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Ko ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā Pūtea Tautiringa. Class actions and litigation funding [2022] NZLCR 147

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Ko ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā Pūtea Tautiringa. Class actions and litigation funding [2022] NZLCR 147 (27 June 2022)

Last Updated: 27 June 2022

Haratua | May 2022

Te Whanganui-a-Tara, Aotearoa

Wellington, New Zealand


Law Commission logo

Pūrongo | Report 147


Ko ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā Pūtea Tautiringa

Class Actions and Litigation Funding


Law Commission logo

Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is an independent, publicly funded, central advisory body established by statute to undertake the systematic review, reform and development of the law of Aotearoa New Zealand. Its purpose is to help achieve law that is just, principled and accessible and that reflects the values and aspirations of the people of Aotearoa New Zealand.

Te Aka Matua in the Commission’s Māori name refers to the parent vine that Tāwhaki used to climb up to the heavens. At the foot of the ascent, he and his brother Karihi find their grandmother Whaitiri, who guards the vines that form the pathway into the sky. Karihi tries to climb the vines first but makes the error of climbing up the aka taepa or hanging vine. He is blown violently around by the winds of heaven and falls to his death. Following Whaitiri’s advice, Tāwhaki climbs the aka matua or parent vine, reaches the heavens and receives the three baskets of knowledge.

Kia whanake ngā ture o Aotearoa mā te arotake motuhake

Better law for Aotearoa New Zealand through independent review

The Commissioners are:

Amokura Kawharu – Tumu Whakarae | President

Claudia Geiringer – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner

Geof Shirtcliffe – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner

The Hon Justice Christian Whata – Kaikōmihana | Commissioner

The Māori language version of this report’s title was developed for Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission by Kiwa Hammond and Maakere Edwards, of Aatea Solutions Limited. The title was finalised in conjunction with the Commission’s Māori Liaison Committee.

Kei te pātengi raraunga o Te Puna Mātauranga o Aotearoa te whakarārangi o tēnei pukapuka.

A catalogue record for this title is available from the National Library of New Zealand.

ISBN 978-0-9951291-8-4 (Print)

ISBN 978-0-9951291-7-7 (Online)

ISSN 0113-2334 (Print)

ISSN 1177-6196 (Online)

This title may be cited as NZLC R147. This title is available on the internet at the website of Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission: www.lawcom.govt.nz

Copyright © 2022 Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission.


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This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. In essence, you are free to copy, distribute and adapt the work, as long as you attribute the work to Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission and abide by other licence terms. To view a copy of this licence, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission

Tumu Whakarae | President
Amokura Kawharu FRSNZ
Kaikōmihana | Commissioners
Claudia Geiringer FRSNZ
Geof Shirtcliffe
The Hon Justice Christian Whata

Hon Kris Faafoi
Minister Responsible for the Law Commission
Parliament Buildings
WELLINGTON
27 May 2022

Tēnā koe Minister

NZLC R147 – Ko ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me ngā Pūtea Tautiringa | Class Actions and Litigation Funding

I am pleased to submit to you the above report under section 16 of the Law Commission Act 1985.

Nāku noa, nā


Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission

Amokura Kawharu

Tumu Whakarae | President


Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission

Foreword

Significant financial, social and other barriers currently undermine access to civil justice in Aotearoa New Zealand. This is a risk to democracy as legal rights provide little protection without meaningful access to institutions that can uphold them.

Improving access to civil justice requires a coordinated effort across many different areas. While class actions and litigation funding do not offer a panacea, they can both make important contributions.

We recommend the creation of a statutory class actions regime, including a new Class Actions Act as the principal source of class actions law. The increasing number of large representative proceedings in Aotearoa New Zealand demonstrates a clear need for a group litigation mechanism that can resolve claims justly and efficiently. It has also exposed the inadequacies of the current procedure and the cost and delay it entails for all parties and the courts. A modern well-designed class actions regime will enable claimants to overcome some of the difficulties in accessing civil justice and help to ensure that multiple claims can be managed, to the benefit of all parties and the courts, in an efficient way.

We also recognise that litigation funding can help to address problems created by the burgeoning costs of legal advice and litigation in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Our recommendations on litigation funding complement our proposals for a statutory class actions regime. Class actions do not always require funding. However, the high costs of class action litigation mean that many cases will not be possible without it. Our recommendations include a range of measures and protections to manage concerns about the provision of litigation funding, in both class actions and ordinary litigation. We also propose that a public class action fund be created to address funding gaps, for example in public interest litigation.

We thank everyone who has taken the time to discuss these challenging and wide-ranging issues with us during our review. While we see this review as one part of broader efforts to improve access to civil justice in Aotearoa New Zealand, we are confident that our recommendations will have a meaningful impact in this context.

Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission

Acknowledgements

Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the many individuals and organisations who have assisted us in the course of our review.

In particular we wish to acknowledge the generous contributions made by our Expert Advisory Group. These individuals provided guidance as we identified issues, developed policy proposals, considered feedback and developed reform recommendations. Members of the Group were:

We are grateful to the members of the legal profession and litigation funders who have discussed aspects of the project with us and provided helpful information to us during the course of our review. We have also benefitted from discussions with several overseas-based academics working in the areas of class actions and litigation funding. We thank in particular Associate Professor Jasminka Kalajdzic, Dr Michael Legg, Professor Vince Morabito, Professor Rachael Mulheron QC and Professor Vicki Waye. We acknowledge and appreciate the feedback we received from the Commission’s Māori Liaison Committee, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society and members of the judiciary. We thank in particular the Hon Justice Cooke for coordinating responses from the judiciary on issues and questions we raised with them. We also wish to thank all those who submitted on our two Issues Papers, responded to our online survey of group members in representative actions, and attended our class actions consultation workshops. We emphasise nevertheless that the views we express in this report are those of the Commission and not necessarily those of the people who have assisted our work.

Nō reira, ko tēnei mātou e mihi nei ki a koutou, kua whai wā ki te āwhina i a mātou. Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa.

The Commissioner responsible for this project is Amokura Kawharu. The legal and policy advisers who worked on this project are Jenny Ryan, Catherine Helm, Rebecca Garden, Nick Gillard and Jesse Watts. Cathy Rodgers, Parliamentary Counsel at Te Tari Tohutohu Pāremata | Parliamentary Counsel Office, drafted the legislative provisions for both the Supplementary Issues Paper and this report. We acknowledge the assistance provided by law clerks who have worked on this project. We also acknowledge the earlier contributions by former Commissioners Sir Douglas White and Belinda Clark. Helen McQueen was a Law Commissioner at the time this report was considered and approved by the Commission’s Board. While Claudia Geiringer has held a warrant as a Law Commissioner since 2 May 2022, she did not participate in the project or in reviewing this report as the report was largely completed prior to that date.

Contents

Glossary


0BAdverse costs

This is where the court orders an unsuccessful party to pay costs to a successful party in a proceeding or interlocutory application to reimburse them for their legal costs. Adverse costs rules are sometimes also referred to as ‘loser pays’, ‘costs follow the event’ or ‘costs shifting’ rules.

1BAfter-the-event insurance

After-the-event insurance is purchased after a legal dispute has arisen, to indemnify the insured in the event the court makes an adverse costs order.

2BAggregate litigation

A form of group litigation which involves multiple individual claims being determined in the same proceeding.

3BAggregate monetary relief

Aggregate monetary relief involves the court assessing monetary relief on an aggregate basis and granting an order for relief based on the aggregate amount. The monetary relief is calculated by proving the damage sustained by the class as a whole, without calculating individual class member entitlements.

4BAlternative distribution

An order for alternative distribution is where the court orders some or all of an award of aggregate monetary relief to be paid to an organisation or charity associated with the claim because it is impossible or impracticable to distribute the relief to individual class members. This is often referred to as cy-près relief in other jurisdictions.

5BAustralian Parliamentary Inquiry

On 13 May 2020, Australia’s House of Representatives referred an inquiry into litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. The committee published its report in December 2020.

6BCertification

Certification is a preliminary stage where the court decides whether the case can proceed in class action form.

7BChamperty

Champerty is a tort (and in some jurisdictions, a crime) where a person who is not a party to, and has no interest in, the litigation provides financial assistance to a party to a civil action in return for a share of any recovery. Champerty is a form of maintenance (defined below).

8BClass member

A person who has opted into a class action or has not opted out by the required date. A class member is not a party to the litigation, unless they are the representative plaintiff.

9BConcurrent class action

A class action proceeding that has the same or similar issues in dispute as another class action proceeding currently before the court, as well as at least one common defendant. In other jurisdictions, this is known as a competing class action.

10BConditional fee

A conditional fee is a fee agreement where some or all of the lawyer’s fees and expenses are payable only if there is a successful outcome. In Aotearoa New Zealand, a conditional fee may include a premium to compensate the lawyer for the risk of not being paid at all and for the disadvantages of not receiving payment on account, provided it is not calculated as a proportion of the amount received by the client.

11BContingency fee

A contingency fee is a fee arrangement where, if there is a successful outcome, the lawyer’s fee will be calculated as a proportion (usually a percentage) of any sum recovered. If the matter is unsuccessful, the lawyer will be paid nothing. This form of fee arrangement is not permitted in Aotearoa New Zealand.

12BCost sharing order

Cost sharing orders are orders which provide for the legal and funding costs of a class action to be equitably spread among all class members, even if they have not signed up to a litigation funding agreement.

13BD&O insurance

Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) is a form of insurance designed to protect company directors and senior employees against personal loss arising from liabilities incurred in the performance of their duties. D&O insurance also provides cover for the reasonable costs of defending a claim.

14BGroup litigation

Group litigation is a term to describe forms of civil litigation where a group of claimants seek redress collectively. It includes class actions and representative actions, as well as civil procedure techniques such as joinder and consolidation and mechanisms applying to specific areas of the law.

15BGroup member

A person who is a member of a representative action. A group member is not a party to the litigation, unless they are the representative plaintiff or defendant.

16BHCR 4.24

Rule 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016. HCR 4.24 enables a plaintiff (or a defendant) in Aotearoa New Zealand to sue (or be sued) on a representative basis.

17BLitigation funding

Litigation funding is where a person who is not a party to, and has no interest in, the litigation agrees to fund some or all of a party’s costs, in exchange for a share of any sum recovered.

18BMaintenance

Maintenance is a tort (and in some jurisdictions, a crime) where a person who is not a party to and has no interest in the litigation, assists a party to a civil action to bring or defend the action, without lawful justification, and this causes damage to the other party.

19BOpt-in

Opt-in is an approach to determining class membership in a representative action or class action. Under this approach, potential class members must affirmatively opt into the litigation by taking a prescribed step by a certain date in order to be bound by any judgment on the common issues in the proceeding, or by a settlement.

20BOpt-out

Opt-out is an approach to determining class membership in a representative action or class action. Under an opt-out approach, all people who fall within the description of the class are bound by the judgment on common issues or settlement unless they take a prescribed step by a certain date to exclude themselves from the proceeding.

21BRepresentative action

A representative action permits a person to sue (or be sued) on behalf of other people who share the same interest in the subject matter of a legal proceeding. In Aotearoa New Zealand, a representative action can be brought under HCR 4.24.

22BRepresentative plaintiff

The representative plaintiff represents the other class members in representative actions and class actions. Unlike other class members, they are a party to the litigation.

23BRules Committee

Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee is a statutory body which has responsibility for procedural rules in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, High Court and District Court.

24BRules of conduct and client care for lawyers

The Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008.

Executive summary



INTRODUCTION

  1. Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission has undertaken a review of class actions and litigation funding. The review has taken place within a wider context of ongoing and pressing concern about financial, social and other barriers to accessing civil justice in Aotearoa New Zealand.
  2. At present, Aotearoa New Zealand does not have class actions legislation. Rule 4.24 of the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) allows a person to sue (or be sued) on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all persons with the same interest in the proceeding. This rule is increasingly being used to bring large, complex cases which are similar in nature to class actions. However, the representative action procedure was not designed for litigation of this kind. As a result, there has been extensive litigation on procedural issues, which has caused delay for parties and required considerable court resources. We have concluded that a statutory class actions regime will be clearer, more certain and more accessible. This in turn will improve access to justice for New Zealanders.
  3. Aotearoa New Zealand also currently lacks specific regulation of litigation funding. The torts of maintenance and champerty, which have historically prohibited litigation funding, remain part of our law. Consequently, there is uncertainty about when and how litigation funding may be provided. This may impact on the availability and affordability of litigation funding and provide insufficient protection for funded plaintiffs. We have concluded that specific regulation is desirable to address these issues and to assure the integrity of the court system. With specific regulation in place, the torts of maintenance and champerty should be abolished.

STATUTORY REGIME FOR AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

  1. Existing methods of group litigation in Aotearoa New Zealand, including the representative actions rule in HCR 4.24, are insufficient. We recommend the creation of a class actions regime, including a Class Actions Act as the principal source of law in relation to class actions. In addition, specific class actions rules in the High Court Rules will be necessary to address more detailed matters of procedure. We explain our view that class actions will improve access to justice and allow multiple claims to be managed in an efficient way and recommend these should be the statutory objectives of class actions. We also discuss the potential disadvantages of class actions and explain how many of these can be mitigated by the design of the regime.
  2. In developing our proposals, we have been guided by the principles that a class actions regime should:
    1. Consider the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.
    2. Safeguard the interests of class members.
    3. Consider the principle of proportionality, meaning that the time and cost of litigation should be proportionate to what is at stake.
    4. Strike an appropriate balance between flexibility and certainty.
    5. Be appropriate for contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand.
    6. Recognise and reflect relevant tikanga Māori.
    7. Not adversely impact on other methods of group litigation.
    8. Provide clarity on issues arising in funded litigation.
  3. We recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider amending the representative actions rules in HCR 4.24 and District Court Rule 4.24 to provide they should not be used when a class action would be a more appropriate procedure. This is to avoid the risk of these rules being used to circumvent the protections of a class actions regime.
  4. While some jurisdictions have provided for defendant class actions, we recommend the Class Actions Act should only apply to plaintiff class actions.

KEY ACTORS IN A CLASS ACTION

Class members

  1. A defining feature of a class action is the presence of class members. They are not parties to the litigation and have little control over how the class action is conducted but will be bound by the outcome. It is therefore essential that a class actions regime includes safeguards to protect the interests of class members and many features of the class actions regime we recommend provide for this.

The representative plaintiff

  1. In a class action, the plaintiff is a representative plaintiff. There are two important dimensions to the representative plaintiff’s role. First, the representative plaintiff, like an ordinary plaintiff, is a party to the proceeding and has a claim against the defendant. Second, the representative plaintiff represents the other class members.
  2. We recommend the representative plaintiff should be responsible for making decisions about the conduct of the class action and giving informed instructions to the lawyer acting for them and the class. We prefer this to the approach of governance and decision-making in a class action being vested in a group such as a litigation committee.
  3. We consider a representative plaintiff should have an overarching duty to act in what they believe to be the best interests of the class. This duty should be specified in the Class Actions Act. We recommend the Act also specify the representative plaintiff does not owe fiduciary duties to class members. There are a number of responsibilities associated with the role of representative plaintiff, such as taking the steps necessary to progress the class action and meeting any order for adverse costs. These responsibilities arise primarily from being a party to the proceeding, but their extent is amplified because they are bringing the litigation on behalf of a large group of class members as well as themselves.
  4. The role of representative plaintiff is significant, and we have accordingly identified some ways of supporting a person in the role. The Class Actions Act should provide the representative plaintiff with a statutory immunity from claims by a class member with respect to their duty unless they have acted recklessly or in wilful default or bad faith. We also recommend a proposed representative plaintiff must receive independent legal advice on the duty and responsibilities of the role.

The defendant

  1. The role of a defendant in a class action does not differ substantially from normal litigation. However, the nature of a class action can give rise to challenges in responding to the litigation and can increase the financial risks and potential liability for defendants. We recommend some measures to respond to these issues, such as enabling a defendant to obtain information on class members who have opted in or opted out and a presumption that in funded class actions, a litigation funder will provide security for costs.

The court

  1. The court will have a more active role in class actions than in most other litigation to ensure the interests of class members are adequately protected. Stages of a class action that require additional court oversight include the requirement for a proceeding to be certified in order to proceed as a class action, court approval of notices to class members and court approval of settlement. The need for this oversight may require extensive judicial resources. We have accordingly made various recommendations to allow the court to manage class actions in an efficient way.

COMMENCING A CLASS ACTION

  1. We recommend the Class Actions Act should not restrict class actions to certain areas of the law or type of claim and that class actions should be able to be commenced in Te Kōti Matua | High Court with respect to claims where the High Court has existing jurisdiction. We do not recommend class actions be available in the District Court, Environment Court or Māori Land Court. However, we recommend the Government consider developing class actions rules for the employment jurisdiction.
  2. To commence a class action, we recommend there must be a proposed representative plaintiff acting on behalf of a class comprising at least two other class members. Each claim must raise a common issue of fact or law, to ensure a single judgment will determine an issue for all class members and prevent disparate claims from being grouped together.
  3. We recommend the representative plaintiff should be a class member, in accordance with normal standing rules. There are benefits to having a representative plaintiff who has their own claim at stake, including demonstrating that the class action is supported by a genuine claimant who is motivated by a desire to resolve their legal claim. We think a state entity should be able to bring a class action as representative plaintiff either where it is a class member or where another Act enables it to do so.
  4. When a class action is commenced, we recommend the limitation periods applying to the claim of each person falling within the proposed class should be suspended. The Class Actions Act should specify a list of circumstances that will lead to limitation periods starting to run again.

CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

  1. Having concurrent (or competing) class actions relating to the same dispute is generally undesirable as this may lead to increased costs for all parties, inefficient use of court resources, increased burden on defendants, confusion for class members and the risk of inconsistent court rulings on the same issue. We recommend there should be a 90-day deadline to commence a concurrent class action, which will enable the court to consider the certification applications of concurrent class actions together. If more than one concurrent class action meets the certification test, we recommend the court must decide which of those class actions will be certified. When making its decision, we recommend the court should consider which approach will best allow class member claims to be resolved in a just and efficient way. If more than one concurrent class action is certified, the court should have the power to make orders for the efficient management of those proceedings.

CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTIONS

  1. We recommend the Class Actions Act should require a proceeding to be certified in order to proceed as a class action. While class actions may provide improved access to justice, they also place a significant burden on defendants and the court system as they are usually expensive and lengthy. Class actions also risk insufficient protection of class members’ interests. We therefore think it is appropriate for a proceeding to have to meet a certification test before it is allowed to proceed as a class action.
  2. We recommend that in order for a proceeding to be certified as a class action, the court must be satisfied that:
    1. The proceeding discloses a reasonably arguable cause of action.
    2. There is a common issue of fact or law in the claim of each class member.
    3. The representative plaintiff is suitable and will fairly and adequately represent the class.
    4. Class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the claims of class members.
    5. The opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an appropriate means of determining class membership.
  3. We consider that both opt-in and opt-out class actions should be allowed in Aotearoa New Zealand. We consider there are advantages and disadvantages to both forms of class action and our proposed certification test will allow flexibility to determine which is appropriate for a particular case.

THE CLASS

Rules for particular class members

  1. We recommend additional rules for certain categories of class members. First, we think that people who reside outside Aotearoa New Zealand should only be able to join a class action if they opt in. This approach responds to the difficulty in providing adequate notice of an opt-out class action to those outside Aotearoa New Zealand. It may also facilitate recognition and enforcement of the court’s judgment in other jurisdictions.
  2. Ministers of the Crown and government departments should only become a class member if they opt in. A key rationale for opt-out class actions is to provide access to justice. However, this is unlikely to apply to the Crown because it has sufficient resources for litigation.
  3. We also recommend rules on class members who are minors or who are considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a particular step. We do not favour a rule where a litigation guardian must be appointed for such a class member as we think it will depend on the class member involved and the consequences of taking, or not taking, a particular step. We therefore recommend that class members (and potential class members) are not required to have a litigation guardian solely because they are under the age of 18 years or are considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a step in a class action proceeding (unless the court orders otherwise). However, the court should have a power to make any order it considers appropriate to protect the interests of such class members.

The relationship between the lawyer and class members

  1. We consider that, after certification, the representative plaintiff’s lawyer should be regarded as the lawyer for the class. As the lawyer will be carrying out legal work on behalf of the entire class, they should not be regarded as solely the representative plaintiff’s lawyer. Class members will be bound by the outcome of the litigation and they should be able to rely on the lawyer to conduct the litigation in a way that advances their interests and complies with ethical and professional obligations.
  2. We think the lawyer-class relationship that arises upon certification needs to be prescribed by legislation and recommend the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 should be amended to mandate this relationship. We also recommend that Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) consider what amendments may be needed to the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in class actions.

STEPS DURING A CLASS ACTION

Notice to class members

  1. Class members need to be notified of particular stages in a class action in order to make informed decisions about their participation. We recommend a list of events that should require notice to class members, with the court retaining a discretion to order that notice is not required. The initial notice in a class action will inform potential class members that a class action has been certified and there is an opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class action. We make detailed recommendations about the contents of this notice. We also recommend the court should approve the contents of notices before they are sent to class members and should have a broad discretion to order any method of notice that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

Case management and discovery

  1. Class actions will need close case management to ensure they proceed efficiently and in a way that protects the interests of class members. We recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a schedule to the High Court Rules listing the matters to be discussed at case management conferences for class actions.
  2. We consider it would be desirable to have a specific rule empowering the court to order one or more class members to provide discovery. We do not think the non-party discovery rule is well suited to class members, as it is designed to apply to persons who are not part of the litigation. We also recommend a defendant should be able to seek an order for information resulting from the opt-in or opt-out process, such as the number of class members.

Sub-classes

  1. We recommend the Class Actions Act should empower a court to order a sub-class to be created in two situations. The first category is where there is a conflict of interest between different groups of class members, such as where the relief sought by some class members could harm the interests of other class members. In this case, we think a sub-class representative plaintiff will usually be needed and they should instruct a lawyer in relation to sub-class issues. The second category is where there is an additional issue shared by a group of class members, but it does not give rise to a conflict.

Staged hearings

  1. In a class action, there will generally be both common and individual issues to resolve. It will often be appropriate for the court to have staged hearings, with common issues considered together and individual issues considered together. We recommend the Class Actions Act should empower the court to make orders for the efficient hearing of a class action, including an order that the hearing should be heard in stages and an order as to which issues should be determined at each stage.

Determining individual issues

  1. If the representative plaintiff obtains a successful judgment on the common issues, the individual issues in the proceeding will need to be determined. We think the Class Actions Act should empower the court to determine issues on an individual basis and to give directions with respect to determination of those issues. We think it is desirable for the court to have flexibility as to how individual issues are determined to ensure this occurs in a fair and efficient way. This could include appointing an expert to enquire into individual issues, giving directions as to the way or form in which evidence on individual issues may be given and ordering individual issues to be determined through a non-judicial process.

COST SHARING ORDERS

  1. In an opt-out class action, a problem can arise where only some class members are contractually required to contribute to the costs of the proceeding, but all class members benefit from any settlement or damages award. To mitigate this, we recommend the court should have the power to order that the litigation costs of a class action (including the legal fees and funding commission) be equitably spread among all class members, even if they have not signed up to the litigation funding agreement. We call this a cost sharing order.
  2. We consider the court should have flexibility as to the terms of the cost sharing order. This will allow the court to either require all class members to contribute a share of their settlement or damages award to cover the costs of the proceeding, or to give a share of their settlement or damages award to class members who have signed a funding agreement with the funder.
  3. To limit the risk of cost sharing orders facilitating windfall profits for funders, we think the court should also be empowered to set a provisional funding commission (or range of commissions) when granting an application for a cost sharing order that enables the funder to receive a funding commission from class members who have not signed a litigation funding agreement. The court should also have the power to vary that funding commission at a later date to ensure it is fair and reasonable in light of the actual costs and circumstances of the class action.

CLASS ACTION JUDGMENTS, RELIEF AND APPEALS

Class action judgments

  1. The ability of a judgment on common issues to bind all class members is a central feature of a class actions regime. If class members were not bound by this judgment, the common issues would not be resolved, and the efficiencies of a class actions regime would not be achieved. We recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that a judgment is binding on class members, with respect to the common issues as set out in the certification order.

Aggregate monetary relief

  1. Where there are many class members, it may not be practicable or efficient for the court to assess each class member’s claim for damages individually. We therefore recommend the court should have the power to make an aggregate assessment of the monetary relief to which the class is entitled and make an order for this amount. In order for the court to make an aggregate assessment of monetary relief, it should be satisfied it can make a reasonably accurate assessment of the amount, but it should be not necessary for an individual class member to establish the amount of loss or damage they have suffered.
  2. We recommend the court should have the power to make any orders for the distribution of an award of aggregate monetary relief that it considers appropriate, including appointing an administrator to distribute the award. We also recommend a distribution outcome report should be filed with the court once the process has been completed.

Alternative distribution

  1. In some jurisdictions, monetary relief may be paid to an organisation or charity associated with the claim rather than to class members. This is known overseas as cy-près damages, but we prefer the term ‘alternative distribution’.
  2. We think it is preferable for relief, where possible, to be distributed to class members. We recommend alternative distribution should only be available where it is not practical or possible to distribute the amount to individual class members or the costs of doing so would be disproportionate. If the court orders alternative distribution of an award, it should usually be paid to a eligible charity or organisation whose activities are related to the claims in the class action and whose activities are likely to directly or indirectly benefit class members.

Appeal rights in class actions

  1. Some aspects of a class action proceeding are unique and require tailored appeal rules. One is the court’s decision on certification. We recommend the plaintiff and defendant should be able to appeal this decision as of right as the implications of certification will be significant to both. However, we recommend that leave should be required to appeal a decision not to certify more than one concurrent class action. We also recommend the parties should be able to appeal a court’s decision declining to approve a settlement with leave of the court.
  2. We do not think class members should have any rights of appeal. While an individual class member may disagree with the representative plaintiff’s decision not to appeal a decision, allowing them to bring an appeal could have significant consequences for other class members. However, we recognise the importance of the judgment on common issues to class members. If the representative does not appeal this judgment, or abandons the appeal, we recommend a class member should be able to apply to replace the representative plaintiff for the purpose of bringing an appeal.

SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION

  1. We consider court approval should be required in order for the settlement of a class action to be binding. This should apply whether the class action is opt-in or opt-out and whether the settlement is reached before or after certification. Court approval of settlement is an important part of the court’s supervisory role to protect the interests of class members, who are unlikely to be involved in negotiating the settlement but will be bound by its terms and conditions.
  2. When a court is deciding an application to approve a class action settlement, we recommend it consider whether the settlement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class. In applying the test, we recommend the court consider the following factors:
    1. The terms and conditions of the proposed settlement.
    2. Any legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief paid to class members.
    3. Any information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
    4. Any views of class members.
    5. Any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
    6. Any other factors it considers relevant.
  3. We recommend class members should have an opportunity to file a written objection to the settlement. In addition, the court should have a power to appoint a court expert or counsel to assist if it considers this will assist it to determine whether to approve a settlement.
  4. We do not recommend a general right for class members to opt out of a settlement as this could cause significant uncertainty and prevent class actions from being settled. Instead, we recommend a class member should only be able to opt out of a settlement where this is permitted by the settlement agreement, or the court considers the interests of justice require it. We also recommend a potential class member should only be able to opt into a settlement on these same grounds.
  5. We consider the court should retain jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of the settlement, as part of its ongoing role to protect the interests of class members. As part of this, the court should have a power to make any orders it considers appropriate for the administration and implementation of a class action settlement. We also recommend a settlement outcome report be filed with the court within 60 days of the settlement implementation process being completed, or at a later time if allowed by the court.
  6. The defendant may also want to reach a settlement with an individual class member. We recommend two protections with respect to individual settlements. First, if a defendant wishes to communicate with class members about individual settlements after certification, we think the defendant should be required to include some court-approved standard text about the class action in that communication. Second, we recommend the defendant must seek approval of individual settlements reached after certification where the number of settlements means there is a realistic prospect that they will effectively dispose of the class action.

Discontinuance of a class action

  1. When a class action is discontinued it will bring the proceeding to an end for class members and so we consider court approval should be required. A discontinuance will not extinguish class members claims like a settlement will and so we consider a lesser threshold is appropriate. We recommend the court consider whether discontinuing a class action would prejudice the interests of class members.

ADVERSE COSTS

  1. We consider the usual adverse costs rule should apply to class actions, which means the successful party in a proceeding or interlocutory application will normally be entitled to an award of costs. While the risk of adverse costs may be a barrier to litigants wanting to commence a class action, we are not convinced that removing the adverse costs rule from class actions is likely to make class action proceedings more feasible.
  2. The representative plaintiff will be liable for any adverse costs award in favour of the defendant since they are a party to the litigation. We anticipate a representative plaintiff would generally obtain an indemnity for adverse costs, such as from a litigation funder. Class members will generally not be liable for costs since they are not a party to the litigation. We consider it would be desirable for the High Court Rules to provide clarity on the limited situations when a class member could be ordered to pay costs.

ABOLISHING MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY

  1. We think litigation funding is desirable for Aotearoa New Zealand in principle. While litigation funding is not a ‘silver bullet’ for the significant access to justice issues facing Aotearoa New Zealand, it has an important role to play in improving access to justice. It can allow plaintiffs to bring claims they could not, or would not, have brought for financial or other reasons. It can also help to level the playing field in litigation against well-resourced defendants. In our view, the statutory class actions regime we recommend would have limited practical utility without litigation funding.
  2. We think the law should clarify that litigation funding is permitted by abolishing the torts of maintenance and champerty. These torts, which have historically prohibited litigation funding, act as an impediment to access to justice. The policy rationales for the torts, to protect members of society from malicious litigation and to assure the integrity of the courts, remain important but can be addressed in other ways. For example, through appropriate and transparent regulation of litigation funding, and the court’s general powers to stay or dismiss proceedings that are an abuse of its process.

MODELS FOR REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF LITIGATION FUNDING

  1. There is a need for further regulation and oversight of litigation funding in Aotearoa New Zealand. Currently, litigation funding is not specifically regulated and there is uncertainty about the extent to which it is permitted. This may reduce the availability and affordability of litigation funding, and increase the risk of challenges to funding agreements. It may also mean that plaintiffs are not adequately protected against the risks that can arise in funded proceedings. For example, in relation to funder control of litigation, conflicts of interest, funder profits and funder capital adequacy. We consider the need for further regulation and oversight of litigation funding is strongest in the class actions context.
  2. We think the objectives for permitting and regulating litigation funding should be improving access to justice, while assuring the integrity of the court system. In developing our recommendations, we were guided by the following principles:
    1. To facilitate access to courts, the litigation funding market should be sustainable, competitive and promote consumer confidence.
    2. To ensure substantively just outcomes in class actions, the costs of litigation funding to representative plaintiffs and class members and the terms of litigation funding agreements should be fair and reasonable.
    3. To assure the integrity of the court system, and recognise defendant concerns in funded proceedings, the involvement and role of litigation funders in funded proceedings should be appropriate and transparent.
  3. We discuss various models for regulation and oversight, including industry self-regulation and oversight, or licensing requirements overseen by an appropriate regulator. However, we conclude that the concerns with litigation funding can best be addressed through regulation and court oversight of funding agreements in class actions, alongside professional regulation of lawyers acting in funded proceedings and changes to strengthen the security for costs mechanism. We think this approach is the most practical and proportionate response to the concerns with litigation funding.

Disclosure of funding agreements

  1. In all funded proceedings, we think there should be a requirement for plaintiffs to disclose their funding agreement to the court and the defendant, with redactions to protect privileged matters or those which might confer a tactical advantage on the defendant. This will assist the defendant to make informed choices about whether to apply for security for costs, or a stay of proceedings on abuse of process grounds. Transparency will also provide greater assurance in the integrity in the court system.

SECURITY FOR COSTS

  1. In response to defendant concerns about litigation funding, we make a number of recommendations to strengthen the security for costs mechanism in funded proceedings. A funder’s failure to maintain adequate capital may mean a successful defendant is left with a significant loss if the funder and the funded plaintiff are unable to meet an adverse costs order. This risk is greatest for defendants in class actions, as class actions tend to be significantly more expensive and protracted than ordinary proceedings.
  2. We do not think the existing security for costs mechanism in HCR 5.45 adequately protects defendants in funded proceedings or promotes efficiency and economy in litigation. Security is currently ordered at the discretion of the courts, and only if sought by the defendant. If the funder is based overseas, a successful defendant may be put to the additional expense, risk and inconvenience of litigation in a foreign jurisdiction to enforce the security provided. Further, HCR 5.45 only empowers the court to order a plaintiff to provide security, which does not accurately reflect the dynamics of some funded proceedings. In class actions, for example, the funder is usually contractually responsible for paying the full costs of the litigation including any security for costs. We think defendants, particularly in funded class actions, need greater certainty that capital will be available to cover their costs in the event they are successful.
  3. We recommend the Rules Committee consider developing a rebuttable presumption that funded representative plaintiffs will provide security for costs in class actions. We also recommend a rebuttable presumption that security for costs, in all funded proceedings, will be provided in a form that is enforceable in Aotearoa New Zealand. Finally, we recommend that the court, in all funded proceedings, should be expressly empowered to order costs, including security for costs, directly against the litigation funder.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN FUNDED PROCEEDINGS

Lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest

  1. The relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client is an essential tool for safeguarding the plaintiff’s interests in litigation. However litigation funding can complicate that relationship, because while the lawyer owes duties to the plaintiff, the lawyer’s fees are paid by the funder.
  2. Conflicts of interest between a lawyer and funded plaintiff can arise where the lawyer has (or wants to cultivate) an ongoing relationship with the funder, owes duties to both the funder and the plaintiff, or where the funder exerts control over the litigation. Conflicts may also arise from any commercial ties between the lawyer and the funder. Conflict-prone stages of funded litigation include determining the litigation strategy and deciding whether to settle a claim. During these stages, the lawyer may be incentivised to protect or promote their own interests by advising or persuading the plaintiff to adopt the funder’s preferred course of action. Conflicts can arise in any funded case and are not limited to funded class actions.
  3. To address these concerns, we recommend NZLS consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to clarify how conflicts of interest should be avoided and managed in funded proceedings, including conflicts arising from a lawyer or law firm having financial or other interests in a funder that is financing the same matter in which they are acting.

Plaintiff’s potential liability for unpaid costs

  1. A funder’s failure to fulfil its financial obligations may mean the plaintiff is left with a substantial and unexpected liability for any unpaid legal costs or adverse costs in excess of any security provided. This risk is particularly concerning in class actions, as the legal costs will be disproportionate to the value of the representative plaintiff’s own claim, and to the risks that other class members carry.
  2. We recommend NZLS should consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to prohibit lawyers from claiming unpaid legal fees and expenses from the representative plaintiff. We think a prohibition will protect representative plaintiffs, and may also encourage best practice. For example, it may incentivise lawyers to ensure that any expert fees, and their own fees, are paid up front or in regular instalments by the funder. It may also encourage lawyers to only recommend funders to their clients that, in their assessment, are competent and financially stable.

COURT OVERSIGHT OF FUNDING AGREEMENTS AND COMMISSIONS

  1. We recommend litigation funding agreements should be subject to court approval in class actions. This responds to concerns about funder control of litigation, conflicts of interest between the funder and the representative plaintiff, and excessive funder profits that may significantly diminish returns to the class. We think court approval will protect the interests of the representative plaintiff and class members, and ensure that litigation funding provides meaningful access to justice. It also will provide assurance in the integrity of the court system, and improve transparency and funder accountability in class actions.
  2. Given the often commercial nature of other funded proceedings, we consider that most individual funded plaintiffs are likely to be sophisticated and able to protect their interests when negotiating funding agreements. Therefore we do not recommend court approval of funding agreements outside the class actions context.
  3. We recommend that court approval of the funding agreement should occur early in the class action, and the funder should be unable to enforce the funding agreement against the representative plaintiff or class members unless the agreement has been approved. The court may only approve a funding agreement if it is satisfied that the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the funding agreement and the agreement as a whole is fair and reasonable. We discuss various factors the court may consider when assessing the fairness and reasonableness of the funding terms and the funding commission. We also recommend a power for the court to appoint an expert if this will assist it to determine whether a funding commission is fair and reasonable.

REDUCING BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CLASS MEMBERS

  1. Throughout this review, we have discussed some of the access to justice barriers for potential representative plaintiffs and class members. The costs of litigation, especially legal fees, mean that seeking redress through the courts is beyond the means of most New Zealanders. The adverse costs rule may also act as a barrier to accessing the courts.
  2. While litigation funding can remove or reduce these barriers in some cases, it is only likely to be available in cases that are sufficiently profitable for a litigation funder. It is unlikely to be available in public interest litigation, or where the relief sought is non-monetary.
  3. We consider a public class action fund could have significant access to justice benefits, particularly given the pressures on the legal aid system and the fact that legal aid is unlikely to be available for many of the individual claims that make up a class action. We discuss how a class action fund could be administered and funded.
  4. We also recognise that, while class members have a largely passive role in the litigation, there are certain stages where they can take an active step in the litigation, such as deciding whether to opt in or opt out and considering whether to object to a settlement. Class members need sufficient understanding of these stages to be able to participate in them and may need assistance to take particular steps. We recommend Te Tāhu o te Ture | Ministry of Justice consider producing a clear and accessible online guide to assist class members to understand the class action process. It could also explore options for providing free legal advice to class members, for example through support for a class actions law clinic.

Recommendations

CHAPTER 2: A CLASS ACTIONS REGIME FOR AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

CHAPTER 3: KEY ACTORS IN A CLASS ACTION

CHAPTER 4: COMMENCING A CLASS ACTION

If there is a right of appeal in any of these situations listed, then the limitation period should not begin running until the expiry of any appeal period or until any appeal has been finally disposed of.

CHAPTER 5: CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

  1. For any concurrent class action proceeding that the court decides will not be certified, although it meets the test for certification, the application for certification must be dismissed.
  1. If the court decides that more than one class action proceeding will be certified, it may make orders for the efficient management of those proceedings, including orders that:
    1. the class actions be case managed together;
    2. the class actions be consolidated;
    3. the class actions be heard together or successively; or
    4. one or more of the class actions be temporarily stayed.

CHAPTER 6: CERTIFICATION

It should be satisfied the person has received independent legal advice on the duty and responsibilities of the role.

If the proposed representative plaintiff will be representing members of their hapū or iwi, the court should be able to consider the tikanga of the hapū or iwi as relevant to representation in the proceeding.

It should also be able to take into account any other factors it considers relevant.

CHAPTER 7: THE CLASS

CHAPTER 8: STEPS DURING A CLASS ACTION

CHAPTER 9: COST SHARING ORDERS

CHAPTER 10: JUDGMENTS, RELIEF AND APPEALS

  1. The court may make an award in the amount assessed as the aggregate monetary relief.

CHAPTER 11: SETTLEMENT OF A CLASS ACTION

The Class Actions Act should require court approval in order for the settlement of a class action proceeding to be binding. This should apply whether the class action is opt-in or opt-out and whether the settlement is reached before or after certification.

  1. A summary of the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including information about how individual entitlements will be determined.
  2. Information about any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from payments to class members if the settlement is approved.
  3. An explanation of the settlement approval process, including the time and location of any hearing to consider the settlement.
  4. How a class member may express their opposition to the settlement and the deadline for doing so.
  5. How a class member may obtain further information about the settlement, including contact details for the lawyer for the class or any counsel to assist that has been appointed.

  1. The proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.
  2. Any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement.
  3. The proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts.
  1. Any legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief payable to class members.
  2. Any information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
  3. Any views of class members.
  4. Any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
  5. Any other factors it considers relevant.

R90 The Class Actions Act should specify that if the court approves a settlement, it must describe which class members are bound by the settlement. The Act should specify that the settlement is binding on the parties to the settlement and the class members described by the court on and from the date of the court’s approval.

CHAPTER 12: ADVERSE COSTS IN CLASS ACTIONS

CHAPTER 13: ABOLISHING MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY

CHAPTER 14: MODELS FOR REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF LITIGATION FUNDING

CHAPTER 15: SECURITY FOR COSTS

CHAPTER 16: PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF LAWYERS IN FUNDED PROCEEDINGS

With respect to all funded proceedings, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society should consider amending the Lawyers and Conveyancers (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 to clarify how conflicts of interest should be avoided and managed in funded proceedings, including conflicts arising from a lawyer or law firm having financial or other interests in a funder that is financing the same matter in which they are acting.

CHAPTER 17: COURT OVERSIGHT OF FUNDING TERMS AND COMMISSIONS

The Class Actions Act should specify that, when determining whether the funding commission is fair and reasonable, the court may consider:

  1. The type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary relief.
  2. The number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief.
  3. The estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful.
  4. The complexity and likely duration of the case.
  5. The estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate variation in the factors identified above in (a)-(d).
  6. Any other matters the court considers are relevant.

The Class Actions Act should specify that the court may:

  1. Appoint an expert at any stage of a funded class action if it considers that will assist the court’s consideration of the fairness and reasonableness of a funding commission; and
  2. Order that one or more of the representative plaintiffs or the litigation funder pay part or all of the costs of the expert.

CHAPTER 18: REDUCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE BARRIERS FOR CLASS MEMBERS

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

OUR REVIEW

Terms of reference

Matters not addressed in this report

OUR PROCESS

Overseas comparisons and other studies

Engagement

OUR REPORT



CHAPTER 2

A class actions regime for Aotearoa New Zealand


INTRODUCTION

(a) Group litigation and its benefits.

(b) Current methods of group litigation in Aotearoa New Zealand and their limitations.

(c) Potential advantages of class actions.

(d) Potential disadvantages of class actions.

(e) Why Aotearoa New Zealand should adopt a statutory class actions regime.

(f) Our proposed objectives for class actions.

(g) Principles for designing a class actions regime.

(h) Retaining the representative actions rule.

(i) Defendant class actions.

GROUP LITIGATION

(a) Preliminary court approval before the case can proceed as a class action, usually known as certification.

(b) The requirement for one or more common issues.

