1060] Of those, 21
submitters thought litigation funding is desirable in
principle.1060F[1061] Some said
it is necessary given the access to justice issues in Aotearoa New
Zealand,1061F[1062] particularly
in the context of a statutory class actions
regime.1062F[1063] Some
indicated that the access to justice advantages of litigation funding outweigh
any potential
disadvantages.1063F[1064] NZLS
said litigation funding is both desirable in principle and an established fact.
Although there are valid concerns, many of these
are best understood as arising
not as a matter of principle but as a matter of proper regulation. Several
others said their support
for litigation funding is contingent on the concerns
with litigation funding being properly
managed.1064F[1065]
- 13.43 Three
submitters were sceptical about the desirability of litigation funding in
principle while also appearing to acknowledge
it is here to
stay.1065F[1066] They emphasised
access to justice limitations of litigation funding, potential dangers and need
for robust regulation.
Survey of group members
- 13.44 In
the anonymous survey of group members who have participated in representative
actions in Aotearoa New Zealand, we asked participants
how likely it is they
would have brought their own individual proceedings if they were not part of the
representative action. We
received 409 responses to this question, with the
overwhelming majority indicating it is not at all likely they would have brought
their own
proceedings.1066F[1067]
- 13.45 We also
asked participants to provide reasons for their
responses.1067F[1068] The main
reason given was that it would have been too
expensive.1068F[1069] Other
common reasons were the risk of having to pay the defendant’s costs if the
litigation is
unsuccessful,1069F[1070] wanting
to avoid the stress of bringing individual
proceedings,1070F[1071]
uncertainty about the process for bringing individual
proceedings,1071F[1072] the time
involved in bringing individual
proceedings,1072F[1073] not
wanting to pursue the defendant on their
own,1073F[1074] the value of
their claim not being worth pursuing
individually1074F[1075] and
being unaware they had a
claim.1075F[1076]
- 13.46 The survey
also asked participants about their experience of litigation funding:
(a) Was your case funded by a litigation funder? There were 409 responses
to this question. Of those, 231 participants (56.5 per cent) said yes, 22 (5.4
per cent) said no, and 156
(38.1 per cent) were unsure.
(b) If so, how have you found the experience of having your case funded by a
litigation funder? There were 227 responses to this question. Most
participants indicated that their experience had been
positive.1076F[1077]
(c) If so, are you satisfied that the funding commission charged by the
litigation funder supporting your case is fair and reasonable? There were
228 responses to this question. Most submitters were neutral or positive
about the funding commission
charged.1077F[1078] It is likely
that some participants were commenting on representative actions that had not
yet been resolved, and they may therefore
have had an incomplete picture of how
much the funder would receive from any sum recovered.
(d) What has been the most positive aspect of being funded by a litigation
funder? There were 201
responses.1078F[1079] Key themes
were: the absence of upfront costs or financial
risks,1079F[1080] that
litigation funding makes litigation
possible,1080F[1081] that the
funder provides expertise and significant
resources,1081F[1082] and
reassurance the case has
merit.1082F[1083]
(e) What has been the most negative aspect of being funded by a litigation
funder? We received 175 responses to this
question.1083F[1084] Key themes
were that the funder’s commission significantly diminishes class
members’
returns,1084F[1085] and that
there was a lack of communication, transparency and control regarding the
litigation or the
funding.1085F[1086]
Approximately 76 participants (43.4 per cent) indicated they had not had any
negative experiences.
Concerns about maintenance and champerty
- 13.47 We
received 10 submissions on the extent to which the torts of maintenance and
champerty are impacting on the availability and
pricing of litigation
funding.1086F[1087]
- 13.48 Five
submitters said the torts are a source of uncertainty and risk for litigation
funders, and this may have access to justice
consequences by impacting on the
availability and affordability of litigation
funding.1087F[1088] Omni
Bridgeway said the failure to abolish the torts in the state of Queensland has
led to confusion about the status of litigation
funding arrangements and costly
satellite litigation. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said the torts
impose an unnecessary
burden on the courts when dealing with questions of
whether or how the torts should be applied. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia also indicated, as did LPF Group, that the torts create an imbalance
between plaintiffs and defendants, which unfairly
benefits defendants.
- 13.49 Four
submitters thought the torts have little impact on litigation
funding.1088F[1089] BusinessNZ
considered that, while the torts have not impacted the availability and pricing
of litigation funding, the concerns underpinning
the torts remain relevant.
Options for reforming maintenance and champerty
- 13.50 We
received 18 submissions on whether the courts should be left to clarify and
develop the law in relation to maintenance and
champerty, or whether the law
should be reformed.1089F[1090]
Of these, 16 submitters indicated the law should be, or may need to be,
reformed.1090F[1091] We also
received 14 submissions commenting on options for
reform.1091F[1092]
Retain the torts in their current form and leave the courts to
clarify and develop the law
- 13.51 BusinessNZ
and Carter Holt Harvey thought the torts should be retained in their current
form, leaving the courts to clarify
and develop the law. They said the potential
for abuse remains in any system and the torts reasonably address that potential.
Retain the torts subject to a statutory exception for
litigation funding
- 13.52 Three
submitters favoured retaining the torts subject to a statutory exception for
litigation funding.1092F[1093]
Bell Gully submitted the torts should be left intact, pointing to Cain v
Mettrick.1093F[1094] In that
case, Te Kōti Matua | High Court held that a clause in the litigation
funding agreement between the plaintiff liquidators
and the funder amounted to
an assignment of a bare cause of action, as it essentially enabled the funder to
pursue litigation against
the wishes of the plaintiff. The Court ordered a stay
of proceedings on the basis that the funding agreement, contrary to law, gave
the funder control of the litigation that went beyond what was reasonable to
protect its
investment.1094F[1095] Bell
Gully said the case shows that a sensible balance can exist between accepting
litigation funding in principle, but subject to
the court’s scrutiny to
protect the interests of claimants.
- 13.53 The
Insurance Council also favoured this option, saying a cautious approach is
desirable in the absence of a full understanding
of the wider impact of
abolishing the torts. When drafting a statutory exception to the torts, it said
it will be important to ensure
nothing affects the court’s power to
prohibit or control a proceeding that constitutes an abuse of process.
Abolish the torts
- 13.54 Five
submitters supported abolishing the
torts,1095F[1096] for example to
clearly permit and encourage the use of litigation funding in class
actions,1096F[1097] and to
reduce the risks of litigation funding for both claimants and
funders.1097F[1098] Two of these
submitters considered a preservation provision is unnecessary. Omni Bridgeway
said the adoption of such provisions in
Australia and the United Kingdom
happened long before litigation funding became widely available and acceptable,
and since then public
policy has “decisively shifted” in favour of
permitting litigation funding. DLA Piper said a preservation provision is
unnecessary, as the courts already have the jurisdiction to determine if a
funding agreement is an abuse of process.
Abolish the torts subject to a preservation provision
- 13.55 Three
submitters supported abolishing the torts, subject to a provision to preserve
the courts’ ability to find a funding
agreement unenforceable on grounds
of public policy or
illegality.1098F[1099] Simpson
Grierson said this would provide greater clarity for all participants in funded
proceedings, whilst ensuring the court retains
discretion in extreme cases.
- 13.56 Chapman
Tripp said the impacts of abolishing the torts appear to be limited. It noted
there has been no successful claim founded
on maintenance and champerty in
Aotearoa New Zealand, and said it is not aware of businesses pursuing litigation
against business
rivals “hiding behind nominal litigants” (one of
the Law Commission’s concerns about abolishing the torts in its
2001
Report).1099F[1100] If such a
situation does arise, it said a preservation provision would allow the court to
render any funding agreement motivated
by such collateral purpose unenforceable
on public policy grounds. The court would also retain its ability to stay the
proceeding
for abuse of process. Chapman Tripp considered it unnecessary to be
prescriptive about when a funding agreement will be contrary
to public policy
and said the courts will be assisted with this assessment by Australian and
English case law.
- 13.57 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia similarly said there is no need to retain the
torts given the court’s existing
power to deal with any abuse of process
and its discretion to award costs. It expressed concern about case-by-case
development of
exceptions if the torts are retained and said no issues have
arisen in Australian states that have abolished the torts. A preservation
provision would conform with the approach taken in many Australian states and
enable courts in Aotearoa New Zealand to draw upon
the body of case law
developed in Australia about the permissibility of funding
arrangements.
Other suggestions
- 13.58 Associate
Professor Barry Allan (Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo | University of Otago)
suggested a class actions statute
could provide guidance on when a funding
agreement will not be illegal or contrary to public policy. For example, if the
funding
agreement is necessary to provide substantively meaningful access to
justice and is fair and reasonable as between the funder and
class members. A
class actions statute could articulate factors for the court to consider when
conducting this assessment. He said
there should also be an ability to render a
funding agreement unenforceable outside the class actions context. However, the
funded
party should have the onus of challenging the funding agreement, just as
it would if the agreement had been obtained by duress.
RECOMMENDATION
- R107 The
torts of maintenance and champerty should be abolished.
Litigation funding is desirable in principle
- 13.59 We
confirm the preliminary view we expressed in the Issues Paper that litigation
funding is desirable for Aotearoa New Zealand
in principle. We think the law
should clarify that litigation funding is permitted by abolishing the torts of
maintenance and champerty.
However, the concerns that litigation funding gives
rise to regarding funder control, conflicts of interest, funder profits and
funder
capital adequacy should be subject to appropriate regulation. We set out
our recommendations for managing these concerns in Chapters
14-17.
- 13.60 Overall,
the submissions confirmed our view that the access to justice advantages of
litigation funding outweigh the potential
disadvantages. As we explained earlier
in this report there are significant access to justice issues facing Aotearoa
New Zealand.1100F[1101] While
litigation funding is not a “silver bullet” for these issues it does
have a role to play in improving access to
justice.1101F[1102] Litigation
funders are primarily motivated by profit, but by assuming the upfront costs and
financial risks of litigation they can
facilitate access to the court system and
enable plaintiffs to seek redress. Litigation funding can allow plaintiffs to
bring claims
they could not have brought (due to financial constraints) or would
not have brought (due to uncertainty about the process, or the
time or stress
that would be involved in doing so). It can also help to “level the
playing field” in litigation against
well-resourced
defendants.1102F[1103]
- 13.61 Earlier in
this report, we recommend the creation of a statutory regime for class actions.
In our view, that regime would have
limited practical utility without litigation
funding. In many cases, class actions would be unable to proceed without
litigation
funding as the financial costs and risks the representative plaintiff
would assume are too
high.1103F[1104]
- 13.62 We are not
persuaded that litigation funding will have a significant impact on the
availability and affordability of D&O
insurance or other kinds of insurance
in Aotearoa New Zealand. We recognise there has been a hardening of the
insurance market in
recent years, which has seen premiums increase and the
availability and coverage of insurance decrease in Aotearoa New Zealand and
particularly in Australia. However, a number of factors may be contributing to
these changes. As we noted in the Issues Paper, although
litigation funding may
also affect the market, it is not easy to separate out the effects of funding
from the effects of these other
factors.1104F[1105] In our view,
the potential impact of litigation funding on the insurance market is not a
compelling reason against litigation funding,
as long as meritless litigation is
prevented. In the absence of meritless cases, any impact litigation funding has
on the insurance
market can only come from meritorious cases that are presently
being hindered by current barriers to access to
justice.1105F[1106]
- 13.63 We think
the risk of litigation funding leading to an increase in meritless cases is
minimal. Litigation funders have little
or no incentive to fund meritless cases
as this is unlikely to be profitable. It is in their commercial interests to
undertake careful
due diligence to ensure they fund meritorious claims. Unlike
some other jurisdictions (such as the United States), a plaintiff in
Aotearoa
New Zealand can be ordered to pay adverse costs to the defendant if the
litigation is unsuccessful, which will also deter
funders from pursuing
meritless claims.
- 13.64 Other
potential disadvantages of litigation funding such as funder control, conflicts
of interest, funder profits, and funder
capital adequacy are addressed in our
recommendations in Chapters 15–17.
- 13.65 We are not
persuaded that any increase in the courts’ workload is a disadvantage of
litigation funding. We acknowledge
that litigation funding may result in an
increase in litigation, particularly class actions that would often be unable to
proceed
without it, and that funded class actions may be resource-intensive for
the courts to manage. However, it is difficult to avoid this
impact given that
litigation funding and class actions are intended to increase access to the
court system. We note that funded class
actions are likely to make up a very
small proportion of civil litigation overall and that a well-designed procedural
regime for
class actions and litigation funding should minimise the impacts on
the court system. Nevertheless, it will be important to understand
the impact of
class actions on the court system so that delays for other litigants can be
avoided. In Chapter 2, we suggest Te Tāhū
o te Ture | Ministry of
Justice should collect data on the numbers of class actions filed and the
judicial resources needed for each.
This will allow analysis of the impact of
class actions on the court system.
- 13.66 In the
Issues Paper, we discussed the risk of a secondary market in litigation funding
developing.1106F[1107] We said
securitisation of funding agreements, where the funder packages their
investments for sale either directly or indirectly
in a secondary market, may
pose a concern. For example, the funder might sell its interest to a hedge fund.
Litigation in this context
constitutes a further step away from the
courts’ function of vindicating wrongs and accordingly may undermine
public perceptions
of the legitimacy of the courts. There appears to be a
growing secondary market in the United States and, more recently, in the United
Kingdom.1107F[1108] However, we
are not aware of any secondary market in litigation funding in Aotearoa New
Zealand, and only one submitter raised this
as a potential concern. We therefore
have not considered the issue. If concerns arise in future, we suggest they be
considered at
that time.
The torts of maintenance and champerty should be
abolished
- 13.67 We
recommend the torts of maintenance and champerty should be abolished. By
constraining what support can be provided to claimants,
they act as an
impediment to access to justice. We think the historical policy rationales for
the torts, to protect members of society
from malicious litigation and to assure
the integrity of the courts, can be addressed in other ways. For example,
through appropriate
and transparent regulation of litigation funding. Already,
numerous exceptions to the prohibition on maintaining legal actions have
emerged, including in relation to the provision of financial support by
relatives, friends or trade unions, subrogation under insurance
policies, and
the assignment of causes of action that are ancillary to property
interests.1108F[1109]
- 13.68 Overseas,
access to justice considerations have led some jurisdictions to abolish the
torts.1109F[1110] Similarly, the
courts in Aotearoa New Zealand have recognised that the cost of litigation is
beyond the means of most New Zealanders
and litigation funders may have an
increasingly important role to play in ensuring access to
justice.1110F[1111] In
Auckland City Council as Assignee of Body Corporate 16113 v Auckland City
Council, the High Court said access to justice and the desirability of
promoting settlement of litigation were reasons for reconsidering the
policy
behind the torts of maintenance and
champerty.1111F[1112] Similarly,
in Saunders v Houghton, Te Kōti Pira | Court of Appeal suggested
access to justice considerations may necessitate a relaxation of the
torts:1112F[1113]
...the interests of justice can require the court to unshackle itself from the
constraints of the former simple rule against champerty
and maintenance. Access
to justice is a fundamental principle of the rule of law. It can require
flexibility to meet the harsh reality
of the current cost to the injured party
of litigation, which is often more than a would-be plaintiff can sensibly be
expected to
bear. The result would be a failure of justice: a plaintiff with
merits can be excluded from relief against the defendant who has
committed a
legal wrong.
- 13.69 In
relation to litigation funding, the High Court in Houghton v Saunders
said:
1113F[1114]
...
there has been a dramatic change in attitude, with some jurisdictions abolishing
the tort of champerty altogether and courts generally
adopting a much more
liberal and relaxed approach, to the point where many authorities appear
actively to support litigation funding
as a matter of public policy.
- 13.70 The
continued existence of the torts creates uncertainty about whether and to what
extent litigation funding is permitted in
Aotearoa New Zealand. This uncertainty
may impact on the availability and affordability of litigation funding, and
ultimately on
the ability of some plaintiffs to access justice. As the Law
Reform Commission of Western Australia (LRCWA) concluded in its 2020
Report
Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia, rather than protecting
citizens from injustice, the torts now risk creating injustice
themselves.1114F[1115]
- 13.71 None of
the submissions we received on maintenance and champerty persuaded us that
anything would be lost if the torts were
abolished. One submitter said Cain v
Mettrick may indicate that the torts still have value. Although one of the
defendants in that case argued that the funding terms were contrary
to the
policies underpinning maintenance and champerty, the High Court did not
determine the proceeding on that
basis.1115F[1116] Instead, it
granted a stay of proceedings on the basis that the funding agreement was an
impermissible assignment of a bare cause
of
action.1116F[1117]
- 13.72 We
acknowledge the Law Commission’s view in its 2001 Report that the torts
may act as a
deterrent.1117F[1118] However,
the authors of Todd on Torts state that the “[w]idening
justifications for supporting actions, and the lack of decisions in New Zealand
imposing liability,
suggest that little would be lost by [abolishing the
torts]”.1118F[1119] We
agree.
- 13.73 In Chapter
17, we recommend court oversight of litigation funding agreements in the context
of class actions to protect the
interests of class members and uphold the
integrity of the courts. We also note the courts will retain the ability to
manage the
policy concerns of the torts through their existing general powers to
stay or dismiss any proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious
or otherwise an
abuse of process, or that disclose no reasonably arguable cause of action. While
abolishing the torts will clarify
that litigation funding is not itself an abuse
of process, it will not limit the court’s ability to stay proceedings
where
the particular terms of the funding arrangement amount to an abuse of
process or an assignment of a bare cause of action, or the
claim is meritless
(in the sense that it discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action), and to
award costs accordingly. We think
this is a more principled and effective
control than relying on defendants to sue under the torts. To the extent that
the prospect
of being sued in tort for maintenance and champerty may have a
deterrent effect on funding malicious litigation, we think the prospect
of a
claim being struck out (with an associated costs award) is likely to provide a
similar effect.
- 13.74 Te
Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court in Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding
considered the circumstances in which a litigation funding agreement may
amount to an abuse of process justifying a stay of
proceedings.1119F[1120] It set
out broad categories of conduct that may attract the intervention of the court
on traditional grounds to include proceedings
that:1120F[1121]
(a) Deceive the court, are fictitious or a mere sham.
(b) Use the process of the court in an unfair or dishonest way, for some
ulterior or improper purpose or in an improper way.
(c) Are manifestly groundless, without foundation or serve no useful purpose.
(d) Are vexatious or oppressive.
- 13.75 In
addition, the Supreme Court found that a litigation funding arrangement can be
challenged as an abuse of process if it effectively
assigns a bare cause of
action in circumstances where that is
impermissible.1121F[1122] In
making this assessment, the Court said regard should be had to the arrangement
as a whole, including the level of control and
profit share of the funder, as
well as the role of the lawyers
acting.1122F[1123]
- 13.76 There was
strong support from submitters for reforming maintenance and champerty. Although
submitters differed on how the law
should be reformed, most favoured abolishing
the torts (either with or without a preservation provision).
- 13.77 On
balance, we think it is unnecessary to preserve any rule of law under which a
litigation funding agreement is to be treated
as contrary to public policy or
otherwise illegal. We do not think a preservation provision has any bearing on
the court’s
ability to stay proceedings if a funding agreement amounts to
an abuse of process. As the Supreme Court observed in Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding, the rule against assignments of bare causes of action
“had its origin in the torts of maintenance and champerty but now seems
to
have an independent existence of its
own”.1123F[1124] We note
the LRCWA recently recommended abolishing the torts subject to a preservation
provision,1124F[1125] and was
partly influenced by a desire to ensure consistency in the law between
Australian
jurisdictions.1125F[1126]
However, this factor has less relevance for Aotearoa New Zealand.
- 13.78 We
acknowledge that in reaching this conclusion we are, to some extent, speculating
on unknowns. It is impossible to know or
quantify the deterrent effect of the
torts, the extent to which the torts are impacting on the availability and
affordability of
litigation funding, or the long-term consequences of abolishing
the torts. In recommending abolition of the torts, our intention
is not to
weaken the courts’ powers to deal with any litigation funding issues that
undermine the courts’ integrity.
Rather, our recommendation reflects our
view that the court has inherent jurisdiction to address these policy concerns,
for example,
the ability to stay or strike-out proceedings that are an abuse of
its process. The rule against bare assignment is a further illustration
of this.
Our recommendations discussed in Chapters 14–17 dealing with the
regulation of litigation funding are directed to
clarifying and reinforcing the
courts’ powers in this context.
- 13.79 Our
recommendation also reflects our view that the torts create uncertainty about
the permissibility of litigation funding,
and that a preservation provision
– while a more cautious approach – would retain ambiguity in the
law. While our recommendation
to abolish the torts departs from the Law
Commission’s conclusion in its 2001 Report that the torts should be
retained, we
agree with its conclusion that no great simplification of the law
would be achieved by following the approach of England and Wales
and some
Australian jurisdictions of abolishing the torts while preserving the
courts’ ability to find a funding agreement
unenforceable on grounds of
public policy or
illegality.1126F[1127]
CHAPTER 14
Models for regulation and oversight of litigation
funding
INTRODUCTION
- 14.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) The limited extent to which litigation funding is regulated in Aotearoa New
Zealand, and the uncertainty about the extent to
which litigation funding is
permitted.
(b) The need for further, specific regulation and oversight of litigation
funding, particularly in the context of class actions.
(c) Objectives and guiding principles for permitting and regulating litigation
funding.
(d) Possible forms of regulation and oversight, and our preference for court
oversight.
(e) Our recommendation in relation to the disclosure of litigation funding
agreements.
LITIGATION FUNDING IS NOT SPECIFICALLY REGULATED IN AOTEAROA
NEW ZEALAND
- 14.2 In
contrast to some comparable jurisdictions, litigation funding in Aotearoa New
Zealand is not specially
regulated.1127F[1128] Instead,
litigation funding is regulated to a limited extent by the following:
(a) General mechanisms available to the court for
managing litigation, which have been applied to address some issues arising in
funded
litigation. These include the courts’ powers to stay or strike-out
proceedings, and order security for costs.
(b) Principles that have developed through the courts to address some of the
issues arising in funded litigation, for example principles
applicable to the
disclosure of litigation funding arrangements.
(c) General statutes that may apply to litigation funding, such as consumer
protection legislation.
(d) The torts of maintenance and champerty (discussed in Chapter 13).
- 14.3 The lack of
any specific regulation of litigation funding, combined with the tension between
litigation funding and the torts
of maintenance and champerty, means there is
some uncertainty about whether, and to what extent, litigation funding is
permitted
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
- 14.4 In the
Issues Paper, we expressed the preliminary view that a regulatory response is
warranted to address this uncertainty in
the law, and to improve transparency
and accountability of litigation funder operations in relation to funder control
of litigation,
conflicts of interest, funder profits and funder capital
adequacy.
- 14.5 We
acknowledged, however, that the need for regulation may depend on the nature of
the funded proceeding or the nature of the
funded plaintiff. For instance, we
observed that recent reforms to regulate litigation funding in Australia have
been directed at
class actions. Australia’s regulatory response arose out
of concerns about inequities and risks of consumer harm in class actions,
and
the potential for poor justice outcomes. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the courts
have also indicated that funded representative actions
may justify greater
supervision than other funded proceedings to ensure the protection of all
parties (including group members who
are not before the court but will have
their rights determined by the
proceedings).1128F[1129]
CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
- 14.6 In
the Issues Paper, we asked submitters which of the concerns with litigation
funding, if any, warrant a regulatory response.
We also discussed options for
the form of any regulation and oversight of litigation funding, and asked
submitters which option they
prefer, and why. In particular, we discussed the
following:1129F[1130]
(a) Industry-based self-regulation and oversight. This would involve
inviting funders operating in Aotearoa New Zealand to develop their own industry
standards, and to form an industry
association responsible for overseeing
compliance with those standards. Membership of the industry association could be
either voluntary
or could be made a statutory requirement in order for a funder
to enter into any funding agreement. The standards of the association
could be
binding on members, and the association could impose sanctions for
non-compliance. The association could be funded by the
litigation funding
industry through member subscriptions. Industry self-regulation and oversight is
the approach taken in England
and
Wales.1130F[1131]
(b) Managed investment scheme and licensing requirements overseen by Te Mana
Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA). The managed investment
scheme and licensing requirements in the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMC
Act) could be imposed on
funders, with compliance overseen by the FMA. Among
other things, funders would be subject to governance and financial resource
requirements.
This would be similar to Australia’s position in relation to
funded class
actions.1131F[1132]
(c) Tailored licensing requirements overseen by the FMA or another
regulator. A variation to the above option is that funders could be subject
to modified or new licensing requirements and be monitored by the
FMA (or
another appropriate regulator). An advantage of this approach would be the
tailoring of licensing to the issues raised by
litigation funding. However, a
disadvantage would be the added regulatory burden of administering a new
licensing regime that is
tailored to a relatively small number of funders
operating in the Aotearoa New Zealand market.
(d) Tailored statutory rules overseen by a new oversight body. A further
option is the creation of a tailored statutory regime and a new statutory body
to oversee compliance with that regime.
The regime could clarify the parameters
for acceptable litigation funding arrangements, set minimum terms for funding
agreements
and minimum standards of behaviour and resources for litigation
funders, impose consequences for non-compliance and establish an
oversight
body.
(e) Court approval of litigation funding arrangements. The courts
could be required to approve funding arrangements in all or some funded
proceedings, for example in funded class actions.
Legislation could set out
certain conditions that litigation funding arrangements and funders would need
to satisfy in order for
the court to approve the arrangement. There is precedent
for court approval of class action funding agreements in
Ontario.1132F[1133]
(f) A combination of these options.
- 14.7 In broad
terms, we said the issue with industry self-regulation is that it is voluntary,
while the issue with statutory regulation
concerns who would be the regulator to
oversee the regime. In terms of managed investment scheme requirements, we noted
that the
FMC Act was not specifically designed with litigation funding in mind,
and significant tailoring of the existing requirements would
be required. Court
approval would be limited to dealing with funding arrangements as and when
funded litigation commences.
RESULTS OF CONSULTATION
The need for specific regulation and oversight
- 14.8 There
was strong support from submitters for specific regulation and oversight of
litigation funding.1133F[1134]
At one end of the spectrum submitters considered robust regulation of litigation
funding is required to manage the
concerns,1134F[1135] with one
commenting that “the case for regulation in some form is
overwhelming”.1135F[1136]
At the other end of the spectrum some submitters favoured a light touch approach
to regulation.1136F[1137] Two
submitters did not think that any government-led regulation of litigation
funding is warranted,1137F[1138]
with one funder suggesting the industry has demonstrated no need for
regulation.1138F[1139]
- 14.9 Several
submitters agreed with our preliminary view that the need for transparency and
accountability in relation to concerns
about funder control, conflicts of
interest, funder profits and funder capital adequacy warrants a regulatory
response.1139F[1140] Others
emphasised particular concerns justifying regulation. For example, Omni
Bridgeway said it supports appropriate regulation
of litigation funding to
address concerns about funder capital adequacy and to ensure funders operate
competently, efficiently, honestly
and
fairly.1140F[1141] Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) said the main purpose of any
regulatory regime should be to demystify
what is on offer so that those who use
litigation funding can make informed choices. It said the focus of regulation
should be on
facilitating the transparent and open provision of information,
including about a funder’s resources and the funding terms
available.
- 14.10 Many
submitters emphasised the greater need for regulation and oversight of
litigation funding in class actions as compared
to other funded proceedings.
This was considered necessary to protect the interests of funded representative
plaintiffs and class
members,1141F[1142] reflect the
burden of class actions on
defendants,1142F[1143] provide
greater certainty for litigation
funders1143F[1144] and ensure an
appropriate balance between the interests of the representative plaintiff, class
members and
defendant.1144F[1145]
- 14.11 Some
submitters emphasised a particular need for regulation and oversight in opt-out
class actions or indicated there is less
need for regulation and oversight in
opt-in class actions.1145F[1146]
Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office said that, in opt-in class actions
where the representative plaintiff and class members
actively sign up to a
proceeding, including any litigation funding arrangement, it is at least
arguable they do so on a “buyer
beware” basis. LPF Group said
contractual certainty in opt-in class actions will facilitate access to justice.
It also said
funders will be discouraged from supporting litigation if the court
has the ability to reopen or vary funding terms agreed by the
plaintiff prior to
entering the agreement.
- 14.12 A number
of submitters suggested the public policy considerations that apply to funded
class actions, or other low-value dispute
resolution for claimants, might not
apply to the sophisticated commercial market or the use of litigation funding in
individual cases.1146F[1147] For
example, Professor Vicki Waye (University of South Australia) said there is no
justification for regulation and oversight in
individual commercial cases. If an
individual wants to access litigation funding as opposed to some other form of
finance, they should
be free to do so and to negotiate their own terms. However,
she suggested regulation and oversight may be justified if funding becomes
available at a consumer level and if less sophisticated consumers do not
understand the risks. Woodsford Litigation Funding noted
that funders who are in
the business of funding commercial high-value disputes already operate in a
highly scrutinised environment
(that is, before judges and arbitral tribunals).
The parties involved are often sophisticated users of legal services and employ
expert legal counsel who have their own professional obligations. It submitted
that the public policy considerations that might apply
to low-value dispute
resolution for plaintiffs who may not have access to expert legal advice should
not apply to the sophisticated
commercial market.
Form of regulation and oversight
- 14.13 We
received 32 submissions on the form that any regulation and oversight of
litigation funding in Aotearoa New Zealand should
take.1147F[1148]
- 14.14 In the
context of representative and class actions, there was strong support for some
form of court oversight of the funding
arrangement at the commencement of the
proceeding and/or when approving a proposed
settlement:1148F[1149]
(a) Twelve submitters indicated support for court approval or oversight of the
litigation funding arrangement at the commencement
of the class
action.1149F[1150] For example,
to ensure compliance with any mandatory minimum terms or statutory requirements.
(b) Eleven submitters supported court oversight of the funding commission in the
context of approving a class action
settlement.1150F[1151]
(c) Six submitters supported court oversight of the litigation funding
arrangement at both the commencement of the class action and
when approving a
settlement.1151F[1152]
- 14.15 In the
Issues Paper, we did not ask submitters whether the court should have an express
power to make common fund orders. However,
some submitters nevertheless
expressed support for court oversight of funding commissions in the context of
exercising a power to
make common fund
orders.1152F[1153] In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, we asked whether the court should have an express
power to make common fund orders or other cost
sharing
orders,1153F[1154] and we
received strong support from submitters for this option. We discuss those
submissions and recommend an express power for the
court to make cost sharing
orders in Chapter 9.
- 14.16 Some
submitters suggested ways the court could be assisted to oversee litigation
funding arrangements. For example, through
statutory criteria to assist the
court in deciding whether to approve a funding agreement or settlement,
mandatory minimum terms
for funding agreements, or an express power for the
court to appoint an expert to assist with its assessment of the reasonableness
of a funding commission.
- 14.17 Alongside
court oversight of litigation funding in representative and class actions, there
was strong support for clarifying
lawyers’ professional obligations when
acting in funded proceedings. We discuss these submissions in Chapter 16 and
make recommendations
on avoiding and managing conflicts of interest in funded
proceedings. In Chapter 7, we make recommendations to clarify the relationship
between the lawyer and the class.
- 14.18 There was
some support for licensing requirements with oversight by the FMA or another
appropriate regulator. Of those who supported
licensing, most favoured tailored
licensing
requirements.1154F[1155] The
managed investment scheme requirements in the FMC Act were generally seen as a
poor fit for regulating litigation
funders.1155F[1156] Notably, the
FMA submitted that litigation funding should be regulated as a legal service,
not a financial markets service. It did
not support licensing requirements and
FMA oversight, saying:
(a) Licensing by the FMA is not an effective mechanism to address the concerns
with litigation funding. The FMA’s role is to
promote the development of
fair, efficient and transparent markets. Financial markets regulation in
Aotearoa is based on a twin peaks
model where the FMA is responsible for market
conduct regulation and Te Pūtea Matua | Reserve Bank of New Zealand is the
prudential
regulator. It is outside the FMA’s remit to address concerns
about funder profits or conflicts of interest, or concerns about
the integrity
of the court system raised by funder control.
(b) Further, licensing would not automatically mean that a funder has adequate
financial resources to meet an adverse costs order,
continue to fund the
proceedings, or distribute funds to shareholders.
(c) It is not clear whether litigation funding arrangements come within the
definition of a “managed investment scheme”
in the FMC
Act.1156F[1157] In order to be a
managed investment scheme, the plaintiff would need to have rights to
participate in, or receive, financial benefits.
Financial benefit is defined as
“capital, earnings, or other financial
returns”.1157F[1158] When
considering the arrangement between a litigation funder and a plaintiff, the FMA
does not consider the features that relate
to reducing financial risk, or
compensation for loss received from the court, fit the definition of a financial
benefit. If a funder
raises contributions from investors this is likely to fit
the definition of a debt security or managed investment scheme (depending
on how
it is structured) under the FMC Act and may accordingly raise issues that
intersect with the FMA’s regulatory mandate.
However, this is not the
purpose for regulating litigation funding, as set out in the Issues Paper.
- 14.19 Only two
submitters clearly favoured a requirement for funders to be licensed as
providers of financial products under the existing
requirements of the FMC
Act.1158F[1159] While some other
submitters could see similarities between litigation funding and other financial
products, or were not opposed to
licensing in principle, they were more
tentative about the suitability of the managed investment scheme and licensing
requirements.1159F[1160] Te
Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand said that, to
the extent funders are sourcing funding from the
public, these offerings should
be regulated as any other investment product would be.
- 14.20 There
was little support for industry self-regulation and
oversight.1160F[1161] This was
generally seen as an inadequate response to the concerns with litigation
funding,1161F[1162] or
impractical given the nascent market for litigation funding in Aotearoa New
Zealand and the fact that most funders are presently
based
overseas.1162F[1163]
- 14.21 There also
was very limited support for retaining the status quo. Joint Action Funding said
the courts have developed the law
in relation to litigation funding since
Houghton v Saunders and this work should not be set back by a “one
rule to fit all legislative solution”.
- 14.22 There was
no support for creating a new statutory body to oversee any regulation of
litigation funding. Only Chapman Tripp commented
on this option and said it sees
no need for a new oversight body at this stage.
OUR APPROACH
- 14.23 The
submissions on the Issues Paper affirmed our preliminary view that the lack of
certainty in the law, and the need for better
transparency and accountability in
relation to the concerns with litigation funding, warrant a regulatory
response.1163F[1164] In Chapter
13, we recommend the torts of maintenance and champerty should be abolished to
clarify that litigation funding is permitted
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
- 14.24 Below, we
conclude that further regulation and oversight of litigation funding is also
required to clarify uncertainty about
the extent to which litigation funding is
permissible and to address the concerns with litigation funding. We discuss
objectives
for permitting and regulating litigation funding, principles for
guiding the design of any regulation and oversight, and the form
that any
regulation and oversight of litigation funding should take.
Further regulation and oversight of litigation funding is
needed
- 14.25 Like
uncertainty about whether litigation funding is permitted (discussed in
Chapter 13), uncertainty about the extent to which litigation funding is
permitted may negatively impact on access to justice, by reducing the
availability and affordability
of litigation funding. It may also increase the
risk of challenges to funding agreements, adding cost and delay to the
resolution
of claims. Furthermore, it may mean that plaintiffs are not
adequately protected against the risks that can arise in funded proceedings,
for
example in relation to funder control of litigation, conflicts of interest,
funder profits and funder capital adequacy (which
together we describe as
“the concerns with litigation funding”).
Class actions
- 14.26 We
think the need for further regulation and oversight of litigation funding is
strongest in the class actions context. For
the reasons below, we think class
actions give rise to particular concerns about funder control of litigation and
funder profits,
as well as more general concerns about conflicts of interest and
funder capital adequacy.
- 14.27 In a class
action, the representative plaintiff may be unable to effectively negotiate fair
and reasonable funding terms, as
there will often be an imbalance of power
between them and the funder. In most cases, the representative plaintiff will be
dependent
on litigation funding to bring their claim given the significant costs
and financial risks of class actions. Costs may include lawyers’
fees for
what may be complex and protracted litigation, as well as disbursements such as
expert witness reports and court fees. Further,
claims that attract litigation
funding will often be against well-resourced defendants backed by their
insurers. This means the representative
plaintiff will usually be dependent on
an adverse costs indemnity from the funder to avoid being exposed to financial
risks that
are disproportionate to the risks that other class members carry, and
to the value of their own
claim.1164F[1165]
- 14.28 Terms that
give the funder control over the conduct of the litigation also give rise to a
risk that the funder will prioritise
its own interests over the interests of the
representative plaintiff and the class. Funder control may diminish the
representative
plaintiff’s ability to have input into how the litigation
is conducted.
- 14.29 Further,
unfair or unreasonable funding terms may diminish the compensation the
representative plaintiff and class members receive
if their claim is successful,
diminishing the access to justice objective for permitting litigation funding
(discussed later in this
chapter). For example, terms that entitle the funder to
an unreasonable share of any settlement or damages award or allow the funder
to
terminate the agreement without cause. The latter can put subtle forms of
pressure on the representative plaintiff and influence
the power dynamics in
settlement discussions.
- 14.30 The
representative plaintiff will often have little or no litigation experience or
expertise, limiting their ability to effectively
monitor their claim and protect
their interests and class member interests during the proceedings.
- 14.31 The
ability of class members to protect their interests is even more limited,
because of their low-level of engagement with
the
claim.1165F[1166] They do not
have the status of parties and may have very little contact with the lawyer for
the representative plaintiff and the
class. Class members will likely have no
ability to influence the funding terms or commission. For example, it is often a
condition
of joining an opt-in class action that the class member signs a
litigation funding agreement that has already been finalised before
the opt-in
period commences. Class members may also have very little input into how the
litigation is conducted, yet they will be
bound by a judgment. Alternatively,
they will be bound by a settlement despite usually having no role in settlement
negotiations.
In opt-out class actions, class members may not even be aware of
the proceeding until it has been resolved.
- 14.32 While the
lawyer for the representative plaintiff has professional duties to promote and
protect their client’s interests,
and may also owe duties to the
class,1166F[1167] there is a
risk that they will be incentivised to prioritise the funder’s interests
(because the funder is paying their bills)
or their own interests (in order to
cultivate or maintain an ongoing business relationship with the funder).
- 14.33 If the
funder fails to maintain adequate capital, a successful defendant may be left
with a significant loss if the funder and
the representative plaintiff are
unable to meet an adverse costs order. If the funder is based overseas, the
defendant may be put
to the additional expense, risk and inconvenience of
litigating in a foreign jurisdiction to enforce any security provided. While
concerns about funder capital adequacy could exist in any funded proceedings,
class actions raise particular concerns because the
class is likely to use
litigation funding when it cannot otherwise afford to litigate. It could
therefore be assumed the class will
be unable to cover the defendant’s
costs if the litigation funder is unable to. As class actions tend to be
significantly more
expensive and protracted than ordinary proceedings, a
defendant’s loss is likely to be significant if the funder fails to fulfil
an obligation to indemnify the representative plaintiff against an adverse costs
order. While security for costs mitigates this concern,
it is not a complete
response as it is a matter for the court’s discretion and may not reflect
the actual costs incurred.
- 14.34 A
representative plaintiff may also be left with a substantial and unexpected
liability for legal fees and adverse costs if
a funder fails to fulfil a
commitment under the funding agreement to meet these expenses. We discuss this
issue in Chapter 16.
Other funded proceedings
- 14.35 In
other funded proceedings, we do not consider litigation funding warrants
regulation and oversight to the same extent as in
class actions. In these cases,
the risk of funder control of litigation and funder profits is less concerning,
and the risk of conflicts
of interest may also be reduced.
- 14.36 The nature
of other claims that attract litigation funding means that the funded plaintiff
is likely to be commercially sophisticated.
Outside the context of
representative actions, litigation funding in Aotearoa New Zealand is most often
used in high-value commercial
cases such as insolvency and insurance
claims.1167F[1168] In such
cases, the plaintiff may themselves have litigation experience or expertise, or
access to their own lawyers or in-house legal
team. They are able to promote and
protect their interests when negotiating litigation funding agreements and are
likely to be actively
engaged in their claim and able to monitor and protect
their interests during the proceedings.
- 14.37 Occasionally,
litigation funding is used outside a commercial context, for example in
high-value relationship property
disputes.1168F[1169] In such
cases, the individual plaintiff will have the status of a party to the
litigation and will be able to have input into the
negotiation of the funding
agreement and the way the litigation is conducted. The funding agreement is
unlikely to give the funder
control over the conduct of the litigation, reducing
the risk of lawyers facing conflicts between the interests of the funder and
their client. The risk of lawyer-plaintiff conflicts may also be reduced if the
plaintiff has a pre-existing relationship with the
lawyer, or if the lawyer does
not have the expectation of, or opportunity for, repeat work from the litigation
funder. Our recommendations
to mitigate lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest
in Chapter 16 nevertheless apply to all funded proceedings and are not limited
to class actions.
- 14.38 Whereas
representative plaintiffs usually require full litigation funding (including for
legal costs), an individual plaintiff
may only require partial funding to
mitigate their risk. For example, they may decide to finance legal fees but seek
funding to satisfy
an order for security for costs or to cover disbursements.
This also reduces the risk of funder control of litigation and conflicts
of
interest.
- 14.39 Finally,
submitters had few, if any, concerns about litigation funding outside the class
actions context. They indicated that
an individual plaintiff does not require
protection to the same extent as representative plaintiffs and class members,
and that they
should be free to contract with the funder on whatever terms are
acceptable to them. This attitude was shared by members of our Expert
Advisory
Group and the judges we consulted. It is also reflected in the approaches to
regulation of litigation funding in Australia
and Ontario, which are largely
confined to class actions.
- 14.40 However,
concerns about funder capital adequacy may arise in any funded proceedings.
Further, while the risk of conflicts of
interest may be reduced in commercial
cases, there remains some risk of lawyer-plaintiff conflicts in these cases. We
consider these
risks in Chapters 15 and 16.
Objectives for permitting and regulating litigation
funding
- 14.41 We
think the objectives for permitting and regulating litigation funding should be
improving access to justice, while assuring
the integrity of the court
system.
Litigation funding should improve access to justice
- 14.42 Access
to justice is a fundamental tenet of democracy. However, as previously noted in
this review, the high costs associated
with litigation are well beyond the means
of most New Zealanders and significantly impede access to the courts.
- 14.43 In Chapter
13, we conclude that, although litigation funding is not a “silver
bullet” for the access to justice
problems facing Aotearoa New Zealand, it
nevertheless has a role to play in improving access to justice. Litigation
funding can allow
plaintiffs to bring claims they could not have brought (due to
financial constraints) or would not have brought (due to uncertainty
about the
process, or the time and stress that would be involved in doing so). It can also
help to level the playing field for plaintiffs
in litigation against
well-resourced defendants. We concluded that litigation funding is desirable in
principle and the law should
clarify its permissibility in Aotearoa New
Zealand.
- 14.44 Regulation
and oversight of litigation funding should therefore support the use of
litigation funding to improve access to justice.
In the Issues Paper, we set out
a holistic approach to access to justice that includes access to the courts, a
fair and transparent
process, meaningful participation rights and a
substantively just
result.1169F[1170] Access to
justice must be considered from the perspective of both plaintiffs and
defendants. This holistic approach enables us, in
making recommendations for
reform, to consider a wide range of factors.
Litigation funding should assure the integrity of the court
system
- 14.45 While
litigation funding can have the effect of improving access to justice,
litigation funders are motivated by profit. Excessive
funder profits may corrode
public perceptions of the court
system.1170F[1171] If a funded
plaintiff’s compensation is substantially diminished because of their
reliance on litigation funding, perceptions
about the quality of justice they
achieved through the courts may also be diminished.
- 14.46 There is a
further risk that the integrity of the court process will be affected by
excessive funder profits and control of
the litigation. The courts provide a
forum where individuals can seek to enforce and defend their substantive rights.
This core function
may be diminished where, rather than adjudicating on rights,
the court process serves the economic purposes of removed third parties.
- 14.47 Historically,
the torts of maintenance and champerty prohibited litigation funding. The policy
rationales for those torts were
to protect members of society from malicious
litigation and to assure the integrity of the courts. In Chapter 13, we
recommend that
the torts should be abolished and conclude that the policy
concerns can be addressed, including through appropriate and transparent
regulation and oversight of litigation funding. Regulation of litigation funding
should therefore provide assurance in the integrity
of the court system.
Principles for designing a regulatory regime
- 14.48 The
following principles have guided our recommendations for the development of
regulation and oversight of litigation funding:
(a) To facilitate access to courts, the litigation funding market should be
sustainable and competitive and promote consumer confidence.
(b) To ensure substantively just outcomes in class
actions, the costs of litigation funding to representative plaintiffs and class
members and the terms of litigation funding agreements should be fair and
reasonable.
(c) To assure the integrity of the court system, and recognise defendant
concerns in funded proceedings, the involvement and role
of litigation funders
in funded proceedings should be appropriate and transparent.
The market should be sustainable and competitive and promote
consumer confidence
- 14.49 We
think the objective of improving access to justice, and particularly access to
courts, can best be furthered by regulation
that allows the nascent litigation
funding market in Aotearoa New Zealand to grow and sustain itself in a way that
protects plaintiffs
who are consumers of litigation funding. There was strong
support from submitters for regulation and oversight of litigation funding
that
supports a competitive market.
- 14.50 In order
for the market to be sustainable and competitive and promote consumer
confidence, we recognise that litigation funding
needs to be commercially viable
for litigation funders. Regulation that is too burdensome may cause funders to
leave or not enter
the market.
- 14.51 The law
also needs to clarify that litigation funding is permitted in Aotearoa New
Zealand, and to what extent. In the absence
of specific regulation of litigation
funding, the parameters within which funders should operate are unclear. This
uncertainty may
increase the risk and cost of funding litigation, impacting on
the availabilty and affordability of litigation funding. The lack
of
transparency in the law may also have a negative impact on consumer confidence.
While it is difficult to measure the impact of
uncertainty in the law on the
litigation funding market and access to justice, several submitters echoed these
concerns.
The costs of litigation funding in class actions should be fair
and reasonable
- 14.52 In
class actions, we think it is essential that the costs of litigation funding to
representative plaintiffs and class members
are fair and reasonable. In
Houghton v Saunders, Te Kōti Matua | High Court acknowledged that
access to justice for a plaintiff may be “diluted” where a
substantial
sum of any award will be paid to a litigation
funder.1171F[1172] The access to
justice objective of permitting litigation funding will not be met if litigation
funding only facilitates access to
courts and does not facilitate access to
substantively just outcomes.
- 14.53 Ensuring
that costs to representative plaintiffs are fair and reasonable will also help
to support consumer confidence in litigation
funding and assure the integrity
and public perceptions of the court system.
The involvement and role of litigation funders should be
appropriate and transparent
- 14.54 The
involvement and role of litigation funders in funded proceedings needs to be
appropriate and transparent in order to assure
the integrity, and public
perceptions, of the court system. We think transparency will also improve funder
accountability. Transparency
and accountability may, in turn, improve consumer
confidence in the market and accordingly support the availability of
funding.
- 14.55 Transparency
around the involvement of litigation funders also recognises legitimate
defendant interests in information about
the litigation that is proceeding
against them. This allows the defendant to take steps, for example applying for
a stay of proceedings
if they think the proceeding is an abuse of process or
applying for security for
costs.1172F[1173]
- 14.56 We
recognise that transparency is not appropriate in relation to all aspects of
litigation funding arrangements. In Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding, for
example, Te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court recognised that a funded litigant
should not be required to disclose the financial
means of the funder, or terms
that might give the defendant an unfair or tactical advantage (such as the terms
on which funding can
be
withdrawn).1173F[1174]
Form of regulation and oversight
- 14.57 We
think the courts are best placed to consider the fairness and reasonableness of
funding agreements in class actions, including
funding commissions, to ensure
the interests of representative plaintiffs and class members are protected.
Court oversight was also
submitters’ preferred option for regulation and
oversight in funded class actions.
- 14.58 The courts
in Aotearoa New Zealand have already recognised their important supervisory role
in representative actions to ensure
that the interests of class members are
protected.1174F[1175] Class
actions raise the same concerns, and court oversight will help to ensure that
litigation funding achieves its access to justice
objective.1175F[1176]
- 14.59 In the
absence of detailed statutory rules, however, the courts in Aotearoa New Zealand
have questioned the institutional capacity
of the courts to approve litigation
funding agreements and assess the fairness of funding commissions. In
Southern Response Earthquake Services v Southern Response Unresolved Claims
Group, Te Kōti Pira | Court of Appeal
said:1176F[1177]
- There is
nothing in r 4.24 which enables a court to approve funding arrangements or
communications, and in the absence of rules creating
a regime for approval, the
status of any such approval would be uncertain ... There must also be questions
about the institutional
capacity of the courts to approve such arrangements in
what is at best, in this country, a developing market for litigation funders,
and given the absence of any detailed rules of procedure or legislation as exist
in other jurisdictions. Rule 4.24 cannot bear the
weight of a complex funding
approval scheme.
