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Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006. The Third Review of the Evidence Act 2006 [2024] NZLCR 148
Last Updated: 23 March 2024
Hui-tanguru | February 2024
Te Whanganui-a-Tara, Aotearoa
Wellington, New Zealand
Pūrongo | Report 148
Te
Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006
The
Third Review of the Evidence Act 2006
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission is an independent, publicly funded,
central advisory body established by statute to undertake
the systematic review,
reform and development of the law of Aotearoa New Zealand. Its purpose is to
help achieve law that is just,
principled and accessible and that reflects the
values and aspirations of the people of Aotearoa New Zealand.
Te Aka Matua in the Commission’s Māori name refers to the parent
vine that Tāwhaki used to climb up to the heavens.
At the foot of the
ascent, he and his brother Karihi find their grandmother Whaitiri, who guards
the vines that form the pathway
into the sky. Karihi tries to climb the vines
first but makes the error of climbing up the aka taepa or hanging vine. He is
blown
violently around by the winds of heaven and falls to his death. Following
Whaitiri’s advice, Tāwhaki climbs the aka matua
or parent vine,
reaches the heavens and receives the three baskets of knowledge.
Kia whanake ngā ture o Aotearoa mā te arotake motuhake
Better law for Aotearoa New Zealand through independent
review
The Commissioners are:
Amokura Kawharu — Tumu Whakarae | President
Claudia Geiringer — Kaikōmihana | Commissioner
Geof Shirtcliffe — Kaikōmihana | Commissioner
Kei te pātengi raraunga o Te Puna Mātauranga o Aotearoa te
whakarārangi o tēnei pukapuka.
A catalogue record for this title is available from the National Library of
New Zealand.
ISBN 978-1-99-115996-0 (Print)
ISBN 978-1-99-115997-7 (Online)
ISSN 0113-2334 (Print)
ISSN 1177-6196 (Online)
This title may be cited as NZLC R148. This title is available on the internet
at the website of Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission:
www.lawcom.govt.nz
Copyright © 2024 Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International licence. In essence, you are free to copy, distribute
and adapt
the work, as long as you attribute the work to Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission and abide by other licence terms.
To view a copy of this licence,
visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
|
|
Tumu Whakarae | President
Amokura Kawharu FRSNZ
Kaikōmihana | Commissioners Claudia Geiringer FRSNZ Geof
Shirtcliffe
|
Hon Paul Goldsmith
Minister Responsible for the Law Commission
Parliament Buildings
WELLINGTON
|
23 February 2024
|
|
Tēnā koe Minister
|
|
NZLC R148 — Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third
Review of the Evidence Act 2006
I am pleased to submit to you the above report under section 16 of the Law
Commission Act 1985.
Nāku noa, nā
Amokura Kawharu
Tumu Whakarae | President
Foreword
This report contains our advice for reform of the Evidence Act 2006. Our
recommendations are designed to promote the just determination
of court
proceedings, in line with the Act’s fundamental purpose.
It has been nearly 20 years since Parliament passed the Act on the advice of
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission. In doing so,
Parliament took the
radical step of bringing the previously disparate body of evidence law into one
accessible statute. Parliament
also added section 202 to the Act requiring the
Commission to conduct operational reviews of the Act every five years. These
reviews
have helped to keep evidence law fit for purpose. However (as earlier
recommended by the Commission) section 202 has been repealed
and this is
therefore our third and final review.
As with our previous reviews, we have concluded the Act is generally working
well in practice. Nevertheless, several issues have been
brought to our
attention that we think require reform. Some of our recommendations are
particularly noteworthy.
We make several recommendations to address long-standing issues with the
current provisions governing hearsay evidence. These include
the admission of
mātauranga (Māori knowledge) and tikanga as evidence as well as the
admission of statements from witnesses
who, due to factors such as intimidation,
are too fearful to give evidence in court.
We also make recommendations to address new and emerging issues. These
include bringing the laws of medical privilege into alignment
with the provision
of modern healthcare and creating specific safeguards for evidence from prison
informants.
We comprehensively examined the many operational issues with the Act’s
provisions governing admission of improperly obtained
evidence. Our
recommendations aim to provide greater clarity and certainty for judges weighing
the important but competing interests
at stake in these decisions.
We also make a number of recommendations aimed at increasing efficiency in
civil proceedings. These include removing inconsistencies
between the Act and
the High Court Rules 2016 regarding hearsay evidence, clarifying the duty to
cross-examine and clarifying the
laws regarding legal and litigation privilege.
We are confident our recommendations will help guide the future reform work
necessary to improve outcomes for everyone seeking justice
in our courts.
- Amokura
Kawharu
- Tumu Whakarae |
President
-
Acknowledgements
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission acknowledges the contributions of
everyone who has helped us in this review.
In particular, we acknowledge the generous contributions made by our Expert
Advisory Group. These individuals provided guidance as
we identified issues,
developed policy proposals, considered feedback and developed reform
recommendations. Our members were:
- Echo
Haronga
- Associate
Professor Anna High (Te Whare Wānanga o Otāgo | University of
Otago)
- Mark Lillico (on
behalf of Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office)
- Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald MNZM (Te Whare Wānanga o Waitaha | University
of Canterbury)
- Jack
Oliver-Hood
- Associate
Professor Scott Optican (Waipapa Taumata Rau | University of Auckland)
- Tania Singh (on
behalf of Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence
Service).
We also thank the Judicial Advisory Committee for their
regular feedback on our proposals. The Committee’s members were Justice
Mathew Downs, Justice Christine French and Judge Stephen Harrop.
We are grateful to those people and organisations who have discussed aspects
of the project with us and provided helpful information
during the course of our
review. This includes members of the legal profession, legal professional
bodies, Ngā Pirihimana o
Aotearoa | New Zealand Police and New Zealand
Family Violence Clearinghouse as well as many other people and organisations
with an
interest in our justice system. We also acknowledge the feedback we
received from submitters and the Commission’s Māori
Liaison
Committee.
We emphasise nevertheless that the views we express in this report are those
of the Commission and not necessarily those of the people
who have assisted our
work.
Nō reira, ko tēnei mātou e mihi nei ki a koutou, kua whai
wā ki te āwhina i a mātou. Tēnā
koutou, tēnā
koutou, tēnā koutou katoa.
The Commissioner responsible for this project is Amokura Kawharu. The Legal
and Policy Advisers who worked on this project are Ruth
Campbell, Tāneora
Fraser, Dena Valente and Jesse Watts. Former Principal Legal and Policy Adviser
Nichola Lambie led the preparation
of our Issues Paper. We acknowledge the
assistance provided by the law clerks who have worked on this project —
Sophie Colson,
George Curzon-Hobson, Kaea Hudson, Jack McNeill and Lucia Young.
We also acknowledge the contribution of Justice Christian Whata,
who provided
valuable input as a Commissioner before returning to the Bench in mid-2023.
Contents
Executive
summary
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
- This
is our third and final statutory review of the Evidence Act 2006. Chapter 1 sets
out the approach we have taken to the review,
its operational nature and scope,
the matters addressed in this report and how we have assessed the need for
reform.
CHAPTER 2: TE AO MāORI AND THE EVIDENCE ACT
- In
Chapter 2, we consider whether the Act adequately provides for the admission of
mātauranga (Māori knowledge) and tikanga
as evidence and whether there
are other issues with how the Act recognises and provides for te ao
Māori.
Mātauranga and tikanga evidence
- It
has long been recognised the Act’s rules against hearsay (section 17) and
opinion evidence (section 23) can create challenges
for the admission of
mātauranga and tikanga evidence, particularly evidence deriving from the
tradition of oral history or kōrero
tuku iho in te ao Māori.
- We
recommend creating an exception to the hearsay rule for statements concerning
the existence or content of mātauranga and tikanga.
This is necessary to
normalise the admission of tikanga and mātauranga (including oral history)
and promote more efficient conduct
of proceedings. In relation to the opinion
rule, we recommend Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee
consider
amending the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses to better recognise
and provide for mātauranga and tikanga as a unique category
of expert
evidence.
- We
do not recommend introducing statutory guidance regarding the need to interpret
and apply the Act having regard to te ao Māori.
We are not persuaded such
guidance would best address the operational issues we have identified and
consider it may instead introduce
uncertainty.
Other issues
- We
received few submissions on other issues relating to how the Act recognises and
provides for te ao Māori. We do not recommend
reform to extend privilege to
communications with kaumātua, tohunga and rongoā practitioners. We
also do not recommend
any further reform in relation to the procedures for
giving evidence in court and their compatibility with tikanga. Te Aka Matua
o te
Ture | Law Commission recommended in its Second Review that the Act be amended
to make it clear the courts can regulate procedures
for giving evidence in a
manner that recognises tikanga. Some of the submissions we received lend further
support to consideration
of that recommendation.
CHAPTER 3: HEARSAY
- In
Chapter 3, we consider the operation of the hearsay rules in sections 17 and 18.
Hearsay statements when the maker of the statement is
fearful of giving evidence
- The
Act currently only permits hearsay statements to be admitted in limited
circumstances. Prompted by recent case law, we considered
whether the Act should
be amended to allow hearsay statements to be admitted when the maker of the
statement is fearful of giving
evidence and, if so, under what circumstances.
- We
recommend amending section 18 to include a new ground for admitting a hearsay
statement where the maker of the statement has a
reasonable fear of retaliation
if they give evidence, they do not intend to give evidence because of that fear
and it is in the interests
of justice to admit their statement. We propose to
define “fear of retaliation” as fear that a defendant or any other
person will cause physical or other harm (including, for example, financial or
social harm) to the maker of the statement or any
other person.
- We
consider this approach strikes a more appropriate balance between the rights and
interests of defendants and witnesses. A hearsay
statement from a fearful person
could be admitted, allowing their evidence to be considered by the court without
putting them at
risk. A defendant would not be able to benefit from the fear
they have created in another person. At the same time, the proposed
reform would
protect the fair trial rights of defendants by confining the exception to an
objective fear of retaliation (rather than
a more general fear of giving
evidence) and only allowing admission where it is “in the interests of
justice”.
When a person “cannot with reasonable diligence”
be found
- Under
section 16(2), one of the circumstances in which a person is “unavailable
as a witness” for the purpose of the hearsay
rules is when they
“cannot with reasonable diligence be identified or found”. We
considered whether the lack of guidance
in the Act as to what is required to
satisfy the “reasonable diligence” requirement is creating
inconsistency in approach
or uncertainty as to what steps police should take to
locate a witness. We do not recommend reform as we did not identify evidence
of
a problem in practice.
Hearsay in civil proceedings
- The
Act determines the admissibility of evidence in both civil and criminal
proceedings. In civil proceedings, the Act must also be
read alongside the High
Court Rules 2016. There are inconsistencies between the Act and the High Court
Rules in relation to the process
for challenging the admissibility of hearsay
statements in civil proceedings and the admissibility of hearsay statements that
are
not challenged.
- We
recommend limiting the operation of section 17 in civil proceedings so that it
only applies where a party challenges the admissibility
of a hearsay statement
in accordance with the relevant rules of court. We also recommend the court
should have residual discretion
to dispense with this requirement. Our
recommendation sets out the circumstances in which a judge may give such a
direction. This
reform will improve the operation of the hearsay provisions in
civil proceedings to better achieve the purpose of the Act by (among
other
things) avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay.
CHAPTER 4: DEFENDANTS’ AND CO-DEFENDANTS’
STATEMENTS
- In
Chapter 4, we consider the admissibility of defendants’ and
co-defendants’ statements in criminal proceedings under
sections 21, 22A
and 27.
Defendants’ exculpatory statements
- Under
section 21, a defendant cannot offer their own hearsay statement in evidence.
This means, for example, that a defendant who
does not give evidence at trial
cannot offer an exculpatory statement they made in a police interview. Case law
has recognised the
courts have a discretion to require the prosecution to offer
evidence of a defendant’s statement where it is necessary to ensure
trial
fairness. In practice, however, there appears to be inconsistency regarding when
prosecutors choose to offer a defendant’s
exculpatory statement in
evidence and when the courts will require them to do so.
- We
do not recommend reform of section 21. While inconsistency in approach is
undesirable, codifying a discretionary approach is unlikely
to increase
consistency. Requiring the prosecution to offer defendants’ police
statements as a matter of course would fundamentally
alter the way criminal
proceedings are run and could lead to defendants electing not to give evidence
in more (or even most) cases.
Defendants’ statements contained within hearsay
statements
- Under
section 27(1), evidence offered by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding of a
statement made by a defendant is admissible
against that defendant. Section
27(3) provides that the hearsay provisions do not apply to such statements. On a
strict interpretation,
this means the hearsay provisions do not apply to a
hearsay statement by a person other than a defendant that recounts something
the
defendant allegedly said. Case law has held that the admissibility of such
statements must first be determined under the hearsay
provisions before applying
section 27. However, this approach requires a purposive interpretation of
section 27(3) that is difficult
to reconcile with its plain wording.
- We
recommend reform to clarify that the hearsay provisions apply to a hearsay
statement made by a person other than a defendant that
contains a
defendant’s statement. This recommendation is consistent with case law and
the intention behind section 27(3).
Admissibility of defendants’ non-hearsay statements
against co-defendants
- Section
27(1) provides that a defendant’s statement is only admissible against a
co-defendant if it is admitted under section
22A. Section 22A was intended to
codify the common law co-conspirators’ rule, which was an exception to the
rule against hearsay.
However, the wording of section 22A only allows for the
admission of hearsay statements. On the plain wording of the Act, a
defendant’s
non-hearsay statement cannot be admitted against a
co-defendant. This is contrary to the position at common law and does not appear
to have been intended.
- In
its Second Review, the Commission recommended an amendment to address this issue
by applying the requirements of the co-conspirators’
rule to both hearsay
and non-hearsay statements. However, as te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court
later pointed out in Winter v R, this approach would not replicate the
common law position either.0F[1] At
common law, defendants’ non-hearsay statements were admissible against
co-defendants without having to satisfy the co-conspirators’
rule.
- We
recommend reform to clarify that a defendant’s non-hearsay statement is
admissible against a co-defendant under section 27.
This reflects the original
intention to codify the common law position.
CHAPTER 5: UNRELIABLE STATEMENTS
- In
Chapter 5, we consider section 28, which provides for the exclusion of
unreliable defendants’ statements offered by the prosecution
in criminal
proceedings.
Wording of section 28
- In
R v Wichman, the majority of the Supreme Court held that
indications of actual reliability (that a statement is true or untrue in fact)
are relevant
to the assessment in section 28 of whether “the circumstances
in which the statement was made were not likely to have adversely
affected its
reliability”.1F[2] This
interpretation is arguably at odds with the plain wording of the section. We
considered whether section 28 should be amended
to make it easier to understand
and apply, and to reflect the intention in Wichman that indications of
actual reliability should only be considered where they are clear and obvious.
- We
do not recommend amending section 28. We did not identify evidence that its
current wording is causing problems in practice. Recent
case law suggests the
courts are applying Wichman correctly and continuing to take a relatively
cautious approach to admitting defendants’ statements when reliability
concerns
are raised. Additionally, although the wording of section 28 does not
necessarily reflect the approach in Wichman, any advantages of an
amendment to clarify are outweighed by the risks of creating further uncertainty
or leading the courts to place
undue weight on actual reliability.
Standard of proof for admissibility
- We
considered whether the “balance of probabilities” standard for
admitting evidence under section 28(2) provides adequate
protection against the
risk of conviction based on a false confession. There is increasing recognition
of the reliability risks associated
with confessions and the undue weight they
may be given by the fact-finder. There has also been an increase in the use of
some investigatory
techniques that may make it more difficult to assess the
reliability of any resulting confession, such as “Mr Big” undercover
operations and the Complex Investigation Phased Engagement Model for questioning
suspects.
- We
do not recommend changing the standard of proof in section 28. There are good
arguments in principle for raising the standard to
reflect the significant risks
of miscarriages of justice based on false confessions. However, there is no
clear evidence of a problem
in practice to warrant reform (for example, evidence
of miscarriages of justice due to false confessions being admitted under section
28). Recent case law suggests the courts are taking a cautious approach to
admitting potentially unreliable statements.
CHAPTER 6: INVESTIGATORY TECHNIQUES AND RISKS OF
UNRELIABILITY
- In
Chapter 6, we consider how the Act governs the admissibility of evidence
obtained through investigatory techniques that risk producing
unreliable
evidence.
- Sections
28 (unreliable statements), 29 (oppression) and 30 (improperly obtained
evidence) were designed to operate alongside each
other to exclude evidence that
has been obtained unfairly and to ensure defendants’ statements are
sufficiently reliable to
be considered by the fact-finder. Preliminary feedback
suggested these provisions may not adequately address the use of certain
techniques
for questioning suspects that have the potential to produce
unreliable confessions.
- As
discussed in Chapter 5, the Supreme Court in R v Wichman found that a
court applying section 28 can consider indications the defendant’s
statement is likely to be true in
fact.2F[3] This limits the
circumstances in which evidence will be excluded under section 28. Further, the
majority judgment in Wichman indicates that, where a statement is not
excluded under section 28, any residual risks of unreliability stemming from the
investigatory
techniques used to obtain the statement are irrelevant to whether
the statement was obtained “unfairly” so as to engage
section 30.
This approach, if adopted, could prevent the courts from excluding evidence to
discourage, and ensure the justice system
is not seen as condoning,
investigatory conduct that risks producing unreliable evidence.
- We
do not recommend reform. We consider section 30 may already apply where
investigators have acted in a manner that risked producing
unreliable evidence.
Such conduct may affect both whether evidence was “unfairly
obtained” (and therefore engages section
30) and the application of the
section 30 balancing test. This approach is consistent with the purpose and
current wording of section
30. At this stage, there is no evidence of
Wichman being applied in a manner that prevents consideration of risks of
unreliability under section 30.
CHAPTER 7: IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
- In
Chapter 7, we consider the application of the section 30 balancing test, which
determines whether improperly obtained evidence
is admissible in criminal
proceedings.
The operation of the balancing test
- There
are long-standing concerns that the balancing test in section 30 may be leading
to admissibility decisions that are too unpredictable
and inconsistent and that
it is too skewed towards admitting improperly obtained evidence.
- We
identify two issues with the application of the section 30 balancing test.
First, the reasoning in some recent judgments indicates
that judges sometimes
give less weight to the impropriety than was anticipated when the balancing test
was developed by the courts
and subsequently codified in the Act. Second, the
unstructured nature of the section 30 test has led to inconsistency in how the
test is applied — in particular, whether and when some of the factors set
out in section 30(3) will weigh in favour of admission
or exclusion. We conclude
section 30 should be amended to provide a clearer structure and guidance on its
application to encourage
a more consistent approach. We make three
recommendations to this end aimed at different elements of the section 30 test.
The wording of the balancing test in section
30(2)(b)
- We
first recommend amending section 30(2)(b) to specify that the judge must exclude
improperly obtained evidence unless satisfied
it is in the public interest to
admit it. This will more clearly signal that the courts should give significant
weight to the impropriety
as a starting point, consistent with the original
intent of the balancing test. It will promote greater consistency in relation to
the weight judges attach to improprieties and encourage the courts to clearly
articulate why admission is in the public interest
(where that is the case).
- This
recommendation should be implemented alongside our second recommendation, which
would clarify the public interests to be weighed
in the balancing test.
Currently, section 30(2)(b) refers to a “balancing process” but does
not specify what considerations
are being balanced against each other or how the
courts should decide what an “effective and credible system of
justice”
requires. If our first recommendation is accepted, we recommend
amending section 30(2)(b) to require the judge to exclude improperly
obtained
evidence unless satisfied that the public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the impropriety is outweighed by the
public interest in having
the evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial.
- If
our first recommendation is not accepted, this second recommendation could still
be implemented on its own. We suggest alternative
wording that would identify
the relevant public interests without otherwise altering the nature of the
section 30(2)(b) test.
Application of the section 30(3) factors in the balancing
test
- Our
third recommendation relates to the application of the factors set out in
section 30(3) to which judges may have regard when applying
the section 30(2)(b)
balancing test. As drafted, each factor is worded in an open way that does not
indicate whether it favours admission
or exclusion, or whether the absence of a
factor is relevant. This has led to confusion over the relevance of certain
factors and
inconsistency in how they are applied.
- We
recommend amending section 30(3) to specify to which public interest each factor
relates (that is, the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the
impropriety or the public interest in having evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial). This amendment
would provide the courts with guidance as
to how the relevance of each factor should be assessed, encouraging a more
structured reasoning
process. We consider this will lead to greater consistency
and predictability in section 30 decisions.
- This
recommendation would need to be enacted alongside our second recommendation to
clarify the interests to be weighed against each
other under section 30(2)(b).
If that recommendation is not accepted, we do not recommend amending section
30(3) to specify whether
certain factors weigh in favour of admission or
exclusion.
- We
also recommend several amendments to the individual factors listed in section
30(3). Some of these proposed amendments aim to improve
the clarity and
accessibility of the law. We recommend they be enacted as part of the package of
section 30(3) reforms outlined above.
Our recommendations to amend section
30(3)(b) (the nature of the impropriety) and repeal of section 30(3)(e) (other
investigatory
techniques) address more significant issues with the current case
law. These could be implemented alone even if other amendments
to section 30 are
not pursued.
Racial bias
- Te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal has recognised that a search influenced by
racial bias could lead to a finding that evidence
was improperly
obtained.3F[4] We considered whether
the application of section 30 in cases of potential racial bias is sufficiently
clear. We do not recommend
amending section 30 to explicitly address issues of
racial bias. Although we acknowledge the serious concerns about Māori and
other ethnic minorities being disproportionately stopped and searched by police,
we do not consider there is clear evidence that
racial bias is not being
considered under section 30 when it ought to be.
Role of causation under section 30(5)
- We
considered whether section 30(5) is sufficiently clear as to the role of
causation in assessing whether evidence is “improperly
obtained”. We
do not recommend reform. We did not identify widespread concern about the
current approach to causation. Further,
causation would be difficult to define
precisely, and any amendment could create further uncertainty or have unintended
consequences.
CHAPTER 8: PRISON INFORMANTS AND INCENTIVISED WITNESSES
- In
Chapter 8, we consider whether the Act sufficiently addresses the risk of
unreliability posed by evidence given by prison informants
and other
incentivised witnesses.
Admissibility of prison informant evidence
- The
Act does not specifically address the admissibility of prison informant
evidence. Currently, it is admissible if it is relevant
(section 7) and not
excluded (under section 8, which requires exclusion of evidence if its probative
value is outweighed by the risk
it will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on,
or needlessly prolong, the proceeding).
- Prison
informant evidence can be highly valuable to the prosecution case. However, it
can be unreliable since prison informants are
often incentivised to give
evidence. Juries tend to find prison informant evidence highly persuasive even
when warned about its potential
unreliability. There have been high-profile
instances of wrongful convictions based in part on false prison informant
evidence.
- We
recommend a new provision requiring the judge to exclude prison informant
evidence offered by the prosecution in a criminal proceeding
unless satisfied on
the balance of probabilities that the circumstances relating to the evidence
provide reasonable assurance that
it is reliable. The provision would also set
out factors to which the judge must have regard when making that assessment.
- This
recommendation relates only to prison informant evidence. There are other
classes of witnesses who are incentivised to give evidence.
However, the risks
of unreliability associated with other types of incentivised evidence have not
been demonstrated to the same degree
as with prison informant evidence. It would
also be difficult to precisely define any wider class of incentivised
witnesses.
Judicial directions
- Section
122(2)(d) requires a judge to consider whether to warn the jury of the need for
caution in deciding whether to accept prison
informant evidence and the weight
to be given to it. We do not recommend reform to enhance judicial directions on
prison informant
evidence. We are not persuaded mandatory or prescribed
directions are necessary or appropriate. Our recommendation to introduce a
reliability threshold for the admission of prison informant evidence would place
less emphasis on judicial directions as a solution
to the risks this evidence
poses.
Additional safeguards
- We
also do not recommend creating additional safeguards in relation to the use of
prison informant evidence. Some safeguards have
been introduced recently —
the Solicitor-General has produced guidance for prosecutors on the use of prison
informant evidence,
and Police has established a central register of prison
informants. These safeguards should be allowed to bed in. In addition, our
recommended admissibility provision will necessarily improve record-keeping and
disclosure since the court will require information
about the informant and
their proposed evidence to reach a view on admissibility.
CHAPTER 9: VERACITY EVIDENCE
- In
Chapter 9, we consider the operation of the veracity rules (sections 37 and 38).
Application of the veracity rules to single lies
- We
do not recommend reform to clarify whether the veracity rules apply to evidence
of a single previous lie (or alleged lie). Recent
case law confirms that
evidence of a single lie can be veracity evidence and that the number of
previous lies is relevant when assessing
whether the evidence is
“substantially helpful” (and therefore admissible under
section 37). We agree that approach is
consistent with the purpose of
section 37 and is available on the current wording of the section.
Assessing substantial helpfulness (section
37(3))
- Section
37(3) purports to provide a non-exhaustive list of matters relevant to deciding
whether veracity evidence is “substantially
helpful”. We recommend
its repeal as it does not perform a useful role in practice. It does not provide
guidance on evaluative
matters the court should consider. Some of the factors
listed are redundant and others are examples of types of veracity
evidence that may be substantially helpful depending on the circumstances. We
consider their continued inclusion as statutory
factors may cause confusion and
unduly elevate the significance of some types of veracity evidence over others.
We also consider
it unnecessary to replace the factors in section 37(3) with a
different list of factors. Case law already provides clear guidance
on the
assessment of substantial helpfulness and may continue to develop over time.
Codifying that guidance would risk reducing the
flexibility of the test for
admissibility of veracity evidence.
Application of section 38(2) when the defendant puts
veracity in issue
- Under
section 38(2), the prosecution may only offer veracity evidence about the
defendant with the judge’s permission and only
if “the defendant
has, in court, given oral evidence about his or her veracity or challenged the
veracity of a prosecution
witness by reference to matters other than the facts
in issue”.
- We
recommend removing the requirement that the defendant put veracity in issue by
giving oral evidence in court. This requirement
does not reflect modern trial
practices, which frequently involve defendants’ evidential video
interviews being played in court.
These interviews may contain claims about the
defendant’s own veracity or challenges to the veracity of a prosecution
witness.
Further, the current law does not account for the different ways a
defendant may put veracity in issue at trial — for example,
by challenging
the veracity of a prosecution witness in cross-examination. Our proposed
amendment also includes safeguards aimed
at avoiding potential unfairness to the
defendant that might otherwise result from this reform.
Use of the term “veracity” in other parts of the
Act
- The
term “veracity” is used in other sections outside the veracity
rules. In some of these sections, the term carries
a different meaning. In
section 37, “veracity” is concerned with evidence extraneous to the
facts in issue. In other
sections, it refers to the truthfulness of the witness
in the particular proceeding. We do not recommend reform to make the different
meanings of “veracity” in the Act explicit. We found no evidence of
problems in practice. The courts are interpreting
the term
“veracity” appropriately having regard to the context in which it is
used.
CHAPTER 10: PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
- In
Chapter 10, we consider section 43, which governs propensity evidence offered by
the prosecution about the defendant.
The general operation of section 43(1)
- Section
43(1) allows the prosecution to offer propensity evidence about a defendant in a
criminal proceeding if its probative value
outweighs the risk that it might have
an unfairly prejudicial effect on the defendant. We considered whether it is
operating as intended
—in particular, whether propensity evidence is being
too readily admitted and whether it is resulting in unpredictable and
inconsistent admissibility decisions.
- We
do not recommend reform in relation to section 43(1). We conclude there is
insufficient evidence of a problem in practice given
mixed feedback from
submitters and the difficulties of evaluating the application of section 43(1)
through case law. We also do not
consider amendment would change the frequency
with which section 43(1) is litigated because of the importance of propensity
evidence
to both the prosecution and defence. We accept that some variance in
case law is to be expected given the fact-specific nature of
the section 43(1)
test. However, we emphasise the importance of the courts providing clear
reasoning for their approach to the section
43(1) assessment.
Prior acquittal evidence
- The
Act does not specifically address the status of evidence that has previously
been led at a trial against the defendant that resulted
in an acquittal (prior
acquittal evidence). The Supreme Court in Fenemor v R held that prior
acquittal evidence should be treated like any other propensity evidence, with
the judge considering whether the fact
that evidence is prior acquittal evidence
gives rise to any additional unfair
prejudice.4F[5] However, case law
since then indicates that only in the rarest of circumstances will the acquittal
dimension of proposed propensity
evidence have a meaningful impact on the
section 43(1) assessment of unfair prejudice.
- We
recommend amending section 43 to provide that, when assessing the prejudicial
effect of prior acquittal evidence on the defendant,
the judge must consider
whether the defendant can fairly respond to the allegations in the present
proceeding. The judge would have
regard to the lapse of time since the earlier
investigation and trial, the material available in relation to the earlier
investigation
and trial and any other relevant matters. This effectively
codifies Fenemor and provides additional guidance for judges when
assessing the prejudicial effect of prior acquittal evidence.
The unusualness factor in section 43(3)
- Section
43(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors the judge may consider when
assessing the probative value of propensity evidence.
Section 43(3)(f) lists the
extent to which the facts that are the subject of both the propensity evidence
and the alleged offence
are “unusual”. Case law has taken varying
approaches to whether this “unusualness” relates to the type of
offending compared to other types of offending, the characteristics of the
particular offending or the nature of the offending compared
to normal standards
of behaviour.
- We
recommend repealing section 43(3)(f). Retaining the factor in any form is likely
to cause continued confusion and inconsistency.
To the extent that it is
appropriate to consider unusualness, the focus should be on the distinctiveness
of the characteristics of
the propensity evidence and the alleged offending.
Distinctiveness can appropriately be considered already under section 43(3)(c)
(the extent of the similarity between the propensity evidence and the facts in
issue).
Relevance of reliability
- It
is unclear whether reliability should form part of the judge’s assessment
when determining the admissibility of propensity
evidence. There has been
diverging case law on this point. Recently, the Supreme Court in W (SC
38/2019) v R found that reliability is relevant when assessing probative
value under section 8 (general
exclusion).5F[6] This approach since
has been applied by one case in te Kōti Matua | High Court in the context
of propensity evidence.6F[7]
- We
do not recommend reform. Recent case law suggests statutory amendment may be
unnecessary following W (SC 38/2019) v R. Any benefits of reform are
outweighed by the risk that it could cause confusion or lead to undue emphasis
on reliability.
CHAPTER 11: VISUAL IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
- In
Chapter 11, we consider the definition of “visual identification
evidence” in section 4(1).
- Sections
45 and 126 provide safeguards to address concerns about the reliability of
visual identification evidence. The definition
of visual identification evidence
in section 4(1) refers to assertions that a defendant was “present or
near” the place
where the crime or relevant acts occurred. It does not
refer assertions about who performed a particular act (observation evidence).
It
is therefore unclear whether the definition includes observation evidence and
whether sections 45 and 126 apply to such evidence.
This issue may arise, for
example, where the defendant admits being present at the scene of the crime but
denies being the perpetrator.
While there is conflicting case law on this issue,
recent decisions have tended to treat observation evidence as visual
identification
evidence.
- We
recommend reform to clarify that the definition of visual identification
evidence includes assertions that a defendant was the
person observed performing
an act constituting direct or circumstantial evidence of the commission of an
offence. This would reflect
the current approach of the courts and ensure
clarity and certainty. It is appropriate that the safeguards for visual
identification
evidence apply to observation evidence as the risk of
misidentification is just as real when identifying who performed an act as
it is
when identifying who was present or near the scene of a crime.
CHAPTER 12: MEDICAL PRIVILEGE
- In
Chapter 12, we consider the operation of section 59, which governs privilege in
criminal proceedings for certain communications
made to, and information
obtained by, medical practitioners and clinical psychologists. Section 59(5)
extends the privilege to people
“acting in a professional capacity on
behalf of a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist”.
Scope of the section 59(1)(b) exception
- Section
59(1)(b) creates an exception to medical privilege in situations where a person
“has been required by an order of a
judge, or by other lawful authority,
to submit himself or herself to the medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist for any examination,
test, or for any other purpose”. It is
not clear whether court-ordered treatment (as opposed to a court-ordered
examination or test) would be captured by this exception.
- We
recommend amending section 59(1)(b) to clarify that the exception does not apply
to court-ordered treatment. This would reflect
and codify the current and
intended approach. Removing privilege from court-ordered treatment would be
contrary to the policy rationale
for medical privilege, which is to encourage
individuals to seek treatment and engage fully and honestly when doing so
without fear
of recrimination in the criminal justice system.
Acting “on behalf of” a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist
- Section
59(5) provides that medical privilege extends to communications made or
information obtained by a person acting in a professional
capacity “on
behalf of” a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist. There is some
uncertainty as to when a person
is acting “on behalf of” a medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist and, accordingly, whether information
received
by them is privileged. Case law has interpreted section 59(5) narrowly.
- We
recommend amending section 59 to:
(a) extend the privilege to “health practitioners” as defined by the
Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003;
and
(b) remove the requirement in section 59(5) that, for medical privilege to
apply, the person acting on behalf of a health practitioner
must be doing so
“in the course” of examination, treatment or care of the person by
that health practitioner.
- These
amendments would allow the courts to take a broader interpretation of the
section consistent with the policy objectives behind
it and the reality of
modern healthcare.
Protections for counselling and therapeutic
notes
- Some
submitters expressed concern that it has become increasingly common for defence
counsel to make non-party requests for disclosure
of counselling notes for
complainants in sexual and family violence cases, and to use information
contained in these notes to discredit
the complainant. A related concern was
raised in the context of te Kōti Whānau | Family Court in relation to
notes about
children and parties in civil proceedings.
- We
did not consult on this issue in our Issues Paper and so are not in a position
to recommend reform. However, given the concerns
of submitters, we recommend the
Ministry of Justice examine protections for counselling notes and other personal
records of complainants
in sexual and family violence cases and of parties and
children in civil cases.
CHAPTER 13: OTHER PRIVILEGE ISSUES
- In
Chapter 13, we consider other issues relating to the privilege provisions in the
Act.
Legal advice privilege and documents prepared but not
communicated between clients and legal advisers
- Section
54 provides a privilege for “communications” with legal advisers
that are intended to be confidential and made
for the purpose of obtaining or
providing legal advice (legal advice privilege). We recommend reform to clarify
that the privilege
extends to documents prepared but not communicated for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. This is consistent with
the
pre-Act common law position, which section 54 was intended to codify, and with
the purpose of the privilege to encourage full
and frank communication with
lawyers.
Termination of litigation privilege
- Section
56 establishes a privilege in relation to preparatory materials for court
proceedings, known as “litigation privilege”.
The Act does not
address whether litigation privilege terminates and case law remains unsettled
on this point.
- We
recommend reform to provide that litigation privilege does not terminate except
as provided for in the Act. This is consistent
with the purpose of the privilege
to protect the adversarial process. If the privilege were to terminate, it would
be difficult for
lawyers to engage in the free and frank discussions necessary
to properly prepare for litigation.
- We
also recommend clarifying that legal advice privilege and settlement privilege
do not terminate except in accordance with the Act,
to avoid creating
unnecessary inconsistency. Case law and the purpose of the privileges support
this approach.
Litigation privilege and confidentiality
- Unlike
sections 54 (legal advice privilege) and 57 (settlement privilege), section 56
(litigation privilege) does not include any
reference to confidentiality. This
appears to be a drafting error. There is clear Supreme Court authority that, for
litigation privilege
to attach to a communication or information, it must have
been intended to be confidential.7F[8]
We recommend amending section 56 to make this clear.
Settlement privilege and the interests of justice
exception
- Section
57(3)(d) creates an “interests of justice” exception to settlement
privilege. High Court decisions have largely
confirmed that the application of
section 57(3)(d) is informed by the pre-Act common law exceptions to settlement
privilege, although
some have suggested its scope may be wider.
- We
do not recommend reform to clarify the scope of section 57(3)(d). It is not
necessarily a problem if the courts apply the exception
more broadly than the
pre-Act common law exceptions. Under the pre-Act common law, it would have been
open to the courts to recognise
new exceptions to the privilege. Most submitters
said the provision is not causing problems in practice and preferred to let the
law develop in the courts.