(c) The existence of a representative plaintiff or representative defendant.

(d) The existence of a class of represented persons.

(e) A mechanism to determine membership of the class, such as ‘opt-in’ or ‘opt-out’.5F[6]

(f) The decision on the common issues binds the class.

(g) A method of determining individual issues.

(h) Active court supervision of proceedings.

(i) The requirement for the court to approve any settlement.

(j) Typically, funding by a lawyer or litigation funder.

GROUP LITIGATION IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

Representative actions

Problems with using HCR 4.24 for group litigation

(a) The uncertainty invites interlocutory applications and subsequent appeals, which can increase cost and delay.

(b) Case law is slow to develop, and occurs in a ‘piecemeal way’. Some significant issues have not received judicial consideration to date because they have not yet arisen in a particular case.

(c) Courts sometimes take inconsistent approaches in different cases.

(d) It does not comply with access to justice or rule of law values.

(e) Lawyers face difficulties advising clients on representative actions.

(a) Inefficiencies caused by a poorly defined common issue or differentiated class of plaintiffs.

(b) The common interest test being too permissive.

(c) A lack of certainty on limitation rules as they relate to representative actions.

(d) Practical issues not being considered at the outset of proceedings, such as how the plaintiff will practically advance their claims and how the defendant’s rights to procedural fairness will be recognised.

(e) Plaintiffs not being required to provide particulars, which can prejudice a defendant’s right to bring third party claims.

(f) Potential group members being confused about the process, including uncertainty about competing representative actions or concern about the risk of adverse costs.

(g) Lack of clarity on the role of a lawyer in a representative action.

Other means of bringing group litigation

POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF CLASS ACTIONS

Access to justice

Improving access to the courts

(a) Redressing the power imbalance between the plaintiff and defendant or ‘levelling the playing field’.

(b) Removing or reducing claimants’ costs exposure (particularly where a litigation funder is involved).

(c) Reducing the risk and uncertainty that claimants experience in the litigation process.

(d) Allowing class members to benefit from litigation without significant involvement.

(e) Providing class members with better access to legal advice and representation.

(f) Addressing issues such as social barriers and limited knowledge of rights.

Procedural access to justice

Substantive access to justice

Enabling economy and efficiency of litigation

Strengthening incentives for compliance with the law

POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF CLASS ACTIONS

(a) Negative impacts on the court system.

(b) Negative impacts for defendants, including pressure to settle claims and increased costs.

(c) Broader negative impacts on the business and regulatory environment.

(d) Insufficient protection of class member interests.

Negative impacts on the court system

Negative impacts on defendants

Negative impacts on the business and regulatory environment

Potential impacts on the insurance market

Potential to deter directors

Risk aversion

Impact on business and regulatory environment

Insufficient protection of class member interests

A STATUTORY CLASS ACTIONS REGIME FOR AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

(a) It would be preferable to relying on HCR 4.24, which was seen as inadequate for modern group litigation.

(b) It would result from a more considered policy and legislative process, rather than piecemeal judicial development.

(c) It would provide greater clarity and certainty.

(d) Class actions have the potential to increase access to justice.

(e) In modern society, where there is the potential for mass harm, there must be a procedural mechanism through which such harms can be addressed.

(f) Regulatory action alone may be an insufficient response to harm caused to a large group.

(g) A regime could be designed in a way that mitigates many of the potential disadvantages of class actions.

Recommendations

(a) Group litigation is beneficial but current mechanisms and alternatives are inadequate.

(b) Class actions will improve access to justice.

(c) Class actions can be an efficient way of managing multiple claims.

(d) Many of the potential disadvantages of class actions can be mitigated by the design of the regime.

(e) A statutory regime will be clearer, more certain and more accessible than the existing law based on HCR 4.24.

Group litigation is beneficial but current mechanisms and alternatives are inadequate

Class actions will improve access to justice

Class actions can be an efficient way of managing multiple claims

Many of the potential disadvantages can be mitigated by the design of the regime

A statutory regime will be clearer, more certain and more accessible

(a) The certification test.

(b) Provisions relating to suspension of limitation periods.

(c) The court’s powers with respect to concurrent class actions.

(d) The binding effect of a class action judgment on class members.

(e) The power to assess and order monetary relief on an aggregate basis.

(f) The power to order alternative distribution of monetary relief.

(g) Appeal rights.

(h) Requirements for approval of a settlement.

(i) The requirement for court review of a litigation funding agreement.

OBJECTIVES OF CLASS ACTIONS

PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING A CLASS ACTIONS REGIME

(a) Consider the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants.

(b) Safeguard the interests of class members.

(c) Consider the principle of proportionality, meaning that the time and cost of litigation should be proportionate to what is at stake.

(d) Strike an appropriate balance between flexibility and certainty.

(e) Be appropriate for contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand.

(f) Recognise and reflect relevant tikanga Māori.

(g) Not adversely impact on other methods of group litigation.

(h) Provide clarity on issues arising in funded litigation.

The interests of both plaintiffs and defendants

Safeguarding class member interests

(a) Active court supervision is an important way of protecting class member interests.

(b) Clarity is needed on the role of lawyers with respect to class members.

(c) There needs to be mechanisms to manage potential conflicts of interest, whether with the representative plaintiff, lawyer or funder.

(d) Class members need adequate information that is clearly and effectively communicated to them.

Proportionality

Balancing flexibility and certainty

Appropriate for contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand

Tikanga Māori

(a) Introducing uncertainty. This is undesirable because one of the reasons for developing a class actions regime is to provide greater certainty and clarity. It may also lead to additional litigation, an issue raised by one submitter.

(b) The potential for inconsistencies between class actions and other civil litigation, given the lack of general reference to tikanga Māori in the High Court Rules.

(c) It may be less meaningful than giving specific consideration to which elements of a class actions regime might engage tikanga Māori.

(d) The risk of tikanga Māori being inappropriately raised by litigants in order to win procedural points.

(e) Making it the responsibility of individual litigants to consider tikanga Māori rather than making tikanga an integral part of the policy process in the development of the legislation.

Avoiding adverse impacts on other forms of group litigation

Recommendation

Providing clarity on issues arising in funded litigation

RETAINING THE REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS RULE

Results of consultation

Recommendations

DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

Recommendation

(a) A representative defendant is usually selected by the plaintiff and may be unwilling to perform the role.

(b) Defendant class members are likely to opt out if given the option.

(c) Proceedings against a representative defendant expose class members to liability, including orders to pay damages.

(d) The effect of any suspension of limitation periods applying to claims.119F[120] In a plaintiff class action, the suspension of the limitation period operates for the benefit of class members. In a defendant class action, the suspension of the limitation period benefits the plaintiff rather than defendant class members.

CHAPTER 3

Key actors in a class action


INTRODUCTION

(a) The role of class members.

(b) The role of the representative plaintiff.

(c) The role of a defendant in a class action.

(d) The court’s supervisory role in a class action.

THE ROLE OF CLASS MEMBERS

(a) A statutory duty on the representative plaintiff to act in what they believe to be the best interests of the class, which we discuss later in this chapter.

(b) The representative plaintiff’s lawyer becoming the lawyer for the class upon certification.

(c) The requirement to give notice to class members at certain stages in a class action.

(d) Court approval of settlement, which requires the court to consider whether a settlement is fair, reasonable and in the best interests of the class.

(e) Clarifying that a class member does not have adverse costs liability, except in limited circumstances.

(f) Requiring court approval of litigation funding agreements in class actions.

(a) The opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class action.

(b) Where the court requires a class member to provide discovery.

(c) The ability for a class member to apply to replace the representative plaintiff.

(d) When class member participation is required to determine an individual issue, such as giving evidence at a hearing.

(e) The opportunity for class members to object to a settlement.

(f) Where a class member must take steps to receive a benefit from the settlement.

THE REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF

Role of the representative plaintiff

(a) Acting in the best interests of class members, including by avoiding any conflicts of interest that may prevent them from properly fulfilling their role.

(b) Ensuring the case is properly prosecuted, which is likely to include retaining and instructing a lawyer and meeting any evidential obligations.

(c) Being liable for adverse costs or ensuring that an indemnity is in place.

(d) Making decisions on any settlement, including applying for court approval of settlement.

Representative plaintiff model

Results of consultation

(a) The lead plaintiff, whose name appears first on court documents. Their case might be considered the most representative or to be a suitable test case.

(b) The person or persons responsible for conducting the litigation, who would be responsible for managing the claim.

(c) The person or persons responsible for funding the litigation, who may be responsible for adverse costs orders and paying security for costs.

(d) The lawyers engaged to run the claim, who should receive instructions from those responsible for conducting the litigation but owe duties to the class as a whole.

(e) The class as a whole, who benefit from the class action but are not generally involved in making decisions relating to the litigation.

(a) In an opt-in class action, the authority could be approved by agreement of the class members.

(b) In opt-out class actions, the court would need to confer this authority.

(a) In reality, the lawyer and/or litigation funder drives the case rather than the representative plaintiff.

(b) The burden is too heavy for representative plaintiffs, who may be in a vulnerable position themselves. Taking on fiduciary obligations exposes the representative plaintiff to risk and may lead to conservatism.

(c) Representative plaintiffs can be out of their depth with respect to managing class actions and giving instructions so it may be difficult for them to act in the best interests of the class.

(d) The focus should be on ensuring that litigation is being run properly and the best interests of all class members are considered. Imposing fiduciary duties and costs liability on a single representative plaintiff is inconsistent with this.

(e) Matters such as understanding the legal issues and negotiating with litigation funders are best done by those with expertise. The litigation committee is best able to hold the lawyer to account, negotiate a favourable deal with litigation funders and act in the best interests of the class.

(a) The representative plaintiff has ‘skin in the game’ and consequently will best preserve the interests of the class.

(b) There are many representative plaintiffs who take their responsibilities seriously and perform their job well, even when ‘unskilled’. We should not underestimate people.

(c) A litigation committee can lead to unfairness if it can make decisions without having responsibility for adverse costs.

Recommendation

Duty and responsibilities of the representative plaintiff

Results of consultation

(a) Having sufficient knowledge of the facts of the case and seeking appropriate legal and expert advice so they can make the necessary decisions and give informed instructions.133F[134]

(b) Making decisions in the class action and not delegating this responsibility.

(c) Ensuring the class is adequately informed, such as on the key facts and the conduct of the class action.

(d) Ensuring there is a workable plan for the proceeding.

(e) Fairly and adequately representing the interests of the class.

(f) Acting in the best interests of the class.

(g) Avoiding conflicts of interest.

(h) Being liable for any adverse costs order.

(a) This will assist the representative plaintiff to be aware of their obligations.

(b) The obligations are a central aspect of the class actions regime and should not be left to case law development. It is undesirable to have potentially parallel common law fiduciary duties.

(c) It would provide clarity on the obligations.

(d) The statute can confirm the obligations take priority over contractual commitments.

(a) The obligations exist independently of statute.

(b) The court should have flexibility to manage issues that arise with respect to a representative plaintiff’s obligations by considering the circumstances of the case.

(c) It could lead to litigation over the relationship between the obligations and contractual commitments.

(d) The list of obligations may become outdated if the obligations are reframed over time.

(e) The obligations should not be overly prescriptive as this could deter plaintiffs from taking on the role. The Australian experience suggests it is not necessary to identify and formulate each obligation with clarity.

Recommendation

(a) The representative plaintiff is aware of the duty before agreeing to take on the role.

(b) A lawyer can advise the representative plaintiff on what is required by the duty.

(c) When the court considers an application for certification, it can consider whether the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on, and demonstrated an understanding of, this aspect of its role.

(d) Litigation funding agreements can be drafted in a way that avoids conflicting with the representative plaintiff’s overarching duty to the class.

(a) Avoid any conflicts of interest that could prevent them from fulfilling this duty, or ensure any conflicts are properly managed (for example, by supporting the appointment of a sub-class representative plaintiff).

(b) Carry out their responsibilities diligently and with reasonable care.

(c) Consider the interests of the class when fulfilling their role and responsibilities, including when making decisions about the conduct of the class action, giving instructions to their lawyer or entering into legal or funding arrangements.

Key responsibilities of the representative plaintiff

(a) Enter into any necessary arrangements for legal representation and funding.

(b) Give informed instructions to their lawyer as to the conduct of the proceeding.

(c) Progress the case as plaintiff in the proceedings.

(d) Meet any order for adverse costs (or arrange an adequate indemnity for any adverse costs, such as from a litigation funder or class members).

(e) Make decisions in relation to any settlement of the class action and be a party to the settlement agreement.

Arrangements for legal representation and funding

Informed instructions

Progress the case as plaintiff in the proceedings

Liability for adverse costs

Being a party to any settlement

Supporting the representative plaintiff

Results of consultation

Recommendations

Statutory immunity from liability

The role of the lawyer and need for independent legal advice

Supervisory role of the court

Indemnity for adverse costs

Honorarium

Having multiple representative plaintiffs

Litigation committee

THE ROLE OF A DEFENDANT IN A CLASS ACTION

THE COURT’S SUPERVISORY ROLE IN A CLASS ACTION

Recommendation

(a) Requiring a proceeding to be certified in order to proceed as a class action.

(b) Court approval of notices to class members.

(c) Court approval of settlement.

(d) Court approval of litigation funding agreements.

CHAPTER 4

Commencing a class action


INTRODUCTION

(a) The desirability of having a general class actions regime.

(b) Which courts a class actions regime should apply to.

(c) Our proposed requirements for commencing a class action.

(d) Limitation periods and class actions.

A GENERAL CLASS ACTIONS REGIME

Results of consultation

(a) There is no principled basis or compelling reason for creating a distinction between which claims can be run as a class action.

(b) Access to justice will be better enhanced by a general regime.

(c) A sectoral approach could lead to arguments over whether a particular proceeding is within the scope of the class actions regime. It could also cause a plaintiff to frame their claim in an artificial way.

(d) Claims are often pleaded with several causes of action and difficulties may arise if only some can be brought as a class action.

(e) Given the size of Aotearoa New Zealand, a general class actions regime will mean the jurisprudence on the framework develops more quickly.

Recommendation

APPROPRIATE COURTS FOR CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

District Court

(a) It would not be economic or cost efficient to have class actions in the District Court.

(b) Because of its extensive criminal jurisdiction and use of jury trials, the District Court may lack the capacity to manage class actions without significant additional resourcing.

(c) There would be an additional layer of appeals, which would make a class action commenced in the District Court more expensive and less efficient.

(d) If a procedure is required for small claims, the representative actions rule in DCR 4.24 could be retained.

Employment Court

Environment Court

Māori Land Court

Tribunals

Recommendations

District Court

Employment Court

Environment Court and Māori Land Court

COMMENCEMENT REQUIREMENTS

(a) There must be two or more class members represented by a representative plaintiff.

(b) Each class member must have their own claim, reflecting the fact that a class action is a form of aggregate litigation. Each claim must have a common issue, but class members do not need to have the same cause of action.

(c) The representative plaintiff should ordinarily be a class member.

(d) A state entity can be representative plaintiff where it is a class member or where another statute provides it with the ability to bring a proceeding on behalf of two or more people.

(e) There must be at least one representative plaintiff with a claim against each defendant. It is not necessary for each class member or representative plaintiff to have a claim against every defendant.

Results of consultation

Claims with a common issue

Minimum class size

Representative plaintiff must be a class member

State entity as representative plaintiff

(a) It would not realise benefits of a class action such as sharing legal costs, resources and adverse costs risk as the FMA would likely carry these costs and risks rather than obtaining litigation funding or sharing costs with class members.

(b) Running a class action would be a complicated way for the FMA to achieve compensation for affected parties and there are simpler ways for it to do this.

(c) Bringing a claim as a class action would likely mean the FMA would have less freedom in how it runs the claim because of the obligations of a representative plaintiff.

(d) Allowing the FMA to bring class actions could signal a willingness for government to advance and fund claims on behalf of private interests, which could lead to claimants failing to look after their own interests. There could be pressure on the FMA to step in where class actions have become economically unviable.

A representative plaintiff must have a claim against each defendant

Recommendations

Documents to be filed when commencing a class action

(a) An interlocutory application for an order certifying the proceeding as a class action and appointing one or more representative plaintiff, with a supporting affidavit.221F[222]

(b) A ‘Summary of Class Action’ form, to enable other lawyers and funders to know whether another proceeding would be considered a concurrent class action.222F[223]

Two or more class members

Each class member must have a claim with a common issue

Representative plaintiff must be a class member

State entity as representative plaintiff

Class actions against multiple defendants

LIMITATION PERIODS

(a) The court declines to certify a class action.

(b) The court makes an order that has the effect of removing or excluding a class member’s claim from the proceeding.

(c) A class member decides not to opt into an opt-in class action.

(d) A class member decides to opt out of an opt-out class action.

(e) The proceeding otherwise ends without an adjudication on the merits, for example if the plaintiff discontinues the claim.

Results of consultation

When should limitation periods be suspended?

When should limitation periods start running again?

Other limitation issues

Recommendations

If there is a right of appeal in any of these situations listed, then the limitation period should not begin running until the expiry of any appeal period or until any appeal has been finally disposed of.

(a) When the court dismisses an application for certification or decertifies the class action.

(b) When the court makes an order that has the effect of removing or excluding a claim from the proceeding. An example would be where the court makes an order that narrows the class definition or strikes out a cause of action.

(c) In an opt-in proceeding, where a potential class member does not opt into the class action by the date specified in the opt-in notice. Limitation would start running from the date specified in the opt-in notice as the last date for opting in.

(d) In an opt-out proceeding, where a potential class member opts out of the class action by the date specified in the opt-out notice. Limitation would start running from the date the class member opts out.

(e) When the proceeding is dismissed without an adjudication on the merits.

(f) When the proceeding is abandoned or discontinued.

DRAFT COMMENCEMENT PROVISIONS

1 Commencement of class action in High Court

(1) A person may commence a class action proceeding against 1 or more defendants as the proposed representative plaintiff—

(a) on behalf of a proposed class; and

(b) if the claims of the members of the proposed class all raise a common issue.

(2) A proceeding under subsection (1) may be commenced by more than 1 proposed representative plaintiff.

(3) A State entity may commence a class action proceeding against 1 or more defendants as the proposed representative plaintiff on behalf of a proposed class if—

(a) it is itself a member of the proposed class and the claims of the members of the proposed class all raise a common issue; or

(b) another Act authorises it to bring a class action proceeding.

(4) This section does not itself confer jurisdiction on the court to hear a proceeding, which must otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the court.

(5) In this section,—

class means,—

(a) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (1), at least 2 persons together with the proposed representative plaintiff, who must also be a class member:

(b) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (3), at least 2 persons in addition to the State entity

common issue means a common issue of fact or law.

2 Multiple defendants

(1) If a class action proceeding is commenced under section 1(1) against more than 1 defendant,—

(a) for each defendant there must be a proposed representative plaintiff and at least 2 other persons with a claim against that defendant:

(b) if there are 2 or more proposed representative plaintiffs, it is not necessary for each of them to have a claim against all of the defendants:

(c) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.

(2) If a class action proceeding is commenced under section 1(3) against more than 1 defendant,—

(a) for each defendant there must be at least 2 persons with a claim against that defendant:

(b) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.

3 Application for certification of class action

When a class action proceeding is commenced, it must be accompanied by an application for an order certifying the proceeding as a class action proceeding and appointing 1 or more representative plaintiffs for the proceeding.

CHAPTER 5

Concurrent class actions


INTRODUCTION

(a) The need for a process to manage concurrent class actions.

(b) Defining concurrent class actions.

(c) The deadline for filing concurrent class actions.

(d) The timing of a hearing on concurrent class actions.

(e) The court’s powers to manage concurrent class actions.

(f) Criteria to apply when assessing concurrent class actions.

(g) Defendant participation in concurrent class action hearings.

THE NEED FOR A PROCESS TO MANAGE CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

DEFINING CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

Recommendation

DEADLINE FOR FILING CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

Timeframe for filing competing class actions

(a) There would be ongoing uncertainty unless there was a time limit.

(b) A 90-day period would allow sufficient flexibility to ensure the process is fair for all parties.

(c) In most cases, it should allow sufficient time for actions to be investigated properly and also provide certainty for the participants and the court at an early stage of the proceedings.

(d) Having a timeframe is consistent with ensuring fairness to defendants and the efficient case management of proceedings.

(e) It will avoid subsequent class actions after a proceeding has been certified, resulting in multiple class actions proceeding by default.

(f) It aligns with the objective of increasing efficiency and reducing the burden on the court.

(g) If there are going to be competing class actions, it will be important to promptly deal with the challenges they present.

Publicising new class actions

Recommendations

(a) The proposed defendant or defendants.

(b) The proposed class definition.

(c) Whether it is proposed that class membership would be determined on an opt-in or opt-out basis.

(d) A summary of the circumstances giving rise to the claims, including any relevant time periods.

(e) The causes of action.

(f) The relief sought.

(g) Whether the applicant is aware of any concurrent class action that has been filed.

(h) The lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff and the class.

(i) Details of any website with further information about the class action.

TIMING OF HEARING ON CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

(a) It is the most efficient option for the parties and the court, and will minimise expense and/or delay.

(b) If the issue of competing class actions is resolved prior to certification, there is a risk that the ‘chosen’ class action is not certified.

(c) While it will require multiple parties to incur the cost and expense of a certification hearing, plaintiffs commence a class action on the understanding that such a hearing will be required.

(d) There is likely to be an overlap in some of the factors considered in the tests for competing class actions and certification.

Recommendation

THE COURT’S POWERS TO MANAGE CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

Recommendation

(a) Cases where there is relatively little overlap between the legal issues and/or the class definition.

(b) Cases where the parties have proposed an efficient way of progressing both proceedings together.

(c) Cases where there is a particular reason for class members retaining the ability to choose between class actions. For example, where the subject matter of the case involves sensitive matters such as allegations of abuse and class members must feel comfortable disclosing information to their lawyer.

(a) The class actions be case managed together.

(b) The class actions be consolidated.

(c) The class actions be heard together or successively.

(d) One or more of the class actions be temporarily stayed (such as where one proceeding will be heard as a test case).296F[297]

CRITERIA TO APPLY WHEN ASSESSING CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

(a) How each case is formulated. This might include the nature and scope of the causes of action, what the common issues are, how manageable the individual issues will be to resolve once common issues are determined, the relief sought, the class definition and likely class size, and whether the plaintiff seeks to bring the claim as an opt-in or opt-out class action.

(b) The preferences of potential class members, to the extent these can be ascertained. We did not think that the number of class members signed up to each class action and litigation funder should be taken as a clear preference of class members for one class action over another.

(c) The funding arrangements for each class action. This would involve consideration of whether litigation funding has been secured and on what basis, including the estimated return to the litigation funder.

(d) Whether there is appropriate legal representation.

Results of consultation

General test

Relevant factors

How cases are formulated

Preferences of potential class members

Litigation funding arrangements

Legal representation

‘First to file’ presumption

Prospects of success

Other factors

Recommendation

Overarching test

Relevant factors

(a) How each case is formulated.

(b) The preferences of potential class members.

(c) Litigation funding arrangements.

(d) Legal representation.

Formulation of the case

(a) Which causes of action are pleaded.

(b) To what extent the case has been developed.

(c) The class definition and likely class size.

(d) The common issues and individual issues to be determined.

(e) Whether the claim is brought as an opt-in or opt-out class action.

(f) The relief sought.

Preferences of potential class members

Litigation funding arrangements

Legal representation

Other factors

DEFENDANT PARTICIPATION IN CONCURRENT CLASS ACTION HEARINGS

Results of consultation

(a) It would be contrary to the principles of access to justice and open justice for a defendant to be excluded.

(b) The outcome of the hearing will impact on the defendant.

(c) The defendant’s involvement may assist the court on issues such as commonality, the relief sought and evidence required.

(d) It would not give the defendant a tactical advantage, or any advantage would only be fleeting.

(e) Courts have the necessary powers to manage any confidentiality issues that arise.

Defendants should not be excluded from concurrent class action hearing

DRAFT CONCURRENT CLASS ACTION PROVISIONS

5 Commencement of concurrent class actions

(1) A concurrent class action proceeding must be commenced—

(a) within 90 days of the date on which notice of the first of the concurrent class action proceedings is given on the Class Actions Register; or

(b) at a later time with the leave of a court.

(2) In this Act,—

Class Actions Register means a register of class action proceedings published on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Ministry of Justice

concurrent class action proceeding means a class action proceeding that has the following in common with another class action proceeding that is currently before the court:

(a) the same or substantially similar issues in dispute; and

(b) at least 1 defendant.


6 Procedure for certification of concurrent class actions

(1) The applications for certification of concurrent class action proceedings must be considered by a court together.

(2) If the court considers that more than 1 of the proceedings meets the test for certification under section 4, it must decide whether all, and if not all which, of those proceedings will be certified.

(3) When deciding which of the proceedings will be certified, the court must consider what approach will best allow the claims of class members to be resolved in a just and efficient way.

(4) When assessing which approach is best under subsection (3), the court may consider—

(a) how each proceeding is formulated:

(b) the preferences of potential class members:

(c) any litigation funding arrangements for each proceeding:

(d) the legal representation for each proceeding:

(e) any other factors the court considers relevant.

(5) If the court decides under subsection (2) that a proceeding will not be certified, the application for certification must be dismissed.

(6) If the court decides that more than 1 of the proceedings will be certified, it may make further orders for the management of those proceedings, including orders that—

(a) the proceedings be case managed together:

(b) the proceedings be consolidated:

(c) the proceedings be heard together or successively:

(d) 1 or more of the proceedings be temporarily stayed.

CHAPTER 6

Certification


INTRODUCTION

(a) Requiring certification of class actions.

(b) The test for certification of a class action.

(c) Procedural matters relating to certification.

REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

(a) Preventing meritless, frivolous or vexatious claims and filtering claims that are unsuitable to proceed as a class action.

(b) Allowing the court to consider the interests of the plaintiff, defendant and class members.

(c) Placing the onus on a plaintiff to show that a claim has been properly brought, rather than leaving it to the defendant to raise any issues.

(d) Requiring the plaintiff to be thoughtful about how the litigation will be run.

(e) Enabling the early identification and management of issues. This includes ensuring claims are properly pleaded, proactively managing conflicts of interest, and ensuring the representative plaintiff is appropriate.

(f) Providing an opportunity to manage concurrent class actions.

(g) Ensuring a level of court oversight at an early stage.

(h) Avoiding the need for multiple interlocutory applications. Certification could lower the overall cost for litigants and provide a degree of certainty at an early stage.

(a) Certification could be cumbersome and costly and may restrict access to justice.

(b) The Australian approach of having powers to discontinue a class action is preferable and has not led to a proliferation of unsuitable class actions.

(c) There are other mechanisms that can protect class member interests, including the right to opt out, notification rights and the ability to apply to substitute the representative plaintiff.

(d) The risk of adverse costs deters vexatious or meritless claims. Defendants have other tools to challenge such claims, such as a strike-out or summary judgment application.

Recommendation

THE TEST FOR CERTIFICATION OF A CLASS ACTION

(a) The statement of claim must disclose a reasonably arguable cause of action.

(b) Each class member’s claim should raise a common issue of fact or law that is of significance to the resolution of the claim.

(c) There must be a suitable representative plaintiff who would fairly and adequately represent class members.

(d) The opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding must be an appropriate means of determining class membership in the circumstances of the case.

(e) A class action must be an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of class member claims.

Results of consultation

REASONABLY ARGUABLE CAUSE OF ACTION

Results of consultation

Recommendation

COMMON ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW

Results of consultation

Recommendation

REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIFF

(a) Whether there are any conflicts of interest that could prevent the person from properly fulfilling their role as representative plaintiff.

(b) Whether the person has a general understanding of the nature of the claims and their obligations as representative plaintiff, including their liability for adverse costs.

(c) In a case where the person seeks to represent members of their hapū or iwi, tikanga on representation.

Results of consultation

(a) They have the means to meet an adverse costs award.366F[367]

(b) They understand class action proceedings and their rights and obligations under any funding arrangements.367F[368]

(c) A method of notifying class members of progress in the class action.368F[369]

(d) Governance and consultation procedures for the class.369F[370]

Recommendations

Relevant factors

(a) It should consider whether there is, or is likely to be, a conflict of interest that could prevent them from properly fulfilling the role as representative plaintiff.372F[373]

(b) It should consider whether they have a reasonable understanding of the nature of the claims and the duty and responsibilities of a representative plaintiff, including their potential liability for costs.373F[374]

(c) It should be satisfied the person has received independent legal advice on the duty and responsibilities of the role.374F[375]

(d) If they will be representing members of their hapū or iwi, the court should be able to consider the tikanga of the hapū or iwi as relevant to representation in the proceeding.375F[376]

Conflicts of interest

Understanding of the case and duty and responsibilities of role

Independent legal advice

Tikanga on representation

Replacing the representative plaintiff

CLASS ACTION MUST BE AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE

(a) The number or potential number of class members.

(b) The nature of the claims.

(c) The extent of the other issues that will need to be determined once the common issue is resolved.

(d) Whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the remedies sought.

(e) Whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims.

(f) Any other factors it considers relevant.

Results of consultation

Recommendation

(a) The proposed class definition.

(b) The potential number of class members.

(c) The nature of the claims.

(d) The nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined once the common issue is resolved.

(e) Whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the remedies sought.

(f) Whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims.

(g) Any other factors it considers relevant.

Proposed class definition

Potential number of class members

Nature of the claims

Nature and extent of the other issues to be determined

Proportionality

(a) The potential duration of the class action, such as the likely number of witnesses and estimated hearing duration.

(b) The likely expenses of the proceeding, such as anticipated legal fees, project management fees and disbursements.

(c) The estimated range of individual claims.

Other procedures for resolving individual claims

CLASS MEMBERSHIP

Results of consultation

Whether to have opt-in and opt-out class actions with no default

Whether test should specify factors

Recommendation

Relevant factors

(a) The potential size of the class and how potential class members will be identified.

(b) The characteristics of the class.

(c) The nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of individual claims.

(d) Whether class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings.

(e) Whether a particular class mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in running its defence.

(f) Any other factor it considers relevant.

Potential size of the class and how potential class members will be identified

Characteristics of the class

Nature of the claims

Whether class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings

Whether class mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in running its defence

Universal class actions

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CERTIFICATION TEST

(a) Whether to require a litigation plan at certification.

(b) The interaction between review of litigation funding arrangements and the certification test.

(c) The effect of the certification requirements being met.

(d) Whether the Class Actions Act should specify matters that will not prevent a case from being certified.

(e) The evidential standard for certification.

Litigation plan

Litigation funding

(a) While many class actions will be litigation funded, this is not a requirement of bringing a class action.

(b) It would not make sense for the court to review a litigation funding arrangement unless it has decided to certify the class action.

(c) If the court has certified the class action on a slightly different basis to that initially sought (for example, by narrowing the class definition or only allowing it to proceed on an opt-in basis), the representative plaintiff and funder may need to review the litigation funding arrangements.

(d) In some cases, litigation funding could be obtained part-way through proceedings, or the litigation funding arrangements could change during the proceedings.

Effect of certification requirements being met

Recommendation

Whether to specify matters that do not prevent certification

(a) The relief sought includes a damages claim that would require individual assessment after the common issues have been determined.

(b) The relief sought relates to separate contracts involving different class members.

(c) Different remedies are sought for different class members.

(d) The number of class members or the identity of each class member is not known.

(e) The class includes a subclass with claims or defences that raise common issues not shared by all class members.

Evidential standard for certification

PROCEDURAL MATTERS RELATING TO CERTIFICATION

(a) The certification application.

(b) The certification hearing.

(c) The certification order.

(d) The court’s powers when certification criteria are no longer met.

Certification application

Results of consultation

(a) The IBA Antitrust Committee said it was unclear when the representative plaintiff must file evidence in support of certification and what the manner, scope and timing of any evidential requirements are. It noted that in Ontario, a proceeding would be initiated by filing a statement of claim and an application would subsequently be filed for orders certifying the proceeding and appointing a representative plaintiff.

(b) Shine Lawyers said that, given the certification criteria will likely require considerable evidence from the plaintiff, it would be premature to require the plaintiff to seek a certification order at commencement. It said this is particularly so given the proposed 90-day time frame for filing a competing class action.

(c) Omni Bridgeway said certification should be able to be determined on the pleadings, except for the requirement for the representative plaintiff to demonstrate they have a reasonable understanding of the nature of the claims and their obligations. This could be dealt with by way of a brief affidavit.

(d) Two submitters queried how a plaintiff could prove aspects of the certification test, such as how they would fairly and adequately represent the class or that a class action is an appropriate procedure.448F[449] The joint submission by Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce noted that opinion evidence from the plaintiff or their counsel would be inadmissible.

Recommendation

The certification hearing

(a) Where the court considers the class definition should be amended from that pleaded in the statement of claim.

(b) Where one or more of the causes of action is not reasonably arguable.

(c) Where the plaintiff has sought to bring a class action on an opt-out basis and the court considers it can only be certified on an opt-in basis.

Certification order

(a) A description of the class.

(b) The name of the representative plaintiff (or plaintiffs).

(c) The nature of the claims asserted on behalf of the class.

(d) The relief sought by the class.

(e) The common issues of law or fact.

(f) Whether the class action has been certified on an opt-in or opt-out basis.

Results of consultation

Recommendations

(a) The class definition.

(b) The name of the representative plaintiff(s).

(c) A description of the causes of action that are pleaded.

(d) The relief sought by the class.

(e) The common issues of law or fact.

(f) Whether the class action has been certified on an opt-in or opt-out basis.

Court’s powers when certification criteria are no longer met

(a) In Ontario, if it appears to the court that the certification requirements are no longer satisfied, it may amend the certification order, decertify the proceeding or make any other order it considers appropriate.462F[463] If the court decertifies a proceeding, it may permit the proceeding to continue as one or more proceedings between different parties.463F[464]

(b) The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal can make an order varying or revoking the certification order or staying the class action. In doing so, it must consider whether the certification criteria continue to be met, whether the representative plaintiff still meets the criteria, and whether the Tribunal has given them permission to withdraw as representative plaintiff.464F[465]

(c) In the United States, a court may alter or amend its class certification decision at any time before final judgment.465F[466] This can include decertifying or modifying a class action that was initially approved if, during the litigation, the class action fails to meet the certification requirements.466F[467]

Recommendation

DRAFT CERTIFICATION PROVISION

4 Certification of class action

(1) Subject to section 6 (which relates to the certification of concurrent class actions), a court must certify a proceeding as a class action proceeding if it is satisfied that—

(a) the proceeding discloses 1 or more reasonably arguable causes of action; and

(b) there is a common issue of fact or law in the claim of each member of the proposed class; and

(c) there is at least 1 representative plaintiff that is suitable and will fairly and adequately represent the class; and

(d) a class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the claims of class members; and

(e) the opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an appropriate means of determining class membership in the circum‐ stances of the proceeding.

(2) When assessing the suitability of a proposed representative plaintiff and whether they will fairly and adequately represent the proposed class under subsection (1)(c), the court—

(a) must co nsider whether there is or is likely to be a conflict of interest that could prevent them from properly fulfilling the role as representative plaintiff:

(b) must consider whether they have a reasonable understanding of the nature of the claims and the duty and responsibilities of a representative plaintiff, including potential liability for costs:

(c) must be satisfied that they have received independent legal advice on the duty and responsibilities of a representative plaintiff:

(d) if they will be representing members of their hapū or iwi, may consider the tikanga of the hapū or iwi as relevant to representation in the proceeding:

(e) may consider any other factors it considers relevant.

(3) When assessing under subsection (1)(d) whether a class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the claims of class members, the court must consider—

(a) the proposed class definition:

(b) the potential number of class members:

(c) the nature of the claims:

(d) the nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined once the common issue is resolved:

(e) whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the remedies sought:

(f) whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims:

(g) any other factors it considers relevant.

(4) When assessing under subsection (1)(e) whether the mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an appropriate means of determining class membership, the court may consider—

(a) the potential size of the proposed class and how potential class members will be identified:

(b) the characteristics of the proposed class:

(c) the nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of indi‐ vidual claims:

(d) whether class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings:

(e) whether the mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in run‐ ning their defence:

(f) any other factors it considers relevant.

CHAPTER 7

The class


INTRODUCTION

(a) Whether special rules are needed for certain categories of class member.

(b) The relationship between the lawyer and class members.

(c) Communications between the defendant’s lawyer and class members.

SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CLASS MEMBER

(a) Class members who reside outside Aotearoa New Zealand.

(b) Ministers and government departments.

(c) Minors and people who are considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a particular step.

Class members who reside outside Aotearoa New Zealand

Overseas approaches

(a) Class actions legislation could expressly allow opt-out classes consisting of both resident and non-resident class members.479F[480]

(b) Class actions legislation could give the court discretion to require non-resident class members to opt into the class action.480F[481]

Recommendation

Ministers and government departments

Results of consultation

(a) The Crown must be deliberate about the litigation it brings. It needs to be cognisant of the power imbalance between the Crown and private litigants, and the use of public money.

(b) Any class action where the Crown is a class member would be caught by the Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business 2016 and the Attorney-General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation. However, the plaintiff class would have their own lawyers and potentially a litigation funder and plaintiff committee, which could remove control of the litigation from the Crown. The plaintiff class might also be pursuing a different litigation strategy to the Crown.

(c) The Crown’s interests are likely to be different from those of private plaintiffs.

(d) There may be important policy reasons against filing a claim in a particular case.

(e) The scale of the Crown’s claim will often be much larger than other class members, which could result in a power imbalance within the class.

Recommendation

Minors and people who are considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a particular step

High Court Rules

Overseas approaches

Recommendations

Litigation guardian not required as a matter of course

Support with steps in a class action

(a) They can exercise an initial right to either opt into or opt out of the class action.

(b) They can bring an application to substitute the representative plaintiff.

(c) They can file an objection to a proposed settlement.

(d) Their participation may be needed when issues are determined on an individual basis (such as giving evidence).

(e) They may need to take an active step to participate in a settlement.

(a) Is under the age of 18 years; or

(b) It considers lacks sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to that step.

Determining whether a person has sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a step

(a) Understand information relevant to the step.

(b) Retain that information to the extent necessary to make decisions relevant to that step.

(c) Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making those decisions.

(d) Communicate those decisions.

Interaction with certification requirements

LAWYER-CLASS MEMBER RELATIONSHIP

(a) The status quo could be maintained. The lawyer would only have a lawyer-client relationship with class members who have signed a retainer. The lawyer would likely owe lesser obligations to class members who have not signed a retainer.

(b) The lawyer could be regarded as having a lawyer-client relationship with each individual class member.

(c) The lawyer could have a lawyer-client relationship with the class as a whole (lawyer for the class), with specific duties created.

Results of consultation

Submissions in favour of lawyer for the class

(a) It would be unworkable to apply the obligations of a traditional lawyer-client relationship to a class where some class members have yet to be identified.

(b) It is illogical to suggest there is a retainer with an unknown class member who has not consented to the lawyer’s services or their fees.

(c) The lawyer acts for the representative plaintiff in proving common issues for the class (but not necessarily individual issues unless specifically instructed).

(d) The lawyer is carrying out the instructions of the representative plaintiff, who conducts the litigation on behalf of the class and is obliged to act in the interests of the class as a whole.

(e) Class members are bound by outcomes achieved by the representative plaintiff’s lawyer, so they ought to enjoy the incidents of a lawyer-client relationship.

(f) There should not be a distinction in the relationship between the lawyer and class members who have opted into the class versus those who have not.

(a) A duty to act in the best interests of the class.515F[516]

(b) A duty to avoid or manage conflicts that affect representation of the class as a whole.516F[517] If a conflict of interest does arise, counsel could seek direction from the court.517F[518]

(c) A duty to promptly disclose all information that the lawyer has, or acquires, that is relevant to the matter.518F[519]

(d) A duty to provide information at key stages of the class action, including an explanation of the legal consequences of key steps in the class action and any necessary steps to be taken by class members.519F[520]

(e) A duty to keep class members informed about the progress of the class action.520F[521]

(f) A duty to ensure the representative plaintiff understands their obligations and has sufficient information and advice to provide informed instructions on the case.521F[522]

(g) A duty to act on the instructions of the representative plaintiff, provided the instructions are consistent with the lawyer’s other duties. Where there is a conflict, the lawyer should seek the direction of the court.522F[523]

Submissions favouring other approaches

(a) The possibility of multiple conflicting duties, where the lawyer owes conflicting duties to different categories of class member. It said that, if a lawyer has professional responsibilities to persons they do not have a retainer with, the extent of those duties should be defined and prescribed in rules.

(b) Who lawyers must provide information about the principal aspects of client service and disclose and communicate information to.

(c) Who a lawyer owes duties of confidentiality to, and which communications are privileged.

(d) Whether the defendant’s lawyer can communicate with individual class members.

Recommendations

Lawyer for the class

Relationship should arise upon certification

Relationship should be prescribed by statute

Duties and obligations of the lawyer for the class

(a) In providing regulated services to a client, a lawyer must always act competently and in a timely manner consistent with the terms of the retainer and the duty to take reasonable care.532F[533]

(b) The duty to protect and hold in strict confidence all information concerning a client, the retainer and the client’s business and affairs acquired in the course of the professional relationship.533F[534]

(c) The obligation not to communicate with another lawyer’s client.534F[535]

Duties prior to certification

Lawyer acting for individual class member

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT’S LAWYER AND CLASS MEMBERS

Results of consultation

Recommendation



CHAPTER 8

Steps during a class action


INTRODUCTION

(a) Notice to class members.

(b) The opt-in or opt-out process.

(c) Case management of class actions.

(d) Discovery and other requirements to provide information.

(e) Appointing sub-classes.

(f) Staged hearings of class actions.

(g) Determining individual issues in a class action.

NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS

When class members should be given notice

(a) When a class action has been certified and an individual can elect whether to opt into or opt out of the class action.

(b) Where the representative plaintiff seeks to discontinue either the class action or an appeal against the judgment on common issues.

(c) Where the representative plaintiff applies to withdraw as the representative plaintiff.