- 14.60 The
Supreme Court also commented generally on the difficulty of drawing a line
between what is an acceptable level of funder
profit and what is excessive in
Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding, saying “whether a bargain is fair
assumes the existence of an ascertainable objective standard against which
fairness is to
be
measured”.1177F[1178]
- 14.61 Nevertheless,
in some comparable jurisdictions there are signs that the courts are willing and
able to assess the fairness and
reasonableness of funding agreements, including
funding commissions. In Ontario, for example, legislation recognises the
courts’
competence to assess the fairness and reasonableness of funding
agreements and commissions. The court may not approve a funding agreement
unless
it is satisfied that the agreement, including the indemnity for costs and
funding commission, is fair and reasonable, the
agreement will not diminish the
representative plaintiff’s ability to instruct their lawyer or control the
litigation, and
the funder is financially able to satisfy any adverse costs
order to the extent provided in the
indemnity.1178F[1179] In
deciding whether to approve a funding agreement, the court must consider whether
the representative plaintiff received independent
legal advice with respect to
the agreement.1179F[1180] The
funding agreement is of no force or effect unless it is approved by the
court.1180F[1181]
- 14.62 Court
approval of funding agreements has also been discussed in Australia. In 2018,
the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended
that litigation funding
agreements should require court approval in order to be
enforceable.1181F[1182] This
would provide the court with an opportunity to consider the terms of the
agreement as a whole, including the scope and extent
of any indemnity offered to
the representative plaintiff, the degree of control sought by the funder, the
funder’s ability
to unilaterally instruct a different plaintiff law firm,
and the appropriateness of any dispute resolution
mechanism.1182F[1183] It
recommended court approval should also involve the court reviewing, amending or
setting funding terms and commissions (when necessary
to protect class
members).1183F[1184] In 2019,
the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry also recommended that litigation funding
agreements should require court approval in
order to be
enforceable.1184F[1185] It
recommended a power for the court to alter, vary or amend the terms of any
funding agreement both prior to, and at the resolution
of, a class
action.1185F[1186] These
recommendations have not been
implemented.1186F[1187] To the
extent, however, that Australian courts have been willing to approve or vary
funding commissions in the context of making
common fund orders, this indicates
some acceptance that oversight falls within their
expertise.1187F[1188]
- 14.63 Court
approval of proposed settlements in class actions is also a key feature of
overseas class actions regimes. In some jurisdictions,
when a court considers
whether to approve a class action settlement, it will consider the
reasonableness of the funding
commission.1188F[1189] Court
oversight at this stage can provide an important defence against the risk that
funders may take an excessive proportion of
a class member’s settlement
sum.1189F[1190]
- 14.64 We think
the concerns with litigation funding can best be addressed through regulation
and court oversight of funding agreements
in class actions, alongside
professional regulation of lawyers acting in funded proceedings and changes to
strengthen the security
for costs
mechanism.1190F[1191] We set out
an overview of our recommendations for the regulation and oversight of
litigation funding at the end of this chapter.
- 14.65 We think
this approach is the most practical and proportionate response to concerns about
funder control, conflicts of interest,
funder profits and funder capital
adequacy. We considered other forms of regulation and oversight but have
concluded:
(a) Industry self-regulation and oversight is an inadequate response to the
concerns with litigation funding, and an impractical
response given the small
size of the market in Aotearoa New Zealand and the fact that most funders are
presently based overseas.
While this model would support a competitive market,
we think the concerns with litigation funding, particularly in class actions,
warrant greater scrutiny to ensure that the permitting and regulating of
litigation funding furthers the objectives of improving
access to justice and
providing assurance in the integrity of the court system.
(b) The managed investment scheme and licensing requirements in the FMC Act are
not a good fit for regulating litigation funding
arrangements.1191F[1192] If we
were to recommend this approach, we would be doing so in circumstances where the
existing requirements have clear limitations
and would require significant
reform to properly address the identified concerns with litigation funding. We
would also be doing
so in the context of strong opposition from the FMA, the
regulator responsible for overseeing the licensing regime.
(c) It is not clear that the significant costs that would be involved in
establishing and administering a tailored licensing regime
for litigation
funders are proportionate to the small size of the market in Aotearoa New
Zealand or the concerns with litigation
funding. For funders, there would be
potentially significant compliance costs, including licensing fees and annual
levies. These
costs would inevitably be passed on to consumers. For any
regulator, there would be the ongoing costs involved in the oversight of
litigation funding arrangements and administration of the regime. In any case,
there is no obvious regulator to oversee such a regime.
(d) We do not support the creation of a new statutory body to oversee any
regulation of litigation funders and funding arrangements.
The cost of this
option would likely be disproportionate to the small size of the litigation
funding market in Aotearoa New Zealand.
No submitters supported this option.
OVERVIEW OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT
- 14.66 In
the section below and the chapters that follow, we explain our recommendations
to regulate litigation funding in detail.
Broadly, we propose the following
approach.
- 14.67 In all
funded proceedings:
(a) Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule to require funded plaintiffs
to disclose their
litigation funding agreement to the court and to the defendant. We discuss this
recommendation below.
(b) The Rules Committee should consider amendments to the High Court Rules 2016
(HCR) to require security for costs to be provided
in a form that is enforceable
in Aotearoa New Zealand, and to expressly empower the court to make orders
directly against the funder
in relation to security for costs and adverse costs.
We discuss this recommendation in Chapter 15.
(c) NZLS should consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care for
lawyers to clarify how conflicts of interest should be avoided and managed
in funded proceedings, including conflicts arising from a lawyer
or law firm
having financial or other interests in the funder that is financing the same
matter in which they are acting. We discuss
this recommendation in Chapter 16.
- 14.68 In funded
class actions only:
(a) The Class Actions Act we recommend should specify that any litigation
funding agreement in a class action must be approved by
the court in order to be
enforceable by the funder. The court must be satisfied that the representative
plaintiff has received independent
legal advice on the funding agreement, and
that the funding agreement (including the funding commission) is fair and
reasonable in
the circumstances of the case. To assist with this assessment, our
proposed funding approval provision sets out factors the court
may consider and
provides that the court may appoint an expert to assist it with assessing the
fairness and reasonableness of the
funding commission. The factors the court may
consider respond, among other things, to concerns about funder control of
litigation,
funder profits and conflicts of interest. We discuss these
recommendations in Chapter 17.
(b) The Class Actions Act should allow the court to review the funding
commission when making a cost sharing order (discussed in
Chapter 9) or when
approving a proposed settlement (discussed in Chapter 11). The court should only
be empowered to vary the funding
commission when making certain cost sharing
orders and, in limited circumstances, in opt-in cases that proceed to judgment
(discussed
in Chapter 17).
(c) The Rules Committee should consider an amendment to the HCR to include a
presumption for security for costs in funded class actions.
We discuss this
recommendation in Chapter 15.
(d) NZLS should consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care for
lawyers to prohibit a lawyer acting in a class action from claiming any
unpaid legal expenses from the funded representative plaintiff if
the funder
fails to meet its financial commitment to pay those expenses. We discuss this
recommendation in Chapter 16.
DISCLOSURE OF LITIGATION FUNDING AGREEMENTS
- R108 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing a High Court Rule to require a funded
plaintiff to disclose their litigation funding agreement to the court and to the
defendant, with redactions of privileged
matters or information that may confer
a tactical advantage. Disclosure of the funding agreement could occur when the
statement of
claim is filed or, if the funding agreement is entered after the
statement of claim has been filed, as soon as practicable after
the funding
agreement has been entered into.
- 14.69 To support
our proposals for the regulation and oversight of litigation funding, we think
there should be a requirement for
plaintiffs, in all funded proceedings, to
disclose their funding agreement to the court and the defendant, with redactions
to protect
privileged matters or those that might confer a tactical advantage on
the defendant.1192F[1193] We
think disclosure of the funding agreement should occur when the statement of
claim is filed or, if the funding agreement is entered
after the statement of
claim has been filed, as soon as practicable after the funding agreement has
been entered into.
- 14.70 Our
recommendation is wider than the current principles applicable to the disclosure
of funding agreements, as articulated by
the Supreme Court in Waterhouse v
Contractors
Bonding.1193F[1194] In
that case, the Supreme Court held that a funded litigant must disclose to
the court and the non-funded party the fact that there is
a litigation funder
involved, the funder’s identity, and whether or not the funder is subject
to the jurisdiction of the New
Zealand courts. It reasoned that the non-funded
party needs to know these matters before it can decide whether to make an
application
for a stay on abuse of process grounds. In principle, the courts and
the other party or parties are entitled to know the identity
of the “real
parties” to the
litigation.1194F[1195]
- 14.71 The
Supreme Court said the funding agreement itself should be disclosed to both the
court and the non-funded party where an
application has been made to which the
litigation funding arrangement may be relevant. This may include an application
for a stay
of proceedings on abuse of process grounds, a non-party costs order
or security for costs. Where disclosure occurs, the agreement
should be redacted
to protect privileged matters or those that might give a tactical advantage to
the non-funded party.1195F[1196]
There is otherwise no general obligation at present to disclose the funding
agreement.1196F[1197]
- 14.72 We think
disclosure of the funding agreement (with appropriate redactions) to the
defendant in all funded proceedings will assist
the defendant to make informed
choices about whether to apply for security for costs or a stay of proceedings
on abuse of process
grounds. A requirement to disclose the funding agreement is
simpler and more efficient than requiring the defendant to apply for
disclosure.
It supports our access to justice objective for permitting and regulating
litigation funding, which includes access to
justice for defendants.
- 14.73 Disclosure
of the funding agreement (with appropriate redactions) will also give the court
an opportunity to stay the proceedings
if it considers the funding agreement
amounts to an abuse of
process.1197F[1198] This
supports our objective of assuring the integrity of the court system and our
principle that the involvement and role of litigation
funders in proceedings
should be appropriate and transparent. A requirement in the High Court Rules for
the disclosure of the funding
agreement to the court and the defendant would
also make the law more accessible.
- 14.74 Finally,
in class actions, disclosure of the funding agreement to the court (with
appropriate redactions) is necessary to give
effect to our recommendation for
court approval of funding agreements in Chapter 17.
CHAPTER 15
Security for costs
INTRODUCTION
- 15.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Concerns about the funder having insufficient resources to pay an adverse
costs order in favour of the defendant.
(b) The limitations of the existing security for costs regime to manage the
concerns.
(c) Our recommendations to strengthen the security for costs mechanism.
DEFENDANTS MAY SUFFER LOSS IF FUNDER FAILS TO FULFIL ITS
COMMITMENTS
- 15.2 In
the Issues Paper, we noted that the principal financial obligation of a
litigation funder is its obligation to pay the plaintiff’s
legal costs
(comprising lawyer’s fees and
expenses).1198F[1199] A funder
may also agree to meet any security for costs or adverse costs that are ordered
against the plaintiff.
- 15.3 Litigation
funders may become unable to meet their financial obligations for a variety of
reasons, including poor financial management
and unwise investment decisions.
Even when well-managed, litigation funding is an inherently risky form of
investment. If successful,
it typically does not provide a return for several
years. Funded litigation, particularly class actions, can be expensive,
uncertain
and protracted. There is also an inherent tension between investing
and holding reserves, that is, a funder may be motivated to invest
money in a
new case notwithstanding that the same money could be required to meet the
funder’s obligations in an existing case.
- 15.4 A
funder’s failure to maintain adequate capital to fulfil its financial
obligations risks leaving a successful defendant
with a significant loss if both
the funder and the funded plaintiff are unable to meet an adverse costs
order.
- 15.5 A
funder’s failure to maintain adequate capital to fulfil its financial
obligations may also mean that the funded plaintiff’s
claim is
discontinued, and they may be left with a significant liability in terms of
unpaid legal fees or unpaid adverse costs in
excess of any security for costs
provided. In Chapter 16, we discuss these plaintiff concerns in more detail and
our recommendation
to respond to those concerns.
- 15.6 In the
Issues Paper, we acknowledged that other consequences may also follow from a
funder’s failure to maintain adequate
capital. For instance, the funded
plaintiff’s lawyer may be left out of pocket for any unpaid work, or the
funded proceedings
may be discontinued having wasted judicial resources. To some
extent, a funder’s failure to fulfil its financial obligations
may
negatively impact perceptions of the litigation funding industry, and we
suggested that reputable funders may therefore have
an interest in ensuring the
capital adequacy of other funders operating in the market.
SECURITY FOR COSTS MAY BE INADEQUATE TO MANAGE THE
CONCERNS
- 15.7 In
the Issues Paper, we explained that defendant concerns about funders’
capital adequacy are addressed primarily through
the security for costs
procedure.1199F[1200] A
defendant can reasonably assume that a plaintiff who requires litigation funding
to bring their claim will be unable to satisfy
an adverse costs order if the
funder fails to meet this expense, and a security for costs order provides a
degree of protection against
that risk. The order requires the plaintiff to
deposit a sum that the judge considers sufficient into court, or to provide
security
for that sum to the satisfaction of the judge or
registrar.1200F[1201]
- 15.8 Currently,
Te Kōti Matua | High Court may order security for costs under rule 5.45 of
the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) where
it is just, and either the plaintiff is
resident or incorporated outside of Aotearoa New Zealand or there is reason to
believe that
they will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if
unsuccessful.1201F[1202] The
court may also exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order security for costs in
a representative action supported by a litigation
funder, even if the plaintiff
is a natural person resident in Aotearoa New
Zealand.1202F[1203] In addition,
the High Court has held that proceedings funded by an overseas-based funder may
attract a security for costs order,
engaging the “evident policy” in
HCR 5.45.1203F[1204]
- 15.9 In general,
the fact that proceedings are funded by a litigation funder is likely to
influence the court to exercise its discretion
to order security for costs.
Further, the quantum is likely to be substantial and will tend towards
relatively full
security.1204F[1205]
- 15.10 Nevertheless,
in the Issues Paper we noted that security for costs may not adequately manage
the concerns about a funder’s
financial resources. For defendants,
security for costs is still a matter for the court’s discretion and HCR
5.45 does not
explicitly contemplate the provision of security in funded
proceedings, whether the funder is based locally or overseas. For funders,
providing substantial security for costs can significantly increase the cost of
funding litigation (particularly if the funder also
pays an upfront premium for
after-the-event insurance).
CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
- 15.11 In
the Issues Paper, we identified two possible options for reform to address
concerns about the capital adequacy of litigation
funders:
(a) Strengthening the security for costs mechanism for some or all kinds of
funded litigation.
(b) Requiring litigation funders to meet minimum capital adequacy requirements.
Strengthening the security for costs mechanism
- 15.12 We
discussed the option of strengthening the security for costs mechanism, for
example through a presumption or requirement
that litigation funders will
provide security for costs in funded proceedings, and a requirement that
security for costs must be
in a form that is directly enforceable in Aotearoa
New Zealand.1205F[1206] We noted
that, in Australia, there has been support for a presumption in favour of
security being ordered in funded class
actions.1206F[1207] We suggested
that strengthening the security for costs mechanism could give defendants
greater comfort that capital will be available
and accessible to cover their
costs in the event they successfully defend the proceedings.
Minimum capital adequacy requirements
- 15.13 We
also discussed the option of requiring litigation funders operating in Aotearoa
New Zealand to comply with minimum capital
adequacy
requirements.1207F[1208]
Broadly, such requirements would oblige a funder to maintain a minimum amount of
available capital. The amount could be calculated
as a proportion of the
funder’s total financial commitments across its investments, although a
fixed dollar amount is also
used in some
jurisdictions.1208F[1209]
Overseas, capital adequacy requirements generally include a combination of
capital requirements, auditing requirements and continuous
disclosure
obligations.1209F[1210]
- 15.14 We
suggested that such requirements may help to protect both the plaintiff and
defendant in funded proceedings from the risk
of funders failing to meet their
financial
obligations.1210F[1211] On the
other hand, we said capital adequacy requirements may not be conducive to a
competitive market if overseas-based funders are
unwilling to bring their
capital into the jurisdiction. They may create a barrier to entry and may
advantage some incumbents in the
market. Such barriers may be justified to
ensure that only reputable and capable funders enter the market. That said, the
funding
market in Aotearoa New Zealand is already small, with very few locally
based funders.1211F[1212]
- 15.15 Funders
are subject to capital adequacy requirements in a number of overseas
jurisdictions including England and Wales (albeit
only funders belonging to the
Association of Litigation Funders), the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts and, in
the arbitration context,
Singapore and Hong Kong. As we discuss below, however,
these requirements do not appear to be onerous. Class action litigation funders
in Australia are required to hold an Australian Financial Services Licence
(AFSL) and comply with managed investment scheme
requirements.1212F[1213] Like
other AFSL holders, they are obliged to “have available adequate resources
... to provide the financial services covered
by the licence and to carry out
supervisory
arrangements”.1213F[1214]
- 15.16 We noted
that key challenges with a capital adequacy requirement include how to formulate
a minimum capital requirement, whether
minimum capital adequacy requirements
should be able to be satisfied if the funder’s capital is held in another
jurisdiction,
who should oversee compliance with any capital adequacy
requirements, and what consequences should follow from
non-compliance.1214F[1215]
RESULTS OF CONSULTATION
- 15.17 In
the Issues Paper, we asked submitters what concerns they have about the capital
adequacy of litigation funders, whether the
current security for costs mechanism
is adequate to manage those concerns, how the security for costs mechanism might
be strengthened,
and whether funders should be subject to minimum capital
adequacy requirements.
Concerns about funders failing to fulfil financial
obligations
- 15.18 We
received 18 submissions on what concerns, if any, submitters have about the
capital adequacy of litigation
funders.1215F[1216] Of those, 14
submitters had concerns about funders’ capital
adequacy,1216F[1217] and three
submitters had no
concerns.1217F[1218] In this
section we summarise the concerns from the perspective of successful defendants,
lawyers and the court. We summarise plaintiff
concerns, and consider how to
address them, in Chapter 16.
Defendant concerns
- 15.19 The
inability of funders to pay an adverse costs order was seen as a significant
concern for defendants, due to the scale of
the litigation funded and the burden
it imposes on
defendants.1218F[1219] Carter
Holt Harvey said the organisational resources and opportunity costs of facing
years of litigation of uncertain but speculatively
high value can be
significant. It pointed to the Feltex representative action, which was
struck out due to the funder’s inability to satisfy a security for costs
order. It said the
Feltex litigation led to defendants facing years of
litigation (as well as millions of dollars in costs) only for the plaintiffs to
fail
almost entirely, and then for their funder to withdraw funding for trial
costs.
- 15.20 Dr Michael
Duffy (Monash University) said successful defendants and plaintiffs suffer where
funders who are liable for adverse
costs either do not have the assets in the
jurisdiction or use a subsidiary special purpose vehicle (SPV) that may have no
claim
on the funder parent entities due to limited liability. Chapman Tripp also
noted that the use of SPVs to fund litigation gives rise
to concerns about the
adequacy of those SPVs.
- 15.21 On the
other hand, some submitters were not concerned about funder capital
adequacy.1219F[1220] The themes
in their submissions were:
(a) Defendants in funded proceedings should not be afforded a greater degree of
protection than they would ordinarily receive.
(b) In any litigation, the defendant faces a risk the plaintiff will not be able
to pay an adverse costs order in favour of the defendant
or will run out of
money mid-dispute. Impecuniosity is one of the inherent risks of litigation that
all parties face and, if anything,
the involvement of a funder may reduce that
risk for defendants.
(c) Concerns about funder capital adequacy can be mitigated through other
mechanisms, including security for costs, non-party costs,
market forces,
funders’ reputational and commercial incentives to ensure they have enough
capital to fund proceedings, lawyers’
abilities to manage payment of
invoices and to alert their clients to any issues with the payment of their
invoices, after-the-event
insurance, and the terms of litigation funding
agreements.1220F[1221]
Other concerns
- 15.22 Simpson
Grierson raised a concern about lawyers (and any witness experts) being unpaid
for their fees. On the other hand, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
said that lawyers have the abilities and systems to ensure the timely payment of
invoices, and
to manage any concerns about a funder’s ability to cover the
plaintiff’s legal fees and expenses. Further, it said the
risk of lawyers
not being paid their fees, or a portion of their costs, along the way is not
different to the risk faced by lawyers
acting for clients in ordinary unfunded
commercial and civil litigation.
- 15.23 LPF Group
said funders’ ability to finance cases in their entirety is fundamental to
achieving an accessible justice system.
If a funder has insufficient capital
then court time is wasted, and the court system becomes ineffectual. It said
regulating funders’
capital adequacy could address “the valid
concern that litigation funding encourages opportunism and unscrupulous persons
to
take unmeritorious cases and frustrate justice”, although in its
experience of funding in Aotearoa New Zealand this is not
a significant
issue.
Adequacy of the existing security for costs
mechanism
- 15.24 Fifteen
submitters addressed the adequacy of the security for costs
mechanism.1221F[1222]
Existing mechanism is inadequate
- 15.25 Eight
submitters thought the existing security for costs mechanism is
inadequate.1222F[1223] Themes in
these submissions were:
(a) A funder’s ability to pay security for costs does not necessarily mean
they have the resources to finance the legal action
in its entirety.
(b) Security for costs does not adequately protect defendants from the high
costs of defending funded proceedings, particularly group
litigation. In some
cases, security may not be adequately set at the outset or revisited as the
litigation progresses.
(c) Security for costs is a discretionary matter for the court. As defendants
are already being put to the burden of defending typically
significant claims,
they should not be put to the additional cost and effort of an application for
security.
(d) There is no requirement for the security to be in Aotearoa New
Zealand’s jurisdiction.
(e) The status quo is inconsistent with the regulation of similar forms of
funding. Two submitters indicated that funders are essentially
financial
institutions, and the lack of regulation of funders’ capital adequacy
seems inconsistent with the treatment of other
such
entities.1223F[1224] In
addition, LPF Group considered it illogical for the law to require funded
plaintiffs to provide security for costs, but not require
defendants funded by
insurance to do the same. It said there should be a reciprocal obligation on
funded defendants to provide security.
Existing mechanism is adequate
- 15.26 Three
submitters thought the existing security for costs mechanism is generally
adequate.1224F[1225] The themes
in these submissions were:
(a) A defendant should not be afforded a greater degree of protection for costs
than they would ordinarily receive simply because
a litigation funder is
involved.
(b) Security for costs is the most effective, targeted and straightforward way
to ensure funders are able to meet their financial
obligations to pay adverse
costs. In contrast to a licensing regime with capital adequacy requirements, it
is intended to directly
address the credit risk imposed on defendants and
representative plaintiffs and achieves the same level of consumer protection
without
the regulatory burden.
(c) In addition to security for costs, market forces and the court’s
ability to order non-party costs directly against a funder
can mitigate the
concern that a funder will be unable to fulfil its financial commitments.
- 15.27 Bell Gully
said the existing security for costs mechanism is adequate but needs to be
strictly enforced. Claimants need to be
held to account if security is not
provided or there are delays in advancing the proceeding. It suggested security
should be mandatory
in funded class actions, which it said is effectively the
position now but should be spelt out in any new class actions regime.
Strengthening security for costs
- 15.28 Eleven
submitters commented on whether the security for costs mechanism should be
strengthened.1225F[1226]
Submissions that supported strengthening security for
costs
- 15.29 Seven
submitters considered the security for costs mechanism should be strengthened in
one or more ways.1226F[1227]
- 15.30 Four
submitters supported a presumption that funders will provide security for costs
in funded
proceedings,1227F[1228] and one
supported a requirement for funders to provide
security.1228F[1229] A
presumption would retain the court’s discretion and could be rebutted in
suitable cases, for example where the proceeding
involves matters of broader
public interest. Some thought there should only be a presumption in funded
representative and class actions.
- 15.31 Five
submitters supported a requirement for security for costs to be provided in a
form that is enforceable in Aotearoa New
Zealand.1229F[1230] Several
commented that requiring a successful defendant to litigate in a foreign
jurisdiction to recover the security provided is
uncertain, risky and expensive.
Defendants should not be put to this extra expense and risk to recover costs
they are entitled to.
For the same reason, some submitters suggested that
after-the-event insurance should generally not be a satisfactory form of
security,
as it is usually underwritten abroad. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia suggested funding agreements should contain standard
terms that state
the governing law under the agreements to be the laws of Aotearoa New Zealand
and otherwise submit the funder to
this jurisdiction for disputes arising from
the litigation funding agreement.
- 15.32 Three
submitters considered there should be a presumption or requirement that funders
provide security calculated on a relatively
full basis in funded
proceedings.1230F[1231] As
defendants in funded proceedings are defending typically significant claims,
they should not be put to the additional cost and
effort of having to apply for
full security.
Submissions that did not support strengthening the security for
costs mechanism
- 15.33 Omni
Bridgeway did not support strengthening the security for costs mechanism, as the
court already has discretion to order
security. It said the court ordinarily
weighs up the competing interests of the parties and the circumstances of the
case, including
the capacity of the claimant to meet an adverse costs order, and
this same balancing exercise should be conducted in funded litigation.
It
supported a licensing regime (including minimum capital requirements) and said
that, if a funder has the capacity to meet an adverse
costs order, there is no
reason why security for costs should be ordered at all. It agreed that, if a
case is unsuccessful, costs
orders could be made directly against the funder to
avoid the time and expense of enforcing a costs order against the
plaintiff.
Other submissions
- 15.34 LPF
Group cautioned that any additional security for costs obligations should not be
imposed on funders lightly, as this will
reduce the compensation payable to
funded plaintiffs. It also submitted that funded plaintiffs and funded
defendants should be subject
to the same security for costs requirements. For
example, plaintiffs and defendants should both be liable for costs on an
indemnity
basis if they lose, and each side should be required to post security
for costs. It suggested that requiring defendants to also provide
security would
ensure only meritorious defences are run, which would free up court time,
provide swifter management of cases and
reduce the costs of class actions.
Capital adequacy requirements
- 15.35 We
received 14 submissions on whether funders operating in Aotearoa New Zealand
should be subject to capital adequacy
requirements.1231F[1232] Seven
submitters said there should be capital adequacy
requirements,1232F[1233] and
five said there should
not.1233F[1234] One submission,
from Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA), did not comment
on whether funders should be subject
to capital adequacy requirements or what
those requirements should be, but strongly opposed FMA oversight of any such
requirements.
Submissions supporting capital adequacy requirements
- 15.36 Submitters
in support of capital adequacy requirements (in addition to, or instead of,
strengthening the security for costs
mechanism) considered these would protect
defendants, given the scale of the litigation that funders typically fund and
the possibility
that security for costs may not be adequately set or revisited
as the litigation develops. Capital adequacy requirements could also
benefit
funded plaintiffs by preventing entities without sufficient capital from
becoming involved in the industry and improving
the resilience of funders.
- 15.37 There were
various suggestions about how any capital adequacy requirements could be
formulated, including:
(a) Funders could be subject to requirements to maintain adequate financial
resources at all times to fund all the disputes they
have agreed to
fund,1234F[1235] and to pay all
debts when they become due and
payable.1235F[1236]
(b) Minimum capital adequacy requirements could correlate to the funder’s
financial commitment in the particular proceedings,
as this would provide
greater reassurance to plaintiffs and defendants than an arbitrary
figure.1236F[1237]
(c) Funders could be required to maintain access to a specified minimum amount
of capital, as in England and Wales under the Association
of Litigation Funders
Code of Conduct for Litigation
Funders.1237F[1238]
(d) Funders could be required to have access to capital in Aotearoa New
Zealand.1238F[1239] They could
have to demonstrate that access to the capital is readily available in Aotearoa
New Zealand, including in an enforcement
context, or that they have the assets
appropriately ‘ring-fenced’ to avoid difficulties accessing it. LPF
Group said
funders could be required to have at least one director resident in
Aotearoa New Zealand and their funding terms should be enforceable
in accordance
with New Zealand law.
- 15.38 Three
submitters thought auditing requirements would be necessary to independently
verify capital adequacy requirements are
being
met.1239F[1240] An appropriate
regulator, such as the FMA, could obtain the audit results and oversee
funders’ compliance. Omni Bridgeway said
funders should be required to
conduct an impairment test on a half-yearly basis to determine whether any of
its funded litigation
investments should be written off or provisioned. The
result of that test could be reported to the FMA. Te Kāhui Inihua o
Aotearoa
| Insurance Council of New Zealand said funders should be subject to
continuous disclosure obligations.
- 15.39 There was
no consensus as to who should oversee a funder’s compliance with any
capital adequacy requirements. Two submitters
indicated the court should oversee
a funder’s capital adequacy at the commencement of a class
action.1240F[1241] Two
submitters said funders operating in Aotearoa New Zealand should be subject to a
licensing regime that includes capital adequacy
and auditing requirements
overseen by an appropriate regulator, such as the
FMA.1241F[1242] However, as we
discussed in Chapter 14, the FMA was strongly opposed to this option. One
litigation funder favoured industry oversight
of funders’ compliance with
any minimum capital adequacy
requirements.1242F[1243] Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society said litigation funding is
a financial product, and therefore any regulatory
response should ensure market
participants are appropriately capitalised. It suggested litigation funding has
similarities with the
insurance industry, so the regulatory regime applying to
insurance companies, which focuses on the financial strength of insurance
companies and how this is communicated to policyholders, is a possible
model.1243F[1244] It suggested
Te Pūtea Matua | Reserve Bank of New Zealand could have a role in
regulating the prudential requirements for litigation
funders.
- 15.40 Submitters
suggested a range of consequences for non-compliance with any capital adequacy
requirements, including civil
penalties,1244F[1245] a
prohibition on a funder enforcing its rights under a funding agreement (unless
non-compliance was accidental or
inadvertent),1245F[1246] or a
provision that a funding agreement in respect of a class action has no force or
effect unless it is approved by the court as
part of a threshold legal
test.1246F[1247]
Submissions opposed to capital adequacy requirements
- 15.41 Five
submitters were opposed to minimum capital adequacy
requirements.1247F[1248] The
themes in their objections were:
(a) Capital adequacy concerns are not based on any evidence of widespread or
systemic misconduct by funders and there are few, if
any, examples where the
lack of capital adequacy of a funder has led to financial loss to plaintiffs.
(b) Capital adequacy requirements have never ensured funders have enough to pay
an adverse costs order, and there is never any guarantee
that a lender (in any
sector) will not fall over.
(c) Capital adequacy regulation was rejected in the United Kingdom because it
imposes a disproportionate regulatory burden, and this
reasoning applies even
more so in the smaller market of Aotearoa New Zealand. The utility and
administrative burden associated with
annual audits is questionable, and a
regulator could instead be empowered to require an audit on an as-needs
basis.
(d) Security for costs, or enhanced security for costs, is a better response to
the concern that funders might lack resources. It
can be tailored to the actual
costs of a particular case, rather than an abstract (and often low) minimum
capital requirement which
may represent only a small fraction of the
funder’s total commitments.
(e) Capital adequacy requirements will add to the compliance costs for funders,
which may impact on the availability and affordability
of litigation funding for
plaintiffs. Such requirements may discourage market entry and cause the exit of
some funders from the market.
They would likely stifle competition by favouring
funders based in Aotearoa New Zealand and large-scale funders that are able to
sustain the costs of maintaining a commercial presence and capital in this
jurisdiction.
RECOMMENDATION
- R109 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider
developing High Court Rules to:
- Create
a rebuttable presumption that funded representative plaintiffs will provide
security for costs in funded class actions.
- Create
a rebuttable presumption that security for costs, in all funded proceedings,
will be provided in a form that is enforceable
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
- Expressly
empower the court, in all funded proceedings, to make orders directly against
the litigation funder for the provision of
security for costs and payment of
adverse costs.
Successful defendants may suffer significant loss
- 15.42 Like
a number of submitters, we are concerned that a funder’s failure to
maintain adequate capital may mean a successful
defendant is left with a
significant loss if the funder and the funded plaintiff are unable to meet an
adverse costs order.1248F[1249]
In addition to the financial implications, defendants may suffer an unnecessary
burden if proceedings are ultimately discontinued
due to the funder’s lack
of capital. The organisational resources and opportunity costs for defendants of
facing years of litigation
of uncertain but speculatively high value is
significant. In addition, a funder’s failure to
maintain adequate capital to continue to support the proceedings has resource
implications
for the court system.
- 15.43 The
Feltex representative action illustrates this burden for defendants. That
claim was filed on behalf of 3,600 shareholders in 2008 and did
not conclude
until the High Court struck out the case in 2020 due to a failure to provide
security for costs for a stage two
trial.1249F[1250] The defendants
were put to significant cost over the course of this
proceeding.1250F[1251] The case
involved a 14-week substantive hearing, as well as a significant number of
interlocutory decisions and
appeals.1251F[1252]
- 15.44 We think
the risk for successful defendants is greatest in class actions. Class members
are likely to use litigation funding
when they cannot otherwise afford to
litigate, and it can reasonably be assumed that they will be unable to cover the
defendant’s
costs if the litigation funder fails. Class actions tend to be
more expensive and protracted than ordinary proceedings, and the overall
cost is
significant compared to individual class member claims, increasing the financial
risks for defendants. Below, we discuss
how security for costs should be
strengthened to respond to this risk.
Existing security for costs regime does not adequately
protect defendants
- 15.45 For
the reasons below, we do not think the existing security for costs mechanism
adequately protects defendants in funded proceedings
or promotes efficiency and
economy in litigation. We think defendants in funded class actions need greater
certainty that capital
will be available to cover their costs in the event they
are successful.
- 15.46 In our
view, the involvement of a funder should shift the court’s focus from the
plaintiff’s potential impecuniosity
and place of residence or
incorportation to the funder’s potential impecuniosity and place of
residence or incorporation. Currently,
HCR 5.45 allows the court to order
security for costs where it is just, and either the plaintiff is resident or
incorporated outside
of Aotearoa New Zealand or there is reason to believe that
the plaintiff will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if unsuccessful.
In practice, the courts have relied on their inherent jurisdiction and the
“evident policy” in HCR 5.45 to order security
for costs in funded
proceedings.1252F[1253] However,
we think it would be preferable for the High Court Rules to explictly address
security for costs in funded proceedings so
that the law is more accessible and
transparent.
- 15.47 Security
for costs is currently ordered at the discretion of the courts, and only if
sought by the defendant. We think this
provides insufficient certainty and
protection for defendants in funded class actions. As previously noted,
defendants can reasonably
assume that a class that requires litigation funding
to bring its claim will be unable to satisfy an adverse costs order if the
funder
fails to meet this expense. We do not think defendants should be put to
the additional cost and effort of having to apply for security
in these
cases.
- 15.48 If the
funder (or any after-the-event insurer) is based overseas, as is often the case
in relation to funded proceedings in
Aotearoa New Zealand, a successful
defendant may be put to the additional expense, risk and inconvenience of
litigating in a foreign
jurisdiction to enforce the security
provided.1253F[1254]
We do not think that is reasonable as a matter of public
policy.1254F[1255] We think this
risk may arise in any proceedings funded by an overseas-based funder and is not
limited to class actions.
- 15.49 Currently,
HCR 5.45 only empowers the court to order a plaintiff to provide security for
costs.1255F[1256] In some
proceedings, this will not acurately reflect the dynamics of the case. In funded
class actions, for example, the funder is
usually contractually responsible for
paying the full costs of the litigation including any security for
costs.
The security for costs regime should be strengthened in
funded proceedings
Presumption for security for costs in funded class actions
- 15.50 While
security for costs is a targeted and effective way to ensure funded plaintiffs
meet their obligations to defendants in
class actions, the burden currently
rests with the defendant to establish that security for costs should be ordered.
We think a presumption
for security would more accurately reflect the
significant costs of class actions, which tend to be considerably more
expensive,
protracted and risky than ordinary proceedings.
- 15.51 A
presumption will reduce interlocutory disputes at the commencement and
throughout the proceedings. It will shift the onus
from the defendant, who is
ordinarily required to satisfy the court that security should be provided, to
the representative plaintiff
(in reality, the funder) if they wish to rebut the
presumption.
- 15.52 We think a
presumption is preferable to a requirement for security for costs, as it retains
the court’s discretion and
ensures the presumption can be rebutted in
suitable cases. This could include, for example, class actions that engage
matters of
significant public interest.
- 15.53 Our
recommendation responds to submitters’ concerns that security for costs is
only ordered at the discretion of the court,
and on the application of the
defendant. It is intended to give defendants in funded class actions greater
comfort that capital will
be available to cover their costs in the event that
they are successful, and to make the process of obtaining security for costs
more efficient and cost-effective. For the same reasons, the Australian Law
Reform Commission (ALRC) and the Australian Parliamentary
Inquiry recommended a
statutory presumption that funders will provide security for costs in class
actions.1256F[1257] The Federal
Government of Australia has agreed with these
recommendations.1257F[1258]
- 15.54 We do not
think there is a need for a presumption for security in other funded
proceedings. In Aotearoa New Zealand, the practice
of the courts has been to
order security in all funded proceedings (not just representative actions) on
the basis that the funder’s
interest is not in having its own rights
vindicated but in making a commercial
profit.1258F[1259] We are not
persuaded that a funder’s profit motive alone increases the risk to
defendants or justifies a presumption for security.
In some funded proceedings
the risk and cost involved may well justify security being ordered, but we think
this can be sought on
a case-by-case basis as necessary. However, as we explain
in Chapter 14, we think the requirements for disclosure of funding agreements
should be strengthened in all funded proceedings. Among other things, this will
assist defendants in non-class actions cases to make
more informed choices about
whether to apply for security.
- 15.55 We
considered whether the High Court Rules should be amended to reflect the
practice of the courts to award security on “a
relatively full
basis” in funded proceedings but concluded this is unnecessary. In
practice, the courts have indicated the
quantum is likely to be substantial and
will tend towards relatively full
security.1259F[1260] We do not
consider reform is necessary, as the law appears to be clear and settled.
Further, we think making this practice into a
presumption or requirement would
diminish the court’s discretion to determine the appropriate quantum in
each case.
- 15.56 We
acknowledge that a presumption for security may increase the cost of litigation
funding, reducing the recovery for plaintiffs.
However, this may not be a
significant change from the status quo, as the practice of the courts has been
to order security on a
relatively full basis in funded proceedings. On balance,
we think a presumption strikes an appropriate balance between the access
to
justice needs of plaintiffs and defendants.
Presumption that security must be enforceable in Aotearoa New
Zealand
- 15.57 We
think there should be a presumption in all funded proceedings that security will
be provided in a form that is enforceable
in Aotearoa New Zealand. By that, we
mean enforcement is a matter governed by New Zealand law, and following the
making of an enforcement
order by a court in Aotearoa New Zealand, there is no
realistic prospect that further enforcement action will be required in a foreign
jurisdiction. Requiring a successful defendant to litigate in a foreign
jurisdiction to recover the security provided is uncertain,
risky,
time-consuming and
expensive.1260F[1261] It
undermines the efficacy of security for costs. The risk may arise in any
proceedings funded by an overseas-based funder and is
not limited to class
actions. While we do not want to restrict the acceptable forms of security, we
have concluded it is unreasonable
for defendants to be put to additional expense
and effort to recover the costs they are entitled to.
- 15.58 Our view
is consistent with the ARLC’s recommendation that funders who fund class
actions should provide security in a
form that is enforceable in
Australia.1261F[1262] In October
2021, the Federal Government agreed with this
recommendation.1262F[1263]
- 15.59 Most
funders operating in Aotearoa New Zealand are based overseas, and any
after-the-event insurance will almost certainly be
underwritten abroad. To our
knowledge, there are no after-the-event insurers based in Aotearoa New Zealand
and very few in Australia.
Most appear to be London-based. This would mean that,
in most (if not all) funded litigation, a deed of indemnity from an
after-the-event
insurer would not be enforceable in Aotearoa New Zealand and
would need to be enforced through ancillary litigation in another jurisdiction.
The presumption we recommend would avoid the need for such ancillary
litigation.
Express power for the court to make orders directly against the
litigation funder
- 15.60 We
think a power for the court to order that security for costs be provided by the
funder would more accurately reflect the
dynamics of funded proceedings. In our
view, the involvement of a funder should shift the focus from the potential
impecuniosity
of the plaintiff to the potential impecuniosity of the funder.
Further, in funded class actions, the funder will usually be contractually
responsible for paying the full costs of the litigation, including any security
for costs ordered.
- 15.61 However,
we recommend that the court’s powers regarding costs not be limited to
security for costs. Currently, in exceptional
circumstances, the common law
allows the court to make a non-party costs order against a funder who takes an
active role in the
proceedings.1263F[1264] Such an
order is particularly directed to a non-party who funds the litigation, has a
close role in its conduct, and also seeks to
benefit from
it.1264F[1265] It is not
controversial that a litigation funder’s involvement can attract costs
liability.1265F[1266] We do not
intend to widen the scope of the court’s power as it currently exists, but
we think an express power for the court
to order adverse costs directly against
the funder will make the law more accessible by codifying the common
law.
Funders should not be subject to minimum capital adequacy
requirements
- 15.62 We
do not consider capital adequacy requirements should be imposed on litigation
funders at this stage. We think defendant concerns
can be more effectively
managed by strengthening the court’s power to order security for costs in
funded proceedings.
Security for costs is a more targeted response to defendant
concerns
- 15.63 Compared
to minimum capital adequacy requirements, we think strengthening security for
costs in funded proceedings is a more
targeted and effective way to manage
defendant concerns about the funder’s ability to fulfil its financial
commitments.
- 15.64 The
FMA’s submission cautioned that a licensing regime, including capital
adequacy requirements, will not automatically
mean that a funder has adequate
financial resources to meet an adverse costs order or continue to fund the
proceedings.
- 15.65 Similiarly,
in Australia there has been considerable discussion about the efficacy of
licensing to manage concerns about funders
failing to meet their financial
obligations. The ALRC favoured capital adequacy requirements in a 2018
discussion paper but did not
recommend them in its final
report.1266F[1267] It concluded
that security for costs and improved court oversight would achieve the same
level of protection as a licensing regime
with minimum capital adequacy
requirements, but without the regulatory
costs.1267F[1268]
- 15.66 In
December 2020, when the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry recommended a statutory
presumption that class action funders will
provide security for costs, it
reasoned that:1268F[1269]
- ...the
Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) does not require litigation funders
to have adequate financial resources. Nor
does the AFSL extend to holding
adequate security for costs for litigation purposes. The AFSL requirements do
not seek to prevent
AFSL holders from becoming insolvent, or failing due to poor
business models or cash flow problems.
- Further, the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s financial requirements
do not protect against credit risk or
provide compensation for loss, or address
the risk that a litigation funder may run out of funds before a case is
complete.
- 15.67 Security
for costs has the advantage that it can be tailored to the actual costs of the
case, rather than an abstract (and often
low) minimum capital requirement. In
England and Wales, the Association of Litigation Funders (ALF) Code of
Conduct for Litigation Funders requires members of the ALF to maintain
access to £5 million of capital (or such other amount as stipulated by the
ALF).1269F[1270] It has been
suggested that this is not a large sum in the context of the litigation funding
industry. The majority of funders belonging
to the ALF operate with capital of
more than £30 million under
management.1270F[1271]
- 15.68 As we
noted in the Issues Paper, one of the key challenges with the capital adequacy
option is how to formulate a minimum capital
requirement.1271F[1272] We
suggested that specifying a particular amount would provide a baseline and would
be simple to administer and audit. However, a
specific amount might not
correlate to a funder’s actual risk and expenditure (as the overseas
examples above suggest). Correlating
minimum capital requirements to a
funder’s portfolio of investments would more accurately reflect the
funder’s risk but
might be more difficult and more costly to administer
and audit. Very few submitters addressed this issue, and those that did were
divided in their
views.1272F[1273]
Security for costs is a more cost-effective option
- 15.69 Establishing
and overseeing minimum capital adequacy requirements would have resource
implications for the responsible regulator
or oversight body, as well as for
funders and consumers of litigation funding. For example, if the licensing and
managed investment
scheme requirements in the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013
were to apply to litigation funders, significant tailoring of the existing
regulations and FMA exemptions would be required (as has been needed in
Australia). As we discuss in Chapter 14, we do not think
the resource
implications for any regulator or oversight body are proportionate to the
concerns or the small size of the market for
litigation funding in Aotearoa New
Zealand. Strengthening the security for cost mechanism avoids this regulatory
burden.
- 15.70 Capital
adequacy requirements would add significant compliance costs to the provision of
litigation funding services, including
the administrative burden of an annual
audit and any licensing fees or levies. These costs will likely be passed on to
consumers
of litigation funding, potentially impacting on access to justice.
- 15.71 There is
also a risk that capital adequacy requirements would stifle market competition
if overseas funders were unwilling to
bring their capital into the jurisdiction.
The requirements might favour funders based in Aotearoa New Zealand and
large-scale funders
that are able to sustain the costs of maintaining a
commercial presence and capital in the jurisdiction. This could be problematic,
given that the funding market is already small with very few locally based
funders.1273F[1274] While a
presumptive requirement for funders to provide security that is enforceable in
Aotearoa New Zealand may have a similar effect
to some degree, security for
costs is at least proportionate to the funder’s level of involvement in
this market.
- 15.72 In our
view, strengthening the security for costs mechanism in funded proceedings is a
more cost-effective response to defendant
concerns than imposing capital
adequacy requirements on funders. This response better aligns with our guiding
principle that the
litigation funding market should be sustainable, competitive
and fair.
Unclear who would oversee compliance with any capital adequacy
requirements
- 15.73 Initially
we thought the FMA may be an appropriate regulatory body to oversee compliance
with any capital adequacy requirements,
for example in the context of a
licensing regime. However, the FMA was strongly opposed to having any role in
overseeing litigation
funders or funding arrangements, except to the extent that
litigation funders raise funds from retail investors to
operate.1274F[1275] It submitted
that this would not fall within its remit as a regulator of financial markets
conduct. The submission from Hīkina
Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment also cast doubt on the suitability of the FMA to
regulate and oversee
litigation funding.
- 15.74 While some
submitters pointed to the litigation funding industry or the Reserve Bank as
oversight options, there was little
support for them. Oversight by an
alternative regulator, such as the Reserve Bank, would have resource
implications and, as we concluded
above, we are not persuaded these costs are
proportionate to the concerns in Aotearoa New Zealand at this time. In Chapter
14, we
also conclude industry oversight is not a sufficiently robust option for
managing the concerns with litigation funding, including
concerns about a
funder’s ability to meet its financial obligations under the funding
agreement.
- 15.75 Therefore,
in addition to the reasons above, we think court oversight of a strengthened
security for costs regime is the most
practical and proportionate response to
the concern about a funder’s ability to fulfil its financial obligation to
pay an adverse
costs award to a successful defendant.
Other concerns do not require a regulatory response
- 15.76 We
do not think regulation is required to manage the concern that lawyers (and any
expert witnesses) may have unpaid legal fees
and disbursements if the funder
fails to meet these costs. As discussed above, a lawyer can require the funder
to pay their legal
fees up front or in stages throughout the funded proceedings,
rather than waiting until the proceeding is concluded to pay the entire
legal
bill. Lawyers also have systems in place to ensure the timely payment of
invoices and can alert their clients to any issues
in respect of non-payment of
invoices (which may lead to termination of the funding agreement). There are
strong commercial incentives
for lawyers to recommend funders that, in their
assessment, are competent and financially stable otherwise they may be left
unpaid.
- 15.77 The
concern that judicial resources will be wasted if proceedings are discontinued
or struck out due to the funder’s lack
of capital is illustrated by the
Feltex representative
action.1275F[1276] However, we
do not think this concern requires specific regulation as it is not unique to
funded litigation. In any litigation there
is a risk that the plaintiff will be
unable to fund their proceedings to completion. We expect that in most cases,
the involvement
of a reputable funder will mean litigation is unlikely to be
struck out or discontinued because the funder has insufficient capital.
- 15.78 Only DLA
Piper commented that the litigation funding industry may be negatively impacted
by poorly capitalised litigation funders.
LPF Group, a litigation funder based
in Aotearoa New Zealand, said in its experience this is not a significant issue.
- 15.79 We
disagree with the suggestion that plaintiffs and defendants should be subject to
the same security for costs requirements.