Successive interests in privileged material
- Section
66(2) provides for successive interests in privileged material. Following an
amendment in 2017, the provision includes a drafting
error that means a
successor in title to the property of a person can only claim privilege if the
person is deceased. This is not
the intent of the provision, and the courts have
not applied it that way. We recommend amendment to clarify that section 66(2)
applies
to all successors in title to property of the person whether or not the
person is deceased.
CHAPTER 14: TRIAL PROCESS
- In
Chapter 14, we address sections 88, 92 and 95, which deal with different aspects
of the trial process.
Restriction on disclosure of complainant’s occupation
in sexual cases
- Section
88 prevents questioning about or comment on the complainant’s occupation
in a sexual case except with the permission
of the judge. Research shows
compliance with this section is low. Complainants are routinely asked about
their occupation without
the judge considering section 88. The section is also
arguably too narrow. It does not apply, for example, to evidence about the
complainant’s status as a student, mother or beneficiary or evidence about
their education or qualifications.
- We
do not recommend reform of section 88. The requirement for judicial approval is
clear on the face of the section so amendment is
unlikely to improve compliance
with it. Given the low compliance with the section, there is little to be gained
by widening its scope.
Additionally, we are concerned that widening the scope of
section 88 may disrupt and lengthen proceedings or make it more difficult
for
counsel to humanise the complainant and contextualise their experiences.
However, we consider there is a role for enhanced guidance
and education for
prosecutors and judges. We recommend Te Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of
Judicial Studies consider developing
new or existing guidance for judges on the
application of section 88.
Cross-examination duties
- Section
92 requires a party to cross-examine a witness on significant matters that are
relevant and in issue and that contradict the
evidence of the witness if the
witness could reasonably be expected to be in a position to give admissible
evidence on those matters.
Case law has confirmed the courts should take a
flexible and purposive approach to section 92, but this is not clear on the
face
of the section.
- We
recommend amending section 92 to require a party to cross-examine a witness on
significant matters that are relevant and in issue
and that contradict the
evidence of the witness “when it is reasonable to expect that ... the
witness or the party that called
the witness is or may be unaware of the basis
on which their evidence is contradicted”. This would assure lawyers and
judges
that rigid and exhaustive cross-examination is not required under section
92.
Cross-examination on behalf of another
- Under
section 95, parties may in certain circumstances be prevented from personally
cross-examining a witness. Where this is the case,
the party may have their
questions put to the witness by a person appointed by the judge, who can be a
lawyer. There is mixed case
law on whether the appointed person is subject to
the cross-examination duties in section 92 or whether they are simply required
to ask the questions provided by the party.
- We
recommend amending section 95 to clarify that the role of a person appointed to
ask questions on behalf of an unrepresented party
is limited to putting that
party’s questions to the witness. We also recommend clarifying that an
appointed person is not acting
as counsel for the party. The purpose of the
section is to protect witnesses, not to assist unrepresented parties.
CHAPTER 15: OTHER ISSUES
- In
Chapter 15, we examine three stand-alone issues relating to the operation of the
Act.
Section 9 (admission by agreement) and the role of the
judge
- We
considered whether there is uncertainty about the extent to which section 9
(admission by agreement) permits admission of evidence
that would otherwise be
inadmissible under a specific provision in the Act or subject to exclusion under
section 8 (general exclusion).
We do not recommend reform. The uncertainty in
case law does not appear to be causing problems in practice. Reform could lead
to
inefficiency and further uncertainty.
Novel scientific evidence
- We
considered the application of the common law
Daubert8F[9] factors, as
affirmed in Lundy,9F[10] to
novel scientific evidence and whether further guidance in the Act would be
helpful. We do not recommend reform. Codifying Lundy is unnecessary and
unlikely to improve understanding or increase clarity. The law should be left to
develop in the courts.
Evidence from undercover police officers
- We
considered whether sections 108–109 (which permit undercover police
officers to give evidence anonymously in cases involving
any offence punishable
by at least seven years’ imprisonment) are causing problems in practice.
Criminal proceedings
- We
considered whether anonymity should be available in criminal cases involving
offences with lower penalties. We do not recommend
reform to change the
seven-year threshold or add further qualifying offences to section 108. We are
unpersuaded there is a problem
in practice. The fact that undercover officers
are not being deployed because an offence is not covered by the anonymity
provisions
is consistent with the legislative intention.
Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act proceedings
- It
is unclear from section 108 whether proceedings under the Criminal Proceeds
(Recovery) Act 2009 must relate to an offence that
meets the seven-year
threshold for anonymity to apply. We do not recommend reform to clarify the
position. In practice, all the relevant
cases we identified under the Criminal
Proceeds (Recovery) Act related to offences that qualify under section 108 in
any event. It
is also unclear from the legislative history what was intended, so
we are not in a position to recommend reform.
Other civil proceedings
- Civil
proceedings against Police can arise from investigations into serious offences
that would attract the protection of sections
108–109 in criminal
proceedings. Currently, those sections do not apply in civil proceedings other
than proceedings under the
Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act, although the High
Court may protect the identity of a witness in civil proceedings through
discretionary
exercise of its inherent power.
- We
do not recommend reform of sections 108–109 to protect the identity of
undercover officers in civil cases against Police.
This would be a significant
widening of identity protection for undercover officers. It would raise
fundamental issues about the
appropriate balance between the public interest in
calling evidence of undercover officers in civil cases, the principle of
“open
justice” and the procedural protections for plaintiffs in the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. This weighing exercise is
outside the scope
of our operational review.
Recommendations
CHAPTER 2: TE AO MāORI AND THE EVIDENCE ACT
- R1 Insert
a new exception to section 17 to provide that the hearsay rule does not apply to
a statement offered in evidence to prove the
existence or content of
mātauranga or tikanga.
- R2 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider amending
the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses in Schedule
4 of the High Court Rules
2016 to better recognise and provide for mātauranga and tikanga as a unique
category of expert evidence.
CHAPTER 3: HEARSAY
- R3 Amend
section 18 to include a new ground for admitting a hearsay statement in a
criminal proceeding where:
- the
maker of the statement has a reasonable fear of retaliation if they give
evidence and they do not intend to give evidence because
of that fear; and
- it is
in the interests of justice to admit their hearsay
statement.
- R4 Define
“fear of retaliation” in section 16(1) as fear that a defendant or
any other person will cause physical or other
harm (including, for example,
financial or social harm) to the maker of the statement or any other
person.
- R5 Insert
a new section providing that:
- despite
section 17, a hearsay statement is admissible in a civil proceeding unless its
admissibility is challenged by another party;
- a
challenge made by another party under subsection (1) must be made in accordance
with the relevant rules of the court unless the
judge directs otherwise;
and
- the
judge may give a direction under subsection (2) if:
- having
regard to the nature and contents of the statement, no party is substantially
prejudiced by the failure to comply with the
rules of court; or
- compliance
was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances; or
- the
interests of justice so require.
CHAPTER 4: DEFENDANTS’ AND CO-DEFENDANTS’
STATEMENTS
- R6 Amend
section 27 to clarify that subpart 1 (hearsay evidence) applies to a hearsay
statement made by a person other than a defendant
that contains a
defendant’s statement.
- R7 Amend
section 27 to clarify that:
- a
defendant’s non-hearsay statement is admissible against a co-defendant;
and
- a
defendant’s hearsay statement is only admissible against a co-defendant if
it is admitted under section 22A.
CHAPTER 7: IMPROPERLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
- R8 Amend
section 30(2)(b) to require the judge to exclude improperly obtained evidence
unless satisfied it is in the public interest
to admit the evidence.
- R9 If
recommendation 8 is accepted:
- amend
section 30(2)(b) to require the judge to exclude improperly obtained evidence
unless satisfied that the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the
impropriety is outweighed by the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial;
and
- repeal
section 30(4).
OR
If recommendation 8 is not accepted, amend section 30(2)(b) to require the
judge to determine whether exclusion is proportionate to
the impropriety by
balancing the public interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety
against the public interest in
having the evidence considered by the fact-finder
at trial.
- R10 Amend
section 30(3) to provide the following:
For the purposes of
subsection (2), when assessing the public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the impropriety, the court
may have regard to:
- the
importance of any right breached or interest infringed by the impropriety and
the seriousness of the intrusion on it;
- the
extent to which it was known, or ought to have been known, that the evidence was
being improperly obtained;
- whether
the impropriety was necessary to avoid apprehended physical danger to the Police
or others;
- the
extent to which the impropriety resulted from urgency in obtaining the evidence;
and
- any
other relevant matters.
For the purposes of subsection (2), when
assessing the public interest in having the evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial,
the court may have regard to:
- the
nature and quality of the improperly obtained evidence;
- the
seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged; and
- any
other relevant matters.
CHAPTER 8: PRISON INFORMANTS AND INCENTIVISED WITNESSES
- R11 Insert
a new provision requiring the judge to exclude prison informant evidence (to be
defined using the wording in section 122(2)(d))
offered by the prosecution in a
criminal proceeding unless satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the
circumstances relating
to the evidence provide reasonable assurance that it is
reliable. The new provision should require a judge in making their assessment
to
have regard to, among other matters:
- any
indications that the evidence is unreliable, including its consistency with
other evidence and whether it has led to the discovery
of other evidence;
- whether
the evidence could have been constructed on the basis of facts and information
gained from sources other than the defendant;
- whether
the witness has been incentivised to give their evidence and the nature of any
incentives offered or received;
- whether
the witness has any other motives to offer unreliable evidence;
- whether
the witness has a record of lying; and
- whether
the witness has any history of offering informant evidence in other proceedings
and, if so, the circumstances and nature of
that evidence and the outcome of
those proceedings.
CHAPTER 9: VERACITY EVIDENCE
- R12 Repeal
section 37(3).
- R13 Amend
section 38 to:
- remove
the requirement in section 38(2)(a) for the defendant to give oral evidence in
court so that the paragraph states “the
defendant has put their veracity
in issue or challenged the veracity of a prosecution witness by reference to
matters other than
the facts in issue”;
- insert
a new subsection in section 38 stating that the defendant may put their veracity
in issue or challenge the veracity of a prosecution
witness by giving evidence
at trial, through the conduct of the defence case (including in
cross-examination) or in a defendant’s
statement offered in evidence by
any party;
- amend
section 38(3)(c) to refer to whether any evidence given or statement made by the
defendant about veracity was elicited by the
prosecution or through
investigative questioning; and
- insert
a new paragraph in section 38(3) referring to the extent to which the defendant
seeks to rely on the evidence of their own
veracity or to challenge the veracity
of a prosecution witness to support their case.
CHAPTER 10: PROPENSITY EVIDENCE
- R14 Amend
section 43 to provide that, when assessing the prejudicial effect of prior
acquittal evidence on the defendant, the judge must
also consider whether the
defendant can fairly respond to the allegations in the present proceeding,
having regard to:
- the
lapse of time since the earlier investigation and trial;
- the
material available in relation to the earlier investigation and trial; and
- any
other relevant matters.
- R15 Repeal
section 43(3)(f).
CHAPTER 11: IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
- R16 Insert
a new paragraph in the definition of “visual identification
evidence” in section 4(1) referring to evidence that
is an
“assertion by a person, based wholly or partly on what that person saw, to
the effect that a defendant was the person
observed performing an act
constituting direct or circumstantial evidence of the commission of an
offence”.
CHAPTER 12: MEDICAL PRIVILEGE
- R17 Amend
section 59 to:
- remove
the words “or for any other purpose” in section 59(1)(b); and
- replace
references to “examination”, “examine”,
“examined” and “test” with “assessment”,
“assess” or “assessed” (as
appropriate).
- R18 Amend
section 59 to:
- replace
references to “medical practitioner or clinical psychologist” with
“health practitioner”; and
- define
“health practitioner” in section 59(6) as having the meaning given
to it in section 5(1) of the Health Practitioners
Competence Assurance Act
2003.
- R19 Amend
section 59(5) to refer to “a person acting in a professional capacity on
behalf of a health practitioner from whom the
person is seeking
assistance”.
- R20 The
Ministry of Justice should examine protections for counselling notes and other
personal records of complainants in sexual and
family violence cases and of
parties and children in civil cases.
CHAPTER 13: OTHER PRIVILEGE ISSUES
- R21 Amend
section 54(1) to:
- remove
the requirement that the communication be made “between the person and the
legal adviser”; and
- extend
the privilege to any document (in addition to any communication) that meets the
requirements in section 54(1)(a) and (b).
- R22 Insert
a new subsection in section 53 to provide that any privilege conferred under
sections 54 (legal advice privilege), 56 (litigation
privilege) or 57
(settlement privilege) does not terminate except as provided for in the
Act.
- R23 Amend
section 56(1) to provide that, in addition to the existing requirements,
subsection (2) applies to a communication or information
only if the
communication or information is intended to be confidential.
- R24 Amend
section 66(2) to clarify that a privilege held by a person under sections
54–57 can pass to the personal representative
of that person on or after
their death or other successor in title to property of that
person.
CHAPTER 14: TRIAL PROCESS
- R25 Te
Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of Judicial Studies should consider developing
new or existing guidance for judges on the application
of section 88. This could
include guidance on when and how to grant permission for questioning pre-trial
or intervene in potential
breaches and whether to direct juries to ignore
evidence given in breach of section 88.
- R26 Amend
section 92(1) to provide that, in any proceeding, a party must cross-examine a
witness on significant matters that are relevant
and in issue and that
contradict the evidence of the witness when it is reasonable to expect
that:
- the
witness is or may be in a position to give admissible evidence on those matters;
and
- the
witness or the party that called the witness is or may be unaware of the basis
on which their evidence is contradicted.
- R27 Amend
section 95(5)(b) to clarify that:
- the
role of a person appointed under section 95(5)(b) is limited to putting the
unrepresented defendant’s or party’s questions
to the witness;
and
- a
lawyer appointed under section 95(5)(b) to put the unrepresented
defendant’s or party’s questions to the witness is
not acting as
counsel for the defendant or party.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
- 1.1 Te
Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission has undertaken a statutory review of the
operation of the provisions of the Evidence Act
2006.10F[11] For reasons explained
below, it is our third and final such review. This report sets out our findings
from the review and makes recommendations
for reform.
- 1.2 In this
chapter, we provide an overview of the Act, explain the scope of our review and
the process we have followed and summarise
the matters addressed in this
report.
OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 2006
- 1.3 The
Act brings together most of the rules of evidence in a single statute. It
governs what evidence can be admitted in criminal
and civil court proceedings
and how evidence can be
given.11F[12] Evidence is used to
establish the facts on which proceedings are determined. The rules of evidence
are therefore vital to securing
just processes and outcomes. This is reflected
in the purpose of the Act, which is to “help secure the just determination
of
proceedings”.12F[13]
- 1.4 To achieve
the Act’s purpose, its rules prescribe what evidence is admissible, any
conditions for admissibility and what
evidence must be excluded. Section 7 sets
out the fundamental principle that all relevant evidence is admissible and
evidence that
is not relevant is
inadmissible.13F[14] Evidence is
relevant if it has a tendency to prove or disprove anything that is of
consequence to the determination of the
proceeding.14F[15] However, under
section 8 (general exclusion), the judge must exclude evidence if its probative
value is outweighed by the risk the
evidence
will:15F[16]
(a) have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding; or
(b) needlessly prolong the proceeding.
- 1.5 In a
criminal proceeding, when determining whether the probative value of evidence is
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudicial
effect, the judge must take into
account the right of the defendant to offer an effective
defence.16F[17]
Background to enactment
- 1.6 The
Act is based on the Commission’s 1999 Report on the law of evidence and
its proposed Evidence Code, which was the product
of a decade-long review of
evidence law in Aotearoa New
Zealand.17F[18] At that time, the
law of evidence was largely found in the common law, which was supplemented by
some statutory provisions.18F[19]
The purpose of the Commission’s review was “[t]o make the law of
evidence as clear, simple and accessible as is practicable,
and to facilitate
the fair, just and speedy resolution of
disputes”.19F[20] With that
purpose in mind, the Commission was asked to examine the law of evidence and
make recommendations for its reform with a
view to
codification.20F[21]
- 1.7 The Evidence
Code was intended to replace most of the common law and statutory provisions on
the admissibility and use of evidence
in court proceedings with one
comprehensive scheme.21F[22] The
Evidence Bill introduced by the Government in 2005 largely reflected the
Commission’s recommendations. The select committee
that considered the
Bill made a number of changes. The underlying purpose of reform, however,
remained the same — the drawing
together of the laws of evidence in one
place.22F[23]
Statutory reviews of the Act’s operation
- 1.8 An
important change made to the Bill at select committee stage was to insert a
requirement that the Commission review the operation
of the Act every five years
to make sure it is working well in practice. This requirement became section
202. The Commission completed
its first review in 2013 (2013
Review).23F[24] It reported that the
Act was generally working well and there was widespread acceptance of the value
of codification of the law in
this area. It made several recommendations for
reform, some of which were adopted in the Evidence Amendment Act 2016.
- 1.9 The
Commission completed its Second Review of the Act in 2019 (Second
Review).24F[25] As in the 2013
Review, it found the Act was generally working well but that important further
amendments were warranted. Some of
these recommendations have since been
implemented by the Sexual Violence Legislation Act 2021. The Government intended
to progress or further consider some other recommendations as part of the
development of an Evidence Amendment
Bill. At the time of writing, no such Bill
has been introduced to Parliament.
- 1.10 In its
Second Review, the Commission also recommended the repeal of section 202, noting
that no other area of the law is subject
to regular statutory review by the
Commission in this way. The Government accepted this recommendation and the
Statutes Amendment
Act 2022 repealed section 202.
SCOPE AND TIMING OF THIS REVIEW
- 1.11 The
Minister of Justice’s letter referring this review to the Commission
(dated 23 February 2022) requested the Commission
to undertake the review in
accordance with the requirements of section
202.25F[26] Therefore, although it
has since been repealed, the scope and timing of this review continue to be
governed by section 202. Section
202 requires the Commission to
consider:
(a) the operation of the provisions of the Act since the Second Review; and
(b) whether repeal or amendment of any provisions of the Act is “necessary
or desirable”.
- 1.12 We
published terms of reference on 28 September 2022. The terms of reference
confirmed the scope of our review pursuant to section
202 and highlighted some
of the key areas we would
address.26F[27] The terms of
reference also confirmed the review would not consider amendments to the Act
made by the Sexual Violence Legislation Act given the recency of those
amendments.
- 1.13 In
accordance with section 202, this report is due to the Minister of Justice by 23
February 2024.27F[28]
OUR PROCESS
Identifying potential operational issues
- 1.14 Given
this scope, we have focused on identifying potential issues with the Act’s
operation since the Second Review. An
example of an operational issue is where
the wording or interpretation of a particular provision or combination of
provisions may
be resulting in uncertainty or inconsistency in practice. Because
this is an operational review, we are not undertaking a first-principles
review
of the rules of evidence. However, if the underlying policy of a provision is
not reflected in the wording of that provision
or is not being achieved in
practice (for example, due to other developments in the law), it may be
necessary to re-examine that
underlying policy as part of assessing how best to
address the operational issue.
- 1.15 We
identified potential issues with the operation of the Act through research and
preliminary feedback from stakeholders. We
examined appellate case law,
commentary and research published since
2018.28F[29]
Operational issues are not always evident from case law and commentary. We also
therefore invited preliminary feedback on potential
issues for inclusion in this
review from the judiciary, interested organisations and individuals within the
legal profession and
academic community.
- 1.16 In
accordance with our statutory obligation to take into account te ao Māori
(the Māori dimension) under section 5
of the Law Commission Act 1985, we
examined potential operational issues in terms of how the Act recognises and
provides for te ao
Māori. As these are cross-cutting issues, we deal with
them first.
- 1.17 The
Minister of Justice’s letter of referral also suggested four issues for
our consideration:29F[30]
(a) whether the process for determining whether improperly obtained evidence is
admissible in criminal proceedings (section 30) gives
sufficient weight to the
impropriety;
(b) whether there should be additional controls on the admissibility of
statements made by defendants to fellow prisoners;
(c) whether the provisions controlling anonymous evidence given by undercover
police officers require amendment; and
(d) whether any clarifications are needed regarding privilege in criminal
proceedings for information obtained by medical practitioners
and clinical
psychologists.
- 1.18 We met with
our Expert Advisory Group, which we established for this review, and with the
Judicial Advisory Committee established
by the Chief Justice for this review to
discuss our preliminary analysis of issues. We also discussed our proposed
approach in relation
to te ao Māori with the Commission’s Māori
Liaison Committee.
Issues Paper
- 1.19 We
published an Issues Paper on 8 May
2023.30F[31] The Issues Paper
invited feedback on 66 questions. We sent the Issues Paper to interested
parties, published it on our website and
publicised it through media engagement.
- 1.20 We
generally only included a matter in the Issues Paper if it met all the following
criteria or if we considered that it could
not be properly assessed against
these criteria without first seeking submissions on the issue from interested
parties:
(a) First, the issue is more than minor or technical in nature (that is, the
issue has the potential to cause a real problem in practice).
(b) Second, the issue relates to the operation of the Act since the Second
Review or the issue pre-dates the last review but is of
such significance that
we think it should be included in this review given the repeal of section
202.
(c) Third, the issue was not comprehensively considered in the
Commission’s earlier reviews of the Act or new material (such
as
subsequent case law or commentary) suggests there is a need to revisit the
conclusions reached by the Commission in its earlier
review(s).
- 1.21 We also
included one technical drafting issue relating to litigation privilege and
confidentiality. We included this issue on
the basis that the drafting problem
appeared to be relatively uncontroversial and could be fixed easily.
Consultation and further research
- 1.22 In
consultation on the Issues Paper, we received a total of 46 submissions on one
or more of the questions we asked. As is our
usual practice, where we refer to
or summarise a submission, we use the submitter’s language as much as
possible with minor
edits for readability. We also met with several parties to
discuss the issues and options for reform.
- 1.23 In
formulating our recommendations, we analysed all submissions and the feedback
received at our meetings. We developed our thinking
to reflect many of the
points raised. On some issues, we also undertook further research or updated our
research.
- 1.24 Following
this analysis, we convened further meetings with the Expert Advisory Group and
Judicial Advisory Committee to receive
feedback on our draft proposals for
reform. We discussed our proposals in relation to te ao Māori with our
Māori Liaison
Committee. We revisited many of our provisional proposals
following these discussions.
Assessing the case for reform
- 1.25 Consistent
with the Commission’s approach in the Second Review, we have assessed the
case for reform in relation to each
issue by reference to the overarching
purpose statement in section 6. As noted, the purpose of the Act is to help
secure the just
determination of proceedings. Section 6 also lists six
objectives by which this purpose can be achieved. Accordingly, when we consider
whether a potential amendment to the Act is necessary or desirable, we have
taken into account whether the amendment helps to secure
the just determination
of proceedings by:31F[32]
(a) providing for facts to be established by the application of logical rules;
(b) providing rules of evidence that recognise the importance of the rights
affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990;
(c) promoting fairness to parties and witnesses;
(d) protecting rights of confidentiality and other important public interests;
(e) avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay; and
(f) enhancing access to the law of evidence.
- 1.26 Because
this is an operational review, we have considered the extent to which there is
evidence of a problem in practice when
determining whether reform is necessary
or desirable. We also recognise that legislative amendment is not the only way
to address
an issue with the Act’s operation. In assessing whether reform
is necessary or desirable, we have also therefore considered
whether the issue
is best left to be resolved by the courts on a case-by-case basis or whether
non-legislative measures (such as
practice notes or guidance) are more
appropriate alternatives to legislative amendment. Such options can be more
flexible and responsive
to changing circumstances or emerging best
practice.32F[33]
- 1.27 We
recognise it is important when making recommendations for legislative amendment
to ensure, as far as practicable, that any
reform does not have unintended
consequences. The risk of unintended consequences may, in some cases, weigh
against reform, particularly
where there is limited evidence of an issue causing
significant problems in practice.
MATTERS ADDRESSED IN THIS REPORT
- 1.28 This
report makes 27 recommendations for reform. Each chapter:
(a) identifies the issues with a provision or provisions of the Act;
(b) summarises what we asked submitters in our Issues Paper;
(c) summarises and analyses the submissions and feedback we received in
response; and
(d) explains our recommendations for reform of the Act or reasons for not
recommending reform (as the case may be).
- 1.29 We have
identified one issue in respect of which the law may be developed without the
need for legislative amendment. In Chapter
2, we recommend Te Komiti mō
ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee consider amending the Code of Conduct
for Expert Witnesses
that forms part of the High Court Rules 2016.
- 1.30 In our
Issues Paper, we invited submitters to raise any issue regarding the operation
of the Act for our consideration. Some
submitters suggested alternative options
for reform from those we proposed in the Issues Paper. Some also raised new
issues for our
consideration. Where we have undertaken detailed analysis of a
suggestion or new issue, this is noted in the relevant part of this
report. We
have not addressed all the suggestions or issues raised by submitters. In
particular, we were unlikely to address suggestions
or issues that fell outside
the limited scope of our review, were raised by only one submitter, required
further consultation or
where the potential case for reform was not so certain
or significant to justify expending resources on their analysis.
- 1.31 One issue
raised with us by submitters concerns the adequacy of protections for
counselling notes and other personal records
of complainants in sexual and
family violence cases and parties and children in civil cases. In Chapter 12, we
explain that, because
we did not consult on the issue, we did not have the
opportunity to hear from other interested parties about the nature and scope
of
any problems in practice. However, given the issue was raised by several
submitters and there are strong public interests involved,
we recommend the
Ministry of Justice examine the issue further.
TERMINOLOGY USED IN THIS REPORT
- 1.32 References
in our report to “the Act” are to the Evidence Act 2006 and
references to a “section” are
to sections of the Act unless
otherwise stated.
- 1.33 References
to our “Issues Paper” are to the Issues Paper we published for this
review on 8 May 2023.33F[34]
- 1.34 References
to the “Evidence Code” are to the Commission’s proposed
Evidence Code published in 1999 as part
of its review of the laws of
evidence.34F[35]
- 1.35 References
to the “2013 Review” are to the Commission’s first operational
review of the Act, completed in
2013.35F[36]
- 1.36 References
to the “Second Review” are to the Commission’s second
operational review of the Act, completed in
2019.36F[37]
- 1.37 We use the
term “fact-finder” as a generic expression to refer either to the
jury (in a trial by jury) or the judge
(in a judge-alone
trial).
CHAPTER 2
Te ao Māori and the Evidence Act
INTRODUCTION
- 2.1 In
this chapter, we consider issues relating to te ao Māori and the Evidence
Act 2006. We address the following:
(a) Mātauranga (Māori knowledge) and tikanga as evidence. We recommend
introducing a new exception to the hearsay rule
and recommend Te Komiti mō
ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee consider amending the Code of Conduct
for Expert Witnesses,
in each case to better provide for the admission of this
kind of evidence.
(b) Other potential issues with how the Act recognises and provides for te ao
Māori. We do not recommend reform in relation
to these other issues.
BACKGROUND
- 2.2 When
developing the Evidence Code, Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission examined
issues of potential concern to Māori.
This included considering how
evidence relating to Māori custom is admitted in court and whether the
confidentiality of communications
on marae and with kaumātua, tohunga (in
this context, spiritual leader) and rongoā (medicine) practitioners should
be protected.37F[38] The Evidence
Code did not expressly recognise te ao Māori or make specific provision for
mātauranga, tikanga or te Tiriti
o Waitangi | Treaty of Waitangi (the
Treaty). However, several provisions in the Evidence Code and the resulting Act
were drafted
in a way that was intended to address those issues.
- 2.3 In the
Commission’s Second Review, it recommended the Act be amended to make it
clear that courts can regulate procedures
for giving evidence in a manner that
recognises tikanga.38F[39] The
Government accepted this recommendation in principle subject to further
consideration of its potential operational
impacts.39F[40]
- 2.4 In this
review we focus on ensuring the Act is responsive to the growing use of
mātauranga and tikanga evidence in court
proceedings.
- 2.5 As we
explain further below, mātauranga is a very general term that includes
tikanga. It also includes kōrero tuku iho,
meaning knowledge that has been
conveyed orally down through generations. Mātauranga Māori and tikanga
Māori comprise
knowledge shared and accepted by Māori. Mātauranga
ā-iwi and tikanga ā-iwi refer to the localised expressions
of these
that are shaped by the knowledge, experiences and circumstances of
iwi.40F[41] We use the term
“iwi” in its broader meaning, so mātauranga ā-iwi and
tikanga ā-iwi may include (for example)
mātauranga ā-waka and
tikanga ā-waka, mātauranga ā-marae and tikanga ā-marae,
mātauranga ā-hapū
and tikanga ā-hapū or mātauranga
ā-whānau and tikanga
ā-whānau.41F[42] These
localised expressions will often convey deeper, more contextual meaning than
knowledge shared more by Māori more widely.
In this chapter, when we refer
to mātauranga and tikanga, we intend these words to include mātauranga
Māori and tikanga
Māori and mātauranga ā-iwi and tikanga
ā-iwi (using “iwi” in its broader meaning). Mātauranga
and
tikanga evidence may comprise mātauranga Māori and/or tikanga
Māori, mātauranga ā-iwi and/or tikanga
ā-iwi or a
combination of them depending on the context of the case.
- 2.6 The usual
approach of the courts to tikanga has been to treat tikanga as something to be
proved as a matter of fact by expert
evidence in the same way as foreign law. Te
Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court in Ellis v R noted the
inappropriateness of this, given tikanga is not foreign
law.42F[43] The Court also
acknowledged, however, that the usual approach is a convenient and efficient way
of providing unfamiliar material
to the
fact-finder.43F[44]
- 2.7 We proceed
on the basis that, at present, the resolution of some claims will depend on the
admission of mātauranga and tikanga
as evidence. Our review is taking place
within a wider context in which the courts are increasingly being called on to
consider and
recognise Māori rights and interests, including those arising
under tikanga and the Treaty, as well as the general application
of
tikanga.44F[45] Evidence of
mātauranga and tikanga is often central to determining these
cases.
MāTAURANGA AND TIKANGA EVIDENCE
Issue
- 2.8 Mātauranga
and tikanga exist within te ao Māori. The Act’s rules of
admissibility have their origins in English
common law. It has long been
recognised that the rules against hearsay and opinion evidence can create
challenges relating to the
admission of mātauranga and tikanga evidence,
particularly evidence deriving from the tradition of oral history or kōrero
tuku iho in te ao Māori.
The rule against hearsay
- 2.9 A
hearsay statement is an out-of-court statement made by a person who is not a
witness that is offered in evidence to prove the
truth of its
contents.45F[46] The Act contains a
rule against hearsay in section 17, which provides that a hearsay statement is
not admissible. The rationale for
the rule concerns reliability and reflects the
reliance placed on cross-examination as a way of testing the truth of evidence.
If
the maker of a statement is unavailable as a witness, a person giving
evidence of the statement lacks first-hand knowledge of the
event and their
evidence cannot be tested properly under
cross-examination.46F[47]
- 2.10 The rule in
section 17 is subject to a general exception in section 18. The exception
applies if two conditions are met. First,
the circumstances relating to the
statement “provide reasonable assurance that the statement is
reliable”. Second, the
maker of the statement is unavailable as a witness
(for example, because they have died) or requiring them to appear as a witness
would cause undue expense or
delay.47F[48]
The rule against opinion evidence and the admissibility of
expert opinion
- 2.11 Section
23 codified the opinion rule, under which a statement of opinion is not
admissible in any proceeding. Opinion evidence
is excluded to prevent the
admission of “unreliable, misleading or superfluous
evidence”.48F[49] The role of
the witness is to give direct evidence of their perceptions of the facts. In
this respect, the opinion rule guards against
witnesses drawing conclusions
about facts as this is the role of the
fact-finder.49F[50] It is also
intended to guard against a witness giving their opinion in relation to facts
that would otherwise be
inadmissible.50F[51]
- 2.12 The opinion
rule is subject to exceptions, including for opinions given by an
“expert” witness.51F[52]
The Act defines an expert as “a person who has specialised knowledge or
skill based on training, study or
experience”.52F[53] Expert
opinion evidence is admissible only if the fact-finder is likely to obtain
substantial help from the opinion in understanding
other evidence in the
proceeding or in ascertaining any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the
proceeding.53F[54] The Code of
Conduct for Expert Witnesses prescribes duties of expert witnesses. For example,
the Code states that an expert witness
has an overriding duty to assist the
court impartially. The Code is set out in Schedule 4 of the High Court Rules
2016.54F[55]
Operation of the hearsay and opinion rules in relation to
mātauranga and tikanga
- 2.13 In
our Issues Paper, we observed that the expert evidence provisions of the Act are
routinely engaged to admit evidence of mātauranga
and tikanga from
pūkenga (experts). We also noted there is less clarity on the scope for
admitting mātauranga or tikanga
outside the expert evidence
provisions.55F[56]
- 2.14 We
explained the rules against hearsay and opinion evidence can potentially apply
to evidence of mātauranga and tikanga
and noted that few cases have
expressly addressed the admissibility of mātauranga and tikanga under these
rules.56F[57] When admissibility has
been addressed, the courts have generally been permissive and pragmatic while
recognising some difficulty
with admitting evidence of mātauranga and
tikanga through these
rules.57F[58]
- 2.15 Case law
also illustrates the influence of the hearsay rule in how the weight of oral
history evidence may be assessed by a fact-finder.
In Te Ara Rangatū o
Te Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General, te Kōti
Matua | High Court examined claims relating to the Crown’s acquisition and
confiscation of ancestral land from
Ngāti Te Ata in 1864 and later
events.58F[59] The Court commented
that, unlike other cases where facts could be drawn from a reasonably
comprehensive documentary record, documentary
evidence of detailed discussions
and relationships between the parties was “scant to say the
least”.59F[60] Many of the
disputed facts were the subject of competing expert evidence. There was no
objection by either party to the evidence
adduced at the trial, so the Court
proceeded on the basis it was admitted by agreement. Where evidence was hearsay,
the Court took
this into account when considering the weight to give to it. It
said this was “particularly necessary in the case of some of
the
historical materials, which are not complete and thus the full context to
certain events and communications is
unknown”.60F[61]
- 2.16 We
identified three other mechanisms for admitting mātauranga and tikanga
evidence under the Act but noted these are generally
limited to undisputed
evidence. These are agreed statements of fact (as in Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc), giving notice of uncontroverted facts
and reliance on published
material.61F[62]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 2.17 We
invited submissions on whether the Act should address the admissibility of
mātauranga and tikanga. We also invited submissions
on whether the Act
should:
(a) Option 1 — introduce statutory exceptions to the rules against hearsay
and opinion evidence for evidence of tikanga and
potentially mātauranga;
and/or
(b) Option 2 — introduce guidance as to the need to interpret and apply
the provisions of the Act having regard to te ao Māori.
- 2.18 Option 1 is
based on the Australian
approach.62F[63] In Australia, there
were concerns about the effect of the hearsay and opinion evidence rules on the
admission of evidence from Aboriginal
people and Torres Strait Islanders. This
resulted in the adoption of exceptions to these rules for evidence about
traditional laws
and
customs.63F[64]
- 2.19 In the
Issues Paper, we also suggested there may be merit in considering a broader
exception to the hearsay and opinion rules
to include other cultures with oral
traditions and methods of storing knowledge.
- 2.20 Option 2 is
more general in nature. It would guide judges in cases involving Māori
interests to interpret provisions of
the Act, and approach questions of
relevance under section 7 having regard to te ao Māori.
Results of consultation
- 2.21 Nine
submitters addressed these
questions.64F[65]
- 2.22 Most
submitters, as well as people we spoke with during consultation, favoured
reform. However, they had different views about
the best reform path to
follow.
Should the Act be amended to address the admissibility of
mātauranga and tikanga?
- 2.23 Four
submitters expressed views on whether the Act should be amended to address the
admissibility of mātauranga and tikanga.