(d) Where individual participation of class members is required.

(e) When the court issues a judgment determining the common issues.

(f) A proposed or approved settlement.

Results of consultation

(a) An appeal of a judgment on the common issues.550F[551]

(b) A material change to the legal retainer or funding agreement, or a change of interest in respect of the lawyer or funder.551F[552]

(c) Where a defendant applies to strike out the case for want of prosecution or other default by the plaintiff.552F[553]

Recommendation

When an individual has an opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class action

Where the representative plaintiff seeks to discontinue a class action

When the representative plaintiff applies to withdraw as representative plaintiff

Where individual participation of class members is required

Where the court issues a judgment determining the common issues

(a) If the plaintiff was successful and no appeal has been filed by the defendant, the matter will proceed to determination of stage two issues (if there has been a staged hearing).554F[555]

(b) If the unsuccessful party has appealed, the likely time frames for the appeal process.

(c) If the proceeding was unsuccessful and no appeal has been filed, the proceeding is at an end. As we discuss in Chapter 10, a class member will only be able to bring an appeal if they successfully apply to replace the representative plaintiff.

Where the representative plaintiff intends to abandon an appeal on common issues

Where there is a proposed or approved settlement

Any other situation where the court considers notice is appropriate

Court discretion to order that notice is not required

(a) Where the court has declined to approve a settlement and the parties submit a new application to approve a settlement with very similar terms, except for a small adjustment that will benefit class members (such as a decrease in a funder’s rate of commission). It may be unnecessary to give class members a second notice of proposed settlement.

(b) Where the court has approved a settlement, it may be unnecessary to give notice of an approved settlement if there was extensive notice of the proposed settlement and the defendant can distribute money directly to class members.558F[559]

(c) Where there are multiple representative plaintiffs and one seeks to withdraw. If there is no real impact on representation of the class and it is not proposed to substitute another representative plaintiff, it may not be necessary to provide notice of the withdrawal of the representative plaintiff.

(d) Where a settlement is reached prior to certification, there will be a single notice advising of the proposed settlement and the right to opt in or opt out, rather than two separate notices.559F[560]

The contents of notice

(a) The identity of the representative plaintiff, including a brief explanation of their role and obligations to the class.

(b) The identity of the lawyer acting for the representative plaintiff, including a brief explanation of their role and obligations to the class.

(c) A description of the class action, including the class description and the identity of the defendants.

(d) What a class member must do to opt into or opt out of the claim (as appropriate), and the date by which they must do so.

(e) An explanation of the binding effect of a class action judgment on class members.

(f) Who to contact if the class member would like further information about the class action.

(g) Disclosure of any potential conflicts of interest.

(h) Anything else the court considers appropriate.

Results of consultation

Recommendations

Court approval of notices

(a) Having a carefully crafted headline to get the reader’s attention.

(b) Avoiding excess capitalisation and small fonts.

(c) Using headings and sub-headings to organise information.

(d) Ensuring the design of any envelope distinguishes it from junk mail.

(e) Using graphics and diagrams (and including accessible alternative text for any graphics, diagrams and images).

(f) Leaving plenty of white space.

(g) Using a Q&A format or bullet points.

Contents of opt-in or opt-out notice

General information about a class action

Description of the proceeding

Class definition

What a class member must do to opt in or opt out

Binding effect of a judgment or settlement

Information about the representative plaintiff and lawyer

Class member participation and liability for adverse costs

Litigation funding

Contact for further information

Method of notice

Results of consultation

Recommendation

Defendant’s obligations with respect to notice

Results of consultation

Providing contact details to the representative plaintiff

(a) A representative plaintiff cannot easily discharge their duty to act in the best interests of the class without knowing the identity of class members and being able to communicate with them.

(b) The defendant will often have the best source of class member contact details. In some cases, the defendant will be the only party with information about the class.

(c) There is often asymmetry of information between the representative plaintiff and defendants.

(d) It can be efficient, minimise legal costs and be more effective in ensuring group members are contacted directly.

(e) In previous cases, defendants have raised concerns about breaches of the Privacy Act 2020. It is desirable to have a statutory obligation to disclose contact details so the “required by law” exception in the Privacy Act can apply.

Giving notice directly to class members

(a) In many cases only the defendant will have the systems in place for communicating with class members and the resources to do so.

(b) Defendants have greater financial capacity to support this administrative exercise. The burden of notice may otherwise dissuade class actions.

(c) In some instances, notice will be less intrusive and more even-handed if the defendant communicates with class members, such as where class members are ongoing customers of the defendant.

(d) It can keep legal costs down and be more effective in ensuring group members are contacted directly.

(e) The defendant could engage a third party provider to contact group members.

Other points made by submitters

Recommendations

Power to order the defendant to provide contact details or assist with notice

Costs of notice

OPT-IN OR OPT-OUT PROCESS

(a) When a class member should be considered to have opted into or opted out of a class action.

(b) Who should be responsible for managing the opt-in or opt-out process.

(c) Whether the court should have a discretion to allow a class member an additional opportunity to opt in or opt out in limited circumstances.

(d) Whether arbitration clauses could prevent class members from becoming part of a class action.

Recommendations

Manner of opting in or opting out

Responsibility for managing the process

Subsequent opt-in or opt-out opportunity

Whether arbitration clauses could prevent potential class members from being part of a class action

CASE MANAGEMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

General power to make necessary orders

(a) Class actions are complex and can raise unique issues. It is impossible for a class actions regime to fully predict all issues that may arise and the court needs the ability to address these.

(b) The court is sometimes hesitant to use the inherent jurisdiction in novel circumstances, so a specific empowering provision is necessary.

(c) It would give the court the flexibility to respond to the circumstances of individual cases and to ensure class actions proceed as efficiently and fairly as possible.

(d) A general power could be worded to avoid the issues that have arisen in Australia. Providing express powers (as well as a general power) could also help to avoid these issues.

Case management conferences

Interlocutory applications

(a) Including guidance on expediting interlocutory applications in a Practice Note.610F[611]

(b) Determining interlocutory applications on the papers unless the complexity and importance of the application means a hearing is necessary.611F[612]

(c) Using judicial settlement conferences more frequently to resolve interlocutory applications.612F[613]

Automatic dismissal

Other suggestions

Recommendation

DISCOVERY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION

Results of consultation

Class member discovery

(a) The non-party discovery rule was developed to recognise the burden of imposing discovery obligations on a person who has no interest or role in the litigation. This is not true of class members, who stand to benefit from the class action and who have either opted in or had the option of opting out.

(b) The party seeking discovery usually pays the reasonable costs of non-party discovery. It would be inappropriate for a defendant to pay the costs of class member discovery.

(c) It would be better to have clear rules rather than leave it to the court. It would avoid the time and cost of an application for non-party discovery.

(a) The current rules are adequate.

(b) Discovery from class members is unnecessary at the common issues stage.

(c) It would add unnecessary cost and delay.

(d) In most instances the defendant will know more about the class members than the representative plaintiff.

(e) Discovery against class members should be the exception, rather than the rule. A judge should carefully consider any request for class member discovery.

(f) Class members may be deterred from joining a class action due to the potential cost of complying with discovery orders. The defendant could also use discovery to intimidate class members into abandoning their claims.

Register of class members

(a) It is important that those organising class actions keep good records of class numbers at any given point in time, both as a protection for class members and so the parties know the size and scope of the claim.

(b) It is fundamental to the administration of justice for the defendant to know the size of the claim against it.

(c) Having this information may help to facilitate settlement.

Other feedback on information requirements

(a) In opt-in cases, the defendant should be provided with the estimated value of each class member’s claim.629F[630]

(b) The defendant should be entitled to other information gathered from class members during the opt-in process.630F[631]

(c) There should be a requirement to provide an estimate of the class size at certification and an obligation to update this estimate as the claim progresses.631F[632]

(d) There should be rules on obtaining particulars and discovery from class members in opt-out class actions.632F[633]

(e) The defendant should have to provide critical information at an early stage. The main problem with discovery in class actions is the expense and delay associated with defendant discovery, with insufficient attention to producing a focused set of documents at an early stage.633F[634]

Recommendations

Class member discovery

Class member particulars

SUB-CLASSES

(a) Where groups of class members have conflicting interests.

(b) Where all class members share a common issue, but there are additional issues that are not common to all class members. In this situation, sub-classes may assist to make litigation more efficient and manageable.

(c) Where there is no issue common to all class members, but there are several related sub-classes.

Results of consultation

(a) Defendants may otherwise be unable to exercise defences that only apply to some class members and not others.

(b) Sub-classes can divide large and complex claims into manageable pieces and allow the proceeding to be managed and progressed more efficiently and cost effectively. They can avoid what would otherwise be separate but similar class actions.

(c) Sub-classes can reduce the potential for artificially inflated class actions, with meritless claims “hiding” among claims with more merit.

(a) The common issue principle is central to a class actions regime and sub-classes should not be used to get around this. If there is no common issue across class members, the case should not be certified.

(b) The benefits of class actions are more able to be realised where there is a common issue across all the claims.

(c) Without a common issue, managing numerous sub-classes would lead to increased cost and delay.

(d) It would create uncertainty for defendants and could complicate settlements.

(a) Sub-classes should not need their own representative plaintiff. This is overly prescriptive and may lead to unnecessary expense. Instead, issues in relation to the sub-class may be dealt with through sample class members giving evidence at trial or could be addressed following the initial trial.645F[646]

(b) A class actions statute does not need to provide for sub-classes, as the court can consider these as part of its general case management powers.646F[647]

(c) The court should have a power to create sub-classes at any stage of the proceeding, not just at certification.647F[648]

(d) The court should only create a sub-class if the issue meets the certification requirement that a class action is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of class member claims.648F[649]

Recommendation

Conflict of interest sub-classes

Additional issue sub-classes

Common issue still required

Reflecting sub-classes in legislation

STAGED HEARINGS

Results of consultation

(a) Staged hearings will be sensible in most class actions.

(b) Staged hearings are a useful mechanism, but the court should still be able to order a single trial if appropriate.

(c) Each class action should be managed according to its particular needs.

(d) Whether staged hearings will be efficient and reduce costs will depend on the circumstances of the case. A Practice Note could provide a non-exhaustive list of circumstances in which staged hearings should be considered.

Recommendation

DETERMINING INDIVIDUAL ISSUES IN A CLASS ACTION

(a) Appointing a court expert who could report back to the court on particular issues. The expert would not necessarily determine individual issues, but they might be able to simplify the court’s task, for example by categorising individual claims into groups.

(b) Directing individual issues to be determined through a non-judicial procedure, where the parties agree (for example, a determination process run by a former judge or a senior lawyer).

(c) Giving directions with respect to the form or way in which evidence on individual issues may be given. The parties might agree to a particular form of evidence, such as standardised forms.

Results of consultation

(a) It is unlikely to be feasible to require each class member to give evidence on individual issues.

(b) It is important that individual issues can be determined fairly and efficiently, without overwhelming the courts.

(c) Our proposed mechanisms may streamline the process.

(d) There is a balance to be struck between precision of assessment and efficiency. It is for the court to consider how the balance is achieved, empowered by wide powers.

(e) The process for determining individual issues should be considered at an early stage in the proceeding, preferably at certification.

(a) The use of sub-classes.

(b) Tiered dispute resolution processes, which could include establishing standardised approaches for assessing damages and causation issues.

(c) A power for the court to direct mediation to occur.

(d) Using standard forms and digital cross-checking of information.

(e) Orders limiting the parties to a single expert for each discrete topic.

(f) The parties seeking to settle the remaining issues amongst themselves after a decision in favour of the representative plaintiff at stage one.

Recommendation

CHAPTER 9

Cost sharing orders


INTRODUCTION

(a) The ‘free-rider’ problem in opt-out class actions.

(b) The use of cost sharing orders to address this problem.

THE ‘FREE-RIDER’ PROBLEM IN OPT-OUT CLASS ACTIONS

Common fund orders and funding equalisation orders in Australia

Cost sharing in Aotearoa New Zealand representative actions

CONSULTATION QUESTIONS

(a) At an early stage of the proceedings, with the court setting a fixed rate at this stage.

(b) At an early stage of the proceedings, with the court indicating a provisional or maximum rate at this stage and setting the final rate at a later stage.

(c) After the common issues have been determined.

(d) At a late stage of the proceedings, such as at settlement or before damages are distributed.

RESULTS OF CONSULTATION

Express power to make cost sharing orders

(a) It is not the role of the courts to improve the economics of class actions for funders.684F[685]

(b) They result in windfall profits for funders, despite very few class members having actually signed up to the class action.685F[686]

(c) While funding equalisation orders can be seen as in the interests of fairness between class members by spreading costs, common fund orders are purely for the benefit of funders by improving the economics of opt-out class actions.686F[687]

(d) Funders appear to be managing without common fund orders.687F[688]

(a) Funding equalisation orders fail to meet funders’ concern that their costs will not be met, which means funders are still required to book build.

(b) They do not incentivise claimants to sign the litigation funding agreement.

(c) They will cause funders to charge higher commissions to reflect “the greater risk associated with compensation uncertainty”.

Timing of cost sharing orders

RECOMMENDATIONS

Power to make cost sharing orders

(a) The distribution and weighting of losses between funded and unfunded class members.699F[700]

(b) Whether the funding agreement entitles the funder to recover from the ‘grossed up’ amount redistributed to funded class members from unfunded class members recoveries.700F[701]

(c) Whether the funding agreement includes other expenses that would be levied on unfunded class members under a funding equalisation-type order but not necessarily a common fund-type order.701F[702]

Power to set provisional funding commission

Power to vary funding commission

CHAPTER 10

Judgments, relief and appeals


INTRODUCTION

(a) Class action judgments, including their binding effect on class members.

(b) The court’s powers to assess and order relief on an individual and aggregate basis.

(c) Appeal rights in class actions.

CLASS ACTION JUDGMENTS

(a) The doctrine of res judicata, which precludes a litigant from accessing the courts where they seek to reopen a dispute that has already been determined.704F[705]

(b) The court’s power to stay a proceeding that is an abuse of process. This power protects against conduct that, left unchecked, “would strike at the public confidence in the Court’s processes”.705F[706] Abuse of process can take a number of forms, but is usually concerned with frivolous claims brought for an improper purpose or claims that seek to improperly relitigate matters already determined.706F[707]

(c) The rule in Henderson v Henderson. Under this rule, unless there are special circumstances, parties are required to bring forward their whole case and will be prevented from litigating issues that should have been raised in previous litigation.707F[708]

Results of consultation

(a) Class member interests need to be protected as they have little control over the proceeding and may not be aware of the proceeding.

(b) The simplicity of the proposed provision will be undermined if class members can be bound by additional issues that should have been raised and dealt with in the litigation.

(c) This is the approach adopted in Ontario and Australia.

(a) Chapman Tripp thought the binding effect of a class action judgment is better dealt with in the judgment itself. The risk of relying on the certification order as the foundation for the binding effect of a judgment is that it would not accurately reflect the evolution of the issues as the case progressed.

(b) Gilbert Walker queried whether it would be feasible to set out the common issue, claim and relief in the certification order. It said attempting this at the outset would be contentious and onerous, and it is inevitable the claim will be amended.

(c) Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said that, if proceedings must be certified (which it did not support), it is logical to link back to the certification order. This would make it easy for class members to establish whether a judgment would be binding on a given issue.

(d) Simpson Grierson said that, if the court gives judgment on common issues not listed in the certification order, class members should still be bound by those issues.

Recommendations

Other powers relating to judgment

Draft judgment provision

9 Effect of judgment on common issue

(1) A judgment on a common issue binds every class member, but only to the extent that the judgment determines a common issue that—

(a) is set out in the certification order; and

(b) relates to a cause of action described in the certification order; and

(c) relates to relief sought by class members as stated in the certification order.

(2) A judgment on a common issue is not binding between a party to the class action proceeding and—

(a) a person who was eligible to opt in to the proceeding but did not do so:

(b) a person who has opted out of the proceeding.

RELIEF IN CLASS ACTIONS

(a) The court’s powers to assess and order individual relief.

(b) The court’s powers to assess and order aggregate monetary relief.

(c) Distribution of aggregate monetary relief.

(d) Alternative distribution.

Individual relief

Aggregate monetary relief

(a) Where the total number of class members and their individual loss is relevant to the aggregate quantum, but it can be proved without requiring individual class member participation. An example of this is where a defendant has overcharged class members, and the total liability can be calculated from the defendant’s records without any need for class member involvement.720F[721] In this scenario, the representative plaintiff would prove the aggregate overcharge, but not the amounts to which each individual class member is entitled.

(b) Where the aggregate quantum can be established without knowing the number of class members or each class member’s loss or damage. An example of this is Allapattah Services v Exxon Corp, a case where the class members alleged Exxon Corp had engaged in an intentional and systematic scheme to overcharge them for petrol.721F[722] In that case, the jury verdict established damages on a cents per gallon basis. The representative plaintiff sought aggregate monetary relief, calculated by multiplying the cents per gallon amount by the annual gallons of petrol sold by the defendant.

(c) Where the size of the class is large but can be determined on an approximate basis and the individual losses are small and fairly uniform. An example of this is ACCC v Golden Sphere Intl Inc, a case brought by class members who had invested in the defendant’s bonds and lost money.722F[723] Class members had different amounts of loss because some had onsold their bonds. The representative plaintiff based its aggregate calculations based on loss of $50 per class member, because not all class members had suffered the maximum loss of $150. This was multipled by a rounded number of class members (11,000), reaching an aggregate total of $550,000. The ACCC called a number of witnesses with varying degrees of loss and gave the names of all other class members. The respondent, while disputing the number, called no evidence in response. The court found ACCC’s assessment was reasonably accurate.

Results of consultation

(a) It may not be possible to assess damages on an individual basis.

(b) It can avoid a potentially expensive process of assessing relief individually.

(c) It can be an efficient way to resolve claims.

(d) It can provide all parties with finality, and this may otherwise be difficult to achieve in some class actions.

(e) It will give the court flexibility when dealing with issues of monetary relief.

(f) It will assist the court to determine quantum of damages on a global basis.

(a) Aggregate monetary relief should only be available where individual assessment of loss is not possible or practicable.728F[729]

(b) Aggregate monetary relief should be available when it can reasonably be determined without proof by individual class members.729F[730]

(c) There should be a presumption that monetary relief is assessed on an individual basis.730F[731]

(d) The court should retain the ability to assess monetary relief on an individual basis if the class is relatively small.731F[732]

Recommendation

Distribution of aggregate monetary relief

Results of consultation

Recommendations

Orders on how the award will be distributed

(a) An order that the defendant must distribute the award directly to class members. This may be appropriate where the defendant has class member details, such as through a share register or a customer database.

(b) An order appointing a person as administrator to distribute the award to class members. This may be necessary where it is not possible for the defendant to make a direct payment or where the class member must take steps to establish their entitlement. We consider the court should have discretion as to whether to appoint an administrator and who should fulfil that role. We think a range of people could fulfil the role, such as a barrister, accountant or a corporate trustee. The appropriate person will depend on the circumstances of the case.

(c) An order approving a process for class members to establish their entitlement to a share of the award. For example, the court might approve a process which requires class members to provide their sales receipt to establish their entitlement. Such an order will not always be necessary, such as when an aggregate award is based on the defendant’s records, and those records show the individual losses.

Orders on how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be distributed

Orders on how the costs of distribution are to be met

Distribution outcome report

(a) The total number of class members, if known, or an estimate of the total number of class members.

(b) The number of class members who received a payment from the award of aggregate monetary relief.

(c) The number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for this.

(d) The cost of administering the distribution of the award of aggregate monetary relief.

(e) The amount of any unclaimed funds and how this is proposed to be distributed.

(f) Any amounts paid to a litigation funder.

Alternative distribution

Results of consultation

(a) Alternative distribution will help to achieve the objective of compensation in an indirect way.

(b) Alternative distribution should be limited because of our conclusion that deterrence should not be an objective of class actions and it is preferable for class members to be compensated directly, where possible.

(c) It will still operate to deter corporate and government wrongdoing.

(d) Alternative distribution is preferable to the other options for unclaimed funds, such as reversion to the defendant or pro-rata distribution amongst class members.

Recommendations

Draft relief provisions

10 Aggregate assessment and distribution of monetary relief

(1) A court may make an aggregate assessment of the monetary relief to which a class is entitled (the aggregate monetary relief) if it is satisfied that it can make a reasonably accurate assessment of that amount.

(2) For the purpose of the court’s assessment of the aggregate monetary relief, it is not necessary for any individual class member to establish the amount of loss or damage suffered by them.

(3) The court may make an award in the amount assessed as the aggregate monetary relief.

(4) The court may also make any orders for the distribution of the award that it considers appropriate, and these may include an order—

(a) that the defendant must distribute the award directly to class members:

(b) appointing a person as the administrator to distribute the award to class members:

(c) approving the process for class members to establish their entitlement to a share of the award:

(d) directing how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be distributed, including by way of an alternative distribution under section 11:

(e) directing how the costs of the distribution are to be met.

(5) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an administrator) must file a report with information about the process and outcome of the distribution of the award within 60 days of the distribution process being completed or at a later time if allowed by the court.

11 Alternative distribution

(1) This section applies if—

(a) it is not practical or possible for an award made under section 10 or any portion of it to be distributed to individual class members; or

(b) the costs of distributing the award made under section 10 or any portion of it to class members would be disproportionate to the amount they would receive.

(2) The court may order that the award or any portion of it be paid instead to an eligible charity or organisation.

(3) In this section, eligible charity or organisation means—

(a) an entity whose activities are related to claims in the class action proceeding and whose activities are likely to directly or indirectly benefit some or all class members; or

(b) an entity prescribed by regulations as an eligible charity or organisation for the purposes of this section.

APPEALS IN CLASS ACTIONS

Party appeal rights

Results of consultation

(a) Since the settlement application is made by both parties, there will be no party to appeal if the settlement is approved.

(b) Where a court declines approval, the parties will often be able to renegotiate the settlement to address any matters noted by the judge.

(c) Appeals should be limited in scope, in the style of judicial review, rather than a full appeal on the merits.

(d) Unnecessary appeals will be problematic where a settlement occurs immediately before or during trial.

(a) A decision on settlement approval should be treated as any other decision finally disposing of the proceeding.

(b) The parties should retain this right where there is an error of fact or law, even though in some circumstances it may be preferable to renegotiate a settlement.

(c) Requiring leave would impose an unnecessary administrative burden. The leave test will be met in nearly all cases because a successful appeal would bring an end to the proceedings and would affect both the parties and class members.

(a) The regime should impose specific time limits for party appeals and decisions in such appeals. It should also allow specific pathways for appeals, such as ‘leap-frog’ appeals for certification and other key decision points.768F[769]

(b) There should be an appeal as of right where a competing class action has been stayed, while another has been certified.769F[770]

(c) Parties should be able to appeal interlocutory applications as of right, due to their significance.770F[771]

(d) The funder may have an interest in an appeal.771F[772]

Recommendation

Class member appeal rights

Results of consultation

(a) A class member who no longer has any opportunity to opt out of the litigation should have the opportunity to seek leave to appeal.

(b) The leave requirement ensures class members have an avenue for appeal if the representative plaintiff does not bring one, but also ensures appeals are only taken for a legitimate reason.

(c) The requirements to seek leave and act as the representative plaintiff will protect the parties and class members from the risk of diverging or conflicting interests between the (new) representative plaintiff and other class members.

(d) The leave requirement is appropriate since class members are not parties to the proceeding.

(a) Appeal rights would undermine the efficiency achieved by allowing a representative plaintiff to bring a proceeding on behalf of the class.

(b) The court’s involvement in certification and settlement is sufficient to safeguard class member interests.

(c) Alternative options (such as opting out or seeking to be substituted as the representative plaintiff) are a more suitable method of protecting class members.

Recommendations

Appeal rights against judgment on common issues

Appeal rights against individual issues

CHAPTER 11

Settlement of a class action


INTRODUCTION

(a) Requiring court approval of settlements in class actions.

(b) The process for court approval of a settlement.

(c) The test for approving a settlement.

(d) Finalising the class for settlement.

(e) Settlement administration and implementation.

(f) Settlements of individual claims.

(g) Discontinuance of a class action.

COURT APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENTS IN CLASS ACTIONS

Results of consultation

(a) It is part of the court exercising its supervisory jurisdiction to protect the interests of class members.

(b) There can be a significant divergence in interests at settlement, which can be difficult for defendants and potentially prejudicial for class members.

(c) Once a settlement is reached, the interests of the representative plaintiff and defendant are usually aligned.

(d) In both opt-in and opt-out cases there is a power imbalance between a litigation funder and class members, and a risk of their interests conflicting.

(e) It will assist lawyers, who may otherwise be facing conflicting duties due to class members having differing claims or expectations.

(f) Settlement approval is an important procedural safeguard to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the class actions regime.

(g) It will result in fairer outcomes in terms of the share of the proceeds that go to class members and a litigation funder respectively.

(h) The court could place emphasis on different matters depending on whether the case is opt-in or opt-out.

Recommendation

(a) The litigation funder is likely to benefit from settlement, because they will get a proportion of the settlement amount and will not have to pay any further litigation costs.

(b) The lawyer may have a conditional fee agreement, where they can receive a premium (in additional to their normal fee) if the matter is successfully resolved through a settlement.

(c) The defendant will have an interest in resolving the litigation at the lowest cost possible.

(d) The representative plaintiff has an interest in settling their individual claim, finishing their role and removing their liability for adverse costs.

(e) The prospects of individual class member claims may differ, in which case there is greater litigation risk for some class members than others.

PROCESS FOR COURT APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT

(a) Making an application for approval of a settlement.

(b) Giving notice to class members about the settlement.

(c) Class members’ ability to object to a proposed settlement.

(d) Other participants in the settlement approval process.

Application for approval of a settlement

(a) The terms of the proposed settlement.

(b) Any legal fees or litigation funding commission that would be deducted from the relief paid to class members.

(c) How the settlement meets the test for court approval of a class action settlement.

(d) The intended method of notifying class members of the proposed settlement.

(e) The likely cost and duration of the class action if the litigation continues.

(f) Any risks associated with continuing the litigation.

(g) The potential relief that could be awarded if the case is successful.

(h) The proposed method of settlement distribution and administration, including any proposal for unclaimed monetary relief.

Results of consultation

Recommendations

(a) The terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
(i) The type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of any monetary relief.

(ii) How the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members.

(iii) Whether the settlement proposes to treat class members differently and the reasons for this.

(iv) The proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.

(v) Any steps a class member will need to take to benefit from a settlement.

(b) The proposed method of settlement distribution and administration, including a proposal for dealing with any unclaimed monetary relief.

(c) Any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from the relief paid to class members.

(d) The likely cost and duration of the class action if the litigation continues.

(e) Any risks associated with continuing the litigation.

(f) The potential relief that could be awarded if the case is successful.

(g) Whether any steps have been taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.

Notice to class members about the settlement

(a) A statement that class members have legal rights that may be affected by the proposed settlement.

(b) A brief description of the class action, including the legal basis for the claims, the remedies sought and the current stage of the litigation.

(c) The class description.

(d) A summary of the terms of the proposed settlement, including information that will allow class members to estimate their individual entitlement.

(e) Information about any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from payments to class members if the settlement is approved.

(f) An explanation of the settlement approval process, including the time and location of any hearing to consider the settlement.

(g) How a class member may express their opposition to, or support for, the settlement.

(h) Information that if the settlement is approved, the court will set a date by which class members can opt out of the settlement.

(i) How a class member may obtain further information about the settlement, including contact details for the representative plaintiff’s lawyer or any counsel to assist that has been appointed.

(a) The court’s approval of a settlement that may affect their legal rights.

(b) How to obtain further information about the settlement, including the court’s judgment approving the settlement.

(c) How a class member may opt out of the settlement, and the deadline for doing so.

(d) The consequences of failing to opt out of the settlement.

(e) Any steps a class member must take to submit a claim.

(f) Who has been appointed as the settlement administrator (if any) and how to contact them.

Results of consultation

When notice should be required

(a) Class members should have an opportunity to object to or support the settlement.

(b) Class members should have the opportunity to seek independent advice.

(c) The degree of class member support is relevant to the court’s consideration of whether to approve a settlement. Giving notice will ensure any feedback is generally representative of the class as a whole.

(d) The notice conveys critical information about class member claims and rights. In an opt-out class action, it is possible that some class members would not be previously aware of this information.

Contents of settlement notices

Recommendation

When a settlement notice should be required

Contents of settlement notices

(a) A statement that class members have legal rights that may be affected by the proposed settlement.

(b) A brief description of the class action, including the legal basis for the claims, the remedies sought and the current stage of the litigation.

(c) The class description.

(d) A summary of the terms of the proposed settlement, including information about how individual entitlements will be assessed (we agree with submitters that it may be difficult to accurately provide information that will allow class members to estimate their individual entitlement).

(e) Information on any legal fees or litigation funding commission that will be deducted from payments to class members if the settlement is approved.

(f) An explanation of the settlement approval process, including the time and location of any hearing to consider the settlement.

(g) How a class member may express their opposition to the settlement and the deadline for doing so.

(h) How a class member may obtain further information about the settlement, including contact details for the lawyer for the class or any counsel to assist that has been appointed.

(a) The court’s approval of a settlement and how it may affect class members’ legal rights.

(b) How to obtain further information about the settlement, including the court’s judgment approving the settlement.

(c) How a class member may opt out of a settlement and the deadline for doing so (where the parties have agreed to provide an ability to opt out of the settlement or the court has ordered specific class members should have a right to opt out).

(d) Any steps a class member must take to submit a claim and the deadline for doing so.

(e) Who has been appointed as the settlement administrator (if any) and how to contact them.

Class member objections to a proposed settlement

Results of consultation

(a) There should be a very short timeframe for lodging objections. It is particularly important to have an efficient process when a settlement is reached mid-trial.806F[807]

(b) Class members could be given guidance on how and where to file an objection, such as in a Practice Note.807F[808]

(c) The objection should be filed with the court registry at the class member’s own effort and expense. This will help protect against unmeritorious objections.808F[809]

(d) Objections should be in writing, with leave required to appear at the settlement approval hearing.809F[810]

(e) There could be a standard form that is filed with the court and served on the parties.810F[811]

(f) Objecting class members should have to particularise and evidence their objections to the normal standard.811F[812]

(g) Class members should be able to attend the hearing and raise objections directly with the court. They may find the experience cathartic and it may allow any misunderstandings to be clarified.812F[813]

(h) If objecting class members have legal assistance this can ensure objections are well prepared and well founded. Class members could be given information on how to access legal assistance (such as through a free legal clinic).813F[814]

(i) The objecting class member’s intention is a relevant consideration and should inform the weight the court gives to any objection.814F[815]

(j) Objections should occur through an alternative dispute resolution process.815F[816]

Recommendations

Other participants in the settlement approval process

Results of consultation

(a) A presumption that the representative plaintiff is responsible for these costs.821F[822]

(b) A presumption that the defendant pays for these costs.822F[823]

(c) That the costs should be shared equally between the parties.823F[824]

Recommendation

(a) Whether any class members have filed objections to the settlement and whether those class members are legally represented.

(b) The complexity of the settlement, and whether there are any unusual features or indications that a settlement might not be in the interests of all class members.

(c) Whether the class is comprised of persons who might find it particularly difficult to consider the terms of a settlement or lodge an objection.

APPROVING A SETTLEMENT

(a) The terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, which should include:
(i) Any relief that will be provided to class members.

(ii) Whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other.

(iii) The proposed method of distributing any settlement amount to class members.

(iv) The proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts.

(b) Any legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief paid to class members.

(c) Potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.

(d) The views of class members.

(e) The process by which the settlement was reached, including whether any potential conflicts of interest were properly managed.

Results of consultation

Factors relevant to settlement approval

Terms and conditions of the settlement

Legal fees and litigation funding commission

Potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the litigation

Views of class members

Process by which the settlement was reached

Other factors

Whether factors should be mandatory

(a) It is important for the court to have discretion and flexibility so it can appropriately balance the factors without being overly formulaic.

(b) The court should be able to consider any relevant factors as appropriate.

(c) The Australian and Canadian regimes do not have mandatory factors and there is no evidence this has resulted in poor outcomes for class members. The court could draw on the principles developed in those jurisdictions.

(d) If the factors are discretionary, it is less likely settlements will be challenged on the basis certain criteria were not considered or given appropriate weight.

The court’s powers to vary litigation funding commissions

Recommendations

  1. Any legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief payable to class members.
  2. Any information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.
  3. Any views of class members.
  4. Any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.
  5. Any other factors it considers relevant.

Test for settlement approval

Factors relevant to settlement approval test

(a) The terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including:
(i) The type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of any monetary relief.

(ii) How the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members.

(iii) Whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other.

(iv) The proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements.

(v) Any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement.

(vi) The proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts.

(b) Any legal fees and litigation funding commission that will be deducted from relief payable to class members.

(c) Any information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding.

(d) Any views of class members.

(e) Any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest.

(f) Any other factors it considers relevant.

Terms and conditions of the settlement

The type of relief to be provided to class members and the total amount of monetary relief

(a) Where class members will only receive non-monetary benefits such as vouchers for the defendant’s product or discounts on future purchases.

(b) Where the defendant will make a payment to a charity rather than to individual class members. This type of payment should ordinarily be limited to cases where it would not be practical or possible to distribute payments to individual class members or where the cost of distribution would be disproportionate to the amount a class member would receive.852F[853]

How the benefits of the settlement will be allocated between class members

Whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other

The proposed method of determining individual class member entitlements

(a) Each class member will receive a fixed amount.

(b) A formula will be developed to calculate individual entitlements.

(c) There will be a process of individual assessment, such as by a settlement administrator.

Any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement

(a) Whether the defendant will pay class members directly or whether a class member would need to submit an individual claim.

(b) Where an individual claim is required, what kind of information a class member would need to provide.

(c) The proposed time period for submitting an individual claim.

The proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts

(a) Returning the money to the defendant.

(b) Distributing the money pro rata amongst class members who filed claims.

(c) Giving the money to a charity whose activities are related to the claim.

Legal fees and litigation funding commission

Potential risks, costs and benefits of continuing with the proceeding

(a) Comparing the amount that class members can receive in the settlement with the range of amounts they could be awarded if their claim was successful.

(b) Considering the risks of proceeding to trial (or appeal) and the likelihood that class members will be unsuccessful in obtaining relief.

(c) How long it might take to resolve the proceedings through litigation and whether this could cause any particular disadvantage (such as where class members are elderly or unwell and there is a risk they will be unable to give evidence).

(d) The costs of continuing with the litigation and the impact for class members in terms of the funding commission that would be deducted from any relief.

Views of class members

Any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest

Court’s powers when approving a settlement

(a) An order appointing a settlement administrator (which we discuss later in this chapter).

(b) Further confidentiality orders.

FINALISING THE CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT

(a) Converting an opt-out class action to opt-in for the purposes of settlement.

(b) Whether class members should have an ability to opt out of a settlement.

(c) Whether other potential class members should be able to opt in for settlement.

(d) Certification for the purposes of settlement.

Converting a class action to opt-in for settlement

Results of consultation

Our view

Opting out of settlement

Results of consultation

(a) The original opt-out process, which is designed to allow class members to make an informed and voluntary decision about whether to participate in a class action.

(b) The court’s role in ensuring the settlement agreement is fair, reasonable and in the interests of the class.

(c) Class members can object to a settlement and seek leave to appeal.

(a) It would allow class members to ‘free ride’.

(b) It would give class members undue protection against the risks of litigation at the expense of the defendant.

(c) It would prejudice the interests of all parties and undermine the certainty and finality of settlements.

(d) Class members who take advantage of a collective process should be bound by it.

(e) By the time a settlement is reached, the parties will have spent significant time, effort and expense on the basis of the known parameters of the class.

(f) Class members are not able to opt out after a judgment.

(g) Where a settlement is only with some defendants, an opportunity to opt out could create chaos and unfairness.

(a) It would create considerable uncertainty about the class size while the parties are negotiating settlement, which may impede, discourage or delay settlements.

(b) It might drive down aggregate monetary relief because of the difficulty in meaningfully assessing aggregate loss during negotiations.

(c) Settlement should be negotiated based on the dispute being fully and finally resolved for class members.

(d) It is likely to result in conditional settlements, based on the number of opt-outs, which may have significant costs consequences for the parties and the court.

(a) It may allow class members to avoid contributing to the costs of the proceeding.

(b) It could lead to inconsistencies with a class member’s contractual obligations under a litigation funding agreement.

(c) It would undermine the certainty that an effective litigation funding market requires.

(d) The funder needs to know who will be bound by a settlement at the outset.

(e) It could undermine commercial calculations that founded the decision to support the class action and impact the viability of the claim for funders.

Recommendation

(a) Where there is a small group of class members who are very opposed to the settlement. Allowing them to opt out might increase the chances of the settlement being approved or avoid the risk of class members having an ongoing sense of grievance about being bound to the settlement.

(b) Where the settlement is reached on a per individual basis rather than global sum basis, so it is not necessary to determine an aggregate amount when negotiating the settlement.

Allowing other potential class members to opt in at settlement

Results of consultation

(a) It will undermine the finality and certainty of a settlement.

(b) There will be uncertainty as to who will be bound by the settlement.

(c) It will undermine the ability to negotiate meaningful and binding settlements.

(d) An increase in the class size might cause the settlement to fall over or significantly diminish the returns of other class members.

(e) It will deter individuals from joining the class action at the beginning, since they could wait and see if there is a settlement.

(f) It will undermine the certainty an effective litigation funding market requires.

Recommendation

Process for settlements reached prior to certification

Results of consultation

Recommendation

SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

(a) Court oversight of settlement.

(b) Appointment of a settlement administrator.

(c) Requirements for reporting on the outcome of the settlement process.

Court oversight of settlement

Results of consultation

Recommendation

Appointment of a settlement administrator

Results of consultation

(a) Someone who is independent of the parties.907F[908]

(b) An independent person who is not a lawyer.908F[909]

(c) An entity with technical or subject matter expertise.909F[910]

(d) An accounting firm or claims consultant, where the process involves calculation and reviewing forms or supporting documents.910F[911]

(e) A barrister or arbitrator, where it is necessary to triage or assess claims.911F[912]

(f) The law firm engaged by the representative plaintiff.912F[913] Shine Lawyers said this will have knowledge of the litigation, may be the most efficient, and can provide consistency to class members.

Recommendation

Settlement outcome reports

Results of consultation

Recommendations

(a) The total amount to be distributed.

(b) The total number of class members (or an estimate if this is unknown).

(c) The number of class members who received a payment from the settlement.

(d) The number of class members who had their claim declined and the reasons for this.

(e) The size of payments received by class members (which could be provided in bands).

(f) The implementation of any non-monetary aspects of the settlement.

(g) The cost of administering the settlement.

(h) The amounts paid to litigation funders.

(i) The amounts paid to lawyers.

(j) The amount of unclaimed funds and how this was distributed.

(a) The settlement process is less private and confidential. Class action settlements must be approved by the court, unlike ordinary civil litigation. In addition, a potentially large number of class members will have information about the settlement terms.

(b) There is a broader public interest in knowing the extent to which class actions fulfil the goals of improving access to justice and managing multiple claims in an efficient way. Settlement outcome reports might also identify issues requiring law reform.

(c) It is important to provide procedural access to justice for class members.920F[921] Transparency about settlement outcomes will help to achieve that.

(d) A class action settlement may include deductions in legal fees, litigation funding commission and other costs in circumstances where class members did not expressly sign up to a legal retainer or funding agreement. Transparency may help to facilitate a competitive litigation funding market There is also a broader public interest in knowing the extent to which litigation funding achieves its access to justice objective.

SETTLEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS

(a) Defendant communications with individual class members about settlements.

(b) When individual settlements could effectively dispose of the class action.

(c) When the representative plaintiff may settle their individual claim.

Defendant communications about settlement

Results of consultation

Recommendation



Where individual settlements could dispose of the proceeding

Recommendation

Settling the representative plaintiff’s claim

Recommendation

COURT APPROVAL OF DISCONTINUANCE OF A CLASS ACTION

Results of consultation

Recommendations

(a) Class members will be free to commence a new proceeding against the same defendant if they wish.

(b) There is no agreement compromising the proceeding and so no merger of class members’ rights.

(c) If there has not been a judicial determination, there will be no res judicata or issue estoppel.

DRAFT SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS

12 Settlement of class action

(1) The settlement of a class action proceeding is not binding unless approved by a court.

(2) An application for approval of a settlement must be made by the representative plaintiff or proposed representative plaintiff if the application is made prior to certification.


13 Settlement application before certification of proceeding

(1) This section applies if an application for approval of a settlement is made before the certification of a class action proceeding.

(2) Before considering that application, the court must consider whether the proceeding meets the requirements of section 4 (with any necessary modifications), and if the court considers the application does so, for the purposes of settlement it must—

(a) certify the proceeding as a class action proceeding; and

(b) appoint 1 or more representative plaintiffs.

14 Approval of settlement

The court must approve the settlement if it is satisfied that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the interests of the class, and when making that assessment the court must consider—

(a) the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including—

(i) the type of relief that will be provided to class members, and if this includes monetary relief, the total amount of that monetary relief; and

(ii) how the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members; and

(iii) whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other; and

(iv) the proposed method of determining the entitlement of individual class members; and

(v) any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement; and

(vi) the proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts; and

(b) any legal fees and funding commission that may be deducted from the relief payable to class members; and

(c) any information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks, costs, and benefits of continuing with the proceeding; and

(d) any views of class members; and

(e) any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest; and

(f) any other factors it considers relevant.


15 Steps following approval of settlement

(1) If the court approves a settlement under section 14, it—

(a) may order that a class member may opt out of the settlement, but only if—
(i) opting out is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or

(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more class members be given the opportunity to opt out of the settlement; and

(b) may order that a person who was eligible to become a class member but did not do so (an eligible person) may opt in to the settlement, but only if—

(i) opting in is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or

(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more eligible persons be given the opportunity to opt in to the settlement; and

(c) must describe which class members will be bound by the settlement.