The security for costs mechanism is
for the protection of
defendants.1276F[1277] It
balances the plaintiff’s right of access to the court and the
defendant’s interest in being protected from a barren
costs
order.1277F[1278] In deciding
whether or not to fund a claim, the funder will carefully consider the
defendant’s ability to pay any judgment
award or settlement sum.
CHAPTER 16
Professional regulation of lawyers in funded
proceedings
INTRODUCTION
- 16.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest in funded
proceedings.
(b) Concerns about the funder having insufficient resources to meet its
financial commitments to the plaintiff.
(c) Our recommendations that Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society (NZLS) should consider:
(i) how conflicts of interest should be avoided and managed in funded
proceedings; and
(ii) prohibiting the lawyer from claiming unpaid legal expenses from the funded
representative plaintiff if the funder fails to pay
them.
LAWYER-PLAINTIFF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Conflicts can arise between the interests of the lawyer and
the funded plaintiff
- 16.2 In
funded proceedings, there is a tripartite relationship between the funder, the
plaintiff and the
lawyer.1278F[1279] In many
instances the interests of all three will align. However, in some circumstances
their interests may diverge and conflict.
- 16.3 The
relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client is an essential
tool for safeguarding the plaintiff’s
interests in
litigation.1279F[1280] However,
litigation funding arrangements can complicate that relationship. Under a
conventional retainer, the lawyer owes professional
obligations to the client
when providing legal services and the client pays the lawyer directly for those
services. This straightforward
exchange between the obligations owed and fees
paid is interrupted in funded litigation, because while the lawyer still owes
duties
to the plaintiff, the lawyer’s fees are paid by the funder.
- 16.4 Conflicts
between a lawyer and plaintiff in funded litigation are most likely to arise
where the lawyer has an ongoing relationship
with the funder (or wants to
cultivate a relationship with the funder in the hope of securing future work),
owes duties to both the
funder and the plaintiff, or where the funder exerts
control over the litigation. Conflicts may also arise from any commercial ties
between the lawyer and the funder (for example, where the lawyer has a financial
interest in the funder).
- 16.5 Conflict-prone
stages of funded litigation include determining the litigation strategy and
deciding whether to settle a claim.
During these stages, the lawyer may be
incentivised to protect or promote their own interests by advising or persuading
the plaintiff
to adopt the funder’s preferred course of action. These
situations may be more common and more pronounced in class
actions.1280F[1281]
Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers may not
adequately manage concerns
- 16.6 Although
lawyers are already subject to extensive duties regarding conflicts of
interest,1281F[1282] there is
some uncertainty about how these duties would or should apply when issues arise
in proceedings involving a litigation funder.
It seems clear that failing to
disclose a benefit provided to the lawyer by the funder would breach the
lawyer’s fiduciary
duties to their
client.1282F[1283] However,
there may be other scenarios that are less clear. For example, where a lawyer
hopes to secure future work from the funder.
While this type of issue is not
unique to litigation funding, it may raise particular concerns in funded class
actions where the
lawyer’s client (that is, the representative plaintiff)
and class members may be less able to monitor and protect their own
interests
(due to a lack of litigation experience or being distanced from their claim). We
are aware of only one case involving an
alleged breach of the Rules of
conduct and client care for lawyers by a lawyer in a funded proceeding, and
the case did not explicitly address the issue of lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of
interest.1283F[1284] As we
discuss in Chapter 7, there is also uncertainty about whether and to what extent
lawyers owe obligations to class members in
class actions.
Consultation questions
- 16.7 In
the Issues Paper, we identified three broad options to address the concerns
about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of
interest:1284F[1285]
(a) Encourage or require funders to include minimum terms in their funding
agreements. For instance, minimum terms that:
(i) Limit the situations in which funding can be withdrawn, to reduce the
incentive on a lawyer to advise the client to follow the
funder’s
preferred course of action to keep proceedings afoot.
(ii) If a lawyer enters into retainer agreements with both the plaintiff and the
funder, provide that the lawyer’s professional
and fiduciary duties to the
plaintiff are to be prioritised over duties to the funder, and specifically,
that the plaintiff’s
instructions are to be prioritised over those of the
funder.
(iii) Prevent the funder from taking any steps that would cause or be likely to
cause the lawyer to act in breach of their professional
duties to the
plaintiff.
(iv) Prevent the funder from seeking to influence the lawyer to cede control
over the conduct of the litigation to the funder.
(b) Develop new professional rules or guidelines for lawyers acting in funded
proceedings. For example, to clarify the relationship
between the lawyer and
members of the class, or to define and require disclosure of relevant conflicts
of interest and require informed
consent and independent advice in respect of
such conflicts before the lawyer can continue to act.
(c) Prohibit activities that give rise to lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of
interest. For example, amending the Rules of conduct and client care for
lawyers to prohibit lawyers from investing in funders, holding office, or
having other interests in litigation funders. Another option would
be to
prohibit lawyers from taking instructions from both the plaintiff and the funder
in funded litigation.
- 16.8 We asked
submitters what concerns, if any, they have about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of
interest and if they are satisfied that
existing mechanisms (such as the
Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers) can adequately manage those
concerns. If not, we asked submitters which option for reform they prefer and
why.
Results of consultation
Concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest
- 16.9 We
received 18 submissions that addressed concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts
of interest. Of those, 15 expressed
concerns,1285F[1286] and three
were generally
unconcerned.1286F[1287]
- 16.10 Those who
had concerns said a lawyer may be unable to provide independent advice
if:
(a) They are dependent on the funder for the payment of their bills and the
continuation of the proceedings.
(b) They have an ongoing business relationship with the funder or want to secure
future business. A lawyer who knows that a funder
has identified them as a
preferred lawyer, or who has consistently worked with a funder, may have an
incentive to favour the interests
of a funder in order to retain a mutually
beneficial relationship. Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of
New Zealand
said a similar situation can emerge in insured litigation, however
insurers instructing lawyers have an overriding duty of utmost
good faith to
their customers (and lawyers have a similar duty) that litigation funders do
not. Further, it said the majority of
general insurers in Aotearoa New Zealand
are also members of the Insurance Council and must comply with the Fair
Insurance Code which
sets out a number of customer-focussed obligations.
(c) They are engaged by and taking instructions from both the plaintiff and the
funder. In this situation, a lawyer may be unable
to discharge their duties to
one party without breaching their duties to the other.
(d) They have financial incentives in the settlement or resolution outcome, or
act as the funder. LPF Group noted, for example, that
this might arise if the
lawyer is entitled to a success fee that is tied to the outcome achieved rather
than the lawyer’s usual
hourly rate.
(e) They have financial or other interests in the funder that is financing the
same matter on which they are acting. Woodsford Litigation
Funding submitted
that lawyers are better placed to protect the best interests of their clients if
their own financial interests
are not impacted by their clients’
decisions. Dr Michael Duffy (Monash University) said close arrangements,
relationships or
cross ownership may tempt lawyers and funders to act in each
other’s interests rather than the plaintiff’s interests.
(f) Specifically in relation to funded class actions, concerns arise where:
(i) The plaintiff is distanced from their case. Michael Duffy said the risk of
lawyer-plaintiff conflicts may be more pronounced
in class actions because the
representative plaintiff may have little involvement with their case. This may
disincentivise their
lawyer from properly ascertaining or advising the
representative plaintiff about which strategies are in their best interests.
(ii) The lawyer also owes duties to class members. Submitters noted uncertainty
about the extent to which lawyers owe fiduciary or
other obligations to class
members who have not retained them or entered into a funding
arrangement.1287F[1288] If the
lawyer owes duties to class members in this situation, conflicts may arise if
the representative plaintiff’s interests
differ from the interests of
class members, and if the class members have individual interests that diverge
from other class members.
Buddle Findlay said conflicts could arise if the
representative plaintiff is seeking a common fund order that would result in a
“substantial
aggrandisement” of the fees to the lawyer and funder.
In this instance, the interests of the funded and unfunded class members
would
be diametrically opposed.
- 16.11 The three
submitters who were unconcerned about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts said the
lawyer-plaintiff relationship does not appear
to have caused any particular
problems in Aotearoa New Zealand to
date,1288F[1289] and existing
mechanisms are adequate to manage any
concerns.1289F[1290]
Adequacy of existing mechanisms to manage the concerns
- 16.12 We
received 13 submissions on whether existing mechanisms for managing
lawyer-plaintiff conflicts are
adequate.1290F[1291]
- 16.13 Eight
submitters considered the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers
are inadequate to manage the
concerns.1291F[1292] These
submitters explained that:
(a) The Rules of conduct and client care for
lawyers are based on a standard lawyer-client paradigm and do not adequately
cater for the sorts of issues likely to arise in funded proceedings.
Buddle
Findlay said this is particularly problematic in funded opt-out class actions.
The submission from NZLS went further, saying
the Rules of conduct and client
care for lawyers are not well-equipped to address the range and complexity
of issues that potentially arise in all tripartite and multi-party relationships
(not just those involving funders). It said these issues include conflicts of
interest, as well as related issues such as lawyers’
obligations of
independence and undivided loyalty to plaintiff-clients, confidentiality and
disclosure, client autonomy in the selection
and engagement of lawyers, and the
no-contact rule.
(b) There needs to be greater clarity to ensure lawyers do not step into the
role of the funder, and to ensure their independence
to advise their clients.
(c) It is unclear to what extent the lawyer for the representative plaintiff
owes fiduciary or other duties to unrepresented class
members. Tom Weston QC
said the law in relation to the professional obligations of lawyers in funded
class actions is “entirely
unsatisfactory and should be clarified”.
- 16.14 Four
submitters considered existing mechanisms are generally adequate to manage any
concerns about lawyer-plaintiff
conflicts,1292F[1293] for the
following reasons:
(a) The Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers adequately protect
plaintiffs from lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest. DLA Piper said it sets
high professional standards for
lawyers, particularly in relation to their
overriding duty to their client.
(b) Conflicts can and should be dealt with by the terms of the funding
agreement. Two funders said their standard funding agreements
provide that
lawyers should prioritise the client’s interests in the event the
client’s interests or instructions diverge
from the funder’s
interests or instructions. Omni Bridgeway said its standard funding agreement
provides that it will pay for
the representative plaintiff to be independently
advised on the agreement.
(c) Some overseas-based funders are required to maintain conflicts management
policies or have effective systems for detecting and
managing potential
conflicts. Omni Bridgeway said it manages conflicts of interest by maintaining a
comprehensive conflicts management
policy, as required by Australian
law.1293F[1294] Woodsford
Litigation Funding said the International Legal Finance Association Best
Practices require members to maintain effective systems to detect and manage
potential conflicts, including those that could impact the enforcement
of an
award or judgment.
(d) BusinessNZ considers existing mechanisms are effective but said the
situation should be monitored in case difficulties arise.
- 16.15 Te Tari
Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office said consideration should be given to how
the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers would or could
assist to ensure that those who purport to be acting in the best interests of
class members are in fact obliged to do so.
Options for reform
- 16.16 There
were some ambiguities in the submissions on options for reform. For instance, it
was not always apparent if submitters
were commenting on options for managing
concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts, funder-plaintiff conflicts, or both.
It was also
not always clear if submitters thought the options for reform should
apply in all funded cases or only in funded class actions.
- 16.17 Several
submitters supported minimum contract terms for funding agreements. These
included terms around the termination of
funding,1294F[1295] the
settlement process,1295F[1296]
dispute resolution,1296F[1297] a
cooling off period,1297F[1298] a
term requiring lawyers to prioritise their duties to the plaintiff above any
duties owed to the
funder,1298F[1299] and a term
that in the event of a disagreement the instructions of the representative
plaintiff prevail over those of the
funder.1299F[1300] However, it
was not always clear if submitters thought funders should be required, or simply
encouraged, to include such terms in
funding agreements. Professor Vicki Waye
(University of South Australia) observed that mandatory minimum contract terms
might increase
the risk of expensive and time-consuming collateral
litigation.
- 16.18 Nine
submitters said the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers should
be reviewed and
amended,1300F[1301] or commented
more generally that new professional and ethical rules or guidelines should be
developed.1301F[1302] These
could include a positive obligation of disclosure of potential conflicts of
interest and how these might be
managed,1302F[1303] a
prohibition on the lawyer or law firm having financial or other interests in the
funder funding the same litigation in which they
are
acting,1303F[1304] client
autonomy in the selection and engagement of the
lawyer,1304F[1305] and the
lawyer’s duties to unrepresented class
members.1305F[1306] NZLS said
amendments to the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers should not
be limited to addressing issues specific to litigation funding, but should
address conflicts of interest and other professional
issues arising from all
tripartite relationships between a lawyer, client and third party. It suggested
that any new rules could
be informed by guidance from Te Kōti Matua | High
Court decisions, including decisions relating to the conduct of lawyers in
tripartite relationships with insurers and policyholders.
- 16.19 Three
submitters were concerned about lawyers having a financial stake in any damages
or settlement sum.1306F[1307]
NZLS submitted that contingency fee arrangements should remain prohibited. It
commented that, depending on the terms of funding,
funding agreements can
present ethical concerns for lawyers if their interests in the funded claim
become more closely aligned with
its overall success. LPF Group said, to the
extent lawyers are operating on conditional fee agreements, professional rules
or guidelines
should be developed to ensure their independence and that success
fees or other fees generated as a result of a successful outcome
are prohibited.
It said the current position should be clarified to ensure success fees are only
tied to the lawyer’s usual
hourly rates and not the outcome achieved
(whether a percentage or otherwise).
- 16.20 Nine
submitters commented on lawyers and law firms having financial or other
interests in the funder of the litigation in which
that lawyer or law firm is
acting.1307F[1308] Of these
submitters, six indicated that lawyers should be prohibited from having
financial or other interests in the funder funding
the litigation on which that
law firm or solicitor is
acting.1308F[1309] Submitters
suggested this could be achieved by amending the Rules of conduct and client
care for lawyers, or through some other statute. Woodsford
Litigation Funding said that, when advising clients on funding arrangements (in
particular, offers received from different
funders), lawyers are better placed
to protect their client’s interests if their own financial interests are
not impacted by
their client’s decision. It was generally unclear if
submitters supported a prohibition in all funded cases or only in funded
class
actions.
- 16.21 Michael
Duffy did not suggest lawyers should be prohibited from having an interest in
the funder but said that, at a minimum,
there should be full disclosure of any
interest followed by the plaintiff’s informed consent, including possible
independent
legal advice. He said there is a potential for conflicts of interest
where lawyers and funders have close relationships or cross-ownership
such that
they may be tempted to favour each other’s interests over the
plaintiff’s interests. While not expressly supporting
a prohibition in
Aotearoa New Zealand, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said it is
clear the courts in Australia will not
permit lawyers to have a significant
financial interest in a litigation funder financing a claim.
- 16.22 DLA Piper
was the only submitter opposed to a prohibition on a lawyer or law firm having
financial or other interests in a funder.
It was strongly of the view that a
prohibition is inappropriate and unnecessary. It explained its association with
Aldersgate Funding
Limited (Aldersgate). Aldersgate is an independent company
set up and owned by DLA Piper that provides DLA Piper clients with access
to
funds of up to £150 million across all jurisdictions in which it operates,
including Aotearoa New Zealand. Aldersgate is
a portfolio fund backed by
Litigation Capital Management. DLA Piper said funding is provided under a
contingency fee arrangement
with the law firm. In its view, preventing a lawyer
or law firm from having an interest in the funder “may have a chilling
effect on the industry and prevent litigation funders from entering our
market”.
- 16.23 Another
option suggested by submitters was to ensure that plaintiffs have access to
independent legal advice on the funding
agreement (from a lawyer not acting in
the proceedings going forward), which should be paid for by the litigation
funder.1309F[1310]
Some also suggested a positive obligation on the lawyer to disclose any
potential conflicts of interest to the plaintiff and how
these might be managed,
prior to entering into a funding
arrangement.1310F[1311] Crown
Law Office and Associate Professor Barry Allan (Te Whare Wānanga o
Otāgo | University of Otago) supported limiting
funder control to manage
the risk of lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest. Crown Law Office said
regulating conflicts and ensuring
“that those who purport to be acting in
the best interest of class members are in fact obliged to do so” means
putting
control of the litigation and key decisions, such as decisions about
settlement or alternative resolution, in the hands of the plaintiff
not the
lawyer or funder.
Recommendation
- R110 With
respect to all funded proceedings, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law Society should consider amending the Lawyers
and Conveyancers (Lawyers:
Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 to clarify how conflicts of
interest should be
avoided and managed in funded proceedings, including conflicts arising from a
lawyer or law firm having financial or
other interests in a funder that is
financing the same matter in which they are acting.
Avoiding and managing conflicts in funded proceedings
- 16.24 Lawyer-plaintiff
conflicts of interest can arise in any funded case, including where the lawyer
owes duties to both the funder
(under the funding agreement) and the client, or
where the funder exerts control over the litigation. These situations are most
likely
to arise in class actions but are not limited to them. As we discuss in
Chapter 14, funders may prefer to exercise more control in
class actions than in
commercial disputes, because the funded representative plaintiff is likely to be
less commercially sophisticated
or experienced in litigation than a commercial
plaintiff. Conflicts may also arise in other situations, as we discuss
above.
- 16.25 We think
these concerns can best be managed through amendments to the existing Rules
of conduct and client care for lawyers, rather than minimum contract
terms.1311F[1312] This
has the advantage that lawyers’ professional obligations in funded
litigation will derive from the same source as their general
professional
obligations. It is also a stronger option than voluntary guidelines for lawyers,
as non-compliance may lead to a disciplinary
response by a Lawyers Standards
Committee. We think a strong response is required.
- 16.26 In Chapter
7, we recommend the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 should be amended to
provide that, following certification of a class action, the lawyer for the
representative plaintiff is regarded
as the lawyer for the class and is
considered to have a relationship with the
class.1312F[1313] We also
recommend that Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS)
consider what amendments may be required to
the Rules of conduct and client
care for lawyers to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in class
actions.
- 16.27 In
addition to these recommendations, we recommend NZLS consider amending the
Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to clarify how the lawyer in
a funded proceeding should avoid or manage conflicts of interest that may arise
as a result of the involvement
of the litigation funder. While the rules
already subject lawyers to extensive duties regarding conflicts of
interest, we agree with submitters who said that, because they are based
on the
standard lawyer-client paradigm, they do not adequately contemplate the
conflicts of interest and professional issues that
can arise where a funder is
involved. In particular, we are influenced by NZLS’s submission to this
effect.
- 16.28 We
acknowledge NZLS’s submission that amendments to the Rules of conduct
and client care for lawyers should not be limited to addressing conflicts
arising from relationships involving a litigation funder and should also address
the
conflicts that can arise in all tripartite relationships between a lawyer,
client and third party. As our terms of reference are
limited to class actions
and litigation funding, we have confined our recommendation to relationships
involving litigation funders.
However, NZLS may wish to address the funding
issues within a wider review of tripartite relationships. NZLS currently has
underway
an Independent Review of the statutory framework for legal services
in Aotearoa.1313F[1314]
This will examine whether NZLS’s representative functions should be
separated from some or all of its regulatory functions,
as well as which legal
services are regulated and by whom.
- 16.29 NZLS is
best placed to undertake the necessary policy work in this area. Here we provide
some general comments. Among other
matters, NZLS may wish to consider specific
rules, to the extent it considers existing rules insufficient, to oblige or
assist the
lawyer in a funded proceeding to:
(a) Avoid conflicts or potential conflicts of interest when advising the client
on litigation funding options and assisting the client
to organise litigation
funding. If a conflict of interest cannot be avoided at this critical stage, the
lawyer should not give this
advice or assistance, and the client should receive
independent advice or assistance instead.
(b) Disclose any conflicts or potential conflicts of interest and obtain the
client’s informed consent before they enter an
agreement with the
litigation funder and if any new conflicts or potential conflicts of interest
arise during the course of the proceeding.
Disclosure is an integral part of
managing conflicts of interest. It promotes accountability and allows consumers
of legal services
to make informed choices.
(c) Prioritise the client’s instructions if there is a potential conflict
between the client’s interests and the funder’s
interests.
(d) Not act, or continue to act, if it is or becomes apparent that the
lawyer’s ability to discharge the obligations owed to
the client is
compromised.
(e) Maintain adequate practices to manage conflicts or potential conflicts of
interest, including documenting, implementing, monitoring
and regularly
reviewing those practices. Adequate practices may, for example, include written
procedures for:1314F[1315]
(i) Identifying and assessing situations where conflicts of interest might
arise.
(ii) Effectively disclosing conflicts of interest. For example, disclosing
conflicts in a timely, prominent and specific manner,
with enough detail to
enable the client to understand the potential impact of the divergent interests
and make an informed decision
about how the relationship may affect the services
being provided to them.
(iii) In class actions, dealing with any recruitment of the representative
plaintiff (that is, the client) if litigation funding
is organised before a
suitable representative plaintiff is found. For example, practices to ensure the
lawyer will not engage in
recruitment strategies that are likely to mislead or
deceive (such as overstating the strength of the case or the potential
compensation).
- 16.30 NZLS may
also consider defining or providing guidance on how a past or current
relationship between the lawyer and the funder
could give rise to potential
conflicts of interest that need to be avoided, disclosed or managed.
Restricting or prohibiting lawyers from having interests in the
funder
- 16.31 When
considering how conflicts should be avoided and managed in funded proceedings,
we also recommend NZLS consider whether
the Rules of conduct and client care
for lawyers should restrict or prohibit a lawyer or law firm from having
financial or other interests in the funder that is funding the same matter
in
which they are acting. In all funded proceedings, we think this type of
lawyer-plaintiff conflict may be unmanageable.
- 16.32 In
Australia, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) and Australian
Parliamentary Inquiry have both recommended that lawyers
in class actions should
be prohibited from having any interests in a funder that is funding the same
matter in which the lawyer is
acting.1315F[1316] The ALRC
reasoned that it may not be possible for the lawyer to disclose the conflict to
all class members and obtain their informed
consent. Further, it may facilitate
informal contingency fee arrangements ‘through the back door’.
Finally, it said “the
potential for unmanageable conflicts of interest
issues to arise is heightened if a solicitor or law firm has a financial
interest
in a litigation
funder”.1316F[1317]
- 16.33 The
Australian Parliamentary Inquiry echoed the ALRC’s recommendation. It said
conflicts arising from an arrangement where
the lawyer or law firm acting for
the representative plaintiff is connected to the litigation funding entity
financing the case are
simply
“unmanageable”.1317F[1318]
To illustrate this, it pointed to the class action Bolitho v Banksia
Securities
Limited.1318F[1319] There,
the lawyers’ pecuniary interest in the class action through their
involvement in the funder led to conduct the judge
described as shattering
confidence in, and expectations of, lawyers as part of an honourable profession,
and corrupting the proper
administration of
justice.1319F[1320] The
impropriety included issuing invoices that did not accurately reflect the real
fee arrangements, providing false and misleading
information to numerous parties
including the court when seeking approval of the settlement
agreement,1320F[1321] submitting
to the court that there was no conflict of interest, and attempting to prevent
or dissuade an appeal on the costs and
funding commission charged.
- 16.34 The
Australian Parliamentary Inquiry concluded that a prohibition on lawyers having
financial or other interests in the funder
is “the best approach for
ensuring uncompromised, objective and independent advice to, and advocacy of,
the representative
plaintiff”.1321F[1322] It
also defined the “other interests” that should be
prohibited:1322F[1323]
- 'Other
interest' should encompass other arrangements that do not necessarily amount to
a pecuniary interest in the litigation funder,
but which nonetheless may give
rise to the likelihood that the interests of the litigation funder may be
prioritised over the interests
of the representative plaintiff or class members,
including common directorships, family ties and ongoing and/or reciprocal
commercial
arrangements.
- 16.35 We think
the risk of lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest arising from a lawyer’s
interest in the funder is not limited
to class actions and could arise in any
funded proceedings. In all funded cases, there is a concern about lawyers
circumventing the
prohibition on contingency fees by having or organising their
financial affairs or investments to include interests in the funder.
It may not
be possible for this conflict, and perceptions of conflict, to be overcome by
obtaining the client’s consent. We
think lawyers would be better placed to
protect the interests of their client if their own financial interests were not
directly
impacted by the client’s decisions.
- 16.36 There is
support for this view in Singapore, where lawyers and law firms in any funded
proceeding are prohibited from having
financial and other interests in the
litigation funder (or receiving commissions, fees or a share of litigation
proceeds).1323F[1324]
Other matters we considered
- 16.37 Some
submitters expressed concern about lawyers’ billing arrangements in funded
proceedings. For example, they reiterated
that lawyers’ fees should not be
proportionally tied to the success of the outcome. While we are alive to this
concern, we
think the law in Aotearoa New Zealand is clear. The Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act 2006 prohibits lawyers from charging contingency fees
but allows them to charge conditional fees in some
circumstances.1324F[1325] A
contingency fee is where the lawyer obtains a fee calculated as a proportion of
any sum recovered if the outcome is successful,
and nothing if the outcome is
unsuccessful. A conditional fee is where the lawyer also obtains nothing if the
outcome is unsuccessful,
but is allowed to charge a fee based on a
lawyer’s normal hourly rate plus a premium that “is not calculated
as a proportion of the amount recovered”
if the outcome is
successful.1325F[1326] The
premium is to compensate the lawyer for the risk of not being paid at all, and
may be calculated as a proportion of the lawyer’s
expenses or a fixed
amount. As with all legal fees, a conditional legal fee must be “fair and
reasonable”.1326F[1327] We
think the law is well-understood within the legal profession and does not need
to be clarified.
- 16.38 We also
considered the risk of blended billing arrangements, where the plaintiff
receives partial litigation funding (for some
legal costs, disbursements,
security for costs or adverse costs) as well as having a conditional fee
arrangement with the lawyer.
This could potentially reduce the plaintiff’s
compensation if both the funder and the lawyer charge a premium price for the
risk of not being paid if the litigation is unsuccessful. This could be
concerning in class actions, given the potential vulnerabilities
of the
representative plaintiff and class members and the access to justice
justification for litigation funding in that context.
However, no submitter on
the Issues Paper raised this as a concern. In any case, the risk may be
mitigated by our recommendations
for court approval of funding agreements
(including funding commissions) in class actions, and court oversight in the
context of
cost sharing orders. Further, lawyers have a professional obligation
not to charge a client more than is fair and
reasonable,1327F[1328] and any
billing complaints can be made to the NZLS Lawyers Complaints Service.
- 16.39 Some of
the concerns raised by submitters about conflicts of interest in funded class
actions have been addressed in other parts
of this report. For
instance:
(a) In Chapter 7, we recommend the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 should be
amended to provide that, following certification of a class action, the lawyer
for the representative plaintiff is regarded
as the lawyer for the class and is
considered to have a relationship with the class. We also recommend NZLS should
consider what
amendments to the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers
may be required to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in class
actions.
(b) In Chapter 17, we recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the
court must not approve a funding agreement unless it
is satisfied that the
representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the agreement
(that is, advice from a lawyer
that is not acting in the same proceeding going
forward).
- 16.40 Finally,
we considered whether to recommend that NZLS should consider developing a
voluntary specialist accreditation course
for class action lawyers. Among other
things, this could provide training for lawyers on how to manage potential
conflicts in funded
cases. This is not an option we discussed in the Issues
Paper, and it was not discussed by any submitters. The idea is based on a
recommendation of the ALRC that the Law Council of Australia should develop a
specialist accreditation course for lawyers in class
actions, requiring
“ongoing education in relation to identifying and managing actual or
perceived conflicts of interest and
duties in class action
proceedings”.1328F[1329]
We think this option could be considered once class actions are more established
in Aotearoa New Zealand.
PLAINTIFF’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR UNPAID COSTS
Plaintiff may be liable for unpaid costs if funder fails to
fulfil financial commitments
- 16.41 In
Chapter 15, we discuss the risks arising from a funder’s failure to
maintain adequate capital to fulfil its financial
obligations under a funding
agreement. Our recommendations in that chapter focus on the risk for a
successful defendant, who may
be left with a significant loss if the funder and
funded party are unable to meet an adverse costs order.
- 16.42 From the
funded plaintiff’s perspective, the funder’s failure to fulfil its
financial obligations may mean that
the plaintiff is left with a substantial and
unexpected liability for any unpaid legal costs or adverse costs in excess of
any security
provided. The funded equine influenza class action in Australia
illustrates the risk of a funded representative plaintiff becoming
personally
liable for adverse
costs.1329F[1330] Partway
through the proceedings, the overseas funder became bankrupt amid allegations
its parent company was engaged in fraudulent
activities.1330F[1331] The
plaintiffs negotiated a settlement for no compensation, with each side bearing
its own costs. The Federal Court of Australia
observed that the benefit achieved
by the plaintiffs was avoiding the possibility of a very substantial adverse
costs order.1331F[1332] In
Aotearoa New Zealand, the representative plaintiff in the Feltex
proceedings was held personally liable for costs (alongside the funder and
funding broker) when the proceedings were struck out due
to inadequate funding
to meet a security for costs
order.1332F[1333]
- 16.43 Further,
the funder’s inability to continue financing the claim may result in the
plaintiff’s claim being discontinued
or struck out, leaving the plaintiff
with no other avenue to pursue their claim. The Feltex proceedings
illustrate this concern.
Consultation questions
- 16.44 In
the Issues Paper, we discussed the option of introducing capital adequacy
requirements for litigation funders. We suggested
such requirements may protect
not only the defendant in the funded proceeding, but also the funded plaintiff.
They may mitigate the
risk of the funder failing to fulfil its financial
obligations, leaving the plaintiff liable for any unpaid legal costs and adverse
costs in excess of the security
provided.1333F[1334]
- 16.45 In Chapter
15, we recommend against introducing capital adequacy requirements and instead
propose to protect defendants in funded
proceedings by strengthening the
security for costs mechanism. However, as we noted in the Issues Paper, the
security for costs mechanism
(even if strengthened) does not mitigate the risk
of the funded plaintiff being liable for any unpaid legal costs if the funder
fails
to pay these costs.
- 16.46 Since
the Issues Paper was published, we have identified an additional option for
reform that submitters were not asked to comment
on. That is, lawyers could be
prohibited from claiming any unpaid legal expenses from the plaintiff if the
funder fails to meet its
financial commitment to cover these costs. We discuss
this option below.
Results of consultation
- 16.47 Some
submitters were concerned that plaintiffs may be left with a substantial and
unexpected liability for their own unpaid
legal costs and for any adverse costs
if the funder fails to fulfil its obligations under the funding agreement to
meet these
costs.1334F[1335]
- 16.48 Some
litigation funders emphasised the importance of funders being adequately
capitalised to protect plaintiffs. For example,
LPF Group said that, if a funder
has insufficient capital to finance a case in its entirety, “deserving
plaintiffs lose out”
and defendants are not held to account.
- 16.49 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia acknowledged that, in class actions, an order
for security for costs does not indemnify
a representative plaintiff or class
members for the unpaid legal fees of their solicitors in the event the funder
fails. However,
it said it is not aware of any instances where a funder has
suffered financial failure and the representative plaintiff’s solicitors
have subsequently sought to enforce an obligation on the plaintiff to pay legal
fees. It said there are strong commercial incentives
for solicitors to select a
litigation funder that, in their assessment, is competent and financially stable
otherwise they will ultimately
be left unpaid. This operates to the mutual
benefit and protection of plaintiffs and class members.
Recommendation
- R111 NZLS
should consider amending the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and
Client Care) Rules 2008 to prohibit a lawyer acting in a class action from
claiming any unpaid legal expenses
from a funded representative plaintiff if the
funder fails to meet its financial commitment to pay those expenses.
- 16.50 While
there is a risk in any funded proceeding that the plaintiff may be liable for
legal costs (including lawyers’ fees
and any expert fees) if the funder
fails to pay them, we are particularly concerned about the potential liability
of a funded representative
plaintiff. This is because the legal costs in a class
action will be disproportionate to the value of the representative
plaintiff’s
own claim, and to the risks that other class members carry.
Although we propose the lawyer for the representative plaintiff should
also be
the lawyer for the
class,1335F[1336] the lawyer
would be unable to recover fees from individual class members as there is no
retainer relationship with them.
- 16.51 We are
less concerned about other funded proceedings because these are often commercial
in nature. Funded plaintiffs are therefore
likely to have more litigation
experience or expertise than a representative plaintiff and will be more
actively engaged in the claim.
Consequently, they will be better able to monitor
and protect their interests during the proceedings and take steps if concerns
about
the funder’s capital adequacy arise (for example, if the funder
fails to pay an invoice for legal fees on time).
- 16.52 We
recommend NZLS consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care for
lawyers to prohibit lawyers from claiming unpaid legal fees and expenses
from the representative plaintiff. Members of our Expert Advisory
Group were
generally unconcerned about a prohibition. Some members considered that any
residual risk of personal liability for unpaid
legal costs might deter people
from taking on the role of the representative plaintiff. Alternatively, it could
create misaligned
incentives where representative plaintiffs are selected based
on their risk tolerance or their finances. Our recommendation would
address
those concerns.
- 16.53 Further,
we think a prohibition on lawyers claiming any unpaid legal fees from the
representative plaintiff will encourage best
practice. For example, it may
incentivise lawyers to ensure that any expert fees, and their own fees, are paid
up front or in regular
instalments by the funder. It may also encourage lawyers
to only recommend funders to their clients that, in their assessment, are
competent and financially stable.
- 16.54 Our
recommendations to strengthen the security for costs mechanism in Chapter 15
will help to alleviate the risk that the funded
representative plaintiff may be
liable for adverse costs exceeding any security for costs provided. In that
chapter, we recommend
a presumption for security for costs in funded class
actions and note the current practice of ordering relatively full security in
proceedings involving a litigation funder.
- 16.55 We
acknowledge that a funded representative plaintiff may be left with some
residual liability for adverse costs in excess of
any security provided.
However, we do not think it is necessary to entirely eliminate the risks for
representative plaintiffs. A
member of our Expert Advisory Group commented that
there may be benefits to representative plaintiffs having some “skin in
the game”. It may encourage them to engage a reputable funder and ensure
an adequate costs indemnity is provided.
- 16.56 We do not
think regulation is necessary to manage the risk that the funded
plaintiff’s claim may be discontinued due to
lack of funding. There will
always be some risk to plaintiffs who use litigation funding and, as long as
they are properly advised
as to the risk, they can choose whether or not to
accept it. If problems with the funder’s capital arise during the
proceedings,
for example if the lawyer notices the funder is no longer paying
invoices for legal fees, the lawyer should alert the plaintiff to
the problem
and may need to advise them to discontinue the proceedings or seek alternative
funding. Funding agreements usually allow
the funded party to terminate the
agreement in the event of an unrectified default in payment by the
funder.1336F[1337] As long as
the proceedings are discontinued and not struck out, the ability to pursue the
claim through other avenues should not
be
affected.1337F[1338]
CHAPTER 17
Court oversight of funding terms and commissions
INTRODUCTION
- 17.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) Concerns about funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest.
(b) Concerns about funder profits.
(c) Our recommendations for court oversight of litigation funding agreements,
including funding commissions, in class actions.
- 17.2 At the end
of this chapter, we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect
to our recommendations on court oversight
of litigation funding agreements in
class actions.
IMPACT OF FUNDING TERMS ON OUTCOMES
- 17.3 Plaintiffs
may be unable to effectively negotiate fair and reasonable funding agreements
where they are dependent on litigation
funding to pursue their claim. There may
be an imbalance in bargaining power, for example resulting from information
asymmetry and
differing sophistication. This may diminish the plaintiff’s
ability to achieve a substantively just outcome and undermine the
rationale for
permitting litigation funding. The risk is most likely to arise in cases where
the plaintiff is less commercially astute
or experienced in litigation, for
example in many class actions.
- 17.4 In the
Issues Paper, we considered funding terms that can have a particularly negative
impact on the representative plaintiff
and class members. In particular, terms
that:
(a) Give the funder considerable control over the claim, and allow the funder to
prioritise its own interests over the interests
of the representative plaintiff
and class members when those interests diverge; or
(b) Entitle the funder to an excessive share of any settlement or damages
obtained, diminishing the returns to the representative
plaintiff and class
members.
Funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest
Funder may promote its own interests at the expense of the
plaintiff’s interests
- 17.5 Concerns
about funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest are closely
related. Although we discussed these concerns
separately in the Issues
Paper,1338F[1339] they were
often discussed together in the submissions we received. We therefore discuss
these concerns together in this chapter.
- 17.6 In the
Issues Paper, we acknowledged that funders have a legitimate commercial interest
in protecting their investment and are
unlikely to invest in litigation unless
they are allowed some measure of
control.1339F[1340] However,
there is a risk that the funder may use its influence and control over the
funded claim to protect and promote its own interests
at the expense of the
funded plaintiff’s interests, particularly where those interests diverge.
Such behaviour may diminish
the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a
substantively just outcome and corrode public perceptions about the quality of
justice
achieved through the courts.
- 17.7 Misaligned
interests between a funder and plaintiff are particularly likely to arise and
create problems where one wishes to
settle but the other does
not.1340F[1341] A plaintiff may
not always be motivated solely by claim maximisation and personal factors, such
as the stress of the litigation,
may mean they want to settle earlier than a
funder who is driven to maximise profit. Alternatively, commercial pressures may
affect
the funder’s interest in, or ability to continue with, the case.
For instance, an immediate problem with cash flow or more
lucrative investment
opportunities could result in a funder wanting to accept an early but low
settlement offer. While accepting
such an offer might be in the interests of the
funder (or its investors), it could come at the expense of the plaintiff who may
receive
a greater amount if they continue the litigation.
Existing mechanism to manage these concerns may be
inadequate
- 17.8 In
Aotearoa New Zealand, the courts will look at the funder’s control of the
litigation (as well as its profit share and
the role of the lawyers acting) when
considering whether a litigation funding agreement amounts to an abuse of
process justifying
a stay of
proceedings.1341F[1342] This
might include the funder’s role in instructing the lawyer and in decisions
about when to settle and on what
terms.1342F[1343] Funding
agreements may also entitle the litigation funder to withdraw funding, with or
without cause. Such termination provisions
can put pressure on plaintiffs and
influence the power dynamics in settlement discussions.
- 17.9 In
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker (PwC v Walker), Elias CJ
addressed the question of when funder control becomes objectionable and
suggested:1343F[1344]
- To be
objectionable such control must be beyond that which is reasonable to protect
money actually advanced or committed to by the
litigation funder.
- 17.10 In that
case, the majority of Te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court was satisfied that
the funder could not exercise inappropriate
control, based on
undertakings the funder made to the
Court.1344F[1345] The majority
considered that, in the absence of these undertakings, it was arguable the
funder had a level of control and profit
that amounted to an impermissible
assignment of the plaintiff’s cause of
action.1345F[1346] However,
Elias CJ considered that the funder could exercise inappropriate control despite
the undertakings, and regarded the funder’s
control over settlement or
discontinuance to be “substantial” when compared to other funding
agreements the courts had
seen.1346F[1347] Given this
decision, it is not clear what level of funder control is objectionable and will
lead to the courts exercising their power
to stay proceedings.
- 17.11 There is
currently no regulation or oversight of funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest.1347F[1348] Funders and
plaintiffs are responsible for negotiating funding agreements privately,
including how any conflicts of interest will
be managed. Plaintiffs may seek
legal advice on the proposed terms and benefit from legal representation in any
negotiations. While
this might provide adequate protection for commercially
sophisticated or experienced parties, there is a danger that inexperienced
plaintiffs may not be able to afford a lawyer and may not adequately foresee the
risks of conflicts of interest or have the ability
to assess the terms they
agree to. This can create an asymmetry of bargaining power between the funder
and the plaintiff.
- 17.12 In class
actions, the relative passivity of class members and their dependence on
litigation funding can further elevate the
risk of their interests not being
adequately protected during the litigation. In Chapter 16, we discuss why
lawyers might be incentivised
to prioritise their own interests (or the
funder’s interests) over the interests of their client.
Funder profits
Funder profits may impact on the ability of funded plaintiffs
to achieve substantive justice
- 17.13 In
the Issues Paper we explained that, where there is an imbalance in bargaining
power because the plaintiff is dependent on
litigation funding to pursue their
claim, the plaintiff may be unable to effectively negotiate a fair and
reasonable funding
commission.1348F[1349] The risk
is that funding commissions will significantly diminish returns to plaintiffs,
impacting on their ability to achieve substantively
just outcomes. This concern
is more likely to arise in a representative or class action, where the
representative plaintiff and class
members will often have no litigation
experience or expertise.
- 17.14 Excessive
funder profits also risk the misuse of the proper function of the
courts.1349F[1350] A core
function of the courts, as a forum where parties can seek to enforce and defend
their substantive rights, may be diminished
where the court process serves the
economic purposes of litigation funders. Further, public perceptions of the
civil justice system
and perceptions about the quality of justice may be
corroded if a claimant’s compensation is substantially diminished because
of their reliance on litigation funding.
Existing mechanism to manage this concern may be
inadequate
- 17.15 The
prohibition against assignments of bare causes of action is one possible way to
meet the concern that funders will profit
excessively from funding litigation.
The profit share of a funder is a factor the courts will consider when
determining whether a
funding agreement amounts to an impermissible assignment
of a bare cause of action, justifying a stay of
proceedings.1350F[1351] However,
the court may be reluctant to assess a funder’s profit share without
knowing the amount that will be recovered and
the costs that will be incurred in
recovering it.1351F[1352] We
think the effectiveness of the existing stay of proceedings mechanism may be
questioned, given the lack of a clear body of case
law to guide funder
behaviour.
CONSULTATION QUESTIONS
Funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest
- 17.16 In
the Issues Paper, we asked submitters what concerns, if any, they have about
funder control of litigation and whether these
concerns can be adequately
managed through existing mechanisms, such as the court’s power to order a
stay of proceedings.1352F[1353]
We also asked submitters what concerns, if any, they have about funder-plaintiff
conflicts of interest and whether these concerns
can be adequately managed by
allowing funders and plaintiffs to negotiate their own contractual terms.
- 17.17 We
discussed and sought feedback on options for reform, including:
(a) Encouraging or requiring litigation funders to include minimum terms in
their litigation funding
agreements.1353F[1354]
For example, terms that:
(i) Provide that the funder will not seek to influence the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s lawyer to give control or conduct of
the litigation to the
funder or take steps that are likely to cause the plaintiff’s lawyer to
act in breach of their professional
duties.
(ii) Set out the funder’s role in decisions about whether to settle the
proceedings and on what terms, or a specific procedure
that will be applied to
reviewing and deciding whether to accept a settlement offer.
(iii) Set out the circumstances in which a funder may terminate the funding
agreement and that the funder shall not be entitled to
terminate except in those
specified circumstances.
(iv) Set out the process for resolving disputes between the funder and the
funded plaintiff about settlement or termination of the
funding (or any
dispute).
(b) Requiring funders to have and follow an adequate conflicts management
policy, as in
Australia.1354F[1355] This could
include practices for disclosing and managing potential or actual conflicts of
interest that arise during the proceedings.
An issue with this option is how
compliance should be monitored and enforced.
(c) Regulation to limit the amount of control a funder may exercise in a
proceeding.1355F[1356] However,
the risk of funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest may not be able to be
completely managed through regulating funder control.
As noted above, subtler
forms of infl‑uence may be exerted by even a relatively passive funder,
particularly if it retains
the ability to terminate funding in a wide range of
circumstances. Real consequences can flow from these pressures even where there
is no explicit power for a party to act contrary to the interests of the other.
Funder profits
- 17.18 In
the Issues Paper, we asked submitters what concerns, if any, they have about
funder profits. We also asked if they are satisfied
that existing mechanisms
(that is, leaving it to funders and plaintiffs to negotiate their own funding
agreements) can adequately
manage these concerns. If not, we asked which option
for managing the concerns submitters preferred, and why.
- 17.19 We
discussed three options for addressing concerns about funder
profits:1356F[1357]
(a) Facilitating competition in the litigation funding market (a market-centred
approach).
(b) Court supervision of funding commissions in class actions (for example, in
the context of exercising a power to make a common
fund order or approve a
settlement).
(c) Directly regulating the commissions that funders can charge (for example, by
placing restrictions on how the funding commission
can be calculated, or capping
funding commissions at a fixed percentage or on a sliding scale).
- 17.20 In the
Supplementary Issues Paper, in the context of our draft settlement approval
mechanism, we also asked submitters whether
the court should have an express
power to amend the funding commission at settlement.
RESULTS OF CONSULTATION
Funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest
- 17.21 We
received 24 submissions on funder
control1357F[1358] and 24
submissions on funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest.1358F[1359] Most
submitters expressed concerns and were not satisfied that existing mechanisms
can adequately manage them.
Concerns about funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest
- 17.22 Funder
control was frequently linked to concerns about funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest.1359F[1360] Professor
Vicki Waye (University of South Australia) said funder control may not be a
problem in itself, but it becomes a real problem
when the possibility of a
conflict of interest occurs and the funder can use its control for its own
advantage. Some submitters commented
on the different motivations of funders and
plaintiffs, which can lead to conflicts where a funder has control. Whereas a
funder’s
primary focus is profit, plaintiffs may be driven by other goals.
- 17.23 Five
submitters indicated that funder control may compromise the access to justice
rationale for permitting litigation funding,
by undermining the fact it is the
plaintiff’s claim and should primarily be pursued for their
benefit.1360F[1361]
- 17.24 Some
submitters reiterated that, even where there are contractual limitations on
funder control, the funder may in reality have
significant influence or
effective control over the
proceedings.1361F[1362]
Dr Michael Duffy (Monash University) said the funding agreement may state that
the plaintiff’s instructions override the funder’s
instructions in
the event of a conflict, but this may be subject to the plaintiff’s
obligation to follow all reasonable legal
advice and fully co-operate with the
funder and the lawyer.
- 17.25 Some
submitters commented that funder control can lead to conflicts in representative
and class actions.1362F[1363]
They said the power imbalance between the funder and representative plaintiff
increases the risk the funder’s commercial goals
will be prioritised. Bell
Gully said the plaintiff needs independent legal advice when entering a funding
agreement to mitigate these
concerns. It submitted that a lawyer engaged by, and
taking instructions from, the funder (even if nominally through the
representative
plaintiff) is not in a position to provide independent advice.
- 17.26 Settlement
was identified as a point where funder control and the risk of funder-plaintiff
conflicts is most concerning, as
disagreements may arise about whether to accept
or reject a settlement
offer.1363F[1364] Three
submitters indicated plaintiffs should always retain significant control over
settlement decisions, even if the decision is
not in the funder’s
financial interest.1364F[1365]
Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office submitted that those who purport to
act in the best interests of class members should
be obliged to do so, including
putting control of the litigation and key decisions such as settlement in the
hands of plaintiffs.
- 17.27 Colin
Carruthers QC submitted that, in general, while funders need to have some
control, any decisions that affect the class
should be a matter for the
representative plaintiff or the litigation committee. Vicki Waye said that in
Australia a funder will
normally sit in on settlement discussions. However, she
said it is important that funder control is constrained in relation to
settlement
decisions, as problems can arise when the funder has an opportunity
to use its control to secure something they would not otherwise
have been able
to secure. Bell Gully noted that funder control creates a difficult dynamic in
settlement discussions for class action
defendants because, in many cases, it
appears to be a numbers game for funders rather than the usual settlement
discussion when redressing
a personal claim.
- 17.28 Two
submitters involved in the litigation funding market were less concerned and
said funder control can be beneficial in some
situations.1365F[1366] In class
actions, an experienced funder that has control of day-to-day decisions can be
valuable for a representative plaintiff who
is inexperienced in
litigation.
Adequacy of existing mechanisms to manage the concerns
- 17.29 Most
submitters who addressed the adequacy of existing mechanisms to manage funder
control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest expressed concerns.
- 17.30 Claims
Resolution Service and Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of
New Zealand said existing mechanisms, such
as the court’s ability to order
a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, are not adequate to manage concerns
about funder
control. Another five submitters implied dissatisfaction by
advocating for
reform.1366F[1367] The Insurance
Council said the courts have shown repeated reluctance to interfere with funding
agreements, and there is uncertainty
about when a court will grant a stay of
proceedings on account of funder control.
- 17.31 Eleven
submitters indicated that existing mechanisms are inadequate to manage concerns
about funder-plaintiff
conflicts.1367F[1368] Several
submitters implied dissatisfaction by supporting options for
reform.1368F[1369] The Insurance
Council and Simpson Grierson expressed concern about the lack of any regulation
or oversight.1369F[1370] Simpson
Grierson also said that allowing the funder and the representative plaintiff to
negotiate their own contract terms is especially
inadequate in representative
and class actions where the representative plaintiff may not be commercially
sophisticated.