One submitter supported reform to
offer more guidance.65F[66] Three
did not consider reform is
needed,66F[67] with two of them
suggesting the law should be allowed an opportunity to develop through case
law.67F[68]
- 2.24 Submitters
and people we spoke with held mixed views about the extent of any problem in
practice. Te Tari Ture o te Karauna |
Crown Law Office and Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald were not aware of instances where the Act’s rules have
prevented
the admission of relevant tikanga evidence. Others said they had
experience of or were familiar with challenges parties can face
when presenting
tikanga evidence to a court, including having to respond to suggestions of
inherent unreliability in relation to
admitted
evidence.68F[69] Chapman Tripp
suggested many of the problems it had identified can be solved through
upskilling lawyers and the judiciary, without
legislative amendment.
- 2.25 Two
submitters expressed concerns about progressing any reform of the Act while the
classification of tikanga as either an issue
of fact or question of law in
respect of some claims may be
unsettled.69F[70] Concerns were also
raised about whether reform would in any event be able to address a more
fundamental problem of fitting mātauranga
and tikanga evidence within a
non-Māori world view and
structure.70F[71]
Statutory exception to the rule against hearsay
- 2.26 Four
submitters addressed the proposed exception to the rule against hearsay for
evidence of mātauranga and tikanga. Two
submitters supported
reform,71F[72] one did
not72F[73] and one commented on the
proposal.73F[74]
- 2.27 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) and Chapman Tripp
supported the proposed exception. The NZLS agreed
with a statement by Chief
Justice Black of the Federal Court of Australia, which was referred to in a
joint report by the Australian,
New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform
Commissions (the Australian Commissions) that led to the introduction of the
uniform Australian
Evidence
Acts:74F[75]
- ... [there
remains] a serious question as to whether it is appropriate for the legal system
to treat evidence of this nature as prima
facie inadmissible and to only admit
it by way of an exception to an exclusionary rule when such evidence is in
precisely the form
by which law and custom are maintained under indigenous
customs.
- 2.28 The NZLS
also quoted from the report itself in support of extending the proposed hearsay
exception to encompass mātauranga
Māori:75F[76]
- Moreover, while
the courts sometimes apply the hearsay rule flexibly with respect to evidence of
traditional laws and customs, it
has been observed that ‘the ghost of
hearsay — the preference of the written word over the spoken word —
still
impacts negatively on the assessment of Aboriginal oral historical
evidence’.
- 2.29 Chapman
Tripp and Te Rōpū Tauira Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Students’ Association commented on the incompatibility
between the hearsay
rule and oral traditions of mātauranga and tikanga. Chapman Tripp submitted
the proposed hearsay exception
would formalise the position and ensure that
reliable evidence regarding mātauranga and tikanga will be admissible.
- 2.30 The Crown
Law Office did not support the proposed exception and said the current rules do
not appear to present a barrier to
the admission of relevant evidence.
Statutory exception to the rule against opinion
evidence
- 2.31 Four
submitters addressed the proposed exception to the rule against opinion
evidence. Two submitters did not support
reform,76F[77] one gave qualified
support77F[78] and one commented on
the proposal.78F[79]
- 2.32 The Crown
Law Office did not think the exception is needed. Chapman Tripp likewise said
the current controls are adequate to
enable reliable tikanga opinion evidence to
be admitted while ensuring unreliable evidence is excluded. Chapman Tripp
suggested the
Act’s definition of expert has a wide meaning and would
permit evidence to be given by kaumātua and kuia, those with lived
experience of “te kawa o te marae/tribal histories” as well as those
with formal qualifications. In its view, removing
the expertise requirement
would risk lessening the quality of tikanga evidence available to the court and
the respect due to pūkenga
who provide evidence.
- 2.33 The NZLS
gave qualified support for the proposed exception. It suggested it may be
preferable for any such exception to be limited
to members of the relevant
whānau, hapū or iwi (similar to the membership requirement in the
Australian exception) provided
this is consistent with the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990.
- 2.34 The
proposed exception for opinion evidence would apply to evidence offered by a
witness who would not need to meet the Act’s
definition of expert. In
response to this aspect of the proposal, Associate Professor Anna High commented
that, in such cases, the
reliability threshold in section 18 (for hearsay
evidence) and the substantial helpfulness test in section 25 may be important
safeguards
against unreliable representations of mātauranga or tikanga. She
also commented that, on the other hand, the evidence would
still be subject to
the general exclusion provision in section 8. Expertise could be taken into
account as a matter of threshold
reliability in the assessment of probative
value under that provision.
- 2.35 During
consultation, we received feedback raising concerns about how the provision for
expert opinion evidence is being used
in practice. We heard, in particular,
about the kinds of expertise that might be needed in order to offer
mātauranga and tikanga
evidence as opinion evidence, as well as potential
barriers to being able to do so. These included the following:
(a) In relation to localised issues, it is a person’s whakapapa that makes
them an expert on the tikanga of the relevant whānau,
hapū or
iwi.79F[80]
(b) Mātauranga and tikanga evidence from within the relevant hapū or
iwi may not reach the standard of independence expected
by the Code of Conduct
for Expert Witnesses. This can deter people from wanting to give relevant
evidence.80F[81]
(c) Many people who want to give evidence would not qualify as an expert. Yet
lived experience can also provide useful information
that can be merged into
other fact evidence.81F[82]
(d) Opinion evidence is essential to incorporating tikanga as part of the common
law. When people are coming to this issue with different
world views, it is
essential to be able to explain those
differences.82F[83]
(e) Some judges have experience and knowledge of applying tikanga frameworks
that they will draw on in particular cases, while others
will want more evidence
(or expert assistance) in order to establish correct
tikanga.83F[84]
- 2.36 There was
no support for a broader exception to either the hearsay or opinion evidence
rules to cover oral traditions of other
cultures. The Crown Law Office and the
NZLS indicated that defining the criteria for when such an exception applies
would be very
difficult and that, in any case, there is no present need for
one.
General statutory guidance for interpreting the Act having
regard to te ao Māori
- 2.37 Eight
submitters addressed option 2, which contemplates introducing statutory guidance
as to the need to interpret and apply
the Act having regard to te ao Māori.
- 2.38 Three
submitters expressed reservations about the proposed reform. The NZLS agreed
with our preliminary view that the proposal
could introduce uncertainty but
encouraged the Commission to seek views of parties who may be better placed to
comment on the need
for it. The Crown Law Office did not support the proposal
and expressed concern it would generate significant uncertainty. Chapman
Tripp
did not think a directive to interpret the Act consistently with tikanga would
add much to the existing legal position that
tikanga is part of New Zealand
law.
- 2.39 Three
submitters commented in favour of this
option,84F[85] and two expressed a
preference for it relative to the proposed hearsay and opinion evidence
exceptions.85F[86] These submitters
suggested the following:
(a) An advantage of this option over the proposed exceptions is that it is
conducive not only to admitting but also excluding evidence
on a tikanga
basis.86F[87]
(b) An advantage of this option over the proposed exceptions is that it is the
more flexible option. If reform is needed, this flexibility
is important given
the law in relation to tikanga is still in the early stages of evolution in some
areas.87F[88]
(c) This option is broader in application and provides a future-proof
solution.88F[89]
(d) The lack of express reference to te ao Māori or tikanga in the Act is
surprising and outdated.89F[90]
(e) The normalisation of consideration of te ao Māori will ensure
Māori interests are protected and will help experiences
of Māori in
the justice system.90F[91]
Preliminary comments
- 2.40 Before
we address the need for reform, we make the following two preliminary
comments.
- 2.41 First, we
have considered whether reform should only address tikanga evidence or should
address tikanga evidence as well as mātauranga
evidence. In current
discussions about the development of the law, the focus is primarily on tikanga
concepts. However, for the purpose
of reforming the laws of evidence, among
submissions and feedback that favoured reform, there was support for extending
reform to
include mātauranga. Our own analysis is that, because
mātauranga is a very general term that encompasses tikanga, it would
be
artificial to separate mātauranga from tikanga and vice versa. Current
practice also demonstrates an increasing reliance
on both mātauranga and
tikanga evidence. Either or both may be relevant in a range of
contexts.91F[92]
- 2.42 Second, we
acknowledge that engagement between tikanga and state law continues to evolve
but do not see this as a barrier to
improving how mātauranga and tikanga
evidence may be offered and admitted in court. As the legal profession and
judiciary develop
their knowledge and experience, over time, it is likely some
claims will increasingly be able to be established through submissions
alone.92F[93] As noted earlier, the
Court in Ellis observed that, for now, treating tikanga as evidence is a
convenient and efficient technique for providing relevant material to the
court
in relation to any claim where tikanga may be at
issue.93F[94] In Ellis,
Glazebrook and Williams JJ also emphasised the need to preserve the integrity of
tikanga in its interactions with the common law.
To some extent, treating
tikanga as a matter of evidence (rather than law) may protect tikanga while
issues of classification are
resolved, because a court does not
“determine” the content of tikanga when it is treated as evidence.
We also agree with
Chapman Tripp that testing tikanga as evidence can help
ensure courts are well equipped to competently rule on issues as to
tikanga.
Statutory exception to the rule against hearsay
The need for reform
- 2.43 We
consider reform in relation to the hearsay rule is necessary to normalise the
admission of tikanga and mātauranga (including
oral history), promote more
efficient conduct of proceedings and address negative perceptions about the
reliability of oral history.
We recommend creating an exception to the hearsay
rule for statements concerning the existence or content of mātauranga and
tikanga.
- 2.44 The Act
currently treats oral history as prima facie inadmissible due to the perceived
inherent unreliability of hearsay. However,
in te ao Māori, oral history
can serve many purposes, including as a record of events, for social, cultural,
legal94F[95] and political purposes
and as a basis for understanding values and
identity.95F[96] The importance of
oral history to a fact-finder is therefore twofold — to help assess
objective fact (as the preferred or only
evidence available to a party) and to
help assess how the interpretation of events, whether objectively true or not,
affects the
rights and interests of the relevant parties.
- 2.45 In its
natural form, oral history may not be concerned primarily or even tangentially
with objective historical
truth.96F[97] From an evidence
perspective, the difficulty with this is that the fact-finding process at trial
is concerned with establishing
facts.97F[98] In Canada, the courts
have examined the implications of this issue in relation to indigenous land
claims and identified the preference
for written historical evidence over oral
history as problematic in principle. The Supreme Court of Canada has said the
courts must
“come to terms with [indigenous] oral histories”
and:98F[99]
- [T]he laws of
evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evidence can be accommodated
and placed on an equal footing with
the types of historical evidence that courts
are familiar with, which largely consists of historical
documents.
- 2.46 The NZLS,
in citing the work of the Australian Commissions to address this issue through
reforms to Australian evidence laws,
expressed a similar view.
- 2.47 In more
concrete terms, we heard during consultation that, in proceedings involving the
Crown, whether the admissibility of mātauranga
and tikanga hearsay evidence
is challenged by the Crown will depend on what is at
stake.99F[100] It appears from
submitter feedback that hearsay objections to admissibility are usually
unsuccessful. In this respect, the default
settings for hearsay evidence, which
assume prima facie inadmissibility of hearsay, do not reflect the general
approach of the courts
towards the admission of this type of
evidence.100F[101]
- 2.48 Once
admitted, any concerns about the reliability of mātauranga or tikanga
evidence will be assessed as a matter of weight.
Our proposal is not that
reliability should in some sense matter less in relation to tikanga and
mātauranga. As we discuss further
below, it is to enable reliability to be
considered on a basis properly reflective of its significance in an oral culture
rather
than being automatically questioned because it is not written or is
technically hearsay. Counsel we spoke with are concerned this
evidence is not
being given due weight because, in a technical sense, it is still hearsay
— the “ghost of hearsay”
remains attached to the evidence, as
noted in the report by the Australian
Commissions.101F[102] For example,
a witness may be asked whether they can attest to particular oral history having
not been alive at the time of relevant
events.102F[103] In this respect,
the implicit preference in the hearsay rule for written historical evidence can
create an unfair disadvantage for
parties wanting to rely on mātauranga and
tikanga evidence for two reasons. The first is that, by its very nature, oral
history
is unwritten. The second is that, where written records of relevant
facts do exist, the records will often have been made by non-Māori
and
reflect a non-Māori perspective of those facts.
- 2.49 In
assessing the case for reform against the Act’s purpose in section 6,
these issues are relevant to section 6(c), which
refers to promoting fairness to
parties and witnesses, section 6(f), which relates to enhancing access to the
law of evidence, and
section 6(e), which relates to avoiding unjustifiable
expense and delay.
Recommendation
- R1 Insert
a new exception to section 17 to provide that the hearsay rule does not apply to
a statement offered in evidence to prove the
existence or content of
mātauranga or tikanga.
- 2.50 In Chapter
3, we recommend a presumptive admissibility approach for hearsay evidence in
civil proceedings. In addition to this
general provision, we recommend the Act
be amended to include a new exception to the hearsay rule, applicable in all
proceedings
(civil and criminal), to extend presumptive admissibility
specifically to mātauranga and tikanga evidence that would otherwise
be
caught by the rule.
- 2.51 We agree
with the NZLS that the new exception should operate as a complete exception to
section 17 and not a modification of
the general exception in section 18. As we
have explained, section 18 includes a reliability test. A key purpose of our
recommended
exception is to remove that test from mātauranga and tikanga
evidence.
- 2.52 Sections 7
(relevance) and 8 (general exclusion) would continue to apply, and any residual
concerns about relevance or reliability
could be raised under these provisions
or simply be treated as a matter of weight. The relevance and probative value of
mātauranga
and tikanga evidence do remain important matters for a
fact-finder to consider. However, these qualities of evidence should be assessed
primarily within an ao Māori framework by reference to ao Māori
indicators of relevance and
reliability.103F[104] General
standards of evidence should not be applied automatically or without careful
thought. In other words, evidence of mātauranga
and tikanga should be
assessed for what it is, including its oral nature and the values that underpin
it, and not, for example, as
evidence that lacks reliability because it is
hearsay.
- 2.53 That said,
we do not envisage that parties would resort to sections 7 and 8 to challenge
mātauranga and tikanga evidence
on a routine basis. We agree with Chapman
Tripp that the proposed hearsay exception will instead formalise the current
position where
the courts usually admit the evidence notwithstanding the
technical application of the hearsay rule and promote consistency of approach.
The new exception would also work to signal to parties and the courts that oral
history has intrinsic value and validity as a means
of conveying knowledge
within te ao Māori.
- 2.54 We consider
the terms “mātauranga” and “tikanga” should not be
defined for the purpose of the new
exception. Any definition of them risks being
either too narrow or prescriptive or, conversely, overly broad and unhelpful.
They
have in any case become familiar in legal use and have been referred to in
legislation without being
defined.104F[105]
- 2.55 Prompted by
comments from members of our Māori Liaison Committee, we have considered
whether “kōrero tuku iho”
should also be referred to expressly
in the hearsay exception. Some members considered kōrero tuku iho is
sufficiently distinct
from mātauranga to warrant separate mention because
it can refer more specifically to tribal history and historical events than
mātauranga does. We agree that kōrero tuku iho is a more specific term
and can convey this meaning. However, we consider
that mātauranga is a
sufficiently general term to capture evidence of tribal history and historical
events. There are many terms
we could use to describe different aspects of
mātauranga but do not consider further specificity is needed or would be
helpful.
It is clear that mātauranga can capture this kind of
evidence.
Amendments to the Code of Conduct for Expert
Witnesses
Our view
- 2.56 In
relation to the opinion rule, we recommend that the Rules Committee consider
reviewing and amending the Code of Conduct for
Expert Witnesses to better
recognise and provide for mātauranga and tikanga as a unique category of
expert evidence.
- 2.57 In our
Issues Paper, we sought feedback on whether the Act should be amended by
introducing an exception to the opinion rule
to provide clarity on how opinions
about mātauranga and tikanga should be approached. We did not explore
possible amendments
to the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses. However, most
of the concerns raised with us about the operation of the opinion rule
related
to matters covered by the Code and the way in which the Code requires expert
witnesses to give and explain their evidence.
Because these issues are best
addressed by changes to the Code itself, reform of the Act through a new
exception to the opinion evidence
rule is neither necessary nor desirable.
- 2.58 Under
section 25, an opinion given by an expert is admissible if the fact-finder is
likely to obtain substantial help from the
opinion.105F[106] The substantial
helpfulness test is cast in general terms and encompasses any situation where
the fact-finder may have difficulty
understanding evidence or ascertaining the
facts without the assistance of an
expert.106F[107] Despite this, the
Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses is difficult to work with for some people
who are asked to offer mātauranga
and tikanga evidence. A key problem is
the assumption in the Code that, when an expert witness gives evidence, they do
so in a technical
and professional capacity.
- 2.59 For
example, the Code provides that an expert witness has an overriding duty to
assist the court impartially and must state their
qualifications as an expert,
state the reasons for the opinions they give, specify any literature or other
relevant material used
or relied on and describe any examinations, tests or
other investigations.
- 2.60 These
aspects of the Code are creating problems:
(a) Relevant mātauranga and tikanga expertise will often exist among
members of the whānau, hapū or iwi that is a
party to the proceeding.
We heard during consultation it may be important to the party to have a person
who is qualified through
whakapapa to give evidence on that party’s
tikanga and mātauranga. However, this type of evidence can be criticised
for
not being sufficiently independent and there is uncertainty about when it
can be offered.107F[108]
(b) We consider the reference in the Code to “qualifications”
(rather than how a person is qualified) and the emphases
on literature, tests
and the like suggest experiential evidence is not a matter of expertise, despite
the Act’s definition
of “expert”. This may be contributing to
the uncertainty, which was also raised during consultation, about the scope
for
evidence of lived experience of mātauranga and
tikanga.108F[109]
(c) We also consider the requirement for a statement of reasons may sometimes
impose an obligation on a witness giving evidence about
tikanga that is not
consistent with tikanga itself. The example brought to our attention during
consultation concerned pūkenga
evidence that intentionally avoided spelling
out reasons for a conclusion. The concern was that specifying reasons (as
opposed to
explaining the outcome) would have been divisive and undercut the
mana of participants.109F[110]
Recommendation
- R2 Te
Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee should consider amending
the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses in Schedule
4 of the High Court Rules
2016 to better recognise and provide for mātauranga and tikanga as a unique
category of expert evidence.
- 2.61 We
recommend the Rules Committee consider reviewing and amending the Code of
Conduct for Expert Witnesses to clarify that, in
relation to mātauranga and
tikanga evidence:
(a) an expert witness with lived experience of the relevant mātauranga and
tikanga may be qualified by that experience;
(b) an expert witness may be qualified in accordance with tikanga;
(c) a whakapapa or personal relationship with a party does not mean that an
expert witness is unable to offer expert evidence;
(d) the requirement to state reasons for an opinion can be met by an explanation
for the opinion that accords with the tikanga being
applied; and
(e) material relied on may include oral history.
- 2.62 The
clarification suggested in (c) would enable counsel to brief a potential witness
about their duty to the court with the understanding
it is appropriate for them
to offer evidence despite (or even because of) a whakapapa relationship. Given
the likelihood that an
expert witness in this context may have a personal
relationship with a party in addition to any whakapapa link, the clarification
should address both. It confirms, for the purpose of this particular context,
the current legal position that an expert witness does
not need to be
independent of the party by whom the witness is briefed. Any potential conflict
of interest is treated as a matter
of weight, not
admissibility.110F[111]
- 2.63 The
clarification suggested in (e) would support our recommendation to introduce an
exception to the hearsay rule for mātauranga
and tikanga evidence. The two
changes would work together in cases involving expert evidence that includes
oral history and limit
challenges to that type of evidence based on assumptions
about its inherent unreliability.
- 2.64 We have
considered the relative merits of amending the Code of Conduct for Expert
Witnesses compared to enacting a new exception
for opinion evidence. We think
amending the Code has several advantages. It retains the substantial helpfulness
gateway to the admissibility
of expert opinion on mātauranga and tikanga.
It also retains the express requirement that witnesses must qualify themselves
as having expertise, which encourages parties to offer quality evidence, while
clarifying how relevant qualifications may be established.
It ensures a party
can challenge evidence of another party on the basis a witness lacks relevant
expertise or argue their own position
is supported by a person with greater
expertise. These are valuable tools to test expert witnesses offering evidence
of mātauranga
or tikanga. In addition, amending the Code rather than the
Act may offer more flexibility for the future. This is because it may
be
relatively easier to respond to evolving practice through changes to the Code
than further amendment to the Act.
- 2.65 Enacting a
new exception would have other disadvantages too. We agree with the issue raised
by Chapman Tripp that removing the
expertise requirement through a new exception
would risk lessening the respect due to pūkenga who offer expert evidence.
In
addition, by not recognising expertise, a new exception may also risk
lessening the respect due to people who have relevant and substantially
helpful
evidence within the meaning of section 25 but may not necessarily qualify as
pūkenga in te ao Māori.
- 2.66 For the
same reasons explained in relation to our proposed hearsay exception, it would
not be necessary to define mātauranga
or tikanga for the purposes of the
suggested amendments.
General statutory guidance for interpreting the Act having
regard to te ao Māori
Reform not recommended
- 2.67 We
do not recommend introducing statutory guidance as to the need to interpret and
apply the provisions of the Act having regard
to te ao Māori. Our
conclusion on this is finely balanced.
- 2.68 The option
has the advantage of future-proofing the Act to ensure the law has enough
inbuilt flexibility to respond to new issues
and the increasing engagement with
tikanga by the courts. In cases involving Māori interests, it would
expressly enable a court
to have regard to te ao Māori in relation to any
issue arising under the Act and guide a judge to consider questions of relevance
under section 7 from an ao Māori perspective. As noted, some submitters
supported the option for these reasons.
- 2.69 During
consultation, the option was also viewed positively as offering a legislative
tool to which counsel could point as additional
justification for approaching
the admissibility and use of evidence in a culturally sensitive way. It could
provide credibility to
arguments concerning mātauranga and tikanga evidence
and allow judges a broader discretion to admit or exclude the evidence
on a
tikanga basis.
- 2.70 However, we
remain of the view that interpretive guidance of general effect can be uncertain
and may result in unintended consequences.
On the one hand, initial uncertainty
in any new law can be resolved through practice and judicial interpretation. On
the other, concerns
were raised with us in consultation about whether counsel
and the judiciary have the required knowledge and skills to ensure the
proposed
guidance is applied appropriately. In time, upskilling among counsel and the
judiciary may mean general interpretive guidance
is not needed in any event.
- 2.71 We also
consider our recommendations in relation to the hearsay and opinion evidence
rules respond to the issues that have been
identified with the way the Act is
currently operating with respect to mātauranga and tikanga evidence. They
respond in a way
that should minimise argument, whereas general interpretive
guidance may invite it. Relatedly, we do not have a clear picture of
wider
operational issues arising across the Act in relation to te ao Māori, and
for this reason too, we are not in a position
to recommend general interpretive
guidance in the context of an operational review.
- 2.72 In
assessing the case for reform against the Act’s purpose in section 6,
recommending general interpretive guidance may
be inconsistent with section
6(e), avoiding unjustifiable expense and delay, and section 6(f), enhancing
access to the law of evidence.
Other matters
- 2.73 In
its submission, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police noted the
importance of recognising principles of tikanga
but expressed concern about the
uncertain implications for criminal law of amending the Act to address the
admissibility of mātauranga
and tikanga evidence. Given the issues we have
identified, we think it would be unjust to wait for the intersection of tikanga
and
state law to reach a settled state before reforming evidence law. That said,
as noted, the key safeguards in section 7 and section
8 will continue to apply
in respect of all mātauranga and tikanga evidence. Our recommendations are
not intended to diminish
the importance of first-hand personal knowledge and
observation of facts relevant to establishing the commission of crimes.
- 2.74 We do not
recommend further exceptions to the hearsay or opinion evidence rules to cover
evidence of oral traditions from other
cultures. Based on submissions received,
there does not appear to be any problem in practice that warrants reform, and
there was
no support for it among submitters. In the absence of an identified
problem, it would be speculative and inappropriate in an operational
review to
seek to identify the circumstances in which such exceptions might
apply.
OTHER POTENTIAL ISSUES
- 2.75 In
our Issues Paper, we identified four other potential issues with how the Act
recognises and provides for te ao
Māori:111F[112]
(a) The operation of section 30 and racial bias.
(b) Protections for confidential information and the desirability of any
extension of privilege to communications with kaumātua,
tohunga and
rongoā practitioners.
(c) Judicial warnings on cross-cultural identification bias.
(d) Procedures for giving evidence in court and their compatibility with
tikanga.
- 2.76 Our
analysis of submissions and conclusions in relation to the operation of section
30 and racial bias are provided in Chapter
7.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 2.77 We
invited feedback on whether there have been any significant developments in
relation to these matters or significant concerns
about how the law is operating
with respect to them in practice. We also asked if there are any provisions in
the Act failing to
adequately provide for te ao Māori in practice and how
any problems should be addressed.
Results of consultation
Protections for confidential information
- 2.78 Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service submitted that the
scope of any extension of privilege to communications
with kaumātua,
tohunga and rongoā practitioners would need to be carefully considered. It
noted there is a very clear definition
of who is a doctor and who is a lawyer
for the purpose of privileged communications. The Public Defence Service
suggested communications
with tohunga are arguably already covered by the
privilege conferred in section 58 for communications with ministers of
religion.
Court procedure
- 2.79 Six
submitters commented on court procedure. The Crown Law Office, NZLS, Police and
Public Defence Service doubted the existence
of a problem in practice regarding
procedures for giving evidence in court and their compatibility with tikanga
and/or the merits
of reforming the Act to enable pūkenga evidence to be
given differently to other types of expert evidence.
- 2.80 The
Wellington Community Justice Project submitted it should be made clear in the
Act that courts can regulate procedures in
a manner that recognises tikanga. We
also heard during consultation there may be shortcomings in resources available
to support mātauranga
and tikanga evidence being given in a tika (correct)
way. For example, we heard that a pūkenga who was uncomfortable giving
evidence in English did so due to the unavailability of translation services and
that the ability to give evidence in a whaikōrero
(a type of formal speech)
style may depend on the judge and whether translation resources are
available.112F[113] We also heard
that, while requirements for written briefs can support party preparation and
fairness, mātauranga and tikanga
evidence can lose its power by being
written down in the structured way expected for
affidavits.113F[114]
- 2.81 Chapman
Tripp proposed the addition of guidance to the Act to provide direction on
matters to which a court should have regard
when dealing with tikanga evidence,
including guidance on whether tikanga evidence is most appropriately heard
orally and correct
approaches to challenging disputed evidence. Chapman Tripp
also proposed that the guidance address the role of pūkenga appointed
to
assist the court. We see merit in these suggestions, but as Chapman Tripp itself
acknowledged, consideration of them is beyond
the scope of this review. This is
because the issues may need to be addressed through a variety of mechanisms,
including mechanisms
that are not closely associated with the operation of the
Act.
Reform not recommended
- 2.82 We
make recommendations relating to visual identification evidence in Chapter 11
that may help to address some of the concerns
we noted in the Issues Paper about
cross-cultural identification bias. We do not propose to make recommendations on
protections for
confidential information and court procedure in light of the
very limited submissions we received on them. Only the Public Defence
Service
submitted on the confidentiality issues, and its submission urged caution in
relation to any reform.
- 2.83 Some
submissions on court procedure reflect a concern that any changes to current
processes for admitting evidence may impact
negatively on trial fairness. At the
same time, there is still some ongoing concern that the current processes are
already unfair
as they inhibit evidence from being offered in its most
appropriate form. In the Second Review, the Commission recommended the Act
be
amended to make it clear that courts can regulate procedures for giving evidence
in a manner that recognises tikanga. As noted
earlier, the Government accepted
this recommendation in principle. Its view, however, was that further
consideration of the potential
operational impacts was
required.114F[115] We make no
additional recommendations on court procedure. The fact there remains ongoing
concern lends support to further consideration
of the Commission’s
recommendation in the Second Review.
CHAPTER 3
Hearsay
INTRODUCTION
- 3.1 In
this chapter, we consider the following issues in relation to the hearsay
provisions in the Evidence Act 2006:
(a) The admissibility of hearsay statements when the maker of the statement is
fearful of giving evidence. We recommend introducing
a new ground to admit a
hearsay statement when the maker of the statement has a reasonable fear of
retaliation if they give evidence
and it is in the interests of justice to admit
the statement.
(b) When a person “cannot with reasonable diligence” be found. We do
not recommend reform as we found no evidence of
a problem in practice.
(c) Hearsay in civil proceedings. We recommend limiting the application of the
hearsay rules in the Act in civil proceedings so that
hearsay evidence is
admissible unless challenged.
BACKGROUND
- 3.2 The
Act is based on the principle of
orality.115F[116] This rests on
the assumption that the fact-finder is likely to benefit from seeing and hearing
witnesses give their evidence and
recognises the fundamental importance of
transparency in the administration of justice through the
courts.116F[117] Evidence is
therefore ordinarily given orally in court by witnesses who are available for
cross-examination.117F[118] To
facilitate this, section 71 provides that every person is eligible and
compellable to give evidence in court unless they fall
into one of the narrow
exceptions in sections
72–75.118F[119]
- 3.3 A hearsay
statement is an out-of-court statement made by a person who is not a witness
that is offered in evidence to prove the
truth of its
contents.119F[120] Hearsay
statements can only be admitted in limited circumstances. The general test for
admitting hearsay statements is contained
in section 18(1), which provides:
- A hearsay
statement is admissible in any proceeding if—
- (a) the
circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable assurance that the
statement is reliable; and
- (b) either—
- (i) the maker
of the statement is unavailable as a witness; or
- (ii) the Judge
considers that undue expense or delay would be caused if the maker of the
statement were required to be a witness.
- 3.4 Section
16(2) states that a person is “unavailable as a witness” for the
purposes of the hearsay provisions if the
person:
- (a) is dead;
or
- (b) is outside
New Zealand and it is not reasonably practicable for him or her to be a witness;
or
- (c) is unfit to
be a witness because of age or physical or mental condition; or
- (d) cannot with
reasonable diligence be identified or found; or
- (e) is not
compellable to give evidence.
- 3.5 The Act does
not provide any grounds to admit hearsay statements other than those listed in
section 18(1)(b). Similarly, it does
not provide any grounds for the court to
find that a person is unavailable other than those listed in section
16(2).
HEARSAY STATEMENTS WHEN THE MAKER OF THE STATEMENT IS FEARFUL
OF GIVING EVIDENCE
Issues
- 3.6 Presently,
the Act does not provide for a hearsay statement to be admitted when the maker
of the statement is available as a witness
but may have a good reason not to
give evidence. Prompted by recent case law concerning the interpretation of
section 16(2), in our
Issues Paper, we identified two issues with this
position:
(a) It may be creating practical issues, including uncertainty as to whether the
categories of unavailability for hearsay purposes
can be interpreted in a way
that includes situations where a person is excused by the court from giving
evidence.
(b) It may not strike an appropriate balance between a defendant’s right
to a fair trial, the public interest in having relevant
evidence before a
fact-finder and the interests of a potential witness who has a good reason not
to give evidence.
The current law may be creating practical issues
- 3.7 The
current law presents several practical difficulties. First, there is uncertainty
about whether and in what situations a hearsay
statement can be admitted where
the maker of the statement has a “just excuse” for not giving
evidence. Under section
165 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, if a person
refuses to give evidence, the court may order that they be detained in custody
for a period not exceeding seven
days.120F[121] However, the court
may exercise its discretion not to make such an order, thereby excusing a person
from giving evidence, if they
can offer a “just
excuse”.121F[122] Recent
case law suggests that having a “just excuse” under the Criminal
Procedure Act could potentially constitute being
“unavailable” for
hearsay purposes, even though it is not recognised as a ground of unavailability
in section 16(2) of
the Evidence
Act.122F[123] However, the courts
have not yet been required to determine this issue.
- 3.8 Second, the
current law may needlessly prolong trials where the case against the defendant
relies substantially on the evidence
of a person (such as the complainant) who
is available as a witness but who the prosecution knows will refuse to give
evidence in
court. In such situations, the prosecution may need to summon the
person under threat of imprisonment and have them declared hostile
in court to
have their previous statement admitted as
evidence.123F[124]
- 3.9 Third, the
current law may be deterring people who are frightened of intimidation or
retaliation from cooperating with police
by providing evidence against a
defendant. This can lead to charges against a defendant being dropped due to
lack of evidence.
The current law may not appropriately balance competing
interests
- 3.10 As
we noted in our Issues Paper, there is a fundamental policy question about how
the Act should respond to situations where
a person has a good reason not to
give evidence.124F[125]
- 3.11 This
question engages competing
interests.125F[126] As a general
rule, it is in the interests of justice to have all relevant evidence before a
fact-finder. The interests of the makers
of hearsay statements are also
important. In some cases, they may face adverse consequences such as
intimidation or retaliation if
they give evidence. As noted above, under the
current law, they may be required to attend court and give evidence under threat
of
imprisonment even if they have good reasons for not giving evidence.
- 3.12 On the
other hand, reliance on hearsay statements deprives a defendant of the
opportunity to challenge that evidence in cross-examination.
This engages a
defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial, which is enshrined under
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
and includes the right to cross-examine
witnesses.126F[127]
- 3.13 The Act
does not allow a hearsay statement to be admitted when the maker of a hearsay
statement is available but may have a good
reason not to give evidence. As we
noted in our Issues Paper, this is consistent with the policy and legislative
history of the Act.127F[128]
Ultimately, greater weight was placed on a defendant’s right to a fair
trial and the importance of preserving the availability
of cross-examination.
Concerns about fearful witnesses were addressed instead through availability of
alternative ways of giving
evidence.128F[129]
- 3.14 In our
Issues Paper, we suggested the hearsay rules may no longer strike an appropriate
balance between these competing interests
because
of:129F[130]
(a) the length of time since the Evidence Code was
developed;130F[131]
(b) the uncertainty created by case law concerning the relationship between
hearsay rules and the Criminal Procedure Act;
(c) criticism of the decision to remove from the Evidence Bill a discretion to
excuse those in “close personal relationships”
with defendants from
giving evidence;131F[132] and
(d) developments in international human rights law from the European Court of
Human Rights in Al Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom, where the Court
found that “to allow the defendant to benefit from the fear he has
engendered in witnesses would be incompatible
with the rights of victims and
witnesses”.132F[133]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 3.15 In
our Issues Paper we noted that there are broadly two opposing legislative
options for reform, which reflect the stark policy
choice underlying this area
of law:133F[134]
(a) Option 1 — clarify that there is no jurisdiction to admit a hearsay
statement by a person excused from giving evidence.
(b) Option 2 — introduce a new ground to admit a hearsay statement when a
person has a good reason not to give evidence.
- 3.16 Option 1
gives priority to a defendant’s right to a fair trial by clarifying that a
person who is available as a witness
and compellable to give evidence must be
available for cross-examination if their evidence is to be admitted in court.
Under this
option, concerns about witnesses who may have a good reason for not
giving evidence would need to be addressed through the Act’s
provision of
alternative ways of giving
evidence.134F[135] As noted above,
this option seems broadly consistent with Parliament’s intention when
passing the Act.
- 3.17 Option 2
gives priority to the public interest in ensuring relevant and reliable
information is still available to the court
when a potential witness has good
reason not to give
evidence.135F[136]
- 3.18 In our
Issues Paper, we noted that, should option 2 be adopted, there is a further
question about how “good reason”
should be defined. We presented two
options:136F[137]
(a) Option 1 — a general ground that would apply when a judge is satisfied
a person has a good reason not to give evidence.
(b) Option 2 — a narrow ground founded on fear. This option is broadly
consistent with the approach taken in comparable jurisdictions,
including
England and Wales, and is largely consistent with developments in international
human rights law.
- 3.19 Under
either option, we identified two subcategories that could potentially warrant
inclusion in any new
ground:137F[138]
(a) When a judge is satisfied a person has been intimidated by or on behalf of
the defendant.
(b) When a person fears retaliation if they give evidence. This could have most
application in situations where a complainant is
in a violent relationship with
the defendant but it would not necessarily be limited to such situations. It
could also apply in situations
where the defendant is part of a gang or other
group.
- 3.20 Lastly, we
asked submitters whether further safeguards would be desirable should a new
ground be adopted.