(2) A settlement is binding on the parties to the settlement and all class members described by the court under subsection (1)(c) on and from the date of the court order approving the settlement.

16 Administration and implementation of settlement

(1) The court retains the jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of a settlement it approves under section 14.

(2) The court may appoint a person as an administrator to implement the settlement.

(3) The court may make any other order it considers appropriate for the administration and implementation of the settlement.

(4) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an administrator) must file a report with information about the process and outcome of the implementation of the settlement within 60 days of the implementation process being completed or at a later time if allowed by the court.

17 Appointment of counsel to assist court or expert

(1) The court may appoint counsel to assist the court or a court expert if it considers this will assist the court to assess whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the interests of the class.

(2) The court may order that 1 or more of the parties pay part or all of the costs of the counsel or expert.



CHAPTER 12

Adverse costs in class actions


INTRODUCTION

(a) Whether the adverse costs rule should apply in class actions.

(b) Costs liability for certification.

(c) Calculating costs in class actions.

(d) Class member liability for costs.

THE ADVERSE COSTS RULE

(a) Australia applies an adverse costs rule in civil litigation, including in relation to its class actions regimes.

(b) A ‘no costs’ rule applies to class actions in the United States, meaning the successful party is generally not entitled to claim costs from the unsuccessful party.

(c) The Canadian jurisdictions have taken different approaches, with several provinces (including Ontario) retaining an adverse costs rule for class actions and other provinces (including British Columbia) adopting a no costs rule.

(d) While the United Kingdom (UK) Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules do not specify that the unsuccessful party must pay adverse costs, the Tribunal has taken the approach that this should be its starting point.

(a) A no costs rule, where the successful party is generally not entitled to claim costs from the unsuccessful party. This could be subject to limited exceptions.

(b) A no costs rule for certain stages of the proceeding, such as certification.

(c) A one-way costs shifting rule, where the defendant but not the plaintiff is liable for adverse costs if they are unsuccessful.

(d) A different costs scale for class actions, or a power for the court to set a maximum costs level.

(e) Specifying considerations that a court may take into account when determining costs in a class action.

Results of Consultation

Adverse costs in representative actions

Adverse costs in class actions

(a) Adverse costs discourage frivolous, vexatious and speculative claims. They also encourage plaintiffs to assess the merits of their claim before proceeding.

(b) Adverse costs discourage inappropriate litigation behaviour.

(c) There is no principled basis to treat class actions differently from any other kind of civil proceeding.

(d) The risk of adverse costs can encourage parties to settle.

(e) Awarding adverse costs enables successful litigants to be compensated for some of their costs.

(f) Adverse costs ensure the parties are treated equally and fairly, particularly compared to a one-way costs rule.

(g) A defendant has no choice about whether they are part of litigation and is not necessarily more able to pay costs than a plaintiff.

(a) The ability to access litigation funding or after-the-event insurance.960F[961]

(b) Requiring litigation funding agreements to contain a complete costs indemnity for the representative plaintiff.961F[962]

(c) A ‘group costs order’ as in Victoria, where a lawyer acting on a contingency fee basis is liable for adverse costs.962F[963]

(d) A public class action fund that could indemnify representative plaintiffs.963F[964]

(a) Having a separate costs regime or provision for increases to existing scale costs for class actions.966F[967]

(b) Capping costs in class actions.967F[968]

(c) Requiring the plaintiff to acknowledge they are aware of and understand their costs obligations before the substantive proceeding commences.968F[969]

(d) An express legislative power for a court to make a public interest costs order, which could involve no costs, lower costs or a cap on costs payable by unsuccessful representative plaintiffs.969F[970]

(e) Costs in concurrent class actions being addressed.970F[971]

(a) Suggesting there should be a cap on the costs that could be claimed.

(b) Commenting that personal costs liability is a disincentive to taking on the role of representative plaintiff.

(c) Proposing that a class actions regime should specify that class members are generally not liable for costs (although other participants thought this was unnecessary).

Recommendation

Mitigating the impact on a representative plaintiff

COSTS LIABILITY FOR CERTIFICATION

Costs lie where they fall approach

Costs in the cause approach

(a) An application for certification would be a requirement of the Class Actions Act, rather than an application the plaintiff chooses to bring.

(b) A plaintiff who is ultimately successful may have to wait several years to claim their entitlement to costs for certification. This means they are unable to use this money for the costs of running the litigation.

(c) It may incentivise a defendant to challenge every point rather than consenting to certification or conceding that some aspects of the certification test are met.

(d) Just because a plaintiff is ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, that does not mean the case should never have been certified.992F[993] A class action may still have been an efficient way of resolving a legal issue that applies to a large number of claimants and may have even been of benefit to the defendant compared to defending many individual claims.

Costs where there are concurrent class actions

(a) Where the court finds that a particular class action does not meet the test for certification, the unsuccessful applicant may face an order to pay costs to the defendant.

(b) Where the court finds that two concurrent class actions meet the test for certification but only one should be certified, the defendant may face an order to pay costs to the successful representative plaintiff. Costs could lie where they fall with respect to the unsuccessful representative plaintiff’s application for certification.

(c) Where the court finds that two concurrent class actions meet the test for certification and both should be certified, the defendant may face an order to pay costs to both representative plaintiffs.

CALCULATING COSTS IN CLASS ACTIONS

CLASS MEMBER LIABILITY FOR COSTS

Recommendation

Class member liability for security for costs

CHAPTER 13

Abolishing maintenance and champerty


INTRODUCTION

(a) The advantages and disadvantages of litigation funding.

(b) Our conclusion that litigation funding is desirable for Aotearoa New Zealand in principle.

(c) Uncertainty in the law about whether litigation funding is permitted.

(d) Our recommendation that the torts of maintenance and champerty be abolished.

DESIRABILITY OF LITIGATION FUNDING IN PRINCIPLE

(a) Improving access to justice for plaintiffs by alleviating the costs of litigation and “levelling the playing field” in litigation against well-resourced defendants.

(b) Reducing the financial risks of litigation for plaintiffs, particularly the risk of an adverse costs order if the litigation is unsuccessful.

(c) Allowing plaintiffs to stay focused on activities other than litigation, for example allowing commercial plaintiffs to stay focused on their core business.

(d) Expanding financing options in respect of litigation.

(e) The availability of a funder’s litigation expertise and experience.

(f) Providing defendants with confidence that their costs will be met by the funder if they are successful.

(a) The risk that the court system may become burdened with an increase in litigation, for example additional representative or class actions.

(b) The risk of encouraging meritless litigation.

(c) Impacts on the availability and affordability of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance).

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHETHER LITIGATION FUNDING IS PERMITTED

CONSULTATION QUESTIONS

Retain the torts and leave the courts to clarify and develop the law

Retain the torts subject to a statutory exception for litigation funding

Abolish the torts

Abolish the torts subject to a preservation provision

RESULTS OF CONSULTATION

Advantages of litigation funding

Improving access to justice

(a) Andrew Barker QC noted that, in the context of settlements, the exact terms are usually confidential even if the broad nature of the settlement is explained. The amount received by litigants, in comparison to how much is received by the funder and lawyers is rarely divulged. In his view, the reality is that the courts are providing a significant business opportunity for funders, and court oversight of funding agreements is necessary to protect funded plaintiffs.

(b) Several submitters said funders only improve access to justice in cases that meet their investment criteria.1040F[1041] Dr Tony Ellis commented that funders are unlikely to fund public law cases given the low monetary awards, and Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand said funders are unlikely to fund public interest cases.

(c) Tom Weston QC said access to justice is a slogan that deserves close scrutiny. Such considerations provide only limited support for class actions and litigation funding, and the more difficult question is whether funded litigation is socially or economically useful. Similarly, the Insurance Council questioned whether litigation funding promotes “worthwhile claims”, for example claims where the aggregate amount is profitable for a funder but the individual harm is negligible.

Funder expertise and evaluation of the merits of claims

Other potential advantages

Disadvantages of litigation funding

The risk of an increase in meritless claims

Impact on directors and officers liability insurance

Other potential disadvantages

Desirability of litigation funding for Aotearoa New Zealand

Survey of group members

(a) Was your case funded by a litigation funder? There were 409 responses to this question. Of those, 231 participants (56.5 per cent) said yes, 22 (5.4 per cent) said no, and 156 (38.1 per cent) were unsure.

(b) If so, how have you found the experience of having your case funded by a litigation funder? There were 227 responses to this question. Most participants indicated that their experience had been positive.1076F[1077]

(c) If so, are you satisfied that the funding commission charged by the litigation funder supporting your case is fair and reasonable? There were 228 responses to this question. Most submitters were neutral or positive about the funding commission charged.1077F[1078] It is likely that some participants were commenting on representative actions that had not yet been resolved, and they may therefore have had an incomplete picture of how much the funder would receive from any sum recovered.

(d) What has been the most positive aspect of being funded by a litigation funder? There were 201 responses.1078F[1079] Key themes were: the absence of upfront costs or financial risks,1079F[1080] that litigation funding makes litigation possible,1080F[1081] that the funder provides expertise and significant resources,1081F[1082] and reassurance the case has merit.1082F[1083]

(e) What has been the most negative aspect of being funded by a litigation funder? We received 175 responses to this question.1083F[1084] Key themes were that the funder’s commission significantly diminishes class members’ returns,1084F[1085] and that there was a lack of communication, transparency and control regarding the litigation or the funding.1085F[1086] Approximately 76 participants (43.4 per cent) indicated they had not had any negative experiences.

Concerns about maintenance and champerty

Options for reforming maintenance and champerty

Retain the torts in their current form and leave the courts to clarify and develop the law

Retain the torts subject to a statutory exception for litigation funding

Abolish the torts

Abolish the torts subject to a preservation provision

Other suggestions

RECOMMENDATION

Litigation funding is desirable in principle

The torts of maintenance and champerty should be abolished

... there has been a dramatic change in attitude, with some jurisdictions abolishing the tort of champerty altogether and courts generally adopting a much more liberal and relaxed approach, to the point where many authorities appear actively to support litigation funding as a matter of public policy.

(a) Deceive the court, are fictitious or a mere sham.

(b) Use the process of the court in an unfair or dishonest way, for some ulterior or improper purpose or in an improper way.

(c) Are manifestly groundless, without foundation or serve no useful purpose.

(d) Are vexatious or oppressive.



CHAPTER 14

Models for regulation and oversight of litigation funding


INTRODUCTION

(a) The limited extent to which litigation funding is regulated in Aotearoa New Zealand, and the uncertainty about the extent to which litigation funding is permitted.

(b) The need for further, specific regulation and oversight of litigation funding, particularly in the context of class actions.

(c) Objectives and guiding principles for permitting and regulating litigation funding.

(d) Possible forms of regulation and oversight, and our preference for court oversight.

(e) Our recommendation in relation to the disclosure of litigation funding agreements.

LITIGATION FUNDING IS NOT SPECIFICALLY REGULATED IN AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

(a) General mechanisms available to the court for managing litigation, which have been applied to address some issues arising in funded litigation. These include the courts’ powers to stay or strike-out proceedings, and order security for costs.

(b) Principles that have developed through the courts to address some of the issues arising in funded litigation, for example principles applicable to the disclosure of litigation funding arrangements.

(c) General statutes that may apply to litigation funding, such as consumer protection legislation.

(d) The torts of maintenance and champerty (discussed in Chapter 13).

CONSULTATION QUESTIONS

(a) Industry-based self-regulation and oversight. This would involve inviting funders operating in Aotearoa New Zealand to develop their own industry standards, and to form an industry association responsible for overseeing compliance with those standards. Membership of the industry association could be either voluntary or could be made a statutory requirement in order for a funder to enter into any funding agreement. The standards of the association could be binding on members, and the association could impose sanctions for non-compliance. The association could be funded by the litigation funding industry through member subscriptions. Industry self-regulation and oversight is the approach taken in England and Wales.1130F[1131]

(b) Managed investment scheme and licensing requirements overseen by Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA). The managed investment scheme and licensing requirements in the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMC Act) could be imposed on funders, with compliance overseen by the FMA. Among other things, funders would be subject to governance and financial resource requirements. This would be similar to Australia’s position in relation to funded class actions.1131F[1132]

(c) Tailored licensing requirements overseen by the FMA or another regulator. A variation to the above option is that funders could be subject to modified or new licensing requirements and be monitored by the FMA (or another appropriate regulator). An advantage of this approach would be the tailoring of licensing to the issues raised by litigation funding. However, a disadvantage would be the added regulatory burden of administering a new licensing regime that is tailored to a relatively small number of funders operating in the Aotearoa New Zealand market.

(d) Tailored statutory rules overseen by a new oversight body. A further option is the creation of a tailored statutory regime and a new statutory body to oversee compliance with that regime. The regime could clarify the parameters for acceptable litigation funding arrangements, set minimum terms for funding agreements and minimum standards of behaviour and resources for litigation funders, impose consequences for non-compliance and establish an oversight body.

(e) Court approval of litigation funding arrangements. The courts could be required to approve funding arrangements in all or some funded proceedings, for example in funded class actions. Legislation could set out certain conditions that litigation funding arrangements and funders would need to satisfy in order for the court to approve the arrangement. There is precedent for court approval of class action funding agreements in Ontario.1132F[1133]

(f) A combination of these options.

RESULTS OF CONSULTATION

The need for specific regulation and oversight

Form of regulation and oversight

(a) Twelve submitters indicated support for court approval or oversight of the litigation funding arrangement at the commencement of the class action.1149F[1150] For example, to ensure compliance with any mandatory minimum terms or statutory requirements.

(b) Eleven submitters supported court oversight of the funding commission in the context of approving a class action settlement.1150F[1151]

(c) Six submitters supported court oversight of the litigation funding arrangement at both the commencement of the class action and when approving a settlement.1151F[1152]

(a) Licensing by the FMA is not an effective mechanism to address the concerns with litigation funding. The FMA’s role is to promote the development of fair, efficient and transparent markets. Financial markets regulation in Aotearoa is based on a twin peaks model where the FMA is responsible for market conduct regulation and Te Pūtea Matua | Reserve Bank of New Zealand is the prudential regulator. It is outside the FMA’s remit to address concerns about funder profits or conflicts of interest, or concerns about the integrity of the court system raised by funder control.

(b) Further, licensing would not automatically mean that a funder has adequate financial resources to meet an adverse costs order, continue to fund the proceedings, or distribute funds to shareholders.

(c) It is not clear whether litigation funding arrangements come within the definition of a “managed investment scheme” in the FMC Act.1156F[1157] In order to be a managed investment scheme, the plaintiff would need to have rights to participate in, or receive, financial benefits. Financial benefit is defined as “capital, earnings, or other financial returns”.1157F[1158] When considering the arrangement between a litigation funder and a plaintiff, the FMA does not consider the features that relate to reducing financial risk, or compensation for loss received from the court, fit the definition of a financial benefit. If a funder raises contributions from investors this is likely to fit the definition of a debt security or managed investment scheme (depending on how it is structured) under the FMC Act and may accordingly raise issues that intersect with the FMA’s regulatory mandate. However, this is not the purpose for regulating litigation funding, as set out in the Issues Paper.

OUR APPROACH

Further regulation and oversight of litigation funding is needed

Class actions

Other funded proceedings

Objectives for permitting and regulating litigation funding

Litigation funding should improve access to justice

Litigation funding should assure the integrity of the court system

Principles for designing a regulatory regime

(a) To facilitate access to courts, the litigation funding market should be sustainable and competitive and promote consumer confidence.

(b) To ensure substantively just outcomes in class actions, the costs of litigation funding to representative plaintiffs and class members and the terms of litigation funding agreements should be fair and reasonable.

(c) To assure the integrity of the court system, and recognise defendant concerns in funded proceedings, the involvement and role of litigation funders in funded proceedings should be appropriate and transparent.

The market should be sustainable and competitive and promote consumer confidence

The costs of litigation funding in class actions should be fair and reasonable

The involvement and role of litigation funders should be appropriate and transparent

Form of regulation and oversight

(a) Industry self-regulation and oversight is an inadequate response to the concerns with litigation funding, and an impractical response given the small size of the market in Aotearoa New Zealand and the fact that most funders are presently based overseas. While this model would support a competitive market, we think the concerns with litigation funding, particularly in class actions, warrant greater scrutiny to ensure that the permitting and regulating of litigation funding furthers the objectives of improving access to justice and providing assurance in the integrity of the court system.

(b) The managed investment scheme and licensing requirements in the FMC Act are not a good fit for regulating litigation funding arrangements.1191F[1192] If we were to recommend this approach, we would be doing so in circumstances where the existing requirements have clear limitations and would require significant reform to properly address the identified concerns with litigation funding. We would also be doing so in the context of strong opposition from the FMA, the regulator responsible for overseeing the licensing regime.

(c) It is not clear that the significant costs that would be involved in establishing and administering a tailored licensing regime for litigation funders are proportionate to the small size of the market in Aotearoa New Zealand or the concerns with litigation funding. For funders, there would be potentially significant compliance costs, including licensing fees and annual levies. These costs would inevitably be passed on to consumers. For any regulator, there would be the ongoing costs involved in the oversight of litigation funding arrangements and administration of the regime. In any case, there is no obvious regulator to oversee such a regime.

(d) We do not support the creation of a new statutory body to oversee any regulation of litigation funders and funding arrangements. The cost of this option would likely be disproportionate to the small size of the litigation funding market in Aotearoa New Zealand. No submitters supported this option.

OVERVIEW OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT

(a) Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider developing a High Court Rule to require funded plaintiffs to disclose their litigation funding agreement to the court and to the defendant. We discuss this recommendation below.

(b) The Rules Committee should consider amendments to the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR) to require security for costs to be provided in a form that is enforceable in Aotearoa New Zealand, and to expressly empower the court to make orders directly against the funder in relation to security for costs and adverse costs. We discuss this recommendation in Chapter 15.

(c) NZLS should consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to clarify how conflicts of interest should be avoided and managed in funded proceedings, including conflicts arising from a lawyer or law firm having financial or other interests in the funder that is financing the same matter in which they are acting. We discuss this recommendation in Chapter 16.

(a) The Class Actions Act we recommend should specify that any litigation funding agreement in a class action must be approved by the court in order to be enforceable by the funder. The court must be satisfied that the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the funding agreement, and that the funding agreement (including the funding commission) is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case. To assist with this assessment, our proposed funding approval provision sets out factors the court may consider and provides that the court may appoint an expert to assist it with assessing the fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission. The factors the court may consider respond, among other things, to concerns about funder control of litigation, funder profits and conflicts of interest. We discuss these recommendations in Chapter 17.

(b) The Class Actions Act should allow the court to review the funding commission when making a cost sharing order (discussed in Chapter 9) or when approving a proposed settlement (discussed in Chapter 11). The court should only be empowered to vary the funding commission when making certain cost sharing orders and, in limited circumstances, in opt-in cases that proceed to judgment (discussed in Chapter 17).

(c) The Rules Committee should consider an amendment to the HCR to include a presumption for security for costs in funded class actions. We discuss this recommendation in Chapter 15.

(d) NZLS should consider amending the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to prohibit a lawyer acting in a class action from claiming any unpaid legal expenses from the funded representative plaintiff if the funder fails to meet its financial commitment to pay those expenses. We discuss this recommendation in Chapter 16.

DISCLOSURE OF LITIGATION FUNDING AGREEMENTS



CHAPTER 15

Security for costs


INTRODUCTION

(a) Concerns about the funder having insufficient resources to pay an adverse costs order in favour of the defendant.

(b) The limitations of the existing security for costs regime to manage the concerns.

(c) Our recommendations to strengthen the security for costs mechanism.

DEFENDANTS MAY SUFFER LOSS IF FUNDER FAILS TO FULFIL ITS COMMITMENTS

SECURITY FOR COSTS MAY BE INADEQUATE TO MANAGE THE CONCERNS

CONSULTATION QUESTIONS

(a) Strengthening the security for costs mechanism for some or all kinds of funded litigation.

(b) Requiring litigation funders to meet minimum capital adequacy requirements.

Strengthening the security for costs mechanism

Minimum capital adequacy requirements

RESULTS OF CONSULTATION

Concerns about funders failing to fulfil financial obligations

Defendant concerns

(a) Defendants in funded proceedings should not be afforded a greater degree of protection than they would ordinarily receive.

(b) In any litigation, the defendant faces a risk the plaintiff will not be able to pay an adverse costs order in favour of the defendant or will run out of money mid-dispute. Impecuniosity is one of the inherent risks of litigation that all parties face and, if anything, the involvement of a funder may reduce that risk for defendants.

(c) Concerns about funder capital adequacy can be mitigated through other mechanisms, including security for costs, non-party costs, market forces, funders’ reputational and commercial incentives to ensure they have enough capital to fund proceedings, lawyers’ abilities to manage payment of invoices and to alert their clients to any issues with the payment of their invoices, after-the-event insurance, and the terms of litigation funding agreements.1220F[1221]

Other concerns

Adequacy of the existing security for costs mechanism

Existing mechanism is inadequate

(a) A funder’s ability to pay security for costs does not necessarily mean they have the resources to finance the legal action in its entirety.

(b) Security for costs does not adequately protect defendants from the high costs of defending funded proceedings, particularly group litigation. In some cases, security may not be adequately set at the outset or revisited as the litigation progresses.

(c) Security for costs is a discretionary matter for the court. As defendants are already being put to the burden of defending typically significant claims, they should not be put to the additional cost and effort of an application for security.

(d) There is no requirement for the security to be in Aotearoa New Zealand’s jurisdiction.

(e) The status quo is inconsistent with the regulation of similar forms of funding. Two submitters indicated that funders are essentially financial institutions, and the lack of regulation of funders’ capital adequacy seems inconsistent with the treatment of other such entities.1223F[1224] In addition, LPF Group considered it illogical for the law to require funded plaintiffs to provide security for costs, but not require defendants funded by insurance to do the same. It said there should be a reciprocal obligation on funded defendants to provide security.

Existing mechanism is adequate

(a) A defendant should not be afforded a greater degree of protection for costs than they would ordinarily receive simply because a litigation funder is involved.

(b) Security for costs is the most effective, targeted and straightforward way to ensure funders are able to meet their financial obligations to pay adverse costs. In contrast to a licensing regime with capital adequacy requirements, it is intended to directly address the credit risk imposed on defendants and representative plaintiffs and achieves the same level of consumer protection without the regulatory burden.

(c) In addition to security for costs, market forces and the court’s ability to order non-party costs directly against a funder can mitigate the concern that a funder will be unable to fulfil its financial commitments.

Strengthening security for costs

Submissions that supported strengthening security for costs

Submissions that did not support strengthening the security for costs mechanism

Other submissions

Capital adequacy requirements

Submissions supporting capital adequacy requirements

(a) Funders could be subject to requirements to maintain adequate financial resources at all times to fund all the disputes they have agreed to fund,1234F[1235] and to pay all debts when they become due and payable.1235F[1236]

(b) Minimum capital adequacy requirements could correlate to the funder’s financial commitment in the particular proceedings, as this would provide greater reassurance to plaintiffs and defendants than an arbitrary figure.1236F[1237]

(c) Funders could be required to maintain access to a specified minimum amount of capital, as in England and Wales under the Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders.1237F[1238]

(d) Funders could be required to have access to capital in Aotearoa New Zealand.1238F[1239] They could have to demonstrate that access to the capital is readily available in Aotearoa New Zealand, including in an enforcement context, or that they have the assets appropriately ‘ring-fenced’ to avoid difficulties accessing it. LPF Group said funders could be required to have at least one director resident in Aotearoa New Zealand and their funding terms should be enforceable in accordance with New Zealand law.

Submissions opposed to capital adequacy requirements

(a) Capital adequacy concerns are not based on any evidence of widespread or systemic misconduct by funders and there are few, if any, examples where the lack of capital adequacy of a funder has led to financial loss to plaintiffs.

(b) Capital adequacy requirements have never ensured funders have enough to pay an adverse costs order, and there is never any guarantee that a lender (in any sector) will not fall over.

(c) Capital adequacy regulation was rejected in the United Kingdom because it imposes a disproportionate regulatory burden, and this reasoning applies even more so in the smaller market of Aotearoa New Zealand. The utility and administrative burden associated with annual audits is questionable, and a regulator could instead be empowered to require an audit on an as-needs basis.

(d) Security for costs, or enhanced security for costs, is a better response to the concern that funders might lack resources. It can be tailored to the actual costs of a particular case, rather than an abstract (and often low) minimum capital requirement which may represent only a small fraction of the funder’s total commitments.

(e) Capital adequacy requirements will add to the compliance costs for funders, which may impact on the availability and affordability of litigation funding for plaintiffs. Such requirements may discourage market entry and cause the exit of some funders from the market. They would likely stifle competition by favouring funders based in Aotearoa New Zealand and large-scale funders that are able to sustain the costs of maintaining a commercial presence and capital in this jurisdiction.

RECOMMENDATION

Successful defendants may suffer significant loss

Existing security for costs regime does not adequately protect defendants

The security for costs regime should be strengthened in funded proceedings

Presumption for security for costs in funded class actions

Presumption that security must be enforceable in Aotearoa New Zealand

Express power for the court to make orders directly against the litigation funder

Funders should not be subject to minimum capital adequacy requirements

Security for costs is a more targeted response to defendant concerns

Security for costs is a more cost-effective option

Unclear who would oversee compliance with any capital adequacy requirements

Other concerns do not require a regulatory response

CHAPTER 16

Professional regulation of lawyers in funded proceedings


INTRODUCTION

(a) Concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest in funded proceedings.

(b) Concerns about the funder having insufficient resources to meet its financial commitments to the plaintiff.

(c) Our recommendations that Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) should consider:

(i) how conflicts of interest should be avoided and managed in funded proceedings; and

(ii) prohibiting the lawyer from claiming unpaid legal expenses from the funded representative plaintiff if the funder fails to pay them.

LAWYER-PLAINTIFF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Conflicts can arise between the interests of the lawyer and the funded plaintiff

Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers may not adequately manage concerns

Consultation questions

(a) Encourage or require funders to include minimum terms in their funding agreements. For instance, minimum terms that:
(i) Limit the situations in which funding can be withdrawn, to reduce the incentive on a lawyer to advise the client to follow the funder’s preferred course of action to keep proceedings afoot.

(ii) If a lawyer enters into retainer agreements with both the plaintiff and the funder, provide that the lawyer’s professional and fiduciary duties to the plaintiff are to be prioritised over duties to the funder, and specifically, that the plaintiff’s instructions are to be prioritised over those of the funder.

(iii) Prevent the funder from taking any steps that would cause or be likely to cause the lawyer to act in breach of their professional duties to the plaintiff.

(iv) Prevent the funder from seeking to influence the lawyer to cede control over the conduct of the litigation to the funder.

(b) Develop new professional rules or guidelines for lawyers acting in funded proceedings. For example, to clarify the relationship between the lawyer and members of the class, or to define and require disclosure of relevant conflicts of interest and require informed consent and independent advice in respect of such conflicts before the lawyer can continue to act.

(c) Prohibit activities that give rise to lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest. For example, amending the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers to prohibit lawyers from investing in funders, holding office, or having other interests in litigation funders. Another option would be to prohibit lawyers from taking instructions from both the plaintiff and the funder in funded litigation.

Results of consultation

Concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest

(a) They are dependent on the funder for the payment of their bills and the continuation of the proceedings.

(b) They have an ongoing business relationship with the funder or want to secure future business. A lawyer who knows that a funder has identified them as a preferred lawyer, or who has consistently worked with a funder, may have an incentive to favour the interests of a funder in order to retain a mutually beneficial relationship. Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand said a similar situation can emerge in insured litigation, however insurers instructing lawyers have an overriding duty of utmost good faith to their customers (and lawyers have a similar duty) that litigation funders do not. Further, it said the majority of general insurers in Aotearoa New Zealand are also members of the Insurance Council and must comply with the Fair Insurance Code which sets out a number of customer-focussed obligations.

(c) They are engaged by and taking instructions from both the plaintiff and the funder. In this situation, a lawyer may be unable to discharge their duties to one party without breaching their duties to the other.

(d) They have financial incentives in the settlement or resolution outcome, or act as the funder. LPF Group noted, for example, that this might arise if the lawyer is entitled to a success fee that is tied to the outcome achieved rather than the lawyer’s usual hourly rate.

(e) They have financial or other interests in the funder that is financing the same matter on which they are acting. Woodsford Litigation Funding submitted that lawyers are better placed to protect the best interests of their clients if their own financial interests are not impacted by their clients’ decisions. Dr Michael Duffy (Monash University) said close arrangements, relationships or cross ownership may tempt lawyers and funders to act in each other’s interests rather than the plaintiff’s interests.

(f) Specifically in relation to funded class actions, concerns arise where:

(i) The plaintiff is distanced from their case. Michael Duffy said the risk of lawyer-plaintiff conflicts may be more pronounced in class actions because the representative plaintiff may have little involvement with their case. This may disincentivise their lawyer from properly ascertaining or advising the representative plaintiff about which strategies are in their best interests.

(ii) The lawyer also owes duties to class members. Submitters noted uncertainty about the extent to which lawyers owe fiduciary or other obligations to class members who have not retained them or entered into a funding arrangement.1287F[1288] If the lawyer owes duties to class members in this situation, conflicts may arise if the representative plaintiff’s interests differ from the interests of class members, and if the class members have individual interests that diverge from other class members. Buddle Findlay said conflicts could arise if the representative plaintiff is seeking a common fund order that would result in a “substantial aggrandisement” of the fees to the lawyer and funder. In this instance, the interests of the funded and unfunded class members would be diametrically opposed.

Adequacy of existing mechanisms to manage the concerns

(a) The Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers are based on a standard lawyer-client paradigm and do not adequately cater for the sorts of issues likely to arise in funded proceedings. Buddle Findlay said this is particularly problematic in funded opt-out class actions. The submission from NZLS went further, saying the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers are not well-equipped to address the range and complexity of issues that potentially arise in all tripartite and multi-party relationships (not just those involving funders). It said these issues include conflicts of interest, as well as related issues such as lawyers’ obligations of independence and undivided loyalty to plaintiff-clients, confidentiality and disclosure, client autonomy in the selection and engagement of lawyers, and the no-contact rule.

(b) There needs to be greater clarity to ensure lawyers do not step into the role of the funder, and to ensure their independence to advise their clients.

(c) It is unclear to what extent the lawyer for the representative plaintiff owes fiduciary or other duties to unrepresented class members. Tom Weston QC said the law in relation to the professional obligations of lawyers in funded class actions is “entirely unsatisfactory and should be clarified”.

(a) The Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers adequately protect plaintiffs from lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest. DLA Piper said it sets high professional standards for lawyers, particularly in relation to their overriding duty to their client.

(b) Conflicts can and should be dealt with by the terms of the funding agreement. Two funders said their standard funding agreements provide that lawyers should prioritise the client’s interests in the event the client’s interests or instructions diverge from the funder’s interests or instructions. Omni Bridgeway said its standard funding agreement provides that it will pay for the representative plaintiff to be independently advised on the agreement.

(c) Some overseas-based funders are required to maintain conflicts management policies or have effective systems for detecting and managing potential conflicts. Omni Bridgeway said it manages conflicts of interest by maintaining a comprehensive conflicts management policy, as required by Australian law.1293F[1294] Woodsford Litigation Funding said the International Legal Finance Association Best Practices require members to maintain effective systems to detect and manage potential conflicts, including those that could impact the enforcement of an award or judgment.

(d) BusinessNZ considers existing mechanisms are effective but said the situation should be monitored in case difficulties arise.

Options for reform

Recommendation

Avoiding and managing conflicts in funded proceedings

(a) Avoid conflicts or potential conflicts of interest when advising the client on litigation funding options and assisting the client to organise litigation funding. If a conflict of interest cannot be avoided at this critical stage, the lawyer should not give this advice or assistance, and the client should receive independent advice or assistance instead.

(b) Disclose any conflicts or potential conflicts of interest and obtain the client’s informed consent before they enter an agreement with the litigation funder and if any new conflicts or potential conflicts of interest arise during the course of the proceeding. Disclosure is an integral part of managing conflicts of interest. It promotes accountability and allows consumers of legal services to make informed choices.

(c) Prioritise the client’s instructions if there is a potential conflict between the client’s interests and the funder’s interests.

(d) Not act, or continue to act, if it is or becomes apparent that the lawyer’s ability to discharge the obligations owed to the client is compromised.

(e) Maintain adequate practices to manage conflicts or potential conflicts of interest, including documenting, implementing, monitoring and regularly reviewing those practices. Adequate practices may, for example, include written procedures for:1314F[1315]

(i) Identifying and assessing situations where conflicts of interest might arise.

(ii) Effectively disclosing conflicts of interest. For example, disclosing conflicts in a timely, prominent and specific manner, with enough detail to enable the client to understand the potential impact of the divergent interests and make an informed decision about how the relationship may affect the services being provided to them.

(iii) In class actions, dealing with any recruitment of the representative plaintiff (that is, the client) if litigation funding is organised before a suitable representative plaintiff is found. For example, practices to ensure the lawyer will not engage in recruitment strategies that are likely to mislead or deceive (such as overstating the strength of the case or the potential compensation).

Restricting or prohibiting lawyers from having interests in the funder

Other matters we considered

(a) In Chapter 7, we recommend the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 should be amended to provide that, following certification of a class action, the lawyer for the representative plaintiff is regarded as the lawyer for the class and is considered to have a relationship with the class. We also recommend NZLS should consider what amendments to the Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers may be required to clarify the obligations of lawyers acting in class actions.

(b) In Chapter 17, we recommend the Class Actions Act should specify that the court must not approve a funding agreement unless it is satisfied that the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the agreement (that is, advice from a lawyer that is not acting in the same proceeding going forward).

PLAINTIFF’S POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR UNPAID COSTS

Plaintiff may be liable for unpaid costs if funder fails to fulfil financial commitments

Consultation questions

Results of consultation

Recommendation



CHAPTER 17

Court oversight of funding terms and commissions


INTRODUCTION

(a) Concerns about funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest.

(b) Concerns about funder profits.

(c) Our recommendations for court oversight of litigation funding agreements, including funding commissions, in class actions.

IMPACT OF FUNDING TERMS ON OUTCOMES

(a) Give the funder considerable control over the claim, and allow the funder to prioritise its own interests over the interests of the representative plaintiff and class members when those interests diverge; or

(b) Entitle the funder to an excessive share of any settlement or damages obtained, diminishing the returns to the representative plaintiff and class members.

Funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest

Funder may promote its own interests at the expense of the plaintiff’s interests

Existing mechanism to manage these concerns may be inadequate

Funder profits

Funder profits may impact on the ability of funded plaintiffs to achieve substantive justice

Existing mechanism to manage this concern may be inadequate

CONSULTATION QUESTIONS

Funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest

(a) Encouraging or requiring litigation funders to include minimum terms in their litigation funding agreements.1353F[1354] For example, terms that:
(i) Provide that the funder will not seek to influence the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s lawyer to give control or conduct of the litigation to the funder or take steps that are likely to cause the plaintiff’s lawyer to act in breach of their professional duties.

(ii) Set out the funder’s role in decisions about whether to settle the proceedings and on what terms, or a specific procedure that will be applied to reviewing and deciding whether to accept a settlement offer.

(iii) Set out the circumstances in which a funder may terminate the funding agreement and that the funder shall not be entitled to terminate except in those specified circumstances.

(iv) Set out the process for resolving disputes between the funder and the funded plaintiff about settlement or termination of the funding (or any dispute).

(b) Requiring funders to have and follow an adequate conflicts management policy, as in Australia.1354F[1355] This could include practices for disclosing and managing potential or actual conflicts of interest that arise during the proceedings. An issue with this option is how compliance should be monitored and enforced.

(c) Regulation to limit the amount of control a funder may exercise in a proceeding.1355F[1356] However, the risk of funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest may not be able to be completely managed through regulating funder control. As noted above, subtler forms of infl‑uence may be exerted by even a relatively passive funder, particularly if it retains the ability to terminate funding in a wide range of circumstances. Real consequences can flow from these pressures even where there is no explicit power for a party to act contrary to the interests of the other.

Funder profits

(a) Facilitating competition in the litigation funding market (a market-centred approach).

(b) Court supervision of funding commissions in class actions (for example, in the context of exercising a power to make a common fund order or approve a settlement).

(c) Directly regulating the commissions that funders can charge (for example, by placing restrictions on how the funding commission can be calculated, or capping funding commissions at a fixed percentage or on a sliding scale).

RESULTS OF CONSULTATION

Funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest

Concerns about funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest

Adequacy of existing mechanisms to manage the concerns

Options for reform

Minimum contract terms

Court oversight of funding agreements

Conflicts management policy

Other options raised by submitters

Funder profits

Concerns about funder profits

(a) Funder profits can significantly diminish compensation for claimants, undermining the access to justice justification for permitting litigation funding.

(b) In representative and class actions, there is no true commercial tension in the negotiation of funding terms and commissions. The power lies with the funder, and the representative plaintiff and class members usually have no other option.

(c) Concerns may be greater in opt-out proceedings than opt-in proceedings because compensation that would otherwise be awarded to class members may be reduced by funding commissions and legal fees they have not actively agreed to.

(d) Funded plaintiffs may be signing away vast portions of their returns without fully understanding what they are doing.

(e) Funder profits are not necessarily commensurate with the risk attached to investing in litigation. Many funded cases are relatively low-risk, and in any case, funders can manage risk with adequate due diligence.

(f) Examples of funders and lawyers benefiting from funded litigation at the expense of class members (and defendants) include Strathboss Kiwifruit v Attorney-General,1394F[1395] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker,1395F[1396] and Huon Corporation.1396F[1397]

(g) Public perceptions of the justice system will be damaged if funders and lawyers are the main beneficiaries of litigation rather than plaintiffs.

(h) There is a risk of funders and lawyers acting together to create and fund litigation without any real client at all. Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society said there is no public policy reason to permit a pure market in litigation in the absence of a genuine principal.

(i) The way that funding commissions are calculated does not always incentivise funders to try and keep lawyers’ costs low.

(j) It is not easy to determine what constitutes acceptable funder profit and what constitutes excessive profit. There is a fine line between regulating litigation funding for the benefit of plaintiffs and discouraging the availability of litigation funding.

(k) There is a lack of empirical evidence on the returns made by funders in Aotearoa New Zealand, and therefore a lack of transparency about whether the outcomes of funded litigation are in fact fair to plaintiffs. The exact terms of settlement are usually confidential, as is the amount actually received by plaintiffs.

(l) Overseas-based funders will take their profits out of Aotearoa New Zealand.

(a) Litigation funding is a commercial arrangement, and it should be uncontroversial that funders expect to profit from their investments. Parties should be free to enter into funding arrangements on commercial terms agreed by both parties.

(b) Without litigation funding, many plaintiffs and class members would be unable to pursue their claims and obtain compensation or hold wrongdoers to account. It is preferable for plaintiffs and class members to receive something, rather than nothing.

(c) Funder profits are commensurate to the inherent risks attached to investing in litigation. Further, it is not appropriate to assess funder profits solely on the basis of outcomes in individual cases, without considering the total costs and risks associated with all the cases in the funder’s portfolio.

Adequacy of existing mechanisms to manage the concerns

(a) The light-touch approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding is not an adequate basis for regulating litigation funding in class actions.1399F[1400] The Australian experience highlights the inadequacy of a light-touch approach.

(b) The court’s ability to stay proceedings on the basis of an impermissible assignment of a bare cause of action does not adequately manage the concerns. Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker,1400F[1401] it is uncertain whether the court will stay proceedings on the basis of funder profit and control.

(c) The torts of maintenance and champerty are not the right mechanism for regulating funding commissions. Their bluntness and ambiguity make them unsuitable for regulating sophisticated funding arrangements, and their policy rationale is no longer convincing.

(d) Lawyers and representative plaintiffs do not necessarily provide an effective check on funding commissions. At the point of settlement, conflicts may arise between the lawyer and the representative plaintiff.1401F[1402] Conflicts may also arise between the representative plaintiff and the class (if the representative plaintiff is to receive a payment for taking on the role).

(a) The court’s supervisory jurisdiction in representative and class actions, particularly court approval of settlements.1402F[1403] In Australia, for example, court approval of settlement includes an examination of what class members will receive after the funding commission and legal costs are deducted.

(b) Competition in the litigation funding market.

(c) The terms of the litigation funding agreement. A well-designed, fit-for-purpose funding agreement can manage concerns about funder profits by providing full disclosure of all fees and charges before the funding agreement is entered into. It can also moderate funder profits and protect class member interests through cooling off periods, support for class members to obtain independent advice, standard terms regarding management of conflicts of interest, and dispute resolution mechanisms (typically overseen by senior officers of the courts, such as Queen’s Counsel).

(d) The obligations of the lawyer for the representative plaintiff and the class as officers of the court, and their overriding obligation and fiduciary duty to their client.

(e) General consumer law protections available to class members, for example in relation to unconscionable conduct, misleading and deceptive conduct and unfair contracts.

Options for reform

Survey of group members

RECOMMENDATIONS

Court approval of funding agreements at the commencement of class actions

(a) The circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the agreement.

(b) Whether the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative plaintiff to instruct their lawyer or control the litigation, or otherwise impair the lawyer-client relationship.

(c) Any process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative plaintiff, and class members, including disputes about settlement and termination of the agreement.

(d) Whether the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement is the law of Aotearoa New Zealand.

(e) If the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and extent of that indemnity.

(f) The fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission.

(g) Any other matters the court considers are relevant.

Termination of the funding agreement

(a) Sets out the circumstances in which the funder can terminate the agreement, and that the funder shall not be entitled to terminate the agreement except in those circumstances. For example, the funder may be entitled to terminate where it reasonably ceases to be satisfied about the merits or commercial viability of the dispute, or where there has been a material unremedied breach of the agreement by the funded plaintiff justifying termination after notice.

(b) Requires the funder to provide the funded plaintiff with notice of its intention to terminate the agreement and continue to perform its obligations under the funding agreement during the notice period. We think the notice period should provide the representative plaintiff with adequate time to seek alternative funding, for example 20 working days might be sufficient in complex litigation. We also anticipate that during the notice period the funder would not seek to be reimbursed for any security paid into court, unless and until alternative funding is secured.