- 17.32 However, a
number of submitters, including litigation funders, considered existing
mechanisms are adequate. For example, two
submitters said court oversight in the
context of considering a stay of proceedings for abuse of process can adequately
address any
issues about funder
control.1370F[1371]
- 17.33 Three
submitters indicated that a well-designed funding agreement can allay any
concerns about funder
control,1371F[1372] or
funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest.1372F[1373] For
example, the agreement can outline the role of the funder and the lawyer, state
that the plaintiff retains control of the litigation
and the funder should not
interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, and set out how any conflicts of
interest will be managed.
- 17.34 Some
overseas-based funders noted they are already subject to regulations or best
practice guidance, which they said is sufficient
to mitigate any concerns about
funder control and conflicts of
interest.1373F[1374]
Options for reform
- 17.35 We
received 19 submissions on options for managing concerns about funder
control,1374F[1375] and 19
submissions on options for managing funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest.1375F[1376] As some of
the options we proposed for managing funder control and funder-plaintiff
conflicts are the same, we summarise the submissions
on these topics together
below.
Minimum contract terms
- 17.36 Nine
submitters indicated some level of support for minimum contract terms to address
funder control[1377] or
conflicts of
interest.1377F[1378] DLA Piper
generally supported the minimum terms set out in the Issues Paper but thought
these should take the form of guidance rather
than mandatory terms. It was
suggested that minimum terms could provide clarity to litigants about the
boundaries that funders must
operate
within.[1379] Compliance could
be overseen by the courts,[1380]
or by an agency such as Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets
Authority (FMA) or Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of
Justice.1380F[1381]
- 17.37 With
respect to particular minimum terms, five submitters supported a term defining
the circumstances in which the funder may
terminate
funding.1381F[1382] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia suggested the funder should be able to
terminate funding where it ceases to be satisfied
about the merits of the
dispute, reasonably believes the dispute is no longer commercially viable, or
where there has been a material
unremedied breach of the agreement by the
plaintiff justifying termination after notice. At the same time, it said
prescribing specific
circumstances that justify termination may have unintended
consequences as the market develops, because novel cases may arise that
justify
further grounds for termination. DLA Piper said the parties should be able to
terminate the funding agreement by mutual agreement.
Five submitters supported a
term that sets out the process for resolving
disputes,1382F[1383] for example
disputes about termination of funding.
- 17.38 Three
submitters supported terms to limit funder control, such as terms requiring the
representative plaintiff’s instructions
to prevail over the funder’s
instructions in the event of a
dispute,1383F[1384] or
preventing the funder from seeking to influence the plaintiff or the
plaintiff’s lawyer to give them control or conduct
of the
litigation.1384F[1385]
- 17.39 Chapman
Tripp and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia supported a “cooling
off” period in which the representative
plaintiff and class members would
be able to seek legal advice on the agreement if they have not already done so.
However, Associate
Professor Barry Allan (Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo |
University of Otago) was unsure what advantage a cooling off period would
have,
as the expectation should be that the representative plaintiff and class members
obtain legal advice before signing the funding
agreement. Further, he said it is
unclear how a cooling off period would apply in an opt-out class action.
- 17.40 Two
submitters expressed neutral views on minimum
terms,1385F[1386] and three did
not support this
option.1386F[1387] Carter Holt
Harvey said minimum contract terms do not resolve the issue of funder control,
as it is possible to agree that the plaintiff’s
lawyer will not give
control of the litigation to the funder while also requiring the funded party to
follow the lawyer’s legal
advice and give the funder the right to appoint
the lawyer.
Court oversight of funding agreements
- 17.41 Several
submitters supported some form of court oversight of funding agreements as a
mechanism for managing concerns about funder
control1387F[1388] or
funder-plaintiff conflicts of
interest.1388F[1389] Suggestions
included empowering the court to look closely at funder control and conflicts of
interest in the context of a power to
approve funding agreements or approve
settlements. Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society said the
courts are best
placed to review funding terms to make sure that each case
“involves a genuine claimant who understands the terms they are
signing up
to”.
- 17.42 Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia did not support court approval of funding
agreements, saying any preliminary review
would duplicate existing judicial
oversight and promote satellite litigation at the pre-trial stage. It favoured
alternatives such
as minimum contract terms, a requirement for the funder to
maintain a conflicts management policy (together with regulatory guidance
and
oversight of the funder’s compliance) and the general supervisory
jurisdiction of the courts in class actions (including
at settlement). It did
not support a power for the court to vary the terms of litigation funding
agreements.
Conflicts management policy
- 17.43 Four
submitters supported a requirement for funders to maintain an adequate conflicts
management policy.1389F[1390]
Two of these submitters commented on the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) Regulatory Guide 248 (RG 248), which
requires class action
funders in Australia to maintain adequate conflicts management policies. The
Association of Litigation Funders
of Australia said having adequate arrangements
for managing conflicts of interest is “essential to good business
practice”.
It said it requires its members to publish their policies,
which must comply with ASIC regulations. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia said RG 248 provides good guidance for funders, and it supports a
similar requirement in Aotearoa New Zealand. Both submitters
noted that more
proactive enforcement of the guidance in RG 248 would be beneficial in
Australia, for example through an annual reporting
requirement on compliance.
- 17.44 Some
submitters discussed a requirement for funders to maintain a conflicts
management policy or manage conflicts of interest
but did not express a clear
view on whether funders operating in Aotearoa New Zealand should be subject to
such a requirement.
Other options raised by submitters
- 17.45 There
was limited support for a code of conduct to manage concerns about funder
control or conflicts of interest. BusinessNZ
supported a voluntary code with
non-compliance having reputational repercussions for the funder concerned.
Woodsford Litigation Funding
noted that the Association of Litigation Funders
(England and Wales) Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders limits funder
control, and the International Legal Finance Association Best Practices
require members to maintain effective systems to detect and manage conflicts of
interest. It did not say whether a code of conduct
would adequately respond to
these concerns in Aotearoa New Zealand, but it did not think any government-led
regulation of litigation
funders is warranted or necessary. Bell Gully supported
a code of conduct and/or minimum contract terms. However, it said that whatever
form regulation takes, it should be “a set of principles with the force of
law and overseen by the courts”. It considered
guidelines or industry
self-regulation would be insufficient to address the concerns about funder
control, which can lead to funder-plaintiff
conflicts.
- 17.46 Michael
Duffy proposed a mutual statutory obligation of good faith, like the duty of
utmost good faith in insurance law. Two
other submitters commented favourably on
recommendations made by the Australian Parliamentary
Inquiry,1390F[1391] for example
that funders should be required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest
to the court.1391F[1392]
Funder profits
Concerns about funder profits
- 17.47 We
received 30 submissions on the concerns about funder profits. Of those, 21
expressed concerns1392F[1393]
and six had no
concerns.1393F[1394]
- 17.48 Among the
submitters who had concerns about funder profits, reasons included the
following:
(a) Funder profits can significantly diminish compensation for claimants,
undermining the access to justice justification for permitting
litigation
funding.
(b) In representative and class actions, there is no true commercial tension in
the negotiation of funding terms and commissions.
The power lies with the
funder, and the representative plaintiff and class members usually have no other
option.
(c) Concerns may be greater in opt-out proceedings than opt-in proceedings
because compensation that would otherwise be awarded to
class members may be
reduced by funding commissions and legal fees they have not actively agreed
to.
(d) Funded plaintiffs may be signing away vast portions of their returns without
fully understanding what they are doing.
(e) Funder profits are not necessarily commensurate with the risk attached to
investing in litigation. Many funded cases are relatively
low-risk, and in any
case, funders can manage risk with adequate due diligence.
(f) Examples of funders and lawyers benefiting from funded litigation at the
expense of class members (and defendants) include Strathboss Kiwifruit v
Attorney-General,1394F[1395]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v
Walker,1395F[1396] and
Huon
Corporation.1396F[1397]
(g) Public perceptions of the justice system will be damaged if funders and
lawyers are the main beneficiaries of litigation rather
than plaintiffs.
(h) There is a risk of funders and lawyers acting together to create and fund
litigation without any real client at all. Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Law Society said there is no public policy reason to permit a pure
market in litigation in the absence
of a genuine principal.
(i) The way that funding commissions are calculated does not always incentivise
funders to try and keep lawyers’ costs low.
(j) It is not easy to determine what constitutes acceptable funder profit and
what constitutes excessive profit. There is a fine
line between regulating
litigation funding for the benefit of plaintiffs and discouraging the
availability of litigation funding.
(k) There is a lack of empirical evidence on the returns made by funders in
Aotearoa New Zealand, and therefore a lack of transparency
about whether the
outcomes of funded litigation are in fact fair to plaintiffs. The exact terms of
settlement are usually confidential,
as is the amount actually received by
plaintiffs.
(l) Overseas-based funders will take their profits out of Aotearoa New Zealand.
- 17.49 Among the
submitters who were unconcerned about funder profits, reasons included the
following:
(a) Litigation funding is a commercial arrangement, and it should be
uncontroversial that funders expect to profit from their investments.
Parties
should be free to enter into funding arrangements on commercial terms agreed by
both parties.
(b) Without litigation funding, many plaintiffs and class members would be
unable to pursue their claims and obtain compensation
or hold wrongdoers to
account. It is preferable for plaintiffs and class members to receive something,
rather than nothing.
(c) Funder profits are commensurate to the inherent risks attached to investing
in litigation. Further, it is not appropriate to
assess funder profits solely on
the basis of outcomes in individual cases, without considering the total costs
and risks associated
with all the cases in the funder’s portfolio.
Adequacy of existing mechanisms to manage the concerns
- 17.50 We
received 26 submissions on whether existing mechanisms for managing the concerns
about funder profits are adequate. Of those,
17 submitters were not satisfied
that existing mechanisms are adequate to manage the
concerns,1397F[1398] and six
submitters considered existing mechanisms are
adequate.1398F[1399]
- 17.51 Submitters
who did not think existing mechanisms are adequate to manage concerns about
funder profits said:
(a) The light-touch approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding is not an adequate basis for regulating litigation
funding in class
actions.1399F[1400] The
Australian experience highlights the inadequacy of a light-touch approach.
(b) The court’s ability to stay proceedings on the basis of an
impermissible assignment of a bare cause of action does not
adequately manage
the concerns. Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in
PricewaterhouseCoopers v
Walker,1400F[1401] it
is uncertain whether the court will stay proceedings on the basis of funder
profit and control.
(c) The torts of maintenance and champerty are not the right mechanism for
regulating funding commissions. Their bluntness and ambiguity
make them
unsuitable for regulating sophisticated funding arrangements, and their policy
rationale is no longer convincing.
(d) Lawyers and representative plaintiffs do not necessarily provide an
effective check on funding commissions. At the point of settlement,
conflicts
may arise between the lawyer and the representative
plaintiff.1401F[1402] Conflicts
may also arise between the representative plaintiff and the class (if the
representative plaintiff is to receive a payment
for taking on the role).
- 17.52 Submitters
who were satisfied with existing mechanisms thought concerns about funder
profits can be adequately managed in one
or more of the following
ways:
(a) The court’s supervisory jurisdiction in representative and class
actions, particularly court approval of
settlements.1402F[1403] In
Australia, for example, court approval of settlement includes an examination of
what class members will receive after the funding
commission and legal costs are
deducted.
(b) Competition in the litigation funding market.
(c) The terms of the litigation funding agreement. A well-designed,
fit-for-purpose funding agreement can manage concerns about funder
profits by
providing full disclosure of all fees and charges before the funding agreement
is entered into. It can also moderate funder
profits and protect class member
interests through cooling off periods, support for class members to obtain
independent advice, standard
terms regarding management of conflicts of
interest, and dispute resolution mechanisms (typically overseen by senior
officers of
the courts, such as Queen’s Counsel).
(d) The obligations of the lawyer for the representative plaintiff and the class
as officers of the court, and their overriding obligation
and fiduciary duty to
their client.
(e) General consumer law protections available to class members, for example in
relation to unconscionable conduct, misleading and
deceptive conduct and unfair
contracts.
Options for reform
- 17.53 We
received 29 submissions commenting on options for managing funder
profits.1403F[1404] We also
received 19 submissions on the question in the Supplementary Issues Paper about
whether the court should have the power to
vary funding commissions at
settlement.1404F[1405] Some
submitters supported more than one option.
- 17.54 Thirteen
submitters, including Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission, supported
facilitating competition in the litigation
funding market, for example to make
litigation funding more
affordable.1405F[1406]
Competition could increase consumer choice, enable consumers to negotiate better
terms and increase the quality of the services provided
by funders. While
Aotearoa New Zealand could benefit from the involvement of more experienced
overseas-based funders in the market,
onerous regulation and compliance
requirements could discourage market entry and favour funders based here.
- 17.55 However,
two submitters stated that facilitating healthy competition should not mean
watering down
regulation.1406F[1407] Simpson
Grierson commented that a clear regulatory framework for litigation funding may
in fact make Aotearoa New Zealand a more
attractive jurisdiction for litigation
funders.
- 17.56 Thirteen
submitters on the Issues Paper supported some form of court oversight of funding
commissions in class
actions.1407F[1408] They were
fairly evenly split on whether the court should consider the funding commission
at the beginning of the class action, later
in the proceedings, or
both.1408F[1409]
- 17.57 Submitters
on the Supplementary Issues Paper were also split on whether the court should
have an express power to vary the funding
commission (outside the context of
making a cost sharing order). While a few submitters supported this
option,1409F[1410] for example
to protect class member interests, the majority did
not.1410F[1411] The concern was
that this would introduce commercial uncertainty for funders and a risk of
hindsight bias colouring assessments of
what is a fair balance of risk and
return. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia submitted that, except for
the purpose of making
a common fund order, the court should not interfere with
the private contractual dealings of consenting parties in the absence of
evidence of wrongful conduct.
- 17.58 Some
submitters supported a statutory cap on funding commissions or a legislated
minimum return to class members. This could
provide greater certainty for
plaintiffs and ensure that class actions are run for the benefit of class
members. There was no consensus
on how funding commissions should be capped, but
suggestions included: benchmarking against private equity
returns,1411F[1412] creating a
“multiplier and multiplicand” tabled system similar to personal
injury cases,1412F[1413]
creating a sliding scale to cap
fees,1413F[1414] capping fees by
reference to multiples of the amount
invested,1414F[1415] or
legislating a minimum return to class members of 50 per cent of gross recoveries
in funded class
actions.1415F[1416]
- 17.59 Six
submitters did not support a statutory cap on funding
commissions.1416F[1417] A cap
could stymie market competition, dissuade litigation funding for more complex
cases and create a tendency for funders to charge
fees at the cap. Chapman Tripp
said a cap is a “blunt instrument” for managing concerns about
funder profits, as it does
not reflect that each case raises different risks
that justify variable funding commissions.
- 17.60 Three
submitters suggested alternative mechanisms. BusinessNZ said guidelines for
funders may be appropriate to address funder
profits if the court’s power
to stay proceedings is inadequate. Chapman Tripp suggested a power for a
regulator (such as the
FMA) to review funding commissions as needed. Vicki Waye
suggested an independent expert could assist the court to assess the
reasonableness
of the funding commission.
- 17.61 Three
submitters supported the effective regulation of funding commissions but did not
specify how funding commissions should
be
regulated.1417F[1418]
Survey of group members
- 17.62 In
our survey of group members who have participated in representative
actions,1418F[1419] we asked
whether funded participants were satisfied that the funding commission they were
charged was fair and reasonable. Most participants
who responded were neutral or
satisfied with the funding
commission.1419F[1420] Some of
the participants may have been involved in proceedings that had not yet
resolved, so they may not yet have had a clear understanding
of how much would
be deducted from any recovery. However, the results may indicate that funder
profits do not cause concern in all
cases or that submitters are unsure
whether the funding commission in their case was
reasonable.
RECOMMENDATIONS
- R112 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, in a funded class action, a litigation
funding agreement (including any amendment to an
existing agreement) is
enforceable by a funder only if it is approved by the
court.
- R113 The
Class Actions Act should require the representative plaintiff in a funded class
action to apply for court approval of the litigation
funding agreement. The
timing for seeking court approval should be:
- If
settlement occurs prior to certification, together with the application for
settlement approval.
- If
the agreement is entered into before certification, as soon as practicable
following certification.
- If
the agreement is entered into after certification, as soon as practicable after
the agreement is entered into.
- If
the terms of an approved litigation funding agreement are amended, as soon as
practicable after that amendment.
- R114 While
the defendant should not be a respondent to the application for funding
approval, they should be notified of the application
and the outcome of the
application. Te Kōmiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee
should consider whether any amendments
to the High Court Rules 2016 are
necessary to achieve this.
- R115 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court must not approve a litigation
funding agreement unless it is satisfied that:
- The
representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the agreement;
and
- The
agreement is fair and reasonable.
- R116 When
determining whether a litigation funding agreement is fair and reasonable, the
court may consider:
- The
circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the agreement.
- Whether
the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative plaintiff to
instruct their lawyer or control the litigation,
or otherwise impair the
lawyer-client relationship.
- Any
process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative plaintiff,
and class members, including disputes about settlement
and termination of the
agreement.
- Whether
the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement is the law
of Aotearoa New Zealand.
- If
the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and extent of
that indemnity.
- The
fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission.
- Any
other matters the court considers are
relevant.
- R117 The
Class Actions Act should specify that, when determining whether the funding
commission is fair and reasonable, the court may consider:
- The
type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary
relief.
- The
number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief.
- The
estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful.
- The
complexity and likely duration of the case.
- The
estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate variation
in the factors identified above in (a)-(d).
- Any
other matters the court considers are relevant.
- R118 The
Class Actions Act should specify that the court may:
- Appoint
an expert at any stage of a funded class action if it considers that will assist
the court’s consideration of the fairness
and reasonableness of a funding
commission; and
- Order
that one or more of the representative plaintiffs or the litigation funder pay
part or all of the costs of the expert.
- R119 The
Class Actions Act should specify that in opt-in class actions that proceed to
judgment, the court may vary the funding commission
that is to be deducted from
any damages award to the extent that the funding commission is materially in
excess of the estimated
returns provided to the court as part of the
court’s approval of the litigation funding agreement.
Court approval of funding agreements at the commencement of
class actions
- 17.63 In
this section, we explain our recommendation that litigation funding agreements
should be subject to court approval in class
actions. We think the requirements
relating to court approval of funding agreements should be included in the Class
Actions Act,
and our draft provisions are set out at the end of this chapter and
in Appendix One.
- 17.64 We think
court approval is necessary to protect the interests of representative
plaintiffs and class members in funded class
actions. The courts in Aotearoa New
Zealand have already recognised their important supervisory role in
representative actions to
ensure that the interests of class members are
protected.1420F[1421] Class
actions raise the same concerns, and court oversight will help to ensure that
litigation funding achieves its access to justice
objective.1421F[1422] In
particular, court approval responds to the concerns discussed in this chapter
about funder control, funder-plaintiff conflicts
of interest and funder profits,
as well as some of the concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest
discussed in Chapter
16. In addition, court approval will help to assure the
integrity of the court system and improve transparency and funder accountability
in class actions, in line with the objectives and guiding principles for
permitting and regulating litigation funding discussed in
Chapter 14. In effect,
court approval requires the funder to publicly justify their funding terms and
commission.
- 17.65 Given the
often commercial nature of other funded proceedings, we consider that most
individual funded plaintiffs are likely
to be more sophisticated and able to
protect their interests when negotiating funding agreements than representative
plaintiffs and
class members. Therefore, we think it would be disproportionate
to the risk, in terms of the time and cost involved, to require court
approval
of funding agreements outside of the class actions context.
- 17.66 In the
absence of detailed statutory rules, Te Kōti Pira | Court of Appeal has
questioned the institutional capacity of
the courts to approve funding
arrangements. The Court has expressed concern that funding approval will assure
claimants all is well
with their claim and discourage them from undertaking
their own assessment of the funding
arrangements.1422F[1423]
- 17.67 However,
as we discussed in Chapter 14, there is precedent for court approval of funding
agreements in Ontario’s class
actions
legislation.1423F[1424] The
legislation, which codified existing practice, provides that a funding agreement
will have no force or effect without court approval,
and sets out factors the
court must be satisfied of before approving the agreement. In Australia, the
Australian Law Reform Commission
(ALRC) and the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry
have also recommended that funding agreements in class actions must be approved
by
the court to be
enforceable.1424F[1425] Unlike
Ontario’s legislation, however, the ALRC and Australian Parliamentary
Inquiry recommended the court should be expressly
empowered to amend the terms
of the funding agreement (not just approve or reject
it).1425F[1426] In 2021, the
federal government sought feedback on a draft Bill that would require court
approval of the claim proceeds distribution
method in a class action in order
for it to be enforceable, and empower the court to vary that method to ensure it
is fair and
reasonable.1426F[1427]
- 17.68 We
recommend that the funder in a class action should be unable to enforce the
funding agreement against the representative
plaintiff or class members, unless
the agreement has been approved by the
court.1427F[1428] This means the
funder will be unable to recover its funding commission unless the funding
agreement is approved by the court, but
ensures that the representative
plaintiff will still be able to rely on the costs indemnity in the funding
agreement if, for example,
their claims fails at certification and before the
funding agreement is approved. If the court declines to approve the funding
agreement,
it should provide reasons so that the funder, representative
plaintiff and class members are able to renegotiate and amend the agreement
if
they wish to reapply for approval. We think this is preferable to a power for
the court to vary the terms of the funding agreement
at the funding approval
stage.
- 17.69 As to
mechanics, we think that the representative plaintiff should seek court approval
of the funding agreement immediately
after the class action is certified, by
filing an interlocutory application for orders approving the funding agreement
together with
any supporting affidavit addressing the factors set out in our
proposed court approval provision (discussed
below).1428F[1429] If the
parties reach a settlement prior to certification, court approval should be
sought together with the application for settlement
approval. If the funding
agreement is entered into after certification, court approval should be sought
as soon practicable after
the agreement is entered into. If the terms of the
funding agreement are amended during the proceedings, further court approval
will
be required, and we consider that this should be sought as soon as
practicable after that amendment.
- 17.70 This
timing will provide funders with some certainty at the commencement of
proceedings, which is essential for the growth of
a competitive and sustainable
market in litigation funding and ultimately for funding to provide access to
courts in class actions.
We think it is important that the funding approval
provision does not become a vehicle for creating further disputes. Therefore,
we
would not expect the defendant to be involved in any argument about the fairness
or reasonableness of the funding terms or funding
commission. At the same time,
we think the defendant ought to be advised of the application for funding
approval and the outcome
of that application. We recommend
Te Kōmiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti |
Rules Committee consider whether any amendments to the High Court Rules 2016
(HCR)
are necessary to achieve this.
- 17.71 We
recommend that the court may only approve a funding agreement if it is satisfied
that the representative plaintiff has received
independent legal advice on the
funding agreement and the agreement as a whole is fair and
reasonable.1429F[1430] The
requirement for independent legal advice responds to the concern about the
imbalance in bargaining power between the litigation
funder and the
representative plaintiff and class members, which increases the risk that the
funder’s commercial interests
will be prioritised. It also emphasises that
it is the role of the lawyer (not just the court) to protect and promote the
interests
of the representative plaintiff and class members in the process of
negotiating the funding agreement. Given the risk of lawyer-plaintiff
conflicts
of interests involving the lawyer acting in the class action, we think it is
appropriate for the representative plaintiff
to receive advice from a lawyer who
is not involved in the funded litigation.
- 17.72 In
determining whether the funding agreement is fair and reasonable, we think the
court should consider the following factors:
(a) The circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the
agreement.
(b) Whether the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative
plaintiff to instruct their lawyer or control the litigation,
or otherwise
impair the lawyer-client relationship.
(c) Any process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative
plaintiff, and class members, including disputes about
settlement and
termination of the agreement.
(d) Whether the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement
is the law of Aotearoa New Zealand.
(e) If the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and
extent of that indemnity.
(f) The fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission.
(g) Any other matters the court considers are relevant.
- 17.73 We
considered whether court approval of funding agreements should depend on the
inclusion of mandatory minimum contract terms.
We have concluded that the above
factors will allow the court to look at the overall fairness and reasonableness
of the funding agreement,
and to evaluate this in the circumstances of each
case. We think that factors to guide the courts’ discretion will provide
greater flexibility for funders, parties and the courts and incentivise more
favourable funding terms for representative plaintiffs
and class members. We
comment on these factors and how they may be applied in more detail below. By
contrast, mandatory minimum contract
terms might – as the name suggests
– incentivise the bare minimum and may make avoidance of the underlying
intent easier.
- 17.74 Our
proposed factors do not invite the court to assess the merits of the class
action, nor should they discourage a representative
plaintiff from undertaking
their own assessment of funding arrangements.
- 17.75 We have
not recommended a requirement for funders to maintain and implement a conflicts
management policy (like ASIC’s
Regulatory Guide 248 in Australia). The
issue with this option is who would oversee funders’ compliance, given
that we do not
think oversight of litigation funding by a regulator (such as the
FMA) is appropriate for Aotearoa New
Zealand.1430F[1431] Submissions
indicated that more proactive enforcement of the guidance in RG 248 would be
beneficial in Australia, for example through
an annual reporting requirement on
compliance. While Aotearoa New Zealand could implement a requirement to provide
a conflicts management
plan to the court, absent an auditing or reporting
requirement, the court would have no way to determine whether or to what extent
the funder is implementing their policy.
Termination of the funding agreement
- 17.76 With
respect to the circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the
funding agreement, we anticipate the court
would not be satisfied that a funding
agreement is fair and reasonable unless the agreement either:
(a) Sets out the circumstances in which the funder can terminate the agreement,
and that the funder shall not be entitled to terminate
the agreement except in
those circumstances. For example, the funder may be entitled to terminate where
it reasonably ceases to be
satisfied about the merits or commercial viability of
the dispute, or where there has been a material unremedied breach of the
agreement
by the funded plaintiff justifying termination after notice.
(b) Requires the funder to provide the funded plaintiff with notice of its
intention to terminate the agreement and continue to perform
its obligations
under the funding agreement during the notice period. We think the notice period
should provide the representative
plaintiff with adequate time to seek
alternative funding, for example 20 working days might be sufficient in complex
litigation.
We also anticipate that during the notice period the funder would
not seek to be reimbursed for any security paid into court, unless
and until
alternative funding is secured.
- 17.77 This
factor responds to the risk that the funder may use its influence and control to
protect its own interests at the expense
of those of the class when those
interests diverge. In particular, it addresses the concern that a funder’s
unfettered discretion
to terminate the funding agreement can put pressure on the
funded representative plaintiff and effectively give the funder control
of the
claim. While some of the grounds we have discussed for terminating funding
agreements are very broad, for example if the claim
is no longer commercially
viable, we also expect that a funding agreement will contain an appropriate
dispute resolution process
(discussed below). Specifying grounds for
termination, rather than allowing funders complete discretion to terminate
without notice
or with limited notice, means disputes about whether those
grounds are established can be dealt with through that process.
Plaintiff’s ability to control the litigation
- 17.78 We
think the court should ensure the funding agreement will not significantly
diminish the rights of the representative plaintiff
to instruct the lawyer or
control the litigation, or otherwise impair the lawyer-client
relationship.1431F[1432] Some
funder involvement in the claim is inevitable to enable it to protect its
investment. For example, the funder will want to be
kept informed of important
developments in the litigation and will expect to be consulted before major
decisions are taken, particularly
in relation to settlement. Even so, we think
the ability of the plaintiff to retain meaningful control over their claim is
relevant
to whether or not the funding agreement is fair and reasonable. The
purpose of this factor is to mitigate concerns about funder-plaintiff
conflicts
of interest, as well as concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest
(discussed in Chapter 16).
Dispute resolution process
- 17.79 We
think a comprehensive process for resolving disputes between the funder and the
funded representative plaintiff is an essential
part of every funding agreement.
This is particularly so in relation to disputes about settlement of the
litigation and termination
of the funding agreement, which is where the
interests of funders and plaintiffs are most likely to diverge and
funder-plaintiff
conflicts of interest may arise. Dispute resolution processes
could include discussion, good faith negotiation, mediation, arbitration
and/or
expert determination. Where a third-party determination is required, we think
the impartiality and expertise of the third-party
will be important to the
assessment of the dispute resolution process. We anticipate the funder would pay
any costs of the process.
Law governing the agreement
- 17.80 Related
to the above factor, we think the court should consider whether the funding
agreement provides that the governing law
under the agreement is the law of
Aotearoa New Zealand. This is important to allay concerns about the
enforceability of funding agreements,
and to ensure that funded representative
plaintiffs and class members can resolve disputes under and in respect of the
agreement
in Aotearoa New Zealand with the assistance of local lawyers. As part
of the court’s assessment, it could also consider whether
the parties have
submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Aotearoa New
Zealand.
Adverse costs indemnity
- 17.81 Typically,
the litigation funder will agree to cover any adverse costs payable to the
defendant if the case is unsuccessful,
and many class actions would be unable to
proceed without this. We think an adverse costs indemnity is a vital safeguard
for the
representative plaintiff, whose liability for adverse costs might
otherwise be disproportionate to the risks that other class members
carry and to
the value of their own claim. We anticipate that a full adverse costs indemnity
will generally be required for the court
to be satisfied the funding agreement
is fair and reasonable.
Fairness and reasonableness of funding commission
- 17.82 Finally,
we think the fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission will be
central to the court’s decision to
approve the funding agreement. In
discussions with our Expert Advisory Group and judges, some concerns were
expressed about the court’s
competence to assess the fairness and
reasonableness of funding commissions. In Waterhouse v Contractors
Bonding, the Supreme Court also commented on the difficulty of drawing a
line between what is an acceptable level of funder profit and what
is
excessive, saying “whether a bargain is fair assumes the existence
of an ascertainable objective standard against which fairness is to
be
measured”.1432F[1433]
- 17.83 We
appreciate it may be challenging for courts to make assessments about the
fairness and reasonableness of funding commissions
in the early years of a
statutory class actions regime, until a body of precedent develops that is
specific to Aotearoa New Zealand
and the application of our proposed factors.
With any new statutory regime, the absence of relevant case law will be a
challenge
for the courts and others who use the regime. We expect that with time
the development of case law and greater transparency around
returns to funders
and representative plaintiffs and class members (for example, through the
mandatory settlement outcome reports
we recommend in Chapter 11) will assist the
court with its assessments of funding commissions.
- 17.84 The
courts’ competence to assess the fairness and reasonableness of funding
commissions is accepted in some comparable
jurisdictions. Ontario’s class
actions legislation provides that the court shall not approve a funding
agreement unless it
is satisfied “the agreement, including indemnity for
costs and amounts payable to the funder under the agreement, is fair and
reasonable”.1433F[1434] In
Australia, to the extent that the courts have been willing to approve or amend
funding commissions when making common fund orders,
this indicates an acceptance
that it falls within their
expertise.1434F[1435]
- 17.85 We think
concerns about the competence of the courts to assess funding commissions can be
overcome by a power for the court
to appoint an expert to assist it to assess
the funding commission in the class action, as well as factors to guide the
court’s
assessment of whether the funding commission is fair and
reasonable. We discuss experts to assist the court later in this chapter.
- 17.86 The
factors we think the court should consider when assessing the fairness and
reasonableness of funding commissions are:
(a) The type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary
relief.
(b) The number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief.
(c) The estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful (for
example, legal fees, expert fees, witness fees, court
fees, security for costs
and adverse costs).
(d) The complexity and likely duration of the case (for example, the number of
defendants, the anticipated number of witnesses and
the number of causes of
action).
(e) The estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate
variation in the factors identified above in (a)–(d).
(f) Any other matters the court considers are relevant.
- 17.87 We
emphasise that these factors focus (at a high-level) on the costs and risks of
the particular litigation for the funder,
not on any other financial commitments
the funder may have. In essence, we think the funding commission should be
justified in light
of the expected costs and rewards of each case. We do not
agree that high funding commissions are justified on the basis that some
compensation for funded representative plaintiffs and class members is better
than no compensation. In each case, we think the funding
commission must offer
the possibility of substantive justice to those who rely on it. Access to
justice is the main reason for permitting
litigation funding in Aotearoa New
Zealand, and our funding approval provision is designed to focus attention on
the fairness and
reasonableness of the funding commission in the circumstances
of each funded class action.
- 17.88 We also
disagree with the argument that high funding commissions are justified by the
risk that other cases in the funder’s
portfolio may be unsuccessful.
Litigation risk within the funder’s portfolio is a matter for the funder
to manage, not the
courts. To the extent possible, our recommendations to
regulate litigation funding aim to reduce commercial uncertainty for funders.
For example, this concern factored into our recommendation about the timing for
funding approval. However, we do not think that wider
commercial risks for
funders should materially factor into the court’s assessment of whether
the funding commission in the
particular case is fair and reasonable.
- 17.89 With
respect to the estimated total amount of monetary relief claimed, we note the
High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) require a statement
of claim seeking the recovery of
a sum of money to state the amount as precisely as
possibly.1435F[1436] We
anticipate the amount claimed will be easier to quantify or estimate in some
class actions than others. For example, in some shareholder
class actions
calculating each class member’s claim may involve a simple numerical
calculation. However, in other cases it
may require individual assessment of the
loss experienced by each class member (such as the extent of any damage to a
house) and
so it will be hard to be precise at an early stage of the proceeding.
The class size will also be uncertain when the application
for approval of a
funding agreement is filed, because we have proposed this should occur prior to
the opt-in or opt-out date.
- 17.90 With
respect to the number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief,
we think this could be expressed as an
estimated range. In many cases the number
of people likely to be entitled to a share of relief will be unknown and
difficult to estimate
at the funding approval stage of a class action.
- 17.91 We think
the court should consider the estimated returns to the funder and how the
returns will accommodate variation in other
factors, such as variation between
the estimated and actual number of people entitled to a share of any relief, and
variation in
the estimated and actual costs of the litigation. In our view, it
would assist the court to see the modelling of the funder’s
potential
returns in a range of scenarios, including reasonable best–case and
reasonable worst–case
scenarios.1436F[1437] Funders
already undertake careful due diligence when deciding whether to fund a claim,
and so we do not anticipate that providing
modelling of the range of possible
funding commissions will burden funders with extra work or expense. Further, we
think this will
encourage a more nuanced approach to setting funding commissions
to help ensure fair and reasonable outcomes for representative plaintiffs
and
class members in all cases and to mitigate the risk of windfall profits for
funders. It may also be attractive to funders, who
gain the added security of
knowing that their funding agreement is approved in the context of a range of
situations, and therefore
less likely to be reconsidered at a later stage.
Court oversight of funding commission later in the
proceeding
- 17.92 We
also think it is important to preserve the court’s ability to review the
funding commission later in the proceeding
to mitigate the risk of unfair
outcomes for class members and windfall profits for funders. However, we think
the court’s ability
to review funding commissions should be constrained to
avoid creating uncertainty for funders and to limit the risk of hindsight
bias
colouring assessments of what is a fair and reasonable funding commission.
Uncertainty and the risk of hindsight bias may undermine
the commercial
viability of litigation funding and deter funders from operating in Aotearoa New
Zealand.
Court oversight of funding commissions at settlement
- 17.93 In
Chapter 11, we recommend the court should consider the commission payable to the
funder when deciding whether a proposed
class action settlement is fair,
reasonable and in the interests of the class. We note that the funding
commission will only be one
factor the court considers when deciding whether or
not to approve a proposed settlement. Further, our proposed test for approving
a
settlement does not require a standard of perfection. A settlement agreement is
necessarily the result of a compromise between
the parties, and there are likely
to be a range of potential settlement terms that could meet the test.
Nevertheless, a funding commission
that is materially different from the
estimated returns provided to the court at the funding approval stage may
justify the court
declining to approve the settlement.
- 17.94 We do not
think the court should have a power to vary the funding commission at settlement
except in the context of making a
cost sharing order, which we discuss below.
There was limited support from submitters for this option. We agree with the
majority
of submitters that a general power for the court to vary funding
commissions at settlement, and the risk of hindsight bias colouring
this
assessment, could introduce commercial uncertainty for funders. This may have
negative consequences for those seeking access
to justice, by reducing the
availability and affordability of litigation funding.
Court oversight of funding commissions in the context of making
cost sharing orders
- 17.95 In
Chapter 9, we recommend the court should be expressly empowered to make cost
sharing orders in class actions, and to vary
funding commissions in the context
of making certain cost sharing orders. A cost sharing order ensures the costs of
the class action
(including the funding commission) are equitably shared among
all class members who benefit from the action, regardless of whether
they signed
an agreement with the funder. Cost sharing orders are usually only sought in
opt-out class actions, as signing a funding
agreement is normally a condition of
joining an opt-in class action.
- 17.96 Cost
sharing orders can also benefit the funder, for example by allowing them to
obtain a funding commission from a greater
number of class members than they are
contractually entitled to. Where a cost sharing order will allow the litigation
funder to receive
a commission from class members who did not sign up to a
funding agreement, we think the court should review the funding commission
to
ensure it is fair and reasonable and, if necessary, reduce it.
- 17.97 In Chapter
9, we recommend the court should set a provisional funding commission when
making a cost sharing order at the commencement
of a class action and, if that
order will allow the funder to receive a commission from class members who did
not sign up to the
funding agreement, the court should be able to review and
vary the provisional rate later in the proceedings (for example, at settlement
or when damages are distributed). As part of approving the funding agreement, we
have recommended the court should consider the estimated
returns to the funder
in a range of scenarios. We anticipate that the funding commissions considered
by the court will then become
the provisional funding commissions set out in any
cost sharing order. By approving a range of potential funding commissions, we
expect the court will be less likely to vary the funding commissions later in
the proceedings (or decline to approve a settlement
on the basis of the funding
commission). The exception to this will be where there has been a material
change from the scenarios
that were presented at the funding approval stage. We
think this will give funders greater certainty about their returns at the
commencement
of class actions.
Court oversight of funding commissions in opt-in cases that
proceed to judgment
- 17.98 We
recommend the court should be expressly empowered to vary the funding commission
in an opt-in case that proceeds to judgment,
to the extent that the funding
commission is materially in excess of the estimated returns provided to the
court as part of the court’s
approval of the funding agreement. In these
cases, the court would otherwise have no oversight of funding commissions later
in the
proceedings. Further, without a power for the court to review the funding
commission, funders may be less inclined to provide accurate
modelling of their
estimated returns when the funding agreement is approved by the court. The power
we propose is narrowly prescribed
to minimise commercial uncertainty for
funders.
Expert to assist the court assessing funding
commissions
- 17.99 In
Chapter 11, we recommend the court should have a power to appoint an expert to
assist it to determine whether a proposed
settlement is fair, reasonable and in
the interests of the class. Similarly, we think the court should be empowered to
appoint an
expert at the funding approval stage, or in the context of making a
cost sharing order, if this will assist it to determine whether
a funding
commission is fair and reasonable.
- 17.100 In
Australia, the Federal Court can appoint an independent referee (at any point in
the proceeding) to assess the reasonableness
of costs in a class
action.1437F[1438] In practice,
the Federal Court has appointed a referee to inquire into and report on funding
commissions proposed to be deducted
from settlement sums, as well as legal
costs.1438F[1439] In its 2020
report, the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry considered there would be benefit
in costs referees being used more widely,
and made recommendations to facilitate
this.1439F[1440]
- 17.101 While the
courts in Aotearoa New Zealand already have a general power to appoint an
independent expert,1440F[1441]
we think a specific provision in the Class Actions Act would draw the
court’s attention to this possibility in the context
of funded class
actions and help foster the development of relevant expertise in this
jurisdiction. We recommend the provision also
empower the court to order that
the representative plaintiff or the litigation funder pay all or part of the
costs of the expert.
Funding commissions should not be capped
- 17.102 We
do not think funding commissions should be regulated by way of a statutory cap
or a legislated minimum return to class members.
We considered a range of
methods for capping funding
commissions.1441F[1442] However,
in our view any statutory cap is a blunt instrument for managing concerns about
funder profits and will not necessarily
ensure funding commissions are fair and
reasonable in each case. Each case raises different risks for the funder,
justifying variable
rates. Higher risks require higher returns for funders to
compensate for the greater uncertainty and risk. Similarly, lower risks
require
a lower return. Court oversight of funding commissions, with assistance from an
independent expert if necessary, has the
advantage of ensuring funding
commissions are proportionate to the costs, complexity, risks and rewards of
each case. There was limited
support among submitters for a statutory cap or
legislated minimum return to class members.
FUNDED REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS UNDER HIGH COURT RULE
4.24
- 17.103 Our
recommendations for court oversight of funding agreements and funding
commissions are confined to funded class actions.
However, the same concerns
about funder control, funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest and funder profits
can arise in funded representative
actions brought under HCR 4.24.
- 17.104 For
reasons explained in Chapter 2, we consider HCR 4.24 should be retained as there
may still be cases that are appropriately
brought as representative actions. At
the same time, we want to ensure that the representative actions procedure
cannot be used to
circumvent the protections for representative plaintiffs and
class members in our statutory class actions regime. In Chapter 2, we
therefore
recommend the Rules Committee should consider amending HCR 4.24 (and the
equivalent provision in the District Court Rules
2014) to provide that it should
not be used where a proceeding is more appropriately brought as a class
action.
DRAFT FUNDING APPROVAL PROVISIONS
- 17.105 Below
we set out draft legislative provisions that could give effect to our
recommendations on court oversight of litigation
funding agreements in class
actions.
7 Litigation funding agreements
(1) A representative plaintiff must apply to the
court for approval of a litigation funding agreement,—
(a) if settlement occurs prior to certification, together with the application
for settlement approval:
(b) if the agreement is entered into before certification, as soon as
practicable following certification:
(c) if the agreement is entered into after certification, as soon as practicable
after the agreement is entered into:
(d) if the terms of an approved litigation funding agreement are amended, as
soon as practicable after that amendment.
(2) A litigation funding agreement is enforceable by a funder only if it is
approved by the court.
(3) In this Act,—
litigation funding agreement means an agreement in which a non-party
agrees to indemnify the representative plaintiff or provide money to pursue a
class action
proceeding, in return for a share of any monetary award or
settlement funds or for any other consideration.
8 Approval of litigation funding agreements by High
Court
(1) A court must not
approve a litigation funding agreement unless it is satisfied that—
(a) the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the
agreement; and
(b) the agreement is fair and reasonable.
(2) When determining whether a litigation funding agreement is fair and
reasonable, the court may consider—
(a) the circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the
agreement:
(b) whether the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative
plaintiff to instruct their lawyer or control the litigation,
or otherwise
impair the lawyer-client relationship:
(c) any process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative
plaintiff, and class members, including disputes about
settlement and
termination of the agreement:
(d) whether the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement
is the law of New Zealand:
(e) if the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and
extent of that indemnity:
(f) the fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission:
(g) any other matters the court considers are relevant.
(3) When determining whether a funding commission is fair and reasonable
under
subsection (2)(f), the court may consider—
(a) the type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary
relief:
(b) the number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief:
(c) the estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful:
(d) the complexity and likely duration of the case:
(e) the estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate
variation in the factors in paragraphs (a) to (d):
(f) any other matters the court considers are relevant.
(4) The court may appoint an expert if it considers that will assist the
court’s con‐ sideration of the fairness and reasonableness
of a
funding commission and may order that 1 or more of the representative plaintiffs
or the litigation funder pay part or all of
the costs of the expert.
CHAPTER 18
Reducing barriers to access to justice for class
members
INTRODUCTION
- 18.1 In
this chapter, we discuss:
(a) The lack of funding available for public interest class actions and class
actions seeking non-monetary relief.
(b) The creation of a public class action fund to help address this funding
gap.
(c) The desirability of having publicly available information about the class
actions process and class member rights.
CLASS ACTION FUND
- 18.2 Throughout
this review, we have discussed some of the barriers to access to justice for
potential representative plaintiffs and
class
members.1442F[1443] We have
noted that the costs associated with litigation, especially legal fees, mean
seeking redress through the courts is beyond
the means of most New Zealanders.
Further, the adverse costs rule may act as a barrier to accessing the courts as
it exposes the
representative plaintiff to potential liability for the
defendant’s costs if the litigation is unsuccessful. The costs and
risks
are likely to be significant, given the typical complexity and duration of class
actions.
- 18.3 While
litigation funding can remove or reduce these barriers in some cases, it is only
likely to be available in cases that are
sufficiently profitable for a
litigation funder. It is therefore unlikely to be available in public interest
litigation, for example,
or in a case where the primary relief sought is
non-monetary.
Class action funds overseas
- 18.4 In
the Issues Paper, we noted that two Canadian jurisdictions have sought to
address these barriers to access to justice by establishing
a public class
action fund. In Ontario, a Class Proceeding Fund (the Fund) was established when
the class actions regime was
introduced.1443F[1444] The Fund
provides financial support to approved representative plaintiffs for legal
disbursements and indemnifies them for adverse
costs.1444F[1445] It does not
provide funding for legal fees, as class action lawyers in Ontario typically
work on a contingency-fee
basis.1445F[1446] The initial
capital for the fund came from a $500,000 grant from the Law Foundation of
Ontario. It receives ongoing funding through
a 10 per cent levy on any award or
settlement received by a funded plaintiff plus a return of any funded
disbursements.1446F[1447] A
Class Proceedings Committee is responsible for deciding whether an applicant
will receive support from the Fund. Considerations
include the strength of the
case, the scope of the public interests involved, the plaintiff’s
fundraising efforts, the likelihood
of certification as a class action and
availability of funds at the time of
application.1447F[1448] The
Fund’s most recent figures show that in 2020, funding was approved for 10
of the 19 applications
received.1448F[1449]
- 18.5 Québec
also has a class action fund, known as the ‘Fonds’, which was
established in 1978.1449F[1450]
Representative plaintiffs may receive an indemnity for adverse costs as well as
funding for legal fees and
disbursements.1450F[1451] The
Fonds has a variety of funding sources, including retaining a percentage of the
recovery made in any class action (funded or
not).1451F[1452 ]The funding
criteria include consideration of the merits of the case and whether it could be
brought without assistance from the
Fonds.1452F[1453] In the 2018/19
financial year, the Fonds agreed to fund 227 of the 560 applications it
received. One Canadian academic has argued
that the Fonds provides significant
access to justice to litigants in Québec, as well as acting as a
“de facto screener
of class
actions”.1453F[1454] She
observed that, once it is announced the Fonds will be funding a case, “a
strong indication will be sent to the legal community
and to the parties that
the case is well worth
litigating”.1454F[1455]
- 18.6 In 1988,
the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended a public fund should be
established to indemnify representative plaintiffs
in class actions for adverse
costs as well as provide funding for legal
costs.1455F[1456] It considered
a fund would acknowledge “there is a public purpose to be served by
enhancing access to remedies where this is
cost effective, especially where many
people have been
affected”.1456F[1457] It
was envisaged the fund would be self-financing to some extent, although it was
also expected to receive any money that remained
unclaimed from eligible class
members.1457F[1458 ]This
recommendation was not implemented. Since then, Australian practitioners, judges
and academics have reiterated the need for a
public fund to assist
representative plaintiffs with the costs of bringing litigation and mitigate the
burden of adverse
costs.1458F[1459]
Results of consultation
- 18.7 The
Issues Paper did not ask submitters whether a class action fund would be a good
idea for Aotearoa New Zealand. Nevertheless,
three submitters expressed support
for the creation of a fund to support litigation of public interest or
importance.1459F[1460] Professor
Samuel Becher (Te Herenga Waka | Victoria University of Wellington) and Dr Tony
Ellis considered the fund should be used
to support class actions. Nicole Smith
indicated the fund should support public interest litigation more broadly.
- 18.8 Professor
Becher submitted that funding could be conditional on full or partial
reimbursement if the litigation succeeds. He
suggested the fund could be managed
by a board, appointed by the Minister of Justice. It could include
representatives of relevant
governmental agencies, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko |
Commerce Commission, the Attorney General, consumer organisations, the legal
profession
and academics. He also suggested that criteria for funding a class
action could guide the board, such as the public and social importance
of the
class action and its contribution to access to justice, consumer welfare and
effective deterrence of potential wrongdoers.
Certain types of class actions
could also be prohibited from receiving public funding.
Recommendation
- R120 The
Government should consider creating a public class action fund that can
indemnify the representative plaintiff in a class action
for adverse costs and
provide funding towards legal fees, disbursements and security for costs. The
fund’s main objective should
be to improve access to justice.
- 18.9 We
think a public class action fund could have significant access to justice
benefits, particularly given the pressures on the
legal aid system and the fact
that legal aid is unlikely to be available for many of the individual claims
that make up a class action.