Results of consultation
Clarifying the law
- 3.21 Five
submitters addressed whether the law needed to be clarified at all. Three
favoured clarification.138F[139]
Two considered any issues with the current law could be addressed through case
law.139F[140]
- 3.22 Those in
favour of clarification expressed concern about the uncertainty the current law
creates, referring in particular to
the disjunct between the hearsay rules and
section 165 of the Criminal Procedure
Act.140F[141] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Office observed that the courts are yet to determine whether
a person who has been excused
from giving evidence under section 165 of the
Criminal Procedure Act is “unavailable” as a witness for the
purposes of
the hearsay provisions. It considered that approach would lack
clarity and transparency, requiring a strained interpretation of the
legislation. It also noted there is no statutory guidance as to what constitutes
“just excuse” for the purposes of section
165 of the Criminal
Procedure Act and, in any event, that determination is not made with the
admission of hearsay evidence in mind.
Associate Professor Anna High noted that
recent developments in case law concerning section 16(2)(c) of the Act (relating
to people
who are unfit to be a witness because of age or a physical or mental
condition) suggest that a finding of “unavailability”
under this
section may be reached where a “just excuse” finding has separately
been reached based on fear, trauma or
intimidation.141F[142] Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald said case law already indicates that a person who
is excused from giving evidence is not compellable
to give
evidence.142F[143]
- 3.23 The Crown
Law Office and Professor McDonald both noted that an anomaly exists under the
current law. A person who can make themselves
unable to be found may have their
hearsay evidence admitted, but a person who comes to court but is too frightened
or distraught
to give evidence will
not.143F[144]
Hearsay statements from people who have a good reason not to
give evidence
- 3.24 Twelve
submitters responded to the question of whether hearsay statements should be
admitted from people who have a good reason
not to give evidence. Seven
submitters supported this
option,144F[145] four opposed
it145F[146] and one said this
issue warrants further
consideration.146F[147]
- 3.25 Those in
favour had a number of concerns with the current law:
(a) Five submitters were concerned for people who are fearful of giving
evidence, particularly victims of family or sexual
violence.147F[148] New Zealand
Family Violence Clearinghouse said alternative methods of giving evidence are
not always effective at addressing these
concerns.
(b) Three submitters were concerned that defendants may have charges dropped
against them or be offered a plea deal because of a
lack of
evidence.148F[149]
(c) Two submitters were concerned about relying on section 16(2)(c) (relating to
people who are unfit to be a witness because of
age or a physical or mental
condition) to capture people with
trauma.149F[150] The Crown Law
Office noted this category is of very limited application and has a high
threshold.150F[151]
(d) Three submitters said specialised knowledge and experience on violence,
including family and gang violence, is important to inform
decision-making.151F[152]
(e) Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police said prosecutors
regularly deal with witnesses who are reluctant to give
evidence in court due to
pressure exerted on them by the defendant or others. This also has resourcing
implications for
Police.152F[153]
(f) Police said the medical ground for unavailability in section 16(2)(c) is
insufficient to address the fear and/or trauma experienced
by some witnesses and
may prevent them from giving evidence at
trial.153F[154]
(g) Police said the current law may be creating mistrust in the criminal justice
system because it incentivises police to detain
or compel potentially vulnerable
people to give evidence.154F[155]
- 3.26 Those
opposed to any new ground for admitting hearsay statements were concerned that
it would undermine a defendant’s right
to a fair trial, including their
right to cross-examine
witnesses.155F[156] The Criminal
Bar Association and Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence
Service both preferred alternative methods
of protecting witnesses’
interests. The Criminal Bar Association was also concerned that, if a new
discretion is introduced,
it will create delays.
The scope of any new ground for admitting hearsay
statements
- 3.27 Thirteen
submitters addressed the scope of any new ground. Seven favoured a general
discretion for situations where a person
has a good reason not to give
evidence156F[157] while four
favoured a narrow discretion founded on
fear.157F[158] Two did not express
a particular view.158F[159]
- 3.28 A strong
theme from submitters that favoured a more general discretion was that it is
difficult to assess “fear”,
noting the complex nature of fear and
violent relationships.159F[160]
- 3.29 The
Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere, submitted that a person could
have a good reason not to give evidence
if:
(a) they are subject to intimidation attributable to any other party in the
proceedings;
(b) they hold a reasonable fear of retaliation if they give evidence;
(c) they are entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination found
in section 60 with respect to all or substantially
all of their proposed
evidence; or
(d) for any other reason it would be contrary to the interests of justice for
them to be compelled to give evidence in the proceeding.
- 3.30 Luke
Cunningham Clere submitted that, to keep the discretion within appropriate
limits, a party seeking to establish (d) should
bear the onus of showing that
compulsion would be “contrary to the interests of justice”.
- 3.31 Submitters
that preferred a narrower ground based on fear were concerned about the impact
on fair trial rights of a more general
ground.160F[161]
- 3.32 The Public
Defence Service said that, while family violence is a vexed area, there are
almost always complicated dynamics at
play and reluctance to give evidence will
not always be because the complainant fears reprisal from the defendant. It
submitted that
fear attributable to the defendant will likely be difficult to
prove and the evidential threshold would need to be high.
- 3.33 The Crown
Law Office supported the approach taken in England and Wales, which provides
that fear is to be widely construed. It
did not support a definition of fear
that is limited to fear attributable directly to the defendant. It said this
would set the bar
too high and fail to account for common scenarios where the
witness’s legitimate fear is not directly attributable to the defendant
or
where they legitimately fear retaliation even though no specific threats were
made. It noted R v Shabir as illustrating a balanced
approach.161F[162]
Safeguards
- 3.34 Nine
submitters addressed whether any new safeguards should be introduced alongside a
new discretion. Three favoured the introduction
of new
safeguards162F[163] while four
thought they were
unnecessary.163F[164] Two did not
express a particular
view.164F[165]
- 3.35 Submitters
that did not think additional safeguards were necessary said sections 8 (general
exclusion) and 18(1)(a) (the reliability
threshold for admitting a hearsay
statement) were sufficient to protect fair trial
rights.165F[166]
- 3.36 Submitters
that supported new safeguards suggested the following additional safeguards
could be inserted into the Act:
(a) The Wellington Community Justice Project and Public Defence Service
submitted that a judge should have the power to stop proceedings
if the hearsay
evidence is so unconvincing that a conviction would be unsafe.
(b) The Criminal Bar Association submitted that, if a complainant’s
hearsay statement is admitted based on a determination
of good reason and there
is no independent corroboration to support their evidence, there must be a
statutory presumption that the
evidence is insufficient to prove the
charge(s).
(c) The Crown Law Office and Criminal Bar Association submitted that a hearsay
statement should only be admitted under a new discretion
where a judge is
satisfied it is in the interests of justice to do so.
(d) The Public Defence Service submitted that safeguards should also include a
high threshold for admission and a requirement to
consider whether alternative
modes of evidence are available. It considered admission should be a last resort
and the judge should
be required to consider the risks to a fair trial (and that
this risk increases the more important the evidence is to the prosecution
case).
It also said consideration could be given to limiting the exception to certain
offences and/or setting out examples of circumstances
that amount to good
reasons/fear.
The need for reform
- 3.37 We
consider reform is desirable to address the practical issues with the current
law and to better balance the competing interests
at stake where a defendant has
caused fear in another.
Addressing practical issues with the current law
- 3.38 Some
of the practical issues with the current law stem from the courts’
recognition, noted above, of a potential avenue
to admit hearsay statements that
was not intended when the Act was passed. Recent cases suggest that a person who
has a “just
excuse” for not giving evidence under section 165 of the
Criminal Procedure Act could be “unavailable” for hearsay
purposes,
potentially allowing their hearsay statements to be
admitted.166F[167] There are
several potential problems with this approach. First, the Criminal Procedure Act
only applies to criminal
proceedings.167F[168] There may be
situations in civil proceedings where a person has a “just excuse”
for not giving evidence.168F[169]
Second, “just excuse” can only be assessed at trial when a witness
is present but is not giving
evidence.169F[170] It is
preferable that evidential issues are able to be dealt with pre-trial where
possible. Lastly, if the law is not clarified through
statutory reform,
resources are likely to be used to clarify the law through the courts. It is
also possible that, without statutory
guidance, judges may take different
approaches to the assessment of “just excuse” in relation to the
hearsay rules in
the Act, creating further uncertainty for parties.
- 3.39 In addition
to the uncertainty about the relationship between the hearsay rules and the
Criminal Procedure Act, the current law
may be creating other practical issues.
Where a person is available as a witness but has a good reason for not giving
evidence, there
is no mechanism in the Act for determining the admissibility of
their hearsay statement pre-trial. If that person’s evidence
is crucial to
the prosecution case (such as the complainant’s evidence in a family
violence case), the prosecution may need
to summon the person under threat of
imprisonment if they do not comply and, if necessary, have them declared hostile
in court to
have their previous statement admitted as
evidence.170F[171] This could
needlessly prolong trials where it is clear earlier in proceedings that the
person will not give evidence in court.
- 3.40 The current
law may also be deterring people who are frightened of intimidation or
retaliation from cooperating with police by
providing evidence against a
defendant.171F[172] This can be a
problem in two ways. First, a person may not come forward to police to make a
complaint or provide information in the
first instance because they are afraid
they will be required to give evidence if the matter goes to trial. Second,
where the person
has already assisted police and charges have been laid, they
may subsequently fail to make themselves available to give evidence.
This may
result in delays to proceedings or charges being dropped if the person’s
hearsay statement (such as their police statement)
is unable to be
admitted.
- 3.41 Some of the
submitters that did not favour a new ground to admit hearsay statements were
concerned it would create delays due
to disputes over whether hearsay statements
should be admitted or
not.172F[173] In our view, the
inverse is true. For the reasons outlined above, we consider the current law is
leading to uncertainty and delays.
Legislative amendment could simplify
decision-making by clarifying the appropriate approach and allow the courts to
resolve any disputes
about admissibility pre-trial.
Balancing competing interests
- 3.42 As
we note above, the law in this area must balance competing interests. These
include the defendant’s right to a fair
trial, the interests of people who
make hearsay statements and the public interest in having all relevant evidence
before a fact-finder.
- 3.43 The
practical issues identified above suggest reform is needed to strike a better
balance between those interests. As submitters
noted:
(a) The current law deprives the fact-finder of relevant and reliable evidence.
This is of particular concern given the increased
use of independently
verifiable evidence, such as text messages and other electronic communications,
sent proximate to an incident
that might currently be inadmissible hearsay
evidence.173F[174]
(b) The current law may result in charges being withdrawn or the prosecution
offering plea bargains due to insufficient
evidence.174F[175] In general, it
is not in the interests of justice to have prosecutions fail because a potential
witness declines to give evidence,
particularly if that is caused by the
defendant. As the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand
Chamber) said
in Al Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom, a defendant
should not be allowed to benefit from the fear they have created in
others.175F[176]
- 3.44 Two
submitters preferred to rely on the common law to develop in the context of
existing provisions in the Act to respond to
situations where a person may have
a good reason not to give
evidence.176F[177] Associate
Professor High suggested section 16(2)(c) (relating to unavailability due to age
or physical or mental condition) could
apply in cases involving fear, trauma or
intimidation.177F[178] We agree
section 16(2)(c) may apply in some cases where a person reasonably fears giving
evidence. As we said in our Issues Paper,
section 16(2)(c) would cover people
who may be too traumatised to give evidence, in line with the original intention
of the provision.178F[179]
However, in our view, relying on section 16(2)(c) risks excluding people
who may have a good reason not to give evidence but do not
meet the legal tests
under section 16(2)(c). That section refers to people who are
“unfit” to give evidence and so responds
to a different policy
concern. We would prefer the Act to respond as directly as possible to different
policy objectives.
- 3.45 Professor
McDonald supported the potential approach left open by the courts of treating a
person excused from giving evidence
under section 165 of the Criminal Procedure
Act as unavailable for hearsay purposes. As we note above, however, section 165
is not
aimed at addressing the admissibility of hearsay statements and involves
different considerations. We consider it is preferable for
the Evidence Act to
respond directly by making it clear when hearsay statements can be
admitted.
- 3.46 Reform is
also desirable to ensure fairness to parties and witnesses by allowing relevant
evidence to be considered by the court
in a way that does not put them at
increased risk of retaliation. In assessing the case for reform against the
Act’s purposes
in section 6, this is relevant to section 6(c), which
refers to fairness to parties and witnesses.
- 3.47 Some
submitters said that alternative ways of giving evidence are preferable to
admitting hearsay statements because they better
protect fair trial rights by
enabling
cross-examination.179F[180] We
agree that alternative ways of giving evidence are important mechanisms to
address some witness concerns while also enabling cross-examination.
Their
importance is represented in the wide range of alternative means available in
the Act. However, they do not respond to the
issues we have identified with the
current law. Where a person refuses to give evidence by any means due to fear of
retaliation,
a defendant may still benefit from the fear they have created in
that person. The fact that alternative means of giving evidence
are available
does not mitigate the defendant’s actions or otherwise respond to this
concern. Alternative means also do not
necessarily address the risk of
retaliation to the person in situations where the defendant is aware of who is
giving evidence. Witness
anonymity orders are also unlikely to be of any
practical use in situations where the person is already known to the
defendant.
Recommendations
- R3 Amend
section 18 to include a new ground for admitting a hearsay statement in a
criminal proceeding where:
- the
maker of the statement has a reasonable fear of retaliation if they give
evidence and they do not intend to give evidence because
of that fear; and
- it is
in the interests of justice to admit their hearsay
statement.
- R4 Define
“fear of retaliation” in section 16(1) as fear that a defendant or
any other person will cause physical or other
harm (including, for example,
financial or social harm) to the maker of the statement or any other
person.
- 3.48 We consider
the Act should be amended to allow the admission of hearsay statements where the
maker of the statement has a reasonable
fear of retaliation and it is in the
interests of justice to admit their hearsay statement.
- 3.49 In our
Issues Paper, we said that providing a new ground for admitting hearsay
statements in the Act could be achieved by either
introducing a new category of
“unavailability” in section 16(2) or providing a new alternative to
the unavailability
requirement in section
18(1)(b).180F[181]
- 3.50 We consider
introducing a new alternative to the unavailability requirement in
section 18(1)(b) is simpler and aligns better
conceptually with the purpose
of our recommendations. A person who does not intend to give evidence because of
fear of retaliation
is not necessarily “unavailable” as that word is
usually understood in everyday language. Our recommended new ground
to admit
hearsay statements should therefore be understood as a general exception to the
rule against hearsay.
- 3.51 As we also
noted in our Issues Paper, the existing notice provision in section 22
(requiring a party to give advance notice of
an intention to offer a hearsay
statement in criminal proceedings) would also apply
here.181F[182]
- 3.52 Our
recommendations are broadly consistent with the approaches taken in comparative
jurisdictions, which allow hearsay statements
to be admitted in a broader range
of situations than under the Act. For example, in England and Wales, a person is
considered “unavailable”
to give evidence if, “through
fear”, they do not give
evidence.182F[183] The approach in
England and Wales has also been implemented in South
Australia.183F[184] In other
Australian legislation, the categories for unavailability provide for situations
where the party seeking to show unavailability
has taken all reasonable steps to
compel the person to give evidence without
success.184F[185] In Canada,
hearsay is admissible if it is sufficiently reliable and, in the circumstances,
admission is “reasonably necessary”.
This has allowed for greater
use of hearsay evidence from witnesses who are technically
“available”.185F[186]
- 3.53 Members of
our Expert Advisory Group were generally supportive of our recommendations. They
noted our proposed amendment would
not address the wider issue of people who
refuse to give evidence for reasons other than fear of retaliation (for example,
women
in abusive relationships who do not want their partner to go to prison).
However, they accepted there was inadequate support for
a broader exception and
considered our recommendation would be an improvement over the current position.
- 3.54 The
Judicial Advisory Committee supported a fear-based exception to the hearsay
rule.
A fear-based approach
- 3.55 In
our view, a fear-based approach provides a more appropriate balance between the
rights and interests discussed above than
a general ground to admit hearsay
statements. As explained by the Grand Chamber in Al Khawaja and Tahery v
United Kingdom, preventing a defendant from benefiting from the fear
they have created in another is a clear and principled reason to admit hearsay
evidence.186F[187] We note that
our recommendations are broad in that they would potentially capture any form of
retaliation by or against any person.
This is necessary to capture the wide
variety of potentially complex circumstances involved where a person may
reasonably fear giving
evidence. However, given the importance of fair trial
rights in this area, we consider any exception to the rule against hearsay
needs
to be carefully limited. This is why we have recommended that fear be limited to
a reasonable fear of retaliation (as we discuss
further below) and not a more
general fear of giving evidence. This is also why we have recommended that a
hearsay statement should
only be admitted when it is in the interests of justice
to do so (also discussed below). These requirements should operate to ensure
that hearsay statements are not admitted where, for example, the potential
retaliation is relatively minor.
- 3.56 The narrow
scope of our recommended exception is in line with the other grounds on which
hearsay statements can be admitted in
the
Act.187F[188] These grounds have
clear, identifiable reasons on the face of the legislation. Creating a new
ground for admissibility when a person
has a good reason not to give evidence,
without further explanation, would be out of step with the other limited grounds
in the Act.
- 3.57 Some
submitters that preferred a more general ground were concerned that fear would
be difficult to assess. We agree that assessing
fear will not always be
straightforward. However, our recommendations will mitigate this difficulty for
the following reasons:
(a) The fear must be reasonable. Evidence demonstrating objective fear should be
easier to evaluate than evidence of subjective fear.
This could include evidence
about the nature of and reasons for the fear, any relevant cultural context and
evidence from experts
who work with victims of family, gang or sexual
violence.188F[189]
(b) Our recommendations are limited to fear of retaliation, which is more
tangible than a general fear of giving evidence.
- 3.58 Also, if we
were to propose a more general discretion, we would anticipate that, in most
cases, fear would still need to be established
as the basis for a good reason.
- 3.59 As noted
above, there may be situations where a person is appropriately captured both
under section 16(2)(c) (unavailability
due to age or physical or mental
condition) because they are too traumatised to give evidence and under any new
fear-based exception.
However, we consider these to be conceptually different
grounds for admission. Not all people who are protected by section 16(2)(c)
due
to the effects of trauma will have a reasonable fear of retaliation. This may be
the case where, for example, the relevant person
has suffered trauma but is
largely unknown to the defendant. Conversely, a person who has a reasonable fear
of retaliation will not
always meet the section 16(2)(c) threshold.
- 3.60 Lastly, we
acknowledge our recommendations are not a complete answer to “the vexed
issue” identified in Awatere v R — that is, how the
law of evidence and the courts should deal with victims of family violence who
do not wish to give evidence for reasons of
fear.189F[190] It may still be a
significant hurdle for a witness to satisfy a judge that they have a reasonable
fear of retaliation.190F[191] For
example, a fear of the adverse emotional consequences of giving evidence would
be unlikely to qualify under this
category.191F[192] Additionally,
even if a complainant is excused from giving evidence, the fact that their
hearsay statement is relied on in court
instead will not necessarily protect
them from future
violence.192F[193]
Defining fear of retaliation
- 3.61 We
do not consider it is necessary or desirable to exhaustively define
“retaliation”. Doing so would risk focusing
the inquiry on what the
maker of the statement fears will be done to them rather than whether there are
objective grounds for their
fear that are supported by evidence. For example,
provided it is properly established, we cannot see a principled reason to
distinguish
between fear of physical retaliation and fear of other forms of
retaliation such as financial or social retaliation. These may be
equally
harmful depending on the circumstances of the case. This is why we have
recommended the Act define “retaliation”
to include forms of
retaliation that are non-physical such as financial or social retaliation. As we
explain below, the definition
would encompass retaliation by a defendant or any
other person against the maker of the statement or any other person.
Fear of retaliation by a defendant
- 3.62 We
recommend defining fear of retaliation in a way that includes fear of
retaliation by a defendant against the maker of the
statement or any other
person.
- 3.63 Where it
can be shown that a person has been subject to intimidation that is attributable
to the defendant, this would usually
provide the clearest grounds for
establishing fear. However, as we noted in our Issues Paper, it may be difficult
to prove intimidation
in any given
case.193F[194] Some submitters
noted the complex dynamics of family or gang violence where the threat of
retaliation is part of the nature of the
relationships involved and does not
need to be made explicit.194F[195]
Where a party can establish that the maker of a statement has a reasonable fear
of retaliation by the defendant, this should provide
a grounds for admitting the
relevant statement. The alternative — a narrower exception for cases where
there is direct evidence
of a defendant causing fear — might have little
utility in practice. The more general language we propose would still respond
to
fear caused by a defendant but may apply where evidence of that fear is
contextual and there is no direct evidence of intimidation.
- 3.64 Some
submitters noted that, in situations of family or gang violence, the maker of
the statement may reasonably fear harm to
others, particularly
children.195F[196] We see no
reason to distinguish this from fear of direct retaliation. This is why we have
included reasonable fear of retaliation
to the maker of the statement or any
other person in our recommendations.
Fear of retaliation by people other than a defendant
- 3.65 Fear
of retaliation should also include fear of retaliation by people other than a
defendant.
- 3.66 Some
submitters noted that potential witnesses may fear retaliation from those in a
gang or other group with the defendant who
are acting with the knowledge and
approval of the defendant. A definition of fear that requires it to be
attributable only to a defendant
may not capture situations where others are
acting with a defendant’s knowledge and
approval.196F[197]
- 3.67 Some
submitters were concerned that this would allow people to be excused from giving
evidence simply because a defendant was
in a gang or other group. The maker of
the statement would, however, still need to establish that they have objective
grounds for
fear that are supported by evidence. This is unlikely to be
established simply by showing that the defendant is in a gang, for example.
As
we discuss below, additional safeguards would also apply and would ensure the
risk of prejudice to the defendant is taken into
account.
Safeguards
- 3.68 As
some submitters noted, a number of provisions already operate effectively as
safeguards to preserve fair trial rights:
(a) A hearsay statement is only admissible if the circumstances relating to the
statement provide reasonable assurance that the statement
is
reliable.197F[198]
(b) Under section 8 (general exclusion), a judge must exclude any evidence if
its probative value is outweighed by the risk that
the evidence will have an
unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding. The right of the defendant to
offer an effective defence
must be part of this
consideration.198F[199]
(c) The veracity and propensity provisions in the Act permit a defendant to
offer evidence in relation to any “person”,
which would appear to
include the maker of a hearsay
statement.199F[200]
(d) In criminal proceedings, a judge has the power to dismiss a charge on their
own motion or on application at any
time.200F[201]
- 3.69 In addition
to these safeguards, we recommend hearsay statements should only be admitted
based on fear of retaliation where it
is in the interests of justice to do so.
The additional requirement for admission to be in the interests of justice is
necessary
to ensure that the impact on the defendant’s rights in the
circumstances of the case is taken into account. We consider, for
example, that
it would not be in the interests of justice to admit a hearsay statement where
the evidence only supports a slight
fear of relatively minor retaliation and the
hearsay statement is a key part of the case against the defendant.
- 3.70 Some
submitters noted that many of the factors that would be relevant to an
“interests of justice” assessment would
be assessed under section 8
anyway.201F[202] They therefore
did not consider it necessary to require admission to be in the interests of
justice. However, in our view, whether
the admission of hearsay evidence is in
the interests of justice requires consideration of the wider circumstances of
the case. This
will include the reasons for and nature of a person’s fear,
which may not be closely connected to a section 8 assessment.
- 3.71 Importantly,
the interests of justice assessment will also enable judges to consider the
relevance of alternative means of giving
evidence. These are unlikely to negate
a person’s fear of retaliation but may nevertheless be relevant to where
the interests
of justice lie in a particular case. For example, it would clearly
not be in the interests of justice to admit a person’s hearsay
statement
if the maker of the statement was willing to give evidence in an alternative
way.
- 3.72 Our
recommended requirement for admission of these hearsay statements to be in the
interests of justice is also broadly consistent
with the approaches taken in
England and Wales and South
Australia.202F[203]
WHEN A PERSON “CANNOT WITH REASONABLE DILIGENCE” BE
FOUND
Issue
- 3.73 Section
16(2)(d) states that a person is “unavailable as a witness” for the
purposes of the hearsay provisions if
the person “cannot with reasonable
diligence be identified or found”. If a person is unavailable as a
witness, their
hearsay statement is admissible provided that the circumstances
relating to the statement provide reasonable assurance that the statement
is
reliable.203F[204]
- 3.74 In our
Issues Paper, we said that initial consultation identified a concern about the
lack of guidance in the Act or case law
as to what is required to satisfy the
“reasonable diligence” requirement in section
16(2)(d).204F[205] We noted recent
case law that had declined to adopt a guiding set of principles, instead saying
that it “is a simple question
of
fact”.205F[206] We also
noted this approach differs from some comparable jurisdictions where further
guidance has been
given.206F[207]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 3.75 We
sought feedback on whether the current approach to the reasonable diligence
requirement is causing problems in practice and
whether reform is necessary or
desirable.207F[208] We also said
the language of “reasonable diligence” used in section 16(2)(d)
could be replaced with “all reasonable
steps”, which is used in
Australia and England and Wales. We said this may assist in focusing the inquiry
more directly on
which steps were (and were not) taken to find the
person.
Results of consultation
Problems in practice
- 3.76 Five
submitters addressed whether section 16(2)(d) is causing problems in practice.
One submitter, the Criminal Bar Association,
said it is causing issues. Three
submitters responded that they are not aware of any issues in
practice.208F[209] A further
submitter had no issues with the status
quo.209F[210]
- 3.77 The
Criminal Bar Association submitted that “reasonable diligence” is
too lenient a test and has resulted in hearsay
statements being admitted when
more could have been done to locate a witness. It said this is a growing issue
given the wider use
of pre-recorded video evidence.
Factors relevant to a section 16(2)(d) determination
- 3.78 Nine
submitters addressed whether the Act should prescribe factors that are relevant
to determining whether the section 16(2)(d)
threshold is satisfied. Three
submitters thought it
should.210F[211] Six submitters
said it should not.211F[212]
- 3.79 Submitters
that supported prescribing factors were concerned with protecting fair trial
rights and ensuring consistency in approach
by
police.212F[213]
- 3.80 Submitters
that did not support prescribing factors were concerned with resourcing
requirements for police,213F[214]
upsetting the highly factual nature of the
inquiry214F[215] and the effect on
victims if police are required to pursue
them.215F[216]
The wording of section 16(2)(d)
- 3.81 Ten
submitters addressed whether the language in section 16(2)(d) should be amended
to require “all reasonable steps”
to be taken to find the person
and/or secure their attendance at court. Three submitters supported amending the
language in the way
we
suggested216F[217] and five did
not.217F[218] Two did not express
a particular view but said modernising the language may be
useful.218F[219]
- 3.82 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) and the Crown Law
Office submitted that whether the “reasonable
diligence” standard is
met is a question of fact. The Crown Law Office said the courts already
typically require evidence of
the steps taken to locate a person and it is not
necessary or desirable to introduce complexity into this area by establishing a
set of guiding principles. For the same reason, it said there should not be
guidance in a non-statutory instrument. The NZLS said
further guidance would
make the assessment less flexible and therefore less able to accommodate the
various circumstances in which
the hearsay provisions are likely to be
engaged.
Reform not recommended
- 3.83 We
do not recommend reform to provide further guidance as to what constitutes
“reasonable diligence” or to amend
the wording in section
16(2)(d).
- 3.84 Submitters
did not identify any problems that the lack of guidance was having in practice.
Without clear evidence of a problem
in practice, we do not see legislative
intervention as necessary or desirable. As we note above, there is clear and
recent appellate
authority that the inquiry is a simple matter of fact.
Prescribing a list of relevant factors would risk unnecessarily upsetting
the
law in this area. Should problems arise, it is open to the courts to provide
guidance.219F[220]
HEARSAY IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Background
- 3.85 The
Act determines the admissibility of evidence in both civil and criminal
proceedings. In civil proceedings, the Act must also
be read alongside the
relevant rules of court, including the High Court Rules 2016 (HCR), which
regulate practice and
procedure.220F[221]
- 3.86 Under the
High Court Rules, evidence-in-chief in civil proceedings is usually given by the
witness reading a brief of evidence
in
court,221F[222] which is prepared
in advance and served on all other parties before
trial.222F[223] Documents are
normally admitted in evidence by their inclusion in the “common
bundle”. The common bundle is prepared
in advance of trial and contains
all the documents on which each party intends to
rely.223F[224] HCR 9.5(4) provides
that a document in the common bundle is “automatically received into
evidence (subject to the resolution
of any objection to admissibility)”
when a witness refers to it in evidence or when counsel refer to it in
submissions (other
than closing submissions).
- 3.87 The rule
against hearsay applies in civil proceedings. If evidence in a civil proceeding
contains a statement by a person who
is not a witness that is relied on to prove
the truth of its contents, it is strictly inadmissible unless one of the
exceptions in
the Act applies.
- 3.88 In November
2022, Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee released its
report, Improving Access to Civil
Justice.224F[225] The
Committee recommended that the Act and the High Court Rules be amended to allow
documents in the common bundle to be admissible
to prove the truth of their
contents.225F[226] It explained
this would “remove the artificial recitation of documents in the briefs of
evidence” to avoid infringing the rule against
hearsay.226F[227] It further
explained that “presumptive admissibility of documentary evidence”
would not “mean its truth cannot
be challenged, or that admissible
documents will be given any weight by a trial
judge”.227F[228]
Rather:228F[229]
- ... it merely
puts the onus on a party seeking to dispute the narrative of events that emerges
from contemporaneous documents to
identify the documents it wishes to challenge,
so that this can be addressed in the course of the trial itself if it becomes
relevant
to do so.
Issues
- 3.89 In
our Issues Paper we identified apparent inconsistencies between the Act and the
High Court Rules in relation to:
(a) the process for challenging the admissibility of hearsay statements in civil
proceedings; and
(b) the admissibility of hearsay statements that are not challenged by any
party.
Process for challenging hearsay statements in civil
proceedings
- 3.90 We
noted in our Issues Paper that the High Court Rules prescribe clear procedures
for challenging the admissibility of evidence,
including hearsay
statements.229F[230] These
requirements are designed to ensure that any evidentiary issues are identified
before trial.230F[231] However, we
also noted the Act does not prescribe a process for challenging the
admissibility of hearsay
statements.231F[232] The courts
have held that failure to adhere to the High Court Rules does not displace the
mandatory statutory criteria for the admissibility
of hearsay statements in the
Act, meaning issues of hearsay can be raised at
trial.232F[233]
- 3.91 We observed
this creates a conflict between the Act and the procedures set out in the High
Court Rules. A hearsay objection does
not need to be made in advance of trial
despite the clear obligation in the High Court Rules to raise admissibility
challenges before
trial.
- 3.92 Late
challenges to hearsay statements have the potential to increase cost and delay,
especially if an adjournment is needed to
address admissibility
issues.233F[234] The consequences
for a party seeking to rely on hearsay statements can also be significant.
Evidence may be ruled inadmissible at
trial despite the pre-trial silence of any
other party. This may affect a party’s trial preparation and
strategy.
Admissibility of unchallenged hearsay statements
- 3.93 HCR
9.5(1) provides that each document in the common bundle is considered to be
admissible unless the court directs otherwise.
However, we noted in our Issues
Paper this does not mean a hearsay statement is admissible if it is included in
the common bundle.234F[235] The
hearsay rules in the Act are described in absolute terms. A hearsay statement is
not admissible unless it meets one of the exceptions
in the
Act.235F[236]
- 3.94 We observed
the status of an unchallenged hearsay statement is, therefore,
unclear.236F[237] Different
outcomes are possible. On a strict interpretation of the Act, the court might
exclude any hearsay statement it identifies
on the basis that no argument has
been made as to its admissibility under the statutory exceptions to the rule
against hearsay.237F[238] We noted
an alternative approach taken in some cases is to treat the parties, by failing
to challenge a hearsay statement, as having
agreed to its
admission.238F[239]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 3.95 In
our Issues Paper, we asked submitters whether the Act should be amended to
clarify the relationship between the Act and the
High Court Rules and/or promote
greater compliance with the hearsay rules in civil proceedings. We identified
two possible options
for
reform.239F[240] We noted that
option 1 could be implemented alone or both option 1 and option 2 could be
adopted together.
Option 1 — limit the operation of section 17 in civil
proceedings
- 3.96 Option
1 was to amend the Act to limit the operation of section 17 (hearsay rule) to
apply in civil proceedings only if a party
challenges the admissibility of a
hearsay statement in accordance with the relevant rules of court (unless the
judge dispenses with
this
requirement).240F[241]
- 3.97 We noted
this option could apply only to documents in the common bundle or it could be
extended to briefs and oral evidence as
well.
Option 2 — introduce a notice procedure for hearsay in
civil proceedings
- 3.98 Option
2 was to introduce a notice procedure for hearsay in civil
proceedings.241F[242] We noted
that, unlike in criminal
proceedings,242F[243] there is no
requirement on a party seeking to offer a hearsay statement in evidence in a
civil proceeding to give notice of their
intention to do so. In criminal
proceedings, notice enables the other party to decide whether to object and
assists the judge in
determining whether to admit the
evidence.243F[244] Similar notice
procedures apply to civil proceedings in England and
Wales.244F[245]
Results of consultation
Limiting the operation of section 17 in civil
proceedings
- 3.99 Four
submitters addressed whether section 17 should be limited in civil proceedings.
Three submitters supported limiting section
17245F[246] and one did
not.246F[247]
- 3.100 Those that
supported limiting section 17 gave the following reasons:
(a) There are good reasons to treat hearsay differently in civil proceedings
compared to criminal proceedings because of the reliance
on documentary evidence
in civil proceedings.247F[248]
(b) Limiting section 17 would promote consistency and
certainty.248F[249]
(c) Limiting section 17 would remove unnecessary
expense.249F[250]
(d) Limiting section 17 would encourage evidentiary issues to be settled before
trial.250F[251]
(e) Reliability can be dealt with as a matter of weight by a
judge.251F[252]
- 3.101 The NZLS
supported limiting section 17 in relation to documentary evidence but not
witness briefs and oral evidence, saying
that this would remove any incentive
for discipline in the preparation and leading of evidence. NZLS further said
this may increase
costs and place well-resourced litigants in a better position
to challenge evidence, creating barriers to accessing justice.
- 3.102 Two
submitters said a judge should retain a discretion to hear late
challenges.252F[253]
- 3.103 Wilson
Harle did not support limiting section 17 in civil proceedings. It said the
hearsay rule prevents admission of evidence
that is of low relevance and
probative value and promotes the just, efficient and speedy resolution of
proceedings.
Requiring parties to give notice of their intention to offer a
hearsay statement
- 3.104 Six
submitters addressed whether the Act should be amended to require a party to
give notice of their intention to offer a hearsay
statement in evidence in a
civil proceeding. Two favoured a notice
requirement253F[254] and two
opposed it.254F[255] Professor
McDonald did not express a particular view but said a notice requirement may be
difficult to enforce in practice. Wilson
Harle preferred that any
inconsistencies between the Act and the High Court Rules be addressed through
amendment to the High Court
Rules. However, if legislative amendment were to
occur, it preferred the introduction of a notice requirement so the burden of
introducing
hearsay evidence lay with the party wishing to introduce it.
- 3.105 Of the two
submitters in favour of a notice requirement, only the NZLS gave reasons. It
said a notice requirement would mean
evidence is more concise and limited to
what is admissible, reducing overall costs.
- 3.106 Submitters
against a notice requirement highlighted the potential practical problems with
it. Laura O’Gorman KC made the
point that hearsay issues are often
impractical to address, or may not even arise, in advance of trial. She said
that, in these situations,
notice would not serve any useful purpose. Laura
O’Gorman KC also said notice requirements would increase costs
unnecessarily
as other parties are already able to assess for themselves any
prejudice they may face from hearsay evidence and raise objections.
The Crown
Law Office said a notice requirement would require parties to give notice even
in respect of uncontroversial hearsay evidence
to which the other party is
unlikely to object.
Do the inconsistencies between the Act and the High Court Rules
create any other problems?