Plaintiff’s ability to control the litigation

Dispute resolution process

Law governing the agreement

Adverse costs indemnity

Fairness and reasonableness of funding commission

(a) The type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary relief.

(b) The number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief.

(c) The estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful (for example, legal fees, expert fees, witness fees, court fees, security for costs and adverse costs).

(d) The complexity and likely duration of the case (for example, the number of defendants, the anticipated number of witnesses and the number of causes of action).

(e) The estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate variation in the factors identified above in (a)–(d).

(f) Any other matters the court considers are relevant.

Court oversight of funding commission later in the proceeding

Court oversight of funding commissions at settlement

Court oversight of funding commissions in the context of making cost sharing orders

Court oversight of funding commissions in opt-in cases that proceed to judgment

Expert to assist the court assessing funding commissions

Funding commissions should not be capped

FUNDED REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS UNDER HIGH COURT RULE 4.24

DRAFT FUNDING APPROVAL PROVISIONS

7 Litigation funding agreements

(1) A representative plaintiff must apply to the court for approval of a litigation funding agreement,—

(a) if settlement occurs prior to certification, together with the application for settlement approval:

(b) if the agreement is entered into before certification, as soon as practicable following certification:

(c) if the agreement is entered into after certification, as soon as practicable after the agreement is entered into:

(d) if the terms of an approved litigation funding agreement are amended, as soon as practicable after that amendment.

(2) A litigation funding agreement is enforceable by a funder only if it is approved by the court.

(3) In this Act,—

litigation funding agreement means an agreement in which a non-party agrees to indemnify the representative plaintiff or provide money to pursue a class action proceeding, in return for a share of any monetary award or settlement funds or for any other consideration.

8 Approval of litigation funding agreements by High Court

(1) A court must not approve a litigation funding agreement unless it is satisfied that—

(a) the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the agreement; and

(b) the agreement is fair and reasonable.

(2) When determining whether a litigation funding agreement is fair and reasonable, the court may consider—

(a) the circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the agreement:

(b) whether the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative plaintiff to instruct their lawyer or control the litigation, or otherwise impair the lawyer-client relationship:

(c) any process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative plaintiff, and class members, including disputes about settlement and termination of the agreement:

(d) whether the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement is the law of New Zealand:

(e) if the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and extent of that indemnity:

(f) the fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission:

(g) any other matters the court considers are relevant.

(3) When determining whether a funding commission is fair and reasonable under

subsection (2)(f), the court may consider—

(a) the type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary relief:

(b) the number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief:

(c) the estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful:

(d) the complexity and likely duration of the case:

(e) the estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate variation in the factors in paragraphs (a) to (d):

(f) any other matters the court considers are relevant.

(4) The court may appoint an expert if it considers that will assist the court’s con‐ sideration of the fairness and reasonableness of a funding commission and may order that 1 or more of the representative plaintiffs or the litigation funder pay part or all of the costs of the expert.



CHAPTER 18

Reducing barriers to access to justice for class members


INTRODUCTION

(a) The lack of funding available for public interest class actions and class actions seeking non-monetary relief.

(b) The creation of a public class action fund to help address this funding gap.

(c) The desirability of having publicly available information about the class actions process and class member rights.

CLASS ACTION FUND

Class action funds overseas

Results of consultation

Recommendation

(a) The merits of the applicant’s case.

(b) Whether the applicant has made reasonable efforts to raise funds from other sources.

(c) Whether the applicant has a clear and reasonable proposal for the use of any funds awarded.

(d) Whether the applicant has appropriate financial controls to ensure that any funds awarded are spent for the purposes of the award.

(e) The extent to which the issues in the proceeding affect the public interest.

(f) How many people would be likely to benefit from the funding.

(g) If the application for funding is made before the proceeding is certified as a class action, the likelihood that it will be certified.

(h) The amount of money in the fund that has been allocated to provide financial support in respect of other applications or that may be required to make adverse costs payments to defendants.

(i) Any other matters the committee considers are relevant.

FACILITATING CLASS MEMBER UNDERSTANDING AND PARTICIPATION

Recommendation

(a) The opportunity to opt into or opt out of the class action.

(b) Where the court requires a class member to provide discovery.1470F[1471]

(c) The ability for a class member to apply to replace the representative plaintiff, including for the purposes of an appeal.1471F[1472]

(d) When class member participation is required to determine an individual issue, such as giving evidence at a hearing.1472F[1473]

(e) The opportunity for class members to object to a settlement.1473F[1474]

(f) Where class members must take active steps to participate in a settlement.1474F[1475]

Class member guide to class actions

Class action clinic

(a) Assisting a potential class member who seeks leave to intervene on an application for certification.

(b) Understanding the implications of opting into or opting out of the class action.

(c) Where the court has certified more than one concurrent action, deciding between class actions.

(d) Deciding whether to accept an individual settlement offer.

(e) Understanding a proposed settlement agreement and deciding whether to lodge an objection.

(f) Supporting an objecting class member to lodge an objection.

(g) Helping a class member to file a claim once a settlement has been approved.



APPENDIX 1

Draft Class Actions Legislation




COMMENCEMENT OF CLASS ACTION

  1. Commencement of class action in High Court

(1) A person may commence a class action proceeding against 1 or more defendants as the proposed representative plaintiff—

(a) on behalf of a proposed class; and

(b) if the claims of the members of the proposed class all raise a common issue.

(2) A proceeding under subsection (1) may be commenced by more than 1 proposed representative plaintiff.

(3) A State entity may commence a class action proceeding against 1 or more defendants as the proposed representative plaintiff on behalf of a proposed class if—

(a) it is itself a member of the proposed class and the claims of the members of the proposed class all raise a common issue; or

(b) another Act authorises it to bring a class action proceeding.

(4) This section does not itself confer jurisdiction on the court to hear a proceeding, which must otherwise be within the jurisdiction of the court.

(5) In this section,—

class means,—

(a) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (1), at least 2 persons together with the proposed representative plaintiff, who must also be a class member:

(b) in the case of a proceeding brought under subsection (3), at least 2 persons in addition to the State entity

common issue means a common issue of fact or law.

  1. Multiple defendants

(1) If a class action proceeding is commenced under section 1(1) against more than 1 defendant,—

(a) for each defendant there must be a proposed representative plaintiff and at least 2 other persons with a claim against that defendant:

(b) if there are 2 or more proposed representative plaintiffs, it is not necessary for each of them to have a claim against all of the defendants:

(c) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.

(2) If a class action proceeding is commenced under section 1(3) against more than 1 defendant,—

(a) for each defendant there must be at least 2 persons with a claim against that defendant:

(b) it is not necessary for each person on whose behalf the proceeding is commenced to have a claim against all of the defendants.

  1. Application for certification of class action

When a class action proceeding is commenced, it must be accompanied by an application for an order certifying the proceeding as a class action proceeding and appointing 1 or more representative plaintiffs for the proceeding.

  1. Certification of class action

(1) Subject to section 6 (which relates to the certification of concurrent class actions), a court must certify a proceeding as a class action proceeding if it is satisfied that—

(a) the proceeding discloses 1 or more reasonably arguable causes of action; and

(b) there is a common issue of fact or law in the claim of each member of the proposed class; and

(c) there is at least 1 representative plaintiff that is suitable and will fairly and adequately represent the class; and

(d) a class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the claims of class members; and

(e) the opt-in or opt-out mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an appropriate means of determining class membership in the circumstances of the proceeding.

(2) When assessing the suitability of a proposed representative plaintiff and whether they will fairly and adequately represent the proposed class under subsection (1)(c), the court—

(a) must consider whether there is or is likely to be a conflict of interest that could prevent them from properly fulfilling the role as representative plaintiff:

(b) must consider whether they have a reasonable understanding of the nature of the claims and the duty and responsibilities of a representative plaintiff, including potential liability for costs:

(c) must be satisfied that they have received independent legal advice on the duty and responsibilities of a representative plaintiff:

(d) if they will be representing members of their hapū or iwi, may consider the tikanga of the hapū or iwi as relevant to representation in the proceeding:

(e) may consider any other factors it considers relevant.

(3) When assessing under subsection (1)(d) whether a class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the claims of class members, the court must consider—

(a) the proposed class definition:

(b) the potential number of class members:

(c) the nature of the claims:

(d) the nature and extent of the other issues that will need to be determined once the common issue is resolved:

(e) whether the likely time and cost of the proceeding is proportionate to the remedies sought:

(f) whether there is another procedure available to class members that would be a more appropriate means of dealing with their claims:

(g) any other factors it considers relevant.

(4) When assessing under subsection (1)(e) whether the mechanism proposed for the proceeding is an appropriate means of determining class membership, the court may consider—

(a) the potential size of the proposed class and how potential class members will be identified:

(b) the characteristics of the proposed class:

(c) the nature of the claims, including the subject matter and the size of individual claims:

(d) whether class members could be adversely affected by the proceedings:

(e) whether the mechanism would unfairly prejudice the defendant in running their defence:

(f) any other factors it considers relevant.

CONCURRENT CLASS ACTIONS

  1. Commencement of concurrent class actions

(1) A concurrent class action proceeding must be commenced—

(a) within 90 days of the date on which notice of the first of the concurrent class action proceedings is given on the Class Actions Register; or

(b) at a later time with the leave of a court.

(2) In this Act,—

Class Actions Register means a register of class action proceedings published on an Internet site maintained by or on behalf of the Ministry of Justice

concurrent class action proceeding means a class action proceeding that has the following in common with another class action proceeding that is currently before the court:

(a) the same or substantially similar issues in dispute; and

(b) at least 1 defendant.

  1. Procedure for certification of concurrent class actions

(1) The applications for certification of concurrent class action proceedings must be considered by a court together.

(2) If the court considers that more than 1 of the proceedings meets the test for certification under section 4, it must decide whether all, and if not all which, of those proceedings will be certified.

(3) When deciding which of the proceedings will be certified, the court must consider what approach will best allow the claims of class members to be resolved in a just and efficient way.

(4) When assessing which approach is best under subsection (3), the court may consider—

(a) how each proceeding is formulated:

(b) the preferences of potential class members:

(c) any litigation funding arrangements for each proceeding:

(d) the legal representation for each proceeding:

(e) any other factors the court considers relevant.

(5) If the court decides under subsection (2) that a proceeding will not be certified, the application for certification must be dismissed.

(6) If the court decides that more than 1 of the proceedings will be certified, it may make further orders for the management of those proceedings, including orders that—

(a) the proceedings be case managed together:

(b) the proceedings be consolidated:

(c) the proceedings be heard together or successively:

(d) 1 or more of the proceedings be temporarily stayed.

LITIGATION FUNDING AGREEMENTS

  1. Litigation funding agreements

(1) A representative plaintiff must apply to the court for approval of a litigation funding agreement,—

(a) if settlement occurs prior to certification, together with the application for settlement approval:

(b) if the agreement is entered into before certification, as soon as practicable following certification:

(c) if the agreement is entered into after certification, as soon as practicable after the agreement is entered into:

(d) if the terms of an approved litigation funding agreement are amended, as soon as practicable after that amendment.

(2) A litigation funding agreement is enforceable by a funder only if it is approved by the court.

(3) In this Act,—

(4) litigation funding agreement means an agreement in which a non-party agrees to indemnify the representative plaintiff or provide money to pursue a class action proceeding, in return for a share of any monetary award or settlement funds or for any other consideration.

  1. Approval of litigation funding agreements by High Court

(1) A court must not approve a litigation funding agreement unless it is satisfied that—

(a) the representative plaintiff has received independent legal advice on the agreement; and

(b) the agreement is fair and reasonable.

(2) When determining whether a litigation funding agreement is fair and reasonable, the court may consider—

(a) the circumstances in which the funder is entitled to terminate the agreement:

(b) whether the agreement will diminish the rights of the representative plaintiff to instruct their lawyer or control the litigation, or otherwise impair the lawyer-client relationship:

(c) any process for resolving disputes between the funder, the representative plaintiff, and class members, including disputes about settlement and termination of the agreement:

(d) whether the agreement prescribes that the governing law under the agreement is the law of New Zealand:

(e) if the agreement provides for an adverse costs indemnity, the terms and extent of that indemnity:

(f) the fairness and reasonableness of the funding commission:

(g) any other matters the court considers are relevant.

(3) When determining whether a funding commission is fair and reasonable under

subsection (2)(f), the court may consider—

(1) the type of relief claimed, including the estimated total amount of monetary relief:

(2) the number of people likely to be entitled to a share of any relief:

(3) the estimated costs if the litigation is successful or unsuccessful:

(4) the complexity and likely duration of the case:

(5) the estimated returns to the funder, and how the returns will accommodate variation in the factors in paragraphs (a) to (d):

(6) any other matters the court considers are relevant.

(4) The court may appoint an expert if it considers that will assist the court’s consideration of the fairness and reasonableness of a funding commission and may order that 1 or more of the representative plaintiffs or the litigation funder pay part or all of the costs of the expert.

EFFECT OF JUDGMENT ON COMMON ISSUE

  1. Effect of judgment on common issue

(1) A judgment on a common issue binds every class member, but only to the extent that the judgment determines a common issue that—

(a) is set out in the certification order; and

(b) relates to a cause of action described in the certification order; and

(c) relates to relief sought by class members as stated in the certification order.

(2) A judgment on a common issue is not binding between a party to the class action proceeding and—

(a) a person who was eligible to opt in to the proceeding but did not do so:

(b) a person who has opted out of the proceeding.

AGGREGATE MONETARY RELIEF

  1. Aggregate assessment and distribution of monetary relief

(1) A court may make an aggregate assessment of the monetary relief to which a class is entitled (the aggregate monetary relief) if it is satisfied that it can make a reasonably accurate assessment of that amount.

(2) For the purpose of the court’s assessment of the aggregate monetary relief, it is not necessary for any individual class member to establish the amount of loss or damage suffered by them.

(3) The court may make an award in the amount assessed as the aggregate monetary relief.

(4) The court may also make any orders for the distribution of the award that it considers appropriate, and these may include an order—

(a) that the defendant must distribute the award directly to class members:

(b) appointing a person as the administrator to distribute the award to class members:

(c) approving the process for class members to establish their entitlement to a share of the award:

(d) directing how any unclaimed portion of the award is to be distributed, including by way of an alternative distribution under section 11:

(e) directing how the costs of the distribution are to be met.

(5) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an administrator) must file a report with information about the process and outcome of the distribution of the award within 60 days of the distribution process being completed or at a later time if allowed by the court.

  1. Alternative distribution

(1) This section applies if—

(a) it is not practical or possible for an award made under section 10 or any portion of it to be distributed to individual class members; or

(b) the costs of distributing the award made under section 10 or any portion of it to class members would be disproportionate to the amount they would receive.

(2) The court may order that the award or any portion of it be paid instead to an eligible charity or organisation.

(3) In this section, eligible charity or organisation means—

(a) an entity whose activities are related to claims in the class action proceeding and whose activities are likely to directly or indirectly benefit some or all class members; or

(b) an entity prescribed by regulations as an eligible charity or organisation for the purposes of this section.

SETTLEMENT

  1. Settlement of class action

(1) The settlement of a class action proceeding is not binding unless approved by a court.

(2) An application for approval of a settlement must be made by the representative plaintiff or proposed representative plaintiff if the application is made prior to certification.

  1. Settlement application before certification of proceeding

(1) This section applies if an application for approval of a settlement is made before the certification of a class action proceeding.

(2) Before considering that application, the court must consider whether the proceeding meets the requirements of section 4 (with any necessary modifications), and if the court considers the application does so, for the purposes of settlement it must—

(a) certify the proceeding as a class action proceeding; and

(b) appoint 1 or more representative plaintiffs.

  1. Approval of settlement

The court must approve the settlement if it is satisfied that the settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the interests of the class, and when making that assessment the court must consider—

(a) the terms and conditions of the proposed settlement, including—

(i) the type of relief that will be provided to class members, and if this includes monetary relief, the total amount of that monetary relief; and

(ii) how the benefits of the settlement will be allocated as between class members; and

(iii) whether class members are treated equitably in relation to each other; and

(iv) the proposed method of determining the entitlement of individual class members; and

(v) any steps a class member must take to benefit from the settlement; and

(vi) the proposed method of dealing with any unclaimed settlement amounts; and

(b) any legal fees and funding commission that may be deducted from the relief payable to class members; and

(c) any information that is readily available to the court about the potential risks, costs, and benefits of continuing with the proceeding; and

(d) any views of class members; and

(e) any steps taken to manage potential conflicts of interest; and

(f) any other factors it considers relevant.

  1. Steps following approval of settlement

(1) If the court approves a settlement under section 14, it—

(a) may order that a class member may opt out of the settlement, but only if—
(i) opting out is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or

(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more class members be given the opportunity to opt out of the settlement; and

(b) may order that a person who was eligible to become a class member but did not do so (an eligible person) may opt in to the settlement, but only if—

(i) opting in is permitted by the terms of the settlement agreement; or

(ii) the court considers that the interests of justice require that 1 or more eligible persons be given the opportunity to opt in to the settlement; and

(c) must describe which class members will be bound by the settlement.

(2) A settlement is binding on the parties to the settlement and all class members described by the court under subsection (1)(c) on and from the date of the court order approving the settlement.

  1. Administration and implementation of settlement

(1) The court retains the jurisdiction to oversee the administration and implementation of a settlement it approves under section 14.

(2) The court may appoint a person as an administrator to implement the settlement.

(3) The court may make any other order it considers appropriate for the administration and implementation of the settlement.

(4) An administrator or the parties (if the court has not appointed an administrator) must file a report with information about the process and outcome of the implementation of the settlement within 60 days of the implementation process being completed or at a later time if allowed by the court.

  1. Appointment of counsel to assist court or expert

(1) The court may appoint counsel to assist the court or a court expert if it con‐ siders this will assist the court to assess whether a settlement is fair, reasonable, and in the interests of the class.

(2) The court may order that 1 or more of the parties pay part or all of the costs of the counsel or expert.





APPENDIX 2

List of Submitters

The Law Commission received submissions from the following organisations and persons during the course of this review:

In response to the Issues Paper

Organisations

Individuals

In response to the Supplementary Issues Paper

Organisations

Individuals




  1. Law Commission logo1238B1238B1238B

Level 9, Solnet House, 70 The Terrace, Wellington 6011

PO Box 2590, Wellington 6140

Telephone: 0800 832 526

Email: com@lawcom.govt.nz


[1] Deborah R Hensler “From Sea to Shining Sea: How and Why Class Actions Are Spreading Globally” (2017) 65 U Kan L Rev 965 at 966.

[2] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Class Actions and Litigation Funding | Ko Ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me Ngā Pūtea Tautiringa (NZLC IP45, 2020).

[3] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Class Actions and Litigation Funding: Supplementary Issues Paper | Ko Ngā Hunga Take Whaipānga me Ngā Pūtea Tautiringa (NZLC IP48, 2021).

[4] Some submitters made submissions on both the Issues Paper and the Supplementary Issues Paper. In many cases it is clear from the context whether the submission was made in response to one or the other but in some cases we state this expressly for the sake of clarity.

[5] See Issues Paper at [2.7]–[2.24].

[6] An opt-out class action is where all persons falling within the class definition are automatically part of the class action unless they take steps to remove themselves. Conversely, an opt-in class action is where individuals are only part of the class action if they take steps to become class members.

[7] We discuss the history of the representative actions rule in the Issues Paper at [2.26]–[2.27] and [3.3]–[3.5].

[8] We identified 44 of these cases in the Issues Paper at [3.10]. Additional cases are: Fullarton v Arowana International Ltd [2021] NZHC 931; Taua v Tahi Enterprises Ltd [2021] NZSC 182; Re Halifax New Zealand Ltd (in liq) [2021] NZHC 1113. We are aware of several other proceedings which have been commenced on a representative basis (but there is not yet a decision as to whether leave should be granted under HCR 4.24): see Simons v ANZ Bank and ASB Bank Ltd (CIV-2021-404-1190), Body Corporate Number DPS 91535 v 3A Composites GmbH [2020] NZHC 985, and <www.a2milkclassaction.com>.

[9] See Issues Paper at [3.15]–[3.21].

[10] See Issues Paper at [4.2]–[4.3].

[11] Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126; [2021] 1 NZLR 117 at [89].

[12] See Issues Paper at [4.4].

[13] Issues Paper at [4.8]–[4.43].

[14] Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Colin Carruthers QC, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Gilbert Walker, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC. Two submissions on the Supplementary Issues Paper addressed this issue: GCA Lawyers and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[15] BusinessNZ, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Kate Tokeley and Tom Weston QC.

[16] Issues Paper at [3.57]–[3.97].

[17] Issues Paper at [3.79]–[3.89].

[18] Issues Paper at [7.9]–[7.10].

[19] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Samuel Becher, Bell Gully, David Bigio QC (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Jennifer Braithwaite, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Tony Ellis, GCA Lawyers (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, International Bar Association (IBA) Antritrust Committee, Jasminka Kalajdzic, Zane Kennedy (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Michael Legg, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Hīkina Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway, Te Mana Mātāpono Matatapu | Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Russell Legal (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Christopher St Johanser, Kate Tokeley, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC (Issues Paper and Supplementary Issues Paper submissions).

[20] Issues Paper at [1.9]–[1.13]. See also Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | The Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice: Initial Consultation with the Legal Profession (Discussion Paper, 16 December 2019).

[21] Jasminka Kalajdzic Class Actions in Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018) at 51.

[22] See Issues Paper at [1.10] and The Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice Further Consultation with the Legal Profession and Wider Community (Further Consultation Paper, 14 May 2021) at [13].

[23] See Issues Paper at [5.12]–[5.14] and The Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice Further Consultation with the Legal Profession and Wider Community (Further Consultation Paper, 14 May 2021) at [21]–[22].

[24] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Samuel Becher, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission, LPF Group, MBIE, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[25] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Samuel Becher, Jennifer Braithwaite, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Simpson Grierson and Kate Tokeley.

[26] Issues Paper at [5.22]–[5.23]. See also Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 1088 at [70].

[27] Bell Gully, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker and Tom Weston QC.

[28] See Issues Paper at [5.24]–[5.28] and Jasminka Kalajdzic Class Actions in Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018) at 51 and 70.

[29] Issues Paper at [5.25].

[30] See Hirini Moko Mead Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (2nd ed, Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2016) at 31 and 35–36.

[31] Hirini Moko Mead Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori Values (2nd ed, Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2016) at 31.

[32] We also received submissions on this issue in response to our question on whether funder profits are a concern: see Chapter 17.

[33] For detailed discussion, see Issues Paper at [5.29]–[5.37]

[34] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS and Kate Tokeley.

[35] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, NZLS and Kate Tokeley.

[36] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group and Vicki Waye. Carter Holt Harvey said although this was a “theoretical” advantage, in practice it could be “illusory” because of acute problems with class actions more generally.

[37] BusinessNZ, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[38] Issues Paper at [5.38]–[5.63].

[39] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway, Nicole Smith, Kate Tokeley, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.

[40] BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, IBA Antitrust Committee and Insurance Council.

[41] Issues Paper at Chapter 6.

[42] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission, Consumer NZ, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Marsh, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.

[43] IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group and Simpson Grierson.

[44] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and NZLS.

[45] BusinessNZ, Gilbert Walker and Tom Weston QC.

[46] Claims Resolution Service, Gilbert Walker, Johnson & Johnson, NZLS, Simpson Grierson, Tom Weston QC.

[47] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia and Crown Law Office (though the latter noted class actions can give rise to practical difficulties for defendants, including cutting across other steps a defendant may be taking to address a legal issue).

[48] Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council and Simpson Grierson,

[49] Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, NZLS and Vicki Waye.

[50] Issues Paper at [6.32]–[6.33] and [17.36]–[17.49].

[51] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Marsh and Simpson Grierson. We also received submissions on the potential impact of litigation funding on insurance, which we discuss in Chapter 13.

[52] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, NZ Shareholders’ Association and Omni Bridgeway.

[53] Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Institute of Directors, Marsh and Simpson Grierson.

[54] Bell Gully and the Institute of Directors urged the Commission to review New Zealand’s continuous disclosure settings. Conversely the NZ Shareholders’ Association submitted that issues associated with introducing class actions or litigation funding regimes should not be conflated with changes to the continuous disclosure liability regime.

[55] Issues Paper at [6.42]–[6.61].

[56] Issues Paper at Chapter 7 and Supplementary Issues Paper at [22].

[57] Submissions in favour of a statutory class actions regime were from: Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Samuel Becher, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Jasminka Kalajdzic, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Marsh, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZLS, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Russell Legal (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Simpson Grierson, NZLS, Nicole Smith, Kate Tokeley, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding. While not expressly endorsing a statutory class actions regime, Hīkina Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment said our proposals would improve the situation and should consequentially improve the effectiveness of those regulatory regimes. Similarly, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission said a statutory class actions regime could allow affected parties to better access remedies.

[58] BusinessNZ considered it was difficult to answer the question definitively.

[59] For example, the group litigation procedures in the Companies Act 1993, s 173; Health and Disability Commissioner Act 1994, s 50; Human Rights Act 1993, ss 92B(2) and 90(1)(c); and Privacy Act 2020, s 97(6). We discuss these in the Issues Paper at [3.68]–[3.71].

[60] Issues Paper at [14.17]–[14.21].

[61] In Australia, of the 63 class actions filed in 2020/2021, 24 were consumer claims: King & Wood Mallesons The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2020/2021 (2021) at 6.

[62] In the Issues Paper we identified six representative actions involving consumer claims: Issues Paper at [3.19]. We are aware of two additional funded consumer representative actions that have been commenced (but where there is not yet a decision as to whether leave should be granted under HCR 4.24). One of these cases relates to building cladding, with the causes of action including alleged breaches of the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 and the Fair Trading Act 1986: Body Corporate Number DPS 91535 v 3A Composites GmbH [2022] NZHC 985. In addition, a proceeding has been brought against ANZ and ASB banks with respect to alleged breaches of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003: see <www.bankingclassaction.com>.

[63] See Pokapū Ratonga Ture I Legal Services Agency Report on the 2006 National Survey of Unmet Legal Needs and Access to Services (November 2006) at 1, 35 and 68, and Colmar Brunton Legal needs among New Zealanders (13 April 2018) at 3 and 6. See also Issues Paper at [4.33].

[64] See Issues Paper at [4.30]–[4.32].

[65] We noted in the Issues Paper that there have been seven investor representative actions and four shareholder representative actions, with six of these cases being funded: see Issues Paper at [3.15], [3.17] and [14.26]. Since the Issues Paper, another shareholder case has been allowed to proceed on a representative basis: see Fullarton v Arowana International [2021] NZHC 931 at [150] and [163]. We are also aware that a shareholder representative action has been commenced against the a2 Milk Company Ltd: see <www.a2milkclassaction.com>. For statistics on securities class actions in other jurisdictions see Issues Paper at [5.17]. In Australia, the number of securities class actions has declined in recent years, with eight securities class actions filed in the year to 30 June 2021 compared with over 20 in the year to 30 June 2018: King & Wood Mallesons The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2020/2021 (2021) at 19.

[66] See Issues Paper at [4.38]–[4.43] discussing these types of class action. Since the date of the Issues Paper, a representative action has been filed against ANZ and ASB banks with respect to alleged breaches of the Credit Contracts and Consumer Finance Act 2003, following on from a settlement reached with Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission: see <www.bankingclassaction.com>.

[67] There are provisions in both the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the Financial Markets Conducts Act 2013 which allow a finding of breach to be relied on in a subsequent civil proceeding: Fair Trading Act 1986, s 46 and Financial Markets Conducts Act 2013, s 487.

[68] We discuss this issue in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.91].

[69] See Issues Paper at [3.95]–[3.96].

[70] King & Wood Mallesons The Review: Class Actions in Australia 2020/2021 (2021) at 30.

[71] In 2020, there were 2173 new civil proceedings filed in Te Kōti Matua | High Court: Te Kōti Matua o Aotearoa | The High Court of New Zealand 2020 – The Year in Review (25 June 2021) at 13.

[72] See Issues Paper at [17.48].

[73] A related point was made by Michael Legg, who noted that the way a regime has been designed will not necessarily reflect exactly how it will work in practice.

[74] Samuel Becher, Gilbert Walker (Supplementary Issues Paper submission) and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (Supplementary Issues Paper submission).

[75] See Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019), Recommendation 1, where we recommended repealing the provision requiring periodic reviews of the operation of the Evidence Act 2006. This recommendation is reflected in the Statutes Amendment Bill 108-1 (2021), cl 37.

[76] Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol I at 306.

[77] Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 1996 (Victoria), rr 18A.01–18A.30.

[78] Schutt Flying Academy v Mobil Oil [2000] VSCA 103. By a majority of 3:2, the court held that the rules were valid.

[79] Legislation Design and Advisory Committee Legislation Guidelines 2021 Edition (September 2021) at 68–69.

[80] Legislation Design and Advisory Committee Legislation Guidelines 2021 Edition (September 2021) at 69.

[81] See Issues Paper at [9.4]–[9.11] and Supplementary Issues Paper at [23]–[28].

[82] See Issues Paper at [9.12]–[9.49] and Supplementary Issues Paper at [31]–[37].

[83] Issues Paper at [9.12]–[9.15].

[84] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.

[85] These included: ensuring a defendant has a clear idea of the potential scope of liability, certification process, early examination of the merits of the case, retaining adverse costs, ability to strike out meritless cases, requiring a plaintiff’s lawyer to personally certify the claim has a proper basis in law, regulation of litigation funding, allowing a defendant to communicate with the class about individual settlements, and managing competing class actions closely.

[86] These included: minimal requirements for commencing class actions, striking out improperly brought interlocutory proceedings brought to delay proceedings, the ability to claim the funder’s fee as a disbursement if a defendant rejects a Calderbank offer, and the ability to seek security for costs from the defendant.

[87] These included: the court having a supervisory role, clear certification process, mechanisms for managing competing class actions, adverse costs to deter proceedings and interlocutory applications that are unlikely to be successful, and procedural certainty.

[88] Issues Paper at [9.16]–[9.23].

[89] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Jasminka Kalajdzic, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management Investors’ Group, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[90] We discuss these matters in Chapters 3, 7 and 8.

[91] Issues Paper at [9.24]–[9.25].

[92] Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | The Rules Committee Improving Access to Justice: Further Consultation with the Legal Profession and Wider Community (14 May 2021) at [72].

[93] See Issues Paper at [9.27]–[9.29]. An Australian Parliamentary report published shortly after the Issues Paper recommended that procedural proportionality in class actions should be improved and suggested that proportionality should be a factor to be considered at the outset of a class action: Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [6.78]–[6.80].

[94] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Barry Allan, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[95] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[96] Supplementary Issues Paper at [37].

[97] Issues Paper at [9.30]–[9.32].

[98] BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[99] We drew on the discussion of the central values that underpin the totality of tikanga Māori in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Māori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (NZLC SP9, 2001) at [125].

[100] See Issues Paper at [9.33]–[9.43].

[101] Barry Allan, Jennifer Braithwaite, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Te Hunga Rōia o Aotearoa and Tom Weston QC.

[102] See Issues Paper at [9.44]–[9.47].

[103] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Te Komihana Tauhokohoko | Commerce Commission, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MBIE, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Te Mana Mātāpono Matatapu | Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[104] Barry Allan, Bell Gully and Insurance Council.

[105] The Ontario class actions legislation provides that it does not apply to other proceedings brought in a representative capacity: see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 37.

[106] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.

[107] We discussed this issue in the Issues Paper at [8.28]–[8.33].

[108] See Supplementary Issues Paper at [38]–[40].

[109] Issues Paper at [8.15].

[110] Issues Paper at [8.27] and [8.32].

[111] Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [6]. The ALRC did not make any recommendations with respect to defendant class actions and said the issue required a separate study.

[112] Re Halifax New Zealand Ltd (in liq) [2021] NZHC 1113 at [13]–[21]. While HCR 4.24 is not mentioned in the judgment, submitters on the Issues Paper indicated this was the basis upon which the representation orders were made.

[113] NZLS and Simpson Grierson.

[114] For example, see Vlaar v van der Lubbe [2016] NZHC 2398, (2016) 4 NZTR 26-022 (which involved a representative plaintiff representing five beneficiaries of an estate), and Cadman v Visini (2011) 3 NZTR 21-011 (which involved two trustees bringing a proceeding on behalf of all three trustees).

[115] See Chapter 6.

[116] See Issues Paper at [8.28].

[117] We discuss defendant class actions in the Issues Paper at [8.19]–[8.27].

[118] Supplementary Issues Paper at [43].

[119] Issues Paper at [8.23].

[120] We discuss limitation periods in Chapter 4.

[121] See discussion of provisions that may require modification in Issues Paper at [8.25].

[122] Issues Paper at [8.24].

[123] Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.1]–[3.8].

[124] Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.13].

[125] Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.17]–[3.21].

[126] When developing its draft Class Actions Bill, Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee considered and rejected the suggestion that a litigation committee rather than the lead plaintiff could take responsibility for important decisions in the conduct of a class action: see Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | The Rules Committee Minutes of meeting held on Friday 6 March 2009 (March 2009) at [14], discussing Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society Letter to the Rules Committee on second class actions consultation paper, draft Bill and High Court Amendment (Class Actions) Rules 2008 (20 November 2008).

[127] See the Issues Paper at [11.24]–[11.33] and the Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.12]–[1.15]. We discuss an exception for government entities in Chapter 4.

[128] See Issues Paper at [6.52], discussing the issue that class action litigation may be driven by lawyers rather than individuals seeking access to justice.

[129] See Chapter 2.

[130] While we consider an honorarium can be paid to a representative plaintiff, we expect it would be at a more modest level than the professional fees of litigation committee members.

[131] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[132] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (although with respect to the common issues only), Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Tom Weston QC.

[133] Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, Insurance Council, Institute of Directors and Johnson & Johnson.

[134] Crown Law Office suggested that difficulties could arise if a self-represented representative plaintiff were able to bring a class action and that a court might decline to certify a class action where a representative plaintiff had not obtained legal representation.

[135] While Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce made a joint submission, there were some issues on which these submitters expressed separate views.

[136] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, NZLS (although as discussed above, it thought the obligations should be held by an entity such as a litigation committee), Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.

[137] Shine Lawyers thought it was unnecessary to have the obligations in statute as they exist as a matter of course but did not have a strong view.

[138] We discuss certification in Chapter 6.

[139] In Chapter 18 we recommend a class action fund should be established.

[140] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care Rules 2008), r 13.3. In addition, a lawyer cannot file a document on behalf of a party unless they are authorised to file that document by (or on behalf of) the party: High Court Rules 2016, r 5.36(1)(a).

[141] In Chapter 7, we suggest that some references to a “client” in the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 should be read as referring to the representative plaintiff, while other references to a “client” should be regarded as referring to the class.

[142] A lawyer should take instructions after the client is informed of the nature of the decisions to be made and the consequences of them: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care Rules 2008), r 13.3.

[143] We discuss this in Chapter 8.

[144] High Court Rules 2016, rr 7.54 and 7.79.

[145] High Court Rules 2016, r 14.2(1)(a).

[146] We also recommend in Chapter 15 that costs orders in funded proceedings may be made directly against a funder.

[147] We discuss this in Chapter 18.

[148] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[149] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[150] Chapman Tripp and Insurance Council. Gilbert Walker noted there was a view in Australia that litigation committees are not helpful because the obligations still sit with the representative plaintiff.

[151] Crown Law Office said this was the view of one Crown agency (unnamed).

[152] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp and Gilbert Walker. Some submitters commented on this point in their submissions on our certification test.

[153] Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[154] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Vince Morabito and Shine Lawyers (at settlement).

[155] Michael Duffy said possibly this should not be allowed, but it may be that a payment is reasonable if fully disclosed.

[156] Nikki Chamberlain, Vince Morabito and Shine Lawyers.

[157] Edward Sherman “Group Litigation under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Actions” (2002) 52 DePaul L Rev 401 at 409.

[158] David Crerar “The Restitutionary Class Action: Canadian Class Proceedings Legislation as a Vehicle for the Restitution of Unlawfully Demanded Payments, Ultra Vires Taxes, and Other Unjust Enrichments” (1998) 56 U Toronto Faculty L Rev 47 at 92. In some cases the representative plaintiff could be a corporate entity and different considerations may apply.

[159] We discuss replacement of the representative plaintiff in Chapter 6.

[160] In Chapter 18 we recommend that Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice produce accessible online information about class actions. This could also help to inform prospective representative plaintiffs about the role.

[161] In Chapter 17 we recommend that court approval of a litigation funding agreement should depend, among other things, on whether the representative plaintiff received independent legal advice on the agreement. This advice could be given by the same lawyer who advises the proposed representative plaintiff on the duty and responsibilities attached to that role.

[162] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 13.3. In Chapter 7, we suggest that when a lawyer is acting for the class, the reference to “client” in this rule should mean the representative plaintiff.

[163] See Chapter 12.

[164] We also recommend that costs orders in all funded proceedings may be made directly against a funder.

[165] We discuss this issue in Chapter 11.

[166] We discuss this in Chapter 4.

[167] In some cases, it may be necessary to create a sub-class, but this will not always be required. We discuss the issue of sub-classes in Chapter 8.

[168] It may be desirable for the retainer agreement to set out the procedures with respect to giving instructions where there are multiple representative plaintiffs. A lawyer may act for more than one party in respect of the same matter where the prior informed consent of all parties is obtained and there is not a “more than negligible risk” that the lawyer may be unable to discharge the obligations owed to one or more of the clients: Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 6.1.1.

[169] We discuss these recommendations in Chapter 8.

[170] We discuss this in Chapter 6.

[171] We discuss this in Chapter 11.

[172] We discuss security for costs in funded litigation in Chapter 15.

[173] High Court Rules 2016, r 5.45. One of the grounds for ordering security for costs is that there is reason to believe a plaintiff will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if the plaintiff is unsuccessful: r 5.45(1)(b).

[174] See Issues Paper at [2.19].

[175] Barbara J Rothstein and Thomas E Willging Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges (3rd ed, Federal Judicial Center, 2010).

[176] Issues Paper at [8.3].

[177] Issues Paper at [8.4]–[8.8].

[178] Issues Paper at [8.9].

[179] Issues Paper at [8.10].

[180] Issues Paper at [8.11]–[8.13].

[181] Barry Allan, Samuel Becher, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding

[182] Barry Allan, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Insurance Council, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[183] For example, in one Canadian copyright class action, the defendant operated a website which posted obituaries and photographs, which had been authored by the representative plaintiff and class members, without permission. One of the remedies sought was an injunction preventing the defendant from continuing and repeating the infringement of the copyright of the representative plaintiff and of each class member: Thomson v Afterlife Network Inc 2019 FC 545.

[184] See, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33C. The Court’s powers include granting equitable relief and making any other order it considers just: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z. The Act also refers to the court’s discretion to dispense with notice requirements when the relief sought does not include a claim for damages: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33X(2).

[185] United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(b)(2).

[186] For example, see Class Proceedings Act RSBC 1996 c 50 (British Columbia), s 4(2)(e).

[187] We discuss certification in Chapter 6.

[188] Issues Paper at [8.14]–[8.18].

[189] See Issues Paper at [3.30] and [8.15].

[190] Barry Allan, Jennifer Braithwaite, BusinessNZ, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, LPF Group, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding. In addition, the submission from Te Mana Mātāpono Matatapu | Office of the Privacy Commissioner discussed the application of class action rules to tribunals.

[191] Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. In addition, NZLS said there were advantages to Te Kōti Matua | High Court having sole jurisdiction over class actions and said the default position should be that the High Court has jurisdiction over class action proceedings.

[192] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[193] Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[194] Jennifer Braithwaite, BusinessNZ and Nikki Chamberlain all expressly supported having class actions in the Employment Court. Barry Allan’s submission discussed situations where employment class actions could be used, though he did not expressly submit that class actions should apply in the Employment Court. LPF Group was generally supportive of class actions being available in other courts, but did not discuss the Employment Court specifically.

[195] Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[196] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. In addition, NZLS’ submission indicates that it may be unnecessary to have class actions in the Māori Land Court.

[197] Draft legislation, cl 1 (heading) and cl 1(4).

[198] We discuss ways of determining individual issues in Chapter 8 and discuss aggregate monetary relief in Chapter 10.

[199] We note the Rules Committee has made proposals for improving civil justice in the District Court: see Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice: Further Consultation with the Legal Profession and Wider Community (14 May 2021) at [52]–[63]. The paper comments on the under-utilisation of the District Court for civil disputes compared to the Disputes Tribunal and High Court, and proposes reforms to strengthen the institutional competency of the District Court’s civil jurisdiction.

[200] District Court Act 2016, ss 86–89.

[201] The object of the Employment Relations Act 2000 acknowledges that there is an inherent inequality of power in employment relationships: s 3.

[202] See Issues Paper at [3.28].

[203] The object of the Act refers to promoting mediation as the primary problem-solving mechanism (other than for enforcing employment standards) and reducing the need for judicial intervention: Employment Relations Act 2000, s 3(a).

[204] Employment Relations Act 2000, s 161.

[205] Employment Relations Act 2000, ss 157(1) and 160. See also ss 179(5)(a)-(b) and 184, which restrict the ability to review procedural decisions of the Authority.

[206] Employment Relations Act 2000, s 187.

[207] See Chapter 11 of the Issues Paper.

[208] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.1]–[1.25].

[209] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA), Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submision) and Nicole Smith.

[210] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submision) and Nicole Smith.

[211] Michael Duffy, FMA, IBA Antitrust Committee and Vince Morabito.

[212] Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee and Omni Bridgeway.

[213] This suggested definition of common issue comes from The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK).

[214] Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[215] Gilbert Walker, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[216] Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito and Simpson Grierson.

[217] Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[218] FMA, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[219] Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[220] High Court Rules 2016, rr 5.22 and 5.25.

[221] The requirements for statements of claim are set out in High Court Rules 2016, rr 5.25–5.35.

[222] We discuss certification in Chapter 6.