For instance, legal aid would not have been
available to homeowners in the Southern Response v Ross representative
action, as assets are relevant to eligibility.
- 18.10 Further,
as noted above, litigation funding will normally only be available in cases that
are sufficiently profitable for a
funder. It is therefore unlikely to be
available where the primary relief sought is non-monetary. A key benefit of a
public fund
is that it will allow class actions to proceed that are unlikely to
attract litigation funding, allowing a broader range of claims
to proceed.
- 18.11 We have
considered the justification for having a public fund that is only available for
class actions and not for other forms
of public interest litigation. We consider
that class actions can provide meaningful access to justice to a large number of
people
in an efficient way. Class actions are likely to consist of claims by
individuals who would otherwise be unable to bring their claim,
and by grouping
viable claims together, they can impose a lower social cost through economies of
scale. While a public fund might
also be worth considering in relation to other
kinds of litigation, this would go beyond the scope of the present review.
- 18.12 Initially,
we think the fund would require a significant government contribution. This
would ensure it is not constrained in
its ability to grant applications,
particularly in its early
stages.1460F[1461] In the long
term, there is a range of ways in which the fund could support and sustain
itself. For example, through a levy on any
awards or settlements received by the
funded class members,1461F[1462]
reimbursement of the funds paid (from an adverse costs order in favour of the
plaintiff) and interest on the fund’s investments.
The fund could also be
supported by an alternative distribution award, where monetary relief that
cannot be distributed to class
members could be paid into the
fund.1462F[1463] Alternatively,
or additionally, the fund could be sustained through annual government
subsidies, as in Québec. This would
make the fund more robust but would
mean it is not completely self-sustaining. In Ontario, where the Class
Proceedings Fund is not
sustained through annual government subsidies, “a
cautionary note has been sounded about the ongoing utility of the
Fund”.1463F[1464] If
adverse costs payments were to deplete the fund, this would put at risk the
ability of the fund to continue funding present (and
future) cases.
- 18.13 We think
the fund should be able to indemnify representative plaintiffs for adverse
costs, and to provide funding towards legal
fees and disbursements (such as
expert fees). Funding for security for costs could also be available. However,
we anticipate that
applications for security would rarely be made against the
fund, as the defendant should not be concerned about the fund’s
ability to
pay an adverse costs order. While the Canadian class action funds discussed
above only offer funding for legal disbursements
and indemnities for adverse
costs, we do not think this would be sufficient to promote access to justice in
Aotearoa New Zealand.
This is because contingency fee arrangements, while common
in Canada, are not permitted in Aotearoa New
Zealand.1464F[1465]
- 18.14 A decision
would be necessary on who should administer the fund. An independent board could
be established, or the administration
of the fund could be tied to an existing
organisation. For example, one option is to establish a committee within Te
Kāhui Ture
o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) to administer the
fund. NZLS already has some administrative capacity, and is well-informed
about
and well-connected within the legal profession. We think it is less likely to be
appropriate for a government department, such
as Te Tāhū o te Ture |
Ministry of Justice, to administer the fund because applicants could seek
funding to bring a class
action against the
government.1465F[1466]
Legislation could determine how board or committee members should be selected,
and their term of
office.1466F[1467]
- 18.15 We think
the board or committee should have discretion to decide what financial support
applicants will receive from the fund,
for example full or partial funding or
indemnification. The legal fee arrangements in the case may be relevant to this
decision —
for example, whether the lawyer is acting on a conditional fee
basis, or whether legal aid is available. Similarly, any funding provided
could
potentially be used alongside commercial litigation funding, and this would be
relevant to the committee’s decision about
what financial support the
applicant should receive. For instance, a funder might agree to provide an
adverse costs indemnity alongside
public funding for legal fees.
- 18.16 In
deciding whether to grant an application for funding, we think the main
objective of the fund should be access to justice.
Consideration could be given
to more detailed statutory criteria to guide the committee’s assessments
of funding applications.
For
example:1467F[1468]
(a) The merits of the applicant’s case.
(b) Whether the applicant has made reasonable efforts to raise funds from other
sources.
(c) Whether the applicant has a clear and reasonable proposal for the use of any
funds awarded.
(d) Whether the applicant has appropriate financial controls to ensure that any
funds awarded are spent for the purposes of the award.
(e) The extent to which the issues in the proceeding affect the public
interest.
(f) How many people would be likely to benefit from the funding.
(g) If the application for funding is made before the proceeding is certified as
a class action, the likelihood that it will be certified.
(h) The amount of money in the fund that has been allocated to provide financial
support in respect of other applications or that
may be required to make adverse
costs payments to defendants.
(i) Any other matters the committee considers are relevant.
- 18.17 We suggest
public funding should not automatically be available for appeals. A recipient of
funding should be required to reapply
for funding for an appeal. A recipient
should be able to apply for supplementary funding at any time in the
proceedings.1468F[1469]
FACILITATING CLASS MEMBER UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATION
Recommendation
- R121 Te
Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice should consider:
- Producing
a clear and accessible online guide to assist class members to understand the
class action process; and
- Exploring
options that would enable free legal advice to be provided to class members,
such as supporting a class actions law clinic.
- 18.18 Class
members do not have the status of parties and generally do not take an active
role in the litigation but will be bound
by any judgment or settlement. For
these reasons, it is important that a class actions regime contains safeguards
to protect the
interests of class members. These include the court’s
supervisory role, the representative plaintiff’s duty to act in
what they
believe to be the best interests of the class and the role of the lawyer for the
class.1469F[1470]
- 18.19 While
class members have a largely passive role in the litigation, there are certain
stages where we propose there should be
an opportunity, or requirement, for them
to take an active step in the litigation. These are:
(a) The opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class action.
(b) Where the court requires a class member to provide
discovery.1470F[1471]
(c) The ability for a class member to apply to replace the representative
plaintiff, including for the purposes of an
appeal.1471F[1472]
(d) When class member participation is required to determine an individual
issue, such as giving evidence at a
hearing.1472F[1473]
(e) The opportunity for class members to object to a
settlement.1473F[1474]
(f) Where class members must take active steps to participate in a
settlement.1474F[1475]
- 18.20 Class
members need sufficient understanding of these stages to be able to participate
in them and may need assistance to take
particular steps. Meaningful
participation rights in class actions are an important aspect of access to
justice, which is a key objective
of class
actions.1475F[1476] There are
elements of our proposed class actions regime that will assist class members to
participate in these stages of a class
action, including our proposed notice
requirements and the procedure for objecting to a class action. However, we
think there are
some broader ways of facilitating class member understanding and
participation in class actions, including developing a guide for
class members
and opportunities for free legal assistance.
Class member guide to class actions
- 18.21 Many
class members (or potential class members) will have no experience of
litigation, let alone large group litigation. Concepts
in a class action will be
unfamiliar to many members of the public, such as what an opt-in or opt-out
process is, the role of the
representative plaintiff and the binding nature of a
judgment.1476F[1477]
- 18.22 This is
supported by the survey of group members who have participated in representative
actions that we
conducted.1477F[1478] Some
survey participants indicated confusion around their role in the proceeding (for
example, whether or not they were the representative
plaintiff) and the role of
the litigation
funder.1478F[1479]
- 18.23 While some
information will be provided in the opt-in or opt-out notice, this will need to
convey a range of case-specific information
and there may be little room for
general information about class actions. We suggest a general guide to class
actions could be developed
that provides a clear overview of what a class action
is, and what being a class member involves. This would enable class members
to
better understand the process of a class action and their rights.
- 18.24 The
information should use clear, concise language and be designed to effectively
communicate with class members. As well as
the language used, the visual design
can have a significant impact on how easily understandable the information is
for class members.1479F[1480] We
suggest that any guide to class actions could be similar to the style and length
of information for the public on the Ministry
of Justice’s website, such
as the guide to bringing civil
claims.1480F[1481] The
information should be made available in accessible formats and could include
short videos.1481F[1482] It may
also be appropriate to make the information available in te reo Māori or
other languages.
- 18.25 In Chapter
5, we recommend creating a class actions webpage on Ngā Kōti ō
Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand website.
The class member guide could be
available on this webpage. Opt-in or opt-out notices could also direct class
members to the class
member guide.
Class action clinic
- 18.26 Class
members may also require legal assistance with some of the stages in which they
can participate. There are some matters
the lawyer for the class can assist
with, such as assisting a class member to comply with an order for discovery or
answering questions
about a class action notice. However, there are other
matters where independent legal advice would be needed, such as where a class
member wants to object to a settlement or is deciding whether to opt out of a
class action or accept an individual settlement offer.
While some class members
will be able to afford to engage a lawyer, this will not always be the case. We
think it would be desirable
if class members could access free or low-cost legal
assistance in appropriate situations.
- 18.27 One option
would be to have this available through community law
centres.1482F[1483] Some
community law centres have specialist drop-in sessions, such as advice on
employment law on a particular evening. Lawyers might
be willing to volunteer
for such a clinic. However, the eligibility criteria (including income and asset
considerations) for free
legal advice and assistance from community law centres
would likely exclude many potential class members from this service.
- 18.28 Another
option is to support the establishment of a class actions law clinic, perhaps
attached to a law school. We are aware
of this occurring in other jurisdictions.
For example, the Windsor Law Class Action Clinic in Ontario aims to provide
class members
across Canada with information, assistance with filing claims in
settlement distribution processes, and representation in court
proceedings.1483F[1484] The
clinic also works to create greater awareness about class actions through public
education, outreach and research. The clinic
is attached to the Faculty of Law
at the University of Windsor and is staffed by law students, a supervising
lawyer and a faculty
director. We are aware of a similar clinic in Tel Aviv,
Israel.1484F[1485]
- 18.29 We think
facilitating free or low cost legal assistance to class members through a
community law centre or class actions law
clinic could help to facilitate
meaningful participation in class actions. Class members or potential class
members could book an
appointment, as a drop-in service may not be sustainable.
The service could help class members with matters such as:
(a) Assisting a potential class member who seeks leave to intervene on an
application for certification.
(b) Understanding the implications of opting into or opting out of the class
action.
(c) Where the court has certified more than one concurrent action, deciding
between class actions.
(d) Deciding whether to accept an individual settlement offer.
(e) Understanding a proposed settlement agreement and deciding whether to lodge
an objection.
(f) Supporting an objecting class member to lodge an objection.
(g) Helping a class member to file a claim once a settlement has been
approved.
APPENDIX 1
Draft Class Actions Legislation
COMMENCEMENT
OF CLASS ACTION
- Commencement
of class action in High Court
(1) A person may commence a class
action proceeding against 1 or more defendants as the proposed representative
plaintiff—
(a) on behalf of a proposed class; and
(b) if the claims of the members of the proposed class all raise a common issue.
(2) A proceeding under subsection (1) may be commenced by more than 1
proposed representative plaintiff.
(3) A State entity may commence a class action proceeding against 1 or more
defendants as the proposed representative plaintiff on
behalf of a proposed
class if—
(a) it is itself a member of the proposed class and the claims of the members of
the proposed class all raise a common issue; or
(b) another Act authorises it to bring a class action proceeding.
(4) This section does not itself confer jurisdiction on the court to hear a
proceeding, which must otherwise be within the jurisdiction
of the court.
(5) In this section,—
class means,—
(a) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (1), at least 2
persons together with the proposed representative plaintiff, who must also be a
class member:
(b) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (3), at least 2
persons in addition to the State entity
common issue means a common issue of fact or law.
- Multiple
defendants
(1) If a class action proceeding is commenced under
section 1(1) against more than 1 defendant,—
(a) for each defendant there must be a proposed representative plaintiff and at
least 2 other persons with a claim against that defendant:
(b) if there are 2 or more proposed representative plaintiffs, it is not
necessary for each of them to have a claim against all of
the defendants:
(c) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is
commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.
(2) If a class action proceeding is commenced under section 1(3)
against more than 1 defendant,—
(a) for each defendant there must be at least 2 persons with a claim against
that defendant:
(b) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is
commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.
- Application
for certification of class action
When a class action proceeding
is commenced, it must be accompanied by an application for an order certifying
the proceeding as a
class action proceeding and appointing 1 or more
representative plaintiffs for the proceeding.
- Certification
of class action
(1) Subject to section 6 (which relates
to the certification of concurrent class actions), a court must certify a
proceeding as a class action proceeding
if it is satisfied that—
(a) the proceeding discloses 1 or more reasonably arguable causes of action;
and
(b) there is a common issue of fact or law in the claim of each member of the
proposed class; and
(c) there is at least 1 representative plaintiff that is suitable and will
fairly and adequately represent the class; and
(d) a class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient
resolution of the claims of class members; and
(e) the opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an
appropriate means of determining class membership in the circumstances
of the
proceeding.
(2) When assessing the suitability of a proposed representative plaintiff and
whether they will fairly and adequately represent the
proposed class under
subsection (1)(c), the court—
(a) must consider whether there is or is likely to be a conflict of interest
that could prevent them from properly fulfilling the
role as representative
plaintiff:
(b) must consider whether they have a reasonable understanding of the nature of
the claims and the duty and responsibilities of a
representative plaintiff,
including potential liability for costs:
(c) must be satisfied that they have received independent legal advice on the
duty and responsibilities of a representative plaintiff:
(d) if they will be representing members of their hapū or iwi, may consider
the tikanga of the hapū or iwi as relevant
to representation in the
proceeding:
(e) may consider any other factors it considers relevant.
(3) When assessing under subsection (1)(d) whether a class action
proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the
claims of class members, the court
must consider—
(a) the proposed class definition:
(b) the potential number of class members:
(c) the nature of the claims:
(d) the nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined
once the common issue is resolved:
(e) whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the
remedies sought:
(f) whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be
a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims:
(g) any other factors it considers relevant.
(4) When assessing under subsection (1)(e) whether the mechanism
proposed for the proceeding is an appropriate means of determining class
membership, the court may consider—
(a) the potential size of the proposed class and how potential class members
will be identified:
(b) the characteristics of the proposed class:
(c) the nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of
individual claims:
(d) whether class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings:
(e) whether the mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in running
their defence:
(f) any other factors it considers relevant.
CONCURRENT CLASS
ACTIONS
- Commencement
of concurrent class actions
(1) A concurrent class action
proceeding must be commenced—
(a) within 90 days of the date on which notice of the first of the concurrent
class action proceedings is given on the Class Actions
Register; or
(b) at a later time with the leave of a court.
(2) In this Act,—
Class Actions Register means a register of class action proceedings
published on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Ministry of
Justice
concurrent class action proceeding means a class action proceeding
that has the following in common with another class action proceeding that is
currently before the
court:
(a) the same or substantially similar issues in dispute; and
(b) at least 1 defendant.
- Procedure
for certification of concurrent class actions
(1) The
applications for certification of concurrent class action proceedings must be
considered by a court together.
(2) If the court considers that more than 1 of the proceedings meets the test
for certification under section 4, it must decide whether all, and if not
all which, of those proceedings will be certified.
(3) When deciding which of the proceedings will be certified, the court must
consider what approach will best allow the claims of
class members to be
resolved in a just and efficient way.
(4) When assessing which approach is best under subsection (3), the
court may consider—
(a) how each proceeding is formulated:
(b) the preferences of potential class members:
(c) any litigation funding arrangements for each proceeding:
(d) the legal representation for each proceeding:
(e) any other factors the court considers relevant.
(5) If the court decides under subsection (2) that a proceeding will
not be certified, the application for certification must be dismissed.
(6) If the court decides that more than 1 of the proceedings will be
certified, it may make further orders for the management of those
proceedings,
including orders that—
(a) the proceedings be case managed together:
(b) the proceedings be consolidated:
(c) the proceedings be heard together or successively:
(d) 1 or more of the proceedings be temporarily stayed.
LITIGATION FUNDING
AGREEMENTS
- Litigation
funding agreements
(1) A representative plaintiff must apply to
the court for approval of a litigation funding agreement,—
(a) if settlement occurs prior to certification, together with the application
for settlement approval:
(b) if the agreement is entered into before certification, as soon as
practicable following certification:
(c) if the agreement is entered into after certification, as soon as practicable
after the agreement is entered into:
(d) if the terms of an approved litigation funding agreement are amended, as
soon as practicable after that amendment.
(2) A litigation funding agreement is enforceable by a funder only if it is
approved by the court.
(3) In this Act,—
(4) litigation funding agreement means an agreement in which a
non-party agrees to indemnify the representative plaintiff or provide money to
pursue a class action
proceeding, in return for a share of any monetary award or
settlement funds or for any other consideration.
- Approval
of litigation funding agreements by High Court
(1) A court must
not approve a litigation funding agreement unless it is satisfied
that—
(a) the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the
agreement; and
(b) the agreement is fair and reasonable.
(2) When determining whether a litigation funding agreement is fair and
reasonable, the court may consider—
(a) the circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the
agreement:
(b) whether the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative
plaintiff to instruct their lawyer or control the litigation,
or otherwise
impair the lawyer-client relationship:
(c) any process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative
plaintiff, and class members, including disputes about
settlement and
termination of the agreement:
(d) whether the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement
is the law of New Zealand:
(e) if the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and
extent of that indemnity:
(f) the fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission:
(g) any other matters the court considers are relevant.
(3) When determining whether a funding commission is fair and reasonable
under
subsection (2)(f), the court may consider—
(1) the type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of
monetary relief:
(2) the number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief:
(3) the estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful:
(4) the complexity and likely duration of the case:
(5) the estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate
variation in the factors in paragraphs (a) to (d):
(6) any other matters the court considers are relevant.
(4) The court may appoint an expert if it considers that will assist the
court’s consideration of the fairness and reasonableness
of a funding
commission and may order that 1 or more of the representative plaintiffs or the
litigation funder pay part or all of
the costs of the expert.
EFFECT OF JUDGMENT
ON COMMON ISSUE
- Effect
of judgment on common issue
(1) A judgment on a common issue
binds every class member, but only to the extent that the judgment determines a
common issue that—
(a) is set out in the certification order; and
(b) relates to a cause of action described in the certification order; and
(c) relates to relief sought by class members as stated in the certification
order.
(2) A judgment on a common issue is not binding between a party to the class
action proceeding and—
(a) a person who was eligible to opt in to the proceeding but did not do so:
(b) a person who has opted out of the proceeding.
AGGREGATE MONETARY
RELIEF
- Aggregate
assessment and distribution of monetary relief
(1) A court may
make an aggregate assessment of the monetary relief to which a class is entitled
(the aggregate monetary relief) if it is satisfied that it can make a
reasonably accurate assessment of that amount.
(2) For the purpose of the court’s assessment of the aggregate monetary
relief, it is not necessary for any individual class
member to establish the
amount of loss or damage suffered by them.
(3) The court may make an award in the amount assessed as the aggregate
monetary relief.
(4) The court may also make any orders for the distribution of the award that
it considers appropriate, and these may include an order—
(a) that the defendant must distribute the award directly to class members:
(b) appointing a person as the administrator to distribute the award to class
members:
(c) approving the process for class members to establish their entitlement to a
share of the award:
(d) directing how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be distributed,
including by way of an alternative distribution under
section 11:
(e) directing how the costs of the distribution are to be met.
(5) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an
administrator) must file a report with information about the
process and outcome
of the distribution of the award within 60 days of the distribution process
being completed or at a later time
if allowed by the court.
- Alternative
distribution
(1) This section applies if—
(a) it is not practical or possible for an award made under section 10 or
any portion of it to be distributed to individual class members; or
(b) the costs of distributing the award made under section 10 or any
portion of it to class members would be disproportionate to the amount they
would receive.
(2) The court may order that the award or any portion of it be paid instead
to an eligible charity or organisation.
(3) In this section, eligible charity or organisation means—
(a) an entity whose activities are related to claims in the class action
proceeding and whose activities are likely to directly or
indirectly benefit
some or all class members; or
(b) an entity prescribed by regulations as an eligible charity or organisation
for the purposes of this section.
SETTLEMENT
- Settlement
of class action
(1) The settlement of a class action proceeding
is not binding unless approved by a court.
(2) An application for approval of a settlement must be made by the
representative plaintiff or proposed representative plaintiff
if the application
is made prior to certification.
- Settlement
application before certification of proceeding
(1) This section
applies if an application for approval of a settlement is made before the
certification of a class action proceeding.
(2) Before considering that application, the court must consider whether the
proceeding meets the requirements of section 4 (with any necessary
modifications), and if the court considers the application does so, for the
purposes of settlement it must—
(a) certify the proceeding as a class action proceeding; and
(b) appoint 1 or more representative plaintiffs.
- Approval
of settlement
The court must approve the settlement if it is
satisfied that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the interests of the
class,
and when making that assessment the court must consider—
(a) the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including—
(i) the type of relief that will be provided to class members, and if this
includes monetary relief, the total amount of that monetary
relief; and
(ii) how the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class
members; and
(iii) whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other;
and
(iv) the proposed method of determining the entitlement of individual class
members; and
(v) any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement; and
(vi) the proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts;
and
(b) any legal fees and funding commission that may be deducted from the relief
payable to class members; and
(c) any information that is readily available to the court about the potential
risks, costs, and benefits of continuing with the
proceeding; and
(d) any views of class members; and
(e) any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest; and
(f) any other factors it considers relevant.
- Steps
following approval of settlement
(1) If the court approves a
settlement under section 14, it—
(a) may order that a class member may opt out of the settlement, but only
if—
(i) opting out is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or
(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more
class members be given the opportunity to opt out of
the settlement; and
(b) may order that a person who was eligible to become a class member but did
not do so (an eligible person) may opt in to the settlement, but only
if—
(i) opting in is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or
(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more
eligible persons be given the opportunity to opt in
to the settlement; and
(c) must describe which class members will be bound by the settlement.
(2) A settlement is binding on the parties to the settlement and all class
members described by the court under subsection (1)(c) on and from the
date of the court order approving the settlement.
- Administration
and implementation of settlement
(1) The court retains the
jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of a settlement it
approves under section 14.
(2) The court may appoint a person as an administrator to implement the
settlement.
(3) The court may make any other order it considers appropriate for the
administration and implementation of the settlement.
(4) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an
administrator) must file a report with information about the
process and outcome
of the implementation of the settlement within 60 days of the implementation
process being completed or at a
later time if allowed by the court.
- Appointment
of counsel to assist court or expert
(1) The court may appoint
counsel to assist the court or a court expert if it con‐ siders this will
assist the court to assess
whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the
interests of the class.
(2) The court may order that 1 or more of the parties pay part or all of the
costs of the counsel or expert.
APPENDIX 2
List of Submitters
The Law Commission
received submissions from the following organisations and persons during the
course of this review:
In response to the Issues Paper
Organisations
- Association
of Litigation Funders of Australia
- Bell Gully
- Buddle
Findlay
- BusinessNZ
- Carter Holt
Harvey
- Chapman
Tripp
- Claims
Resolution Service
- Te Komihana
Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission
- Consumer NZ
- Te Tari Ture o
te Karauna | Crown Law Office
- DLA Piper
- Te Mana Tatai
Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority
- Gilbert
Walker
- Institute of
Directors
- Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand
- International
Bar Association Antitrust Committee
- Johnson &
Johnson
- Joint Action
Funding
- LPF Group
- Marsh
- Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (joint submission)
- Meredith
Connell
- Hīkina
Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
- Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society
- New Zealand
Shareholders’ Association
- NZX
- Te Mana
Mātāpono Matatapu | Office of the Privacy Commissioner
- Omni Bridgeway
- Ross Asset
Management Investors Group
- Simpson
Grierson
- Te Hunga
Rōia Māori o Aotearoa | Māori Law Society
- Tempest
- Woodsford
Litigation Funding
Individuals
- Associate
Professor Barry Allan (Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo | University of
Otago)
- Andrew Barker QC
- Professor Samuel
Becher (Te Herenga Waka | Victoria University of Wellington)
- Jennifer
Braithwaite
- Colin Carruthers
QC
- Nikki
Chamberlain (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland)
- Dr Michael Duffy
(Monash University)
- Dr Tony
Ellis
- Associate
Professor Jasminka Kalajdzic (University of Windsor)
- Murray
Lazelle
- Professor
Michael Legg (University of New South Wales)
- Ryan
O'Connor
- Michael
Riordan
- Nicole
Smith
- Christopher St
Johanser
- Associate
Professor Kate Tokeley (Te Herenga Waka | Victoria University of
Wellington)
- Professor Vicki
Waye (University of South Australia)
- Tom Weston
QC
In response to the Supplementary Issues Paper
Organisations
- Bell
Gully
- Chapman
Tripp
- Consumer NZ
- Te Tari Ture o
te Karauna | Crown Law Office
- Te Mana Tatai
Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority
- GCA Lawyers
- Gilbert
Walker
- Institute of
Directors
- Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand
- International
Bar Association Antitrust Committee
- Johnson &
Johnson
- LPF Group
- Maurice
Blackburn
- Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (joint submission)
- MinterEllisonRuddWatts
- Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society
- Omni
Bridgeway
- Ross Asset
Management Investors Group
- Russell
Legal
- Shine
Lawyers
- Simpson
Grierson
- Woodsford
Litigation Funding
Individuals
- David
Bigio QC
- Nikki
Chamberlain (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland)
- Dr Michael Duffy
(Monash University)
- Andrew
Harmos
- Zane
Kennedy
- Professor Vince
Morabito (Monash University)
- Rhonson Salim
(Aston University)
- Philip Skelton
QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce (joint submission)
- Nicole
Smith
- Tom Weston
QC
- 1238B1238B1238B
Level 9, Solnet House, 70 The Terrace,
Wellington 6011
PO Box 2590, Wellington 6140
Telephone: 0800 832 526
Email: com@lawcom.govt.nz
[1] Deborah R Hensler “From
Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are Spreading Globally”
(2017) 65 U Kan L Rev 965 at 966.
[2] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Class Actions and Litigation Funding | Ko Ngā Hunga
Take Whaipānga me Ngā Pūtea Tautiringa (NZLC IP45, 2020).
[3] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Class Actions and Litigation Funding: Supplementary Issues Paper
| Ko Ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me Ngā Pūtea Tautiringa
(NZLC IP48, 2021).
[4] Some submitters made
submissions on both the Issues Paper and the Supplementary Issues Paper. In many
cases it is clear from the
context whether the submission was made in response
to one or the other but in some cases we state this expressly for the sake of
clarity.
[5] See Issues Paper at
[2.7]–[2.24].
[6] An opt-out class action is
where all persons falling within the class definition are automatically part of
the class action unless
they take steps to remove themselves. Conversely, an
opt-in class action is where individuals are only part of the class action if
they take steps to become class members.
[7] We discuss the history of the
representative actions rule in the Issues Paper at [2.26]–[2.27] and
[3.3]–[3.5].
[8] We identified 44 of these
cases in the Issues Paper at [3.10]. Additional cases are: Fullarton v
Arowana International Ltd [2021] NZHC 931; Taua v Tahi Enterprises
Ltd [2021] NZSC 182; Re Halifax New Zealand Ltd (in liq) [2021] NZHC
1113. We are aware of several other proceedings which have been commenced on a
representative basis (but there is not yet a decision as
to whether leave should
be granted under HCR 4.24): see Simons v ANZ Bank and ASB Bank Ltd
(CIV-2021-404-1190), Body Corporate Number DPS 91535 v 3A Composites GmbH
[2020] NZHC 985, and <www.a2milkclassaction.com>.
[9] See Issues Paper at
[3.15]–[3.21].
[10] See Issues Paper at
[4.2]–[4.3].
[11] Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126; [2021] 1 NZLR 117 at [89].
[12] See Issues Paper at
[4.4].
[13] Issues Paper at
[4.8]–[4.43].
[14] Andrew Barker QC, Bell
Gully, Colin Carruthers QC, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Gilbert Walker,
Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of
New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Meredith Connell, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society (NZLS), NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson,
Nicole Smith and Tom
Weston QC. Two submissions on the Supplementary Issues Paper addressed this
issue: GCA Lawyers and Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission).
[15] BusinessNZ, Insurance
Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith
Connell, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith, Kate Tokeley and Tom
Weston QC.
[16] Issues Paper at
[3.57]–[3.97].
[17] Issues Paper at
[3.79]–[3.89].
[18] Issues Paper at
[7.9]–[7.10].
[19] Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Samuel Becher, Bell Gully, David Bigio QC
(Supplementary Issues Paper
submission), Jennifer Braithwaite, BusinessNZ,
Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Te Komihana
Tauhokohoko
| Commerce Commission, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Tony Ellis, GCA
Lawyers (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Gilbert Walker,
Insurance
Council, International Bar Association (IBA) Antritrust Committee, Jasminka
Kalajdzic, Zane Kennedy (Supplementary Issues
Paper submission), Michael Legg,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Hīkina Whakatutuki | Ministry
of Business, Innovation
and Employment (MBIE), NZLS, NZ Shareholders’
Association, Omni Bridgeway, Te Mana Mātāpono Matatapu | Office of
the
Privacy Commissioner, Russell Legal (Supplementary Issues Paper submission),
Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Christopher St Johanser,
Kate Tokeley, Vicki
Waye and Tom Weston QC (Issues Paper and Supplementary Issues Paper
submissions).
[20] Issues Paper at
[1.9]–[1.13]. See also Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | The
Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice: Initial Consultation with
the Legal Profession (Discussion Paper, 16 December 2019).
[21] Jasminka Kalajdzic Class
Actions in Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press,
Vancouver, 2018) at 51.
[22] See Issues Paper at [1.10]
and The Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice Further
Consultation with the Legal Profession and Wider Community (Further
Consultation Paper, 14 May 2021) at [13].
[23] See Issues Paper at
[5.12]–[5.14] and The Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice
Further Consultation with the Legal Profession and Wider Community (Further
Consultation Paper, 14 May 2021) at [21]–[22].
[24] Association of Litigation
Funders of Australia, Samuel Becher, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce
Commission, LPF Group, MBIE, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Nicole
Smith.
[25] Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Samuel Becher, Jennifer Braithwaite, Te
Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce
Commission, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers
(Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, NZLS, Simpson
Grierson and Kate Tokeley.
[26] Issues Paper at
[5.22]–[5.23]. See also Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 1088 at
[70].
[27] Bell Gully, Michael Duffy,
Gilbert Walker and Tom Weston QC.
[28] See Issues Paper at
[5.24]–[5.28] and Jasminka Kalajdzic Class Actions in Canada: The
Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018) at 51
and 70.
[29] Issues Paper at [5.25].
[30] See Hirini Moko Mead
Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (2nd ed, Huia Publishers,
Wellington, 2016) at 31 and 35–36.
[31] Hirini Moko Mead Tikanga
Māori: Living by Māori Values (2nd ed, Huia Publishers,
Wellington, 2016) at 31.
[32] We also received
submissions on this issue in response to our question on whether funder profits
are a concern: see Chapter 17.
[33] For detailed discussion,
see Issues Paper at [5.29]–[5.37]
[34] Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, NZLS and Kate
Tokeley.
[35] Association of Litigation
Funders of Australia, NZLS and Kate Tokeley.
[36] Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group and Vicki Waye. Carter Holt Harvey
said although this was
a “theoretical” advantage, in practice it
could be “illusory” because of acute problems with class actions
more generally.
[37] BusinessNZ, Insurance
Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[38] Issues Paper at
[5.38]–[5.63].
[39] Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Vince Morabito,
NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway,
Nicole Smith, Kate Tokeley, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.
[40] BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp,
IBA Antitrust Committee and Insurance Council.
[41] Issues Paper at Chapter
6.
[42] Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey,
Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce
Commission, Consumer NZ, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Michael
Duffy,
Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Michael Legg, LPF Group,
Marsh, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson,
Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.
[43] IBA Antitrust Committee,
LPF Group and Simpson Grierson.
[44] Association of Litigation
Funders of Australia, Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia
and NZLS.
[45] BusinessNZ, Gilbert Walker
and Tom Weston QC.
[46] Claims Resolution Service,
Gilbert Walker, Johnson & Johnson, NZLS, Simpson Grierson, Tom Weston
QC.
[47] Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia and Crown Law Office (though the latter noted
class actions can give
rise to practical difficulties for defendants, including
cutting across other steps a defendant may be taking to address a legal
issue).
[48] Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman
Tripp, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council and Simpson Grierson,
[49] Chapman Tripp, Insurance
Council, NZLS and Vicki Waye.
[50] Issues Paper at
[6.32]–[6.33] and [17.36]–[17.49].
[51] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp,
Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Marsh and
Simpson Grierson. We also
received submissions on the potential impact of
litigation funding on insurance, which we discuss in Chapter 13.
[52] Association of Litigation
Funders of Australia, NZ Shareholders’ Association and Omni Bridgeway.
[53] Bell Gully, BusinessNZ,
Institute of Directors, Marsh and Simpson Grierson.
[54] Bell Gully and the
Institute of Directors urged the Commission to review New Zealand’s
continuous disclosure settings. Conversely
the NZ Shareholders’
Association submitted that issues associated with introducing class actions or
litigation funding regimes
should not be conflated with changes to the
continuous disclosure liability regime.
[55] Issues Paper at
[6.42]–[6.61].
[56] Issues Paper at Chapter 7
and Supplementary Issues Paper at [22].
[57] Submissions in favour of a
statutory class actions regime were from: Barry Allan, Association of Litigation
Funders of Australia,
Samuel Becher, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Colin
Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Consumer
NZ, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial
Markets Authority, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Jasminka Kalajdzic, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Marsh,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Meredith Connell, NZ
Shareholders’ Association, NZLS, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Russell Legal
(Supplementary Issues Paper
submission), Simpson Grierson, NZLS, Nicole Smith,
Kate Tokeley, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding. While not
expressly
endorsing a statutory class actions regime, Hīkina Whakatutuki |
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment said our proposals
would improve
the situation and should consequentially improve the effectiveness of those
regulatory regimes. Similarly, Te Komihana
Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission
said a statutory class actions regime could allow affected parties to better
access remedies.
[58] BusinessNZ considered it
was difficult to answer the question definitively.
[59] For example, the group
litigation procedures in the Companies Act 1993, s 173; Health and Disability
Commissioner Act 1994, s 50;
Human Rights Act 1993, ss 92B(2) and 90(1)(c); and
Privacy Act 2020, s 97(6). We discuss these in the Issues Paper at
[3.68]–[3.71].
[60] Issues Paper at
[14.17]–[14.21].
[61] In Australia, of the 63
class actions filed in 2020/2021, 24 were consumer claims: King & Wood
Mallesons The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2020/2021 (2021) at
6.
[62] In the Issues Paper we
identified six representative actions involving consumer claims: Issues Paper at
[3.19]. We are aware of
two additional funded consumer representative actions
that have been commenced (but where there is not yet a decision as to whether
leave should be granted under HCR 4.24). One of these cases relates to building
cladding, with the causes of action including alleged
breaches of the Consumer
Guarantees Act 1993 and the Fair Trading Act 1986: Body Corporate Number DPS
91535 v 3A Composites GmbH [2022] NZHC 985. In addition, a proceeding has
been brought against ANZ and ASB banks with respect to alleged breaches of the
Credit Contracts and
Consumer Finance Act 2003: see <www.bankingclassaction.com>.
[63] See Pokapū Ratonga
Ture I Legal Services Agency Report on the 2006 National Survey of Unmet
Legal Needs and Access to Services (November 2006) at 1, 35 and 68, and
Colmar Brunton Legal needs among New Zealanders (13 April 2018) at 3 and
6. See also Issues Paper at [4.33].
[64] See Issues Paper at
[4.30]–[4.32].
[65] We noted in the Issues
Paper that there have been seven investor representative actions and four
shareholder representative actions,
with six of these cases being funded: see
Issues Paper at [3.15], [3.17] and [14.26]. Since the Issues Paper, another
shareholder
case has been allowed to proceed on a representative basis: see
Fullarton v Arowana International [2021] NZHC 931 at [150] and [163]. We
are also aware that a shareholder representative action has been commenced
against the a2 Milk Company Ltd: see <www.a2milkclassaction.com>. For
statistics on securities class actions in other jurisdictions see Issues Paper
at [5.17]. In Australia, the number of securities
class actions has declined in
recent years, with eight securities class actions filed in the year to 30 June
2021 compared with over
20 in the year to 30 June 2018: King & Wood
Mallesons The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2020/2021 (2021) at 19.
[66] See Issues Paper at
[4.38]–[4.43] discussing these types of class action. Since the date of
the Issues Paper, a representative
action has been filed against ANZ and ASB
banks with respect to alleged breaches of the Credit Contracts and Consumer
Finance Act
2003, following on from a settlement reached with Te Komihana
Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission: see <www.bankingclassaction.com>.
[67] There are provisions in
both the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Financial Markets Conducts Act 2013 which
allow a finding of breach
to be relied on in a subsequent civil proceeding: Fair
Trading Act 1986, s 46 and Financial Markets Conducts Act 2013, s 487.
[68] We discuss this issue in
the Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.91].
[69] See Issues Paper at
[3.95]–[3.96].
[70] King & Wood Mallesons
The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2020/2021 (2021) at 30.
[71] In 2020, there were 2173
new civil proceedings filed in Te Kōti Matua | High Court: Te Kōti
Matua o Aotearoa | The High
Court of New Zealand 2020 – The Year in
Review (25 June 2021) at 13.
[72] See Issues Paper at
[17.48].
[73] A related point was made by
Michael Legg, who noted that the way a regime has been designed will not
necessarily reflect exactly
how it will work in practice.
[74] Samuel Becher, Gilbert
Walker (Supplementary Issues Paper submission) and Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia (Supplementary
Issues Paper submission).
[75] See Te Aka Matua o te Ture
| Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142,
2019), Recommendation 1, where we recommended repealing the provision requiring
periodic reviews of the operation of the
Evidence Act 2006. This recommendation
is reflected in the Statutes Amendment Bill 108-1 (2021), cl 37.
[76] Ontario Law Reform
Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol I at
306.
[77] Supreme Court (General
Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Victoria), rr 18A.01–18A.30.
[78] Schutt Flying Academy v
Mobil Oil [2000] VSCA 103. By a majority of 3:2, the court held that the
rules were valid.
[79] Legislation Design and
Advisory Committee Legislation Guidelines 2021 Edition (September 2021)
at 68–69.
[80] Legislation Design and
Advisory Committee Legislation Guidelines 2021 Edition (September 2021)
at 69.
[81] See Issues Paper at
[9.4]–[9.11] and Supplementary Issues Paper at [23]–[28].
[82] See Issues Paper at
[9.12]–[9.49] and Supplementary Issues Paper at [31]–[37].
[83] Issues Paper at
[9.12]–[9.15].
[84] Barry Allan, Bell Gully,
Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Gilbert
Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Vicki
Waye and Tom Weston QC.
[85] These included: ensuring a
defendant has a clear idea of the potential scope of liability, certification
process, early examination
of the merits of the case, retaining adverse costs,
ability to strike out meritless cases, requiring a plaintiff’s lawyer to
personally certify the claim has a proper basis in law, regulation of litigation
funding, allowing a defendant to communicate with
the class about individual
settlements, and managing competing class actions closely.
[86] These included: minimal
requirements for commencing class actions, striking out improperly brought
interlocutory proceedings brought
to delay proceedings, the ability to claim the
funder’s fee as a disbursement if a defendant rejects a Calderbank offer,
and
the ability to seek security for costs from the defendant.
[87] These included: the court
having a supervisory role, clear certification process, mechanisms for managing
competing class actions,
adverse costs to deter proceedings and interlocutory
applications that are unlikely to be successful, and procedural certainty.
[88] Issues Paper at
[9.16]–[9.23].
[89] Barry Allan, Bell Gully,
Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Insurance
Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Jasminka Kalajdzic, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Ross
Asset Management Investors’ Group, Simpson Grierson, Nicole
Smith and Tom
Weston QC.
[90] We discuss these matters in
Chapters 3, 7 and 8.
[91] Issues Paper at
[9.24]–[9.25].
[92] Te Komiti mō ngā
Tikanga Kooti | The Rules Committee Improving Access to Justice: Further
Consultation with the Legal Profession and Wider Community (14 May 2021) at
[72].
[93] See Issues Paper at
[9.27]–[9.29]. An Australian Parliamentary report published shortly after
the Issues Paper recommended
that procedural proportionality in class actions
should be improved and suggested that proportionality should be a factor to be
considered
at the outset of a class action: Australian Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at
[6.78]–[6.80].
[94] Association of Litigation
Funders of Australia, Barry Allan, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey,
Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman
Tripp, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, LPF Group,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson
and Tom Weston QC.
[95] Association of Litigation
Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council,
LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[96] Supplementary Issues Paper
at [37].
[97] Issues Paper at
[9.30]–[9.32].
[98] BusinessNZ, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[99] We drew on the discussion
of the central values that underpin the totality of tikanga Māori in Te Aka
Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand
Law (NZLC SP9, 2001) at [125].
[100] See Issues Paper at
[9.33]–[9.43].
[101] Barry Allan, Jennifer
Braithwaite, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, Insurance Council, LPF
Group, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Te Hunga Rōia o Aotearoa and Tom
Weston QC.
[102] See Issues Paper at
[9.44]–[9.47].
[103] Barry Allan, Bell Gully,
BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce
Commission, Insurance
Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, MBIE, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Te Mana
Mātāpono
Matatapu | Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[104] Barry Allan, Bell Gully
and Insurance Council.
[105] The Ontario class
actions legislation provides that it does not apply to other proceedings brought
in a representative capacity:
see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s
37.
[106] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson,
Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.
[107] We discussed this issue
in the Issues Paper at [8.28]–[8.33].
[108] See Supplementary Issues
Paper at [38]–[40].
[109] Issues Paper at [8.15].
[110] Issues Paper at [8.27]
and [8.32].
[111] Australian Law Reform
Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at
[6]. The ALRC did not make any recommendations with respect to defendant class
actions and said the issue required
a separate study.
[112] Re Halifax New
Zealand Ltd (in liq) [2021] NZHC 1113 at [13]–[21]. While HCR 4.24 is
not mentioned in the judgment, submitters on the Issues Paper indicated this was
the basis upon which
the representation orders were made.
[113] NZLS and Simpson
Grierson.
[114] For example, see
Vlaar v van der Lubbe [2016] NZHC 2398, (2016) 4 NZTR 26-022 (which
involved a representative plaintiff representing five beneficiaries of an
estate), and Cadman v Visini (2011) 3 NZTR 21-011 (which involved two
trustees bringing a proceeding on behalf of all three trustees).
[115] See Chapter 6.
[116] See Issues Paper at
[8.28].
[117] We discuss defendant
class actions in the Issues Paper at [8.19]–[8.27].
[118] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [43].
[119] Issues Paper at
[8.23].
[120] We discuss limitation
periods in Chapter 4.
[121] See discussion of
provisions that may require modification in Issues Paper at [8.25].
[122] Issues Paper at [8.24].
[123] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.1]–[3.8].
[124] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.13].
[125] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.17]–[3.21].
[126] When developing its
draft Class Actions Bill, Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules
Committee considered and rejected
the suggestion that a litigation committee
rather than the lead plaintiff could take responsibility for important decisions
in the
conduct of a class action: see Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti |
The Rules Committee Minutes of meeting held on Friday 6 March 2009 (March
2009) at [14], discussing Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society Letter to the Rules Committee on second class actions consultation
paper, draft Bill and High Court Amendment (Class Actions) Rules
2008 (20
November 2008).
[127] See the Issues Paper at
[11.24]–[11.33] and the Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.12]–[1.15].
We discuss an exception
for government entities in Chapter 4.
[128] See Issues Paper at
[6.52], discussing the issue that class action litigation may be driven by
lawyers rather than individuals seeking
access to justice.
[129] See Chapter 2.
[130] While we consider an
honorarium can be paid to a representative plaintiff, we expect it would be at a
more modest level than the
professional fees of litigation committee
members.
[131] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office,
Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Institute
of Directors, Te Kāhui Inihua o
Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law Society (NZLS), Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[132] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (although
with respect to the common issues
only), Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission)
and Tom Weston QC.
[133] Chapman Tripp, Crown Law
Office, Insurance Council, Institute of Directors and Johnson & Johnson.
[134] Crown Law Office
suggested that difficulties could arise if a self-represented representative
plaintiff were able to bring a class
action and that a court might decline to
certify a class action where a representative plaintiff had not obtained legal
representation.
[135] While Philip Skelton QC,
Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce made a joint submission, there were some issues on
which these submitters
expressed separate views.
[136] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, NZLS (although as discussed
above, it thought the obligations should
be held by an entity such as a
litigation committee), Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.
[137] Shine Lawyers thought it
was unnecessary to have the obligations in statute as they exist as a matter of
course but did not have
a strong view.
[138] We discuss certification
in Chapter 6.
[139] In Chapter 18 we
recommend a class action fund should be established.
[140] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care Rules 2008), r 13.3. In addition, a lawyer
cannot file a document on behalf of a party unless they
are authorised to file
that document by (or on behalf of) the party: High Court Rules 2016, r
5.36(1)(a).
[141] In Chapter 7, we suggest
that some references to a “client” in the Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 should be read as referring to
the representative plaintiff, while other references
to a “client”
should be regarded as referring to the class.
[142] A lawyer should take
instructions after the client is informed of the nature of the decisions to be
made and the consequences of
them: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers:
Conduct and Client Care Rules 2008), r 13.3.
[143] We discuss this in
Chapter 8.
[144] High Court Rules 2016,
rr 7.54 and 7.79.
[145] High Court Rules 2016, r
14.2(1)(a).
[146] We also recommend in
Chapter 15 that costs orders in funded proceedings may be made directly against
a funder.
[147] We discuss this in
Chapter 18.
[148] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni
Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint submission).
[149] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway and
Simpson Grierson.
[150] Chapman Tripp and
Insurance Council. Gilbert Walker noted there was a view in Australia that
litigation committees are not helpful
because the obligations still sit with the
representative plaintiff.
[151] Crown Law Office said
this was the view of one Crown agency (unnamed).
[152] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp and Gilbert Walker. Some submitters commented on this point in their
submissions on our certification
test.
[153] Consumer NZ, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[154] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Vince Morabito and Shine Lawyers (at settlement).
[155] Michael Duffy said
possibly this should not be allowed, but it may be that a payment is reasonable
if fully disclosed.
[156] Nikki Chamberlain, Vince
Morabito and Shine Lawyers.
[157] Edward Sherman
“Group Litigation under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives
to American Actions” (2002) 52 DePaul L Rev 401 at 409.
[158] David Crerar “The
Restitutionary Class Action: Canadian Class Proceedings Legislation as a Vehicle
for the Restitution of
Unlawfully Demanded Payments, Ultra Vires Taxes, and
Other Unjust Enrichments” (1998) 56 U Toronto Faculty L Rev 47 at 92. In
some cases the representative plaintiff could be a corporate entity and
different considerations may apply.
[159] We discuss replacement
of the representative plaintiff in Chapter 6.
[160] In Chapter 18 we
recommend that Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice produce
accessible online information about class
actions. This could also help to
inform prospective representative plaintiffs about the role.
[161] In Chapter 17 we
recommend that court approval of a litigation funding agreement should depend,
among other things, on whether the
representative plaintiff received independent
legal advice on the agreement. This advice could be given by the same lawyer who
advises
the proposed representative plaintiff on the duty and responsibilities
attached to that role.
[162] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 13.3. In Chapter 7, we
suggest that when a lawyer is acting for the class, the reference
to
“client” in this rule should mean the representative plaintiff.
[163] See Chapter 12.
[164] We also recommend that
costs orders in all funded proceedings may be made directly against a
funder.
[165] We discuss this issue in
Chapter 11.
[166] We discuss this in
Chapter 4.
[167] In some cases, it may be
necessary to create a sub-class, but this will not always be required. We
discuss the issue of sub-classes
in Chapter 8.
[168] It may be desirable for
the retainer agreement to set out the procedures with respect to giving
instructions where there are multiple
representative plaintiffs. A lawyer may
act for more than one party in respect of the same matter where the prior
informed consent
of all parties is obtained and there is not a “more than
negligible risk” that the lawyer may be unable to discharge
the
obligations owed to one or more of the clients: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
(Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 6.1.1.
[169] We discuss these
recommendations in Chapter 8.
[170] We discuss this in
Chapter 6.
[171] We discuss this in
Chapter 11.
[172] We discuss security for
costs in funded litigation in Chapter 15.
[173] High Court Rules 2016, r
5.45. One of the grounds for ordering security for costs is that there is reason
to believe a plaintiff
will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if the
plaintiff is unsuccessful: r 5.45(1)(b).
[174] See Issues Paper at
[2.19].
[175] Barbara J Rothstein and
Thomas E Willging Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges
(3rd ed, Federal Judicial Center, 2010).
[176] Issues Paper at
[8.3].