- 3.107 Two
submitters addressed whether the inconsistencies between the Act and the High
Court Rules create problems in respect of
the operation of other admissibility
rules in civil
proceedings.255F[256] Both
submitters supported amending section 23 (opinion evidence) so that opinion
evidence is admissible in civil proceedings unless
challenged.
The need for reform
- 3.108 We
conclude reform is desirable to address the relationship between the Act and the
High Court Rules. The current approach in
the Act creates uncertainty because
parties may not know whether hearsay statements on which they seek to rely will
be challenged
at trial despite the clear obligations in the High Court Rules to
identify evidentiary issues before trial. Relatedly, reform is
desirable to
encourage hearsay objections to be made in accordance with the High Court Rules
so as to reduce late objections.
- 3.109 Reform is
also desirable because the current approach appears inconsistent with the
approach taken prior to the Act when a failure
to object to documents in the
common bundle pre-trial could mean that a party was estopped from raising
objections at trial.256F[257]
Recommendation
- R5 Insert
a new section providing that:
- despite
section 17, a hearsay statement is admissible in a civil proceeding unless its
admissibility is challenged by another party;
- a
challenge made by another party under subsection (1) must be made in accordance
with the relevant rules of the court unless the
judge directs otherwise;
and
- the
judge may give a direction under subsection (2) if:
- having
regard to the nature and contents of the statement, no party is substantially
prejudiced by the failure to comply with the
rules of court; or
- compliance
was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances; or
- the
interests of justice so require.
Limiting the operation of section 17 in civil
proceedings
- 3.110 We
recommend limiting the operation of section 17 in civil proceedings for all
hearsay evidence, including documentary evidence,
witness briefs and oral
evidence.
- 3.111 In our
recommendation:
(a) Part (a) adopts a presumption or starting point that a hearsay statement is
admissible in civil proceedings. That presumption
could be rebutted through a
challenge to the admissibility of the hearsay statement.
(b) Part (b) provides that a challenge to the admissibility of the hearsay
statement must be made in accordance with the relevant
rules of the court unless
the judge directs otherwise. This means that, in accordance with the current
High Court Rules,257F[258]
challenges should be made before trial unless the rules provide otherwise. A
party wishing to make a challenge other than in accordance
with the rules could
only do so if directed by the judge.
(c) Part (c) provides grounds for the judge to dispense with the requirement for
challenges to be made in accordance with the relevant
rules. This would usually
be to permit challenges to be made at trial.
- 3.112 If the
admissibility of hearsay evidence is challenged, the court would determine
admissibility under the Act’s hearsay
rules. If admissibility is not
challenged, the reliability of the hearsay statement would be treated as a
matter of weight by the
fact-finder.
- 3.113 Our
recommendation would avoid the need for the court to address admissibility
issues with hearsay statements when no challenge
has been made. We do not
anticipate this would result in any significant change in civil litigation
practice. As noted, this appears
to be consistent with what the High Court Rules
already envisage. Our recommendation focuses on improving the operation of the
hearsay
rules in civil proceedings to better achieve the purpose in section 6,
which is to help secure the just determination of proceedings
by (among other
things) avoiding unjustifiable expense and
delay.258F[259]
- 3.114 Limiting
the operation of the hearsay provisions in civil proceedings was supported by a
majority of submitters. Submitters
said this would promote certainty for
litigants and practitioners, reduce unnecessary expense, reflect current
practice and encourage
evidentiary matters to be settled before trial.
- 3.115 Limiting
the operation of section 17 in civil proceedings is also consistent with the
recommendations of the Rules Committee
in Improving Access to Civil
Justice to allow documents in the common bundle to be admissible as to the
truth of their contents.259F[260]
Our recommendation does, however, stand on its own and does not rely on the
Rules Committee’s recommendations being adopted.
- 3.116 In our
Issues Paper, we said that limiting the operation of section 17 in civil
proceedings would result in different approaches
to hearsay in criminal and
civil proceedings.260F[261] In our
view, there are good reasons to distinguish between civil and criminal
proceedings in this context. The policy consideration
of protecting a
defendant’s fair trial rights does not arise in civil proceedings. In
addition, civil proceedings are typically
heard by a judge rather than a jury so
the concern about a jury’s “supposed inability to make a proper
assessment of
evidence which has not been tested by cross-examination”
does not often arise.261F[262]
Rather, judges “are expected to have the skills to sift the wheat from the
chaff and assess whatever evidence is available
in accordance with its true
significance”.262F[263] For
these reasons, there has long been debate about applying the same strict
approach to hearsay in civil
proceedings.263F[264]
- 3.117 As noted
above, one approach taken in some cases to address unchallenged hearsay
statements is to treat them as admissible under
section 9 by implied agreement.
We see a presumptive admissibility approach as preferable to a finding that a
hearsay statement was
admitted under an implied agreement because there was no
objection to its admission. This is not the intention of section 9, which
contemplates a prior agreement between parties as to the admissibility of
evidence. Admitting hearsay statements under this section
without any prior
agreement stretches the meaning of section 9. Our recommendation would make the
law clearer by making these unchallenged
hearsay statements admissible and
providing rules for challenging them.
- 3.118 Our
recommendation is broadly consistent with the less restrictive approaches taken
in some comparable jurisdictions where the
hearsay rules have been limited or
abolished in civil
proceedings.264F[265]
Documentary evidence
- 3.119 Limiting
the operation of section 17 in civil proceedings in relation to documentary
evidence recognises the significance of
documentary evidence in civil
proceedings.265F[266] It also
reflects the fact that documents in the common bundle are potentially more at
risk of infringing the rule against hearsay
because they do not need to be
produced by a witness.266F[267] We
agree with the Rules Committee that documentary hearsay evidence can simply be
weighed appropriately by the trial judge or identified
and challenged by the
other party before trial. That is particularly so given the Rules
Committee’s recommendation that the
parties should produce a joint
chronology setting out facts to be drawn from the documentary
evidence.267F[268]
- 3.120 Limiting
the operation of section 17 in civil proceedings in relation to documentary
evidence was supported by all but one submitter
that addressed the issue. Some
submitters said this reflects what already happens in practice.
Briefs and oral evidence
- 3.121 We
recommend a presumptive admissibility approach should also apply to briefs and
oral evidence. Several of the cases we identified
in our Issues Paper where
hearsay was at issue in civil proceedings involved hearsay statements in witness
briefs.268F[269] Limiting a
presumption of admissibility to documents in the common bundle would not,
therefore, wholly address the issue of unchallenged
hearsay statements.
- 3.122 The NZLS
supported limiting the hearsay rules for documentary evidence but did not
support extending a presumptive admissibility
approach to briefs and oral
evidence. It said this would remove any incentive for discipline in the
preparation and leading of evidence.
However, any party would still be able to
challenge the admissibility of hearsay evidence offered in witness briefs and
oral evidence.
We note that, under the Rules Committee’s recommendations,
evidence given by witnesses will not be expected to traverse the
events
disclosed by the documentary record but rather address genuine issues of fact.
This should mitigate against undisciplined
practices and make it easier to
identify any evidence a party wishes to challenge. The Rules Committee also
recommended witness briefs
be exchanged earlier in
proceedings.269F[270] This should
help to ensure parties have the opportunity to analyse them and decide whether
to make such a challenge. Accordingly,
parties should still be incentivised to
take care in the preparation and leading of evidence to avoid unnecessary
admissibility challenges.
Dispensing with the requirement to comply with the relevant
rules of the court
- 3.123 We
recommend the court should be able to dispense with the requirement that any
objection comply with the relevant rules of
court. There will be situations
where evidence is not known to be hearsay until the trial (for example, if a
late decision is made
not to call a witness) or where the significance of a
hearsay statement is not clear until the trial. A discretion to hear a late
challenge would also help to address the concern that requiring objections to
comply with the rules of court could unintentionally
increase cost and delay at
the pre-trial stage by incentivising parties to make unnecessary challenges to
protect their position.
- 3.124 Grounds
for dispensing with the requirement to comply with the rules of court should be
similar to those relating to the power
to dispense with notice requirements in
respect of hearsay statements offered in criminal
proceedings.270F[271] Our
recommendation proposes the following grounds that:
(a) having regard to the nature and contents of the
statement, no party is substantially prejudiced by the failure to comply with
the requirements; or
(b) compliance was not reasonably practicable in the circumstances; or
(c) the interests of justice so require.
- 3.125 This would
allow a judge to consider the nature of the evidence, the reasons why it was not
challenged and any prejudicial effect
of allowing a late challenge. We see these
broad considerations as necessary given the wide range of evidence and trial
contexts
that may come before a judge.
- 3.126 No
submitters commented specifically on whether these grounds are appropriate or
not. However, retaining a discretion to allow
late challenges was supported by
the submitters that commented on
it.271F[272]
A notice procedure for hearsay in civil proceedings
- 3.127 We
do not recommend requiring a party to give notice of their intention to offer a
hearsay statement in civil proceedings.
- 3.128 In our
Issues Paper, we noted this option would increase the cost of pre-trial
procedures, especially in complex cases with
voluminous briefs and common
bundles. If a notice procedure was introduced, the party proposing to offer
hearsay statements in evidence
would need to identify those statements and the
reasons why they are admissible under the Act in advance of knowing whether a
challenge
to that evidence will be made. Some submitters noted this would result
in parties having to identify hearsay evidence that is unlikely
to be
challenged. In complex civil proceedings with potentially large amounts of
evidence, we anticipate this burden would be unduly
onerous. Also, requiring
parties to provide notice for all hearsay evidence they wish to admit would not
remove the burden on other
parties to identify what hearsay evidence they wish
to challenge (although we acknowledge it would reduce the scope of any search).
Lastly, as noted above, the Rules Committee has recommended requiring parties to
produce chronologies setting out the relevant
facts.272F[273] If this occurs,
the evidence any party wishes to challenge should become easier to identify. For
these reasons, placing a burden
on the party preparing evidence to give notice
of every hearsay statement is likely to create more cost and delay than relying
on
other parties to identify any hearsay evidence they wish to challenge.
- 3.129 In our
Issues Paper, we also noted it had been observed that cases, including Zespri
Group Ltd v Gao,273F[274]
“demonstrate the increased readiness of the courts to enforce the
rules of evidence”, which “in turn will encourage
greater discipline
on the part of lawyers in preparing
briefs”.274F[275] We
anticipate this trend to continue given the Rules Committee
recommendations.
Any other problems
- 3.130 The
Crown Law Office and Laura O’Gorman KC supported amending the Act so that
opinion evidence is admissible unless challenged
in civil proceedings. We do not
consider this is necessary or desirable. These submitters did not identify any
issues in practice
regarding the hearsay rules and opinion evidence. Also,
different policy reasons underly the exclusionary rules against opinion evidence
and hearsay evidence. Opinion evidence is excluded to prevent the admission of
“unreliable, misleading or superfluous
evidence”.275F[276] Hearsay
statements are generally excluded to ensure that, if the evidence is to be
offered, the maker of the statement must be a
witness who can be cross-examined
and observed by the fact-finder. Without evidence of a problem in practice, we
do not see it as
necessary or desirable to enable parties to include opinion
evidence in documentary evidence or witness briefs unless it is challenged.
This
would risk incentivising parties to generate opinion evidence to support their
case when it actually does not benefit a fact-finder
to hear that evidence and
would place a burden on opposing parties to challenge that opinion
evidence.
CHAPTER 4
Defendants’ and co-defendants’ statements
INTRODUCTION
- 4.1 In
this chapter, we consider the admissibility of defendants’ and
co-defendants’ statements in criminal proceedings
under sections 21, 22A
and 27 of the Evidence Act 2006. We address the following:
(a) Defendants’ exculpatory statements (section 21). We do not recommend
reform. While there appears to be some inconsistency
in practice as to when such
statements are offered in evidence, legislative reform is unlikely to resolve
this issue.
(b) Defendants’ statements contained within hearsay statements. We
recommend amending section 27 to clarify that the hearsay
provisions apply to a
hearsay statement made by a person other than a defendant that contains a
defendant’s statement.
(c) Admissibility of defendants’ non-hearsay statements against
co-defendants. We recommend amending section 27 to clarify
that a
defendant’s non-hearsay statement is admissible against a co-defendant but
a defendant’s hearsay statement is
only admissible against a co-defendant
if it is admitted under section 22A.
DEFENDANTS’ EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS
Issue
- 4.2 A
defendant’s statement is “exculpatory” if it asserts or tends
to show the defendant did not commit the alleged
offence.
“Inculpatory” statements tend to establish the defendant’s
guilt.
- 4.3 Section 21
prevents a defendant from offering their own hearsay statement. This means a
defendant who elects not to give evidence
at trial cannot offer evidence of
their own out-of-court statement to prove the truth of its contents (for
example, an exculpatory
statement made in a police interview). The prosecution
may offer a defendant’s statement (under section 27) but the Act does
not
require them to. We discussed the history of sections 21 and 27 and their
application by the courts in our Issues
Paper.276F[277]
- 4.4 Case law has
recognised the courts have a discretion to require the prosecution to offer
evidence of a defendant’s statement
where it is necessary to ensure trial
fairness.277F[278] Te Kōti
Pīra | Court of Appeal has indicated this will only occur in
“exceptional
cases”.278F[279] Typically,
the discretion is applied to prevent the prosecution from “cherry
picking” parts of a “mixed”
statement (one that contains both
inculpatory and exculpatory aspects) that are helpful to its
case.279F[280] Appellate case law
suggests it is unlikely to be exercised in relation to wholly exculpatory
statements.280F[281] Preliminary
feedback from defence counsel indicated that, in practice, some prosecutors
choose to offer such statements in evidence.
As we discuss further below, there
are also indications that te Kōti-ā-Rohe | District Court judges are
requiring prosecutors
to offer such statements in some cases.
- 4.5 These issues
often arise in relation to defendants’ statements made to police or other
law enforcement officers during investigative
questioning (for example, in video
interviews). Many submitters commented on this type of statement specifically.
There are also
other types of mixed or exculpatory statements addressed in case
law such as statements made by a defendant to a
witness.281F[282]
- 4.6 In our
Issues Paper, we identified two potential concerns with the current
approach:282F[283]
(a) Potential inconsistency regarding when prosecutors offer evidence of a
defendant’s mixed or exculpatory statement. Defence
counsel told us the
approach taken by prosecutors varies between regions, with some choosing to
offer wholly exculpatory statements
and others not. We also noted that, while
the case law is reasonably clear that the prosecution cannot cherry pick parts
of “mixed”
statements, recent case law suggests there may be
continued uncertainty among
counsel.283F[284]
(b) Concern about the policy underlying section 21 and its potential to cause
unfairness to defendants. We noted defence counsel
and a commentator7
had suggested defendants’ police statements should be placed before the
fact-finder as a matter of course. Otherwise, the fact-finder
is deprived of
relevant evidence. In addition, juries may assume the defendant has not denied
the offending and draw adverse inferences
from that (although section 32
prevents them from being invited to draw such an inference and requires the
judge to warn them not
to do so).
- 4.7 We noted the
High Court of Australia had raised similar concerns about unfairness to
defendants in Nguyen v
R.284F[285] In that case, the
Court referred to the prosecutorial obligation to act fairly and present all
available, cogent and admissible
evidence.285F[286] It considered
it was inconsistent with that obligation for prosecutors to make tactical
decisions not to call evidence to disadvantage
the
defendant.286F[287]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 4.8 We
invited submissions on whether sections 21 and 27 are causing problems in
practice, having regard to the case law recognising
a judicial discretion to
require prosecutors to offer defendants’ statements to ensure trial
fairness. In particular, we sought
views on:
(a) whether there are inconsistent approaches by prosecutors and/or uncertainty
among counsel regarding when defendants’ mixed
or exculpatory statements
should be offered; and
(b) whether (and in what circumstances) failure to offer such statements may be
causing unfairness to defendants or contributing
to miscarriages of justice.
- 4.9 We also
invited submissions on how any problems should be addressed. In terms of
inconsistency in prosecutorial practice, we suggested
this could be addressed
through prosecution guidelines specifying when prosecutors should offer (or
consider offering) mixed or wholly
exculpatory statements. Alternatively, or in
addition, the Act could be amended to require mixed statements relied on by the
prosecution
to be offered in their entirety in line with existing case law.
- 4.10 As to the
second issue, we said if there was widespread concern that the current approach
is causing unfairness to defendants,
legislative reform could be considered. For
example, the Act could be amended to:
(a) give the court discretion to admit a defendant’s statement where it is
necessary to avoid unfairness; and/or
(b) make defendants’ police statements admissible as a matter of course.
Results of consultation
- 4.11 Nine
submitters responded to this question. Four submitters said there are problems
with inconsistency in prosecution practice
and unfairness to
defendants.287F[288] Five
submitters said there is no justification for reform and good reasons to retain
the current approach in
section 21.288F[289]
Inconsistency in prosecution practice
- 4.12 The
four submitters that said there are problems in practice referred to variation
both regionally and between individual prosecutors
as to whether
defendants’ police statements will typically be offered in
evidence.289F[290] Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) noted the decision not to offer
a statement is sometimes made expressly
for tactical reasons to force the
defendant to give evidence. Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public
Defence Service said
there are also issues with the prosecution indicating it
will offer a statement only to reverse that decision on the eve of the trial.
- 4.13 Submitters
said inconsistency in prosecution practice makes it difficult for defence
counsel to advise clients because they do
not know whether a police interview
will be offered in
evidence.290F[291] The Auckland
District Law Society (ADLS) and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand also said that leaving the admissibility
of defendants’
exculpatory statements to the discretion of individual prosecutors introduces
arbitrariness to criminal trials
and undermines the even-handed administration
of justice.
- 4.14 On the
other hand, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office was not aware of any
regional variation between Crown solicitors.
It said that, while prosecutors may
sometimes choose to offer an exculpatory statement, this depends on the
circumstances of the
case. For example, a defendant’s exculpatory
statement may be offered where evidence obtained since the statement was made
makes it clear the defendant lied. It submitted case law is sufficiently clear
to promote consistency so no amendment to prosecution
guidelines is required.
- 4.15 Most
submitters that addressed the point agreed that the law relating to
“mixed” statements is reasonably
clear291F[292] and that such
statements are generally offered in full by the
prosecution.292F[293] The Public
Defence Service said the law is clear but there is still some inconsistency so
supported legislative clarification. No
other submitters supported legislative
reform in relation to mixed statements specifically.
Unfairness to defendants
- 4.16 Four
submitters said the current approach causes unfairness to defendants for the
following reasons:
(a) It deprives the fact-finder of relevant and probative
evidence.293F[294] Often such
statements include the defendant’s account of what happened, given at a
point in time close to the events at issue
and before the defendant had the
opportunity to calculate a position based on pre-trial disclosure of
evidence.294F[295]
(b) It confuses juries and creates a risk of speculation adverse to the
defendant.295F[296] They may be
left with the impression that the defendant did not give an explanation when
arrested. While the jury sometimes finds
out an interview occurred through
cross-examination,296F[297] they
remain unaware of its contents. Research has demonstrated jurors believe
suspects who do not give an explanation in response
to an allegation are more
likely to be guilty.297F[298]
(c) It infringes fair trial rights, including the right to put forward a
reasonable and proper
defence.298F[299] The argument
that the defendant can elect to give evidence at trial is no answer to this
because it effectively compels them as a
witness (in breach of
section 25(d) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ Bill of
Rights)).299F[300]
(d) It is inconsistent with the duty of prosecutors to present all credible and
relevant evidence.300F[301]
(e) It discourages defendants from making statements to
investigators.301F[302] If they
say anything exculpatory, it may not be offered in evidence anyway, but if they
say anything inculpatory, it will be used
against them.
- 4.17 The Public
Defence Service noted the onus is on the prosecution to prove the defendant
guilty, not on the defendant to prove
their innocence. It therefore rejected any
suggestion that section 21 is required to ensure fairness to complainants (who
are subject
to cross-examination). Similarly, the ADLS and Defence Lawyers
Association submitted that resistance to admitting defendants’
statements
on the basis that they are “self-serving” has no place in a system
in which defendants are presumed innocent.
- 4.18 Based on
the above concerns, three submitters supported reform to make defendants’
police statements admissible as a matter
of course — either as an
exception to
section 21302F[303] or by
requiring the prosecution to offer them unless there is good reason not to or
the parties agree
otherwise.303F[304] The NZLS
instead proposed a new provision allowing the court to admit a defendant’s
statement where it is necessary to avoid
unfairness. It suggested this would
strike an appropriate balance between the prosecution’s discretion and the
defendant’s
fair trial rights.
- 4.19 Submitters
in support of the current policy approach provided the following
comments:
(a) Defendants’ out-of-court statements are presumptively inadmissible
because they have not met the reliability threshold
in section 18 (the exception
to the rule against hearsay) and the defendant cannot be cross-examined despite
being “available”
to give
evidence.304F[305]
(b) Defendants should not be able to put forward their version of events without
being subject to
cross-examination.305F[306]
Associate Professor Anna High was concerned this would unfairly alter the
balance in “he-said-she-said” trials.
(c) Admitting defendants’ exculpatory statements makes it more likely that
defendants will opt out of giving evidence at
trial.306F[307]
(d) The right to silence prohibits juries from speculating about the absence of
a defendant’s statement and they are invariably
told
this.307F[308] Any concern that
juries do not follow directions is a fundamental challenge to the system of jury
trials and is not specific to this
issue.308F[309]
- 4.20 The Crown
Law Office considered it unnecessary to create a legislative judicial discretion
to admit exculpatory statements for
fairness reasons since the courts have
already confirmed this discretion exists at common law. It said it would expect
prosecutors
to consider whether fair trial issues might arise if a
defendant’s exculpatory statement is not led — for example, where
a
positive defence to the charge has been raised.
- 4.21 The
Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere, said that, in practice, the
prosecution usually does put defendants’
statements before the fact-finder
(for example, it said DVD interviews are routinely played). It therefore did not
consider there
was any unfairness in practice.
- 4.22 Ngā
Pirihimana Aotearoa | New Zealand Police said it supported the current approach
of the senior courts in not allowing
admission of the statements to override the
statutory purpose of section 21 in relation to wholly exculpatory statements.
Police
prosecutors reported that judges often require them to produce wholly
exculpatory statements made by the defendant in cases that
do not meet the
“exceptional case” threshold suggested by the Court of Appeal in
S (CA481/2018) v
R.309F[310] Based on further
discussion with Police, we understand that this is largely occurring in the
District Courts and has not been subject
to appeal. Police indicated it had
occurred in family violence cases where the defendant’s police interview
raises the issue
of self-defence. Police considered this to be problematic
because requiring prosecutors to offer defendants’ police statements
discourages defendants from giving evidence in court and means their statements
are untested by cross-examination.
Reform not recommended
- 4.23 We
do not recommend amendment to increase consistency in prosecution practice or
clarify when defendants’ exculpatory statements
should be offered in
evidence. For reasons we explain below, we consider this is better addressed
through case law.
Inconsistency in prosecution practice
- 4.24 There
was a clear view among most submitters that the case law preventing the
prosecution from cherry picking parts of a mixed
statement is settled. It
appears prosecutors are generally offering defendants’ statements in full
where they wish to rely
on any part of them. Accordingly, reform is unnecessary
to clarify the law in this regard.
- 4.25 In relation
to other exculpatory statements, there appear to be inconsistent approaches
among prosecutors and, potentially, between
the trial and appellate courts. The
submissions we received indicate there are different understandings of the
circumstances in which
trial fairness considerations may require a
defendant’s statement to be offered. Ultimately, however, we conclude it
is preferable
for this to be addressed through case law rather than legislative
amendment.
- 4.26 Recent
appellate case law suggests the courts will only require the prosecution to
offer a defendant’s statement they do
not wish to rely on in
“exceptional
cases”310F[311] —
usually where it is necessary to prevent the prosecution from “cherry
picking” parts of a
statement.311F[312] In other
cases, it is a matter of prosecutorial discretion whether to offer
defendants’ statements on which the prosecution
does not wish to
rely.
- 4.27 It appears
there may be variation in this approach at the trial level. Police submitted
that, despite the approach of the appellate
courts, in practice, police
prosecutors are sometimes required to produce wholly exculpatory
defendants’ statements. In our
Issues Paper, we identified one District
Court decision from 2013 where the Court ordered the prosecution to offer
evidence of a
statement on which it did not wish to
rely.312F[313] The statement was
relevant to the issue of self-defence. The Court considered it inappropriate and
unfair to the defendant for the
prosecution to decline to offer the statement
for tactical
reasons.313F[314]
- 4.28 This
apparent uncertainty as to the scope of the judicial discretion may partially
explain why prosecutors appear to be taking
different approaches to offering
defendants’ statements. Organisations representing defence counsel
unanimously reported inconsistent
prosecution practices. While the Crown Law
Office said it was unaware of variation in practice, its submission and those
received
from Luke Cunningham Clere and Police suggest they have different
understandings of what occurs:
(a) The Crown Law Office said there may be “individual cases” where
prosecutors elect to offer a defendant’s exculpatory
statement. The
example it gave was a situation where admission of the statement would benefit
the prosecution — that is, where
evidence obtained since the statement was
made suggests the defendant lied.
(b) Luke Cunningham Clere said that, in practice, prosecutors
“usually” put defendants’ statements before the fact-finder
and, in particular, that defendants’ DVD interviews are
“routinely” played.
(c) Police did not expressly address this issue. However, as we have noted, it
reported that Police prosecutors are often being required
by the courts to offer
evidence of defendants’ exculpatory statements. This suggests Police
prosecutors are not routinely choosing
to offer defendants’ exculpatory
statements in evidence.
- 4.29 This
variation in approach may make it difficult for defence counsel to predict
whether a statement will be offered and therefore
to advise their clients on the
conduct of the case. It may also mean that defendants in similar situations are
treated differently.
- 4.30 We
considered whether it is desirable to amend the Act to encourage a more
consistent approach — for example, by codifying
the judicial discretion to
require the prosecution to offer defendants’ statements for fairness
reasons. However, if a new
provision remained discretionary, any increase in
consistency would likely be limited. The Judicial Advisory Committee was
concerned
such an amendment would significantly increase defence applications to
admit statements, increasing the administrative burden on
the courts. The
Judicial Advisory Committee and some members of our Expert Advisory Group were
also concerned it could result in
significantly more defendants’
statements being offered by the prosecution, depending on how the provision is
interpreted.
Some Expert Advisory Group members said this could fundamentally
alter the balance in criminal trials by allowing defendants to put
their version
of events before the court without being cross-examined. A member of our Expert
Advisory Group also suggested it could
lead to prosecutors only offering a
defendant’s exculpatory statement if required to. Ultimately, we consider
the risks of
codification outweigh any potential increase in consistency.
- 4.31 Finally, we
considered whether the prosecution guidelines could be amended to help encourage
a more consistent approach among
prosecutors. However, in the absence of any
clear consensus in case law as to when the judicial discretion is likely to be
exercised
or the principles to be applied, it is difficult to know what any
guidance would say (beyond simply indicating that prosecutors should
take trial
fairness into account, which is unlikely to be particularly helpful). There was
also little support for this option from
submitters.
Unfairness to defendants
- 4.32 We
are not satisfied there is a sufficient case for fundamentally altering the
policy of section 21 — for example, by requiring
defendants’
police statements to be offered as a matter of course. We acknowledge that, as
some submitters emphasised, defendants’
police statements are often highly
probative evidence and prosecutors have a general duty to present credible and
relevant evidence
to the court. However, such an amendment would represent a
substantial change to the way criminal trials operate. It could lead to
defendants electing not to give evidence in more (or even most) cases since they
could rely on their police interview instead. This
would deprive the prosecution
of the ability to cross-examine the defendant on their version of events based
on all relevant evidence.
Some of that evidence may not be available to
investigators when interviewing the defendant — for example, evidence
given by
witnesses at trial.
- 4.33 There are
existing protections in place that help to avoid unfairness to defendants if
their statement is not offered in evidence.
The courts have recognised that,
where a defendant’s exculpatory police statement is not offered, the
interests of fairness
may require that the prosecution confirm the defendant
denied the offending when questioned (for example, during cross-examination
of a
police witness).314F[315] We
consider that is appropriate. It should prevent the jury from incorrectly
assuming the defendant did not answer questions or maintain
their innocence. In
addition, if it does appear the defendant failed to answer questions or provide
a defence before trial, section
32 requires the judge to warn the jury not to
infer the defendant is guilty.
DEFENDANTS’ STATEMENTS CONTAINED WITHIN HEARSAY
STATEMENTS
Issue
- 4.34 Section
27(3) provides that the hearsay provisions do not apply to a defendant’s
statement offered by the prosecution in
a criminal proceeding. This allows the
prosecution to offer evidence of an out-of-court statement made by the defendant
without having
to establish that the circumstances relating to the statement
“provide reasonable assurance that the statement is reliable”
for
the purpose of the hearsay exception in section
18(1)(a).315F[316]
- 4.35 It is
unclear how section 27(3) is intended to operate when a defendant’s
statement is contained within a hearsay statement
made by a person other than
the defendant. On a literal interpretation, section 27(3) allows the prosecution
to offer a hearsay statement
by a person other than a defendant that contains an
account of something the defendant said, thereby bypassing section 18(1)(a).
This issue arose in the Red Fox Tavern case in which two deceased people had
given police statements claiming the defendants had
confessed to a robbery. Te
Kōti Matua | High Court held that the portions of the hearsay statements
that contained statements
made by the defendants were exempt from the hearsay
provisions by virtue of section
27(3).316F[317] The Court of
Appeal in R v Hoggart reversed this, finding admissibility must first be
determined under the ordinary hearsay provisions before applying section
27.317F[318]
- 4.36 While
Hoggart provides appellate authority on how section 27 is to be
interpreted in relation to hearsay statements that contain defendants’
statements, commentators have observed this is difficult to reconcile with the
plain wording of section
27.318F[319]
- 4.37 As outlined
in our Issues Paper, there are good policy reasons for applying the hearsay
provisions in the Act to hearsay statements
that contain defendants’
statements.319F[320] If the person
who has first-hand knowledge of a defendant’s statement is not available
for cross-examination, it is important
that the reliability of that statement is
assessed. While section 18 provides for this, section 27 does not. Section 18
has also
been designed specifically to respond to the inherent concerns with
hearsay statements. Our review of the policy and legislative
history of the Act
did not show any intention to exempt hearsay statements containing
defendants’ statements from the hearsay
provisions.320F[321]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 4.38 We
asked submitters whether section 27 should be amended to clarify that a
defendant’s statement contained within a hearsay
statement is subject to
the hearsay provisions.
Results of consultation
- 4.39 Nine
submitters responded to this question. Six submitters supported our proposed
amendment,321F[322] two opposed
it322F[323] and one commented on
the proposal but was neutral about
reform.323F[324] No submitters
supported a literal interpretation of section 27.
- 4.40 Submitters
supporting reform noted the tension between a literal interpretation of the
section and the approach of the Court
of Appeal in
Hoggart324F[325] and/or
agreed with our views on the problems with allowing these statements to avoid
the safeguards for hearsay
statements.325F[326]
- 4.41 The Crown
Law Office and Associate Professor High opposed reform on the basis that the
Court of Appeal in Hoggart had already reached the correct position
through a purposive interpretation of section
27.326F[327]
- 4.42 The Crown
Law Office said that, despite the literal wording of section 27, it cannot have
been Parliament’s intent that
defendants’ statements would be
admissible even where they are contained in a hearsay statement and so may be of
suspect reliability.
- 4.43 Associate
Professor High noted the approach in Hoggart was endorsed by te Kōti
Mana Nui | Supreme Court in W (SC 38/2019) v
R.327F[328] Associate
Professor High was concerned our proposal, as phrased, would cause confusion
because it would result in the defendant’s
statement itself (as contained
within another person’s hearsay statement) becoming subject to the
reliability threshold.
- 4.44 Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald did not take a position on reform but said
reliability is the main
issue.328F[329]
The need for reform
- 4.45 We
consider reform is desirable to clarify the admissibility of defendants’
statements contained within hearsay statements.
The literal interpretation of
section 27(3) is directly at odds with the policy underlying section 18(1)(a).
There is also no indication
Parliament intended section 27(3) to have this
effect. Almost all submitters agreed a literal interpretation is undesirable
because
of the reliability concerns with second-hand hearsay statements.
However, submitters took different views about whether amendment
is needed in
light of subsequent cases.
- 4.46 While a
purposive approach to interpretation can largely resolve these problems, we
think it is preferable for the legislative
intention to be reflected in the
plain wording of the section. This is consistent with section 6(f) (enhancing
access to the law
of evidence).
Recommendation
- R6 Amend
section 27 to clarify that subpart 1 (hearsay evidence) applies to a hearsay
statement made by a person other than a defendant
that contains a
defendant’s statement.
- 4.47 We
recommend amending section 27 to clarify that subpart 1 (hearsay evidence)
applies to a hearsay statement made by a person
other than a defendant that
contains a defendant’s statement.
- 4.48 We accept
Associate Professor High’s concern about the phrasing of our original
proposal, which referred to “a defendant’s
statement contained
within a hearsay statement” being subject to the hearsay provisions. This
could imply the defendant’s
statement is itself subject to the hearsay
provisions rather than the hearsay statement it is contained in. Our
recommendation modifies
our original proposal to clarify that only the hearsay
statement by a person other than the defendant is subject to the hearsay
provisions.
The defendant’s statement itself would continue to be governed
by section 27(3). The reliability assessment in section 18(1)(a)
would
therefore focus on whether the circumstances relating to the hearsay statement
mean it is likely to accurately convey what
the defendant said. It would not be
necessary to show the defendant’s statement itself is likely to be
reliable to have the
hearsay statement admitted (although it would remain
possible to exclude the defendant’s statement under other provisions in
the Act in appropriate
cases).329F[330]
ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS’ NON-HEARSAY STATEMENTS
AGAINST CO-DEFENDANTS
Issue
- 4.49 Section
27 reformed the law relating to defendants’ statements offered by the
prosecution. Under the pre-Act common law,
defendants’ out-of-court
statements were considered
hearsay.330F[331] They were
therefore inadmissible to prove the truth of their contents unless one of the
exceptions to the rule against hearsay applied.
Section 27 created a general
rule that defendants’ statements offered by the prosecution are admissible
regardless of whether
they are
hearsay.331F[332]
- 4.50 Notwithstanding
that general rule, defendants’ statements offered by the prosecution are
only admissible against a co-defendant
if they meet the requirements in section
22A.332F[333] Section 22A sought
to codify the common law co-conspirators’ rule. It provides:
- In a criminal
proceeding, a hearsay statement is admissible against a defendant if—
- (a) there is
reasonable evidence of a conspiracy or joint enterprise; and
- (b) there is
reasonable evidence that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy or joint
enterprise; and
- (c) the
hearsay statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy or joint
enterprise.
- 4.51 In its
Second Review, the Commission said the combined effect of sections 27(1) and 22A
is to impose greater restrictions on
the admissibility of defendants’
statements than existed at common
law.333F[334] Section 27(1) says
that a defendant’s statement is only admissible against a co-defendant
under section 22A, but section 22A
only allows for hearsay statements to
be admitted. This means a defendant’s out-of-court statement will not be
admissible against a co-defendant
if:334F[335]
(a) the defendant elects to give evidence at trial and does not adopt the
statement in their
testimony;335F[336] or
(b) the prosecution intends to rely on the statement for a purpose other than
proving the truth of its contents.
- 4.52 At common
law, there was no rule against admitting defendants’ non-hearsay
statements against a co-defendant. It does not
appear to have been
Parliament’s intention to depart from the common law position on
co-defendants’
statements.336F[337]
- 4.53 The
Commission concluded there was no principled basis for limiting section 22A to
hearsay statements.337F[338] It
recommended replacing section 22A with a new
section 27AA.338F[339] The
Commission’s proposed section 27AA allowed for both hearsay and
non-hearsay statements to be admitted if they met the requirements
currently
contained in
section 22A.339F[340]
- 4.54 The Supreme
Court in Winter v R commented on the operation of sections 27(1) and 22A
and the Commission’s proposed section
27AA.340F[341] It
said that, while section 22A was intended to codify the common law, “the
intention of codifying the common law was only partly
achieved”.341F[342] The
wording of section 27(1) “arguably” means a defendant’s
non-hearsay statement can never be admitted against
a
co-defendant.342F[343] However,
the Supreme Court noted the Commission’s proposed section 27AA did
not replicate the common law
either.343F[344] This is
because the common law provided for the admission of non-hearsay statements
without the need to satisfy the threshold criteria
for the
co-conspirators’ rule. By contrast, the proposed section 27AA would apply
the same high threshold for co-conspirators’
statements to all
defendants’ statements, whether or not they were hearsay.