[223] We discuss concurrent class actions in Chapter 5.

[224] Draft legislation, cl 1(5).

[225] Draft legislation, cl 4(4)(a).

[226] Draft legislation, cl 1(1), 1(5).

[227] We discuss sub-classes in Chapter 8.

[228] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.5].

[229] Draft legislation, cl 1(5).

[230] As noted in the Issues Paper, there are obiter comments about whether this is a requirement of HCR 4.24 in Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General [2017] NZSC 17, [2017] 1 NZLR 423 at [651] and [657]. We are also aware of a representative action where two incorporated bodies were appointed to represent a number of age-related residential care service providers: Healthcare Providers New Zealand Inc v Northland District Health Board HC Wellington CIV-485-1814, 7 December 2007 at [27]–[28].

[231] As we explain in Chapter 8, a common method of managing common and individual issues in class actions is to have staged hearings (also known as split trials). The ‘stage one’ hearing will typically determine common issues (and sometimes the entirety of the representative plaintiff’s claim) and the ‘stage two’ hearing will determine individual issues.

[232] See Issues Paper at [11.31].

[233] For example, our research showed that the British Columbia provision has only been used to appoint a non-class member representative plaintiff in one case: see Dominguez v Northland Properties Corp 2012 BCSC 539, applying Class Proceedings Act RSBC 1996 c 50, s 2(4).

[234] In Canada, the threshold for allowing a non-class member representative plaintiff is high. See Cantlie v Canadian Heating Products Inc 2017 BCSC 286 at [364] where the court commented that while s 2(4) had received little judicial consideration, it was clear that the burden was high. See also L(T) v Alberta (Director of Child Welfare 2009 ABQB 96 at [15]–[16] where the court suggested that “compelling evidence” would be required and said it was not convinced that counsel had made an “exhaustive search of its records” to identify an appropriate representative plaintiff from the class.

[235] See High Court Rules 2016, rr 4.29–4.31. We discuss the issue of class members are under 18 years or who are considered to lack sufficient decision-making capacity with respect to a step in a class action in Chapter 7.

[236] See Duval-Comrie v Commonwealth of Australia [2016] FCA 1523. The representative plaintiff and class members were workers with learning/intellectual disabilities who had been employed in an Australian Disability Enterprise and alleged discrimination with respect to their wages. The representative plaintiff commenced the proceeding through a litigation guardian, his mother. See also Nojin (on behalf of Nojin) v Commonweath [2011] FCA 1066. This case also alleged discrimination with respect to wages paid by Australian Disability Enterprises to persons with learning/intellectual disabilities. The case was brought by Elizabeth Nojin on behalf of her son Michael. However, the court commented that it would have been more appropriate to name Michael Nojin as the applicant with his mother named as his “next friend” or appointed as his tutor for the purposes of the proceeding.

[237] Draft legislation, cl 1(3) (September 2021 version).

[238] Draft legislation, cl 1(4 (September 2021 version).

[239] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.20].

[240] We discuss the submissions we received on when a government entity should be able to fulfil the role of the representative plaintiff in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.16]–[1.17].

[241] This provision has been relied upon by the Commerce Commission to bring proceedings.

[242] Financial Markets Authority Act 2011, s 41.

[243] Financial Markets Authority v Prince & Partners Trustee Company Ltd [2017] NZHC 2059.

[244] Draft legislation, cl 1(3).

[245] Draft legislation, cl 2(1)(a).

[246] While we recommend a specific provision on class member discovery in Chapter 8, this would require an application by a defendant and would not be available as of right.

[247] Draft legislation, cl 2(1)(b).

[248] Draft legislation, cl 2(1)(a).

[249] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.112].

[250] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.117].

[251] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.118].

[252] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.119].

[253] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.122].

[254] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[255] Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Tom Weston QC.

[256] Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[257] As noted in the Supplementary Issues Paper, the Australian regimes take a relatively general approach, specifying that the limitation periods will run again if (a) a class member opts out of the proceeding or (b) the proceedings and any appeals are determined without finally disposing of the class member’s claim: Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.121].

[258] In Chapter 11, we recommend a class action may only be discontinued with the leave of the court.

[259] We discuss concurrent class actions in Chapter 5.

[260] We have drawn on the approach in Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 28.

[261] We discuss settlement in Chapter 11.

[262] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.1].

[263] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.2]–[2.16].

[264] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.18]–[2.20].

[265] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.21].

[266] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[267] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding. While Gilbert Walker did not comment specifically on most of the individual questions on competing class actions, it indicated general agreement with our proposals on this topic.

[268] Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, and Omni Bridgeway.

[269] The Practice Note defines a competing class action as “a class action in which the claims of group members in a class action (as that term is understood in s 33C of the Federal Court Act) are sought to be advanced in another class action (irrespective as to differences as to the time period to which the class actions relate or differences in the way any allegations of contraventions are made in each class action)”. See: Class Actions Practice Note (Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note GPN-CA, December 2019) at [8.1].

[270] See draft legislation, cl 5(2).

[271] High Court Rules 2016, r 10.12. We discuss these powers in the Issues Paper at [3.61]–[3.63].

[272] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.24]–[2.28].

[273] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [4.98]–[4.101].

[274] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), ss 13.1(3) and (8).

[275] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.26]–[2.28].

[276] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.27].

[277] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[278] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, MinterEllisonRuddWatts (it said 90 calendar days), Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[279] Bell Gully said the court registry should publish details of a class action on ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand website as soon as practicable after it is filed. The 90-day period should start following publication. LPF Group said it could start once the statement of claim becomes publicly available.

[280] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (if a time limit is implemented), MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[281] See Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 13.1(3) and 13.1(8).

[282] Draft legislation, cl 5(1).

[283] For example, see the material published on the website of a representative action that has been filed against ANZ and ASB banks: Banking Class Action “Claim Documents” <www.bankingclassaction.com>.

[284] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.30]–[2.32].

[285] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[286] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[287] Draft legislation, cl 6(1).

[288] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.34]–[2.36].

[289] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Andrew Harmos, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[290] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Andrew Harmos, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[291] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Johnson & Johnson and Rhonson Salim. In addition, LPF Group said certifying multiple class actions should be an exception rather than the rule.

[292] Draft legislation, cl 6(2).

[293] We discuss certification orders in Chapter 6.

[294] Draft legislation, cl 6(5).

[295] This differs from the court’s decision not to certify a class action on the basis that the certification test is not met, which we recommend can be appealed as of right.

[296] Draft legislation, cl 6(6).

[297] We note that under our proposed approach to limitation, staying a proceeding would not cause limitation periods to begin running again. We discuss limitation in Chapter 4.

[298] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.38]–[2.66].

[299] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.

[300] Nikki Chamberlain, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.

[301] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[302] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[303] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson. Omni Bridgeway thought the preferences of potential class members were only relevant in an opt-in class action.

[304] Book building is a process where a lawyer and/or litigation funder sign up a person to a class action.

[305] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[306] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[307] Bell Gully, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[308] Bell Gully, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[309] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[310] It referred to: the nature and scope of the causes of action advanced; the theories advanced by the legal team as supporting the claims advanced; which group delivers the best value to the class; the state of each class action, including preparation; the number, size and extent of involvement of the proposed representative plaintiffs; the relative priority of commencing the class actions; the resources and experience of the legal teams; and the presence of any conflicts of interest.

[311] Draft legislation, cl 6(3).

[312] Issues Paper at [5.23] and Supplementary Issues Paper at [27].

[313] Draft legislation, cl 6(4).

[314] The Ontario legislation refers to “the expertise and experience of, and results previously achieved by, each solicitor in class proceedings litigation or in the substantive areas of law at issue”: Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s 13.1(4)(c). This followed a recommendation by the Law Commission of Ontario, which did not think “experience of counsel” should be interpreted exclusively as meaning experience in class action litigation as this might bar new entrants to the plaintiff class action “marketplace”: Law Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 26.

[315] Supplementary Issues Paper at [2.67].

[316] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[317] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[318] Issues Paper at [10.4] and [10.8]–[10.15].

[319] Issues Paper at [10.16]–[10.18].

[320] Issues Paper at [10.20]–[10.28].

[321] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.27]–[1.33].

[322] Fourteen submitters commented on certification in their submissions on both the Issues Paper and the Supplementary Issues Paper.

[323] Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Gilbert Walker (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Andrew Harmos (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Institute of Directors, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), LPF Group, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society, NZX, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. We note Andrew Harmos and LPF Group said they supported a process where the plaintiff filed a document from an independent lawyer certifying that certification requirements were met and the court then granted certification.

[324] Zane Kennedy, Rhonson Salim and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[325] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Joint Action Funding, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Meredith Connell, Vince Morabito (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[326] Barry Allan, Samuel Becher, Colin Carruthers QC, Michael Duffy (Supplementary Issues Paper submission), Michael Legg and Vicki Waye (although she indicated certification was probably not necessary).

[327] In Chapter 5 we recommend the court should consider the applications for certification of concurrent class action proceedings together.

[328] Issues Paper at [10.29]–[10.71].

[329] Issues Paper at [11.2]–[11.23].

[330] Issues Paper at [11.42]–[11.47].

[331] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.34]–[1.102].

[332] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[333] Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) indicated they agreed with our draft certification provision. Submitters who generally agreed with our certification provision but suggested some amendments were: Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson. Shine Lawyers disagreed with certification but said if Aotearoa New Zealand was to adopt a certification process, it generally agreed with our draft provision.

[334] Institute of Directors, IBA Antitrust Committee, Nicole Smith, Insurance Council and Tom Weston QC.

[335] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers.

[336] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.74]–[1.76].

[337] Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.

[338] Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker and Simpson Grierson. In addition, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) indicated general agreement with our certification provision.

[339] Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 16.01(c).

[340] In its submission on the Issues Paper, it suggested a “real prospect of success” test.

[341] Draft legislation, cl 4(1)(a).

[342] As Te Kōti Pira | Court of Appeal said in a case under HCR 4.24, “...the Court cannot grant leave to the bringing of plainly meritless claims, and so allow those propounding the claim to invite others to join the group represented”: Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group [2017] NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [16].

[343] Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267. See also Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45, [2008] 3 NZLR 725 at [33] per Elias CJ and Anderson J.

[344] Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267; Attorney-General v McVeagh [1995] 1 NZLR 558 at 566 and Collier v Panckhurst CA136/97, 6 September 1999 at [19].

[345] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(1)(a).

[346] Law Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 39–40. The LCO was able to review 30 cases where certification was denied between 2011 and 2018. There were 14 cases where the court found there was no cause of action, although in six of those cases the court found some of the plaintiffs had a cause of action on some issues but not on others.

[347] We agree with the point made in submissions that a plaintiff should not be able to satisfy elements of the certification test on the basis of a cause of action that is not reasonably arguable.

[348] Stephenson v Jones [2014] NZHC 1604 at [7].

[349] High Court Rules 2016, r 15.1(1).

[350] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.39]–[1.41].

[351] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[352] Michael Duffy and Simpson Grierson. In addition, Gilbert Walker, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) indicated general agreement with our certification provision.

[353] Nikki Chamberlain, Omni Bridgeway and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission). The Supplementary Issues Paper discusses the submissions we received on predominance in response to the Issues Paper at [1.37]–[1.38].

[354] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 73(2). The IBA Antitrust Committee suggested this definition apply in the commencement provision. However, we have considered this as part of certification as the definition in the commencement provision is simply meant to reflect the certification test.

[355] Draft legislation, cl 4(1)(b).

[356] As we note in Chapter 4, each class member’s claim may include multiple causes of action.

[357] Issues Paper at [10.36]–[10.46].

[358] Rachael Mulheron Class Actions and Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020) at 115. In Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 48, (1999) 199 CLR 255 at [27]–[28], the Court said a substantial common issue was one which was not “ephemeral or nominal”, was “real or of substance”, but did not have to be one of “special significance”.

[359] A similar conclusion was reached by the Ontario Law Reform Commission, which thought the issue of whether the common issues predominated was more relevant to the issue of whether a class action would be a superior procedure, rather than the common issues test: see Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 346.

[360] For example, in British Columbia, class member claims must raise common issues, whether or not they predominate over individual issues. When the court is determining whether a class action would be the preferable procedure for the fair and efficient resolution of the common issues, it must consider whether common questions predominate over individual questions: Class Proceedings Act RSBC 1996 c 50, s 4(1)(c) and 4(2)(a). Note, however, that in Ontario the common issues must predominate over individual questions: Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(1.1)(b). This requirement was added to the certification test in 2020.

[361] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 79(1)(b).

[362] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 73(2).

[363] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 1(1).

[364] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.84]–[1.96].

[365] Bell Gully, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, NZLS, Rhonson Salim and Nicole Smith.

[366] Bell Gully, Michael Duffy, Rhonson Salim and Insurance Council. In addition, Gilbert Walker, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) indicated general agreement with our certification provision.

[367] Bell Gully and Insurance Council.

[368] Bell Gully.

[369] Rhonson Salim.

[370] Rhonson Salim.

[371] Draft legislation, cl 4(1)(c).

[372] See Issues Paper at [11.6]. In Australia, there are provisions that allow the court to discontinue proceedings or replace a representative plaintiff if they cannot adequately represent class members: see Issues Paper at [11.6]–[11.7].

[373] Draft legislation, cl 4(2)(a).

[374] Draft legislation, cl 4(2)(b).

[375] Draft legislation, cl 4(2)(c).

[376] Draft legislation, cl 4(2)(d).

[377] Draft legislation, cl 4(4)(e).

[378] See Issues Paper at [11.10].

[379] See Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 293 (commenting that requiring a representative plaintiff to have a detailed knowledge of the relevant law and facts “would hold the representative to such a high standard that the effect of class actions legislation would be essentially nullified”).

[380] We note in the United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal, a representative plaintiff may only withdraw from their role with the leave of the court: The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 87.

[381] We discuss individual settlements in Chapter 11.

[382] In Australia, the court may substitute another class member as representative plaintiff if it appears to the court that the representative plaintiff is not able to adequately represent the interests of class members: see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33T. The other Australian regimes have similar provisions.

[383] We discuss decertification later in this chapter.

[384] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.44].

[385] Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[386] In addition, Gilbert Walker, Zane Kennedy and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) indicated general agreement with our certification provision.

[387] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(1)(d).

[388] We discuss alternative distribution in Chapter 10.

[389] Draft legislation, cl 4(1)(d).

[390] We do, however, make recommendations to enable individual issues to be determined in an efficient manner in a class action. In Chapter 8, we recommend the court should have a power to give directions with respect to determination of individual issues. In Chapter 10, we recommend the court should have a power to make an aggregate assessment of monetary relief.

[391] Draft legislation, cl 4(3).

[392] Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – a Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, 2004) at 324. The example is given of a claim brought against an educational institution for alleged misrepresentations that students relied on to their detriment. Defining the class as all persons who attended the institution between certain dates was considered over-inclusive because not all of those students had experienced detriment.

[393] Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – a Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 327.

[394] Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – a Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 330.

[395] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(1)(b). The other Canadian regimes have similar provisions.

[396] Garry D Watson Holmested and Watson: Ontario Civil Procedure (online ed, Carswell) at §27:12. However, it notes several cases where courts have taken a more relaxed view of the prohibition against merits-based class definitions.

[397] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 79(1)(a).

[398] Competition Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings (2015) at 6.37.

[399] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §3:2.

[400] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §3:3.

[401] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §3:3.

[402] See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33H(1)(a). The other Australian regimes have similar provisions. In Petrusevski v Bulldogs Rugby League Club Ltd [2003] FCA 61 at [19], the court said that a useful test was: “...whether the description is such as to enable a person, with the assistance of a legal adviser if necessary, to ascertain whether he or she is a group member. If the description incorporates a reference to conduct alleged in the pleadings, a person or his or her adviser ought to be able, by reading the description and the relevant portion of the pleadings, to determine whether he or she is a member of the represented group”.

[403] A representative action will not be allowed if it might confer a right of action on a group member who would not otherwise be able to assert that in individual proceedings: Cridge v Studorp [2017] NZCA 376 at [11(i)].

[404] Draft legislation, cl 1(5).

[405] Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 209.

[406] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.52]–[1.59].

[407] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.68].

[408] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431, (2019) 25 PRNZ 33 at [82].

[409] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Vince Morabito, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[410] Michael Duffy, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[411] The latter referred us to: Vince Morabito “Opt in or Opt Out A Class Dilemma for New Zealand” (2011) 24 NZULR 421.

[412] We discuss this issue in Chapter 7.

[413] As noted above, Bell Gully submitted that opt-in should be the default mechanism.

[414] Issues Paper at [12.15]–[12.50].

[415] Draft legislation, cl 4(1)(e).

[416] For example, a litigation funder may only be prepared to fund the proceeding on an opt-out basis since this is likely to result in a larger class size.

[417] We note the Ontario class actions legislation provides that the court may adjourn an application for certification to permit the parties to amend their materials or pleadings or to permit further evidence: Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s 5(4).

[418] Draft legislation, cl 4(4).

[419] Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [98]. The size and nature of the class may be considered by the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal when determining whether a class action should be opt-in or opt-out: The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 79(3).

[420] Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [98].

[421] It may also be that Aotearoa New Zealand is not the appropriate forum for the class action where the majority of class members are outside the jurisdiction. This is an issue the court could consider as part of its assessment of whether a class action proceeding is an appropriate procedure for the efficient resolution of the claims of class members.

[422] Te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court has said that an opt-in approach should be favoured in representative actions where there is a real prospect that some class members may end up worse off or adversely affected by proceedings, including where there is potential for a counterclaim: Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [93].

[423] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.124]–[1.125].

[424] Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 487–491.

[425] See Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 8(1)(f) and 9. Subsequent to the Ontario Law Reform Commission’s report, there was consultation with interest groups on class actions reform and agreement was reached to undertake class actions reform according to certain parameters. The terms of reference for the Attorney-General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform included having an opt-out entitlement: see Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (Ministry of the Attorney General, February 1990) at 22 and 33–34.

[426] United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(b)(2). See also Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.64]–[1.67].

[427] Rachael Mulheron “Opting in, Opting Out, and Closing the Class: Some Dilemmas for England’s Class Action Lawmakers” (2011) 50 Can Bus LJ 376 at 388.

[428] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.99]–[1.101].

[429] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.102].

[430] Andrew Harmos, LPF Group and NZLS.

[431] However, if settlement occurs prior to certification, the funded representative plaintiff should apply for court approval of the funding agreement at the same time as the application for settlement approval. If the funding agreement is entered into after certification, funding approval should be sought as soon as practicable after the agreement is entered into. If the terms of an approved funding agreement are amended during the proceedings, funding approval should be sought as soon as practicable after that amendment.

[432] Draft legislation, cl 4(1).

[433] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 6. The other common law Canadian regimes have similar provisions.

[434] See Bywater v Toronto Transit Commission (1998) 27 CPC (4th) 172 at [23].

[435] See Issues Paper at [2.27] and [2.36]–[2.37].

[436] Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 347 and 531.

[437] See Issues Paper at [3.33]–[3.36].

[438] See Issues Paper at [3.38]–[3.42].

[439] Issues Paper at [10.72].

[440] See Z v Dental Complaints Assessment Committee [2008] NZSC 55, [2009] 1 NZLR 1 at [97].

[441] Hollick v Toronto (City) 2001 SCC 68 at [25]; Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp 2013 SCC 57 at [99]–[105].

[442] Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp 2013 SCC 57 at [102].

[443] Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd v Microsoft Corp 2013 SCC 57 at [103].

[444] Law Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 45–48.

[445] Law Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 46.

[446] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §7:21.

[447] See Attorney-General v Prince & Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267, Attorney-General v McVeagh [1995] 1 NZLR 558 at 566, Collier v Panckhurst CA136/97, 6 September 1999 at [19].

[448] Draft legislation, cl 3.

[449] Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Pearce/Carter Quinn (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[450] Draft legislation, cl 3.

[451] High Court Rules 2016, r 7.20. We note the court retains a discretion to extend the time for filing a supporting affidavit: see New Zealand Trade Centre v Jianhua Trading Group Ltd [2015] NZHC 3014 at [5].

[452] We discuss concurrent class actions in Chapter 5.

[453] High Court Rules 2016, rr 7.24–7.25.

[454] An extension of this timeframe could be granted under the High Court Rules 2016, r 1.19.

[455] Te Kōti Matua | High Court has jurisdiction to make orders or directions as to how a hearing should be conducted under the High Court Rules 2016, r 7.43A(1)(d)-(e) and inherent jurisdiction to grant leave to a non-party to intervene in a proceeding: Te Pou Matakana Ltd v Attorney-General [2021] NZHC 2833 at [11]; Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 828 at [41].

[456] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 5(4).

[457] Ministry of the Attorney General Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (February 1990) at 31.

[458] See High Court Rules 2016, r 7.42.

[459] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.109].

[460] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[461] Chapman Tripp, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers.

[462] These functions of a certification order were identified in Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 432.

[463] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 10(1).

[464] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 10(2).

[465] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 85(1)-(2).

[466] United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(c)(1)(C).

[467] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §7:34 and §7:38.

[468] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 33L-33P.

[469] Earlier in this chapter, we recommend there should be a power to substitute the representative plaintiff.

[470] We have drawn on the approaches outlined in Rachael Mulheron “Asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident class members: comparative insights for the United Kingdom” (2019) J Priv Int L 445 at 452.

[471] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 82(1)(b)(ii).

[472] Class Proceedings Act RSNB 2011 c 125 (New Brunswick), s 18(3); Class Actions Act SNL 2001 c C-18.1 (Newfoundland and Labrador), s 17(2). The class must be divided into resident and non-resident sub-classes: Class Proceedings Act RSNB 2011 c 125, s 8(2); Class Actions Act SNL 2001 c C-18.1, s 7(2). Note this approach was originally followed in Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan, but the provisions were subsequently amended.

[473] For example, see Airia Brands Inc v Air Canada 2017 ONCA 792, leave refused in Air Canada v Airia Brands Inc [2017] SCC 476.

[474] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §4:71. This analysis typically takes place in the “superiority” limb of the certification test.

[475] Tania Monestier “Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata” (2011) 86 Tul L Rev 1 at 21.

[476] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §4:71.

[477] Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022 at [7.180]. However, the authors note that it may still be desirable to limit the class description to those within the jurisdiction to ensure the judgment can be enforced and because of the cost and difficulty of giving notice to overseas class members.

[478] Impiombato v BHP Group (No 2) [2020] FCA 1720 at [105].

[479] Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33KA(2)(a). Commentary notes that “from a jurisdictional perspective it is hard to see that s 33KA serves a meaningful purpose in respect of foreign group members. It is the defendant’s amenability to the jurisdiction that is critical”: Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022 at 129.

[480] Rachael Mulheron “Asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident class members: comparative insights for the United Kingdom” (2019) J Priv Int L 445 at 453. This approach is followed in several Canadian jurisdictions: Class Proceedings Act RSBC 1996 c 50 (British Columbia), s 4.1 (2)(a); The Class Proceedings Act SM 2002 c C-130 (Manitoba), s 6(3); The Class Actions Act SS 2001 c C-12.01 (Saskatchewan), s 6.1(2)(a).

[481] Rachael Mulheron “Asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident class members: comparative insights for the United Kingdom” (2019) J Priv Int L 445 at 454. The example of the Pennsylvania Code is given.

[482] See Debra Lyn Bassett “Implied "Consent" to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class Litigation” [2004] Mich State Int Law Rev 619 at 628.

[483] Maria Hook and Jack Wass The Conflict of Laws in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2020) at [2.225].

[484] See Tania Monestier “Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for Res Judicata” (2011) 86 Tul L Rev 1 at 67 (suggesting that most foreign jurisdictions would regard a foreign claimant’s consent to join a class action in the United States as precluding any subsequent action) and Rachael Mulheron “Asserting personal jurisdiction over non-resident class members: comparative insights for the United Kingdom” (2019) J Priv Int L 445 at 455–456 (noting that a key reason why foreign class members are required to opt into class actions in the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal is to avoid the risk that the judgment would not be recognised in other jurisdictions and would not have preclusive effect).

[485] It may also be that Aotearoa New Zealand is not the appropriate forum for the class action where the majority of class members are outside the jurisdiction.

[486] Each of the Australian regimes provides that the following must give consent to being a class member: the Commonwealth, a State or Territory, a Minister of a Commonwealth, State or Territory, a body corporate established for a public purpose by a law of the Commonwealth, State or Territory (other than an incorporated company or association); and an officer of the Commonwealth, State or Territory in their capacity as an officer. For example, see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33E(2). In Victoria, written consent is also required before a judge, magistrate or other judicial officer can become a class member: Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33E(2)(d).

[487] Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [128].

[488] Cabinet Office Circular “Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business” (30 March 2016) CO 16/2 at [13].

[489] Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office Crown “Attorney-General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation” (31 July 2013) at [5].

[490] The “Attorney-General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation” (31 July 2013) apply to civil litigation “conducted on behalf of Crown departments, officers, and Ministers” (see [3]), which could extend to a class action. Note that the Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business 2016 refer to legal representation in litigation where the Crown is a party: Cabinet Office Circular “Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business” (30 March 2016) CO 16/2 at [9.2.1]. The Crown would not be a party in a class action unless it was the representative plaintiff or defendant.

[491] See “Attorney-General’s Values for Crown Civil Litigation” (31 July 2013) at [4]: “There is only one Crown in New Zealand. Accordingly, the Crown needs to be able to have a single and consistent view, and speak with one voice, on questions of law”.

[492] Although we note our recommendation for all class actions to be listed on the class actions webpage of ngā Kōti o Aotearoa | Courts of New Zealand website will assist with identifying class actions.

[493] Cabinet Office Circular “Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business” (30 March 2016) CO 16/2 at [7.1].

[494] The Directions do not apply to the following public entities: the Parliamentary Counsel Office, the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the Parliamentary Service, Crown entities, State-owned enterprises, offices of Parliament, bodies listed in Schedules 4, 4A and 5 of the Public Finance Act 1989, local authorities, and other bodies corporate that exist to perform public functions or that are owned by the Crown or a public entity: Cabinet Office Circular “Cabinet Directions for the Conduct of Crown Legal Business” (30 March 2016) CO 16/2 at [8].

[495] High Court Rules 2016, r 4.31.

[496] High Court Rules 2016, r 4.30.

[497] High Court Rules 2016, r 4.29.

[498] The provisions fall under Part 4 of the High Court Rules 2016, which is headed “Parties”.

[499] High Court Rules 2016, r 4.29.

[500] High Court Rules 2016, rr 4.30 and 4.31.

[501] See: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33F; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 160; Civil Proceedings Act 2011 (Qld), s 103E; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic), s 33F; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas), s 69. Some of these jurisdictions use the term “next friend” or “committee” instead of litigation guardian.

[502] Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [130]. Note that it referred to a litigation guardian as a “tutor”.

[503] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 17(8) and 27.1(9). The Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee provides services to protect the financial, legal and personal care of “mentally incapable Ontarians”: Ministry of the Attorney General “Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee” Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca>.

[504] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 27.1(11)(a). The Office of the Children’s Lawyer is an independent law office in the Ministry of the Attorney General that represents the interests of a child under age 18 in court cases and matters in Ontario: Ministry of the Attorney General “Office of the Children’s Lawyer” Government of Ontario <www.ontario.ca>.

[505] Law Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 57.

[506] Class Proceedings Act SA 2003 c C-16.5 (Alberta), s 27(3).

[507] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 77(2)(b).

[508] We note that when a court is considering whether to appoint a litigation guardian for a person under the High Court Rules, the inquiry into capacity focuses on the party’s role in the specific litigation at issue: Corbett v Patterson [2014] NZCA 274, [2014] 3 NZLR 318 at [43(b)].

[509] Our recommendation reflects the approach to decision-making competence used in the End of Life Choice Act 2019, s 6 (which sets out when a person is competent to make an informed decision about assisted dying) and to decision-making capacity in the Substance Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 2017, s 9 (capacity to make informed decisions about treatment for a severe substance addition). These statutes reflect a ‘functional’ approach to decision-making capacity to a greater extent than the current language in the High Court Rules 2016, consistent with recent approaches to decision-making capacity in comparable jurisdictions. Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of the law relating to adult decision-making capacity: He Arotake I te Ture mō ngā Huarahi Whakatau a ngā Pakeke | Review of Adult Decision-making Capacity Law.

[510] We discuss the role of the representative plaintiff in Chapter 3.

[511] Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.22].

[512] Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.27]–[3.47].

[513] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Carter Pearce, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC, Nicole Smith, Woodsford Litigation Funding and Tom Weston QC. Not all submitters indicated which option they preferred. While Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce made a joint submission, there were some issues on which these submitters expressed separate views.

[514] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Carter Pearce, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[515] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Carter Pearce, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[516] Chapman Tripp, Nikki Chamberlain, Carter Pearce, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[517] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[518] Chapman Tripp. Philip Skelton QC made this same point but did not think the lawyer should be regarded as the lawyer for the class.

[519] Chapman Tripp.

[520] Rhonson Salim.

[521] Chapman Tripp.

[522] Chapman Tripp.

[523] Chapman Tripp.

[524] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office (for opt-out class actions), Insurance Council and Simpson Grierson. Philip Skelton QC preferred the status quo but thought the statute should recognise that the plaintiff’s lawyer has to act in the best interests of the class. He also thought the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 should be amended to require retainer agreements with individual class members to record that the lawyer owes duties to the class as a whole and to have provisions for managing any conflict that may arise.

[525] We discuss this proposal in Chapter 3.

[526] See Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.28]–[3.29]. See also Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022) at [6.210], noting that a number of cases have supported the proposition that the lawyer owes a fiduciary duty to class members but “the precise content of any fiduciary duty owed to those unrepresented class members has not been fully explored in Australia”.

[527] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2451 at [49], [121] and [149].

[528] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2451 at [155].

[529] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2451 at [159].

[530] However, later in this chapter we make a specific recommendation about communications between the defendant’s lawyer and class members. This is an issue we specifically sought feedback on in the Supplementary Issues Paper.

[531] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 2.3 and 2.8.

[532] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 3.4, 4.2, 4.3 and 9.4.

[533] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 3.

[534] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 8.

[535] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4. We discuss the application of this rule below.

[536] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 7.

[537] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 13–13.1 and 13.3.

[538] An example would be where the representative plaintiff instructs the lawyer to settle the class action on terms that favour the defendant and representative plaintiff but would be detrimental to the class.

[539] Lawyers already have an obligation not to engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive anyone on any aspect of the lawyer’s practice: see Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.9.

[540] We note there are some scenarios where a lawyer may communicate directly with a person represented by another lawyer: see Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.5 and 10.4.6.

[541] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.

[542] Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.63].

[543] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[544] Bell Gully, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[545] Subject to any exceptions that apply in Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.

[546] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.

[547] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 7.

[548] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.5].

[549] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, IBA Antitrust Committee, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[550] It also said that two settlement notices were unnecessary and only a notice of proposed settlement should be required. We discuss the settlement notice requirements in Chapter 11.

[551] Chapman Tripp.

[552] IBA Antitrust Committee.

[553] Gilbert Walker.

[554] In Chapter 12, we recommend a court should be able to order adverse costs against a class member with respect to issues determined on an individual basis.

[555] A common method of managing common and individual issues in class actions is to have staged hearings. Typically, the ‘stage one’ hearing will determine common issues (and sometimes the entirety of the representative plaintiff’s claim) and the ‘stage two’ hearing will determine individual issues. We discuss staged hearings below.

[556] We discuss this issue in Chapter 10.

[557] We discuss this issue in Chapter 17.

[558] We note that in Australia, a notice is required where the defendant applies to dismiss the proceedings for want of prosecution: see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33X(1)(b).

[559] We discuss this issue in Chapter 11.

[560] We discuss settlement prior to certification in Chapter 11.

[561] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.20].

[562] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[563] Bell Gully, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers.

[564] Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[565] Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[566] See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Y(2); Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 20(3); The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 81(1); United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(c)(2)(B) and 23(d)(1)(B).

[567] United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(c)(2)(B). Commentary to this requirement describes it as “a reminder of the need to work unremittingly at the difficult task of communicating with class members”, noting the difficulty of providing information about class actions that is both accurate and easily understood by class members who are not lawyers: United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—2003 Amendment).

[568] We have drawn on: Todd B Hilsee, Shannon R Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J Legal Ethics 1359 at 1377–1380; Margaret Hagan “A Human-Centred Design Approach to Access to Justice: Generating New Prototypes and Hypotheses for Interventions to Make Courts User-Friendly” (2018) 6 Ind J L & Soc Equal 199 at 234; and Federal Judicial Center Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide (2010).

[569] The Victorian Law Reform Commission recommended the Supreme Court should consider drafting Plain English standard form opt-out and settlement notices in consultation with the Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice – Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings: Report (March 2018), Recommendation 21.

[570] See Digital.govt.nz “Designing documents for print” (3 November 2020) <www.digital.govt.nz>.

[571] We discuss cost sharing orders in Chapter 9.

[572] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.10].

[573] For example, in an opt-in case, it should be easy to provide subsequent notices to class members once they have opted in and provided contact details.

[574] In most cases it would be the representative plaintiff who would give the report, but as we discuss below, in appropriate circumstances the court might order the defendant to give notice.

[575] The initial opt-in or opt-out notice will be sent to ‘potential class members’ and subsequent notices will be sent to class members. For simplicity, we refer to class members throughout this section.

[576] See Alexander W Aiken “Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967 at 979.

[577] Figures show 584,000 people read the print version of the New Zealand Herald in an average seven-day period (year to June 2021). In comparison, over the same period, 1,598,000 people read the digital version of the New Zealand Herald. See Roy Morgan “Almost 3 million New Zealanders read newspapers and nearly 1.8 million read magazines in 2021” (13 September 2021) <www.roymorgan.com>. See also Roy Morgan “Readership in New Zealand, 12 Months to December 2021” <roymorgan.com> for similar figures.

[578] For example, commercial radio network rankings show that a radio station’s audience share differs by age bracket: Radio Broadcasters Association and Growth from Knowledge “Commercial Radio reaches almost 3.5m New Zealanders” (press release, 29 April 2021).

[579] Alexander W Aiken “Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967 at 990–994.

[580] Alexander W Aiken “Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967 at 1011–1013.

[581] Alexander W Aiken “Class Action Notice in the Digital Age” (2017) 165 U Pa L Rev 967 at 994–995.

[582] Todd B Hilsee, Shannon R Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J Legal Ethics 1359 at 1364.

[583] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.12].

[584] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.13]–[4.15].

[585] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, GCA Lawyers, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[586] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce and Nicole Smith.

[587] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[588] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp and Gilbert Walker.

[589] See Privacy Act 2020, s 24. Relevantly, this provides that nothing in information privacy principle 11 (which relates to disclosure) affects a provision contained in any New Zealand enactment that authorises or requires personal information to be made available. An enactment means the whole or part of an Act or any secondary legislation: Legislation Act 2019, s 13.

[590] High Court Rules 2016, r 8.30(4).

[591] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Y(3)(d).

[592] Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 284 at [19].

[593] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 22.

[594] See Fantl v ivari 2018 ONSC 4443 at [14].

[595] William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §8.31–§8.33.

[596] There are examples of defendants being required to contribute to notice costs in other jurisdictions. For example, in Canada defendants have been ordered to contribute to notice costs where there has been financial hardship on the part of the plaintiff, where the litigation has a public interest dimension, and where the defendant is better placed to pay for the notice: Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 360. In the United States, circumstances include where the costs would be substantially reduced if the defendant undertook the notice rather than the plaintiff, when there is an existing fiduciary relationship between the parties, when the defendant is the party requesting certification, and when there has been some preliminary finding of the defendant’s liability: William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §8:33.

[597] We discuss limitation in Chapter 4.

[598] Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff “Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking Deck of Justice” The New York Times (online ed, New York, 31 October 2015).

[599] Arbitration Act 1996, s 10(1). Arguments for not enforcing class action waiver clauses are presented in Nikki Chamberlain “Contracting-Out of Class Action Litigation: Lessons from the United States” [2018] NZ L Rev 371 at 386–390.

[600] Arbitration Act 1996, s 11.

[601] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Arbitration (NZLC R20, 1991) at [235].

[602] Employment Relations Act 2000, s 155. Under this provision, the Arbitration Act 1996 (including its enforcement mechanisms) does not apply to arbitrations of employment relationship problems. A party is also entitled to make an application to the Employment Relations Authority or Employment Court, notwithstanding any arbitration.

[603] Insurance Law Reform Act 1977, s 8, provides that an arbitration agreement entered into by an insured otherwise than in trade is not enforceable against the insured.

[604] Supplementary Issues Papter at [4.22].

[605] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.23]–[4.27].

[606] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.28]–[4.33].

[607] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[608] IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[609] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[610] IBA Antritrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers.

[611] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[612] Insurance Council and Shine Lawyers.

[613] Chapman Tripp.

[614] IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers.

[615] Although Chapman Tripp acknowledged this may not be realistic given the court’s resourcing constraints.

[616] We also note there is a rule for “cases not provided for”: High Court Rules 2016, r 1.6. This provides that if a case arises where no procedure has been prescribed, the court must dispose of the case “as nearly as may be practicable in accordance with the provisions of these rules affecting any similar case”. If there are no such rules, the court must dispose of the case in a matter the court thinks is best calculated to achieve the objective of the High Court Rules.

[617] High Court Rules 2016, Sch 10.

[618] High Court Rules 2016, rr 7.3, 7.3(A) and Sch 5.

[619] High Court Rules 2016, r 15.2.

[620] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.51].

[621] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.52]–[4.56].

[622] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.57]–[4.61].

[623] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Tom Weston QC.

[624] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[625] Those factors are: the stage of the class action and the issues to be determined at that stage; whether there are sub-classes; whether the discovery is necessary given the claims or defences of the party seeking it; the monetary value of individual claims; whether discovery would be oppressive or result in undue annoyance, burden or expense for class members; any other matter the court considers relevant. See Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 15(3). There are similar provisions in most other Canadian class actions regimes.

[626] IBA Antitrust Committee, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers.

[627] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson. Note that in opt-out cases, some submitters anticipated the representative plaintiff would provide a list of those who had opted out, while others thought only the number of persons opting out would be provided. Crown Law Office said the current rules were probably adequate for opt-in class actions, although having a register of class members would enable the defendant to understand the identity and circumstances of class members.

[628] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[629] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[630] Simpson Grierson.

[631] Chapman Tripp. It said not having sufficient information about class member claims could lead to a claim or class size appearing larger than it is. Information about class member claims could also allow a more informed consideration of the framing of common issues and sub-classes.

[632] Chapman Tripp.

[633] Crown Law Office.

[634] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[635] High Court Rules 2016, r 8.22(3), and Andrew Beck and others (eds) McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at HR8.22.02.

[636] In developing these factors, we have drawn on Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 15(3).

[637] High Court Rules 2016, r 8.22.

[638] Alternatively, in such a case, it would be possible to determine who has remained in the class action and provide that information to the defendant.

[639] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.105]–[1.107].

[640] Supplementary Issues Paper at [1.108].

[641] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[642] Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[643] The example came from Anchem Products v Windsor [1997] USSC 67; 521 US 591 (1997) and was cited by Johnson & Johnson.

[644] Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[645] Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.

[646] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[647] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Omni Bridgeway.

[648] Shine Lawyers. A similar point was made by Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, which said a class actions regime should not require a sub-class representative plaintiff to be identified at an early stage of the proceeding.

[649] Insurance Council.

[650] See Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 285.

[651] In the United States, methods used to address intra-class conflicts other than sub-classing include: having separate liability and damages trials; appointing a judge or “special master” to hear individual damages proceedings; decertifying the class after the liability trial and giving class members notice as to how they can prove damages; and, altering or amending the class. See William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §7:31.

[652] For example, see Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 1355 at [15]–[21].

[653] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.35]–[4.40].

[654] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.41].

[655] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[656] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[657] IBA Antitrust Committee, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[658] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.42].

[659] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.50].

[660] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[661] We note the Ontario legislation refers to the court being able to determine individual issues in further hearings: Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 25(1)(a). The Australian federal class actions legislation refers to the court’s ability to make an award of damages for individual class members: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z(1)(e).

[662] We also note that class members may have adverse costs liability for issues determined on an individual basis, as we discuss in Chapter 12.

[663] This approach has been allowed by some courts in the United States: see William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §12:5.

[664] Courts in the United States have been reluctant to allow this approach: see William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §11.21 and §12.5. See also Houghton v Saunders [2019] NZHC 142 at [22], where the Court expressed reluctance about the proposed approach of bringing evidence from a sample of group members, along with additional evidence to show the Court’s findings on that evidence could be properly applied to others.

[665] High Court Rules 2016, r 7.79(5). We note that consent is not required to convene a judicial settlement conference under r 7.79(1), although it is usual practice for the judge to take the parties’ views into account: Andrew Beck and others (ed) McGechan on Procedure (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at HR7.79.01.

[666] Another mechanism is ‘closed classes’, where the class is defined so that it only includes claimants who have entered into an agreement with the litigation funder. We do not discuss this mechanism further, as it is similar in effect to an opt-in class action and we have proposed that opt-in class actions should be available in Aotearoa New Zealand.

[667] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [9.6]. See also BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627 at [1], [135] and [178]. For further discussion on common fund orders, see Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.68]–[4.83].

[668] Money Max Int Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance Group Ltd [2016] FCAFC 148, (2016) 245 FCR 191.

[669] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [9.13].

[670] BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627.

[671] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V(2). See for example: Evans v Davantage Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 70 at [49]; Uren v RMBL Investments Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 647 at [50]–[53]; McKay Super Solutions Pty Ltd v Bellamy’s Australia Ltd [2020] FCA 461 at [31]; Hall v Arnold Bloch Leibler (a firm) (No 2) [2022] FCA 163 at [22]–[38]. There have also been some divergent decisions on this point: see Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Ltd (No 5) [2020] FCA 637 at [418]–[421].

[672] See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [9.119]–[9.123] (Recommendation 7); Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [4.35] (Recommendation 3).

[673] The judgment also noted that the plaintiffs might seek a common fund order (or in the alternative, a funding equalisation order) at the end of the proceeding: Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2454 at [3], [10], [23]–[24] and [27]–[29].

[674] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431 at [110].