[177] Issues Paper at
[8.4]–[8.8].
[178] Issues Paper at
[8.9].
[179] Issues Paper at
[8.10].
[180] Issues Paper at
[8.11]–[8.13].
[181] Barry Allan, Samuel
Becher, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims
Resolution Service, Michael Duffy,
Gilbert Walker, Te Kāhui Inihua o
Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, International Bar Association (IBA)
Antitrust
Committee, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Meredith Connell, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa |
New Zealand Law
Society (NZLS), NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston
QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding
[182] Barry Allan, BusinessNZ,
Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Insurance Council,
Michael Legg, LPF Group,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith
Connell, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[183] For example, in one
Canadian copyright class action, the defendant operated a website which posted
obituaries and photographs, which
had been authored by the representative
plaintiff and class members, without permission. One of the remedies sought was
an injunction
preventing the defendant from continuing and repeating the
infringement of the copyright of the representative plaintiff and of each
class
member: Thomson v Afterlife Network Inc 2019 FC 545.
[184] See, Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C. The Court’s powers include granting
equitable relief and making any other order it considers just: Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z. The Act also refers to the court’s
discretion to dispense with notice requirements when the relief sought does not
include
a claim for damages: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s
33X(2).
[185] United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(b)(2).
[186] For example, see Class
Proceedings Act RSBC 1996 c 50 (British Columbia), s 4(2)(e).
[187] We discuss certification
in Chapter 6.
[188] Issues Paper at
[8.14]–[8.18].
[189] See Issues Paper at
[3.30] and [8.15].
[190] Barry Allan, Jennifer
Braithwaite, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council,
LPF Group, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC
and Woodsford Litigation Funding. In addition, the submission from Te Mana
Mātāpono
Matatapu | Office of the Privacy Commissioner discussed the
application of class action rules to tribunals.
[191] Insurance Council, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. In addition, NZLS said there were
advantages to Te Kōti
Matua | High Court having sole jurisdiction over
class actions and said the default position should be that the High Court has
jurisdiction
over class action proceedings.
[192] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom
Weston QC.
[193] Chapman Tripp, Insurance
Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[194] Jennifer Braithwaite,
BusinessNZ and Nikki Chamberlain all expressly supported having class actions in
the Employment Court. Barry
Allan’s submission discussed situations where
employment class actions could be used, though he did not expressly submit that
class actions should apply in the Employment Court. LPF Group was generally
supportive of class actions being available in other
courts, but did not discuss
the Employment Court specifically.
[195] Insurance Council, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[196] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom
Weston QC. In addition, NZLS’
submission indicates that it may be
unnecessary to have class actions in the Māori Land Court.
[197] Draft legislation, cl 1
(heading) and cl 1(4).
[198] We discuss ways of
determining individual issues in Chapter 8 and discuss aggregate monetary relief
in Chapter 10.
[199] We note the Rules
Committee has made proposals for improving civil justice in the District Court:
see Te Komiti mō ngā
Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving
Access to Civil Justice: Further Consultation with the Legal Profession and
Wider Community (14 May 2021) at [52]–[63]. The paper comments on the
under-utilisation of the District Court for civil disputes compared to
the
Disputes Tribunal and High Court, and proposes reforms to strengthen the
institutional competency of the District Court’s
civil jurisdiction.
[200] District Court Act 2016,
ss 86–89.
[201] The object of the
Employment Relations Act 2000 acknowledges that there is an inherent inequality
of power in employment relationships:
s 3.
[202] See Issues Paper at
[3.28].
[203] The object of the Act
refers to promoting mediation as the primary problem-solving mechanism (other
than for enforcing employment
standards) and reducing the need for judicial
intervention: Employment Relations Act 2000, s 3(a).
[204] Employment Relations Act
2000, s 161.
[205] Employment Relations Act
2000, ss 157(1) and 160. See also ss 179(5)(a)-(b) and 184, which restrict the
ability to review procedural
decisions of the Authority.
[206] Employment Relations Act
2000, s 187.
[207] See Chapter 11 of the
Issues Paper.
[208] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.1]–[1.25].
[209] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Michael Duffy, Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority
(FMA), Gilbert Walker, Insurance
Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Omni
Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submision) and Nicole Smith.
[210] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submision) and
Nicole Smith.
[211] Michael Duffy, FMA, IBA
Antitrust Committee and Vince Morabito.
[212] Chapman Tripp, Michael
Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee and Omni Bridgeway.
[213] This suggested
definition of common issue comes from The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015
(UK).
[214] Gilbert Walker, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson
Grierson.
[215] Gilbert Walker, Omni
Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.
[216] Michael Duffy, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito
and Simpson Grierson.
[217] Michael Duffy, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson
Grierson.
[218] FMA, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[219] Michael Duffy, Gilbert
Walker, Insurance Council and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[220] High Court Rules 2016,
rr 5.22 and 5.25.
[221] The requirements for
statements of claim are set out in High Court Rules 2016, rr
5.25–5.35.
[222] We discuss certification
in Chapter 6.
[223] We discuss concurrent
class actions in Chapter 5.
[224] Draft legislation, cl
1(5).
[225]
Draft legislation, cl 4(4)(a).
[226] Draft legislation, cl
1(1), 1(5).
[227] We discuss sub-classes
in Chapter 8.
[228] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.5].
[229] Draft legislation, cl
1(5).
[230] As noted in the Issues
Paper, there are obiter comments about whether this is a requirement of HCR 4.24
in Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General [2017] NZSC 17, [2017] 1
NZLR 423 at [651] and [657]. We are also aware of a representative action where
two incorporated bodies were appointed to represent a number of age-related
residential care service providers: Healthcare Providers New Zealand Inc v
Northland District Health Board HC Wellington CIV-485-1814, 7 December 2007
at [27]–[28].
[231] As we explain in Chapter
8, a common method of managing common and individual issues in class actions is
to have staged hearings
(also known as split trials). The ‘stage
one’ hearing will typically determine common issues (and sometimes the
entirety
of the representative plaintiff’s claim) and the ‘stage
two’ hearing will determine individual issues.
[232] See Issues Paper at
[11.31].
[233] For example, our
research showed that the British Columbia provision has only been used to
appoint a non-class member representative
plaintiff in one case: see
Dominguez v Northland Properties Corp 2012 BCSC 539, applying
Class Proceedings Act RSBC 1996 c 50, s 2(4).
[234] In Canada, the threshold
for allowing a non-class member representative plaintiff is high. See Cantlie
v Canadian Heating Products Inc 2017 BCSC 286 at [364] where the court
commented that while s 2(4) had received little judicial consideration, it was
clear that the burden was high. See
also L(T) v Alberta (Director of Child
Welfare 2009 ABQB 96 at [15]–[16] where the court suggested that
“compelling evidence” would be required and said it was not
convinced that
counsel had made an “exhaustive search of its
records” to identify an appropriate representative plaintiff from the
class.
[235] See High Court Rules
2016, rr 4.29–4.31. We discuss the issue of class members are under 18
years or who are considered to
lack sufficient decision-making capacity with
respect to a step in a class action in Chapter 7.
[236] See Duval-Comrie v
Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCA 1523. The representative plaintiff and
class members were workers with learning/intellectual disabilities who had been
employed in an Australian
Disability Enterprise and alleged discrimination with
respect to their wages. The representative plaintiff commenced the proceeding
through a litigation guardian, his mother. See also Nojin (on behalf of
Nojin) v Commonweath [2011] FCA 1066. This case also alleged discrimination
with respect to wages paid by Australian Disability Enterprises to persons with
learning/intellectual
disabilities. The case was brought by Elizabeth Nojin on
behalf of her son Michael. However, the court commented that it would have
been
more appropriate to name Michael Nojin as the applicant with his mother named as
his “next friend” or appointed
as his tutor for the purposes of the
proceeding.
[237] Draft legislation, cl
1(3) (September 2021 version).
[238] Draft legislation, cl
1(4 (September 2021 version).
[239] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.20].
[240] We discuss the
submissions we received on when a government entity should be able to fulfil the
role of the representative plaintiff
in the Supplementary Issues Paper at
[1.16]–[1.17].
[241] This provision has been
relied upon by the Commerce Commission to bring proceedings.
[242] Financial Markets
Authority Act 2011, s 41.
[243] Financial Markets
Authority v Prince & Partners Trustee Company Ltd [2017] NZHC 2059.
[244] Draft legislation, cl
1(3).
[245] Draft legislation, cl
2(1)(a).
[246] While we recommend a
specific provision on class member discovery in Chapter 8, this would require an
application by a defendant
and would not be available as of right.
[247] Draft legislation, cl
2(1)(b).
[248] Draft legislation, cl
2(1)(a).
[249] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.112].
[250] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.117].
[251] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.118].
[252] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.119].
[253] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.122].
[254] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole
Smith and
Tom Weston QC.
[255] Insurance Council,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni
Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson,
Nicole Smith, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Tom Weston QC.
[256] Insurance Council,
Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission),
Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[257] As noted in the
Supplementary Issues Paper, the Australian regimes take a relatively general
approach, specifying that the limitation
periods will run again if (a) a class
member opts out of the proceeding or (b) the proceedings and any appeals are
determined without
finally disposing of the class member’s claim:
Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.121].
[258] In Chapter 11, we
recommend a class action may only be discontinued with the leave of the
court.
[259] We discuss concurrent
class actions in Chapter 5.
[260] We have drawn on the
approach in Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 28.
[261] We discuss settlement in
Chapter 11.
[262] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.1].
[263] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.2]–[2.16].
[264] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.18]–[2.20].
[265] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.21].
[266] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa
| Insurance Council of New Zealand,
Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway,
Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford
Litigation Funding.
[267] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson &
Johnson, LPF Group, Rhonson Salim,
Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford
Litigation Funding. While Gilbert Walker did not comment specifically on most of
the
individual questions on competing class actions, it indicated general
agreement with our proposals on this topic.
[268] Michael Duffy, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, and Omni
Bridgeway.
[269] The Practice Note
defines a competing class action as “a class action in which the claims of
group members in a class action
(as that term is understood in s 33C of the
Federal Court Act) are sought to be advanced in another class action
(irrespective as
to differences as to the time period to which the class actions
relate or differences in the way any allegations of contraventions
are made in
each class action)”. See: Class Actions Practice Note (Federal
Court of Australia, Practice Note GPN-CA, December 2019) at [8.1].
[270] See draft legislation,
cl 5(2).
[271] High Court Rules 2016, r
10.12. We discuss these powers in the Issues Paper at [3.61]–[3.63].
[272] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.24]–[2.28].
[273] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
[4.98]–[4.101].
[274] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), ss 13.1(3) and (8).
[275] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.26]–[2.28].
[276] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.27].
[277] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni
Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[278] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, LPF Group, MinterEllisonRuddWatts
(it said 90 calendar days), Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[279] Bell Gully said the
court registry should publish details of a class action on ngā Kōti o
Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand
website as soon as practicable after it is
filed. The 90-day period should start following publication. LPF Group said it
could start
once the statement of claim becomes publicly available.
[280] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia (if a time limit
is implemented), MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Simpson
Grierson and Nicole
Smith.
[281] See Class Proceedings
Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 13.1(3) and 13.1(8).
[282] Draft legislation, cl
5(1).
[283] For example, see the
material published on the website of a representative action that has been filed
against ANZ and ASB banks:
Banking Class Action “Claim Documents”
<www.bankingclassaction.com>.
[284] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.30]–[2.32].
[285] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson
& Johnson, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law
Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[286] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson
& Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim,
Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[287] Draft legislation, cl
6(1).
[288] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.34]–[2.36].
[289] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Andrew Harmos, Insurance
Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[290] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Andrew Harmos, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson
& Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni
Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Woodsford
Litigation Funding.
[291] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Johnson & Johnson and Rhonson Salim. In
addition, LPF Group said certifying multiple
class actions should be an
exception rather than the rule.
[292] Draft legislation, cl
6(2).
[293] We discuss certification
orders in Chapter 6.
[294] Draft legislation, cl
6(5).
[295] This differs from the
court’s decision not to certify a class action on the basis that the
certification test is not met,
which we recommend can be appealed as of right.
[296] Draft legislation, cl
6(6).
[297] We note that under our
proposed approach to limitation, staying a proceeding would not cause limitation
periods to begin running
again. We discuss limitation in Chapter 4.
[298] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.38]–[2.66].
[299] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson
& Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.
[300] Nikki Chamberlain,
Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Omni
Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim and Simpson
Grierson.
[301] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy,
LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts,
Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford
Litigation Funding.
[302] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[303] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson
& Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and
Simpson Grierson. Omni Bridgeway thought the preferences of potential class
members were only
relevant in an opt-in class action.
[304] Book building is a
process where a lawyer and/or litigation funder sign up a person to a class
action.
[305] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy,
LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts,
Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[306] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[307] Bell Gully, Michael
Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers
and Simpson Grierson.
[308] Bell Gully, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[309] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers
and Simpson Grierson.
[310] It referred to: the
nature and scope of the causes of action advanced; the theories advanced by the
legal team as supporting the
claims advanced; which group delivers the best
value to the class; the state of each class action, including preparation; the
number,
size and extent of involvement of the proposed representative
plaintiffs; the relative priority of commencing the class actions;
the resources
and experience of the legal teams; and the presence of any conflicts of
interest.
[311] Draft legislation, cl
6(3).
[312] Issues Paper at [5.23]
and Supplementary Issues Paper at [27].
[313] Draft legislation, cl
6(4).
[314] The Ontario legislation
refers to “the expertise and experience of, and results previously
achieved by, each solicitor in
class proceedings litigation or in the
substantive areas of law at issue”: Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s
13.1(4)(c).
This followed a recommendation by the Law Commission of Ontario,
which did not think “experience of counsel” should be
interpreted
exclusively as meaning experience in class action litigation as this might bar
new entrants to the plaintiff class action
“marketplace”: Law
Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms
– Final Report (July 2019) at 26.
[315] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [2.67].
[316] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[317] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[318] Issues Paper at [10.4]
and [10.8]–[10.15].
[319] Issues Paper at
[10.16]–[10.18].
[320] Issues Paper at
[10.20]–[10.28].
[321] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.27]–[1.33].
[322] Fourteen submitters
commented on certification in their submissions on both the Issues Paper and the
Supplementary Issues Paper.
[323] Andrew Barker QC, Bell
Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Gilbert Walker (Supplementary Issues
Paper submission), Andrew Harmos (Supplementary Issues Paper submission),
Institute
of Directors, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of
New Zealand, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson
(Supplementary
Issues Paper submission), LPF Group, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law Society, NZX, Simpson Grierson
and Tom Weston QC. We note Andrew Harmos and
LPF Group said they supported a process where the plaintiff filed a document
from an
independent lawyer certifying that certification requirements were met
and the court then granted certification.
[324]
Zane Kennedy, Rhonson Salim and Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[325] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Joint Action Funding, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Meredith Connell,
Vince Morabito (Supplementary Issues Paper
submission), Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers (Supplementary Issues Paper
submission), Nicole
Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[326] Barry Allan, Samuel
Becher, Colin Carruthers QC, Michael Duffy (Supplementary Issues Paper
submission), Michael Legg and Vicki Waye
(although she indicated certification
was probably not necessary).
[327] In Chapter 5 we
recommend the court should consider the applications for certification of
concurrent class action proceedings together.
[328] Issues Paper at
[10.29]–[10.71].
[329] Issues Paper at
[11.2]–[11.23].
[330] Issues Paper at
[11.42]–[11.47].
[331] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.34]–[1.102].
[332] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, International Bar
Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee,
Institute of Directors, Insurance
Council, Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole
Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[333] Michael Duffy, Gilbert
Walker, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission) indicated they agreed
with our draft certification provision.
Submitters who generally agreed with our certification provision but suggested
some amendments
were: Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Johnson
& Johnson, LPF Group, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson. Shine Lawyers
disagreed with certification but said if Aotearoa New Zealand was to adopt a
certification process, it generally agreed with our
draft provision.
[334] Institute of Directors,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Nicole Smith, Insurance Council and Tom Weston QC.
[335] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers.
[336] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.74]–[1.76].
[337] Chapman Tripp, Michael
Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.
[338] Michael Duffy, Gilbert
Walker and Simpson Grierson. In addition, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission) indicated general agreement with
our certification provision.
[339] Federal Court Rules 2011
(Cth), r 16.01(c).
[340] In its submission on the
Issues Paper, it suggested a “real prospect of success” test.
[341] Draft legislation, cl
4(1)(a).
[342] As Te Kōti Pira |
Court of Appeal said in a case under HCR 4.24, “...the Court cannot
grant leave to the bringing of plainly meritless claims, and so allow those
propounding the claim to invite
others to join the group represented”:
Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved
Claims Group [2017] NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [16].
[343] Attorney-General v
Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267. See also Couch v
Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 at [33] per Elias CJ and
Anderson J.
[344] Attorney-General v
Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267; Attorney-General v
McVeagh [1995] 1 NZLR 558 at 566 and Collier v Panckhurst CA136/97, 6
September 1999 at [19].
[345] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(1)(a).
[346] Law Commission of
Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and
Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 39–40. The
LCO was able to review 30 cases where certification was denied between 2011 and
2018. There were
14 cases where the court found there was no cause of action,
although in six of those cases the court found some of the plaintiffs
had a
cause of action on some issues but not on others.
[347] We agree with the point
made in submissions that a plaintiff should not be able to satisfy elements of
the certification test on
the basis of a cause of action that is not reasonably
arguable.
[348] Stephenson v Jones
[2014] NZHC 1604 at [7].
[349] High Court Rules 2016, r
15.1(1).
[350] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.39]–[1.41].
[351] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint submission).
[352] Michael Duffy and
Simpson Grierson. In addition, Gilbert Walker, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission) indicated general agreement with
our certification provision.
[353] Nikki Chamberlain, Omni
Bridgeway and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
The Supplementary Issues Paper
discusses the submissions we received on
predominance in response to the Issues Paper at [1.37]–[1.38].
[354] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 73(2). The IBA Antitrust Committee suggested this
definition apply in the commencement
provision. However, we have considered this
as part of certification as the definition in the commencement provision is
simply meant
to reflect the certification test.
[355] Draft legislation, cl
4(1)(b).
[356] As we note in Chapter 4,
each class member’s claim may include multiple causes of action.
[357] Issues Paper at
[10.36]–[10.46].
[358] Rachael Mulheron
Class Actions and Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2020) at 115. In Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 48, (1999) 199 CLR
255 at [27]–[28], the Court said a substantial common issue was one which
was not “ephemeral or nominal”, was “real or
of
substance”, but did not have to be one of “special
significance”.
[359] A similar conclusion was
reached by the Ontario Law Reform Commission, which thought the issue of whether
the common issues predominated
was more relevant to the issue of whether a class
action would be a superior procedure, rather than the common issues test: see
Ontario
Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at
346.
[360] For example, in British
Columbia, class member claims must raise common issues, whether or not they
predominate over individual
issues. When the court is determining whether a
class action would be the preferable procedure for the fair and efficient
resolution
of the common issues, it must consider whether common questions
predominate over individual questions: Class Proceedings Act RSBC
1996 c 50, s
4(1)(c) and 4(2)(a). Note, however, that in Ontario the common issues must
predominate over individual questions: Class
Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6
(Ontario), s 5(1.1)(b). This requirement was added to the certification test in
2020.
[361] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 79(1)(b).
[362] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 73(2).
[363] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 1(1).
[364] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.84]–[1.96].
[365] Bell Gully, Michael
Duffy, Insurance Council, NZLS, Rhonson Salim and Nicole Smith.
[366] Bell Gully, Michael
Duffy, Rhonson Salim and Insurance Council. In addition, Gilbert Walker, Zane
Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission)
indicated general agreement with our certification provision.
[367] Bell Gully and Insurance
Council.
[368] Bell Gully.
[369] Rhonson Salim.
[370] Rhonson Salim.
[371] Draft legislation, cl
4(1)(c).
[372] See Issues Paper at
[11.6]. In Australia, there are provisions that allow the court to discontinue
proceedings or replace a representative
plaintiff if they cannot adequately
represent class members: see Issues Paper at [11.6]–[11.7].
[373] Draft legislation, cl
4(2)(a).
[374] Draft legislation, cl
4(2)(b).
[375] Draft legislation, cl
4(2)(c).
[376] Draft legislation, cl
4(2)(d).
[377] Draft legislation, cl
4(4)(e).
[378] See Issues Paper at
[11.10].
[379] See Rachael Mulheron
The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – A Comparative
Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 293 (commenting that
requiring a representative plaintiff to have a detailed knowledge of the
relevant
law and facts “would hold the representative to such a high
standard that the effect of class actions legislation would be
essentially
nullified”).
[380] We note in the United
Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal, a representative plaintiff may only
withdraw from their role with the
leave of the court: The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 87.
[381] We discuss individual
settlements in Chapter 11.
[382] In Australia, the court
may substitute another class member as representative plaintiff if it appears to
the court that the representative
plaintiff is not able to adequately represent
the interests of class members: see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s
33T. The other Australian regimes have similar provisions.
[383] We discuss
decertification later in this chapter.
[384] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.44].
[385] Gilbert Walker,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[386] In addition, Gilbert
Walker, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission) indicated general agreement
with our certification provision.
[387] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(1)(d).
[388] We discuss alternative
distribution in Chapter 10.
[389] Draft legislation, cl
4(1)(d).
[390] We do, however, make
recommendations to enable individual issues to be determined in an efficient
manner in a class action. In Chapter
8, we recommend the court should have a
power to give directions with respect to determination of individual issues. In
Chapter 10,
we recommend the court should have a power to make an aggregate
assessment of monetary relief.
[391] Draft legislation, cl
4(3).
[392] Rachael Mulheron The
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – a Comparative Perspective
(Hart Publishing, 2004) at 324. The example is given of a claim brought
against an educational institution for alleged misrepresentations
that students
relied on to their detriment. Defining the class as all persons who attended the
institution between certain dates
was considered over-inclusive because not all
of those students had experienced detriment.
[393] Rachael Mulheron The
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – a Comparative Perspective
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 327.
[394] Rachael Mulheron The
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – a Comparative Perspective
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 330.
[395] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(1)(b). The other Canadian regimes have similar
provisions.
[396] Garry D Watson
Holmested and Watson: Ontario Civil Procedure (online ed,
Carswell) at §27:12. However, it notes several cases where courts have
taken a more relaxed view of the prohibition
against merits-based class
definitions.
[397] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 79(1)(a).
[398] Competition Appeal
Tribunal Guide to Proceedings (2015) at 6.37.
[399] William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §3:2.
[400] William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §3:3.
[401] William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §3:3.
[402] See Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33H(1)(a). The other Australian regimes have similar
provisions. In Petrusevski v Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd [2003] FCA 61
at [19], the court said that a useful test was: “...whether the
description is such as to enable a person, with the assistance of a
legal
adviser if necessary, to ascertain whether he or she is a group member. If the
description incorporates a reference to conduct
alleged in the pleadings, a
person or his or her adviser ought to be able, by reading the description and
the relevant portion of
the pleadings, to determine whether he or she is a
member of the represented group”.
[403] A representative action
will not be allowed if it might confer a right of action on a group member who
would not otherwise be able
to assert that in individual proceedings: Cridge
v Studorp [2017] NZCA 376 at [11(i)].
[404] Draft legislation, cl
1(5).
[405] Rachael Mulheron The
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 209.
[406] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.52]–[1.59].
[407] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.68].
[408] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431, (2019) 25 PRNZ 33 at [82].
[409] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson &
Johnson, Vince Morabito, Rhonson
Salim, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[410] Michael Duffy, Omni
Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.
[411] The latter referred us
to: Vince Morabito “Opt in or Opt Out A Class Dilemma for New
Zealand” (2011) 24 NZULR 421.
[412] We discuss this issue in
Chapter 7.
[413] As noted above, Bell
Gully submitted that opt-in should be the default mechanism.
[414] Issues Paper at
[12.15]–[12.50].
[415] Draft legislation, cl
4(1)(e).
[416] For example, a
litigation funder may only be prepared to fund the proceeding on an opt-out
basis since this is likely to result
in a larger class size.
[417] We note the Ontario
class actions legislation provides that the court may adjourn an application for
certification to permit the
parties to amend their materials or pleadings or to
permit further evidence: Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s 5(4).
[418] Draft legislation, cl
4(4).
[419] Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [98]. The size and nature
of the class may be considered by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal when
determining whether a class action
should be opt-in or opt-out: The Competition
Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 79(3).
[420] Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [98].
[421] It may also be that
Aotearoa New Zealand is not the appropriate forum for the class action where the
majority of class members are
outside the jurisdiction. This is an issue the
court could consider as part of its assessment of whether a class action
proceeding
is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the
claims of class members.
[422] Te Kōti Mana Nui |
Supreme Court has said that an opt-in approach should be favoured in
representative actions where there
is a real prospect that some class members
may end up worse off or adversely affected by proceedings, including where there
is potential
for a counterclaim: Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v
Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [93].
[423] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.124]–[1.125].
[424] Ontario Law Reform
Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 487–491.
[425] See Class Proceedings
Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 8(1)(f) and 9. Subsequent to the Ontario Law Reform
Commission’s report,
there was consultation with interest groups on class
actions reform and agreement was reached to undertake class actions reform
according
to certain parameters. The terms of reference for the
Attorney-General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform included
having an opt-out entitlement: see Report of the Attorney General’s
Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (Ministry of the Attorney General,
February 1990) at 22 and 33–34.
[426] United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(b)(2). See also Supplementary Issues Paper at
[1.64]–[1.67].
[427] Rachael Mulheron
“Opting in, Opting Out, and Closing the Class: Some Dilemmas for
England’s Class Action Lawmakers”
(2011) 50 Can Bus LJ 376 at
388.
[428] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.99]–[1.101].
[429] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.102].
[430] Andrew Harmos, LPF Group
and NZLS.
[431] However, if settlement
occurs prior to certification, the funded representative plaintiff should apply
for court approval of the
funding agreement at the same time as the application
for settlement approval. If the funding agreement is entered into after
certification,
funding approval should be sought as soon as practicable after
the agreement is entered into. If the terms of an approved funding
agreement are
amended during the proceedings, funding approval should be sought as soon as
practicable after that amendment.
[432] Draft legislation, cl
4(1).
[433] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 6. The other common law Canadian regimes have similar
provisions.
[434] See Bywater v Toronto
Transit Commission (1998) 27 CPC (4th) 172 at [23].
[435] See Issues Paper at
[2.27] and [2.36]–[2.37].
[436] Ontario Law Reform
Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 347 and 531.
[437] See Issues Paper at
[3.33]–[3.36].
[438] See Issues Paper at
[3.38]–[3.42].
[439] Issues Paper at [10.72].
[440] See Z v Dental
Complaints Assessment Committee [2008] NZSC 55, [2009] 1 NZLR 1 at [97].
[441] Hollick v Toronto
(City) 2001 SCC 68 at [25]; Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp
2013 SCC 57 at [99]–[105].
[442] Pro-Sys Consultants
Ltd v Microsoft Corp 2013 SCC 57 at [102].
[443] Pro-Sys Consultants
Ltd v Microsoft Corp 2013 SCC 57 at [103].
[444] Law Commission of
Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and
Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 45–48.
[445] Law Commission of
Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and
Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 46.
[446] William B
Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson
Reuters) at §7:21.
[447] See Attorney-General
v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267, Attorney-General v
McVeagh [1995] 1 NZLR 558 at 566, Collier v Panckhurst CA136/97, 6
September 1999 at [19].
[448] Draft legislation, cl
3.
[449] Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Pearce/Carter Quinn (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[450] Draft legislation, cl
3.
[451] High Court Rules 2016, r
7.20. We note the court retains a discretion to extend the time for filing a
supporting affidavit: see
New Zealand Trade Centre v Jianhua Trading Group
Ltd [2015] NZHC 3014 at [5].
[452] We discuss concurrent
class actions in Chapter 5.
[453] High Court Rules 2016,
rr 7.24–7.25.
[454] An extension of this
timeframe could be granted under the High Court Rules 2016, r 1.19.
[455] Te Kōti Matua |
High Court has jurisdiction to make orders or directions as to how a hearing
should be conducted under the
High Court Rules 2016, r 7.43A(1)(d)-(e) and
inherent jurisdiction to grant leave to a non-party to intervene in a
proceeding: Te Pou Matakana Ltd v Attorney-General [2021] NZHC 2833 at
[11]; Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 828 at [41].
[456] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(4).
[457] Ministry of the Attorney
General Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class
Action Reform (February 1990) at 31.
[458] See High Court Rules
2016, r 7.42.
[459] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.109].
[460] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[461] Chapman Tripp, Omni
Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers.
[462] These functions of a
certification order were identified in Ontario Law Reform Commission Report
on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 432.
[463] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 10(1).
[464] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 10(2).
[465] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 85(1)-(2).
[466] United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(c)(1)(C).
[467] William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §7:34 and
§7:38.
[468] Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 33L-33P.
[469] Earlier in this chapter,
we recommend there should be a power to substitute the representative
plaintiff.
[470] We have drawn on the
approaches outlined in Rachael Mulheron “Asserting personal jurisdiction
over non-resident class members:
comparative insights for the United
Kingdom” (2019) J Priv Int L 445 at 452.
[471] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 82(1)(b)(ii).
[472] Class Proceedings Act
RSNB 2011 c 125 (New Brunswick), s 18(3); Class Actions Act SNL 2001 c C-18.1
(Newfoundland and Labrador),
s 17(2). The class must be divided into resident
and non-resident sub-classes: Class Proceedings Act RSNB 2011 c 125, s 8(2);
Class
Actions Act SNL 2001 c C-18.1, s 7(2). Note this approach was originally
followed in Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan,
but the provisions were
subsequently amended.
[473] For example, see
Airia Brands Inc v Air Canada 2017 ONCA 792, leave refused in Air
Canada v Airia Brands Inc [2017] SCC 476.
[474] William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §4:71. This
analysis typically takes place in the “superiority” limb of the
certification
test.
[475] Tania Monestier
“Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res
Judicata” (2011) 86 Tul L Rev 1 at 21.
[476] William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §4:71.
[477] Damian Grave, Ken Adams
and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters,
Sydney, 2022 at [7.180]. However, the authors note that it may still be
desirable to limit the class description
to those within the jurisdiction to
ensure the judgment can be enforced and because of the cost and difficulty of
giving notice to
overseas class members.
[478] Impiombato v BHP
Group (No 2) [2020] FCA 1720 at [105].
[479] Supreme Court Act 1986
(Vic), s 33KA(2)(a). Commentary notes that “from a jurisdictional
perspective it is hard to see that s 33KA serves a meaningful purpose in respect
of foreign group members. It is the defendant’s amenability to the
jurisdiction that
is critical”: Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts
Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022 at
129.
[480] Rachael Mulheron
“Asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident class members:
comparative insights for the United Kingdom”
(2019) J Priv Int L 445 at
453. This approach is followed in several Canadian jurisdictions: Class
Proceedings Act RSBC 1996 c 50
(British Columbia), s 4.1 (2)(a); The Class
Proceedings Act SM 2002 c C-130 (Manitoba), s 6(3); The Class Actions Act SS
2001 c C-12.01
(Saskatchewan), s 6.1(2)(a).
[481] Rachael Mulheron
“Asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident class members:
comparative insights for the United Kingdom”
(2019) J Priv Int L 445 at
454. The example of the Pennsylvania Code is given.
[482] See Debra Lyn Bassett
“Implied "Consent" to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class
Litigation” [2004] Mich State
Int Law Rev 619 at 628.
[483] Maria Hook and Jack Wass
The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2020) at
[2.225].
[484] See Tania Monestier
“Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res
Judicata” (2011) 86 Tul L Rev 1 at 67 (suggesting that most foreign
jurisdictions would regard a foreign claimant’s consent to join a class
action in the United
States as precluding any subsequent action) and Rachael
Mulheron “Asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident class members:
comparative insights for the United Kingdom” (2019) J Priv Int L 445 at
455–456 (noting that a key reason why foreign
class members are required
to opt into class actions in the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal is to avoid the
risk that the judgment
would not be recognised in other jurisdictions and would
not have preclusive effect).
[485] It may also be that
Aotearoa New Zealand is not the appropriate forum for the class action where the
majority of class members are
outside the jurisdiction.
[486] Each of the Australian
regimes provides that the following must give consent to being a class member:
the Commonwealth, a State
or Territory, a Minister of a Commonwealth, State or
Territory, a body corporate established for a public purpose by a law of the
Commonwealth, State or Territory (other than an incorporated company or
association); and an officer of the Commonwealth, State or
Territory in their
capacity as an officer. For example, see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976
(Cth), s 33E(2). In Victoria, written consent is also required before a judge,
magistrate or other judicial officer can become a class member: Supreme Court
Act 1986 (Vic), s 33E(2)(d).
[487] Australian Law Reform
Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at
[128].
[488] Cabinet Office Circular
“Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business” (30
March 2016) CO 16/2 at [13].
[489] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Office Crown “Attorney-General’s Values for
Crown Civil Litigation” (31
July 2013) at [5].
[490] The
“Attorney-General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation” (31
July 2013) apply to civil litigation “conducted
on behalf of Crown
departments, officers, and Ministers” (see [3]), which could extend to a
class action. Note that the Cabinet
Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal
Business 2016 refer to legal representation in litigation where the Crown is a
party: Cabinet
Office Circular “Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of
Crown Legal Business” (30 March 2016) CO 16/2 at [9.2.1]. The
Crown would
not be a party in a class action unless it was the representative plaintiff or
defendant.
[491] See
“Attorney-General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation” (31
July 2013) at [4]: “There is only one Crown
in New Zealand. Accordingly,
the Crown needs to be able to have a single and consistent view, and speak with
one voice, on questions
of law”.
[492] Although we note our
recommendation for all class actions to be listed on the class actions webpage
of ngā Kōti o Aotearoa
| Courts of New Zealand website will assist
with identifying class actions.
[493] Cabinet Office Circular
“Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business” (30
March 2016) CO 16/2 at [7.1].
[494] The Directions do not
apply to the following public entities: the Parliamentary Counsel Office, the
Office of the Clerk of the House
of Representatives, the Parliamentary Service,
Crown entities, State-owned enterprises, offices of Parliament, bodies listed in
Schedules
4, 4A and 5 of the Public Finance Act 1989, local authorities, and
other bodies corporate that exist to perform public functions
or that are owned
by the Crown or a public entity: Cabinet Office Circular “Cabinet
Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal
Business” (30 March 2016) CO
16/2 at [8].
[495] High Court Rules 2016, r
4.31.
[496] High Court Rules 2016, r
4.30.
[497] High Court Rules 2016, r
4.29.
[498] The provisions fall
under Part 4 of the High Court Rules 2016, which is headed
“Parties”.
[499] High Court Rules 2016, r
4.29.
[500] High Court Rules 2016,
rr 4.30 and 4.31.
[501] See: Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33F; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 160; Civil
Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 103E; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33F; Supreme
Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 69. Some of these jurisdictions use the
term “next friend” or “committee” instead of litigation
guardian.
[502] Australian Law Reform
Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at
[130]. Note that it referred to a litigation guardian as a
“tutor”.
[503] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 17(8) and 27.1(9). The Office of the Public Guardian and
Trustee provides services
to protect the financial, legal and personal care of
“mentally incapable Ontarians”: Ministry of the Attorney General
“Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee” Government of Ontario
<www.ontario.ca>.
[504] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 27.1(11)(a). The Office of the Children’s Lawyer is
an independent law office
in the Ministry of the Attorney General that
represents the interests of a child under age 18 in court cases and matters in
Ontario:
Ministry of the Attorney General “Office of the Children’s
Lawyer” Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca>.
[505] Law Commission of
Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final
Report (July 2019) at 57.
[506] Class Proceedings Act SA
2003 c C-16.5 (Alberta), s 27(3).
[507] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 77(2)(b).
[508] We note that when a
court is considering whether to appoint a litigation guardian for a person under
the High Court Rules, the inquiry
into capacity focuses on the party’s
role in the specific litigation at issue: Corbett v Patterson [2014] NZCA
274, [2014] 3 NZLR 318 at [43(b)].
[509] Our recommendation
reflects the approach to decision-making competence used in the End of Life
Choice Act 2019, s 6 (which sets
out when a person is competent to make an
informed decision about assisted dying) and to decision-making capacity in the
Substance
Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 2017, s 9
(capacity to make informed decisions about treatment for a severe substance
addition). These statutes reflect a ‘functional’ approach to
decision-making capacity to a greater extent than the current
language in the
High Court Rules 2016, consistent with recent approaches to decision-making
capacity in comparable jurisdictions.
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is
currently undertaking a review of the law relating to adult decision-making
capacity:
He Arotake I te Ture mō ngā Huarahi Whakatau a ngā
Pakeke | Review of Adult Decision-making Capacity Law.
[510] We discuss the role of
the representative plaintiff in Chapter 3.
[511] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.22].
[512] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.27]–[3.47].
[513] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council
of New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Carter Pearce, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC, Nicole Smith, Woodsford Litigation Funding
and Tom Weston QC. Not all submitters indicated which option they preferred.
While Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce
made a joint submission,
there were some issues on which these submitters expressed separate views.
[514] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, Johnson &
Johnson, Carter Pearce, Rhonson Salim,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and
Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[515] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Carter Pearce, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[516] Chapman Tripp, Nikki
Chamberlain, Carter Pearce, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[517] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[518] Chapman Tripp. Philip
Skelton QC made this same point but did not think the lawyer should be regarded
as the lawyer for the class.
[519] Chapman Tripp.
[520] Rhonson Salim.
[521] Chapman Tripp.
[522] Chapman Tripp.
[523] Chapman Tripp.
[524] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Crown Law Office (for opt-out class actions), Insurance Council and
Simpson Grierson. Philip Skelton
QC preferred the status quo but thought the
statute should recognise that the plaintiff’s lawyer has to act in the
best interests
of the class. He also thought the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
(Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 should be amended to require
retainer agreements with individual class members to record
that the lawyer owes
duties to the class as a whole and to have provisions for managing any conflict
that may arise.
[525] We discuss this proposal
in Chapter 3.
[526] See Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.28]–[3.29]. See also Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts
Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022) at
[6.210], noting that a number of cases have supported the proposition that the
lawyer owes
a fiduciary duty to class members but “the precise content of
any fiduciary duty owed to those unrepresented class members
has not been fully
explored in Australia”.
[527] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2451 at [49], [121] and
[149].
[528] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2451 at [155].
[529] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2451 at [159].
[530] However, later in this
chapter we make a specific recommendation about communications between the
defendant’s lawyer and class
members. This is an issue we specifically
sought feedback on in the Supplementary Issues Paper.
[531] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 2.3 and 2.8.
[532] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 3.4, 4.2, 4.3 and 9.4.
[533] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 3.
[534] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 8.
[535] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4. We discuss the
application of this rule below.
[536] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 7.
[537] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 13–13.1 and
13.3.
[538] An example would be
where the representative plaintiff instructs the lawyer to settle the class
action on terms that favour the
defendant and representative plaintiff but would
be detrimental to the class.
[539] Lawyers already have an
obligation not to engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to
mislead or deceive anyone
on any aspect of the lawyer’s practice: see
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r
10.9.
[540] We note there are some
scenarios where a lawyer may communicate directly with a person represented by
another lawyer: see Lawyers
and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client
Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.5 and 10.4.6.
[541] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.
[542] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.63].
[543] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[544] Bell Gully, Johnson
& Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Simpson Grierson,
Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole
Smith.
[545] Subject to any
exceptions that apply in Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and
Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.
[546] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.
[547] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 7.
[548] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.5].
[549] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa
| Insurance Council of New Zealand,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson and Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[550] It also said that two
settlement notices were unnecessary and only a notice of proposed settlement
should be required. We discuss
the settlement notice requirements in Chapter
11.
[551] Chapman Tripp.
[552] IBA Antitrust
Committee.
[553] Gilbert Walker.
[554] In Chapter 12, we
recommend a court should be able to order adverse costs against a class member
with respect to issues determined
on an individual basis.
[555] A common method of
managing common and individual issues in class actions is to have staged
hearings. Typically, the ‘stage
one’ hearing will determine common
issues (and sometimes the entirety of the representative plaintiff’s
claim) and the
‘stage two’ hearing will determine individual issues.
We discuss staged hearings below.
[556] We discuss this issue in
Chapter 10.
[557] We discuss this issue in
Chapter 17.
[558] We note that in
Australia, a notice is required where the defendant applies to dismiss the
proceedings for want of prosecution:
see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976
(Cth), s 33X(1)(b).
[559] We discuss this issue in
Chapter 11.
[560] We discuss settlement
prior to certification in Chapter 11.
[561] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.20].
[562] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni
Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford
Litigation Funding.
[563] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers.
[564] Consumer NZ, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[565] Consumer NZ, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[566] See Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Y(2); Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario),
s 20(3); The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 81(1); United States
Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(c)(2)(B) and 23(d)(1)(B).
[567] United States Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(c)(2)(B). Commentary to this requirement
describes it as “a reminder
of the need to work unremittingly at the
difficult task of communicating with class members”, noting the difficulty
of providing
information about class actions that is both accurate and easily
understood by class members who are not lawyers: United States Federal
Rules of
Civil Procedure, r 23 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—2003
Amendment).
[568] We have drawn on: Todd B
Hilsee, Shannon R Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to
Know My Rights? The Ethics
Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice is More
Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J
Legal Ethics 1359 at 1377–1380; Margaret Hagan “A Human-Centred
Design Approach to Access to Justice: Generating New Prototypes and Hypotheses
for Interventions to Make Courts User-Friendly” (2018) 6 Ind J L & Soc
Equal 199 at 234; and Federal Judicial Center Judges’ Class Action
Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide (2010).
[569] The Victorian Law Reform
Commission recommended the Supreme Court should consider drafting Plain English
standard form opt-out and
settlement notices in consultation with the Victorian
Law Reform Commission Access to Justice – Litigation Funding and Group
Proceedings: Report (March 2018), Recommendation 21.
[570] See
Digital.govt.nz “Designing documents for
print” (3 November 2020) <www.digital.govt.nz>.
[571] We discuss cost sharing
orders in Chapter 9.
[572] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.10].
[573] For example, in an
opt-in case, it should be easy to provide subsequent notices to class members
once they have opted in and provided
contact details.
[574] In most cases it would
be the representative plaintiff who would give the report, but as we discuss
below, in appropriate circumstances
the court might order the defendant to give
notice.
[575] The initial opt-in or
opt-out notice will be sent to ‘potential class members’ and
subsequent notices will be sent to
class members. For simplicity, we refer to
class members throughout this section.
[576] See Alexander W Aiken
“Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967
at 979.
[577] Figures show 584,000
people read the print version of the New Zealand Herald in an average seven-day
period (year to June 2021).
In comparison, over the same period, 1,598,000
people read the digital version of the New Zealand Herald. See Roy Morgan
“Almost
3 million New Zealanders read newspapers and nearly 1.8 million
read magazines in 2021” (13 September 2021) <www.roymorgan.com>.
See also Roy Morgan “Readership in New Zealand, 12 Months to December
2021” <roymorgan.com>
for similar figures.
[578] For example, commercial
radio network rankings show that a radio station’s audience share differs
by age bracket: Radio Broadcasters
Association and Growth from Knowledge
“Commercial Radio reaches almost 3.5m New Zealanders” (press
release, 29 April
2021).
[579] Alexander W Aiken
“Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967
at 990–994.
[580] Alexander W Aiken
“Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967
at 1011–1013.
[581] Alexander W Aiken
“Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967
at 994–995.
[582] Todd B Hilsee, Shannon R
Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights?
The Ethics Behind Due Process
in Class Action Notice is More Than Just Plain
Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J Legal Ethics
1359 at 1364.
[583] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.12].
[584] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.13]–[4.15].
[585] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, GCA Lawyers, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson
Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint
submission) and Nicole Smith.
[586] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce and Nicole Smith.
[587] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[588] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp and Gilbert Walker.
[589] See Privacy Act 2020, s
24. Relevantly, this provides that nothing in information privacy principle 11
(which relates to disclosure)
affects a provision contained in any New Zealand
enactment that authorises or requires personal information to be made available.
An enactment means the whole or part of an Act or any secondary legislation:
Legislation Act 2019, s 13.
[590] High Court Rules 2016, r
8.30(4).
[591] Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Y(3)(d).
[592] Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd
v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 284 at [19].
[593] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 22.
[594] See Fantl v ivari
2018 ONSC 4443 at [14].
[595] William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at
§8.31–§8.33.
[596] There are examples of
defendants being required to contribute to notice costs in other jurisdictions.
For example, in Canada defendants
have been ordered to contribute to notice
costs where there has been financial hardship on the part of the plaintiff,
where the litigation
has a public interest dimension, and where the defendant is
better placed to pay for the notice: Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in
Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2004) at 360. In the United States, circumstances include where the
costs would be substantially reduced
if the defendant undertook the notice
rather than the plaintiff, when there is an existing fiduciary relationship
between the parties,
when the defendant is the party requesting certification,
and when there has been some preliminary finding of the defendant’s
liability: William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed,
Thomson Reuters) at §8:33.
[597] We discuss limitation in
Chapter 4.
[598] Jessica Silver-Greenberg
and Robert Gebeloff “Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of
Justice” The New York Times (online ed, New York, 31 October 2015).
[599] Arbitration Act 1996, s
10(1). Arguments for not enforcing class action waiver clauses are presented in
Nikki Chamberlain “Contracting-Out
of Class Action Litigation: Lessons
from the United States” [2018] NZ L Rev 371 at 386–390.
[600] Arbitration Act 1996, s
11.
[601] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Arbitration (NZLC R20, 1991) at [235].
[602] Employment Relations Act
2000, s 155. Under this provision, the Arbitration Act 1996 (including its
enforcement mechanisms) does
not apply to arbitrations of employment
relationship problems. A party is also entitled to make an application to the
Employment
Relations Authority or Employment Court, notwithstanding any
arbitration.
[603] Insurance Law Reform Act
1977, s 8, provides that an arbitration agreement entered into by an insured
otherwise than in trade is
not enforceable against the insured.
[604] Supplementary Issues
Papter at [4.22].
[605] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.23]–[4.27].
[606] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.28]–[4.33].
[607] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission),
Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[608] IBA Antitrust Committee,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson
Grierson.
[609] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission), Nicole Smith, Tom Weston
QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[610] IBA Antritrust
Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers.
[611] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[612] Insurance Council and
Shine Lawyers.
[613] Chapman Tripp.
[614] IBA Antitrust Committee,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers.
[615] Although Chapman Tripp
acknowledged this may not be realistic given the court’s resourcing
constraints.
[616] We also note there is a
rule for “cases not provided for”: High Court Rules 2016, r 1.6.
This provides that if a case
arises where no procedure has been prescribed, the
court must dispose of the case “as nearly as may be practicable in
accordance
with the provisions of these rules affecting any similar case”.
If there are no such rules, the court must dispose of the case
in a matter the
court thinks is best calculated to achieve the objective of the High Court
Rules.
[617] High Court Rules 2016,
Sch 10.
[618] High Court Rules 2016,
rr 7.3, 7.3(A) and Sch 5.
[619] High Court Rules 2016, r
15.2.
[620] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.51].
[621] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.52]–[4.56].
[622] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.57]–[4.61].
[623] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Gilbert Walker, Institute
of Directors, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson
Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission)
and Tom Weston QC.
[624] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[625] Those factors are: the
stage of the class action and the issues to be determined at that stage; whether
there are sub-classes; whether
the discovery is necessary given the claims or
defences of the party seeking it; the monetary value of individual claims;
whether
discovery would be oppressive or result in undue annoyance, burden or
expense for class members; any other matter the court considers
relevant. See
Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 15(3). There are similar
provisions in most other Canadian class actions
regimes.
[626] IBA Antitrust Committee,
Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway and
Shine Lawyers.
[627] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.
Note that in opt-out cases, some
submitters anticipated the representative
plaintiff would provide a list of those who had opted out, while others thought
only the
number of persons opting out would be provided. Crown Law Office said
the current rules were probably adequate for opt-in class actions,
although
having a register of class members would enable the defendant to understand the
identity and circumstances of class members.
[628] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint submission).
[629] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission).
[630] Simpson Grierson.
[631] Chapman Tripp. It said
not having sufficient information about class member claims could lead to a
claim or class size appearing
larger than it is. Information about class member
claims could also allow a more informed consideration of the framing of common
issues and sub-classes.
[632] Chapman Tripp.
[633] Crown Law Office.
[634] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[635] High Court Rules 2016, r
8.22(3), and Andrew Beck and others (eds) McGechan on Procedure (online
looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at HR8.22.02.
[636] In developing these
factors, we have drawn on Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 15(3).
[637] High Court Rules 2016, r
8.22.
[638] Alternatively, in such a
case, it would be possible to determine who has remained in the class action and
provide that information
to the defendant.