- 4.55 Preliminary
feedback, case law and commentary indicated there are good reasons to revisit
how reform should address this
issue:344F[345]
(a) While Parliament and the Commission intended to codify the common law, this
would not be achieved under the proposed section
27AA.
(b) While there are good policy reasons for adopting a cautious approach to the
admission of defendants’ hearsay statements
against
co-defendants,345F[346] these
reasons are not applicable (or at least not to the same extent) to non-hearsay
statements.
(c) It is unclear how the section 22A assessment would work in practice if
non-hearsay co-defendants’ statements required the
same treatment as
hearsay statements.346F[347]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 4.56 We
asked submitters whether section 27 should be amended to clarify that a
defendant’s non-hearsay statement is admissible
against a co-defendant but
that, if the statement is hearsay, it is only admissible against a co-defendant
if it is admitted under
section 22A.
Results of consultation
- 4.57 Eleven
submitters responded to this question. Seven submitters supported amendment in
some form347F[348] while two
opposed reform.348F[349] Three
took no position.349F[350]
- 4.58 Ethan Huda
submitted the drafting of section 22A is causing problems for the admission of
electronic communications and related
electronic data. Evidence that would not
otherwise be offered for a hearsay purpose (that is, to prove the truth of its
contents)
is nevertheless being presented as hearsay evidence so it can be
admitted under section 22A. He suggested this unnecessarily consumes
court
time, much of it funded by legal aid. He considered the admissibility criteria
in section 22A are unnecessary for non-hearsay
statements. Where a statement is
not hearsay because it is not relied on to prove the truth of its contents, any
issues of unfair
prejudice or misuse of the evidence can be dealt with through a
combination of section 8 (general exclusion) and a strong judicial
direction on
the appropriate use of the statement. He suggested that, while most judges give
strong directions, the Act should make
it clear this is required.
- 4.59 The Crown
Law Office agreed the current wording of section 27(1) may result in evidence
being excluded that would have been admissible
at common law. It said reform
should clarify that a defendant’s statement remains admissible if a
defendant elects to give
evidence. It said excluding such statements has no
logical connection with the policy behind section 22A and noted that a
co-defendant
has greater protection in this situation through the ability to
cross-examine the defendant.
- 4.60 Of the
submitters that favoured reform, five supported our proposed
amendment.350F[351]
- 4.61 The Crown
Law Office supported reform but suggested instead amending section 22A to
clarify that a defendant’s statements
are admissible against a
co-defendant if:
(a) they pass the requirements of the co-conspirators’ rule but ultimately
are not a “hearsay” statement because
the defendant ultimately gives
evidence; or
(b) the prosecution uses the statement for a non-hearsay purpose.
- 4.62 The Crown
Law Office said it may be difficult to redraft section 22A to precisely capture
the former common law without risking
the creation of other unintended issues.
It said that “in this already complex area”, clarity should be the
guiding principle
rather than “rigid adherence to what the common law
formerly provided”.
- 4.63 The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association opposed reform. They submitted amending section
27 to make defendants’ non-hearsay
statements admissible could
unjustifiably disadvantage co-defendants by forcing them to rebut the evidence.
They said this would
inadvertently breach section 25(d) of the NZ Bill of
Rights, which preserves the right not to be compelled to be a witness.
- 4.64 Three
submitters took no clear
position.351F[352] The Public
Defence Service said feedback received from its lawyers was mixed. There was
some preference for maintaining the same
high threshold for
co-conspirators’ statements even if they are not hearsay but an
acknowledgement that this may not have been
Parliament’s intention.
The need for reform
- 4.65 For
the reasons outlined in our Issues Paper, we consider reform is necessary to
make it clear in the Act how sections 27 and
22A apply to defendants’
non-hearsay statements.
- 4.66 Submitters
reiterated the concerns raised during the Commission’s Second Review,
including the impact on multi-party drug
trials involving large quantities of
electronic communications and related data. Similar issues can be observed in
case law.352F[353] We think this
shows a real problem in practice.
- 4.67 Submitters
also noted section 22A was intended to codify the common law, but this was not
achieved in the drafting of section
22A or the previously proposed section 27AA.
We think the common law approach ought to be reflected in the section. We see no
basis
for applying the cautious approach to the admission of defendants’
hearsay statements against co-defendants to non-hearsay
statements.
Recommendation
- R7 Amend
section 27 to clarify that:
- a
defendant’s non-hearsay statement is admissible against a co-defendant;
and
- a
defendant’s hearsay statement is only admissible against a co-defendant if
it is admitted under section 22A.
- 4.68 We
recommend amending section 27 to clarify that a defendant’s non-hearsay
statement is admissible against a co-defendant.
A defendant’s hearsay
statement should continue to be admissible only if it satisfies section 22A.
Submitters generally supported
this approach. The most common reason given by
submitters was that this was the position under the common law, which section
22A
was intended to codify.
- 4.69 We consider
requiring non-hearsay statements to meet the requirements in section 22A is
undesirable and unjustified for three
reasons. First, the main reason for
restricting the use of defendants’ statements in section 27(1) is to
prevent defendants
from making unreliable, self-serving statements against
co-defendants and having these statements admitted by the prosecution while
avoiding
cross-examination.353F[354]
However, a self-serving statement of this sort will invariably be a hearsay
statement — that is, a statement that is relied
on for the truth of its
contents. The same risk does not arise with non-hearsay statements.
- 4.70 Second, the
requirements of the co-conspirators’ rule were not developed to determine
the admissibility of non-hearsay
statements and do not seem to serve any purpose
in performing that role. If non-hearsay statements were subject to
section 22A, they
would need to be framed as being made “in
furtherance of a conspiracy or joint enterprise” even if they were only
offered
to provide important background or context.
- 4.71 Third,
requiring non-hearsay statements to meet the requirements in section 22A could
cause undue expense and delay or mean that
important evidence is
inadmissible.
- 4.72 For these
reasons, we think it is preferable for defendants’ non-hearsay statements
to be generally admissible against
a co-defendant under section 27.
- 4.73 While the
Crown Law Office supported making defendants’ non-hearsay statements
generally admissible against a co-defendant,
it said this should be done by
amending section 22A instead of section 27. We think this is undesirable.
Section 22A is in subpart
1 of the Act, which deals with hearsay evidence.
Section 22A is also subject to section 22, which requires notice to be given
when
hearsay evidence is offered in criminal proceedings, and expressly includes
evidence called under section 22A. This could cause confusion
when the evidence
is not hearsay and unintentionally trigger the notice provision. For these
reasons, amending section 27 is preferable.
- 4.74 We do not
recommend requiring a judicial direction when non-hearsay evidence is admitted
against a co-defendant. A warning is
only needed when the evidence could cause
significant prejudice because of its potential to be treated as a hearsay
statement. Given
this will not always be the case with non-hearsay evidence, we
think it is preferable for judges to use their existing powers to
decide whether
to give a warning.
CHAPTER 5
Unreliable statements
INTRODUCTION
- 5.1 In
this chapter, we consider the following issues relating to section 28 of the
Evidence Act 2006, which provides for the exclusion
of unreliable
defendants’ statements offered by the prosecution in criminal
proceedings:
(a) The wording of section 28 and its relationship to te Kōti Mana Nui |
Supreme Court’s decision in R v
Wichman.354F[355] We do not
recommend reform as there is insufficient evidence of a problem in practice.
(b) The standard of proof for admissibility. We do not recommend reform given
the lack of available evidence of miscarriages of justice,
recent trends in case
law and limited support from submitters.
BACKGROUND
- 5.2 Section
28 sets out when a defendant’s statement offered by the prosecution in a
criminal proceeding will be excluded because
of reliability concerns. It
recognises the risk of wrongful convictions based on false
confessions.355F[356] The section
applies if the “issue of the reliability of the statement” is raised
by the defendant or a co-defendant on
the basis of an evidential foundation or
by the judge (section 28(1)). Once the issue of reliability is raised, the judge
must exclude
the statement unless satisfied on the balance of probabilities that
the circumstances in which it was made were not likely to have
adversely
affected its reliability (section 28(2)).
- 5.3 The focus of
section 28 (as it is now applied by the courts) and of this chapter is on the
reliability of a particular statement.
The section 28 assessment considers the
circumstances in which the statement was made. This can include whether the
conduct of investigators
(for example, when interviewing the defendant) may have
adversely affected the reliability of the statement. However, the primary
concern of the courts under section 28 is whether a statement is sufficiently
reliable to be considered by the
fact-finder.356F[357] In Chapter
6, we discuss a separate but related issue about the extent to which evidence
can be excluded to discourage, and ensure
the justice system is not seen as
condoning, investigatory conduct that risks producing unreliable evidence (even
if the specific
evidence in question is likely to be reliable in fact).
WORDING OF SECTION 28
Issue
- 5.4 In
our Issues Paper, we suggested the wording of section 28 may be unclear and out
of step with how it is now applied by the courts
following the Supreme
Court’s decision in
Wichman.357F[358] In that
case, the Court considered the admissibility of a confession made by the
defendant in the context of a “Mr Big”
undercover
operation.358F[359] The majority
held indications of the actual reliability (that is, the likely truth) of a
statement can be considered under section
28.359F[360] This can include, for
example, the degree to which the statement is consistent with other evidence and
its general plausibility.
This means the courts may admit a statement that would
otherwise be excluded if the section 28 assessment was limited to the
circumstances
in which the statement was
made.360F[361]
- 5.5 In its
Second Review, Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission endorsed the
majority’s approach in
Wichman.361F[362] It
considered that, “while the focus of section 28 is on the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement, that should
not prevent judges from
considering any obvious indications that the statement is true or
false”.362F[363] The
majority of submitters favoured that approach. The Commission concluded the
guidance in Wichman was sufficiently clear so no amendment was
required.363F[364]
- 5.6 In the
context of this review, we have not addressed again whether indications of
actual reliability should be considered under
section 28. That issue was
considered in the Second Review, and case law since then does not suggest
reconsideration is
necessary.364F[365] Rather, our
focus is on whether the wording of section 28 sufficiently reflects the guidance
in Wichman and, if not, whether that has the potential to cause problems
in practice. This issue was not specifically considered in the Second
Review and
was raised in subsequent
commentary.365F[366]
- 5.7 To
understand the potential interpretational issues with section 28, it is
necessary to provide some background. The decision
in Wichman represented
a departure from the original intent of section
28.366F[367] The Commission, when
drafting the Evidence Code provision that became section 28, intended that
it would serve two
purposes.367F[368] The first was
to ensure that defendants’ statements are only admitted if they are
sufficiently reliable to be considered by
the fact-finder at trial. The second
was to deter unacceptable police questioning practices that create a risk of
unreliability.
The actual truth of the statement was intended to be irrelevant
— a view reinforced by the select committee that considered
the Evidence
Bill.368F[369]
- 5.8 As we
explained in our Issues Paper, section 28 incorporated aspects of two separate
common law
rules:369F[370]
(a) The voluntariness rule, under which confessions obtained by a promise,
threat or other inducement by a person in authority were
considered involuntary.
Involuntary statements could only be admitted if the judge was satisfied that
the means by which the confession
was obtained were not likely to cause a false
confession. The actual truth or falsity of the confession was irrelevant —
the
focus was on the tendency of the inducement to affect the reliability of the
statement rather than the actual result.
(b) The fairness discretion, which allowed a defendant’s statement to be
excluded if (among other reasons) it was unreliable
due to factors internal to
the defendant such as fatigue, their psychological state or the influence of
drugs or alcohol.
- 5.9 The majority
in Wichman observed that combining these two separate rules complicated
the situation.370F[371] While the
truth of a statement was irrelevant under the voluntariness rule, it was not
clear the same approach was required where
the unreliability stemmed from
internal factors.371F[372] The
majority did not favour an approach that would see an obviously true confession
(such as one leading to the discovery of physical
evidence) excluded under
section 28 because the defendant was
delusional.372F[373] The
Commission did not address this issue when recommending the provision that would
become section 28 in the Evidence Code.
- 5.10 Wichman
has been criticised by one commentator as being inconsistent with the
wording of
section 28.373F[374] In
particular, section 28(2) focuses on “the circumstances in which the
statement was made”, which arguably does not
include its actual
reliability or unreliability. The majority in Wichman acknowledged that
section 28(2) “is not an entirely easy provision and its language gives
rise to a range of possible
interpretations”.374F[375]
- 5.11 Additionally,
section 28(1) uses different language to section 28(2) — it refers to
“the issue of the reliability
of the statement”. We said in our
Issues Paper that it is potentially unclear whether the issue of reliability
must be raised
by reference to the circumstances in which the statement was
made, its actual reliability or a mixture of
both.375F[376]
- 5.12 We
expressed the view that it is appropriate for the courts to exercise caution
when deciding to admit a statement under section
28 based on indications of
actual reliability.376F[377] We
suggested that section 30 (improperly obtained evidence) may be able to address
some of the concerns about the means used to obtain
a defendant’s
statement that were previously addressed by the voluntariness rule (as we
discuss in Chapter 6). However, we
noted section 30 should not be used as a
general substitute for section 28. Exclusion under section 30 depends on
the application
of a balancing test, whereas section 28 results in
automatic exclusion once a judge is satisfied section 28(2) is met.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 5.13 We
sought feedback on whether the potential lack of clarity in the wording of
section 28 is causing confusion in practice. We
asked whether it is desirable to
amend section 28 to make it easier to understand and apply and to ensure
indications of actual reliability
are only considered where they are clear and
obvious (consistent with the decision in
Wichman).377F[378] We
identified three options for reform intended to reinforce that the section
continues to focus primarily on the circumstances in
which a statement was made
but that clear indications of actual reliability or unreliability may be taken
into account when deciding
whether to admit the
statement.378F[379]
- 5.14 We
considered it important to retain the focus on the circumstances in which the
statement was made given the difficulties in
accurately assessing the truth of
confession evidence. We also suggested section 28 should not be engaged where a
defendant makes
a free and informed choice about whether to make a statement and
what to say but it proves to be incorrect (for example, because
they are
mistaken or choose to lie of their own volition). We noted juries are routinely
trusted to assess such evidence.
Results of consultation
- 5.15 Ten
submitters responded to this question. Four supported reform along the lines we
had proposed379F[380] while three
opposed it.380F[381] The remaining
three submitters disagreed with the approach in Wichman and did not
consider that indications of actual reliability should be treated as favouring
admission under
section 28.381F[382]
- 5.16 The
submitters that supported amendment considered it desirable to align the wording
of the section with
Wichman382F[383] and to
emphasise that only clear indications of consistency or inconsistency should be
taken into account.383F[384] They
did not identify any issues in practice with the current wording of section
28.
- 5.17 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) suggested it is
appropriate to emphasise that the focus of section
28 is on the
circumstances in which the statement was made and that indications of actual
reliability should be considered only where
they are clear without much further
inquiry. It acknowledged this approach “may mean that evidence is unlikely
to be excluded
as a deterrent to poor police practises”. However, it
considered these issues are better dealt with under section 30 or, in
relation
to the most serious improprieties, section 29 (statements influenced by
oppression).
- 5.18 The
submitters that opposed reform considered Wichman provides sufficient
guidance.384F[385] Associate
Professor Anna High noted subsequent case law does not suggest there are issues
with its application. She was also concerned
reform might overemphasise actual
reliability. Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police suggested
“[a]ny residual
concerns about the admission of a defendant’s
statement can be addressed under s 30”. It said reform could have
unintended
consequences.
- 5.19 The
remaining three submitters expressed concern about the approach in
Wichman. Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence
Service suggested Wichman should be reconsidered, noting the difficulty
of accurately assessing actual reliability pre-trial and the risk of
perpetuating unsafe
questioning practices by police. It did not support any
reform that might prevent the courts from reconsidering Wichman in
future. The Auckland District Law Society and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers
Association New Zealand noted indications of reliability
such as general
plausibility and consistency with other evidence have been present in proven
false confessions. While they supported
taking into account indications that a
statement is “patently untrue” (referring to Lyttle v
R),385F[386] they were
concerned about inviting judges to admit the statement on the basis it appears
to be congruent with objective facts.
- 5.20 Finally, we
note the Criminal Bar Association suggested section 28 should be capable of
applying to a statement by any witness,
not just defendants. Similarly, an
individual submitter, Stephen Hudson, supported additional controls on the
admissibility of other
witnesses’ evidence on the basis that lies by
witnesses are a leading cause of miscarriages of justice.
Reform not recommended
- 5.21 We
do not recommend amending section 28 to clarify its application. While some
submitters supported clarification, none suggested
the current wording of
section 28 is causing problems in practice. Case law suggests the courts
are aware of the guidance in Wichman and are applying it correctly. They
have continued to take a relatively cautious approach to admitting
defendants’ statements
when reliability concerns are
raised.386F[387] We saw no
suggestion, for example, that indications of actual reliability are being
considered where they are insufficiently clear.
- 5.22 In general,
it is desirable for the Act to be as clear and accessible as
possible.387F[388] We acknowledge
that the current wording of section 28 does not necessarily make it clear that
the approach set out in Wichman should be adopted. However, in this
instance, we consider the potential benefits of codifying that approach are
outweighed by the
risks of:
(a) creating further uncertainty through the need to interpret new legislative
wording given the current approach is now reasonably
clear in case law;
(b) cementing an approach that some submitters objected to in principle rather
than leaving it open to the courts to develop the
law in this area if that
proves desirable in future; and
(c) prompting the courts to place greater emphasis on actual reliability than
they do currently (which we would not support given
the difficulties in
accurately assessing the truth of confession evidence and the associated risk of
miscarriages of justice).388F[389]
- 5.23 Our
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, as we discuss below, we do not
recommend raising the standard of proof for admissibility
under section 28 (an
option that received little support from submitters). Had we recommended raising
the standard of proof, that
would have helped to offset the risk that the courts
might place greater emphasis on actual reliability (as it would have required
more convincing evidence of actual reliability before admitting a confession on
that basis). If the current “balance of probabilities”
standard is
retained, however, there is a greater risk that expressly referring to actual
reliability in section 28 could result
in false confessions being admitted.
- 5.24 Some
submitters disagreed with the approach in Wichman, suggesting that actual
reliability should not be considered under section 28. As noted above, this
issue was considered in the Commission’s
Second Review and we have not
revisited it. Case law since Wichman suggests the courts are continuing
to take a cautious approach to admitting defendants’ statements under
section 28.389F[390] Indications
of unreliability (such as inconsistencies with other evidence or general
implausibility) have been viewed as supporting exclusion in some cases,
suggesting
the approach in Wichman does not necessarily favour admission
of evidence.390F[391]
- 5.25 Considering
actual reliability may allow some evidence to be admitted under section 28 that
would have been excluded under the
common law voluntariness rule. As we discuss
in Chapter 6, section 30 (improperly obtained evidence) may operate to exclude a
statement
where there are concerns about the conduct of investigators in
obtaining it. Nonetheless, the need for caution in admitting statements
under
section 28 remains. Section 30 is not a substitute for section 28 since
exclusion under section 30 depends on the application
of a balancing test. By
contrast, section 28 results in automatic exclusion once section 28(2) is met,
in recognition of the significant
risk of miscarriages of justice based on false
confessions. For this reason, if the circumstances indicate the reliability of a
statement
may have been adversely affected, exclusion should be presumed unless
there are clear and obvious indications the statement is
true.391F[392]
- 5.26 We have not
considered extending section 28 to other witnesses, as two submitters
suggested.392F[393] This would
represent a significant change in the policy underlying section 28, which
is aimed at addressing the risk of false confessions
by defendants and the
significant weight likely to be given to such confessions. The same risk does
not arise in relation to evidence
given by other witnesses — although it
may be unreliable for different reasons (as we discuss in relation to prison
informant
evidence in Chapter 8). The Supreme Court has recently confirmed
reliability considerations may be taken into account when deciding
whether to
exclude a witness’s evidence under section 8 (general exclusion), which
applies to all evidence.393F[394]
STANDARD OF PROOF FOR ADMISSIBILITY
Issue
- 5.27 In
our Issues Paper, we queried whether the balance of probabilities standard for
admitting a defendant’s statement under
section 28(2) provides adequate
protection against the risk of conviction based on a false confession. We
explained that the Evidence
Code had proposed a “beyond reasonable
doubt” standard for establishing the reliability of a defendant’s
statement,
consistent with the approach under the common law voluntariness
rule.394F[395] A beyond reasonable
doubt standard still applies under section 29 (statements influenced by
oppression).
- 5.28 We noted it
was difficult to assess from case law whether the balance of probabilities
standard was resulting in the admission
of false
confessions.395F[396] However,
several developments had occurred since section 28 was enacted that we suggested
may justify reconsideration of the appropriate
standard of
proof:396F[397]
(a) Increasing recognition of the reliability risks associated with confessions
and a growing body of evidence indicating they may
be given undue weight by the
fact-finder.
(b) The use in Aotearoa New Zealand of Mr Big undercover operations and the
Complex Investigation Phased Engagement
Model397F[398] for questioning
suspects. These techniques have been the subject of considerable media scrutiny,
have prompted concerns from defence
counsel and have been used in a manner that
produced unreliable statements in some
cases.398F[399] They can involve
significant interaction between investigators and suspects over an extended
period of time — some of which
may be informal and/or not recorded —
making it potentially more difficult to accurately assess the reliability of any
resulting
confession.
(c) The finding in Wichman (and its application in subsequent cases) that
indications of the actual reliability of a statement can be taken into account
under
section 28. Such indications have the potential to be misleading —
for example, a defendant’s statement could be consistent
with other
evidence due to “contamination” during the investigation or because
the defendant knows the offender. This
may mean a higher standard of proof for
admissibility is appropriate.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 5.29 In
light of these developments, we asked submitters whether section 28(2) should be
amended to adopt a standard of beyond reasonable
doubt. We noted that raising
the standard of proof for admissibility could provide greater protection against
the risk of wrongful
conviction based on false confession evidence. It would
signal that the courts should err on the side of exclusion where there is
limited evidence of reliability. On the other hand, we noted a beyond reasonable
doubt standard could be considered too high a hurdle
at the pre-trial stage
since the court would not have access to all the evidence that would be
available to the fact-finder at trial.
Results of consultation
- 5.30 Ten
submitters responded to this question. Three submitters supported raising the
standard to beyond reasonable
doubt.399F[400] Six submitters
opposed this.400F[401] The
remaining submitter, the Public Defence Service, said its lawyers had mixed
views on this issue.
- 5.31 Submitters
in favour of a beyond reasonable doubt standard said multiple cases
internationally and in New Zealand show there
is a high risk that false
confessors will be
convicted.401F[402] They also
noted Glazebrook J’s view in Wichman that indicators of reliability
must be clear and obvious, saying this shows the need for a higher standard than
the balance of
probabilities.402F[403]
- 5.32 Most
submitters that opposed a beyond reasonable doubt standard thought it would be
inappropriate at the threshold stage where
the judge is acting as a
gatekeeper.403F[404] The NZLS
observed the section 28 assessment often focuses on circumstances that can have
large grey areas (for example, the likely
impact of a defendant’s mental
or psychological issues on an interview). It therefore considered that requiring
the prosecution
to prove reliability beyond reasonable doubt would set the
standard too high. It also expressed concern that a higher standard could
lead
to inconsistent findings if a judge were to admit evidence on the basis that
they are satisfied of its reliability beyond reasonable
doubt only for the
evidence to be rejected by a jury applying the same standard.
- 5.33 Te Tari
Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office and Police submitted there is no convincing
case for change. Police said there is
little evidence of unreliable statements
being admitted or leading to unsafe convictions. The Crown Law Office suggested
the exclusion
of confessions in
Lyttle404F[405] and
Gebhardt405F[406]
demonstrates section 28(2) has meaningful application and the balance of
probabilities standard does not set the bar too low.
- 5.34 The Public
Defence Service submitted a higher standard is necessary and would help to
offset concerns about considering actual
reliability. However, it said its
lawyers had mixed views on the appropriate standard. It expressed concern that a
beyond reasonable
doubt standard may be inappropriate pre-trial. Specifically,
it noted a risk that, once this threshold is satisfied, it would effectively
determine guilt and would be difficult to counter at trial. Alternatively, a
beyond reasonable doubt standard might be nearly impossible
to satisfy
pre-trial.
Reform not recommended
- 5.35 We
do not recommend changing the standard of proof in section 28. We consider there
are good arguments in principle for raising
the standard to reflect the
significant risk of miscarriages of justice based on false
confessions.406F[407] However,
given a beyond reasonable doubt standard was originally proposed by the
Commission407F[408] and was
specifically rejected in the Evidence
Bill,408F[409] we would need clear
evidence of a problem in practice to recommend reform.
- 5.36 As we noted
in our Issues Paper, there is no clear evidence of false confessions being
admitted under section 28 and resulting
in miscarriages of
justice.409F[410] Further, the
courts have ruled defendants’ statements inadmissible under section 28 in
three recent cases.410F[411] These
decisions tend to suggest the courts are exercising caution when deciding
whether to admit statements made in circumstances
that may have impacted their
reliability. This is likely to influence decisions by trial judges in
future.
- 5.37 There was
also limited support from submitters for raising the standard of proof. Even
among defence counsel, there was some
concern about applying a beyond reasonable
doubt standard at the threshold stage.
- 5.38 For
completeness, we do not necessarily agree that applying a beyond reasonable
doubt standard in section 28 is inappropriate
pre-trial or would risk
predetermining matters that are properly left to the jury. While ultimate
reliability is a question for the
jury, that is not what section 28 is concerned
with.411F[412] Even following
Wichman, the court’s determination under section 28 relates
primarily to the likely impact of the circumstances in which a statement
was
made.412F[413] If the evidence is
admitted, it remains open to the jury to reach a different view on whether the
statement is reliable in fact having regard to the totality of the
evidence. A beyond reasonable doubt standard applies under section 29
(statements influenced
by oppression), which involves consideration of factors
similar to those in section
28.413F[414] Accordingly, should
it become evident in future that statements are being too readily admitted under
section 28 (for example, through
subsequent exonerations), it may be appropriate
to reconsider the standard of proof.
CHAPTER 6
Investigatory techniques and risks of unreliability
INTRODUCTION
- 6.1 In
this chapter, we consider how the Evidence Act 2006 governs the admissibility of
evidence obtained through investigatory techniques
that risk producing
unreliable evidence. We conclude there is insufficient evidence of a problem in
practice to recommend reform.
ISSUE
- 6.2 In
our Issues Paper, we noted that preliminary feedback expressed concern that the
Act does not adequately address the use of
certain investigatory techniques to
obtain statements from
defendants.414F[415] These
concerns related in particular to “Mr Big” undercover operations and
the Complex Investigation Phased Engagement
Model (CIPEM) for questioning
suspects, which have been criticised as having the potential to produce
unreliable confessions.415F[416]
This led us to consider whether sections 28 (unreliable statements), 29
(statements influenced by oppression) and 30 (improperly
obtained evidence), as
they are now applied by the courts, provide a coherent scheme for determining
the admissibility of evidence
obtained in a manner that risks producing
unreliable evidence.
- 6.3 We discuss
issues specific to section 28 in Chapter 5. As it is now applied by the courts,
section 28 focuses on whether a particular
statement by a defendant is
sufficiently reliable to be considered by the fact-finder. In this chapter, we
discuss a separate but
related issue about the extent to which evidence can be
excluded to discourage, and ensure the justice system is not seen as condoning,
investigatory conduct that risks producing unreliable evidence (even if the
specific evidence in question is likely to be reliable
in fact).
- 6.4 Sections
28–30 were intended to operate alongside each other to perform the roles
previously fulfilled by the common law
voluntariness rule and the jurisdiction
to exclude evidence that was obtained unfairly (the fairness
discretion).416F[417] Section 30
also fulfils an additional role of providing for exclusion of evidence obtained
in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 (NZ Bill of Rights) and
other legislation. As a scheme, sections 28–30 were designed to ensure
defendants’ statements
are sufficiently reliable to be considered by the
fact-finder and to discourage the use of unacceptable methods to obtain
evidence.417F[418] Section 29 is
confined to rare cases of serious mistreatment of a defendant when obtaining a
statement, whereas sections 28 and 30
have broader application.
- 6.5 As we
discuss in Chapter 5, the wording of section 28 focuses on whether the
circumstances in which a defendant’s statement
was made may have adversely
affected its reliability.418F[419]
This stems from the common law voluntariness rule, which was concerned with the
methods used to obtain a statement rather than whether
it was
true.419F[420] However, the
majority of te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court in R v Wichman found
that a court applying section 28 can consider indications the defendant’s
statement is actually reliable (that is, likely
to be
true).420F[421] This decision
suggests section 28, as it is now applied by the courts, is primarily concerned
with whether a statement is sufficiently
reliable to be considered by the
fact-finder.421F[422] Conduct by
investigators that risks producing unreliable evidence will be relevant to that
assessment but may not justify exclusion
on its own if a statement is considered
to be sufficiently reliable in fact.
- 6.6 As we
discuss further in Chapter 7, section 30 is directly concerned with the methods
used to obtain evidence. It governs the
admissibility of evidence that is
“improperly obtained”. This includes evidence obtained in breach of
an enactment or
rule of law (section
30(5)(a))422F[423] or unfairly
(section 30(5)(c)). The “unfairness” limb is most often engaged
where there has been a breach of the Chief
Justice’s Practice Note on
Police Questioning423F[424] but is
not limited to such
situations.424F[425] Once evidence
is found to be improperly obtained, section 30(2) sets out a balancing test
to determine whether it should be admitted
or excluded.
- 6.7 In our
Issues Paper, we suggested the majority decision in Wichman may have
created a gap in the operation of sections 28–30 that was not intended
when those sections were
enacted.425F[426] It could
lead to statements being admitted under section 28 that would previously have
been excluded under the voluntariness rule due
to concerns about the methods
used to obtain them. Further, the majority judgment indicates that, where a
statement is not excluded
under section 28 (for example, due to indications of
actual reliability), any residual risks of unreliability stemming from the
investigatory
methods used to obtain the statement are irrelevant to whether the
evidence was obtained “unfairly” so as to engage section
30.426F[427] We suggested this
could prevent the courts from calling on section 30 to fill the gap left in the
operation of section 28 as compared
to the voluntariness rule (that is, to
address concerns about investigatory conduct that risks producing unreliable
evidence).
- 6.8 In some
cases, section 30 will apply anyway because there is some other basis on which
to find the evidence was improperly obtained
(such as a breach of the NZ Bill of
Rights or the Chief Justice’s Practice Note on Police Questioning).
Alternatively, section
29 may apply in rare cases where the high threshold for
oppression is met. In other cases, however, we said the courts may have no
mechanism to exclude evidence where they consider the conduct of investigators
carried an unacceptable risk of producing unreliable
evidence.
- 6.9 We
acknowledged that it was not yet clear from subsequent case law whether
Wichman will be applied in this
way.427F[428] While several
subsequent cases have involved arguments that the conduct of investigators
carried an unacceptable risk of producing
a false confession, in each case, the
court was able to exclude the evidence on other
grounds.428F[429]
CONSULTATION
What we asked submitters
- 6.10 We
sought submissions on whether the potential gap we had identified in the
operation of sections 28–30 was causing concern
or problems in practice.
We expressed our preliminary view that the courts should be able to consider the
risk that an investigatory
technique could produce unreliable evidence under
section 30.429F[430] We suggested
the administration of justice may be brought into disrepute if the courts are
unable to exclude evidence resulting from
practices they consider carry an
unacceptable risk of producing unreliable evidence. This could encourage the use
of similar techniques
in future, increasing the risk of unreliable evidence more
generally and undermining public trust and confidence in the justice system.
These are the types of considerations section 30 is designed to address.
- 6.11 We asked
submitters whether legislative reform is desirable to provide that the courts
can have regard to the risk that an investigatory
technique would produce
unreliable evidence at both stages of the section 30 inquiry (that is, when
determining whether the evidence
was improperly obtained and when applying the
balancing test). We suggested this could ensure sections 28–30 together
cover
the same ground as the voluntariness rule did at common law, as appears to
have been the legislative intent.
Results of consultation
- 6.12 Eleven
submitters responded to this question. Six submitters supported amendment to
clarify that the risk that an investigatory
technique could produce unreliable
evidence can be considered under section
30.430F[431] Five submitters
opposed amendment.431F[432]
- 6.13 The
Auckland District Law Society and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand noted the courts have recognised
there are reliability issues with some
techniques being used by police, referring to Mr Big
operations432F[433] and
CIPEM.433F[434] Given this, they
submitted consideration of the reliability risks associated with such techniques
should be available and signalled
to judges when applying the section 30
balancing exercise.
- 6.14 Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) submitted section 30
is the appropriate section to determine the
admissibility of evidence that has
been obtained through investigatory techniques known to carry a risk of
producing unreliable evidence.
It suggested some techniques that have resulted
in unreliable confessions (such as Mr Big operations and CIPEM) have also, in
some
cases, been carried out in ways that could be deemed unfair. It emphasised,
however, that these techniques may not be inherently
unfair and a case-by-case
assessment is required to determine whether their use engages the section 30
admissibility test.
- 6.15 Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service considered the term
“unfairly obtained” in section
30 should be broad enough to cover
conduct that risks producing unreliable evidence. However, it supported reform
on the basis that
an express provision may encourage judges to treat such
conduct more seriously. It suggested the more important amendment would be
to
clarify that the extent of the reliability risks is relevant to the application
of the balancing test. It said it is often easier
to convince the courts that
evidence is improperly obtained than to convince them that exclusion is
proportionate. On the other hand,
the NZLS and Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown
Law Office considered reliability risks can already be taken into account under
other
factors in the section 30(3) balancing
test.434F[435]
- 6.16 Of the
submitters against amendment, only the Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke
Cunningham Clere, expressly disagreed in principle
with taking risks of
unreliability into account under section 30. It submitted that it is appropriate
to differentiate issues of
impropriety and reliability and that the options
presented in our Issues Paper would conflate them. It noted section 30 rightly
requires
some improper conduct to trigger the balancing test, while section 28
focuses on ensuring actually unreliable statements are not
used against
defendants. If section 28 is seen to permit the admission of evidence that is
unreliable, this is reason to amend section
28 rather than section 30.
- 6.17 The
remaining submitters did not argue against the courts considering the risk of
unreliability associated with an investigatory
technique under section 30.
Rather, they were not sure that the decision in Wichman would prevent
this so considered amendment would be
premature.435F[436] Associate
Professor Anna High noted Wichman does not mean the courts are
required to admit evidence based on indications of actual reliability
— actual reliability is relevant but not determinative. The Crown
Law
Office was concerned amendment could reduce the flexibility of the term
“unfairly” in section 30, leading to too
much emphasis on
reliability compared to other types of unfairness.
- 6.18 Ngā
Pirihimana Aotearoa | New Zealand Police suggested criticism of the Mr Big
technique is overstated, as the technique
mitigates risks of unreliability
through its emphasis on honesty. It also said Mr Big and other undercover
operations can serve to
clear a suspect of an offence. In a follow-up
discussion, Police emphasised there is nothing inherently unfair about
techniques such
as Mr Big and CIPEM. Rather, any technique can be unfair if it
is taken to the extreme.
REFORM NOT RECOMMENDED
- 6.19 We
do not recommend amendment to clarify that section 30 may apply where the
conduct of investigators risked producing unreliable
evidence. There is
insufficient evidence of a problem in practice requiring reform. At this stage,
it remains unclear what effect
Wichman will have in this regard. We found
no evidence of Wichman being applied in a manner that prevents
consideration of risks of unreliability under section 30, nor did submitters
raise any other
practical issues (for example, uncertainty among counsel as to
when and how reliability concerns could be raised).