[675] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd at [2021] NZHC 2454 at [4], [63] and [92]. The representative plaintiffs proposed that the funds set aside would be put into an interest-bearing escrow account, with no payment being made from the account unless and until approved by the Court following determination of the plaintiffs’ application for a common fund order.

[676] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497.

[677] See “What is a ‘common fund order’?” Banking Class Action <www.bankingclassaction.com>.

[678] We discussed these options in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.86]–[4.95].

[679] Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Russell Legal, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding. Michael Duffy said common fund orders can be of assistance, but these must be subject to stringent notice requirements to class members.

[680] Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission). Michael Duffy said funding equalisation orders are a useful tool in equalising funding burdens.

[681] Bell Gully, Johnson & Johnson and Tom Weston QC.

[682] LPF Group, Russell Legal, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Woodsford Ligation Funding.

[683] Russell Legal and Shine Lawyers.

[684] Zane Kennedy, Russell Legal, Simpson Grierson, Michael Duffy, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[685] Bell Gully referred to comments to this effect by the majority of the High Court of Australia in BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627 at [94] per Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ. See also at [126] per Nettle J and at [153]–[154] and [164] per Gordon J.

[686] Bell Gully.

[687] While Gilbert Walker reserved comment on whether funding equalisations orders and/or common fund orders should be available, it said it “would require greater persuasion that the latter is required than the former” for this reason.

[688] Tom Weston QC.

[689] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia. Bell Gully thought funding equalisation orders could achieve this more effectively than common fund orders.

[690] Chapman Tripp.

[691] GCA Lawyers, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[692] For example: the distribution and weighting of losses as between the funded and unfunded class members; whether the funding agreement allows the funder to recover its commission from the “grossed up” amount (that is, whether the funding commission is calculated as a percentage of funded class members’ recovery including or excluding the amount redistributed to them from unfunded class members); whether only the representative plaintiff is funded (in which case a funding equalisation order would not be appropriate).

[693] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Nicole Smith, Russell Legal, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Woodsford Litigation Funding. While Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce made a joint submission, there were some issues on which the submitters exprssed separate views.

[694] Chapman Tripp, LPF Group, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Zane Kennedy, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Russell Legal, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[695] Chapman Tripp, LPF Group and MinterEllisonRuddWatts.

[696] Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Philip Skelton QC.

[697] Bell Gully and Nicole Smith.

[698] Shine Lawyers and Carter Pearce (while Philip Skelton QC, Kelly Quinn and Carter Pearce made a joint submission, there were some issues on which these submitters expressed separate views). Chapman Tripp also said “the court should have flexibility in any power to make common fund orders”, but suggested a presumption in favour of making the order at an early stage in the proceeding.

[699] See Webster v Murray Goulburn Co-Operative Co Ltd (No 4) [2020] FCA 1053 at [119].

[700] See Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527 at [162]. Whether a common fund type order or a funding equalisation type order would deduct less from class members will involve an assessment of the ratio of unfunded class members compared to funded class members, and the relative weight of the claims as between class members. This second factor may be important where a small number of class members’ claims are significantly larger than the average class member.

[701] Under a funding equalisation order in Australia, when a percentage amount is deducted from the unfunded class members and added back pro rata across all class members, that incrementally increases the recovery for each funded class member. Litigation funders may then assert that they are contractually entitled to an additional amount (that is, a percentage on the incremental amount). The Full Federal Court of Australia discussed this issue in Money Max Int Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance Group Ltd [2016] FCAFC 148, (2016) 245 FCR 191 at [56]–[57]. See also Blairgowrie Trading Ltd v Allco Finance Group Ltd (Recs & Mgrs Apptd) (In Liq) (No 3) [2017] FCA 330, (2017) 343 ALR 476 at [99(d)].

[702] For example, the funding agreement may impose costs on funded class members in addition to legal fees and the funding commission, which will then be spread across all class members pursuant to a funding equalisation order. See Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527 at [167], where the court noted a common fund order, unlike a funding equalisation order, would avoid class members incurring the $756,402 project management fee.

[703] In Chapter 17, we recommend that the Class Actions Act should require the representative plaintiff to apply to the court for approval of the funding agreement, in order for the funding agreement to be enforceable by the funder. We also make recommendations as to when the representative plaintiff should apply for court approval of the funding agreement, and factors the court may consider when determining the application.

[704] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.1].

[705] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.5]. Res judicata means “a matter judged”.

[706] Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464 (CA) at 482 per Richardson J.

[707] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.6], citing Craig v Stringer [2020] NZCA 260 at [31]. See also Andrew Beck and others McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [HR15.1.05(2)(a)] citing Collier v Butterworths of New Zealand Ltd (1997) 11 PRNZ 581 (HC) at 586.

[708] Henderson v Henderson [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100, 67 ER 313 (Ch) at 115. Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.7].

[709] Draft legislation, cl 5(1) (September 2021 version).

[710] Draft legislation, cl 5(2) (September 2021 version).

[711] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith. Andrew Barker QC also discussed the application of res judicata to class members in his Issues Paper submission and suggested the Commission give thought to this issue.

[712] Seven submitters made this point expressly: Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.

[713] Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim and Simpson Grierson.

[714] Draft legislation, cl 9(1).

[715] In this respect, our approach aligns with Canada and Australia, see the Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.12]–[5.15] and [5.18].

[716] In Aotearoa New Zealand, the principle in Henderson v Henderson is conceptualised as an abuse of process, see Craig v Stringer [2020] NZCA 260 at [19], citing Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd [2013] UKSC 46 at [25]. See also Lai v Chamberlains [2006] NZSC 70, [2007] 2 NZLR 7 at [59]. It appears Henderson v Henderson (or its equivalent) is conceptualised as an estoppel in Canada and Australia, see Allan v CIBC Trust Corporation (1998) 39 OR (3d) 675 (ONCJ) at 7–8 and Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) v Collins [2016] HCA 44 at [27]. However, both jurisdictions also have abuse of process. In the two cases where it was argued Henderson v Henderson applied to class members, the defendants also ran abuse of process in the alternative (albeit unsuccessfully): Allan v CIBC Trust Corporation (1998) 39 OR (3d) 675 (ONCJ) and Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) v Collins [2016] HCA 44.

[717] Draft legislation, cl 9(2).

[718] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z(1) provides the court may determine an issue of law; determine an issue of fact; make a declaration of liability; grant any equitable relief; make an award of damages for group members, sub-group members or individual group members; award damages in an aggregate amount; make such other orders as the court thinks just. The Rules Committee proposed a similar clause in its Class Actions Bill: Class Actions Bill (Te Tari Tohutohu Pāremata | Parliamentary Counsel Office, PCO 8247/2.13, 2009), s 12(2).

[719] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.21].

[720] This approach has been allowed by some courts in the United States: see William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §12:5.

[721] Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 416–417.

[722] Allapattah Services Inc v Exxon Mobil Corp 157 F Supp 2d 1291 (7 August 2001).

[723] ACCC v Golden Sphere Intl Inc [1998] FCA 598; (1998) 83 FCR 424.

[724] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.24]–[5.49].

[725] Draft legislation, s 11(1)(b) (September 2021 version).

[726] Andrew Barker QC (Issues Paper submission), Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[727] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[728] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson

[729] Bell Gully and Chapman Tripp.

[730] Vince Morabito.

[731] Michael Duffy and Insurance Council.

[732] Simpson Grierson.

[733] Draft legislation, cl 10(1) and 10(3).

[734] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.48]–[5.49].

[735] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.47]–[5.48], Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 521. See also Rachael Mulheron “Restitutionary Relief in Competition Law Class Actions: An Evolving Landscape” (2018) 26 RLR 1 at 2, 7–13, where she discusses the difference between restitutionary damages and unjust enrichment giving rise to an account of profits and whether both are permissible under The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules.

[736] Draft legislation, cl 10(1).

[737] This also aligns with the principle the courts have developed under High Court Rules 2016, r 4.24 that a representative action should not be allowed where it would deprive the defendant of a defence or allow a class member to succeed where they would not have succeeded if they brought an individual claim: Cridge v Studorp Ltd [2017] NZCA 376, (2017) 23 PRNZ 582 at [11](i).

[738] Rachael Mulheron The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) at 418–419. See also Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions (1982) vol II at 555.

[739] The test proposed in the Supplementary Issues Paper incorporated the tests from both Canada and Australia. In Australia the court can award aggregate damages if “a reasonably accurate assessment can be made of the total amount to which group members will be entitled under the judgment”: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33Z(3). In Canada, no further issues must be determined to establish the amount of the defendant’s liability: see for example Class Proceedings Act 1992 SO c 6 (Ontario), s 24(1)(b).

[740] Draft legislation, cl 10(2).

[741] Draft legislation, cl 10(3).

[742] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.34].

[743] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.36].

[744] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.39].

[745] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Gilbert Walker, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[746] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[747] Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker and Simpson Grierson.

[748] Draft legislation, cl 10(4).

[749] Draft legislation, cl 10(5).

[750] Issues Paper at [5.24]–[5.25].

[751] In Chapter 5 we recommend a class actions webpage be created by Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice.

[752] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[753] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[754] Bell Gully, GCA Lawyers (although it only referred to unclaimed settlement money) and Nicole Smith.

[755] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito (he refers to his article that advocates for an express power to order cy-près distribution where it is “not practical or possible to compensate class members directly, using best but reasonable efforts”), Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith (by implication).

[756] For example, where individual losses are very low and the administrative costs of paying those amounts to individual class members would absorb a significant portion of the monetary relief award, or where class members are unlikely to participate in the process required to receive their portion of the monetary relief awarded

[757] It referred to the Palm Island class action settlement scheme (Wotton v State of Queensland (No 10) [2018] FCA 915) where if following two rounds of payments there was money left over from the settlement pool but the leftover money was less than $100 per registered group member, this leftover money would instead be paid to the Cathy Freeman Foundation which provides support to Indigenous students on Palm Island.

[758] Vince Morabito referred us to the article Georgina Dimopoulos and Vince Morabito “Cy-près Remedies in Class Actions – Quo Vadis?” (2021) 95 ALJ 710 at 726.

[759] Draft legislation, cl 11.

[760] Draft legislation, cl 11(3).

[761] We note the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) recommended against measures that redirect unclaimed aggregate damages in alternative ways (including cy-près), noting that the Australian class action procedure was not intended “to penalise ... or to deter behaviour to any greater extent than provided for under the existing law”: Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [239] and [236]–[240].

[762] See Issues Paper at [5.24]–[5.28] and Jasminka Kalajdzic Class Actions in Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018) at 51 and 70.

[763] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.52].

[764] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson, Shine Lawyers, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[765] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[766] Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson (said it supported our approach ‘for the reasons given’), Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Shine Lawyers.

[767] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Rhonson Salim, Nicole Smith and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[768] Gilbert Walker, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[769] Rhonson Salim.

[770] Simpson Grierson. Nicole Smith also suggested that, in the competing class actions context, the unsuccessful representative plaintiff should be able to appeal as of right.

[771] Shine Lawyers.

[772] Tom Weston QC.

[773] Senior Courts Act 2016, s 56(4)..

[774] Senior Courts Act 2016, ss 56(3) and 56(5)-(6).

[775] See Chapter 5.

[776] Senior Courts Act 2016, ss 56(3) and 56(5)-(6).

[777] May v May (1982) 1 NZFLR 165 (CA) at 170, Blackstone v Blackstone [2008] NZCA 312, 19 PRNZ 40 at [8] and K v B [2010] NZSC 112, [2011] 2 NZLR 1 at [32].

[778] Supplementary Issues Paper at [5.63].

[779] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[780] Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[781] Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson. Nicole Smith supported such an appeal right if class members had previously opted in. Vince Morabito supported an appeal right and did not mention a leave requirement.

[782] Bell Gully, Johnson & Johnson, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[783] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.2]–[6.3].

[784] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Institute of Directors, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[785] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Institute of Directors, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith. In addition, Vince Morabito referred us to his article “An Australian Perspective on the Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements” (2021) 29 New Zealand Universities Law Review 52, which tends to indicate support for judicial approval of settlements.

[786] We were told in Australia it typically costs $200,000 to $500,000 for the settlement approval process and takes three to six months to prepare for a settlement hearing.

[787] Draft legislation, cl 12(1).

[788] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.12] and [6.14] and draft legislation (September 2021 version), cl 6(2).

[789] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.17].

[790] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[791] Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[792] Draft legislation, cl 12(2). If the application is made prior to certification, it should be made by the proposed representative plaintiff.

[793] See High Court Rules 2016, r 7.19 and Form G 31.

[794] When applying for approval of a class action settlement in the Federal Court of Australia, supporting material will usually be required to address “the terms of any advice received from counsel and/or from any independent expert in relation to the issues which arise in the proceeding”: Class Actions Practice Note (Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note GPN-CA, December 2019) at [15.5](j). In the United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal, an application for settlement of a class action may include “any opinion of the applicants’ legal representatives as to the merits of the collective settlement”: The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 94(4)(c).

[795] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.24].

[796] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.29].

[797] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.25].

[798] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.30].

[799] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[800] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[801] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[802] Nikki Chamberlain, Consumer NZ and Insurance Council.

[803] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[804] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.33].

[805] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[806] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[807] Chapman Tripp. Similarly, the Insurance Council said the timeframe should be reasonable but finite so that one class member cannot hold up the settlement process for an unduly long period of time.

[808] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[809] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[810] Nikki Chamberlain.

[811] Simpson Grierson.

[812] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[813] Shine Lawyers.

[814] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[815] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[816] Nicole Smith.

[817] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.40]–[6.41].

[818] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.42].

[819] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[820] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[821] Nikki Chamberlain, Johnson & Johnson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) (although they did not express a view on whether an express power was necessary for the court to do this) and Nicole Smith.

[822] Chapman Tripp and Simpson Grierson.

[823] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[824] Insurance Council.

[825] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.35].

[826] We have also taken this approach in the context of the court’s power to approve funding agreements: see Chapter 17.

[827] Draft legislation, cl 17(1).

[828] Draft legislation, cl 17(2).

[829] Where the court appoints a court expert on its own initiative, it may order the costs of the expert to be paid for by Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice: see High Court Rules 2016, r 9.41(3). The court can also order the costs of a counsel to assist to be paid out of public funds: see Senior Courts Act 2016, s 178.

[830] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.49]–[6.50].

[831] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.58]–[6.90].

[832] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.91]–[6.99].

[833] Submitters who agreed with the proposed test were: Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission). Chapman Tripp preferred a different test.

[834] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[835] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[836] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[837] Nikki Chamberlain, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[838] Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[839] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group and Shine Lawyers.

[840] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers and Simpson Grierson.

[841] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway (it agreed with our proposed list of factors as long as they were not exhaustive or mandatory) and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission). Some participants at our consultation workshops also suggested the factors should not be mandatory.

[842] Nikki Chamberlain, Michael Duffy and Insurance Council.

[843] We discussed cost sharing orders in Chapter 9.

[844] Draft legislation, cl 14.

[845] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 27.1(5). We discuss the tests applied in overseas jurisdictions in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.44]–[6.50].

[846] See Prygodicz v Commonwealth of Australia (no 2) [2021] FCA 634 at [85]; Evans v Davantage Group Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 70 at [15]; Blairgowrie Trading Ltd v Allco Finance Group Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 330, (2017) 343 ALR 476 at [81].

[847] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497. The Court said at [61] that there was no reason to approach the approval of a “settling discontinuance” by a different standard to that applying to settlements.

[848] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497 at [3] and [130].

[849] Draft legislation, cl 14.

[850] We discuss this issue in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.51]–[6.58].

[851] In Australia, the court has separate powers to approve a settlement and make orders with respect to distribution of a settlement: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V(1) and 33V(2).

[852] We discuss these issues in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.64].

[853] This is in line with our recommendations on when a court should be able to award aggregate monetary relief to be paid on an alternative distribution basis, which we discuss in Chapter 10.

[854] Re Strahl [2021] NZHC 3608.

[855] Re Strahl [2021] NZHC 3608 at [63].

[856] Re Strahl [2021] NZHC 3608 at [86]. We note this was an application to approve a proposed methodology for the distribution of settlement funds, rather than an application to approve the settlement with the defendant.

[857] We discuss this issue in the Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.66]–[6.67].

[858] See Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.75]–[6.78].

[859] See Chapter 5 of the Issues Paper.

[860] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 9.

[861] Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022) at [19.840].

[862] For example, see Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (No 6) [2004] FCA 1598, (2002) 122 FCR 168 and Bywater v Appco Group Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1877.

[863] See Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.35].

[864] Earlier in this chapter we suggest the representative plaintiff could be responsible for collating expressions of support and conveying them to the court.

[865] We discuss cost sharing orders in Chapter 9.

[866] Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022) at [19.790].

[867] Damian Grave, Ken Adams and Jason Betts Class Actions in Australia (3rd ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2022) at [19.790].

[868] Draft legislation, cl 15(1)(c).

[869] Draft legislation, cl 15(2).

[870] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.101]-[6.102].

[871] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.105]–[6.106].

[872] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[873] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. In addition Shine Lawyers supported a “soft class closure” order, that would operate for a specified period. It said class members who did not register or opt out should still enjoy the benefit of a ceased limitation period (until the settlement was approved) and they should continue to be class members if the matter does not settle within the specified period.

[874] Class closure orders and closed class descriptions have been developed as ways of getting around this issue. See Issues Paper at [12.50a] and Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.102]–[6.104].

[875] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.110]–[6.115].

[876] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith. (We note that while we received separate submissions from Maurice Blackburn and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, they make the same points on this question. For simplicity, where we discuss reasons provided by submitters, we have referred to Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia).

[877] Although we note that two other submitters implicitly agreed with the right to opt-out in their submissions on the notice of approved settlement.

[878] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, GCA Lawyers, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[879] It may be more straightforward for the class member to bring or settle their own individual claim because of the development of the claims through the class action. In some cases, a settlement has been reached after the court’s decision on common issues.

[880] Draft legislation, cl 15(1)(a)(i).

[881] See Class Actions Practice Note (Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note GPN-CA, December 2019) at [15.2(p)], which states that notice of a proposed settlement should outline any steps required to be taken by persons wishing to opt out of the settlement “if that is possible under the terms of the settlement”.

[882] Robertson v ProQuest Information and Learning LLC 2011 ONSC 2629 at [25]. The parties also agreed the defendant could unilaterally terminate the settlement if more than 300 class members opted out.

[883] Draft legislation, cl 15(1)(a)(ii).

[884] Prygodicz v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 634 at [255] and [260].

[885] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.117].

[886] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, GCA Lawyers, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[887] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp and Insurance Council.

[888] GCA Lawyers, Maurice Blackburn, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Omni Bridgeway.

[889] Draft legislation, cl 15(1)(b)(i).

[890] Draft legislation, cl 15(1)(b)(ii).

[891] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.7]–[6.8].

[892] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.118].

[893] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.122].

[894] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[895] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson and Simpson Grierson.

[896] Earlier in this chapter, we recommended that a settlement reached prior to certification requires court approval in order to be binding.

[897] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.128].

[898] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.130].

[899] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.129].

[900] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[901] Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Rhonson Salim, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[902] Draft legislation, cl 16(1).

[903] We discuss settlement outcome reports later in this chapter.

[904] Draft legislation, cl 16(3).

[905] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V(2).

[906] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.131]–[6.132].

[907] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[908] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers (it said a third-party administrator may be appropriate where the role merely involves providing a payment to class members).

[909] Johnson & Johnson. In addition, the Insurance Council commented it should not be necessary for an administrator to have a legal qualification.

[910] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[911] Nicole Smith.

[912] Nicole Smith.

[913] Omni Bridgeway, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Shine Lawyers. However, Bell Gully said the representative plaintiff’s law firm should not fulfil the role.

[914] Draft legislation, cl 16(2).

[915] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.136]–[6.141].

[916] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[917] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson and Nicole Smith.

[918] Nikki Chamberlain (subject to any confidentiality orders), Johnson & Johnson, Omni Bridgeway and Shine Lawyers (subject to any confidentiality orders).

[919] Issues Paper at [5.24]–[5.25].

[920] Draft legislation, cl 16(4).

[921] We discuss this aspect of access to justice in the Issues Paper at [5.22].

[922] Supplementary Issues Paper at [3.66]–[3.70].

[923] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vince Morabito, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[924] Chapman Tripp, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Nicole Smith. Shine Lawyers supported court supervision and/or a communications protocol. In addition, Vince Morabito referred us to his article on judicial supervision of individual settlements with class members: Vince Morabito “Judicial Supervision of Individual Settlements with Class Members in Australia, Canada and the United States” (2003) 38 Tex Int’l LJ 663 at 723–727.

[925] Bell Gully, Gilbert Walker, Johnson & Johnson, Simpson Grierson and Philp Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[926] Gilbert Walker and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[927] Johnson & Johnson thought the process on communications with class members outlined in Part 11 of the Class Actions Practice Note (Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note GPN-CA, December 2019) was appropriate.

[928] Unless the court made an order allowing the class member an additional opportunity to opt out of the class action. In Chapter 8 we recommend such an order should only be granted where the interests of justice require it.

[929] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 10.4.

[930] We note that in Ross v Southern Response, the Court made decisions on the contents of the opt-out notice and defendant communications with class members at the same time: see Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2452 and Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2453.

[931] See King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd [2002] FCA 872, (2002) 121 FCR 480 at [42]; Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 957, (2002) 122 FCR 168 at [45]; Bates v Dow Corning (Australia) Pty Ltd [2005] FCA 927 at [16].

[932] Federal Court of Australia Act (Cth), s 33W(1).

[933] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), rr 86 and 94(1).

[934] In Chapter 6 we recommend the court should only allow a representative plaintiff to withdraw from the role with the leave of the court.

[935] Supplementary Issues Paper at [6.10].

[936] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Nicole Smith.

[937] See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 33V(1) and Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 29(1).

[938] Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [83].

[939] Mercedes Holdings Pty v Waters (No 1) [2010] FCA 124, (2010) 77 ACSR 265 at [10]. See also Wotton v Queensland [2009] FCA 534, (2009) 109 ALD 534 at [37]–[40].

[940] Laine v Thiess Ptd Ltd [2016] VSC 689 at [34]; Babscay Ptd Ltd v Pitcher Partners [2020] FCA 1610, (2020) 148 ACSR 551 at [3], [29]; Markovic v Unified Security Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2021] VSC 840 at [11].

[941] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497 at [55].

[942] See Johnson v North American Palladium Ltd 2021 ONSC 3346 at [15].

[943] See Babscay Ptd Ltd v Pitcher Partners [2020] FCA 1610, (2020) 148 ACSR 551 at [22]. This is referred to in Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497 at [54].

[944] See Babscay Ptd Ltd v Pitcher Partners [2020] FCA 1610, (2020) 148 ACSR 551 at [23].

[945] We prefer the approach followed in authorities such as Laine v Thiess Ptd Ltd [2016] VSC 689 to the approach in Mercedes Holdings Pty v Waters (No 1) (2010) [2010] FCA 124, 77 ACSR 265.

[946] In Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 3497 at [46] and [61], the court distinguished between a “unilateral discontinuance” and a “settling discontinuance”.

[947] High Court Rules 2016, r 14.2(1)(a).

[948] Issues Paper at [13.5]–[13.8].

[949] Issues Paper at [13.10].

[950] Issues Paper at [13.9].

[951] Issues Paper at [13.13]–[13.14].

[952] Issues Paper at [13.35]–[13.36]. Security for costs in Te Kōti Matua | High Court is governed by the High Court Rules 2016, r 5.45. Security may be awarded where it is just, and either the plaintiff is not resident or incorporated in Aotearoa New Zealand, or there is reason to believe they would be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if unsuccessful. A security for costs order gives the defendant some protection against the risk a plaintiff will not meet an adverse costs order. We discuss security for costs in funded proceedings in Chapter 15.

[953] Issues Paper at [13.19]–[13.30].

[954] Issues Paper at [13.31]–[13.34].

[955] Bell Gully, Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Meredith Connell, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[956] Although Simpson Grierson commented that there may be a small number of marginal cases where the risk of adverse costs dissuades a class from bringing an action.

[957] In addition, Tony Ellis referred to litigants not bringing ordinary litigation because of the risk of adverse costs. He also referred to the difficulty in continuing with a case when there was a settlement offer on the table, because rejecting a Calderbank offer could lead to increased costs.

[958] We asked participants who would not have brought their own individual proceeding what the reasons were for that, with respondents able to select multiple options. The most popular response was ‘too expensive’ (with 334 people selecting this option) and the second most popular response was ‘risk of having to pay defendant’s legal costs’ (192 people selected this option). A total of 409 people answered our survey.

[959] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Insurance Counsel, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[960] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp and Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand.

[961] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia.

[962] Bell Gully.

[963] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[964] Nikki Chamberlain, Tony Ellis and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[965] Bell Gully, Nikki Chamberlain, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[966] Jennifer Braithwaite, Jasminka Kalajdzic and NZ Shareholders’ Association.

[967] Chapman Tripp.

[968] Consumer NZ.

[969] Institute of Directors.

[970] Vince Morabito.

[971] Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[972] As noted above, our survey of group members in representative actions indicated that the cost of bringing litigation was the primary reason why individuals would not have brought their own individual proceeding, with the risk of adverse costs second.

[973] See Issues Paper at [2.22].

[974] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 333–335.

[975] High Court Rules 2016, r 14.7(e).

[976] Law Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 84.

[977] Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice—Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings: Report (March 2018) at [5.8].

[978] Issues Paper at [13.11].

[979] Issues Paper at [13.22]–[13.23].

[980] Law Commission of Ontario Class Actions: Objectives, Experiences and Reforms – Final Report (July 2019) at 88.

[981] High Court Rules 2016, r 14.8.

[982] See Locking v McCowan 2016 ONSC 7854 at [7], Quinte v Eastwood Mall Inc 2014 ONSC 1661 at [5], and Frank v Farlie, Turner & Co 2013 ONSC 4364 at [29]–[32]. As we discuss below, costs in the cause means the party who is ultimately unsuccessful in the substantive proceeding is liable to pay costs for certification.

[983] Where the court declines to certify a proposed class action and there is no appeal, we envisage costs would be fixed and payable following the court’s decision.

[984] High Court Rules 2016, r 14.8(1).

[985] Chapman v Badon Ltd [2010] NZCA 613, 20 PRNZ 83 at [12].

[986] High Court Rules 2016, r 14.8(2).

[987] This point has been made in relation to the Canadian regime: 2038724 Ontario Ltd v Quizno’s Canada Restaurant Corp [2008] 96 OR (3d) 252 (ONSC) at [22].

[988] Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 2482, 23 PRNZ 64 at [19], [21] and [23].

[989] “Costs in the cause” means that the costs of an interlocutory proceeding is to be awarded according to the final award of costs in the case. If the plaintiff is ultimately successful in the case, they will get interlocutory costs as part of the costs awarded against the defendant and vice versa: see JT Stratford & Son Ltd v Lindley and Others (No 2) [1969] 3 All ER 1122 (CA) at 1123.

[990] Situations where costs in the cause have been ordered include where a party has successfully appealed a summary judgment, where an injunction has been successfully obtained, and where both parties have partially succeeded.

[991] Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 2482, (2015) 23 PRNZ 64 [Strathboss - costs] at [24]–[25].

[992] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2452 [Ross - notification application] at [193].

[993] In Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada 2015 ONSC 6354 at [137], the Court observed there was not a general practice of making costs in the cause in contested certification applications because certification was a procedural step that was independent from the ultimate merits of the litigation. The outcome of the common issues trial did not mean that the proceeding should not have been certified.

[994] See High Court Rules 2016, sch 2 (appropriate daily recovery rates) and sch 3 (time allocations).

[995] High Court Rules 2016, r 14.3.

[996] See for example Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 62 at [38]–[39], where the Court considered it was appropriate to award costs for the provision of particulars. Although there was normally no allowance for this, the particulars ordered were extensive and necessary (in part) because the case was a representative action.

[997] Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2019] NZCA 431, (2019) 25 PRNZ 33 at [108]; Houghton v Saunders [2011] NZHC 542; (2011) 20 PRNZ 509 (HC) at [211]; Houghton v Saunders HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-348, 26 May 2010 at [43]; Hedley v Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd (2000) 15 PRNZ 210 at [32].

[998] Houghton v Saunders HC Christchurch CIV-2008-409-348, 26 May 2010 at [36]–[43].

[999] We note that in Australia, research has shown “numerous instances” of class members adding comments on their opt‑out forms which indicated a mistaken belief that the class action could expose them to liability for costs: Vince Morabito and Naomi Hatcher “Security for Costs in Unfunded Federal Class Actions: Back to the Future” (2018) 92 ALJ 105 at 114.

[1000] For example, see Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43(1A). See also Issues Paper at [13.10].

[1001] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 31(2). There are similar provisions in other Canadian regimes: see Issues Paper at [13.10].

[1002] See Bancroft-Snell v Visa Canada Corporation 2020 ONCA 549 at [7] and Trillium Motor World Ltd v General Motors of Canada Ltd 2017 ONCA 545 at [61].

[1003] This relies on the court’s jurisdiction under Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 14, which enables the court to grant a class member leave to participate on whatever terms it considers appropriate, including as to costs. See Bancroft-Snell v Visa Canada Corporation 2020 ONCA 549 at [7] and [10] and Silver v Imax Corporation 2012 ONSC 4064 at [12].

[1004] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 98.

[1005] See Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [169].

[1006] In Chapter 8, we recommend the court should have a power to give directions with respect to the determination of individual issues.

[1007] Our recommendations on limitation in Chapter 4 will not assist a class member where the limitation period expired prior to the class action proceeding being commenced.

[1008] We discuss sub-classes in Chapter 8.

[1009] We discuss the contents of the opt-in or opt-out notice in Chapter 8.

[1010] Issues Paper at [13.36].

[1011] For detailed discussion, see Issues Paper at Chapter 17.

[1012] Issues Paper at Chapter 16.

[1013] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2016] NZCA 338 at [14].

[1014] We discuss maintenance and champerty in the Issues Paper in Chapters 15, 16 and 18.

[1015] Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia (Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 14; PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [121] per Elias CJ.

[1016] See PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [121] per Elias CJ.

[1017] See Issues Paper at [15.6]–[15.12].

[1018] See Issues Paper at [16.7]–[16.11] and Chapter 1. See also Houghton v Saunders [2008] NZHC 1569; (2008) 19 PRNZ 173 (HC) at [177], and Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28] and [77].

[1019] Auckland City Council as Assignee of Body Corporate 16113 v Auckland City Council [2007] NZHC 1411; [2008] 1 NZLR 838 (HC) at [16]–[17]; Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28]. See also Issues Paper at [16.9]–[16.10].

[1020] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [111] per Elias CJ.

[1021] For detailed discussion, see Issues Paper at Chapter 18.

[1022] See Issues Paper at [18.2]–[18.9].

[1023] See Issues Paper at [18.22]–[18.25].

[1024] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 11.

[1025] See Issues Paper at [18.22]–[18.25].

[1026] See Issues Paper at [18.19].

[1027] See Issues Paper at [18.14].

[1028] See Issues Paper at [18.17].

[1029] The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia has also recommended the torts should be abolished, subject to a preservation provision: Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia (Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 2, Recommendation 1.

[1030] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 10–11. See also Issues Paper at [18.37].

[1031] Submitters who answered Question 37 of the Issues Paper were: Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy , Tony Ellis, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Murray Lazelle, LPF Group, Marsh, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Hīkina Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Christopher St Johanser, Tempest, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC. Some submitters on the Issues Paper commented on the advantages and disadvantages of permitting litigation funding in their responses to other questions in the Issues Paper, however they are not recorded in this list. In addition, a number of submitters on the Supplementary Issues Paper also commented on the potential advantages and disadvantages of litigation funding, including David Bigio QC, GCA Lawyers, Andrew Harmos, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Ross Asset Management Investors Group and Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission).

[1032] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MBIE, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Christopher St Johanser, Tempest and Vicki Waye.

[1033] Barry Allan, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Murray Lazelle, Marsh, NZX, Simpson Grierson and Tempest.

[1034] Barry Allan, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Johnson & Johnson, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Simpson Grierson and Tempest.

[1035] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Christopher St Johanser, Tempest and Vicki Waye.

[1036] Andrew Barker QC, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ (implied) and Gilbert Walker.

[1037] For example, Barry Allan, IBA Antitrust Committee and Vicki Waye. Some submitters on the Supplementary Issues Paper also made this point.

[1038] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group and Omni Bridgeway.

[1039] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, DLA Piper, IBA Antitrust Committee and NZLS.

[1040] Andrew Barker QC, Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.

[1041] Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee and Vicki Waye.

[1042] Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and NZLS.

[1043] Barry Allan, Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Institute of Directors, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Simpson Grierson and Tempest.

[1044] Buddle Findlay, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee and Simpson Grierson.

[1045] Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS and Simpson Grierson. Barry Allan said the present market in Aotearoa New Zealand does not suggest any need for concern, but cautioned that less scrupulous funders may emerge as the market matures. Tempest said vexatious and frivolous claims will be bolstered if funders are “allowed to speculate in litigation”.

[1046] Buddle Findlay, Institute of Directors and Insurance Council. Simpson Grierson considered this a risk in the “absence of further regulation of litigation funders”.

[1047] Insurance Council, Institute of Directors, Marsh and NZX.

[1048] Marsh.

[1049] Insurance Council.

[1050] In particular, Marsh said the average rate per million increase for D&O insurance for ASX250 clients in 2020 was 182 per cent above 2019, and the average retention increased for the same period by 211 per cent.

[1051] In particular, Marsh said it has become increasingly difficult to purchase companies securities cover.

[1052] Institute of Directors, Insurance Council and Marsh.

[1053] For example, its own submission to the Australian Law Reform Commission’s inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders.

[1054] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZ Shareholders’ Association and Vicki Waye.

[1055] NZ Shareholders’ Association and Vicki Waye.

[1056] Bell Gully, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson and Murray Lazelle.

[1057] Bell Gully, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson and Murray Lazelle.

[1058] Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Michael Duffy and the IBA Antitrust Committee.

[1059] Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, IBA Antitrust Committee and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[1060] Andrew Barker QC, Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1061] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1062] Claims Resolution Service, Gilbert Walker, LPF Group and NZLS.

[1063] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, BusinessNZ, Nicole Smith and Vicki Waye. Tom Weston QC said there is little benefit in establishing a class actions regime without also addressing litigation funding, but this does not necessarily make funding “desirable”.

[1064] Chapman Tripp, Consumer NZ, DLA Piper, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[1065] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, NZ Shareholders’ Association and NZX.

[1066] Andrew Barker QC, Carter Holt Harvey and Tom Weston QC.

[1067] Participants could give an answer ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 5 (extremely likely). The numerical breakdown of responses was: 330 participants answered 1 (not at all likely), 55 answered 2, 11 answered 3, one answered 4 and 11 answered 5 (extremely likely). For information on the survey see Chapter 1.

[1068] Participants could select one or more of 10 reasons, including “other” (in which they could type their own answer).

[1069] 334 responses.

[1070] 192 responses.

[1071] 188 responses.

[1072] 181 responses.

[1073] 165 responses.

[1074] 141 responses

[1075] 105 responses.

[1076] 82 responses.

[1077] Participants could give an answer ranging from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive). The numerical breakdown of responses was: 82 participants answered 5 (very positive), 71 answered 4, 65 answered 3, five answered 2 and four answered 1 (very negative).

[1078] Participants could give an answer ranging from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). 32 participants answered 5 (very satisfied), 75 answered 4, 102 answered 3, 15 answered 2 and four answered 1 (very unsatisfied).

[1079] This question required a free-text response.

[1080] 98 responses.

[1081] 44 responses.

[1082] 29 responses.

[1083] 13 responses.

[1084] This question required a ‘free text’ response.

[1085] 45 responses.

[1086] 19 responses.

[1087] Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Vicki Waye.

[1088] DLA Piper, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Nicole Smith.

[1089] Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Simpson Grierson and Vicki Waye.

[1090] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[1091] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[1092] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Tony Ellis, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Vicki Waye.

[1093] Bell Gully, BusinessNZ and Insurance Council.

[1094] Cain v Mettrick [2020] NZHC 2125.

[1095] Cain v Mettrick [2020] NZHC 2125 at [72]. For discussion of this case, see Issues Paper at [15.37].

[1096] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper, Tony Ellis, LPF Group and Omni Bridgeway.

[1097] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia.

[1098] DLA Piper.

[1099] Chapman Tripp, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[1100] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 10.

[1101] See Chapter 2.

[1102] See Issues Paper at Chapter 5 and [17.4].

[1103] See further Issues Paper at [17.6] and [17.8].

[1104] See Issues Paper at [17.11]–[17.14]. We discuss adverse costs in Chapter 12.

[1105] Issues Paper at [17.43]–[17.48].

[1106] See also Chapter 2.

[1107] See Issues Paper at [21.12]

[1108] See Issues Paper at [21.12].

[1109] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [115]. See also: Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41, (2006) 229 CLR 386 at [253]; Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia (Project 110: Discussion Paper, 2019) at 8.

[1110] For examples of jurisdictions that have abolished the torts, see Issues Paper at [18.17].

[1111] For example, Houghton v Saunders [2008] NZHC 1569; (2008) 19 PRNZ 173 (HC) at [177]. See also Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28] and [77].

[1112] Auckland City Council as Assignee of Body Corporate 16113 v Auckland City Council [2007] NZHC 1411; [2008] 1 NZLR 838 (HC) at [17], [36], [43] and [45]–[46]. See Issues Paper at [15.8]–[15.9].

[1113] Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [28].

[1114] Houghton v Saunders [2008] NZHC 1569; (2008) 19 PRNZ 173 (HC) at [176].

[1115] Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia (Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 14.

[1116] Cain v Mettrick [2020] NZHC 2125 at [41]–[43]. The litigation was being funded by Winton Capital Ltd through PLF Services Ltd. Winton Capital specialised in managing and acquiring distressed assets and property developments. It had not previously been involved in litigation funding of this kind but had looked into such opportunities. It was approached by the liquidators to fund the proceedings and saw this as an opportunity to make a return on its investment. The High Court considered Winton had no problematic motives.

[1117] Cain v Mettrick [2020] NZHC 2125 at [65] and [85].

[1118] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 11.

[1119] Stephen Todd “Abuse of Legal Process” in Stephen Todd (ed) Todd on Torts (8th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2019) at [18.4.04].

[1120] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91.

[1121] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [31], citing Jeffery & Katauskas Pty Ltd v SST Consulting Pty Ltd [2009] HCA 43, (2009) 239 CLR 75 at [27] and IH Jacob “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 CLP 23 at 43.

[1122] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].

[1123] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57]. There will not be an abuse of process where the effective assignment under a funding agreement is in favour of a party with a genuine commercial interest: PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [77]. See also Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse [1980] QB 629 (CA) at 645, and Samy Trustee Ltd v Pauanui Dream Estate Ltd [2020] NZHC 2118 at [25].

[1124] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].

[1125] Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia (Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 2, Recommendation 1.

[1126] Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Maintenance and Champerty in Western Australia (Project 110: Final Report, 2020) at 18–19.

[1127] Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Subsidising Litigation (NZLC R72, 2001) at 11.

[1128] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [15.13]–[15.62].

[1129] See Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [63]; Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [86]; Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group [2017] NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [78].

[1130] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [23.13]–[23.51].

[1131] Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice Council, January 2018). For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [23.17]–[23.18].

[1132] For discussion of Australia’s approach to regulation of litigation funding, see Issues Paper at [23.29]–[23.32].

[1133] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1. For further discussion of court approval of funding arrangements see Issues Paper at [23.47]–[23.51]. See also Chapter 17.

[1134] Including from Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Gilbert Walker, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, Michael Legg, Murray Lazelle, LPF Group, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), NZ Shareholders’ Association, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[1135] For example, Andrew Barker QC, Carter Holt Harvey and Johnson & Johnson.

[1136] Andrew Barker QC.

[1137] For example, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia and DLA Piper.

[1138] Tempest Litigation Funding and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1139] Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1140] For example, Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[1141] Other examples include Gilbert Walker (which emphasised the need for regulation of funder profits), the IBA Antitrust Committee (which was especially concerned about funder profits and conflicts of interest) and LPF Group (which emphasised the need for regulation to address uncertainty about whether litigation funding is permitted, funder capital adequacy, funder presence in Aotearoa New Zealand, conditional fee arrangements, disclosure and security for costs).

[1142] Barry Allan, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully (implied), Buddle Findlay (implied), Colin Carruthers QC, Chapman Tripp, Gilbert Walker, Michael Legg, LPF Group and Vicki Waye.

[1143] Carter Holt Harvey and Johnson & Johnson.

[1144] LPF Group.

[1145] For example, NZX said the regulatory settings for litigation funding should be designed to ensure an appropriate balance between providing access to redress and the negative effects of vexatious actions.

[1146] Barry Allan, Buddle Findlay, Crown Law Office, Michael Legg, LPF Group and Vicki Waye.

[1147] For example, Barry Allan, Andrew Barker QC, DLA Piper, Michael Legg, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1148] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA), Gilbert Walker, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Hīkina Whakatutuki | Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1149] Barry Allan, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Colin Carruthers QC, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding. The Association of Litigation Funders of Australia noted the existing power in Australia for the court to approve class action settlements and suggested that a statutory cap would be unnecessary if the court has this power. DLA Piper supports guidelines for funders, and said the court could take non-compliance into account when considering whether the funding agreement is an abuse of process.

[1150] Barry Allan, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Colin Carruthers QC, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, NZLS, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. DLA Piper explicitly said that court approval of funding arrangements is not necessary (and it is sufficient to disclose the funder’s identity, location and amenability to the jurisdiction of the court) but said the court should continue to have some oversight to the limited extent of ensuring funding arrangements do not amount to an abuse of process.

[1151] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1152] Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Colin Carruthers QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Insurance Council and IBA Antitrust Committee.

[1153] Bell Gully, LPF Group and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia. Crown Law Office said some regulation may be warranted where funding pricing models are used as the starting point for orders that apply to class members who have not agreed to them.

[1154] Supplementary Issues Paper at [4.68]–[4.85] and Q 27.

[1155] Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson support a tailored licensing regime, overseen by the FMA. NZX suggested an appropriate regulatory body should establish a licensing regime for funders of class actions. Bell Gully said it is not opposed to tailored licensing requirements. Vicki Waye said there may be merit in character requirements for funders, for example through a bespoke licensing requirement.