[639] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.105]–[1.107].
[640] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [1.108].
[641] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[642] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council, Johnson & Johnson and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia.
[643] The example came from
Anchem Products v Windsor [1997] USSC 67; 521 US 591 (1997) and was cited by Johnson
& Johnson.
[644] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson
and Nicole Smith.
[645] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.
[646] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[647] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia and Omni Bridgeway.
[648] Shine Lawyers. A similar
point was made by Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, which said a class
actions regime should
not require a sub-class representative plaintiff to be
identified at an early stage of the proceeding.
[649] Insurance Council.
[650] See Rachael Mulheron
The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 285.
[651] In the United States,
methods used to address intra-class conflicts other than sub-classing include:
having separate liability and
damages trials; appointing a judge or
“special master” to hear individual damages proceedings;
decertifying the class
after the liability trial and giving class members notice
as to how they can prove damages; and, altering or amending the class.
See
William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson
Reuters) at §7:31.
[652] For example, see
Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 1355
at [15]–[21].
[653] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.35]–[4.40].
[654] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.41].
[655] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[656] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole
Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[657] IBA Antitrust Committee,
Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[658] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.42].
[659] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.50].
[660] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[661] We note the Ontario
legislation refers to the court being able to determine individual issues in
further hearings: Class Proceedings
Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 25(1)(a). The
Australian federal class actions legislation refers to the court’s ability
to make
an award of damages for individual class members: Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z(1)(e).
[662] We also note that class
members may have adverse costs liability for issues determined on an individual
basis, as we discuss in
Chapter 12.
[663] This approach has been
allowed by some courts in the United States: see William B Rubenstein Newberg
on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §12:5.
[664] Courts in the United
States have been reluctant to allow this approach: see William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §11.21 and
§12.5. See also Houghton v Saunders [2019] NZHC 142 at [22], where
the Court expressed reluctance about the proposed approach of bringing evidence
from a sample of group members, along with
additional evidence to show the
Court’s findings on that evidence could be properly applied to others.
[665] High Court Rules 2016, r
7.79(5). We note that consent is not required to convene a judicial settlement
conference under r 7.79(1),
although it is usual practice for the judge to take
the parties’ views into account: Andrew Beck and others (ed) McGechan
on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at HR7.79.01.
[666] Another mechanism is
‘closed classes’, where the class is defined so that it only
includes claimants who have entered
into an agreement with the litigation
funder. We do not discuss this mechanism further, as it is similar in effect to
an opt-in class
action and we have proposed that opt-in class actions should be
available in Aotearoa New Zealand.
[667] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [9.6]. See also
BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627 at [1],
[135] and [178]. For further discussion on common fund orders, see Supplementary
Issues Paper at [4.68]–[4.83].
[668] Money Max Int Pty Ltd
v QBE Insurance Group Ltd [2016] FCAFC 148, (2016) 245 FCR 191.
[669] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [9.13].
[670] BMW Australia Ltd v
Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627.
[671] Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V(2). See for example: Evans v Davantage Group
Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 70 at [49]; Uren v RMBL Investments Ltd (No
2) [2020] FCA 647 at [50]–[53]; McKay Super Solutions Pty Ltd v
Bellamy’s Australia Ltd [2020] FCA 461 at [31]; Hall v Arnold Bloch
Leibler (a firm) (No 2) [2022] FCA 163 at [22]–[38]. There have also
been some divergent decisions on this point: see Cantor v Audi Australia Pty
Ltd (No 5) [2020] FCA 637 at [418]–[421].
[672] See Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at
[9.119]–[9.123] (Recommendation 7); Australian Law Reform Commission
Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action
Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [4.35]
(Recommendation 3).
[673] The judgment also noted
that the plaintiffs might seek a common fund order (or in the alternative, a
funding equalisation order)
at the end of the proceeding: Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2454 at [3], [10],
[23]–[24] and [27]–[29].
[674] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431 at [110].
[675] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd at [2021] NZHC 2454 at [4], [63] and [92].
The representative plaintiffs proposed that the funds set aside would be put
into an interest-bearing escrow account,
with no payment being made from the
account unless and until approved by the Court following determination of the
plaintiffs’
application for a common fund order.
[676] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497.
[677] See “What is a
‘common fund order’?” Banking Class Action <www.bankingclassaction.com>.
[678] We discussed these
options in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.86]–[4.95].
[679] Chapman Tripp, Consumer
NZ, GCA Lawyers, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New
Zealand, International Bar Association
(IBA) Antitrust Committee, Zane Kennedy,
LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts,
Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway,
Russell Legal, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation
Funding. Michael Duffy said common fund orders
can be of assistance, but these
must be subject to stringent notice requirements to class members.
[680] Chapman Tripp, Consumer
NZ, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway
and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint submission). Michael Duffy said funding equalisation orders are a useful
tool
in equalising funding burdens.
[681] Bell Gully, Johnson
& Johnson and Tom Weston QC.
[682] LPF Group, Russell
Legal, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Woodsford Ligation Funding.
[683] Russell Legal and Shine
Lawyers.
[684] Zane Kennedy, Russell
Legal, Simpson Grierson, Michael Duffy, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee and
Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[685] Bell Gully referred to
comments to this effect by the majority of the High Court of Australia in BMW
Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627 at [94] per
Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ. See also at [126] per Nettle J and at
[153]–[154] and [164] per Gordon J.
[686] Bell Gully.
[687] While Gilbert Walker
reserved comment on whether funding equalisations orders and/or common fund
orders should be available, it
said it “would require greater persuasion
that the latter is required than the former” for this reason.
[688] Tom Weston QC.
[689] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee and
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia. Bell Gully thought funding
equalisation orders could achieve this more effectively than common fund
orders.
[690] Chapman Tripp.
[691] GCA Lawyers, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint submission).
[692] For example: the
distribution and weighting of losses as between the funded and unfunded class
members; whether the funding agreement
allows the funder to recover its
commission from the “grossed up” amount (that is, whether the
funding commission is
calculated as a percentage of funded class members’
recovery including or excluding the amount redistributed to them from unfunded
class members); whether only the representative plaintiff is funded (in which
case a funding equalisation order would not be appropriate).
[693] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Nicole
Smith, Russell Legal, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint
submission) and Woodsford Litigation Funding. While Philip Skelton QC,
Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce made a joint submission, there
were some issues on
which the submitters exprssed separate views.
[694]
Chapman Tripp, LPF Group, Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Zane Kennedy, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
MinterEllisonRuddWatts,
Russell Legal, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission) and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[695] Chapman Tripp, LPF Group
and MinterEllisonRuddWatts.
[696] Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Philip
Skelton QC.
[697] Bell Gully and Nicole
Smith.
[698] Shine Lawyers and Carter
Pearce (while Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce made a joint
submission, there were some
issues on which these submitters expressed separate
views). Chapman Tripp also said “the court should have flexibility in any
power to make common fund orders”, but suggested a presumption in favour
of making the order at an early stage in the proceeding.
[699] See Webster v Murray
Goulburn Co-Operative Co Ltd (No 4) [2020] FCA 1053 at [119].
[700] See Caason
Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527 at [162]. Whether a common
fund type order or a funding equalisation type order would deduct less from
class members will involve an assessment
of the ratio of unfunded class members
compared to funded class members, and the relative weight of the claims as
between class members.
This second factor may be important where a small number
of class members’ claims are significantly larger than the average
class
member.
[701] Under a funding
equalisation order in Australia, when a percentage amount is deducted from the
unfunded class members and added
back pro rata across all class members, that
incrementally increases the recovery for each funded class member. Litigation
funders
may then assert that they are contractually entitled to an additional
amount (that is, a percentage on the incremental amount). The
Full Federal Court
of Australia discussed this issue in Money Max Int Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance
Group Ltd [2016] FCAFC 148, (2016) 245 FCR 191 at [56]–[57]. See also
Blairgowrie Trading Ltd v Allco Finance Group Ltd (Recs & Mgrs Apptd) (In
Liq) (No 3) [2017] FCA 330, (2017) 343 ALR 476 at [99(d)].
[702] For example, the funding
agreement may impose costs on funded class members in addition to legal fees and
the funding commission,
which will then be spread across all class members
pursuant to a funding equalisation order. See Caason Investments Pty Ltd v
Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527 at [167], where the court noted a common fund
order, unlike a funding equalisation order, would avoid class members incurring
the $756,402
project management fee.
[703] In Chapter 17, we
recommend that the Class Actions Act should require the representative plaintiff
to apply to the court for approval
of the funding agreement, in order for the
funding agreement to be enforceable by the funder. We also make recommendations
as to
when the representative plaintiff should apply for court approval of the
funding agreement, and factors the court may consider when
determining the
application.
[704] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.1].
[705] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.5]. Res judicata means “a matter judged”.
[706] Moevao v Department
of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464 (CA) at 482 per Richardson J.
[707] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.6], citing Craig v Stringer [2020] NZCA 260 at [31]. See also
Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters)
at [HR15.1.05(2)(a)] citing Collier v Butterworths of New Zealand Ltd
(1997) 11 PRNZ 581 (HC) at 586.
[708] Henderson v
Henderson [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313 (Ch) at 115. Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.7].
[709] Draft legislation, cl
5(1) (September 2021 version).
[710] Draft legislation, cl
5(2) (September 2021 version).
[711] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Simpson
Grierson and Nicole Smith. Andrew Barker QC also discussed the application of
res judicata to class members in his Issues Paper submission and
suggested the Commission give thought to this issue.
[712] Seven submitters made
this point expressly: Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council, Johnson
& Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim and
Simpson Grierson.
[713] Nikki Chamberlain,
Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Rhonson Salim and Simpson
Grierson.
[714] Draft legislation, cl
9(1).
[715] In this respect, our
approach aligns with Canada and Australia, see the Supplementary Issues Paper at
[5.12]–[5.15] and [5.18].
[716] In Aotearoa New Zealand,
the principle in Henderson v Henderson is conceptualised as an abuse of
process, see Craig v Stringer [2020] NZCA 260 at [19], citing Virgin
Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd [2013] UKSC 46 at [25]. See also
Lai v Chamberlains [2006] NZSC 70, [2007] 2 NZLR 7 at [59]. It appears
Henderson v Henderson (or its equivalent) is conceptualised as an
estoppel in Canada and Australia, see Allan v CIBC Trust Corporation
(1998) 39 OR (3d) 675 (ONCJ) at 7–8 and Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in
liq) v Collins [2016] HCA 44 at [27]. However, both jurisdictions also have
abuse of process. In the two cases where it was argued Henderson v Henderson
applied to class members, the defendants also ran abuse of process in the
alternative (albeit unsuccessfully): Allan v CIBC Trust Corporation
(1998) 39 OR (3d) 675 (ONCJ) and Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) v
Collins [2016] HCA 44.
[717] Draft legislation, cl
9(2).
[718] Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z(1) provides the court may determine an issue of
law; determine an issue of fact; make a declaration of liability; grant any
equitable
relief; make an award of damages for group members, sub-group members
or individual group members; award damages in an aggregate
amount; make such
other orders as the court thinks just. The Rules Committee proposed a similar
clause in its Class Actions Bill:
Class Actions Bill (Te Tari Tohutohu
Pāremata | Parliamentary Counsel Office, PCO 8247/2.13, 2009), s 12(2).
[719] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.21].
[720] This approach has been
allowed by some courts in the United States: see William B Rubenstein Newberg
on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §12:5.
[721] Rachael Mulheron The
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 416–417.
[722] Allapattah Services
Inc v Exxon Mobil Corp 157 F Supp 2d 1291 (7 August 2001).
[723] ACCC v Golden Sphere
Intl Inc [1998] FCA 598; (1998) 83 FCR 424.
[724] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.24]–[5.49].
[725] Draft legislation, s
11(1)(b) (September 2021 version).
[726] Andrew Barker QC (Issues
Paper submission), Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ,
Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince
Morabito, Omni
Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith, Tom Weston
QC and
Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[727] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson,
Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[728] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Michael Duffy, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway
and Simpson Grierson
[729] Bell Gully and Chapman
Tripp.
[730] Vince Morabito.
[731] Michael Duffy and
Insurance Council.
[732] Simpson Grierson.
[733] Draft legislation, cl
10(1) and 10(3).
[734] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.48]–[5.49].
[735] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.47]–[5.48], Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class
Actions (1982) vol II at 521. See also Rachael Mulheron
“Restitutionary Relief in Competition Law Class Actions: An Evolving
Landscape”
(2018) 26 RLR 1 at 2, 7–13, where she discusses the
difference between restitutionary damages and unjust enrichment giving
rise to
an account of profits and whether both are permissible under The Competition
Appeal Tribunal Rules.
[736] Draft legislation, cl
10(1).
[737] This also aligns with
the principle the courts have developed under High Court Rules 2016, r 4.24 that
a representative action should
not be allowed where it would deprive the
defendant of a defence or allow a class member to succeed where they would not
have succeeded
if they brought an individual claim: Cridge v Studorp Ltd
[2017] NZCA 376, (2017) 23 PRNZ 582 at [11](i).
[738] Rachael Mulheron The
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 418–419. See also Ontario Law Reform
Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 555.
[739] The test proposed in the
Supplementary Issues Paper incorporated the tests from both Canada and
Australia. In Australia the court
can award aggregate damages if “a
reasonably accurate assessment can be made of the total amount to which group
members will
be entitled under the judgment”: Federal Court of Australia
Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z(3). In Canada, no further issues must be determined to
establish the amount of the defendant’s liability: see for example Class
Proceedings Act 1992 SO c 6 (Ontario), s 24(1)(b).
[740] Draft legislation, cl
10(2).
[741] Draft legislation, cl
10(3).
[742] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.34].
[743] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.36].
[744] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.39].
[745] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Gilbert Walker, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[746] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Simpson Grierson and Nicole
Smith.
[747] Chapman Tripp, Gilbert
Walker and Simpson Grierson.
[748] Draft legislation, cl
10(4).
[749] Draft legislation, cl
10(5).
[750] Issues Paper at
[5.24]–[5.25].
[751] In Chapter 5 we
recommend a class actions webpage be created by Te Tāhū o te Ture |
Ministry of Justice.
[752] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, Johnson
& Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission),
Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[753] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Vince Morabito, Shine Lawyers, Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[754] Bell Gully, GCA Lawyers
(although it only referred to unclaimed settlement money) and Nicole Smith.
[755] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Vince Morabito (he refers
to his article that advocates for an
express power to order cy-près distribution where it is “not
practical or possible
to compensate class members directly, using best but
reasonable efforts”), Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission) and Nicole Smith (by implication).
[756] For example, where
individual losses are very low and the administrative costs of paying those
amounts to individual class members
would absorb a significant portion of the
monetary relief award, or where class members are unlikely to participate in the
process
required to receive their portion of the monetary relief awarded
[757] It referred to the Palm
Island class action settlement scheme (Wotton v State of Queensland (No
10) [2018] FCA 915) where if following two rounds of payments there was
money left over from the settlement pool but the leftover money was less than
$100 per registered group member, this leftover money would instead be paid to
the Cathy Freeman Foundation which provides support
to Indigenous students on
Palm Island.
[758] Vince Morabito referred
us to the article Georgina Dimopoulos and Vince Morabito “Cy-près
Remedies in Class Actions
– Quo Vadis?” (2021) 95 ALJ 710 at
726.
[759] Draft legislation, cl
11.
[760] Draft legislation, cl
11(3).
[761] We note the Australian
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) recommended against measures that redirect
unclaimed aggregate damages in alternative
ways (including cy-près),
noting that the Australian class action procedure was not intended “to
penalise ... or to
deter behaviour to any greater extent than provided for under
the existing law”: Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings
in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [239] and [236]–[240].
[762] See Issues Paper at
[5.24]–[5.28] and Jasminka Kalajdzic Class Actions in Canada: The
Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018) at 51
and 70.
[763] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.52].
[764] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson, Shine
Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole
Smith and
Tom Weston QC.
[765] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole
Smith.
[766] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council, Johnson & Johnson (said it supported our approach ‘for the
reasons given’), Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson
Salim, Simpson Grierson and Shine Lawyers.
[767] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Rhonson Salim, Nicole Smith and
Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission).
[768] Gilbert Walker, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[769] Rhonson Salim.
[770] Simpson Grierson. Nicole
Smith also suggested that, in the competing class actions context, the
unsuccessful representative plaintiff
should be able to appeal as of right.
[771] Shine Lawyers.
[772] Tom Weston QC.
[773] Senior Courts Act 2016,
s 56(4)..
[774] Senior Courts Act 2016,
ss 56(3) and 56(5)-(6).
[775] See Chapter 5.
[776] Senior Courts Act 2016,
ss 56(3) and 56(5)-(6).
[777] May v May (1982)
1 NZFLR 165 (CA) at 170, Blackstone v Blackstone [2008] NZCA 312, 19 PRNZ
40 at [8] and K v B [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [32].
[778] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [5.63].
[779] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Vince Morabito, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[780] Chapman Tripp, Gilbert
Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Vince Morabito,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[781] Chapman Tripp, Gilbert
Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson. Nicole
Smith supported such an appeal right if class members had previously opted in.
Vince Morabito
supported an appeal right and did not mention a leave
requirement.
[782] Bell Gully, Johnson
& Johnson, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and
Simpson Grierson.
[783] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.2]–[6.3].
[784] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa |
Insurance Council of New Zealand,
Institute of Directors, Johnson & Johnson,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Te Kāhui Ture o
Aotearoa
| New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission)
and Nicole Smith.
[785] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Institute of Directors, Johnson
& Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o
Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers,
Simpson Grierson,
Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission)
and Nicole Smith. In addition, Vince Morabito referred us to his article
“An Australian Perspective on the Judicial Review of Class Action
Settlements” (2021) 29 New Zealand Universities Law Review 52, which tends
to indicate support for judicial approval of settlements.
[786] We were told in
Australia it typically costs $200,000 to $500,000 for the settlement approval
process and takes three to six months
to prepare for a settlement hearing.
[787] Draft legislation, cl
12(1).
[788] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.12] and [6.14] and draft legislation (September 2021 version), cl
6(2).
[789] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.17].
[790] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston
QC.
[791] Chapman Tripp, Insurance
Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[792] Draft legislation, cl
12(2). If the application is made prior to certification, it should be made by
the proposed representative
plaintiff.
[793] See High Court Rules
2016, r 7.19 and Form G 31.
[794] When applying for
approval of a class action settlement in the Federal Court of Australia,
supporting material will usually be required
to address “the terms of any
advice received from counsel and/or from any independent expert in relation to
the issues which
arise in the proceeding”: Class Actions Practice Note
(Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note GPN-CA, December 2019) at
[15.5](j). In the United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal,
an application for
settlement of a class action may include “any opinion of the
applicants’ legal representatives as
to the merits of the collective
settlement”: The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 94(4)(c).
[795] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.24].
[796] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.29].
[797] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.25].
[798] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.30].
[799] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[800] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[801] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[802] Nikki Chamberlain,
Consumer NZ and Insurance Council.
[803] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni
Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson
Grierson.
[804] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.33].
[805] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission) and Nicole
Smith.
[806] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[807] Chapman Tripp.
Similarly, the Insurance Council said the timeframe should be reasonable but
finite so that one class member cannot
hold up the settlement process for an
unduly long period of time.
[808] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[809] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[810] Nikki Chamberlain.
[811] Simpson Grierson.
[812] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[813] Shine Lawyers.
[814] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[815] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[816] Nicole Smith.
[817] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.40]–[6.41].
[818] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.42].
[819] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and
Nicole Smith.
[820] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[821] Nikki Chamberlain,
Johnson & Johnson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint
submission) (although they did not
express a view on whether an express power
was necessary for the court to do this) and Nicole Smith.
[822] Chapman Tripp and
Simpson Grierson.
[823] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[824] Insurance Council.
[825] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.35].
[826] We have also taken this
approach in the context of the court’s power to approve funding
agreements: see Chapter 17.
[827] Draft legislation, cl
17(1).
[828] Draft legislation, cl
17(2).
[829] Where the court appoints
a court expert on its own initiative, it may order the costs of the expert to be
paid for by Te Tāhū
o te Ture | Ministry of Justice: see High Court
Rules 2016, r 9.41(3). The court can also order the costs of a counsel to assist
to be paid out of public funds: see Senior Courts Act 2016, s 178.
[830] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.49]–[6.50].
[831] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.58]–[6.90].
[832] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.91]–[6.99].
[833] Submitters who agreed
with the proposed test were: Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council,
Johnson & Johnson, LPF
Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission). Chapman Tripp preferred a different
test.
[834] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Institute of
Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson & Johnson,
LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts,
Omni Bridgeway,
Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[835] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group,
Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[836] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group,
Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[837] Nikki Chamberlain,
Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Shine Lawyers and Simpson
Grierson.
[838] Nikki Chamberlain,
Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Shine Lawyers
and Simpson Grierson.
[839] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group and
Shine Lawyers.
[840] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, Omni
Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.
[841] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway (it agreed with our proposed list of factors
as long as they were not
exhaustive or mandatory) and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission). Some participants at our consultation
workshops also suggested the factors should not be mandatory.
[842] Nikki Chamberlain,
Michael Duffy and Insurance Council.
[843] We discussed cost
sharing orders in Chapter 9.
[844] Draft legislation, cl
14.
[845] Class Proceedings Act SO
1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 27.1(5). We discuss the tests applied in overseas
jurisdictions in the Supplementary
Issues Paper at [6.44]–[6.50].
[846] See Prygodicz v
Commonwealth of Australia (no 2) [2021] FCA 634 at [85]; Evans v
Davantage Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 70 at [15]; Blairgowrie Trading
Ltd v Allco Finance Group Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 330, (2017) 343 ALR 476 at
[81].
[847] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497. The Court said at [61]
that there was no reason to approach the approval of a “settling
discontinuance” by a different
standard to that applying to
settlements.
[848] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497 at [3] and [130].
[849] Draft legislation, cl
14.
[850] We discuss this issue in
the Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.51]–[6.58].
[851] In Australia, the court
has separate powers to approve a settlement and make orders with respect to
distribution of a settlement:
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s
33V(1) and 33V(2).
[852] We discuss these issues
in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.64].
[853] This is in line with our
recommendations on when a court should be able to award aggregate monetary
relief to be paid on an alternative
distribution basis, which we discuss in
Chapter 10.
[854] Re Strahl [2021]
NZHC 3608.
[855] Re Strahl [2021]
NZHC 3608 at [63].
[856] Re Strahl [2021]
NZHC 3608 at [86]. We note this was an application to approve a proposed
methodology for the distribution of settlement funds, rather than an application
to approve the settlement with the defendant.
[857] We discuss this issue in
the Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.66]–[6.67].
[858] See Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.75]–[6.78].
[859] See Chapter 5 of the
Issues Paper.
[860] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 9.
[861] Damian Grave, Ken Adams
and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters,
Sydney, 2022) at [19.840].
[862] For example, see
Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1598, (2002) 122 FCR 168 and
Bywater v Appco Group Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1877.
[863] See Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.35].
[864] Earlier in this chapter
we suggest the representative plaintiff could be responsible for collating
expressions of support and conveying
them to the court.
[865] We discuss cost sharing
orders in Chapter 9.
[866] Damian Grave, Ken Adams
and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters,
Sydney, 2022) at [19.790].
[867] Damian Grave, Ken Adams
and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters,
Sydney, 2022) at [19.790].
[868] Draft legislation, cl
15(1)(c).
[869] Draft legislation, cl
15(2).
[870] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.101]-[6.102].
[871] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.105]–[6.106].
[872] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[873] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. In
addition Shine Lawyers supported a “soft class closure” order, that
would operate
for a specified period. It said class members who did not register
or opt out should still enjoy the benefit of a ceased limitation
period (until
the settlement was approved) and they should continue to be class members if the
matter does not settle within the
specified period.
[874] Class closure orders and
closed class descriptions have been developed as ways of getting around this
issue. See Issues Paper at
[12.50a] and Supplementary Issues Paper at
[6.102]–[6.104].
[875] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.110]–[6.115].
[876] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith. (We
note
that while we received separate submissions from Maurice Blackburn and
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, they make the
same points on this
question. For simplicity, where we discuss reasons provided by submitters, we
have referred to Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia).
[877] Although we note that
two other submitters implicitly agreed with the right to opt-out in their
submissions on the notice of approved
settlement.
[878] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni
Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[879] It may be more
straightforward for the class member to bring or settle their own individual
claim because of the development of
the claims through the class action. In some
cases, a settlement has been reached after the court’s decision on common
issues.
[880] Draft legislation, cl
15(1)(a)(i).
[881] See Class Actions
Practice Note (Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note GPN-CA, December
2019) at [15.2(p)], which states that notice of a proposed settlement
should
outline any steps required to be taken by persons wishing to opt out of the
settlement “if that is possible under the
terms of the
settlement”.
[882] Robertson v ProQuest
Information and Learning LLC 2011 ONSC 2629 at [25]. The parties also agreed
the defendant could unilaterally terminate the settlement if more than 300 class
members opted out.
[883] Draft legislation, cl
15(1)(a)(ii).
[884] Prygodicz v
Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 634 at [255] and [260].
[885] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.117].
[886] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, GCA Lawyers, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson,
Maurice Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[887] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp and Insurance Council.
[888] GCA Lawyers, Maurice
Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Omni Bridgeway.
[889] Draft legislation, cl
15(1)(b)(i).
[890] Draft legislation, cl
15(1)(b)(ii).
[891] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.7]–[6.8].
[892] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.118].
[893] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.122].
[894] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[895] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson and Simpson Grierson.
[896] Earlier in this chapter,
we recommended that a settlement reached prior to certification requires court
approval in order to be
binding.
[897] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.128].
[898] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.130].
[899] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.129].
[900] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and
Nicole Smith.
[901] Insurance Council,
Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson
Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson,
Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter
Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[902] Draft legislation, cl
16(1).
[903] We discuss settlement
outcome reports later in this chapter.
[904] Draft legislation, cl
16(3).
[905] Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V(2).
[906] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.131]–[6.132].
[907] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole
Smith.
[908] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers (it said a third-party administrator may
be appropriate where the role
merely involves providing a payment to class
members).
[909] Johnson & Johnson.
In addition, the Insurance Council commented it should not be necessary for an
administrator to have a legal
qualification.
[910] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[911] Nicole Smith.
[912] Nicole Smith.
[913] Omni Bridgeway, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers. However, Bell Gully said
the representative plaintiff’s
law firm should not fulfil the role.
[914] Draft legislation, cl
16(2).
[915] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.136]–[6.141].
[916] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson &
Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine
Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[917] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson and Nicole Smith.
[918] Nikki Chamberlain
(subject to any confidentiality orders), Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway
and Shine Lawyers (subject to any
confidentiality orders).
[919] Issues Paper at
[5.24]–[5.25].
[920] Draft legislation, cl
16(4).
[921] We discuss this aspect
of access to justice in the Issues Paper at [5.22].
[922] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [3.66]–[3.70].
[923] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
Vince Morabito, Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and
Nicole Smith.
[924] Chapman Tripp, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Nicole Smith. Shine Lawyers supported
court supervision and/or a communications
protocol. In addition, Vince Morabito
referred us to his article on judicial supervision of individual settlements
with class members:
Vince Morabito “Judicial Supervision of Individual
Settlements with Class Members in Australia, Canada and the United States”
(2003) 38 Tex Int’l LJ 663 at 723–727.
[925] Bell Gully, Gilbert
Walker, Johnson & Johnson, Simpson Grierson and Philp Skelton QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[926] Gilbert Walker and
Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[927] Johnson & Johnson
thought the process on communications with class members outlined in Part 11 of
the Class Actions Practice Note (Federal Court of Australia, Practice
Note GPN-CA, December 2019) was appropriate.
[928] Unless the court made an
order allowing the class member an additional opportunity to opt out of the
class action. In Chapter 8
we recommend such an order should only be granted
where the interests of justice require it.
[929] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.
[930] We note that in Ross
v Southern Response, the Court made decisions on the contents of the opt-out
notice and defendant communications with class members at the same time: see
Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2452 and
Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2453.
[931] See King v AG
Australia Holdings Ltd [2002] FCA 872, (2002) 121 FCR 480 at [42];
Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 957, (2002) 122 FCR 168 at [45];
Bates v Dow Corning (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 927 at [16].
[932] Federal Court of
Australia Act (Cth), s 33W(1).
[933] The Competition Appeal
Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), rr 86 and 94(1).
[934] In Chapter 6 we
recommend the court should only allow a representative plaintiff to withdraw
from the role with the leave of the
court.
[935] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [6.10].
[936] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.
[937] See Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V(1) and Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6
(Ontario), s 29(1).
[938] Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [83].
[939] Mercedes Holdings Pty
v Waters (No 1) [2010] FCA 124, (2010) 77 ACSR 265 at [10]. See also
Wotton v Queensland [2009] FCA 534, (2009) 109 ALD 534 at
[37]–[40].
[940] Laine v Thiess Ptd
Ltd [2016] VSC 689 at [34]; Babscay Ptd Ltd v Pitcher Partners [2020]
FCA 1610, (2020) 148 ACSR 551 at [3], [29]; Markovic v Unified
Security Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 840 at [11].
[941] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497 at [55].
[942] See Johnson v North
American Palladium Ltd 2021 ONSC 3346 at [15].
[943] See Babscay Ptd Ltd v
Pitcher Partners [2020] FCA 1610, (2020) 148 ACSR 551 at [22]. This
is referred to in Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021]
NZHC 3497 at [54].
[944] See Babscay Ptd Ltd v
Pitcher Partners [2020] FCA 1610, (2020) 148 ACSR 551 at [23].
[945] We prefer the approach
followed in authorities such as Laine v Thiess Ptd Ltd [2016] VSC 689 to
the approach in Mercedes Holdings Pty v Waters (No 1) (2010) [2010] FCA
124, 77 ACSR 265.
[946] In Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497 at [46] and [61], the
court distinguished between a “unilateral discontinuance” and a
“settling discontinuance”.
[947] High Court Rules 2016, r
14.2(1)(a).
[948] Issues Paper at
[13.5]–[13.8].
[949] Issues Paper at [13.10].
[950] Issues Paper at
[13.9].
[951] Issues Paper at
[13.13]–[13.14].
[952] Issues Paper at
[13.35]–[13.36]. Security for costs in Te Kōti Matua | High Court is
governed by the High Court Rules
2016, r 5.45. Security may be awarded where it
is just, and either the plaintiff is not resident or incorporated in Aotearoa
New
Zealand, or there is reason to believe they would be unable to pay the
defendant’s costs if unsuccessful. A security for costs
order gives the
defendant some protection against the risk a plaintiff will not meet an adverse
costs order. We discuss security
for costs in funded proceedings in
Chapter 15.
[953] Issues Paper at
[13.19]–[13.30].
[954] Issues Paper at
[13.31]–[13.34].
[955] Bell Gully, Tony Ellis,
Insurance Council, LPF Group, Meredith Connell, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston
QC.
[956] Although Simpson
Grierson commented that there may be a small number of marginal cases where the
risk of adverse costs dissuades
a class from bringing an action.
[957] In addition, Tony Ellis
referred to litigants not bringing ordinary litigation because of the risk of
adverse costs. He also referred
to the difficulty in continuing with a case when
there was a settlement offer on the table, because rejecting a Calderbank offer
could lead to increased costs.
[958] We asked participants
who would not have brought their own individual proceeding what the reasons were
for that, with respondents
able to select multiple options. The most popular
response was ‘too expensive’ (with 334 people selecting this option)
and the second most popular response was ‘risk of having to pay
defendant’s legal costs’ (192 people selected this
option). A total
of 409 people answered our survey.
[959] Barry Allan, Association
of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey,
Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman
Tripp, Michael Duffy, Insurance Counsel, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom
Weston
QC.
[960] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp and Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance
Council of New Zealand.
[961] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia.
[962] Bell Gully.
[963] Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia.
[964] Nikki Chamberlain, Tony
Ellis and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[965] Bell Gully, Nikki
Chamberlain, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[966] Jennifer Braithwaite,
Jasminka Kalajdzic and NZ Shareholders’ Association.
[967] Chapman Tripp.
[968] Consumer NZ.
[969] Institute of
Directors.
[970] Vince Morabito.
[971] Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[972] As noted above, our
survey of group members in representative actions indicated that the cost of
bringing litigation was the primary
reason why individuals would not have
brought their own individual proceeding, with the risk of adverse costs second.
[973] See Issues Paper at
[2.22].
[974] Lawyers and Conveyancers
Act 2006, ss 333–335.
[975] High Court Rules 2016, r
14.7(e).
[976] Law Commission of
Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final
Report (July 2019) at 84.
[977] Victorian Law Reform
Commission Access to Justice—Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings:
Report (March 2018) at [5.8].
[978] Issues Paper at
[13.11].
[979] Issues Paper at
[13.22]–[13.23].
[980] Law Commission of
Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and
Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 88.
[981] High Court Rules 2016, r
14.8.
[982] See Locking v McCowan
2016 ONSC 7854 at [7], Quinte v Eastwood Mall Inc 2014 ONSC 1661 at
[5], and Frank v Farlie, Turner & Co 2013 ONSC 4364 at
[29]–[32]. As we discuss below, costs in the cause means the party who is
ultimately unsuccessful in the substantive proceeding
is liable to pay costs for
certification.
[983] Where the court declines
to certify a proposed class action and there is no appeal, we envisage costs
would be fixed and payable
following the court’s decision.
[984] High Court Rules 2016, r
14.8(1).
[985] Chapman v Badon Ltd
[2010] NZCA 613, 20 PRNZ 83 at [12].
[986] High Court Rules 2016, r
14.8(2).
[987] This point has been made
in relation to the Canadian regime: 2038724 Ontario Ltd v Quizno’s
Canada Restaurant Corp [2008] 96 OR (3d) 252 (ONSC) at [22].
[988] Strathboss Kiwifruit
Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 2482,
23 PRNZ 64 at [19], [21] and [23].
[989] “Costs in the
cause” means that the costs of an interlocutory proceeding is to be
awarded according to the final award
of costs in the case. If the plaintiff is
ultimately successful in the case, they will get interlocutory costs as part of
the costs
awarded against the defendant and vice versa: see JT Stratford
& Son Ltd v Lindley and Others (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 (CA) at
1123.
[990] Situations where costs
in the cause have been ordered include where a party has successfully appealed a
summary judgment, where
an injunction has been successfully obtained, and where
both parties have partially succeeded.
[991] Strathboss Kiwifruit
Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 2482, (2015) 23 PRNZ 64 [Strathboss -
costs] at [24]–[25].
[992] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2452 [Ross - notification
application] at [193].
[993] In Labourers’
Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada 2015 ONSC 6354 at
[137], the Court observed there was not a general practice of making
costs in the cause in contested certification applications because certification
was a procedural step that was independent from the ultimate merits of the
litigation. The outcome of the common issues trial did
not mean that the
proceeding should not have been certified.
[994] See High Court Rules
2016, sch 2 (appropriate daily recovery rates) and sch 3 (time allocations).
[995] High Court Rules 2016, r
14.3.
[996] See for example
Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 62 at
[38]–[39], where the Court considered it was appropriate to award costs
for the provision of particulars. Although there was normally
no allowance for
this, the particulars ordered were extensive and necessary (in part) because the
case was a representative action.
[997] Ross v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431, (2019) 25 PRNZ 33 at
[108]; Houghton v Saunders [2011] NZHC 542; (2011) 20 PRNZ 509 (HC) at [211]; Houghton
v Saunders HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-348, 26 May 2010 at [43]; Hedley
v Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd (2000) 15 PRNZ 210 at [32].
[998] Houghton v Saunders
HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-348, 26 May 2010 at [36]–[43].
[999] We note that in
Australia, research has shown “numerous instances” of class members
adding comments on their opt‑out
forms which indicated a mistaken belief
that the class action could expose them to liability for costs: Vince Morabito
and Naomi
Hatcher “Security for Costs in Unfunded Federal Class Actions:
Back to the Future” (2018) 92 ALJ 105 at 114.
[1000] For example, see
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43(1A). See also Issues Paper at
[13.10].
[1001] Class Proceedings Act
SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 31(2). There are similar provisions in other Canadian
regimes: see Issues Paper at
[13.10].
[1002] See Bancroft-Snell
v Visa Canada Corporation 2020 ONCA 549 at [7] and Trillium Motor World
Ltd v General Motors of Canada Ltd 2017 ONCA 545 at [61].
[1003] This relies on the
court’s jurisdiction under Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s
14, which enables the court to
grant a class member leave to participate on
whatever terms it considers appropriate, including as to costs. See
Bancroft-Snell v Visa Canada Corporation 2020 ONCA 549 at [7] and [10]
and Silver v Imax Corporation 2012 ONSC 4064 at [12].
[1004] The Competition
Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 98.
[1005] See Australian Law
Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46,
1988) at [169].
[1006] In Chapter 8, we
recommend the court should have a power to give directions with respect to the
determination of individual issues.
[1007] Our recommendations
on limitation in Chapter 4 will not assist a class member where the limitation
period expired prior to the class
action proceeding being commenced.
[1008] We discuss
sub-classes in Chapter 8.
[1009] We discuss the
contents of the opt-in or opt-out notice in Chapter 8.
[1010] Issues Paper at
[13.36].
[1011] For detailed
discussion, see Issues Paper at Chapter 17.
[1012] Issues Paper at
Chapter 16.
[1013]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2016] NZCA 338 at [14].
[1014] We discuss
maintenance and champerty in the Issues Paper in Chapters 15, 16 and 18.
[1015] Law Reform Commission
of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia
(Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 14; PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker
[2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [121] per Elias CJ.
[1016] See
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC
151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [121] per Elias CJ.
[1017] See Issues Paper at
[15.6]–[15.12].
[1018] See Issues Paper at
[16.7]–[16.11] and Chapter 1. See also Houghton v Saunders [2008] NZHC 1569; (2008)
19 PRNZ 173 (HC) at [177], and Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610,
[2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28] and [77].
[1019] Auckland City
Council as Assignee of Body Corporate 16113 v Auckland City Council [2007] NZHC 1411; [2008] 1
NZLR 838 (HC) at [16]–[17]; Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610,
[2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28]. See also Issues Paper at [16.9]–[16.10].
[1020]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[111] per Elias CJ.
[1021] For detailed
discussion, see Issues Paper at Chapter 18.
[1022] See Issues Paper at
[18.2]–[18.9].
[1023] See Issues Paper at
[18.22]–[18.25].
[1024] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 11.
[1025] See Issues Paper at
[18.22]–[18.25].
[1026] See Issues Paper at
[18.19].
[1027] See Issues Paper at
[18.14].
[1028] See Issues Paper at
[18.17].
[1029] The Law Reform
Commission of Western Australia has also recommended the torts should be
abolished, subject to a preservation provision:
Maintenance and Champerty in
Western Australia (Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 2, Recommendation
1.
[1030] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at
10–11. See also Issues Paper at [18.37].
[1031] Submitters who
answered Question 37 of the Issues Paper were: Barry Allan, Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew
Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay,
BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper,
Michael Duffy
, Tony Ellis, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Te
Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Murray Lazelle, LPF Group, Marsh, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Hīkina Whakatutuki
| Ministry of
Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Law Society (NZLS), NZ Shareholders’
Association, NZX, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Christopher St Johanser, Tempest, Vicki Waye and
Tom Weston QC. Some submitters
on the Issues Paper commented on the advantages
and disadvantages of permitting litigation funding in their responses to other
questions
in the Issues Paper, however they are not recorded in this list. In
addition, a number of submitters on the Supplementary Issues
Paper also
commented on the potential advantages and disadvantages of litigation funding,
including David Bigio QC, GCA Lawyers,
Andrew Harmos, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group,
MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Ross Asset Management Investors Group and Philip Skelton
QC/Kelly
Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).
[1032] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully,
BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper,
Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, MBIE, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson
Grierson, Christopher St Johanser, Tempest and Vicki Waye.
[1033] Barry Allan, Andrew
Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Institute
of Directors, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson,
Murray Lazelle, Marsh, NZX, Simpson Grierson and Tempest.
[1034] Barry Allan, Andrew
Barker QC, Bell Gully, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Johnson &
Johnson, Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Simpson Grierson and
Tempest.
[1035] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully,
BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper,
Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson &
Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Christopher St Johanser, Tempest and Vicki Waye.
[1036] Andrew Barker QC,
Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ (implied) and Gilbert Walker.
[1037] For example, Barry
Allan, IBA Antitrust Committee and Vicki Waye. Some submitters on the
Supplementary Issues Paper also made this
point.
[1038] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group and Omni Bridgeway.
[1039] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, DLA Piper, IBA Antitrust Committee
and NZLS.
[1040] Andrew Barker QC,
Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Vicki Waye and Tom
Weston QC.
[1041] Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee and Vicki Waye.
[1042] Chapman Tripp,
Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and NZLS.
[1043] Barry Allan, Chapman
Tripp, Consumer NZ, Institute of Directors, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, NZLS, Simpson Grierson
and Tempest.
[1044] Buddle Findlay,
Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee and Simpson
Grierson.
[1045] Chapman Tripp,
Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS and Simpson
Grierson. Barry Allan said the present
market in Aotearoa New Zealand does not
suggest any need for concern, but cautioned that less scrupulous funders may
emerge as the
market matures. Tempest said vexatious and frivolous claims will
be bolstered if funders are “allowed to speculate in
litigation”.
[1046] Buddle Findlay,
Institute of Directors and Insurance Council. Simpson Grierson considered this a
risk in the “absence of further
regulation of litigation
funders”.
[1047] Insurance Council,
Institute of Directors, Marsh and NZX.
[1048] Marsh.
[1049] Insurance
Council.
[1050] In particular, Marsh
said the average rate per million increase for D&O insurance for ASX250
clients in 2020 was 182 per cent
above 2019, and the average retention increased
for the same period by 211 per cent.
[1051] In particular, Marsh
said it has become increasingly difficult to purchase companies securities
cover.
[1052] Institute of
Directors, Insurance Council and Marsh.
[1053] For example, its own
submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission’s inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party
Litigation Funders.
[1054] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZ Shareholders’ Association and Vicki
Waye.
[1055] NZ
Shareholders’ Association and Vicki Waye.
[1056] Bell Gully, Michael
Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson and Murray Lazelle.
[1057] Bell Gully, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson and Murray Lazelle.
[1058] Andrew Barker QC,
Bell Gully, Michael Duffy and the IBA Antitrust Committee.
[1059] Chapman Tripp,
Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia.
[1060] Andrew Barker QC,
Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully,
BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, LPF Group,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ
Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole
Smith, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1061] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer
NZ, DLA Piper, Gilbert Walker,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia,
NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1062] Claims Resolution
Service, Gilbert Walker, LPF Group and NZLS.
[1063] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, BusinessNZ, Nicole Smith and
Vicki Waye. Tom Weston QC said there is
little benefit in establishing a class
actions regime without also addressing litigation funding, but this does not
necessarily make
funding “desirable”.
[1064] Chapman Tripp,
Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson
Grierson.
[1065] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, NZ Shareholders’ Association and NZX.
[1066] Andrew Barker QC,
Carter Holt Harvey and Tom Weston QC.
[1067] Participants could
give an answer ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely likely). The
numerical breakdown of responses
was: 330 participants answered 1 (not at all
likely), 55 answered 2, 11 answered 3, one answered 4 and 11 answered 5
(extremely likely).
For information on the survey see Chapter 1.
[1068] Participants could
select one or more of 10 reasons, including “other” (in which they
could type their own answer).
[1069] 334 responses.
[1070] 192
responses.
[1071] 188 responses.
[1072] 181 responses.
[1073] 165 responses.
[1074] 141 responses
[1075] 105 responses.
[1076] 82 responses.
[1077] Participants could
give an answer ranging from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive). The
numerical breakdown of responses was:
82 participants answered 5 (very
positive), 71 answered 4, 65 answered 3, five answered 2 and four answered 1
(very negative).
[1078]
Participants could give an answer ranging from 1
(very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). 32 participants answered 5 (very
satisfied),
75 answered 4, 102 answered 3, 15 answered 2 and four answered 1
(very unsatisfied).
[1079] This question
required a free-text response.
[1080] 98 responses.
[1081] 44 responses.
[1082] 29 responses.
[1083] 13 responses.
[1084] This question
required a ‘free text’ response.
[1085] 45 responses.
[1086] 19 responses.
[1087] Bell Gully,
BusinessNZ, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith and Vicki
Waye.
[1088] DLA Piper, LPF Group,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Nicole Smith.
[1089] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council, Simpson Grierson and Vicki Waye.
[1090] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter
Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy,
Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, NZLS, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston
QC.
[1091] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp,
Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Michael
Duffy, Tony Ellis, Insurance
Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni
Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson,
Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[1092] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA
Piper, Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, LPF
Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson and
Vicki Waye.
[1093] Bell Gully,
BusinessNZ and Insurance Council.
[1094] Cain v Mettrick
[2020] NZHC 2125.
[1095] Cain v Mettrick
[2020] NZHC 2125 at [72]. For discussion of this case, see Issues Paper at
[15.37].
[1096] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper, Tony Ellis, LPF Group and Omni
Bridgeway.
[1097] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia.
[1098] DLA Piper.
[1099] Chapman Tripp,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[1100] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 10.
[1101] See Chapter 2.
[1102] See Issues Paper at
Chapter 5 and [17.4].
[1103] See further Issues
Paper at [17.6] and [17.8].
[1104] See Issues Paper at
[17.11]–[17.14]. We discuss adverse costs in Chapter 12.
[1105] Issues Paper at
[17.43]–[17.48].
[1106] See also Chapter
2.
[1107] See Issues Paper at
[21.12]
[1108] See Issues Paper at
[21.12].
[1109]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[115]. See also: Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006]
HCA 41, (2006) 229 CLR 386 at [253]; Law Reform Commission of Western
Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia (Project 110:
Discussion Paper, 2019) at 8.
[1110] For examples of
jurisdictions that have abolished the torts, see Issues Paper at [18.17].
[1111] For example,
Houghton v Saunders [2008] NZHC 1569; (2008) 19 PRNZ 173 (HC) at [177]. See also
Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28] and
[77].
[1112]
Auckland City Council as Assignee of Body
Corporate 16113 v Auckland City Council [2007] NZHC 1411; [2008] 1 NZLR 838 (HC) at
[17], [36], [43] and [45]–[46]. See Issues Paper at
[15.8]–[15.9].
[1113] Saunders v
Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28].
[1114] Houghton v
Saunders [2008] NZHC 1569; (2008) 19 PRNZ 173 (HC) at [176].
[1115] Law Reform Commission
of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia
(Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 14.
[1116] Cain v Mettrick
[2020] NZHC 2125 at [41]–[43]. The litigation was being funded by
Winton Capital Ltd through PLF Services Ltd. Winton Capital specialised in
managing
and acquiring distressed assets and property developments. It had not
previously been involved in litigation funding of this kind
but had looked into
such opportunities. It was approached by the liquidators to fund the proceedings
and saw this as an opportunity
to make a return on its investment. The High
Court considered Winton had no problematic motives.
[1117] Cain v Mettrick
[2020] NZHC 2125 at [65] and [85].
[1118] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 11.
[1119] Stephen Todd
“Abuse of Legal Process” in Stephen Todd (ed) Todd on Torts
(8th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2019) at [18.4.04].
[1120] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91.
[1121] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [31], citing
Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 43,
(2009) 239 CLR 75 at [27] and IH Jacob “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the
Court” (1970) 23 CLP 23 at 43.
[1122] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].
[1123] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57]. There will
not be an abuse of process where the effective assignment under a funding
agreement is in favour of a party with a genuine
commercial interest:
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[77]. See also Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629 (CA)
at 645, and Samy Trustee Ltd v Pauanui Dream Estate Ltd [2020] NZHC 2118
at [25].
[1124] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].
[1125] Law Reform Commission
of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia
(Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 2, Recommendation 1.
[1126] Law Reform Commission
of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia
(Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 18–19.
[1127] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 11.
[1128] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [15.13]–[15.62].
[1129] See Saunders v
Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [63]; Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [86]; Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group [2017]
NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [78].
[1130] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [23.13]–[23.51].
[1131] Association of
Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice
Council, January 2018). For further discussion, see Issues Paper at
[23.17]–[23.18].
[1132] For discussion of
Australia’s approach to regulation of litigation funding, see Issues Paper
at [23.29]–[23.32].
[1133]
Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1.
For further discussion of court approval of funding arrangements see Issues
Paper
at [23.47]–[23.51]. See also Chapter 17.
[1134] Including from Andrew
Barker QC, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law
Office, Gilbert Walker, Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of
New Zealand, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, Michael
Legg, Murray
Lazelle, LPF Group, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society (NZLS), NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson
Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[1135] For example, Andrew
Barker QC, Carter Holt Harvey and Johnson & Johnson.
[1136] Andrew Barker QC.
[1137] For example,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia and DLA Piper.