- 6.20 Almost all
submitters considered that, where the conduct of investigators risks producing
unreliable evidence, that may be relevant
when assessing whether evidence is
unfairly obtained under section 30(5)(c) and when applying the section
30(2) balancing test. Most
submitters agreed this approach is already available
on the wording of section 30 although they held differing views on whether
clarification
is nonetheless desirable in light of Wichman.
- 6.21 As we
explain below, we consider that Wichman and subsequent case law leaves it
open to the courts to consider investigatory conduct that risks producing
unreliable evidence under
section 30. We also agree with most submitters that
the current wording of section 30 allows for this. For these reasons, we
consider
it would be premature to recommend legislative reform.
- 6.22 In
Wichman, the majority disagreed with te Kōti Pīra | Court of
Appeal’s approach of considering reliability risks associated
with the Mr
Big undercover technique under
section 30.436F[437] By
contrast, Glazebrook J (dissenting) agreed with the Court of Appeal that
“the substantial risk of unreliability inherent
in the technique is one
factor to be considered in deciding whether statements obtained through the Mr
Big technique are obtained
unfairly”.437F[438] The
majority did, however, seem to accept that the “unfairness” limb of
section 30 could be engaged in some cases where
investigators use threats
or inducements to place pressure on defendants to
confess.438F[439] This may be
viewed as an acknowledgment that, in some situations, conduct that risks
producing unreliable evidence may be appropriately
considered under section 30
even where it does not breach the NZ Bill of Rights or the Chief Justice’s
Practice Note on Police
Questioning.439F[440]
- 6.23 The Crown
Law Office referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in R v Chetty
(decided after Wichman) to demonstrate that investigatory techniques
that risk producing unreliable evidence can be considered under section
30(5)(c).440F[441] The facts in
Chetty included breaches of the Chief Justice’s Practice Note on
Police Questioning, but there was also another aspect of police conduct
that
contributed to the finding of unfairness. A detective had told Mr Chetty that he
would be charged with rape, that rape carried
a maximum penalty of 20
years’ imprisonment and that he was on his own from that point on. The
context in which this statement
was made led the defendant to believe that,
unless he told his interviewers what they wanted to hear, he would face 20
years’
imprisonment.441F[442] The
prosecution accepted this exchange meant Mr Chetty’s subsequent admissions
were unfairly obtained so the court did not
consider in detail how the
detective’s conduct engaged
section 30(5)(c).442F[443]
The majority did, however, comment that the detective should not have told Mr
Chetty the maximum sentence for
rape.443F[444]
- 6.24 We agree
that Chetty appears to be an example of the Court considering the risk
that the conduct of investigators could result in an unreliable statement
when
assessing unfairness under section 30, albeit without doing so expressly.
Similarly, in Zurich v R, the Court of Appeal referred to the fact
that the defendant was interviewed while clearly intoxicated as a factor in
deciding his
statement was unfairly
obtained.444F[445]
- 6.25 We also
agree with Associate Professor High’s observation that Wichman does
not require the courts to admit a defendant’s statement under
section 28 based on indications of actual reliability. Since
Wichman, the courts have generally considered the consistency of a
statement with other evidence and its general
plausibility445F[446] in line with
the majority’s finding that such matters are relevant to the section 28(2)
inquiry.446F[447] However, they
may still decide what weight to give those matters compared to concerns about
the circumstances in which the statement
was made (which remain the primary
focus of section 28). In practice, this may mean Wichman does not
significantly narrow the scope for the courts to exclude statements under
section 28.
- 6.26 Where the
primary concern is not the reliability of the statement in question but rather
that investigators acted in a manner
that risked producing unreliable evidence,
we consider section 30 may apply (or section 29 in particularly egregious
cases). This
type of conduct may affect both whether evidence was unfairly
obtained (under section 30(5)(c)) and the application of the balancing
test.
- 6.27 This
approach is available on the current wording of section 30, so amendment is not
required to enable it. The wording of the
“unfairly obtained” limb
of section 30 is sufficiently broad to capture conduct that risks producing
unreliable evidence
(as Chetty and Zurich demonstrate). When
applying the balancing test, the extent of the risk could be considered under
the section 30(3)(a) factor (the
nature of the right breached and the
seriousness of the intrusion on it). As we discuss in Chapter 7, the courts have
applied that
factor to enable a broader consideration of the interests infringed
by the impropriety, even where there is no breach of a “right”
in a
strict sense. We recommend an amendment to clarify that this is the correct
approach. In our view, the section 30(3)(a) assessment
could include
consideration of the public interest in ensuring criminal investigations are
conducted in a manner that is likely to
produce reliable evidence. This is
consistent with the primary rationale underlying section 30, which is to
maintain an effective
and credible system of
justice.447F[448]
- 6.28 We do not
consider this approach inappropriately conflates issues of reliability and
impropriety. The section 30 analysis would
continue to focus on the conduct of
investigators rather than on the reliability of a particular statement (which is
properly addressed
by section
28).448F[449] If investigators act
in a way that involves a significant risk of producing unreliable evidence
— for example, by placing pressure
on a defendant to confess — the
admission of that evidence may undermine the credibility of the justice system
and fail to
deter similar conduct in future. Accordingly, it may properly be
deemed unfair (and therefore “improper”) for section
30 purposes.
- 6.29 We do not
suggest that the use of certain investigatory techniques (such as Mr Big
undercover operations or CIPEM) should automatically
be deemed unfair for
section 30 purposes. We agree with Police and the NZLS that a case-by-case
assessment is required. The use of
a particular technique may be unfair in some
cases and not in others depending on how it is carried out (for example, the
precise
nature of any pressure exerted on a defendant) and the wider context
(for example, whether the defendant was known to be vulnerable
to manipulation).
The focus under section 30 is on the nature of the conduct in a particular
case.
- 6.30 Since this
is our final statutory review of the operation of the Act, the Ministry of
Justice may wish to monitor the development
of case law in this area to ensure
there remains scope under sections 28–30 for the courts to exclude
evidence obtained through
conduct that risks producing unreliable evidence.
CHAPTER 7
Improperly obtained evidence
INTRODUCTION
- 7.1 In
this chapter, we consider section 30 of the Evidence Act 2006, which sets out a
balancing test to determine whether improperly
obtained evidence should be
admitted or excluded. We discuss the following:
(a) The operation of the section 30 balancing test. We identify two issues with
the test as it is currently applied. First, some
court decisions appear to give
less weight to the seriousness of the impropriety than was intended when section
30 was enacted. Second,
the test is applied inconsistently, making it difficult
to predict outcomes.
(b) The wording of the balancing test in section 30(2)(b). We make two
recommendations for reform to:
(i) specify that the judge must exclude improperly obtained evidence unless
satisfied it is in the public interest to admit it; and
(ii) identify the two competing public interests that must be weighed against
each other (the public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the
impropriety and the public interest in having the evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial).
(c) The application of the section 30(3) factors in the balancing test. We
recommend specifying the public interest identified in
section 30(2)(b) to which
each factor relates. We also propose amendments to clarify the operation of some
factors and to repeal
factors that are not helpful.
(d) The role of causation in determining whether evidence is improperly obtained
under section 30(5). We conclude it is preferable
for the law on causation to be
refined through case law rather than legislative amendment.
BACKGROUND
- 7.2 Section
30 sets out a balancing test to determine whether improperly obtained evidence
is admissible in criminal
proceedings.449F[450] Once
evidence is found to be improperly obtained, the court
must:450F[451]
- ... determine
whether or not the exclusion of the evidence is proportionate to the impropriety
by means of a balancing process that
gives appropriate weight to the impropriety
and takes proper account of the need for an effective and credible system of
justice.
- 7.3 Section
30(3) contains a non-exhaustive list of factors that the court may take into
account when applying this balancing test.
If the court finds that exclusion of
the evidence is proportionate to the impropriety, it must exclude the
evidence.451F[452]
- 7.4 In our
Issues Paper, we discussed the history and underlying policy of section 30 and
assessed how the courts have applied the
balancing
test.452F[453] We do not repeat
the detail of that discussion here except to note the following key points.
- 7.5 First,
section 30 is based on the balancing test adopted by te Kōti Pīra |
Court of Appeal in R v
Shaheed.453F[454] Prior to
that, evidence obtained in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ
Bill of Rights) was subject to prima facie
exclusion.454F[455] Te Aka Matua o
te Ture | Law Commission’s Evidence Code included an improperly obtained
evidence provision that was based on
the prima facie exclusionary rule but would
have applied to “improperly obtained evidence” more broadly
(including evidence
obtained in breach of any enactment or rule of law or
unfairly).455F[456] After the
Evidence Code was published but before the Evidence Bill was drafted, the Court
of Appeal in Shaheed overturned the prima facie exclusionary rule and
replaced it with a balancing test. It considered the rule had led to an unduly
rigid
approach with almost all breaches of the NZ Bill of Rights resulting in
exclusion of the evidence
obtained.456F[457] The Government
largely sought to codify the Shaheed approach when drafting the Evidence
Bill457F[458] but applied it to
improperly obtained evidence more generally (as the Commission had proposed in
relation to the prima facie exclusionary
rule).458F[459]
- 7.6 Second,
there are three main rationales for exclusion of improperly obtained evidence:
maintaining the integrity of the justice
system, vindicating breaches of rights
and deterring future
improprieties.459F[460] All three
have been recognised by the courts in Aotearoa New Zealand. The primary
rationale for the balancing test formulated in
Shaheed and reflected in
section 30 is to maintain an effective and credible system of justice that
commands the respect of the
community.460F[461] However, the
majority in Shaheed also saw the test as a way to vindicate breaches of
rights and (to a lesser extent) deter future
improprieties.461F[462]
Since section 30 was enacted, the courts have made it clear that an
effective and credible system of justice does not lightly condone
police conduct
that breaches rights462F[463] and
may seek to reduce the risk of future
improprieties.463F[464]
- 7.7 Third, there
have been long-standing concerns about the section 30 balancing test from
commentators and submitters in previous
Law Commission
reviews.464F[465] The test has
been criticised as leading to inconsistent and unpredictable decisions and as
being too skewed towards admitting improperly
obtained evidence. Section 30
decisions are frequently the subject of
appeals465F[466] and split
decisions.466F[467]
- 7.8 Finally, the
appellate courts have generally avoided providing detailed guidance on the
balancing test. Before section 30 was
enacted, the Court of Appeal in R v
Williams laid out a structured approach to the Shaheed test with the
aim of achieving more consistent
results.467F[468] However, te
Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court departed from this structured approach in
Hamed v R, preferring instead to give the courts flexibility as to
whether a factor supported admission or exclusion in a particular
case.468F[469] Gault J noted the
application of the balancing test “may well depend on inclinations of
particular judges”.469F[470]
THE OPERATION OF THE BALANCING TEST
Issue
- 7.9 The
Minister of Justice suggested we consider whether the section 30 process for
determining the admissibility of improperly obtained
evidence in criminal
proceedings gives sufficient weight to the
impropriety.470F[471] We also
received preliminary feedback suggesting that court decisions under section 30
are too unpredictable or inconsistent or unduly
favour admission of improperly
obtained evidence.
- 7.10 In our
Issues Paper, we set out our analysis of a snapshot case study of section 30
decisions between 2019 and
2022.471F[472] The results must be
treated with some caution. The review only covered three years and did not
include te Kōti-a-Rōhe |
District Court decisions (due to lack of
availability on online databases). In addition, there are various reasons why
the admission
of improperly obtained evidence may not be challenged and why
first-instance decisions may not be appealed. That said, of the cases
we
reviewed, improperly obtained real evidence (that is, physical evidence) was
admitted in around two-thirds of
cases.472F[473] The importance of
the evidence to the prosecution case and the seriousness of the offence were
often treated as significant (and
sometimes determinative) factors favouring
admission. By contrast, defendants’ statements that were improperly
obtained were
usually
excluded.473F[474]
- 7.11 We
questioned in the Issues Paper whether the courts’ current approach is
consistent with the original intent of section
30.474F[475] As noted above, the
section was based on the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v
Shaheed.475F[476] While the
majority in Shaheed clearly anticipated some rebalancing, they also
indicated that, in most cases, the balancing test should not lead to results
different
from those reached under the prima facie exclusionary
rule.476F[477] It was intended to
give “appropriate and significant weight” to the fact there had been
a breach of rights.477F[478]
Although a breach of rights might be “outweighed by the accumulation of
other factors”,478F[479] the
public interest in convicting those guilty of serious crimes would “not
normally outweigh an egregious breach of
rights”.479F[480]
- 7.12 We also
questioned whether section 30 had led to an unnecessary degree of uncertainty
and inconsistency. We noted it is a rule
of law principle that the law be
consistently applied, with like cases being treated alike.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.13 We
sought feedback on whether the section 30 balancing test, as currently applied
by the courts, is leading to evidence being
admitted too often, to inconsistent
or unpredictable decisions or to overemphasis on certain factors. If so, we
asked whether this
was problematic.
Results of consultation
- 7.14 Eleven
submitters responded to this question. Of those, eight raised issues with how
the test is operating.480F[481]
They referred to unpredictable or inconsistent decisions (five
submitters),481F[482] improperly
obtained evidence being too readily admitted (four
submitters)482F[483] and factors
such as the seriousness of the offence or the nature and quality of the evidence
too easily outweighing improprieties
(three
submitters).483F[484] Five
submitters also expressed concern that the current approach incentivises
repeated improprieties.484F[485]
Three submitters did not consider the current approach to be problematic based
on the available
evidence.485F[486]
- 7.15 The
Auckland District Law Society (ADLS) and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers
Association New Zealand suggested that whether evidence
is excluded tends to
hinge on who the decision-maker is. They said the current approach is arbitrary,
provides no consequences for
breaches of rights and encourages further
illegality through frequent admission of improperly obtained evidence.
- 7.16 Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service commented that
section 30 is arguably too predictable in that improperly obtained
evidence is consistently admitted. It said the current approach “promotes
convictions
above all else and potentially incentivises deliberate or reckless
impropriety in obtaining evidence”. It considered the nature
and quality
of real evidence and its importance to the prosecution case are given more
weight than serious breaches of privacy in
unlawful searches. It saw the
seriousness of the offence as operating “almost to the exclusion of all
other factors”.
- 7.17 Ethan Huda
referred to a perception within the New Zealand legal system that, unless there
has been a particularly egregious
violation, evidence obtained in a breach of
right can still be admitted and used. He said police understand how far they can
push
an approach while still ensuring admissibility of evidence, which has
resulted in certain breaches becoming normalised. He submitted
the lack of
punishment for such breaches has also resulted in an incremental erosion of
rights over time.
- 7.18 The
Criminal Bar Association, Ethan Huda and the Public Defence Service all said
some defence counsel are reluctant to challenge
the admissibility of improperly
obtained evidence under section 30 due to a perception that the evidence is
likely to be admitted
under the balancing test. The Public Defence Service
pointed out that a decision to challenge admissibility is not without cost to
defendants. They can incur financial costs (including for legally aided
defendants with repayment orders), costs to liberty in terms
of extended periods
in custody while a pre-trial hearing is set down or potential loss of a guilty
plea credit on sentence if the
plea is entered after an unsuccessful
section 30 challenge.
- 7.19 The
Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere, said the unstructured nature
of the balancing exercise means it is “likely
that the law is being
applied inconsistently”. Commentator Don Mathias considered that
outcomes in section 30 cases are generally consistent but there is
inconsistency in the reasons for decisions. He submitted this is
problematic because it can make outcomes unpredictable, making it difficult for
lawyers to advise
clients. He suggested inconsistent reasoning may occur because
judges first decide the outcome based on general notions of what is
“just” and then look for reasons to support that conclusion. He said
there is no attempt to show that like cases are
treated alike.
- 7.20 Te
Kāhui Tātari Ture | Criminal Cases Review Commission, while not
commenting directly on the application of the balancing
test, said that
improperly obtained evidence is a known contributor to miscarriages of justice
and forms the basis of a number of
applications to the Commission.
- 7.21 On the
other hand, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police said that, while
it is difficult to say whether there
is inconsistency without more information,
the courts do exclude improperly obtained evidence (especially defendants’
statements)
where appropriate. Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society (NZLS) and Associate Professor Anna High both considered
that some
variability is to be expected given the nature of the test, but it has not been
shown this is resulting in unfair outcomes.
- 7.22 Several
submitters commented on the difficulty in relying on case studies in this area.
Luke Cunningham Clere and the NZLS both
urged caution when relying on appellate
case law because the prosecution is less likely to appeal than a defendant. On
the other
hand, the Public Defence Service said its perception is that more
evidence is admitted than our case study showed due to District
Court cases not
being included and the admissibility of evidence not always being challenged
(based on advice from counsel that challenges
are unlikely to
succeed).
The need for reform
- 7.23 We
conclude reform of the section 30 balancing test is desirable. This section
summarises our reasons for that overall conclusion.
We discuss specific issues
with the wording of the provisions and our recommendations for reform later in
this chapter.
- 7.24 We see two
issues with the way the section 30 balancing test is currently applied. First,
the reasoning in some judgments lends
support to the concern expressed by
several submitters that judges sometimes appear to give less weight to the
impropriety than was
anticipated when the balancing test was adopted in
Shaheed (and later codified in section 30). As we have said, the
Court in Shaheed envisaged the balancing test would give significant
weight to the impropriety and that the public interest in convicting those
guilty
of serious crimes would not usually outweigh an egregious breach of
rights.486F[487] The codification
of the Shaheed test and its extension to other improprieties in section
30 indicates a similar approach was intended to apply to all improper conduct
in
the obtaining of
evidence.487F[488]
- 7.25 In
practice, of course, the weight given to an impropriety will vary depending on
its seriousness. Some judgments we reviewed,
however, did not clearly
acknowledge the fact that an impropriety (and sometimes a significant one) had
occurred at all. In other
judgments, the impropriety was acknowledged but
appeared to be given relatively little consideration in the balancing exercise.
For
example:
(a) sometimes the impropriety was assessed as not very serious despite involving
a significant breach of an important right or interest,
because there was no
evidence of bad faith by police (which, as we discuss below, is almost always
the case); and
(b) the reasoning in some cases focused primarily on factors favouring admission
(such as the fact that the evidence was important
to the prosecution case or the
defendant was charged with a serious offence), giving the impression that these
factors will tend
to outweigh even significant improprieties.
- 7.26 Deficiencies
of this kind were evident primarily in decisions involving improperly obtained
real evidence. The courts typically
showed an appropriate level of caution when
deciding whether to admit improperly obtained defendants’ statements under
section
30 (where concerns about coercion or the reliability of a statement may
arise).
- 7.27 We stress
that deficiencies in reasoning of this kind were not found in a large number of
decisions. They were, however, common
enough to lend support to the concern
expressed by some submitters and some members of our Expert Advisory Group that
improprieties
are not always taken seriously by the courts or that some judges
err on the side of admitting evidence. We are conscious, too, that
submitters
told us defence counsel are now less likely to advise clients to challenge
improperly obtained evidence because of their
perception that challenges are
unlikely to succeed.488F[489]
- 7.28 We do not
wish to speculate about whether the outcomes in particular cases may have been
different if the seriousness of the
impropriety had been given greater weight.
Deficiencies in reasoning do not necessarily affect the outcome. For example,
even if
a particular judge clearly acknowledged the seriousness of an
impropriety, it would not necessarily follow that they would exclude
the
evidence.
- 7.29 It is
reasonable to conclude, however, that deficiencies in reasoning affect the
outcome at least some of the time. In any event,
the primary aim of section 30
is to maintain the integrity of the justice system. This is achieved not only by
excluding evidence
in appropriate cases but also by demonstrating respect for
the rule of law and human rights in judgments of the courts. The courts
must
consistently show they are taking improper conduct by state
agencies489F[490] seriously. We
consider the wording of section 30 could provide better guidance to the
courts on how to do so. As we discuss further
in the next section, submissions
showed significant and broad-based support for reform to require clear
justification to admit improperly
obtained evidence.
- 7.30 The second
issue is that the unstructured nature of the section 30 balancing test has led
to inconsistency in how the test is
applied. For example, as we discuss later in
this chapter, some of the section 30(3) factors are variously treated as
favouring admission
or exclusion of the evidence without good reason. This makes
it difficult to predict outcomes, which affects the ability of counsel
to advise
their clients on whether to challenge the admissibility of evidence. It may also
mean that similar cases are not being
treated alike.
- 7.31 There was a
perception among submitters that outcomes can depend on the inclinations of
particular judges — consistent
with the view expressed by Gault J in
Hamed.490F[491] Support for
this view is found in the number of split decisions on the application of the
balancing test in the appellate
courts.491F[492] Submitters were
concerned that the flexible nature of section 30 and the lack of guidance on its
application means it can be interpreted
to fit the desired outcome rather than
guiding principled decision-making. Similar views have also been expressed by
commentators.492F[493]
- 7.32 These
inconsistencies in section 30 decisions and perceptions about the application of
the balancing test are concerning. They
suggest that the section 30 test in its
current form does not support public confidence in the justice system. We
consider it is
desirable to provide a clearer structure to encourage a more
consistent application of the balancing test while retaining sufficient
flexibility to allow judges to address the particular facts before
them.
Overview of recommended amendments to section 30
- 7.33 In
this chapter, we make three recommendations to help address the two issues
identified above.
(a) First, we recommend specifying in section 30(2)(b) that the judge must
exclude improperly obtained evidence unless satisfied
it is in the public
interest to admit it. This recommendation will promote greater consistency in
relation to the weight judges attach
to improprieties and encourage the courts
to clearly explain why admission is in the public interest (where that is the
case).
(b) Second, we recommend identifying the competing public interests to be
weighed against each other under section 30(2)(b). This
recommendation is
intended to resolve confusion about the current wording of the provision and
provide a clearer framework to guide
judicial decision-making.
(c) Third, we recommend clarifying the application of the section 30(3) factors.
This recommendation would encourage a more structured
approach to the balancing
test, supporting more consistent judicial reasoning and more predicable outcomes
over time. It would also
help to ensure the factors are applied in a principled
way that informs a proper assessment of the public interests on both sides
of
the balancing equation.
- 7.34 These
recommendations are designed to work together. If, however, the first
recommendation is not progressed, the other recommendations
could still be
implemented. We explain how this would work in relation to the section 30(2)(b)
test when discussing the second recommendation.
- 7.35 Some
submitters appeared to have broader concerns about the fairness of a balancing
test where evidence has been improperly
obtained.493F[494] In the context
of this review, which is concerned with the operation of the Act, we have not
undertaken a first-principles consideration
of New Zealand’s approach to
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence. Instead, our recommendations aim to
address the problems
identified above (so far as possible) in a manner
consistent with the underlying policy of
section 30.494F[495]
- 7.36 Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald expressed the view that empirical research is
needed to justify reform. As noted above,
we conducted a snapshot case study of
section 30 decisions in te Kōti Matua | High Court, Court of Appeal
and Supreme Court
over a three-year period. Further review of cases, including
at the District Court level, might have added to the information obtained
in our
study. However, it would have been difficult to undertake both because of the
statutory timeframe for completion of this review
and because of the limited
online availability of District Court decisions. Further, as we have noted and
submitters emphasised,
there would have been significant limits to the utility
of any such study. For example, it would not have shown the extent to which
defendants are being deterred from challenging evidence due to the perception
that such challenges are unlikely to succeed. We are
not convinced a more
extended empirical study would have added much to what we already know.
- 7.37 We consider
there is sufficient evidence of a problem in practice to recommend reform based
on our review of case law, the submissions
we received, commentary on
section 30 and our own analysis of deficiencies in the statutory wording.
THE WORDING OF THE BALANCING TEST IN SECTION 30(2)(b)
Specifying what the judge must be satisfied of
Issue
- 7.38 Currently,
once the court has found that evidence was improperly obtained, it must apply
the balancing test to determine whether
or not the exclusion of the evidence is
proportionate to the
impropriety.495F[496] Section 30
does not identify a starting point for that determination — for example,
by providing that the evidence should be
excluded unless certain considerations
outweigh others. It does not direct a court what to do if the factors for and
against exclusion
are evenly balanced.
- 7.39 This
contrasts with other provisions in the Act that similarly require the court to
consider competing interests. For example,
admissibility provisions typically
provide that certain evidence is inadmissible unless certain criteria are
met,496F[497] require the court to
exclude certain evidence “unless” satisfied of certain
matters497F[498] or determine
admissibility based on whether certain considerations are
“outweighed” by
others.498F[499]
- 7.40 As noted
above, the current approach in section 30 may be considered inconsistent with
the view expressed in Shaheed that, as a starting point, a breach of a
constitutional right should be given significant
weight.499F[500] While the
reasoning in Shaheed was confined to breaches of the NZ Bill of Rights,
the statutory extension of the test to other types of improprieties in section
30 suggests Parliament considered the same approach was warranted wherever
evidence has been obtained unlawfully or unfairly.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.41 In
our Issues Paper, we suggested it is arguable that, once a court has found
evidence was obtained through improper means, the
prosecution should have to
show it is nonetheless appropriate to admit the
evidence.500F[501] Otherwise, the
courts may be seen as allowing improper conduct in the gathering of evidence
without good reason. This may have a
detrimental effect on public confidence in
the justice system and increase the likelihood of future improprieties.
- 7.42 We asked
submitters whether section 30(2)(b) should be amended to place an onus on the
prosecution to satisfy the judge that
the public interest favours admission of
the evidence, similar to the approach in many Australian
jurisdictions.501F[502] For
example, it could require exclusion of improperly obtained evidence unless the
public interest in its admission outweighs the
public interest in its
exclusion.502F[503]
- 7.43 We noted
the adoption of this approach in Australia did not appear to have tipped the
balance too far in favour of exclusion
— if anything, it raised the
question whether our option for reform would have a significant
impact.503F[504] We suggested,
however, that it may result in a modest rebalancing of the current approach by
emphasising the need for clear justification
to admit improperly obtained
evidence.
- 7.44 We
indicated we did not consider this option for reform would result in a return to
the rigidity of the prima facie exclusionary
rule that existed before Shaheed
(or to the problem of judges compensating for that rigidity by introducing
variability into the meaning of “unreasonable”
search and
seizure).504F[505]
This is because the courts are now used to a much more flexible approach and
to accommodating a broad range of factors in deciding
whether to admit
improperly obtained evidence.
Results of consultation
- 7.45 Fifteen
submitters commented on this option for reform. Ten supported
amendment505F[506] while five
disagreed there was a need for
reform.506F[507] One additional
submitter did not specifically comment on reform options but expressed concern
about the number of breaches of rights
being tolerated and suggested Shaheed
did not envisage the changes that had actually
occurred.507F[508]
- 7.46 The Public
Defence Service suggested this amendment would help to create a mindset shift.
It considered it was “appropriate
that the prosecution (who are seeking to
admit improperly obtained evidence) should carry the onus of convincing the
judge why that
should be allowed”.
- 7.47 Luke
Cunningham Clere observed it is reasonable to assume a return to presumptive
inadmissibility would reintroduce some structure
to the exercise. It suggested
the strength of the presumption should depend on the seriousness of the
impropriety as it would be
counter to the interests of justice for technical,
inadvertent or minor improprieties to result in exclusion. It was also unsure
how much of a practical impact such a reform would have. It therefore considered
clarifying the section 30(3) factors (which we discuss
below) would be the most
important reform.
- 7.48 Alexandra
Allen-Franks considered this option to be consistent with the Court’s aims
in Shaheed — it would give considerable weight to the breach of a
right while recognising there may be reasons why the evidence should be admitted
in a particular case. It would also be consistent with the principle of
maintaining the integrity of the justice system since it
would require the
courts to explore the issue of unlawful or illegal conduct. She agreed with the
preliminary view in our Issues
Paper that this approach would not return to the
prima facie exclusionary rule. She suggested the Australian experience
demonstrates this approach leads (in general) to careful consideration of
whether evidence
needs to be admitted in the context of a finding of impropriety
or illegality. She did, however, consider the argument for reform
to be stronger
in relation to breaches of the NZ Bill of Rights and other enactments (compared
to where evidence is obtained
“unfairly”).508F[509]
- 7.49 Don Mathias
also considered the Australian approach to be sensible. He noted the Australian
experience does not suggest this
change would result in too much evidence being
excluded. To the contrary, he said the amendment may not ultimately lead to a
change
in results.
- 7.50 Tim
Cochrane submitted our option for reform would provide marginally better
protection against unjustified interference with
rights to privacy and other
implicated rights. He suggested it would not be overly onerous on the
prosecution as they should reasonably
be expected to be alive to public interest
considerations in any event.
- 7.51 Four of the
submitters that supported reform suggested more significant amendments than our
option proposed. The ADLS and Defence
Lawyers Association supported a more
wholesale recalibration of section 30 to return to the prima facie
exclusionary rule and more
squarely reflect all three of the rationales for the
exclusion of evidence. They were concerned that “a more diluted approach
would fail to recognise police’s adoption of increasingly radical
investigative methods that are designed to defeat or circumvent
the protections
offered by [the NZ Bill of Rights] and the [Chief Justice’s Practice Note
on Police Questioning]”. The
Public Defence Service noted some of its
lawyers suggested the amendment could require the public interest in admission
to clearly outweigh the public interest in exclusion. Stephen Hudson
submitted unfairly obtained evidence should be automatically excluded to
disincentivise unlawful action by police.
- 7.52 The
submitters that opposed amendment were not convinced of the need for reform. Te
Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office
considered amendment would be purely
symbolic because in practice the prosecution already advances grounds for
admission of the evidence
and the judge must be satisfied that they favour
admission. The NZLS saw weight in the argument that, if the Crown has obtained
evidence
in breach of the law or the defendant’s rights, it should have to
justify the admission of that evidence. However, it said
this arguably already
happens. It considered our option for reform would only affect those cases where
the factors are evenly matched,
which does not occur often enough to warrant
amendment. Associate Professor High was also unsure the amendment would make any
difference
in practice and was concerned it would cause confusion in relation to
existing case law.
- 7.53 Police was
concerned our proposed amendment would risk giving less weight to the public
interest in the investigation and prosecution
of crime.
The need for reform
- 7.54 We
conclude reform is desirable to signal that the courts should give significant
weight to the impropriety as a starting point
(although the precise weight given
to a particular impropriety will, of course, depend on its seriousness, as we
discuss below).
We see this as consistent with the original intent of the
balancing test as set out in Shaheed. The Court of Appeal anticipated
both that the breach of a right would be given significant weight and that,
where it is outweighed
by the accumulation of other factors, “the
conscientious carrying out of the balancing exercise will at least demonstrate
that
the right has been taken
seriously”.509F[510]
- 7.55 As
discussed above, we heard significant concerns from submitters that
section 30 decisions are not consistently giving effect
to this original
intent. Our snapshot case study suggested these concerns have merit. The
reasoning in some judgments we examined
did not appear to give significant
weight to the impropriety or to demonstrate due regard for both sides of the
balancing equation.
Although this was not a large number of decisions, it was
enough to bear out the concerns of submitters and commentators that section
30
is not being applied in a consistent and principled
way.510F[511] We are also
conscious of the point made by several submitters that defence counsel’s
perceptions about the utility of section
30 may mean challenges are no longer
being taken.
- 7.56 There is a
strong public interest in ensuring that human rights and the rule of law are
upheld. Public confidence in the justice
system requires that the courts are not
seen as routinely condoning improprieties in the gathering of evidence or
failing to deter
similar improprieties in future. On the other hand, public
confidence in the justice system may also be damaged if relevant and probative
evidence is withheld from the fact-finder without good reason, defendants are
perceived as avoiding conviction based on technicalities
or defence counsel are
encouraged to challenge every possible impropriety. In some cases, it will be
appropriate to admit improperly
obtained evidence — particularly where the
impropriety is minor, the offence serious and the evidence highly probative.
Where
that is the case, we think it is important that the courts clearly explain
why admission is in the overall public interest notwithstanding
the impropriety
that has occurred.
- 7.57 The wording
of section 30(2)(b) does not signal the need for clear justification to admit
improperly obtained evidence. It only
requires the court to “determine
whether or not the exclusion of the evidence is proportionate to the
impropriety”. By contrast, other admissibility provisions in the Act
require exclusion unless the court is satisfied a statutory test is
met.511F[512] While section
30(2)(b) states that the balancing test must give “appropriate weight to
the impropriety”, it does not
indicate what “appropriate
weight” means, nor does case law provide any clear guidance on this
issue.
- 7.58 There was
considerable support for reform from submitters. While submitters primarily
focused on the options for reform, some
referred to the desirability of a
mindset shift512F[513] and of
providing better protection against breaches of
rights.513F[514]
- 7.59 The
Judicial Advisory Committee did not support reform, although it conveyed a
minority view among some judges that reform is
desirable. The Committee noted
the absence of any clear evidence that the current test is resulting in unfair
outcomes. Some submitters
made similar comments. On the other hand, some members
of our Expert Advisory Group considered evidence of unfair outcomes is not
relevant and is unlikely to be found since section 30 is not aimed at ensuring
fair outcomes.
- 7.60 We agree
with the latter view. Section 30 is not primarily concerned with achieving fair
outcomes for individuals in the sense
of ensuring the evidence presented to the
fact-finder can support a safe conviction. That is addressed by other provisions
such as
section 28 (unreliable statements). Section 30 is concerned with the
wider public interest in maintaining an effective and credible
system of
justice. Depending on the strength of the competing public interests at play
(which we discuss in the next section), evidence
must sometimes be excluded to
demonstrate respect for the rule of law and the requirements of
procedural fairness in obtaining evidence. Procedural fairness includes,
for example, compliance with the rights of persons arrested or
detained514F[515] and the Chief
Justice’s Practice Note on Police
Questioning.515F[516] Conduct by
investigators that is unlawful or procedurally unfair will not necessarily
result in outcomes that are unfair or convictions that are
unsafe.516F[517] Accordingly, we
do not consider evidence of unfair outcomes is needed to justify reform.
Instead, we have focused on whether the
reasoning in section 30 judgments shows
the test is being applied as it was intended.
Recommendation
- R8 Amend
section 30(2)(b) to require the judge to exclude improperly obtained evidence
unless satisfied it is in the public interest
to admit the evidence.
- 7.61 This
recommendation should be read and implemented alongside recommendation 9 below,
which also relates to the wording of the
section 30(2)(b) balancing test. Our
discussion here relates to the general desirability of requiring exclusion of
improperly obtained
evidence unless the judge is satisfied of the case for
admission. In the next section, we show how this could be incorporated into
a
revised section 30(2)(b) along with other amendments to identify the two
competing public interests that must be weighed when applying
the test.
- 7.62 In our
Issues Paper, we described our option for reform as placing an “onus on
the prosecution”, consistent with
how the approach has been described in
Australia.517F[518] On reflection,
we prefer not to use that wording when describing our recommendation. Neither
the Australian legislation nor the amendment
discussed in our Issues Paper
explicitly require the prosecution to meet a particular standard of proof.
Rather, their key feature
is that the evidence must be excluded unless the
public interest in exclusion is outweighed by the public interest in
admission. In practice, the prosecution would need to present evidence and
submissions to enable the court
to make such a finding. Ultimately, however, the
question whether to admit the evidence would remain an evaluative one for the
judge
after weighing the relevant factors, consistent with most other
admissibility provisions in the
Act.518F[519]
- 7.63 There was
strong support for this option for reform among submitters. Those who supported
it generally considered it would encourage
a more structured analysis of the
seriousness of the impropriety and the reasons why admission of the evidence
might nonetheless
be justified. We agree. Our recommended reform would perform
an important signalling function by demonstrating Parliament’s
intent that
the courts should give significant weight to the impropriety. It would also more
clearly prompt the courts to explain
why admission is nonetheless appropriate in
the circumstances where that is the case. This would support public confidence
in the
justice system by helping to ensure the courts are seen as taking
breaches of rights and laws seriously. We agree with the Australian
Law Reform
Commission that:519F[520]
- [T]he policy
considerations supporting non-admission of the evidence suggest that, once
misconduct is established, the burden should
rest on the prosecution to persuade
the court that the evidence should be admitted. After all, the evidence has been
procured in
breach of the law or some established standard of conduct. Those who
infringe the law should be required to justify their actions
and thus bear the
onus of persuading the judge not to exclude the evidence so
obtained.