[1156] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper, FMA, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding. MBIE said more thought needs to be given to the appropriateness of the FMA as the potential regulator of litigation funders, given the primary issue at hand is access to justice. Further, it said the purpose of litigation funding is inconsistent with the purposes of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, ss 3–4.

[1157] Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, s 9.

[1158] Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, s 9.

[1159] Johnson & Johnson said robust regulation of funders is required to meet the interests of all stakeholders, including defendants, and considered funders should be subject to a similar degree of prudential supervisions as other financial service providers. Carter Holt Harvey said there is no principled justification for excusing funders from complying with securities law, and said the definition of a managed investment scheme under Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) does not differ materially from the definition in the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013.

[1160] For example, Gilbert Walker said that in some ways the relationship between a plaintiff and funder resembles that of an investor and issuer governed by the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 and other corporate legislation. However, it said it did not have developed thoughts on what form regulation should take. NZLS submitted that litigation funding is an unusual form of “financial product”, and supported prudential regulation by the Reserve Bank and operational oversight by the courts rather than oversight by the FMA. Bell Gully said it is not opposed to imposing managed investment requirements on funders in principle, but noted this has caused problems in Australia. Chapman Tripp supported the FMA having an oversight role (alongside the courts and Te Tāhū o te Ture | Ministry of Justice) but did not detail which matters should be overseen by the FMA, or whether funders should be brought within the scope of the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013.

[1161] BusinessNZ considers industry regulation would be preferable to statutory regulation. LPF Group supports industry regulation along the lines of the Association of Litigation Funders’ Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice Council, January 2018).

[1162] Carter Holt Harvey, Claims Resolution Service, Gilbert Walker and IBA Antitrust Committee.

[1163] Chapman Tripp and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[1164] Issues Paper at [23.8].

[1165] In cases under HCR 4.24, the courts have said it is the representative plaintiff who has costs liability and individual group members are generally not exposed to the risk of an adverse costs order: Issues Paper at [13.9]. See also Chapter 12.

[1166] In Chapter 18 we discuss recommendations to assist class members to make informed decisions about their participation in a class action.

[1167] In Chapter 7, we recommend that the lawyer for the representative plaintiff should become the lawyer for the class upon certification and have a lawyer-client relationship with the class as a whole. We also recommend NZLS consider amending the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 to clarify the duties the lawyer owes to the class.

[1168] For example, the recent Mainzeal litigation was a funded liquidator action against the former directors of Mainzeal, which collapsed in 2013 owing more than $110 million to unpaid subcontractors and creditors. For discussion of this case, and further information about the use of litigation funding in insolvency and insurance claims in Aotearoa New Zealand, see Issues Paper at [14.28]–[14.32].

[1169] For example, Patel v Patel [2014] NZHC 2410. In our conversations with some litigation funders, they confirmed that relationship property disputes sometimes attract litigation funding.

[1170] See Issues Paper at Chapter 5 and Chapter 2 of this report.

[1171] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at xiii and xv.

[1172] Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 1088 at [74].

[1173] In Chapter 15, we recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee consider developing a High Court Rules to create a rebuttable presumption that funded representative plaintiffs will provide security for costs in class actions. However, a defendant will still need to apply for security in other funded proceedings.

[1174] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [70]–[71].

[1175] See Issues Paper at [9.18]–[9.19]. In Australia, see similar comments in: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at [11.53] and Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.64].

[1176] See Chapter 3, where we note the court may have a more active role in the control, supervision and disposition of class actions than in other litigation because of the need to ensure the interests of class members are adequately protected.

[1177] Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group [2017] NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [79].

[1178] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [48], citing Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41, (2006) 229 CLR 386 at [92] per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ.

[1179] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(9)(a).

[1180] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(10).

[1181] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(2)–(3).

[1182] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018), Recommendation 14(a).

[1183] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.66].

[1184] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018), Recommendation 14(b).

[1185] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020), Recommendation 11.

[1186] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020), Recommendation 11.

[1187] The Australian Treasury sought stakeholder views on “exposure draft legislation to promote a fair and reasonable distribution of class action proceeds in proceedings involving third party litigation funders” in September and October 2021, see The Treasury “Treasury Laws Amendment (Measures for Consultation) Bill 2021: Litigation funders” <www.treasury.gov.au>. The Australian Attorney-General subsequently stated that any class action reforms will be deferred until after the 2022 Australian Federal Election: Michael Pelly “No time for federal ICAC: Cash” The Australian Financial Review (online ed, 7 February 2022).

[1188] In BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster, for example, one of the dissenting judges specifically rejected the argument that making a common fund order required the Court to embark on an inquiry that was beyond its institutional competence: BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45, (2019) 374 ALR 627 at [115] per Gageler J. See also Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1885 at [22]–[25].

[1189] The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2015 (UK), r 94(9); and United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r 23(e)(2)(C). See discussion in William B Rubenstein Newberg on Class Actions (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at §13:54. See Chapter 11 and Issues Paper at [21.25].

[1190] For further discussion about court approval of class action settlements, see Chapter 11.

[1191] In 2018, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) reached a similar conclusion in its report Integrity, Fairness and EfficiencyAn Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018). Although the ALRC had initially supported a licensing regime for funders in a Discussion Paper, and although licensing was strongly supported by submitters, the ALRC concluded that improved court oversight of litigation funders “would achieve at least the same level of consumer protection without the regulatory burden of a licensing regime”: at [6.37]. This view was supported by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission who told the ALRC that the court would be “better placed to regulate litigation funders, through court rules and procedure, oversight and security for costs”: at [6.37].

[1192] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [23.33]—[23.37].

[1193] For an example from Ontario, see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s 33.1(5) and (7).

[1194] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [67]–[76].

[1195] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [68].

[1196] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [73].

[1197] See Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [86] (noting it would be “premature” to say there is an expectation that a funding agreement should be disclosed where the court grants leave for a representative action under HCR 4.24(b)).

[1198] For discussion of when a litigation funding agreement may amount to an abuse of process justifying a stay of proceedings, see Chapter 13 at [13.74]–[13.75].

[1199] In Chapter 22 of the Issues Paper, we discussed the financial obligations of the funder to the funded plaintiff, the concern that funders may have insufficient resources to fulfil those obligations, and the consequences of a funder’s failure to meet those commitments.

[1200] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.10]–[22.16].

[1201] High Court Rules 2016, r 5.45(3)(a).

[1202] High Court Rules 2016, r 5.45(1). In the District Court, a power to order security is contained in the District Court Rules 2014, r 5.48.

[1203] Saunders v Houghton [2009] NZCA 610, [2010] 3 NZLR 331 at [36]. Te Kōti Pira | Court of Appeal referred to s 16 of the Judicature Act 1908 which confirmed the ongoing inherent jurisdiction of Te Kōti Matua | High Court. This provision is now found in the Senior Courts Act 2018, s 12.

[1204] White v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 188, (2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at [13].

[1205] Houghton v Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [125]; Houghton v Saunders [2015] NZCA 141 at [11]; Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1596, (2015) 23 PRNZ 69 at [79]; Walker v Forbes [2017] NZHC 1212 at [33] and [71].

[1206] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.18]–[22.23].

[1207] See Issues Paper at [22.19]–[22.22], citing Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency – An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R 134, 2018) at Recommendation 12.

[1208] Issues Paper at [22.26]–[22.51].

[1209] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.38].

[1210] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [22.36].

[1211] For instance, such requirements may make funders more resilient to unexpected losses, help to mitigate the risk that new entrants to the funding market will not appreciate the costs of conducting complex litigation like class actions, and reassure plaintiffs that the funder has sufficient funds to finance the case for its entirety.

[1212] For further discussion about the litigation funding market in Aotearoa New Zealand, see Chapter 14 of the Issues Paper.

[1213] Corporations Amendment (Litigation Funding) Regulations 2020 (Cth). See also Josh Frydenberg (Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia) “Litigation funders to be regulated under the Corporations Act” (press release, 22 May 2020).

[1214] Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 912A(1)(d).

[1215] Issues Paper at [22.35]–[22.51].

[1216] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Institute of Directors, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Tom Weston QC, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1217] Bell Gully, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Michael Duffy, Institute of Directors, Insurance Council, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1218] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Vicki Waye. One submission was unclear.

[1219] Carter Holt Harvey and Insurance Council. Tom Weston QC pointed to the Feltex representative action to illustrate the risks if there is not capital adequacy. BusinessNZ said it is too early to say what future concerns might arise and therefore how these should be addressed.

[1220] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Vicki Waye. DLA Piper was also largely unconcerned.

[1221] For example, terms enabling the funded party to terminate the funding agreement in the event of an unrectified default in payment by the funder.

[1222] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye and Tom Weston QC.

[1223] Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Insurance Council, LPF Group, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. NZLS did not comment on the adequacy of the security for costs mechanism, but supported funders being subject to minimum capital adequacy requirements.

[1224] Insurance Council and NZLS.

[1225] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper and Vicki Waye. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia said the existing security for costs mechanism is adequate, but it supported strengthening the mechanism.

[1226] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Carter Holt Harvey, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[1227] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson. Omni Bridgeway did not think the security for costs regime should be strengthened. Three submissions were unclear.

[1228] Bell Gully (in funded class actions), Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (in funded class actions), Insurance Council and Simpson Grierson.

[1229] Chapman Tripp.

[1230] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[1231] Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp and Simpson Grierson.

[1232] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, DLA Piper, Te Mana Tatai Hokohoko | Financial Markets Authority (FMA), Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1233] Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. Woodsford Litigation Funding supported capital adequacy requirements, but only as part of an industry self-regulation and oversight model, as in England and Wales.

[1234] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Barry Allan, BusinessNZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Vicki Waye.

[1235] Chapman Tripp and Insurance Council.

[1236] Insurance Council.

[1237] Insurance Council.

[1238] Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1239] Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council and LPF Group.

[1240] Insurance Council, Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[1241] Insurance Council and LPF Group.

[1242] Omni Bridgeway and Simpson Grierson.

[1243] Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1244] This is contained in the Insurance (Prudential Supervision) Act 2010.

[1245] Insurance Council.

[1246] Simpson Grierson.

[1247] Tom Weston QC supported Ontario’s regulation of litigation funding in class actions in the Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s 33.1. See also Chapter 17 and Issues Paper at [23.50].

[1248] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, BusinessNZ, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Vicki Waye.

[1249] We discuss plaintiff concerns regarding a funder’s failure to maintain adequate capital in Chapter 15.

[1250] In May 2020, the High Court made an “unless” order striking out the proceedings unless security for costs was provided by a specified date and senior counsel for the claimants confirmed the claimants were adequately resourced to prepare for and present their stage two claims: Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 1088 at [92]. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal: Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZCA 638. Te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court has declined leave to appeal the Court of Appeal’s decision: Houghton v Saunders [2021] NZSC 38.

[1251] The defendants were awarded costs at the conclusion of the litigation, see Houghton v Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590.

[1252] Houghton v Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590 at [7].

[1253] See for example White v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 188, (2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at [13]–[14].

[1254] See Houghton v Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [112]–[121]; White v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 188, (2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at [13]–[15] (cited with approval in Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 2030 at [65]).

[1255] The Australian Law Reform Commission also held this view. See Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency – An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.51].

[1256] Although in exceptional circumstances the court can make a costs order directly against a non-party funder who takes an active role in the proceedings: see Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd (No 2) [2004] UKPC 39, [2005] 1 NZLR 145 and Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [52]–[53].

[1257] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at Recommendation 12; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 10.

[1258] It said a presumption will provide greater assurance to defendants that their costs will be met if they successfully defend the class action, while maintaining the court’s discretion to allow the presumption to be rebutted in suitable cases: Australian Government Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services report: Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Actions Industry and The Australian Law Reform Commission report: Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency – An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (October 2021) at 26.

[1259] See Issues Paper at [15.44]–[15.47].

[1260] Houghton v Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [125]; Houghton v Saunders [2015] NZCA 141 at [11]; Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1596, (2015) 23 PRNZ 69 at [79]; Walker v Forbes [2017] NZHC 1212 at [33] and [71].

[1261] See Houghton v Saunders [2013] NZHC 1824 at [112]–[121]; White v James Hardie New Zealand [2019] NZHC 188, (2019) 24 PRNZ 493 at [13]–[15] cited with approval in Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZHC 2030 at [65].

[1262] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at Recommendation 12 and [6.51]. Contrast the Australian Parliamentary Inquiry, which did not recommend that security should be in a form that is enforceable in Australia. It acknowledged the argument that a defendant should not have to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction in order to recover their legal costs when they have been successful in a class action, but recognised that a jurisdictional requirement could restrict the options available to a funder to satisfy a security for costs order: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at [10.59].

[1263] It said it is unreasonable to expect a defendant to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction to recover against the security provided: Australian Government Australian Government response to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services report: Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Actions Industry and The Australian Law Reform Commission report: Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency – An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (October 2021) at 26.

[1264] See Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd (No 2) [2004] UKPC 39, [2005] 1 NZLR 145 and Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [52]–[53].

[1265] Houghton v Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590 at [82].

[1266] See Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [52]. With respect to security for costs, see for example: Strathboss Kiwifruit Ltd v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1596, (2015) 23 PRNZ 69 at [89]; Houghton v Saunders [2011] NZHC 542; (2011) 20 PRNZ 509 at [231] (plaintiff’s application to lift the interim stay was granted subject to the plaintiff or the funder providing security for costs); Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2016] NZHC 3105 at [104].

[1267] Australian Law Reform Commission Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC DP85, 2018), Proposal 3-2.

[1268] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.34] and [6.37].

[1269] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 10 and [10.56]–[10.57]. See also Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission No 39 to Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (June 2020) at [104] and [106].

[1270] Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice Council, January 2018) at [9.4.2], and Association of Litigation Funders Rules of the Association (July 2016), r 3.15.1.

[1271] See Issues Paper at [22.38]. Similar amounts are prescribed in the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts Litigation Funding Rules 2019, the Hong Kong Code of Practice for Third Party Funding in Arbitration, and Singapore’s Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations 2017.

[1272] Issues Paper at [22.37].

[1273] Woodsford Litigation Funding supported a fixed minimum amount pursuant to a voluntary code of conduct, as in England and Wales. The Insurance Council thought minimum requirements should correlate to the funder’s financial commitment in the particular proceeding.

[1274] For further discussion about the litigation funding market in Aotearoa New Zealand, see Issues Paper at Chapter 14.

[1275] We set out the FMA’s submissions in Chapter 14 at [14.18].

[1276] In upholding the High Court’s decision to strike out the proceedings due to the funder’s difficulties in satisfying the security for costs order, the Court of Appeal said “...it is clearly contrary to the public interest to permit this proceeding to continue to absorb the finite resources of the courts, to the detriment of other litigants, for a further – potentially lengthy – period”: Houghton v Saunders [2020] NZCA 638 at [89].

[1277] Security for costs is governed by High Court Rule 5.45. It may be awarded where it is just, and either the plaintiff is not resident or incorporated in Aotearoa New Zealand, or there is reason to believe they would be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if unsuccessful.

[1278] McGechan on Procedure (online ed, Thomson Reuters) at [5.45], citing Clear White Investments Ltd v Otis Trustee Ltd [2016] NZHC 2837 at [4].

[1279] In Chapter 3, we address the relationship between the representative plaintiff and the class in a class action, and we address the relationship between the lawyer and the class in Chapter 7.

[1280] We discuss lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest in the Issues Paper at Chapter 20.

[1281] For further discussion of these issues, see Issues Paper at [20.36]–[20.46].

[1282] For example, see the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 5.4, 5.5, 5.9 and 6.1. See also Issues Paper at [20.47].

[1283] The Western Australian Supreme Court held that a lawyer breached their fiduciary duty in failing to disclose that the funding agreement provided the lawyer with a 20 per cent reduction in fees if the case was unsuccessful, and a 25 per cent uplift if the claim succeeded: Clairs Keeley (a Firm) v Treacy [2003] WASCA 299, (2003) 28 WAR 139 at [28]–[29].

[1284] The Committee determined that, in the particular circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the lawyer not to have advised the client about the possibility of funding being withdrawn: National Standards Committee v Shand [2019] NZLCDT 2 at [36]–[39] and [57].

[1285] For more detailed discussion on these options, see Issues Paper at [20.49]–[20.58].

[1286] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1287] DLA Piper and Omni Bridgeway (although Omni Bridgeway did suggest one amendment to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008). BusinessNZ said issues do not yet appear to have arisen in Aotearoa New Zealand, but there could merit in providing guidance if the use of funding increases.

[1288] Buddle Findlay, Michael Duffy and Tom Weston QC.

[1289] BusinessNZ.

[1290] DLA Piper and Omni Bridgeway (although Omni Bridgeway did suggest one amendment to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008).

[1291] Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, LPF Group, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1292] Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Chapman Tripp (implied in its suggestions for reform), Insurance Council, LPF Group, NZLS, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[1293] BusinessNZ, DLA Piper, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1294] Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth), r 7.6.01AB(2) and Australian Securities and Investments Commission Litigation schemes and proof of debt schemes: Managing conflicts of interest (Regulatory Guide 248, April 2013).

[1295] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, and Simpson Grierson. In addition, Chapman Tripp supported a prohibition on discretionary rights for funders to terminate funding agreements. DLA Piper supported guidelines on this minimum term but only if the status quo is considered inadequate.

[1296] Bell Gully.

[1297] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[1298] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[1299] Chapman Tripp and Simpson Grierson. DLA Piper supported guidelines on this minimum term but only if the status quo is considered inadequate.

[1300] Chapman Tripp, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson. DLA Piper supported guidelines on this minimum term but only if the status quo is considered inadequate.

[1301] Bell Gully, Insurance Council, LPF Group, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding. Crown Law Office said consideration should be given to how the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 could assist.

[1302] Buddle Findlay and Tom Weston QC.

[1303] Buddle Findlay and LPF Group. DLA Piper supports guidelines on disclosure if the status quo is considered inadequate.

[1304] Insurance Council and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1305] NZLS.

[1306] Tom Weston QC.

[1307] Buddle Findlay, LPF Group and NZLS.

[1308] Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Chapman Tripp, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Michael Duffy, Simpson Grierson and Woodsford Litigation Funding. In addition, Barry Allan said “a hard line needs to be drawn by the law” to respond to concerns about lawyer-plaintiff conflicts of interest, and that “a lawyer intent on feathering his or her nest with the funder is not going to serve the interests of the plaintiff”. LPF Group said there should be a prohibition on “success fees or other fees generated as a result of a successful outcome”.

[1309] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, LPF Group (implied), Simpson Grierson and Woodsford Litigation Funding. Buddle Findlay did not explicitly support a prohibition, but said conflicts are exacerbated where lawyers “have a significant financial stake in any success resolution outcome”, and that it seems impossible for lawyers to provide independent advice in this situation.

[1310] Bell Gully and Nicole Smith. Michael Duffy thought independent legal advice might be appropriate if there are potential conflicts of interest. Omni Bridgeway said its funding agreements already provide that it will pay for the representative plaintiff to be independently advised on the terms of the funding agreement.

[1311] Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ (would support this option if problems arise in the future), DLA Piper (through guidelines if the status quo is considered to be inadequate), LPF Group and Michael Duffy.

[1312] In Chapter 17, we also consider but reject the option of minimum contract terms as a response to concerns about funder control and funder-plaintiff conflicts of interest.

[1313] Prior to certification, we consider the lawyer should still act in the interests of the potential class as a whole.

[1314] More information regarding the Independent Review is available on the NZLS website <www.lawsociety.org.nz>

[1315] See Australian Securities and Investments Commission Litigation schemes and proof of debt schemes: Managing conflicts of interest (Regulatory Guide 248, April 2013) and Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.102]–[6.104].

[1316] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at Recommendation 21; Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 26.

[1317] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [7.153].

[1318] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [15.101].

[1319] Bolitho v Banksia Securities Limited (No 4) [2014] VSC 582. See the summary of this case in Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at 276–278.

[1320] Bolitho v Banksia Securities Ltd (No 18) (remitter) [2021] VSC 666 at [3].

[1321] This included information about the fee agreements, work completed, fees charged and paid, the role and commission of the funder, and a misleading assessment of the reasonableness of the costs by a costs assessor appointed by the team of lawyers and litigation funder.

[1322] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [15.102].

[1323] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 26.

[1324] Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Singapore), r 49B.

[1325] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 333–336 and Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 9.8–9.12.

[1326] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 333.

[1327] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 9.2 and 9.9.

[1328] Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, r 9.

[1329] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [7.139]–[7.148], Recommendation 20.

[1330] Clasul Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2016] FCA 1119.

[1331] Michael Legg “Regulations needed for litigation funders who can’t pay out when cases fail” The Conversation (online ed, Australia, 15 February 2017).

[1332] Clasul Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [2016] FCA 1119 at [6].

[1333] Houghton v Saunders [2021] NZHC 3590.

[1334] Issues Paper at [22.16] and [22.27]–[22.29].

[1335] LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/ Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[1336] See Chapter 7.

[1337] See submission by Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[1338] We discuss discontinuance in Chapter 11.

[1339] Issues Paper at Chapter 19 and Chapter 20.

[1340] For instance, funders want to be kept informed of important developments in the litigation and most will also expect to be consulted before major decisions are taken, particularly in relation to settlement. They may also want to approve or choose the legal team responsible for conducting the case. See Issues Paper at [19.2]–[19.4].

[1341] See Issues Paper at [20.6]–[20.9]. For completeness, we note the interests of the funder and plaintiff will often align.

[1342] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].

[1343] For example, see PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [126] per Elias CJ.

[1344] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [122].

[1345] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [91] per Glazebrook, Arnold, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ.

[1346] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [82] per Glazebrook, Arnold, O’Regan and Ellen France JJ.

[1347] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735 at [126].

[1348] Issues Paper at [20.10]–[20.12].

[1349] Issues Paper at [21.7]–[21.8].

[1350] Issues Paper at [21.9]–[21.11].

[1351] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [57].

[1352] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2016] NZCA 338 at [31].

[1353] The Issues Paper also discussed other possible mechanisms for managing the concerns about funder control, including the court’s powers to strike out proceedings or make a non-party costs order. However, we considered these mechanisms would only manage the concerns to a limited extent. See Issues Paper at [19.13]–[19.22].

[1354] The use of minimum contract terms to manage funder control has been adopted in England and Wales in the Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (which applies to members of the Association of Litigation Funders), by the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts and, in the arbitration context, in Singapore and Hong Kong. See Issues Paper at [19.23]–[19.28] and [20.15]–[20.19].

[1355] Issues Paper at [20.20]–[20.30].

[1356] Issues Paper at [20.31]–[20.32].

[1357] For further discussion, see Issues Paper at [21.16]–[21.27].

[1358] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Colin Carruthers QC, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Te Kāhui Inihua o Aotearoa | Insurance Council of New Zealand, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS), Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1359] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Colin Carruthers QC, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Consumer NZ, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1360] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Simpson Grierson and Vicki Waye.

[1361] Barry Allan, BusinessNZ, Colin Carruthers QC, Chapman Tripp and Insurance Council.

[1362] Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy and Tom Weston QC.

[1363] Bell Gully, IBA Antitrust Committee and Ross Asset Management Investors Group.

[1364] Bell Gully, Consumer NZ, Insurance Council, Simpson Grierson and Vicki Waye.

[1365] Consumer NZ, Crown Law Office and Insurance Council.

[1366] DLA Piper and Omni Bridgeway.

[1367] Barry Allan, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Crown Law Office and Simpson Grierson.

[1368] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Colin Carruthers QC, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Working Committee, Nicole Smith, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia supports the current approach that parties should be able to privately negotiate contract terms, but also supports enhancing the status quo to ensure “greater accountability, transparency and enforcement” through regulation.

[1369] For example, Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[1370] IBA Antitrust Committee noted that the litigation funding industry in the United Kingdom is self-regulated and considered this an insufficient safeguard against the risks of litigation funding.

[1371] DLA Piper and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia (although it also considers minimum contract terms could further assist in regulating funder control).

[1372] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, LPF Group and Omni Bridgeway.

[1373] LPF Group and Omni Bridgeway.

[1374] Woodsford Litigation Funding said the Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (England and Wales) and International Legal Finance Association Best Practices prevent funders from taking control of litigation or settlement negotiations. The Association of Litigation Funders of Australia and Omni Bridgeway said the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s (ASIC) regulation requires Australian funders to maintain conflict management policies, and this is also reflected in the Association of Litigation Funders of Australia's Best Practice Guidelines.

[1375] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1376] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith , Vicki Waye, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1377] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[1378] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[1379] Bell Gully and Chapman Tripp (implied).

[1380] Chapman Tripp and Simpson Grierson.

[1381] Chapman Tripp.

[1382] Barry Allan, Bell Gully, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson. In addition, Chapman Tripp supported a prohibition on discretionary rights for funders to terminate funding agreements.

[1383] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Simpson Grierson.

[1384] Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[1385] Bell Gully, Insurance Council and Simpson Grierson.

[1386] Tom Weston QC regarded minimum terms as “one way to address the problems”, and Vicki Waye said that minimum terms could be an option but noted it might increase the risk of expensive collateral litigation.

[1387] BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey and NZLS.

[1388] Bell Gully, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[1389] Bell Gully, IBA Antitrust Committee and Nicole Smith.

[1390] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Chapman Tripp, Insurance Council and Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia.

[1391] Buddle Findlay and Vicki Waye.

[1392] For example, Recommendation 25 provides that funders should be obliged to disclose to the Federal Court of Australia any potential conflicts of interest, any new or potential conflicts that arise after the first case management conference, and the funder’s conflict management policy (when applying for approval of a funding agreement): Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020).

[1393] Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Crown Law Office, Michael Duffy, Tony Ellis, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, International Bar Association (IBA) Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Murray Lazelle, Michael Legg, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[1394] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, DLA Piper, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/ Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding. Three submissions were unclear.

[1395] Gilbert Walker gave this example. In the Strathboss representative action, the parties reached a $40 million settlement of a $450 million claim, with the kiwifruit growers reportedly recovering 62 per cent of the settlement (about 5 cents in the dollar for what they claimed). However, the settlement followed a decision by Te Kōti Pira | Court of Appeal that it would not be fair, just or reasonable to make the Crown legally responsible for the loss, and that therefore, no legal duty of care was owed by Te Manatu Ahuwhenua, Ngāherehere | Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry staff to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed an appeal against the decision to the Supreme Court, but the hearing was vacated following the out-of-court settlement.

[1396] The Insurance Council explicitly gave this example, and some submitters appeared to refer to it indirectly. The settlements and payments made under litigation funding arrangements in respect of that litigation are being challenged in 100 Investments Ltd v Registrar of Companies [2020] NZHC 880.

[1397] Johnson & Johnson gave the example of Fitzgerald v CBL Insurance Ltd [2014] VSC 493 (2 October 2014) (“Huon Corporation”), which was discussed in Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice – Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings (March 2018) at [2.75]–[2.87]. The case attracted attention because the company’s former employees, on whose behalf the litigation was conducted, received none of the payments ordered by the court. The entire $5,107,259 award went to pay the litigation funder, lawyers and accountants. The litigation took 11 years to resolve.

[1398] Andrew Barker QC, Bell Gully, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp (at least in the absence of a mature and competitive funding market), Claims Resolution Service, Gilbert Walker, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson (implied), Murray Lazelle (implied), NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Ross Asset Management Investors Group (implied), Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC.

[1399] LPF Group and DLA Piper. This point was also made by the Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Maurice Blackburn/ Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway and Woodsford Litigation Funding. However they appear to be commenting on the adequacy of existing mechanisms in Australia, rather than Aotearoa New Zealand. Three submissions were unclear.

[1400] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91.

[1401] PricewaterhouseCoopers v Walker [2017] NZSC 151, [2018] 1 NZLR 735.

[1402] In Chapter 7, we recommend that, when a proceeding is certified as a class action, the representative plaintiff’s lawyer should be regarded as the lawyer for the class and have a solicitor-client relationship with the class.

[1403] The Supreme Court has said that courts have the power to approve settlements in representative actions under HCR 4.24: Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Ross [2020] NZSC 126 at [82]. In Chapter 11, we recommend the courts should be required to approve settlements in class actions.

[1404] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, Buddle Findlay, BusinessNZ, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Commerce Commission, Crown Law Office, DLA Piper, Michael Duffy, Insurance Council, IBA Antitrust Committee, Johnson & Johnson, Murray Lazelle, Michael Legg, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, NZX, Omni Bridgeway, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson, Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1405] Bell Gully, David Bigio QC, Nikki Chamberlain, Chapman Tripp, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Andrew Harmos, Johnson & Johnson, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, MinterEllisonRuddWatts, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission), Nicole Smith, Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1406] Barry Allan, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Claims Resolution Service, Commerce Commission, DLA Piper, Insurance Council, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZX, Ross Asset Management Investors Group, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1407] NZX and Simpson Grierson.

[1408] Andrew Barker QC, Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Buddle Findlay, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZLS, NZ Shareholders’ Association, Simpson Grierson, Vicki Waye (implied), Tom Weston QC and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1409] Six submitters supported the court considering the funding commission at the beginning of a class action: Andrew Barker QC, Carter Holt Harvey, Chapman Tripp, NZLS, Simpson Grierson and Tom Weston QC. Five submitters supported the court considering the funding commission later in the proceedings, such as when approving a class action settlement: Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Andrew Barker QC, IBA Antitrust Committee, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia and Woodsford Litigation Funding. Buddle Findlay submitted Aotearoa New Zealand should pay close heed to recent recommendations by the Australian Law Reform Commission and Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, including recommendations for court approval of funding agreements and court supervision of funding commissions in the context of making a common fund order (if such orders are considered necessary). Some submitters expressed support for court oversight of funding commissions, but did not specify when this should occur.

[1410] Bell Gully, Michael Duffy, Gilbert Walker, Johnson & Johnson, Nicole Smith and Tom Weston QC.

[1411] David Bigio QC, Chapman Tripp, Andrew Harmos, Zane Kennedy, LPF Group, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, Omni Bridgeway, Shine Lawyers, Simpson Grierson, Philip Skelton QC/Kelly Quinn/Carter Pearce (joint submission) and Woodsford Litigation Funding. MinterEllisonRuddWatts submitted that the court should not have a power to vary funding commissions at settlement, except in cases where the real return to funders would be out of all proportion to the risk taken and costs incurred. Some submitters on the Issues Paper also commented on this option in the context of discussing the court oversight of funding arrangements option.

[1412] Insurance Council.

[1413] NZX.

[1414] Vicki Waye. For example, where the claim is very small the funding commission might be capped at 50 per cent of any recovery, but where the claim is large the funding commission might be capped at 10 per cent of the recovery.

[1415] Vicki Waye.

[1416] Omni Bridgeway.

[1417] Association of Litigation Funders of Australia, Chapman Tripp, Claims Resolution Service, Maurice Blackburn/Claims Funding Australia, NZ Shareholders’ Association and Woodsford Litigation Funding.

[1418] Johnson & Johnson, Murray Lazelle and Michael Legg.

[1419] For more information about the survey, see Chapter 1.

[1420] Participants could give an answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being “very unsatisfied” and 5 being “very satisfied”. There were 228 responses to this question, and the average response was 3.51.

[1421] See Issues Paper at [9.18]–[9.19]. In Australia, see similar comments in: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Inquiry into Litigation Funding and the Regulation of the Class Action Industry (December 2020) at [11.53] and Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at [6.64].

[1422] See Chapter 14, where we set out objectives and guiding principles for permitting and regulating litigation funding. See also Chapter 3, where we note the court may have a more active role in the control, supervision and disposition of class actions than in other litigation because of the need to ensure the interests of class members are adequately protected.

[1423] Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd v Southern Response Unresolved Claims Group [2017] NZCA 489, [2018] 2 NZLR 312 at [79].

[1424] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1. See also Issues Paper at [23.50].

[1425] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at 169 (Recommendation 14(a)); Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 11.

[1426] Australian Law Reform Commission Integrity, Fairness and Efficiency—An Inquiry into Class Action Proceedings and Third-Party Litigation Funders (ALRC R134, 2018) at 169 (Recommendation 14(b)); Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 11.

[1427] The Treasury “Treasuring Laws Amendment (Measures for Consultation) Bill 2021: Litigation funders” <www.treasury.gov.au>. A “claim proceeds distribution method” means “a method... for determining the amount of any claim proceeds for the scheme that is to be paid or distributed to the scheme’s general members”.

[1428] For a similar example of this approach in Ontario, see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, s 33.1(3).

[1429] The High Court Rules require any affidavit in support of an interlocutory application to be filed at the same time as the application: High Court Rules 2016, r 7.20.

[1430] For an example of a similiar approach in Ontario, see Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6, ss 33.1(9)(a)(i) and 33.1(10)

[1431] See our discussion about models for regulation and oversight of litigation funding in Chapter 14.

[1432] For examples of guidance to this effect in comparable jurisdictions, see: Association of Litigation Funders Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders (Civil Justice Council, January 2018) at [9.2]–[9.3]; Hong Kong Code of Practice for Third Party Funding of Arbitration 2018 at [2.9]; Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts Litigation Funding Rules 2019, r 9(1); and Singapore Institute of Arbitrators Guidelines for Third Party Funders (18 May 2017) at [6.1.1], [6.1.4] and [6.2.1].

[1433] Waterhouse v Contractors Bonding Ltd [2013] NZSC 89, [2014] 1 NZLR 91 at [48].

[1434] Class Proceedings Act SO 1992 c 6 (Ontario), s 33.1(9)(a)(i).

[1435] For example, Money Max Int Pty Ltd v QBE Insurance Group Ltd [2016] FCAFC 148, (2016) 245 FCR 191 at [79]–[83], and Asirifi-Otchere v Swann Insurance (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2020] FCA 1885 at [21]–[25].

[1436] High Court Rules 2016, rr 5.26(b) and 5.32.

[1437] For example, if the amount recovered is [A], the number of claimants entitled to a share in any settlement or award is [B] and the costs amount to [C], then the funding commission will be [D].

[1438] Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 54A(1)‑-(2).

[1439] Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at [11.82].

[1440] It recommended the Federal Court’s Class Actions Practice Note be amended to expressly state the court can appoint a referee to act as a litigation funding costs assessor at any point in the proceedings, including when the funder seeks court approval of the funding agreement and when settlement approval is sought. It recommended the referee should be a professional with market capital or finance experience, and considered that embedding a practice of appointing referees to assess litigation funding costs will establish a panel of competent and reputable experts in the capital market or finance from which the court can select a referee. See Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services Litigation funding and the regulation of the class action industry (December 2020) at Recommendation 13 and Recommendation 14, and at [11.88].

[1441] High Court Rules 2016, r 9.36

[1442] Including a fixed percentage-based statutory cap on funding commissions, a sliding scale cap (where the upper limit for funding commissions progressively drops as the amount recovered increases), a statutory cap calculated as a multiple of the funder’s costs, a legislated minimum return to class members, and a multiplier and multiplicand table system. A multiplicand is a lump sum calculation that should represent the conservative basis figure of an award to an individual claimant while factoring in any potential costs involved, and a multiplier could then be applied to the multiplicand based on the number of claimants in the class action.

[1443] See Chapter 2. See also Issues Paper at Chapters 1, 5 and 17.

[1444] Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8, s 59.1; Jasminka Kalajdzic Class Actions in Canada: The Promise and Reality of Access to Justice (UBC Press, Vancouver, 2018) at 153–154. According to the Report of the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee on Class Action Reform (Ministry of the Attorney General, February 1990) at 59:

... [t]he answer to accessibility is not the removal of all risk of the obligations for costs, but rather, the support of worthwhile class proceedings through assistance with disbursements and protection against adverse costs awards.

[1445] Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8 (Ontario), s 59.1(2).

[1446] A contingency fee is where the lawyer obtains a fee calculated as a proportion of any sum recovered if the outcome is successful, and nothing if the outcome is unsuccessful.

[1447] The Fund’s levy is calculated in accordance with reg 10 of O Reg 771/92 (Class Proceedings) issued under the Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8 (Ontario).

[1448] See Edwards v Law Society of Upper Canada (1995) 36 CPC (3d) 116 at 116–118. Edwards is a decision of the Class Proceedings Committee that outlines the Committee’s approach to applications and is referred to on the Law Foundation of Ontario’s website as a source of guidance for applicants. See The Law Foundation of Ontario “Class Proceedings Fund: Application Process” <www.lawfoundation.on.ca>.

[1449] The Law Foundation of Ontario Staying Connected: 2020 Annual Report (July 2021) at 37.

[1450] The ‘Fonds’ is short for Fonds d’aide aux actions collectives.

[1451] Act respecting the Fonds d’aide aux actions collectives CQLR c F-3.2.0.1.1, Arts 27 and 29. Note that there is a maximum hourly rate at which legal fees are funded ($100 per hour for senior lawyers and $40 per hour for junior lawyers), which is significantly below the market rate: Catherine Piché “Public Financiers as Overseers of Class Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779 at 802.

[1452 ] The other sources of funding are: annual Government subsidies, reimbursement of funds paid (from costs awarded paid by unsuccessful defendants) and interests on investments. See Catherine Piché “Public Financiers as Overseers of Class Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779 at 797–798.

[1453] Act respecting the Fonds d’aide aux actions collectives CQLR c F-3.2.0.1.1, Art 23.

[1454] Catherine Piché “Public Financiers as Overseers of Class Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779 at 803–‑‑‑‑‑804.

[1455] Catherine Piché “Public Financiers as Overseers of Class Proceedings” (2016) 12 NYU JLB 779 at 804–805.

[1456] Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [307]–[314].

[1457] Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [308].

[1458 ] Australian Law Reform Commission Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court (ALRC R46, 1988) at [312]; Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice—Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings: Report (March 2018) at [5.127].

[1459] Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice—Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings: Report (March 2018) at [5.127]—[5.128].

[1460] Samuel Becher, Tony Ellis and Nicole Smith.

[1461] See Rachael Mulheron Class Actions and Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020) at 170.

[1462] Rachael Mulheron suggests legislation should identify whether the charge received by a public fund upon the recovery should take effect prior to, or following, the compensation of those class members who come forward to claim their individual compensation: Rachael Mulheron Class Actions and Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020) at 170.

[1463] We discuss this in Chapter 10.

[1464] Rachael Mulheron Class Actions and Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2020) at 148, citing Law Reform Commission of Ontario Review of Class Actions in Ontario – Issues to be Considered (November 2013) at 7.

[1465] The Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 prohibits lawyers from charging contingency fees, but allows them to charge conditional fees in some circumstances. A contingency fee is where the lawyer obtains a fee calculated as a proportion of any sum recovered if the outcome is successful, and nothing if the outcome is unsuccessful. A conditional fee is where the lawyer also obtains nothing if the outcome is unsuccessful, but is allowed to charge a fee based on a lawyer’s normal hourly rate plus a premium that “is not calculated as a proportion of the amount recovered” if the outcome is successful. The premium is to compensate the lawyer for the risk of not being paid at all, and may be calculated as proportion of the lawyer’s expenses or a fixed amount. See Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, ss 333–336 and Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, rr 9.8–9.12.

[1466] Although we note that legal aid is administered by the Ministry and is available for claims against the Government, for example Waitangi Tribunal claims.

[1467] In Ontario, for example, the Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8 provides that the Law Foundation shall administer the Class Proceedings Fund. It establishes a Class Proceedings Committee comprising one member appointed by the Foundation, one member appointed by the Attorney General, and three members appointed jointly by the Foundation and the Attorney General. Each member holds office for a period of three years and is eligible for re-appointment. Three members constitute a quorum. Members are not remunerated but are entitled to compensation for any expenses. See Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8, s 59.2.

[1468] See Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8 (Ontario), s 59.3(4) and O Reg 771/92 (Class Proceedings), s 5.

[1469] See Law Society Act RSO 1990 c L-8 (Ontario), s 59.3(5).

[1470] See Chapter 3 and Chapter 7.

[1471] We recommend an express provision relating to class member discovery in Chapter 8.

[1472] See Chapter 6 and Chapter 10.

[1473] We discuss options for determining individual issues in an efficient manner in Chapter 8.

[1474] We discuss settlement in Chapter 11.

[1475] See Chapter 11.

[1476] See Chapter 2.

[1477] See Victorian Law Reform Commission Access to Justice—Litigation Funding and Group Proceedings: Report (March 2018) at [4.223] and Todd B Hilsee, Shannon R Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J Legal Ethics 1359 at 1365.

[1478] We explain the scope and methodology of the survey in Chapter 1.

[1479] We asked participants whether they were “a representative or lead plaintiff”, “a member of a plaintiff committee or management committee”, “neither a representative plaintiff nor a member of the plaintiff committee”, or “unsure”. We received 409 responses. Of those, 239 survey participants indicated they were neither the representative plaintiff nor a member of the plaintiff committee, 17 participants identified as a representative or lead plaintiff, 5 participants identified as a member of a plaintiff committee or management committee, and 148 participants were unsure.

[1480] See Todd B Hilsee, Shannon R Wheatman and Gina M Intrepido “Do You Really Want Me to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform” (2005) 18 The Geo J Legal Ethics 1359 at 1377–1380, Margaret Hagan “A Human-Centred Design Approach to Access to Justice: Generating New Prototypes and Hypotheses for Interventions to Make Courts User-Friendly” (2018) 6 Ind J L & Soc Equal 199 at 234 and Federal Judicial Center “Judges’ Class Action Notice and Claims Process Checklist and Plain Language Guide” (2010).

[1481] Ministry of Justice “Civil” (11 March 2022) <www.justice.govt.nz/courts/civil/>.

[1482] Information should comply with relevant accessibility standards or guidelines.

[1483] In Ross v Southern Response Te Kōti Matua | High Court directed a copy of the judgment approving notice to be provided to Community Law Canterbury and the Greater Christchurch Claims Resolution Service to “achieve a greater level of completed communication with class members” as they could be relied upon to “bring the class members notice to the attention of any policyholder they encounter”: Ross v Southern Response Earthquake Services Ltd [2021] NZHC 2452 at [164].

[1484] Class Action Clinic: Windsor Law “Our Mission and Services” <www.classactionclinic.com>.

[1485] Clinical Legal Education Tel Aviv University “Class Action Clinic” <www.en-law.tau.ac.il>.


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