[1138] Tempest Litigation
Funding and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1139] Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1140] For example, Bell
Gully, Insurance Council, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[1141] Other examples
include Gilbert Walker (which emphasised the need for regulation of funder
profits), the IBA Antitrust Committee
(which was especially concerned about
funder profits and conflicts of interest) and LPF Group (which emphasised the
need for regulation
to address uncertainty about whether litigation funding is
permitted, funder capital adequacy, funder presence in Aotearoa New Zealand,
conditional fee arrangements, disclosure and security for costs).
[1142] Barry Allan, Andrew
Barker QC, Bell Gully (implied), Buddle Findlay (implied), Colin Carruthers QC,
Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker,
Michael Legg, LPF Group and Vicki Waye.
[1143] Carter Holt Harvey
and Johnson & Johnson.
[1144] LPF Group.
[1145] For example, NZX said
the regulatory settings for litigation funding should be designed to ensure an
appropriate balance between
providing access to redress and the negative effects
of vexatious actions.
[1146] Barry Allan, Buddle
Findlay, Crown Law Office, Michael Legg, LPF Group and Vicki Waye.
[1147] For example, Barry
Allan, Andrew Barker QC, DLA Piper, Michael Legg, Vicki Waye and Woodsford
Litigation Funding.
[1148] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully,
Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt
Harvey, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki
Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Crown Law Office, DLA
Piper, Te Mana Tatai
Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA), Gilbert
Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Hīkina Whakatutuki | Ministry of
Business, Innovation and
Employment (MBIE), NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni
Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management
Investors Group, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye,
Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1149] Barry Allan, Andrew
Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Colin Carruthers QC,
Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, Michael Legg, LPF
Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’
Association,
NZX, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford
Litigation Funding. The Association of Litigation Funders of Australia
noted the
existing power in Australia for the court to approve class action settlements
and suggested that a statutory cap would
be unnecessary if the court has this
power. DLA Piper supports guidelines for funders, and said the court could take
non-compliance
into account when considering whether the funding agreement is an
abuse of process.
[1150] Barry Allan, Andrew
Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Colin Carruthers QC,
Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council,
IBA Antitrust Committee, NZLS, Simpson
Grierson and Tom Weston QC. DLA Piper explicitly said that court approval of
funding arrangements
is not necessary (and it is sufficient to disclose the
funder’s identity, location and amenability to the jurisdiction of the
court) but said the court should continue to have some oversight to the limited
extent of ensuring funding arrangements do not amount
to an abuse of
process.
[1151] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay,
Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and
Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1152] Andrew Barker QC,
Bell Gully, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council and IBA
Antitrust Committee.
[1153] Bell Gully, LPF Group
and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia. Crown Law Office said some
regulation may be warranted where
funding pricing models are used as the
starting point for orders that apply to class members who have not agreed to
them.
[1154] Supplementary Issues
Paper at [4.68]–[4.85] and Q 27.
[1155] Omni Bridgeway and
Simpson Grierson support a tailored licensing regime, overseen by the FMA. NZX
suggested an appropriate regulatory
body should establish a licensing regime for
funders of class actions. Bell Gully said it is not opposed to tailored
licensing requirements.
Vicki Waye said there may be merit in character
requirements for funders, for example through a bespoke licensing
requirement.
[1156] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper, FMA, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF
Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Vicki Waye and Woodsford
Litigation Funding. MBIE said more thought needs to be given to the
appropriateness of the FMA
as the potential regulator of litigation funders,
given the primary issue at hand is access to justice. Further, it said the
purpose
of litigation funding is inconsistent with the purposes of the Financial
Markets Conduct Act 2013, ss 3–4.
[1157] Financial Markets
Conduct Act 2013, s 9.
[1158] Financial Markets
Conduct Act 2013, s 9.
[1159] Johnson & Johnson
said robust regulation of funders is required to meet the interests of all
stakeholders, including defendants,
and considered funders should be subject to
a similar degree of prudential supervisions as other financial service
providers. Carter
Holt Harvey said there is no principled justification for
excusing funders from complying with securities law, and said the definition
of
a managed investment scheme under Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
does not differ materially from the definition
in the Financial Markets Conduct
Act 2013.
[1160] For example, Gilbert
Walker said that in some ways the relationship between a plaintiff and funder
resembles that of an investor
and issuer governed by the Financial Markets
Conduct Act 2013 and other corporate legislation. However, it said it did not
have developed
thoughts on what form regulation should take. NZLS submitted that
litigation funding is an unusual form of “financial product”,
and
supported prudential regulation by the Reserve Bank and operational oversight by
the courts rather than oversight by the FMA.
Bell Gully said it is not opposed
to imposing managed investment requirements on funders in principle, but noted
this has caused
problems in Australia. Chapman Tripp supported the FMA having an
oversight role (alongside the courts and Te Tāhū o te
Ture | Ministry
of Justice) but did not detail which matters should be overseen by the FMA, or
whether funders should be brought
within the scope of the Financial Markets
Conduct Act 2013.
[1161] BusinessNZ considers
industry regulation would be preferable to statutory regulation. LPF Group
supports industry regulation along
the lines of the Association of Litigation
Funders’ Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice
Council, January 2018).
[1162] Carter Holt Harvey,
Claims Resolution Service, Gilbert Walker and IBA Antitrust Committee.
[1163] Chapman Tripp and
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[1164] Issues Paper at
[23.8].
[1165] In cases under HCR
4.24, the courts have said it is the representative plaintiff who has costs
liability and individual group members
are generally not exposed to the risk of
an adverse costs order: Issues Paper at [13.9]. See also Chapter 12.
[1166] In Chapter 18 we
discuss recommendations to assist class members to make informed decisions about
their participation in a class
action.
[1167] In Chapter 7, we
recommend that the lawyer for the representative plaintiff should become the
lawyer for the class upon certification
and have a lawyer-client relationship
with the class as a whole. We also recommend NZLS consider amending the Lawyers
and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 to
clarify the duties the lawyer owes to the class.
[1168] For example, the
recent Mainzeal litigation was a funded liquidator action against the
former directors of Mainzeal, which collapsed in 2013 owing more than $110
million
to unpaid subcontractors and creditors. For discussion of this case, and
further information about the use of litigation funding
in insolvency and
insurance claims in Aotearoa New Zealand, see Issues Paper at
[14.28]–[14.32].
[1169] For example, Patel
v Patel [2014] NZHC 2410. In our conversations with some litigation funders,
they confirmed that relationship property disputes sometimes attract litigation
funding.
[1170] See Issues Paper at
Chapter 5 and Chapter 2 of this report.
[1171] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at xiii and xv.
[1172] Houghton v
Saunders [2020] NZHC 1088 at [74].
[1173] In Chapter 15, we
recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee consider
developing a High Court Rules to
create a rebuttable presumption that funded
representative plaintiffs will provide security for costs in class actions.
However,
a defendant will still need to apply for security in other funded
proceedings.
[1174] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at
[70]–[71].
[1175] See Issues Paper at
[9.18]–[9.19]. In Australia, see similar comments in: Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services Inquiry into Litigation
Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at
[11.53] and Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and
Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party
Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.64].
[1176] See Chapter 3, where
we note the court may have a more active role in the control, supervision and
disposition of class actions
than in other litigation because of the need to
ensure the interests of class members are adequately protected.
[1177] Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group [2017]
NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [79].
[1178] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [48], citing
Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41, (2006)
229 CLR 386 at [92] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.
[1179] Class Proceedings Act
SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(9)(a).
[1180] Class Proceedings Act
SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(10).
[1181] Class Proceedings Act
SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(2)–(3).
[1182] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018),
Recommendation 14(a).
[1183]
Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity,
Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and
Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.66].
[1184] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018),
Recommendation 14(b).
[1185] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020), Recommendation
11.
[1186] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020), Recommendation
11.
[1187] The Australian
Treasury sought stakeholder views on “exposure draft legislation to
promote a fair and reasonable distribution
of class action proceeds in
proceedings involving third party litigation funders” in September and
October 2021, see The Treasury
“Treasury Laws Amendment (Measures for
Consultation) Bill 2021: Litigation funders” <www.treasury.gov.au>.
The Australian Attorney-General subsequently stated that any class action
reforms will be deferred until after the 2022 Australian
Federal Election:
Michael Pelly “No time for federal ICAC: Cash” The Australian
Financial Review (online ed, 7 February 2022).
[1188] In BMW Australia
Ltd v Brewster, for example, one of the dissenting judges specifically
rejected the argument that making a common fund order required the Court
to
embark on an inquiry that was beyond its institutional competence: BMW
Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627 at [115]
per Gageler J. See also Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No
3) [2020] FCA 1885 at [22]–[25].
[1189] The Competition
Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 94(9); and United States Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, r 23(e)(2)(C). See
discussion in William B Rubenstein
Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §13:54. See
Chapter 11 and Issues Paper at [21.25].
[1190] For further
discussion about court approval of class action settlements, see Chapter 11.
[1191] In 2018, the
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) reached a similar conclusion in its
report Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018).
Although the ALRC had initially supported a licensing regime for funders in
a Discussion Paper, and although licensing was strongly
supported by submitters,
the ALRC concluded that improved court oversight of litigation funders
“would achieve at least the
same level of consumer protection without the
regulatory burden of a licensing regime”: at [6.37]. This view was
supported
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission who told the
ALRC that the court would be “better placed to regulate
litigation
funders, through court rules and procedure, oversight and security for
costs”: at [6.37].
[1192] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [23.33]—[23.37].
[1193] For an example from
Ontario, see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s 33.1(5) and (7).
[1194] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at
[67]–[76].
[1195] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [68].
[1196] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [73].
[1197] See Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [86] (noting it
would be “premature” to say there is an expectation that a funding
agreement should be disclosed where the
court grants leave for a representative
action under HCR 4.24(b)).
[1198] For discussion of
when a litigation funding agreement may amount to an abuse of process justifying
a stay of proceedings, see Chapter
13 at [13.74]–[13.75].
[1199] In Chapter 22 of the
Issues Paper, we discussed the financial obligations of the funder to the funded
plaintiff, the concern that
funders may have insufficient resources to fulfil
those obligations, and the consequences of a funder’s failure to meet
those
commitments.
[1200] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.10]–[22.16].
[1201] High Court Rules
2016, r 5.45(3)(a).
[1202] High Court Rules
2016, r 5.45(1). In the District Court, a power to order security is contained
in the District Court Rules 2014,
r 5.48.
[1203] Saunders v
Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [36]. Te Kōti Pira |
Court of Appeal referred to s 16 of the Judicature Act 1908 which confirmed the
ongoing inherent jurisdiction
of Te Kōti Matua | High Court. This provision
is now found in the Senior Courts Act 2018, s 12.
[1204] White v James
Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 188, (2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at [13].
[1205] Houghton v
Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [125]; Houghton v Saunders [2015] NZCA
141 at [11]; Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC
1596, (2015) 23 PRNZ 69 at [79]; Walker v Forbes [2017] NZHC 1212 at [33]
and [71].
[1206] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.18]–[22.23].
[1207] See Issues Paper at
[22.19]–[22.22], citing Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity,
Fairness and Efficiency – An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and
Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R 134, 2018) at Recommendation 12.
[1208] Issues Paper at
[22.26]–[22.51].
[1209] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.38].
[1210] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.36].
[1211] For instance, such
requirements may make funders more resilient to unexpected losses, help to
mitigate the risk that new entrants
to the funding market will not appreciate
the costs of conducting complex litigation like class actions, and reassure
plaintiffs
that the funder has sufficient funds to finance the case for its
entirety.
[1212] For further
discussion about the litigation funding market in Aotearoa New Zealand, see
Chapter 14 of the Issues Paper.
[1213] Corporations
Amendment (Litigation Funding) Regulations 2020 (Cth). See also Josh Frydenberg
(Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia)
“Litigation funders to be
regulated under the Corporations Act” (press release, 22 May 2020).
[1214] Corporations Act 2001
(Cth), s 912A(1)(d).
[1215] Issues Paper at
[22.35]–[22.51].
[1216] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp,
Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper,
Michael Duffy, Institute of Directors, Te
Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Michael Legg,
LPF Group,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson, Tom Weston QC, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1217] Bell Gully, Carter
Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Michael Duffy, Institute
of Directors, Insurance Council,
Michael Legg, LPF Group, Te Kāhui Ture o
Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Tom
Weston
QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1218] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and
Vicki Waye. One submission was unclear.
[1219] Carter Holt Harvey
and Insurance Council. Tom Weston QC pointed to the Feltex representative
action to illustrate the risks if there is not capital adequacy. BusinessNZ said
it is too early to say what future
concerns might arise and therefore how these
should be addressed.
[1220] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and
Vicki Waye. DLA Piper was also largely
unconcerned.
[1221] For example, terms
enabling the funded party to terminate the funding agreement in the event of an
unrectified default in payment
by the funder.
[1222] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey,
Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
DLA Piper, Insurance Council, LPF
Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson, Vicki
Waye and Tom Weston QC.
[1223] Carter Holt Harvey,
Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Simpson
Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
NZLS did not comment on the adequacy of the security
for costs mechanism, but supported funders being subject to minimum capital
adequacy requirements.
[1224] Insurance Council and
NZLS.
[1225] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper and Vicki Waye. Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said the existing
security for costs
mechanism is adequate, but it supported strengthening the mechanism.
[1226] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Carter Holt Harvey, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Insurance
Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson
Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[1227] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson
Grierson. Omni Bridgeway did not
think the security for costs regime should be strengthened. Three submissions
were unclear.
[1228] Bell Gully (in funded
class actions), Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (in funded class
actions), Insurance Council and
Simpson Grierson.
[1229] Chapman Tripp.
[1230] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson
Grierson.
[1231] Carter Holt Harvey,
Chapman Tripp and Simpson Grierson.
[1232] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, DLA
Piper, Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial
Markets Authority (FMA), Insurance
Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson, Vicki
Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1233] Chapman Tripp,
Insurance Council, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
Woodsford Litigation Funding supported
capital adequacy requirements, but only
as part of an industry self-regulation and oversight model, as in England and
Wales.
[1234] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Barry Allan, BusinessNZ, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Vicki Waye.
[1235] Chapman Tripp and
Insurance Council.
[1236] Insurance
Council.
[1237] Insurance
Council.
[1238] Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1239] Chapman Tripp,
Insurance Council and LPF Group.
[1240] Insurance Council,
Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.
[1241] Insurance Council and
LPF Group.
[1242] Omni Bridgeway and
Simpson Grierson.
[1243] Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1244] This is contained in
the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010.
[1245] Insurance
Council.
[1246] Simpson Grierson.
[1247] Tom Weston QC
supported Ontario’s regulation of litigation funding in class actions in
the Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c
6, s 33.1. See also Chapter 17 and Issues
Paper at [23.50].
[1248] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, BusinessNZ, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Vicki Waye.
[1249] We discuss plaintiff
concerns regarding a funder’s failure to maintain adequate capital in
Chapter 15.
[1250] In May 2020, the High
Court made an “unless” order striking out the proceedings unless
security for costs was provided
by a specified date and senior counsel for the
claimants confirmed the claimants were adequately resourced to prepare for and
present
their stage two claims: Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 1088 at
[92]. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal: Houghton v Saunders
[2020] NZCA 638. Te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court has declined leave to
appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision: Houghton v Saunders [2021]
NZSC 38.
[1251] The defendants were
awarded costs at the conclusion of the litigation, see Houghton v
Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590.
[1252] Houghton v
Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590 at [7].
[1253] See for example
White v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 188, (2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at
[13]–[14].
[1254]
See Houghton v Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at
[112]–[121]; White v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 188,
(2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at [13]–[15] (cited with approval in Houghton v
Saunders [2020] NZHC 2030 at [65]).
[1255] The Australian Law
Reform Commission also held this view. See Australian Law Reform Commission
Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency – An Inquiry into Class Action
Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
[6.51].
[1256] Although in
exceptional circumstances the court can make a costs order directly against a
non-party funder who takes an active role
in the proceedings: see Dymocks
Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd (No 2) [2004] UKPC 39, [2005] 1 NZLR
145 and Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1
NZLR 91 at [52]–[53].
[1257] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
Recommendation 12; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial
Services Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry
(December 2020) at Recommendation 10.
[1258] It said a presumption
will provide greater assurance to defendants that their costs will be met if
they successfully defend the
class action, while maintaining the court’s
discretion to allow the presumption to be rebutted in suitable cases: Australian
Government Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services report: Litigation Funding
and
the Regulation of the Class Actions Industry and The Australian Law Reform
Commission report: Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency
– An Inquiry into
Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (October 2021)
at 26.
[1259] See Issues Paper at
[15.44]–[15.47].
[1260] Houghton v
Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [125]; Houghton v Saunders [2015] NZCA
141 at [11]; Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC
1596, (2015) 23 PRNZ 69 at [79]; Walker v Forbes [2017] NZHC 1212 at [33]
and [71].
[1261] See Houghton v
Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [112]–[121]; White v James Hardie New
Zealand [2019] NZHC 188, (2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at [13]–[15] cited with
approval in Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 2030 at [65].
[1262] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
Recommendation 12 and [6.51]. Contrast the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry,
which did not recommend that security
should be in a form that is enforceable in
Australia. It acknowledged the argument that a defendant should not have to
litigate in
a foreign jurisdiction in order to recover their legal costs when
they have been successful in a class action, but recognised that
a
jurisdictional requirement could restrict the options available to a funder to
satisfy a security for costs order: Parliamentary
Joint Committee on
Corporations and Financial Services Litigation Funding and the Regulation of
the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at [10.59].
[1263] It said it is
unreasonable to expect a defendant to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction to
recover against the security provided:
Australian Government Australian
Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services report: Litigation Funding
and the Regulation of the Class
Actions Industry and The Australian Law Reform Commission report: Integrity,
Fairness and Efficiency
– An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and
Third-Party Litigation Funders (October 2021) at 26.
[1264] See Dymocks
Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd (No 2) [2004] UKPC 39, [2005] 1 NZLR
145 and Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1
NZLR 91 at [52]–[53].
[1265] Houghton v
Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590 at [82].
[1266] See Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [52]. With
respect to security for costs, see for example: Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v
Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1596, (2015) 23 PRNZ 69 at [89]; Houghton v
Saunders [2011] NZHC 542; (2011) 20 PRNZ 509 at [231] (plaintiff’s application to lift
the interim stay was granted subject to the plaintiff or the funder providing
security for
costs); Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group v Southern
Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2016] NZHC 3105 at [104].
[1267] Australian Law Reform
Commission Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation
Funders (ALRC DP85, 2018), Proposal 3-2.
[1268]
Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity,
Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and
Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.34] and [6.37].
[1269] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation Funding and the
Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 10
and [10.56]–[10.57]. See also Australian Securities and Investments
Commission, Submission
No 39 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations
and Financial Services Inquiry into Litigation Funding and the Regulation of
the Class Action Industry (June 2020) at [104] and [106].
[1270] Association of
Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice
Council, January 2018) at [9.4.2], and Association of Litigation Funders
Rules of the Association (July 2016), r 3.15.1.
[1271] See Issues Paper at
[22.38]. Similar amounts are prescribed in the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts
Litigation Funding Rules 2019,
the Hong Kong Code of Practice for Third Party
Funding in Arbitration, and Singapore’s Civil Law (Third-Party Funding)
Regulations
2017.
[1272] Issues Paper at
[22.37].
[1273] Woodsford Litigation
Funding supported a fixed minimum amount pursuant to a voluntary code of
conduct, as in England and Wales.
The Insurance Council thought minimum
requirements should correlate to the funder’s financial commitment in the
particular
proceeding.
[1274] For further
discussion about the litigation funding market in Aotearoa New Zealand, see
Issues Paper at Chapter 14.
[1275] We set out the
FMA’s submissions in Chapter 14 at [14.18].
[1276] In upholding the High
Court’s decision to strike out the proceedings due to the funder’s
difficulties in satisfying
the security for costs order, the Court of Appeal
said “...it is clearly contrary to the public interest to permit this
proceeding
to continue to absorb the finite resources of the courts, to the
detriment of other litigants, for a further – potentially
lengthy –
period”: Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZCA 638 at [89].
[1277] Security for costs is
governed by High Court Rule 5.45. It may be awarded where it is just, and either
the plaintiff is not resident
or incorporated in Aotearoa New Zealand, or there
is reason to believe they would be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if
unsuccessful.
[1278] McGechan on
Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [5.45], citing Clear White
Investments Ltd v Otis Trustee Ltd [2016] NZHC 2837 at [4].
[1279] In Chapter 3, we
address the relationship between the representative plaintiff and the class in a
class action, and we address the
relationship between the lawyer and the class
in Chapter 7.
[1280] We discuss
lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest in the Issues Paper at Chapter 20.
[1281] For further
discussion of these issues, see Issues Paper at [20.36]–[20.46].
[1282] For example, see the
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr
5.4, 5.5, 5.9 and 6.1. See also Issues Paper at [20.47].
[1283] The Western
Australian Supreme Court held that a lawyer breached their fiduciary duty in
failing to disclose that the funding agreement
provided the lawyer with a 20 per
cent reduction in fees if the case was unsuccessful, and a 25 per cent uplift if
the claim succeeded:
Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy [2003] WASCA 299,
(2003) 28 WAR 139 at [28]–[29].
[1284] The Committee
determined that, in the particular circumstances, it was not unreasonable for
the lawyer not to have advised the client
about the possibility of funding being
withdrawn: National Standards Committee v Shand [2019] NZLCDT 2 at
[36]–[39] and [57].
[1285] For more detailed
discussion on these options, see Issues Paper at [20.49]–[20.58].
[1286] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, Buddle Findlay, Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law
Office, Michael Duffy, Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of
New Zealand, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, LPF Group,
Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Simpson
Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1287] DLA Piper and Omni
Bridgeway (although Omni Bridgeway did suggest one amendment to the Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008). BusinessNZ said
issues do not yet appear to have arisen in Aotearoa New Zealand,
but there could
merit in providing guidance if the use of funding increases.
[1288] Buddle Findlay,
Michael Duffy and Tom Weston QC.
[1289] BusinessNZ.
[1290] DLA Piper and Omni
Bridgeway (although Omni Bridgeway did suggest one amendment to the Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008).
[1291] Bell Gully, Buddle
Findlay, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Insurance
Council, LPF Group, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway,
Simpson Grierson, Tom Weston QC and
Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1292]
Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Chapman Tripp (implied
in its suggestions for reform), Insurance Council, LPF Group, NZLS, Simpson
Grierson
and Tom Weston QC.
[1293] BusinessNZ, DLA
Piper, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1294] Corporations
Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 7.6.01AB(2) and Australian Securities and Investments
Commission Litigation schemes and proof of debt schemes: Managing conflicts
of interest (Regulatory Guide 248, April 2013).
[1295] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, and Simpson Grierson. In addition, Chapman Tripp supported a
prohibition on discretionary
rights for funders to terminate funding agreements.
DLA Piper supported guidelines on this minimum term but only if the status quo
is considered inadequate.
[1296] Bell Gully.
[1297] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[1298] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[1299] Chapman Tripp and
Simpson Grierson. DLA Piper supported guidelines on this minimum term but only
if the status quo is considered
inadequate.
[1300] Chapman Tripp,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson. DLA Piper
supported guidelines on this minimum term
but only if the status quo is
considered inadequate.
[1301] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council, LPF Group, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding. Crown
Law Office said consideration
should be given to how the Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 could assist.
[1302] Buddle Findlay and
Tom Weston QC.
[1303] Buddle Findlay and
LPF Group. DLA Piper supports guidelines on disclosure if the status quo is
considered inadequate.
[1304] Insurance Council and
Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1305] NZLS.
[1306] Tom Weston QC.
[1307] Buddle Findlay, LPF
Group and NZLS.
[1308] Bell Gully, Buddle
Findlay, Chapman Tripp, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Michael Duffy,
Simpson Grierson and Woodsford Litigation
Funding. In addition, Barry Allan said “a hard line needs to be drawn by
the law”
to respond to concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of
interest, and that “a lawyer intent on feathering his or her nest
with the
funder is not going to serve the interests of the plaintiff”. LPF Group
said there should be a prohibition on “success
fees or other fees
generated as a result of a successful outcome”.
[1309] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, LPF Group (implied), Simpson Grierson and Woodsford
Litigation Funding. Buddle Findlay
did not explicitly support a prohibition, but
said conflicts are exacerbated where lawyers “have a significant financial
stake
in any success resolution outcome”, and that it seems impossible for
lawyers to provide independent advice in this situation.
[1310] Bell Gully and Nicole
Smith. Michael Duffy thought independent legal advice might be appropriate if
there are potential conflicts
of interest. Omni Bridgeway said its funding
agreements already provide that it will pay for the representative plaintiff to
be independently
advised on the terms of the funding agreement.
[1311] Buddle Findlay,
BusinessNZ (would support this option if problems arise in the future), DLA
Piper (through guidelines if the status
quo is considered to be inadequate), LPF
Group and Michael Duffy.
[1312] In Chapter 17, we
also consider but reject the option of minimum contract terms as a response to
concerns about funder control and
funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest.
[1313] Prior to
certification, we consider the lawyer should still act in the interests of the
potential class as a whole.
[1314] More information
regarding the Independent Review is available on the NZLS website <www.lawsociety.org.nz>
[1315] See Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Litigation schemes and proof of debt
schemes: Managing conflicts of interest (Regulatory Guide 248, April 2013)
and Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and
Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party
Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.102]–[6.104].
[1316] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
Recommendation 21; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial
Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action
industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 26.
[1317] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
[7.153].
[1318]
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action
industry (December 2020) at [15.101].
[1319] Bolitho v Banksia
Securities Limited (No 4) [2014] VSC 582. See the summary of this case in
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services
Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry
(December 2020) at 276–278.
[1320] Bolitho v Banksia
Securities Ltd (No 18) (remitter) [2021] VSC 666 at [3].
[1321] This included
information about the fee agreements, work completed, fees charged and paid, the
role and commission of the funder,
and a misleading assessment of the
reasonableness of the costs by a costs assessor appointed by the team of lawyers
and litigation
funder.
[1322] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [15.102].
[1323] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at Recommendation
26.
[1324] Legal Profession
(Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Singapore), r 49B.
[1325] Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 333–336 and Lawyers and Conveyancers Act
(Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 9.8–9.12.
[1326] Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 333.
[1327] Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 9.2 and
9.9.
[1328] Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 9.
[1329] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
[7.139]–[7.148], Recommendation 20.
[1330] Clasul Pty Ltd v
Commonwealth [2016] FCA 1119.
[1331] Michael Legg
“Regulations needed for litigation funders who can’t pay out when
cases fail” The Conversation (online ed, Australia, 15 February
2017).
[1332] Clasul Pty Ltd v
Commonwealth [2016] FCA 1119 at [6].
[1333] Houghton v
Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590.
[1334] Issues Paper at
[22.16] and [22.27]–[22.29].
[1335] LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/ Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[1336] See Chapter 7.
[1337] See submission by
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[1338] We discuss
discontinuance in Chapter 11.
[1339] Issues Paper at
Chapter 19 and Chapter 20.
[1340] For instance, funders
want to be kept informed of important developments in the litigation and most
will also expect to be consulted
before major decisions are taken, particularly
in relation to settlement. They may also want to approve or choose the legal
team
responsible for conducting the case. See Issues Paper at
[19.2]–[19.4].
[1341] See Issues Paper at
[20.6]–[20.9]. For completeness, we note the interests of the funder and
plaintiff will often align.
[1342] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].
[1343] For example, see
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[126] per Elias CJ.
[1344]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[122].
[1345]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[91] per Glazebrook, Arnold, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ.
[1346]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[82] per Glazebrook, Arnold, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ.
[1347]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at
[126].
[1348] Issues Paper at
[20.10]–[20.12].
[1349] Issues Paper at
[21.7]–[21.8].
[1350] Issues Paper at
[21.9]–[21.11].
[1351] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].
[1352]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2016] NZCA 338 at [31].
[1353] The Issues Paper also
discussed other possible mechanisms for managing the concerns about funder
control, including the court’s
powers to strike out proceedings or make a
non-party costs order. However, we considered these mechanisms would only manage
the concerns
to a limited extent. See Issues Paper at [19.13]–[19.22].
[1354] The use of minimum
contract terms to manage funder control has been adopted in England and Wales in
the Association of Litigation
Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation
Funders (which applies to members of the Association of Litigation Funders),
by the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts and, in the arbitration
context, in
Singapore and Hong Kong. See Issues Paper at [19.23]–[19.28] and
[20.15]–[20.19].
[1355] Issues Paper at
[20.20]–[20.30].
[1356] Issues Paper at
[20.31]–[20.32].
[1357] For further
discussion, see Issues Paper at [21.16]–[21.27].
[1358] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Colin
Carruthers QC, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Consumer NZ, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Michael
Duffy, Te Kāhui
Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, IBA
Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society
(NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management Investors
Group, Simpson Grierson,
Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1359] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay,
BusinessNZ, Colin Carruthers QC, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Consumer NZ, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA
Antitrust Committee,
Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management Investors
Group,
Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1360] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Crown Law Office, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson
& Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Simpson Grierson and
Vicki Waye.
[1361] Barry Allan,
BusinessNZ, Colin Carruthers QC, Chapman Tripp and Insurance Council.
[1362] Chapman Tripp,
Michael Duffy and Tom Weston QC.
[1363] Bell Gully, IBA
Antitrust Committee and Ross Asset Management Investors Group.
[1364] Bell Gully, Consumer
NZ, Insurance Council, Simpson Grierson and Vicki Waye.
[1365] Consumer NZ, Crown
Law Office and Insurance Council.
[1366] DLA Piper and Omni
Bridgeway.
[1367] Barry Allan, Carter
Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office and Simpson Grierson.
[1368] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Colin Carruthers QC, Insurance
Council, IBA Antitrust Working
Committee, Nicole Smith, Simpson Grierson and Tom
Weston QC. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia supports the current
approach
that parties should be able to privately negotiate contract terms, but
also supports enhancing the status quo to ensure “greater
accountability,
transparency and enforcement” through regulation.
[1369] For example, Barry
Allan, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[1370] IBA Antitrust
Committee noted that the litigation funding industry in the United Kingdom is
self-regulated and considered this an
insufficient safeguard against the risks
of litigation funding.
[1371] DLA Piper and Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (although it also considers minimum contract
terms could further assist
in regulating funder control).
[1372] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group and Omni Bridgeway.
[1373] LPF Group and Omni
Bridgeway.
[1374] Woodsford Litigation
Funding said the Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for
Litigation Funders (England and Wales) and International Legal
Finance Association Best Practices prevent funders from taking control of
litigation or settlement negotiations. The Association of Litigation Funders of
Australia and
Omni Bridgeway said the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission’s (ASIC) regulation requires Australian funders to
maintain
conflict management policies, and this is also reflected in the Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia's Best Practice Guidelines.
[1375] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Crown Law Office, DLA Piper,
Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Simpson
Grierson,
Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1376] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay,
BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Crown Law Office, Michael
Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole
Smith , Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1377] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Insurance Council,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[1378] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, Chapman Tripp, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia and Simpson Grierson.
[1379] Bell Gully and
Chapman Tripp (implied).
[1380] Chapman Tripp and
Simpson Grierson.
[1381] Chapman Tripp.
[1382] Barry Allan, Bell
Gully, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson
Grierson. In addition, Chapman
Tripp supported a prohibition on discretionary
rights for funders to terminate funding agreements.
[1383] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson
Grierson.
[1384] Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[1385] Bell Gully, Insurance
Council and Simpson Grierson.
[1386] Tom Weston QC
regarded minimum terms as “one way to address the problems”, and
Vicki Waye said that minimum terms could
be an option but noted it might
increase the risk of expensive collateral litigation.
[1387] BusinessNZ, Carter
Holt Harvey and NZLS.
[1388] Bell Gully, Chapman
Tripp, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Simpson Grierson and Tom
Weston QC.
[1389] Bell Gully, IBA
Antitrust Committee and Nicole Smith.
[1390] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council and Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.
[1391] Buddle Findlay and
Vicki Waye.
[1392] For example,
Recommendation 25 provides that funders should be obliged to disclose to the
Federal Court of Australia any potential
conflicts of interest, any new or
potential conflicts that arise after the first case management conference, and
the funder’s
conflict management policy (when applying for approval of a
funding agreement): Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial
Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action
industry (December 2020).
[1393] Andrew Barker QC,
Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Crown Law Office, Michael
Duffy, Tony Ellis, Gilbert Walker, Insurance
Council, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson,
Murray Lazelle, Michael Legg, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association,
NZX, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson
and Tom Weston QC.
[1394] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/ Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway
and Woodsford Litigation Funding. Three
submissions were unclear.
[1395] Gilbert Walker gave
this example. In the Strathboss representative action, the parties
reached a $40 million settlement of a $450 million claim, with the kiwifruit
growers reportedly
recovering 62 per cent of the settlement (about 5 cents in
the dollar for what they claimed). However, the settlement followed a
decision
by Te Kōti Pira | Court of Appeal that it would not be fair, just or
reasonable to make the Crown legally responsible
for the loss, and that
therefore, no legal duty of care was owed by Te Manatu Ahuwhenua,
Ngāherehere | Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry staff to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs filed an appeal against the decision to the Supreme Court, but
the hearing was
vacated following the out-of-court settlement.
[1396] The Insurance Council
explicitly gave this example, and some submitters appeared to refer to it
indirectly. The settlements and
payments made under litigation funding
arrangements in respect of that litigation are being challenged in 100
Investments Ltd v Registrar of Companies [2020] NZHC 880.
[1397] Johnson & Johnson
gave the example of Fitzgerald v CBL Insurance Ltd [2014] VSC 493 (2
October 2014) (“Huon Corporation”), which was
discussed in Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice –
Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings (March 2018) at
[2.75]–[2.87]. The case attracted attention because the company’s
former employees, on whose behalf the
litigation was conducted, received none of
the payments ordered by the court. The entire $5,107,259 award went to pay the
litigation
funder, lawyers and accountants. The litigation took 11 years to
resolve.
[1398] Andrew Barker QC,
Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp (at least in the
absence of a mature and competitive
funding market), Claims Resolution Service,
Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson &
Johnson (implied),
Murray Lazelle (implied), NZLS, NZ Shareholders’
Association, NZX, Ross Asset Management Investors Group (implied), Simpson
Grierson and Tom Weston QC.
[1399] LPF Group and DLA
Piper. This point was also made by the Association of Litigation Funders of
Australia, Maurice Blackburn/ Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and
Woodsford Litigation Funding. However they appear to be commenting on the
adequacy of existing
mechanisms in Australia, rather than Aotearoa New Zealand.
Three submissions were unclear.
[1400] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91.
[1401]
PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735.
[1402] In Chapter 7, we
recommend that, when a proceeding is certified as a class action, the
representative plaintiff’s lawyer should
be regarded as the lawyer for the
class and have a solicitor-client relationship with the class.
[1403] The Supreme Court has
said that courts have the power to approve settlements in representative actions
under HCR 4.24: Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020]
NZSC 126 at [82]. In Chapter 11, we recommend the courts should be required to
approve settlements in class actions.
[1404] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Buddle
Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman
Tripp, Claims Resolution
Service, Commerce Commission, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy,
Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Murray
Lazelle, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
NZLS, NZ Shareholders’
Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset
Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC, Vicki
Waye
and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1405] Bell Gully, David
Bigio QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker,
Andrew Harmos, Johnson & Johnson,
Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice
Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson
Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce
(joint submission), Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
[1406] Barry Allan,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Claims Resolution Service,
Commerce Commission, DLA Piper, Insurance
Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, NZLS, NZX, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson
Grierson, Vicki Waye
and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1407] NZX and Simpson
Grierson.
[1408] Andrew Barker QC,
Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt
Harvey, Chapman Tripp, IBA Antitrust
Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding
Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Simpson Grierson, Vicki
Waye (implied),
Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1409] Six submitters
supported the court considering the funding commission at the beginning of a
class action: Andrew Barker QC, Carter
Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, NZLS, Simpson
Grierson and Tom Weston QC. Five submitters supported the court considering the
funding
commission later in the proceedings, such as when approving a class
action settlement: Association of Litigation Funders of Australia,
Andrew Barker
QC, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and
Woodsford Litigation Funding. Buddle Findlay
submitted Aotearoa New Zealand
should pay close heed to recent recommendations by the Australian Law Reform
Commission and Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial
Services, including recommendations for court approval of funding agreements and
court
supervision of funding commissions in the context of making a common fund
order (if such orders are considered necessary). Some submitters
expressed
support for court oversight of funding commissions, but did not specify when
this should occur.
[1410]
Bell Gully, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Johnson
& Johnson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.
[1411] David Bigio QC,
Chapman Tripp, Andrew Harmos, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims
Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway,
Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip
Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Woodsford Litigation
Funding.
MinterEllisonRuddWatts submitted that the court should not have a power
to vary funding commissions at settlement, except in cases
where the real return
to funders would be out of all proportion to the risk taken and costs incurred.
Some submitters on the Issues
Paper also commented on this option in the context
of discussing the court oversight of funding arrangements option.
[1412] Insurance
Council.
[1413] NZX.
[1414] Vicki Waye. For
example, where the claim is very small the funding commission might be capped at
50 per cent of any recovery, but
where the claim is large the funding commission
might be capped at 10 per cent of the recovery.
[1415] Vicki Waye.
[1416] Omni Bridgeway.
[1417] Association of
Litigation Funders of Australia, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service,
Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia,
NZ Shareholders’ Association
and Woodsford Litigation Funding.
[1418] Johnson &
Johnson, Murray Lazelle and Michael Legg.
[1419] For more information
about the survey, see Chapter 1.
[1420] Participants could
give an answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being “very unsatisfied” and 5
being “very satisfied”.
There were 228 responses to this question,
and the average response was 3.51.
[1421] See Issues Paper at
[9.18]–[9.19]. In Australia, see similar comments in: Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services Inquiry into Litigation
Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at
[11.53] and Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and
Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party
Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.64].
[1422] See Chapter 14, where
we set out objectives and guiding principles for permitting and regulating
litigation funding. See also Chapter
3, where we note the court may have a more
active role in the control, supervision and disposition of class actions than in
other
litigation because of the need to ensure the interests of class members
are adequately protected.
[1423] Southern Response
Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group [2017]
NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [79].
[1424] Class Proceedings Act
SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1. See also Issues Paper at [23.50].
[1425] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
169 (Recommendation 14(a)); Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action
industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 11.
[1426] Australian Law Reform
Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class
Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at
169 (Recommendation 14(b)); Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and
Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action
industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 11.
[1427] The Treasury
“Treasuring Laws Amendment (Measures for Consultation) Bill 2021:
Litigation funders” <www.treasury.gov.au>.
A “claim proceeds
distribution method” means “a method... for determining the amount
of any claim proceeds for
the scheme that is to be paid or distributed to the
scheme’s general members”.
[1428] For a similar example
of this approach in Ontario, see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s
33.1(3).
[1429] The High Court Rules
require any affidavit in support of an interlocutory application to be filed at
the same time as the application:
High Court Rules 2016, r 7.20.
[1430] For an example of a
similiar approach in Ontario, see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, ss
33.1(9)(a)(i) and 33.1(10)
[1431] See our discussion
about models for regulation and oversight of litigation funding in Chapter
14.
[1432] For examples of
guidance to this effect in comparable jurisdictions, see: Association of
Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice
Council, January 2018) at [9.2]–[9.3]; Hong Kong Code of Practice for
Third Party Funding of Arbitration 2018
at [2.9]; Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts
Litigation Funding Rules 2019, r 9(1); and Singapore Institute of Arbitrators
Guidelines for Third Party Funders (18 May 2017) at [6.1.1], [6.1.4] and
[6.2.1].
[1433] Waterhouse v
Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [48].
[1434] Class Proceedings Act
SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(9)(a)(i).
[1435] For example, Money
Max Int Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance Group Ltd [2016] FCAFC 148, (2016) 245 FCR
191 at [79]–[83], and Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd
(No 3) [2020] FCA 1885 at [21]–[25].
[1436] High Court Rules
2016, rr 5.26(b) and 5.32.
[1437] For example, if the
amount recovered is [A], the number of claimants entitled to a share in any
settlement or award is [B] and the
costs amount to [C], then the funding
commission will be [D].
[1438] Federal Court of
Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 54A(1)‑-(2).
[1439] Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the
regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [11.82].
[1440] It recommended the
Federal Court’s Class Actions Practice Note be amended to expressly state
the court can appoint a referee
to act as a litigation funding costs assessor at
any point in the proceedings, including when the funder seeks court approval of
the funding agreement and when settlement approval is sought. It recommended the
referee should be a professional with market capital
or finance experience, and
considered that embedding a practice of appointing referees to assess litigation
funding costs will establish
a panel of competent and reputable experts in the
capital market or finance from which the court can select a referee. See
Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services
Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry
(December 2020) at Recommendation 13 and Recommendation 14, and at
[11.88].
[1441] High Court Rules
2016, r 9.36
[1442] Including a fixed
percentage-based statutory cap on funding commissions, a sliding scale cap
(where the upper limit for funding
commissions progressively drops as the amount
recovered increases), a statutory cap calculated as a multiple of the
funder’s
costs, a legislated minimum return to class members, and a
multiplier and multiplicand table system. A multiplicand is a lump sum
calculation that should represent the conservative basis figure of an award to
an individual claimant while factoring in any potential
costs involved, and a
multiplier could then be applied to the multiplicand based on the number of
claimants in the class action.
[1443] See Chapter 2. See
also Issues Paper at Chapters 1, 5 and 17.
[1444] Law Society Act RSO
1990 c L-8, s 59.1; Jasminka Kalajdzic Class Actions in Canada: The Promise
and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018) at
153–154. According to the Report of the Attorney General’s
Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (Ministry of the Attorney General,
February 1990) at 59:
... [t]he answer to accessibility is not the removal of all risk of the
obligations for costs, but rather, the support of worthwhile
class proceedings
through assistance with disbursements and protection against adverse costs
awards.
[1445] Law Society Act RSO
1990 c L-8 (Ontario), s 59.1(2).
[1446] A contingency fee is
where the lawyer obtains a fee calculated as a proportion of any sum recovered
if the outcome is successful,
and nothing if the outcome is unsuccessful.
[1447] The Fund’s levy
is calculated in accordance with reg 10 of O Reg
771/92 (Class Proceedings) issued under the Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8
(Ontario).
[1448] See Edwards v Law
Society of Upper Canada (1995) 36 CPC (3d) 116 at 116–118.
Edwards is a decision of the Class Proceedings Committee that outlines
the Committee’s approach to applications and is referred to
on the Law
Foundation of Ontario’s website as a source of guidance for applicants.
See The Law Foundation of Ontario “Class
Proceedings Fund: Application
Process” <www.lawfoundation.on.ca>.
[1449] The Law Foundation of
Ontario Staying Connected: 2020 Annual Report (July 2021) at 37.
[1450] The
‘Fonds’ is short for Fonds d’aide aux actions
collectives.
[1451] Act respecting the
Fonds d’aide aux actions collectives CQLR c F-3.2.0.1.1, Arts 27 and 29.
Note that there is a maximum hourly
rate at which legal fees are funded ($100
per hour for senior lawyers and $40 per hour for junior lawyers), which is
significantly
below the market rate: Catherine Piché “Public
Financiers as Overseers of Class Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779
at 802.
[1452 ] The other sources of
funding are: annual Government subsidies, reimbursement of funds paid (from
costs awarded paid by unsuccessful
defendants) and interests on investments. See
Catherine Piché “Public Financiers as Overseers of Class
Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779 at 797–798.
[1453] Act respecting the
Fonds d’aide aux actions collectives CQLR c F-3.2.0.1.1, Art 23.
[1454] Catherine
Piché “Public Financiers as Overseers of Class
Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779 at
803–‑‑‑‑‑804.
[1455] Catherine
Piché “Public Financiers as Overseers of Class
Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779 at 804–805.
[1456] Australian Law Reform
Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at
[307]–[314].
[1457] Australian Law Reform
Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at
[308].
[1458 ] Australian Law Reform
Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at
[312]; Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice—Litigation
Funding and Group Proceedings: Report (March 2018) at [5.127].
[1459] Victorian Law Reform
Commission Access to Justice—Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings:
Report (March 2018) at [5.127]—[5.128].
[1460] Samuel Becher, Tony
Ellis and Nicole Smith.
[1461] See Rachael Mulheron
Class Actions and Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2020) at 170.
[1462] Rachael Mulheron
suggests legislation should identify whether the charge received by a public
fund upon the recovery should take
effect prior to, or following, the
compensation of those class members who come forward to claim their individual
compensation: Rachael
Mulheron Class Actions and Government (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2020) at 170.
[1463] We discuss this in
Chapter 10.
[1464]
Rachael Mulheron Class Actions and Government
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020) at 148, citing Law Reform
Commission of Ontario Review of Class Actions in Ontario – Issues to be
Considered (November 2013) at 7.
[1465] The Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act 2006 prohibits lawyers from charging contingency fees,
but allows them to charge conditional fees in some circumstances. A contingency
fee is where the lawyer obtains a fee calculated as a proportion of any sum
recovered if the outcome is successful, and nothing if
the outcome is
unsuccessful. A conditional fee is where the lawyer also obtains nothing if the
outcome is unsuccessful, but is allowed
to charge a fee based on a
lawyer’s normal hourly rate plus a premium that “is not calculated
as a proportion of the amount recovered”
if the outcome is successful. The
premium is to compensate the lawyer for the risk of not being paid at all, and
may be calculated
as proportion of the lawyer’s expenses or a fixed
amount. See Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 333–336 and Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr
9.8–9.12.
[1466] Although we note that
legal aid is administered by the Ministry and is available for claims against
the Government, for example
Waitangi Tribunal claims.
[1467] In Ontario, for
example, the Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8 provides that the Law Foundation
shall administer the Class Proceedings
Fund. It establishes a Class Proceedings
Committee comprising one member appointed by the Foundation, one member
appointed by the
Attorney General, and three members appointed jointly by the
Foundation and the Attorney General. Each member holds office for a
period of
three years and is eligible for re-appointment. Three members constitute a
quorum. Members are not remunerated but are
entitled to compensation for any
expenses. See Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8, s 59.2.
[1468] See Law Society Act
RSO 1990 c L-8 (Ontario), s 59.3(4) and O Reg 771/92 (Class Proceedings), s
5.
[1469] See Law Society Act
RSO 1990 c L-8 (Ontario), s 59.3(5).
[1470] See Chapter 3 and
Chapter 7.
[1471] We recommend an
express provision relating to class member discovery in Chapter 8.
[1472] See Chapter 6 and
Chapter 10.
[1473] We discuss options
for determining individual issues in an efficient manner in Chapter 8.
[1474] We discuss settlement
in Chapter 11.
[1475] See Chapter 11.
[1476] See Chapter 2.
[1477] See Victorian Law
Reform Commission Access to Justice—Litigation Funding and Group
Proceedings: Report (March 2018) at [4.223] and Todd B Hilsee, Shannon
R Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights?
The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice is More Than Just Plain
Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J Legal Ethics
1359 at 1365.
[1478] We explain the scope
and methodology of the survey in Chapter 1.
[1479] We asked participants
whether they were “a representative or lead plaintiff”, “a
member of a plaintiff committee
or management committee”, “neither a
representative plaintiff nor a member of the plaintiff committee”, or
“unsure”.
We received 409 responses. Of those, 239 survey
participants indicated they were neither the representative plaintiff nor a
member
of the plaintiff committee, 17 participants identified as a
representative or lead plaintiff, 5 participants identified as a member
of a
plaintiff committee or management committee, and 148 participants were unsure.
[1480] See Todd B Hilsee,
Shannon R Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to Know My
Rights? The Ethics Behind Due
Process in Class Action Notice is More Than Just
Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J Legal
Ethics 1359 at 1377–1380, Margaret Hagan “A Human-Centred Design
Approach to Access to Justice: Generating New Prototypes and Hypotheses
for
Interventions to Make Courts User-Friendly” (2018) 6 Ind J L & Soc
Equal 199 at 234 and Federal Judicial Center “Judges’
Class Action
Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide” (2010).
[1481] Ministry of Justice
“Civil” (11 March 2022) <www.justice.govt.nz/courts/civil/>.
[1482] Information should
comply with relevant accessibility standards or guidelines.
[1483] In Ross v Southern
Response Te Kōti Matua | High Court directed a copy of the judgment
approving notice to be provided to Community Law Canterbury and the
Greater
Christchurch Claims Resolution Service to “achieve a greater level of
completed communication with class members”
as they could be relied upon
to “bring the class members notice to the attention of any policyholder
they encounter”:
Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd
[2021] NZHC 2452 at [164].
[1484] Class Action Clinic:
Windsor Law “Our Mission and Services” <www.classactionclinic.com>.
[1485] Clinical Legal
Education Tel Aviv University “Class Action Clinic” <www.en-law.tau.ac.il>.
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/lawreform/NZLCR/2022/147.html