- 7.64 The
minority of submitters that did not support this amendment did so principally on
the basis that it may not achieve anything
in practice. A similar concern was
expressed by some members of our Expert Advisory Group. The Crown Law Office and
NZLS both said
that, in practice, the prosecution already needs to establish a
case for admitting the evidence. The NZLS added that our proposed
amendment
would only make any difference in cases where the factors are evenly matched,
which is rare.
- 7.65 We accept
there is a risk the amendment we propose will not have a significant practical
impact. This will depend on how judges
interpret and apply the amended
provision, which is difficult to predict. The test would still depend on how the
competing public
interests are weighted so the courts would continue to have
considerable flexibility in how they apply it in a particular case. We
think it
is likely, however, that the amendment would have an appreciable (though not
radical) influence on the general tenor of
section 30 judgments over time.
If Parliament chooses to enact the amendment, that change would provide a
powerful reinforcement
of the intended effect of the section. We would expect
this to be taken into account by the courts when interpreting (and making
clear
their interpretation of) the amended provision.
- 7.66 We do not
expect our proposed amendment will change the outcome in the majority of
cases.520F[521] As we have said,
the majority of the judgments we reviewed did appear to give appropriate weight
to the impropriety. Our recommendation
is intended to ensure this approach is
taken consistently and is reflected in judicial reasoning. In some cases, this
may lead to
a different result. In other cases, it will not.
- 7.67 We do not
consider the impact of the amendment would be limited to cases where the factors
are evenly matched (as the NZLS submitted).
As we have said, currently some
judgments do not sufficiently assess the factors relevant to the seriousness of
the impropriety or
appear to give them inadequate weight. Our proposed amendment
would help to ensure both sides of the balancing equation are properly
assessed
and explained.
- 7.68 Police was
the only submitter to suggest that our proposed amendment could shift the
balancing test too far towards exclusion,
giving less weight to the public
interest in the investigation and prosecution of crime. It was notable that the
Crown Law Office
and Luke Cunningham Clere did not appear to share this view,
instead suggesting the amendment may be of limited practical effect.
Overall,
there was little concern from submitters that our proposed amendment would
result in too much evidence being excluded or
lead to a return to the
pre-Shaheed prima facie exclusionary rule. As we discussed in our Issues
Paper, we see little risk of this given the courts are now used to a
flexible
balancing test and would continue to consider a wide range of factors when
deciding whether to admit improperly obtained
evidence.521F[522]
- 7.69 The
Judicial Advisory Committee was concerned our proposed amendment could
significantly increase the number of defence applications
to exclude improperly
obtained evidence, with resourcing implications for the courts. In the short
term, we agree there may be an
increase in defence applications although we do
not necessarily accept this is a bad thing. Any legislative amendment will take
time
to bed in while new case law develops. Over time, however, it should become
clearer when the courts are likely to admit or exclude
evidence under the new
test. This will inevitably influence both prosecution decisions whether to offer
improperly obtained evidence
and defence decisions whether to seek its
exclusion.
- 7.70 A related
point was raised by Associate Professor High, who submitted that amendment could
cause confusion in relation to existing
case law. The impact on existing case
law is always a consideration when amending legislation. In relation to section
30, however,
the existing case law provides relatively little guidance on the
application of the balancing test. It is also inconsistent in many
respects (as
we discuss further below). We consider our proposed amendments, taken together,
will assist decision-making and increase
certainty over time by providing more
structure around the application of the balancing test. This should also help
defence counsel
to advise clients more accurately on whether an application to
exclude improperly obtained evidence is likely to succeed.
- 7.71 In terms of
the Act’s purpose of securing the just determination of proceedings, we
consider our proposed reform is consistent
with section 6(a), which refers to
“providing for facts to be established by the application of logical
rules”.522F[523] It would
make it clear that the courts should err on the side of exclusion if there is
any uncertainty about the result. We also
see our recommendation as consistent
with section 6(b), which refers to “providing rules of evidence that
recognise the importance
of the rights affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990” (although section 30 does, of course, apply to a wider
range
of improprieties).523F[524]
Clarifying the public interests to be weighed
Issue
- 7.72 Section
30(2)(b) sets out the test for determining whether to exclude improperly
obtained evidence. It requires the court to
undertake “a balancing process
that gives appropriate weight to the impropriety and takes proper account of the
need for an
effective and credible system of justice”.
- 7.73 As we
explained in our Issues Paper, this provision (as well as the absence of clear
case law on its application) has attracted
criticism from
commentators.524F[525] Although it
refers to a “balancing process”, it does not specify what
considerations are being balanced against each
other or how the courts should
decide what an effective and credible system of justice requires.
- 7.74 The Supreme
Court made it clear in Hamed that an “effective and credible system
of justice” does not represent one side of the balancing equation —
it can
favour admission or exclusion depending on the
circumstances.525F[526] As
Blanchard J
explained:526F[527]
- An effective
and credible system of justice requires not only that offenders be brought to
justice but also that impropriety on the
part of the police should not readily
be condoned by allowing evidence thereby obtained to be admitted as proof of the
offending.
- 7.75 A minor
amendment in 2017 sought to clarify that the need for an effective and credible
system of justice is not a counterpoint
to the
impropriety.527F[528] However,
because the provision refers to a “balancing process” that takes
account of both “the impropriety”
and “the need for an
effective and credible system of justice”, it may still imply that these
are the two considerations
being balanced against each other.
- 7.76 Further,
the 2017 amendment suggests the need for an effective and credible system of
justice is the underlying aim of the section
rather than one side of the
balancing equation. That being the case, it is arguable section 30 should more
clearly identify what
is being “balanced” against what and how (if
at all) the need for an effective and credible system of justice is relevant.
As
noted above, preliminary feedback and the submissions we received suggested
decisions under section 30 are unpredictable and inconsistent.
While it is
difficult to say with certainty, the lack of guidance about the nature of the
balancing test in section 30(2)(b) may
be contributing to this.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.77 We
sought feedback on whether section 30(2)(b) should be amended to clarify what is
being “balanced” against what.
If so, we suggested one option for
reform would be to amend section 30(2)(b) to require the court to:
- ... determine
whether exclusion is proportionate to the impropriety by balancing the public
interest in recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety against the public
interest in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial.
- 7.78 We said an
alternative approach would be simply to refer to “the public interest in
exclusion of the evidence” and
“the public interest in the admission
of the evidence” (similar to the Australian approach). This would retain
greater
flexibility to take into account any public interests the court
considers relevant but would also provide less guidance on the nature
of the key
public interests at stake.
- 7.79 Finally, we
asked whether the reference to “an effective and credible system of
justice” should be removed from section
30(2)(b) based on preliminary
feedback that its inclusion is unhelpful when setting out the balancing test. We
suggested a separate
subsection could be inserted stating that the purpose of
the section 30 is to maintain an effective and credible system of justice
if
this was considered necessary.
Results of consultation
- 7.80 Twelve
submitters responded to these questions. Eight submitters supported clarifying
the balancing test,528F[529] two
opposed reform529F[530] and two
proposed more significant reform to protect defendants’
rights.530F[531] Of the submitters
that supported clarification, four explicitly agreed with our proposed
wording,531F[532] one preferred
the alternative approach of referring to the public interest in exclusion and
the public interest in
admission532F[533] and three did
not express a clear view.533F[534]
- 7.81 Submitters
in favour of clarification said our option for reform would better encapsulate
the ultimate focus of the
test,534F[535] make the test
clearer and more workable535F[536]
and usefully emphasise that the interests being balanced are both public
interests.536F[537]
- 7.82 Associate
Professor High, while supporting clarification of the test, preferred the
alternative approach of referring to “the
public interest in exclusion of
the evidence” and “the public interest in the admission of the
evidence” (similar
to the Australian formulation). She said this language
is simpler, which would minimise the risk of unintended consequences. Alexandra
Allen-Franks submitted the Australian formulation is broad because it applies to
both criminal and civil
proceedings.537F[538] She noted
this concern does not arise if section 30 remains limited to criminal
proceedings (although she also suggested our proposed
wording could apply to
civil proceedings).
- 7.83 Police
opposed amendment on the basis that it risks creating more uncertainty than it
would solve. The ADLS and Defence Lawyers
Association considered our proposed
amendment would not adequately protect defendants’ rights. They said there
should be a
clear statement of principle that an effective and credible system
of justice favours exclusion unless the prosecution satisfies
the court that
admission will not condone improprieties in gathering evidence and fail to give
substantive effect to human rights
and the rule of law.
- 7.84 Seven
submitters commented on whether the reference to an effective and credible
system of justice should be removed or placed
in a separate subsection. None
specifically supported removing the reference from the section entirely although
one noted its inclusion
is not strictly
necessary.538F[539] Three
submitters supported the inclusion of a new subsection in section 30 stating
that the purpose of the section is to maintain
an effective and credible system
of justice.539F[540] Two
submitters said the reference to an effective and credible system of justice
should remain in section
30(2).540F[541] Two submitters
suggested alternative
approaches.541F[542]
- 7.85 The
submitters that favoured a new subsection agreed maintaining an effective and
credible system of justice is properly understood
as the underlying policy of
the balancing test.542F[543] They
considered placing it in a separate subsection would ensure it is not confused
with a balancing factor. Don Mathias observed
it is not strictly necessary to
refer to this principle in the legislation since it reflects what the courts do
anyway. However,
he considered the inclusion of the term “did no
harm” provided it is not subjected to minute legal analysis.
- 7.86 Police and
the Criminal Bar Association preferred to retain the current reference to an
effective and credible system of justice
in section 30(2)(b). Police noted there
is now clear guidance on the meaning of the phrase and amendment could create
uncertainty.
- 7.87 Alexandra
Allen-Franks and the NZLS did not express a view on whether the phrase should be
retained in section 30(2)(b) but suggested
different ways of incorporating it in
the Act if it is removed from that paragraph. Alexandra Allen-Franks suggested
that, if a separate
provision is considered necessary, it should be added to
section 6 (the purpose provision) to the extent it is not already captured.
The
NZLS said it should be added to section 30(3) as a factor in the balancing test.
The NZLS was concerned moving the phrase to
a separate subsection could mean it
is given more weight than the other section 30(3) factors and cause unfairness
in the application
of the balancing test.
The need for reform
- 7.88 We
conclude reform is desirable to clarify the application of the balancing test.
Most submitters that addressed this issue thought
section 30(2)(b) is unclear
and would benefit from reform. The Judicial Advisory Committee also thought the
test could be stated
in plainer language. We agree.
- 7.89 The current
test set out in section 30(2)(b) is
ambiguous.543F[544] It requires
the courts to conduct a “balancing process” but does not state what
considerations should be balanced against
each other. It may erroneously imply
that “the need for an effective and credible system of justice” is a
counterpoint
to the impropriety, favouring admission of the evidence. Although
the Supreme Court has made it clear this is not
correct,544F[545] recent case law
suggests it is a misapprehension that persists. As recently as 2020, the Court
of Appeal explained section 30(2)(b)
as involving “a balancing process
that weighs the impropriety against the need for an effective and
credible system of
justice”.545F[546] Other
cases appear to treat the need for an effective and credible system as
equivalent to the public interest in
conviction.546F[547]
- 7.90 Given this
confusion about the test as it is currently framed, amendment to clarify the
position is consistent with the Act’s
purpose of securing the just
determination of proceedings by (among other things) providing for facts to be
established by the application
of logical rules and enhancing access to the law
of evidence.547F[548]
- 7.91 It seems
likely the lack of clarity about the interests being balanced under section
30(2)(b) and the place of “the need
for an effective and credible system
of justice” in the balancing exercise are contributing to the concerns we
identified above
in discussing the operation of the section 30 balancing test.
Those concerns are that some judgments appear to give insufficient
weight to the
impropriety and that the application of the test is unpredictable and
inconsistent. It is difficult to expect the courts
to conduct a careful weighing
of the competing public interests at stake or to do so in a consistent way when
the provision does
not specify what those interests are.
Recommendation
- R9 If
recommendation 8 is accepted:
- amend
section 30(2)(b) to require the judge to exclude improperly obtained evidence
unless satisfied that the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the
impropriety is outweighed by the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial;
and
- repeal
section 30(4).
OR
If recommendation 8 is not accepted, amend section 30(2)(b) to require the
judge to determine whether exclusion is proportionate to
the impropriety by
balancing the public interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety
against the public interest in
having the evidence considered by the fact-finder
at trial.
- 7.92 Our
preferred approach is to implement this recommendation together with
recommendation 8 above. If, however, recommendation
8 is not progressed, this
recommendation still stands and could be implemented on its own. We have shown
in the recommendation text
how section 30(2)(b) would be framed in each
scenario. In both cases, the provision would identify the two public interests
to be
weighed against each other.
- 7.93 If
recommendation 8 is accepted, the first public interest would need to be
outweighed by the second public interest for the
evidence to be admitted.
Because the amendment would specify when improperly obtained evidence must be
excluded, section 30(4) would
no longer be required and should be repealed. That
provision currently requires judges to exclude any improperly obtained evidence
if, in accordance with subsection (2), they conclude that its exclusion is
proportionate to the impropriety.
- 7.94 If
recommendation 9 is implemented as a stand-alone reform to section 30(2)(b), the
court would balance the two public interests
to determine whether exclusion is
proportionate to the impropriety (similar to the current test in
section 30(2)(b)). If this approach
is taken, section 30(4) should be
retained.
Identifying the relevant public interests
- 7.95 We
recommend amending section 30(2)(b) to specify that the test involves weighing
two public interests: the public interest in
recognising the seriousness of the
impropriety and the public interest in having the evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial.
As we explained in our Issues Paper, these two public
interests reflect the competing concerns
that:548F[549]
(a) on the one hand, admitting improperly obtained evidence may compromise the
integrity of the justice system by condoning the use
of improper methods to
obtain evidence, failing to give substantive effect to human rights and the rule
of law or failing to deter
future use of improper methods to obtain evidence;
and
(b) on the other hand, excluding improperly obtained evidence may allow those
who commit crimes to escape conviction, diminishing
respect for the
administration of justice and putting public safety at risk.
- 7.96 This
recommendation is not intended to significantly change the law, but rather to
reflect appellate authority on the meaning
of an effective and credible system
of justice and ensure it is consistently
applied.549F[550] The amended
language would spell out more clearly what this principle requires in the
context of the section 30 balancing test. Most
submitters that addressed the
appropriate wording of section 30(2)(b) supported our proposed amendment,
suggesting it would be clearer
and better reflect the balancing process required
of the courts.
- 7.97 Only one
submitter supported the alternative approach we identified of referring to
“the public interest in exclusion of
the evidence” and “the
public interest in the admission of the
evidence”.550F[551] While a
similar approach is taken in Australian legislation, as Alexandra Allen-Franks
pointed out, that may be because the Australian
provisions apply to civil cases
as well (where slightly different public interest considerations may apply). We
consider that specifying
the nature of the public interests involved would be of
greater assistance to the courts when applying the test, particularly since
the
factors listed in section 30(3) are non-exhaustive.
- 7.98 Luke
Cunningham Clere’s submission included a proposed amendment to section
30(2)(b) similar to our recommendation, except
it simply referred to “the
seriousness of the impropriety” instead of “the public interest in
recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety”. This is similar to how
the Court of Appeal in Williams explained this side of the balancing
test.551F[552] On the other hand,
Don Mathias considered it desirable to emphasise that the interests involved are
both public interests. We agree
with that view. It is important to emphasise
that the balancing test does not involve weighing the defendant’s
interests (in
excluding the evidence) against the public’s interest (in
admitting the evidence). As the Court of Appeal recognised in Shaheed,
society’s long-term interests may sometimes be better served by excluding
improperly obtained
evidence.552F[553] A justice
system that condones impropriety in the gathering of evidence may not command
the respect of the community, and guilty
verdicts reached on the basis of such
evidence may lack moral authority.
- 7.99 The test we
propose in section 30(2)(b) would require an assessment of the relative
strength of the two public interests. So, for example, if the public
interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety is
assessed as being
on the lower end of the spectrum, it would be outweighed more easily by the
public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder. The
inverse would also apply.
Removing the reference to the need for an effective and
credible system of justice
- 7.100 We
suggest removing the reference to an effective and credible system of justice
from section 30(2)(b) to avoid confusion about
its relevance. As we said in our
Issues Paper, we consider the need for an effective and credible system of
justice reflects the
underlying rationale for the section 30 test. It is not a
criterion that can be “balanced” against the impropriety.
- 7.101 There was
some support from submitters for inserting a separate subsection in
section 30 stating that the purpose of the section
is to maintain an
effective and credible system of justice. Having given more thought to this
option, we are not convinced it is
appropriate. In particular, the Legislation
Design and Advisory Committee’s Legislation Guidelines state policy
purpose provisions should be “unambiguous” and “not add
uncertainty or otherwise have unintended legal
effects on the interpretation of
the legislation”.553F[554]
As we have discussed, one of our reasons for recommending reform is that the
reference to the need for an effective and credible
system of justice is
ambiguous and its intended effect is unclear on the face of the section. We
are concerned that its inclusion as a purpose provision
might be equally
unclear.
- 7.102 If section
30(2)(b) is amended as proposed, we consider the need for an effective and
credible system of justice will be reflected
in the outcome. It is unnecessary
to explicitly refer to it in section 30. By way of comparison, most provisions
in the Act do not
specify their purpose — although where that purpose is
clear (for example, from the legislative history), it may still be considered
by
the courts where interpretative issues arise.
- 7.103 The NZLS
supported including the need for an effective and credible system of justice as
a factor in section 30(3). In our view
this would be inappropriate, for the
reasons discussed above. This principle is not a factor to be
“balanced” but rather
the underlying rationale for the balancing
test.
- 7.104 We also
considered Alexandra Allen-Franks’ suggestion that the “need for an
effective and credible system of justice”
could be included in section 6
(the Act’s purpose provision) to the extent it is not already covered. To
some extent, similar
considerations are already reflected in section 6. For
example, it states the Act’s overriding purpose is the “just
determination
of proceedings” that can be achieved by, among other things,
“providing rules of evidence that recognise the importance
of the rights
affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990”. While we see the
need for an effective and credible system
of justice as an important principle,
we do not recommend its insertion as a general principle in section 6. As
discussed above,
even in the context of section 30, we are concerned such a
principle may have uncertain application. It is not clear how it might
(or
should) influence the interpretation of other provisions in the Act. We
therefore consider it undesirable to recommend such a
change, particularly
without having consulted on it.
APPLICATION OF THE SECTION 30(3) FACTORS IN THE BALANCING
TEST
Background
- 7.105 In
this section, we discuss issues relating to section 30(3), which sets out
factors to which a judge may have regard when applying
the section 30(2)(b)
balancing test. The list is non-exhaustive — other matters may also be
considered. The factors listed
are:
- (a) the
importance of any right breached by the impropriety and the seriousness of the
intrusion on it:
- (b) the nature
of the impropriety, in particular, whether it was deliberate, reckless, or done
in bad faith:
- (c) the nature
and quality of the improperly obtained evidence:
- (d) the
seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged:
- (e) whether
there were any other investigatory techniques not involving any breach of the
rights that were known to be available
but were not used:
- (f) whether
there are alternative remedies to exclusion of the evidence that can adequately
provide redress to the defendant:
- (g) whether the
impropriety was necessary to avoid apprehended physical danger to the Police or
others:
- (h) whether
there was any urgency in obtaining the improperly obtained
evidence.
Overview of recommended amendments to section
30(3)
- 7.106 First,
we discuss the overall structure of section 30(3). We recommend reform to
specify to which public interest each factor
relates. This aligns with our
recommendation above to clarify the public interests to be weighed against each
other in the section
30(2)(b) balancing test. It would need to be implemented in
combination with that recommendation.
- 7.107 We then
discuss each of the factors listed in section 30(3) individually. We recommend
several amendments to clarify their application.
Some of our proposed amendments
to the factors aim to improve their clarity and accessibility. This is
consistent with section 6(f),
which refers to enhancing access to the law
of evidence.554F[555] We recommend
they be implemented as part of our proposed reform of section 30(3). Our
recommendations to amend the wording of section
30(3)(b) (the nature of the
impropriety) and repeal section 30(3)(e) (other investigatory techniques)
address significant issues
with the current case law. We consider they could
usefully be implemented alone, even if other amendments to section 30(3) are not
pursued.
For ease of reference, all our proposed amendments relating to section 30(3) are
set out together in the recommendation below. We
explain our reasons for each
part of the recommendation in the remainder of this section.
- R10 Amend
section 30(3) to provide the following:
For the purposes of
subsection (2), when assessing the public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the impropriety, the court
may have regard to:
- the
importance of any right breached or interest infringed by the impropriety and
the seriousness of the intrusion on it;
- the
extent to which it was known, or ought to have been known, that the evidence was
being improperly obtained;
- whether
the impropriety was necessary to avoid apprehended physical danger to the Police
or others;
- the
extent to which the impropriety resulted from urgency in obtaining the evidence;
and
- any
other relevant matters.
For the purposes of subsection (2), when
assessing the public interest in having the evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial,
the court may have regard to:
- the
nature and quality of the improperly obtained evidence;
- the
seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is charged; and
- any
other relevant matters.
Clarifying how each factor affects the balancing
test
Issue
- 7.109 In
our Issues Paper, we explained that each factor is worded in an open way that
does not indicate whether it favours admission
or exclusion or whether the
absence of a factor is
relevant.555F[556] We discussed
how each factor had been applied by the
courts556F[557] and noted apparent
confusion over the relevance of certain factors and inconsistency in how they
are applied.557F[558] We discuss
this further in relation to individual factors below.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.110 We
invited submissions on whether section 30(3) should be amended to clarify how
each factor may affect the balancing exercise.
We sought feedback on the
following options for reform:
(a) If our proposed amendment to section 30(2)(b) is adopted, we suggested
section 30(3) could be amended to list which factors relate
to the public
interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety and which relate to
the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at
trial.
(b) If section 30(2)(b) is not amended, we raised the possibility of amending
section 30(3) to specify which factors may favour admission
of the evidence and
which factors may favour exclusion. We suggested, however, that this option
would be harder to achieve since
the extent to which (if at all) a particular
factor supports or reduces the case for admission or exclusion on the particular
facts
is an evaluative one.
Results of consultation
- 7.111 Nine
submitters responded to this question. Five supported amending section 30(3) to
clarify the relevance of each
factor558F[559] while four opposed
amendment.559F[560] The majority
of those in favour of reform did not express a clear view on the form of the
amendment, with one submitter noting this
would depend on the Commission’s
recommendations in relation to section
30(2)(b).560F[561] Two submitters
expressly supported specifying to which public interest each factor relates
(option (a) above).561F[562]
- 7.112 Luke
Cunningham Clere submitted that revising the section 30(3) factors is the most
important of the reforms proposed. It considered
the unstructured nature of the
section 30 balancing exercise means it is likely the law is being applied
inconsistently. While it
broadly supported our proposed amendments to section
30(2)(b), it had reservations about how much this would assist in structuring
what is effectively a broad value judgment. It submitted that separating the
factors into those relating to the seriousness of the
impropriety and those
relating to the public interest in having the evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial would:
(a) encourage judges to adopt a more disciplined reasoning process, which it saw
as preferable to having judges put all factors “in
the mix” to reach
a broad evaluative judgement; and
(b) reflect the underlying policy tension being balanced in section 30, namely
the desire to have all probative evidence before the
fact-finder and the desire
to enforce adherence to the rule of law by public sector bodies.
- 7.113 Luke
Cunningham Clere agreed with our assessment in the Issues Paper that it would be
difficult to specify which factors favour
admissibility and which favour
exclusion as that is often fact-dependent.
- 7.114 Don
Mathias and the Public Defence Service also supported separating the factors
into statutory categories. Don Mathias said
this would promote clarity, noting
the absence of clear categories has led to complexity and artificiality in the
case law. The Public
Defence Service considered separating the factors into
categories may help to improve the consistency of decision-making. It suggested
making it clear that the factors listed under each category can either increase
or decrease the relevant interest. The Public Defence
Service also said an
amendment to clarify the relevance of each factor is unlikely to address the
concern that some factors are given
more weight than others. It suggested we
consider clarifying that no factor carries more weight than another on its face.
- 7.115 The
submitters that opposed amending section 30(3) favoured the flexibility of the
current provision. Police submitted it operates
well, providing sufficient
guidance and flexibility for judges. Associate Professor High was concerned the
proposed reform risks
limiting the ability of the courts to take a fact-specific
approach. Similarly, the NZLS suggested some factors can cut both ways
depending
on the circumstances of the case.
The need for reform
- 7.116 We
conclude it is desirable to amend section 30(3) to clarify how each factor may
affect the balancing test. We refer to our
conclusions earlier in this chapter
about the unpredictability of the section 30 test and the fact that some
judgments appear to
give insufficient weight to the impropriety. As we discuss
further below in relation to the individual factors, there is significant
confusion in case law about how some factors should affect the balancing test.
This has led to some factors being applied in an inconsistent
and unprincipled
way.
- 7.117 Submitters
that opposed reform favoured the flexibility of the current approach. However,
we are concerned it is too flexible. Judgments sometimes apply factors in
ways that were not intended and, in our view, are not always fully justified by
the
fact-specific nature of the assessment. For example, as we discuss further
below, “good faith” (or the absence of bad
faith) is often treated
as favouring the admission of improperly obtained evidence despite clear
authority that it should be neutral.
- 7.118 Other
factors are sometimes said to “cut both ways” but the explanation
for this is often generic rather than fact-specific.
For example, the
seriousness of the offence is generally seen as favouring admission of the
evidence,562F[563] but some case
law563F[564] and one
submitter564F[565] suggested this
factor can also favour exclusion. The argument is that, where the offence is
serious (and therefore the consequences
of conviction are more significant), it
is more important that rights are protected. If this reasoning is accepted, it
could apply
in any case where the offence is serious. It is not clear how a
judge would then determine whether the seriousness of the offence
favours
admission or exclusion in a particular case. The Judicial Advisory Committee,
although not supporting reform of section 30
more broadly, did say there might
be benefit in clarifying that the seriousness of the offence does not “cut
both ways”.
- 7.119 We agree
with the submitters that suggested some degree of flexibility in the application
of the section 30(3) factors is required
to account for the facts of particular
cases. This is an inherent feature of a balancing test. However, we consider the
question
of how each factor may affect the balancing test is one of principle
that is better resolved through legislation. This will help
to avoid similar
cases leading to different results. As we discuss below, we consider it is
possible to provide greater structure
around the application of the section
30(3) factors while still retaining a sufficient degree of flexibility for the
courts to address
the specific facts before them. For example, it would remain
open to the courts to decide what weight (if any) to give a factor in
a
particular case.
Recommendation
- 7.120 We
recommend separating the section 30(3) factors into two categories —
factors relating to the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the
impropriety and factors relating to the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder
at trial.
- 7.121 As noted
above, this recommendation would need to be implemented alongside recommendation
9 (clarifying the public interests
to be weighed against each other under
section 30(2)(b)). If that recommendation is not accepted, we do not recommend
amending section
30(3) to specify that certain factors favour admission or
exclusion of the evidence. We indicated in our Issues Paper that this would
be
difficult to achieve, and the submissions we received did not change that view.
Such an approach would inadequately capture the
nuance of the assessment we have
described above and is likely to be unduly restrictive.
- 7.122 We agree
with the submitters that considered separating the factors into categories would
encourage a more structured reasoning
process leading to greater consistency and
predictability in section 30 decisions. This approach was also supported by some
members
of our Expert Advisory Group. In our view, it will help to ensure
factors are applied in a principled way that gives appropriate
weight to the
impropriety without unduly restricting the ability of the courts to take a
fact-specific approach.
- 7.123 Specifying
which public interest each factor affects should provide the courts with some
guidance as to how the relevance of
the factor should be assessed while leaving
it open to them to assess the weight to be given to that factor on the facts of
the case.
For example, as we discuss further below, specifying that the
seriousness of the offence relates to the public interest in having
the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial would signal that, in general, the more
serious the offence, the more likely
the evidence will be
admitted.565F[566] However, it
would still be open to the court to treat that factor as carrying reduced weight
or being neutral in appropriate circumstances
(such as where there are concerns
about the reliability of the evidence, raising the possibility of an unsafe
conviction).566F[567]
- 7.124 This is
different to saying that certain factors may “cut both ways”,
favouring exclusion or admission depending
on the facts of the case. If a factor
is treated as neutral or as carrying reduced weight, that will affect how the
strength of the
relevant public interest is assessed but it will not add weight
to the other side of the balancing equation. For example, the fact
that an
impropriety was inadvertent may mean the public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the impropriety is on the lower
end of the spectrum (compared to
where the impropriety is deliberate). It will then be easier for that public
interest to be outweighed
by the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial, but the prosecution would still need to
make
the case for admission based on (for example) the probative value of the
evidence and the seriousness of the offence. Whether the
evidence is admitted or
excluded would always depend on the relative strength of the two public
interests.
- 7.125 As noted
above, we considered an amendment to specify which factors favour admission and
which favour exclusion. In general,
if the public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the impropriety is high, that will favour exclusion. If the
public interest
in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial is
high, that will favour admission. However, we think it is more appropriate
to
refer to the relevant public interests rather than specifying which factors
favour admission or exclusion of the evidence, for
three reasons:
(a) It fits better with our recommended amendments to section 30(2)(b), making
it clear how each of the public interests identified
in that provision are to be
assessed.
(b) Stating that factors favour admission or exclusion may imply they will
always have that effect. As we have said, in some cases,
it may be appropriate
to treat certain factors as neutral. We think specifying the public interest to
which each factor relates more
accurately conveys this.
(c) Some factors are not accurately described as favouring either admission or
exclusion. The “apprehended physical danger”
and
“urgency” factors will tend to decrease (rather than increase) the
public interest in recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety. This will
make it more likely that the evidence is admitted, but we do not think it is
appropriate to say these
factors positively favour admission. They do not
increase the public interest having the evidence considered at trial.
- 7.126 The Public
Defence Service suggested clarifying that the listed factors may increase or
decrease the relevant public interest.
We think this is unnecessary as it should
be self-evident from the nature of the factors themselves and the fact that our
proposed
amendment would list them as relevant when “assessing” the
applicable public interest. It would also add complexity to
the provisions.
- 7.127 We do not
recommend attempting to indicate what weight should be given to different
factors (for example, as the Public Defence
Service suggested, by stating that
no factor carries more weight than another on its face). We do not see how this
could be usefully
done through legislative amendment given that — as the
Public Defence Service acknowledged — the weight given to each
factor will
vary depending on the circumstances of each case.
The importance of any right breached and the seriousness of
the intrusion on it (section 30(3)(a))
Issue
- 7.128 Section
30(3)(a) only refers to breaches of “rights”. We noted in our Issues
Paper that section 30 also applies
to evidence obtained in breach of enactments
or rules of law aside from the NZ Bill of Rights and evidence obtained unfairly
(including,
but not only, through breaches of procedural protections such as the
Chief Justice’s Practice Note on Police
Questioning).567F[568]
- 7.129 While we
agreed with the courts that any breach of the NZ Bill of Rights will make
exclusion more likely,568F[569] we
suggested it is also open to the courts to attach particular importance to other
rules of law and procedural protections where
appropriate. For example, the
Practice Note on Police Questioning provides important procedural protections
during interrogations,
some of which are of long standing and arguably of
constitutional
significance.569F[570]
- 7.130 In
practice, the courts have taken an expansive view of section 30(3)(a). Where
relevant, they have considered the importance
of the protections in the Practice
Note on Police Questioning and the extent to which they were
breached.570F[571] We said this
may mean reform is unnecessary. However, the plain wording of the provision does
not reflect the approach of the courts,
and a minor amendment could clarify its
effect.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.131 We
asked submitters whether section 30(3)(a) should be amended to refer to the
importance of any right, statutory requirement,
rule of law or procedural
protection breached and the extent of that
breach.571F[572]
- 7.132 We
suggested this factor could be listed as relating to the public interest in
recognising the seriousness of the impropriety.
We noted we would still expect
this factor to be applied in an evaluative way. For example, if a breach was
minor or technical, it
may be given reduced weight, meaning the public interest
in exclusion is assessed as lower than it might be if the breach was more
significant.
Results of consultation
- 7.133 Ten
submitters responded to this question. Seven supported our option for
amendment572F[573] while two
preferred to retain the current
wording.573F[574] One submitter
proposed a different amendment to this
factor.574F[575]
- 7.134 Submitters
on both sides agreed that the courts already interpret “any right”
broadly. Those in favour of reform
considered it is appropriate for the
provision to reflect what actually
happens575F[576] and the amendment
would provide useful
clarification.576F[577] Those
against reform considered amendment is unnecessary given how the law has
developed and is developing in the
courts.577F[578]
- 7.135 Don
Mathias did not see a need to amend section 30(3)(a) in the way proposed since
the courts interpret the factor broadly.
However, he proposed an alternative of
rewording the factor to refer simply to the seriousness of the impropriety. He
was unsure
it is helpful for the factor to refer separately to the importance of
the right and the extent of the breach, noting the courts tend
to consider
similar matters under both limbs. He said the extent of intrusion depends on how
the right is described in the context
of the case (for example, the right not to
be unreasonably searched versus the right not to be unreasonably searched in a
public
place). He saw a risk this could lead to double counting of matters that
diminish the exclusionary weight of an impropriety. For
example, the fact a
search occurred in a public place could be treated as diminishing both the
importance of the right breached and
the extent of the
intrusion.578F[579]
- 7.136 If section
30 is amended to specify the relevance of each factor, six submitters agreed
this factor should be listed as relating
to the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the
impropriety.579F[580] No other
submitters addressed the point.
The need for reform
- 7.137 We
conclude it is desirable to amend section 30(3)(a) to clarify that it is not
limited to breaches of rights recognised in
the NZ Bill of Rights. Section 30 is
also engaged where evidence is obtained in breach of other legislative
requirements or rules
of law or unfairly. While it is often appropriate to
accord high importance to rights recognised in the NZ Bill of
Rights,580F[581] these other
grounds for finding that evidence is improperly obtained also protect important
interests that should be weighed as part
of the balancing test.
- 7.138 There was
general agreement among submitters that the current wording of
section 30(3)(a) does not reflect the breadth of the
assessment undertaken
by the courts. While the provision refers to the importance of any
“right” breached, the courts
often conduct a broader assessment of
the interests infringed by the impropriety under this factor. For example, case
law has recognised
the importance to the balancing test of the interests
protected by certain legal requirements and the guidelines in the Chief
Justice’s
Practice Note on Police
Questioning.581F[582] The courts
also sometimes refer to “rights” in a more general sense to describe
protections that are not recognised in
the NZ Bill of
Rights.582F[583] The rights and
interests recognised by the courts in this context include both public ones
(such as the public interest in ensuring
confessions are not extracted by
improper means)583F[584] and
private ones (such as privacy
interests584F[585] and the right
to protection of bodily
integrity).585F[586]
- 7.139 As we
explained in our Issues Paper, the section 30(3) factors are based on the Court
of Appeal’s decision in Shaheed. The majority described the
assessment now reflected in section 30(3)(a) as
follows:586F[587]
- The starting
point should always be the nature of the right and the breach. The more
fundamental the value which the right protects
and the more serious the
intrusion on it, the greater will be the weight which must be given to the
breach.
- 7.140 The
balancing test adopted in Shaheed only applied to breaches of the NZ Bill
of Rights, which explains why the Court focused on the nature of the right and
the breach.
It appears that, although section 30 extended the application
of the test to other types of impropriety, the Shaheed factors were
largely replicated without change. We consider that, in light of the broader
application of the section 30 test, the
reasoning in the quote above also
applies more broadly. The more fundamental the right or interest infringed by
the impropriety and
the more serious the intrusion on it, the more weight the
courts should give to this factor.
- 7.141 We propose
an amendment to section 30(3)(a) to make this clear. We emphasise we are not
suggesting that the courts are applying
the factor inappropriately or that
legislative amendment is intended to change their approach. Rather, if section
30 is being amended
anyway, it provides an opportunity to ensure the wording of
this factor is clear and consistent with the approach taken by the courts.
This
should make it easier for counsel and judges to understand and apply the factor
without the need for extensive reference to
case law. It is consistent with
section 6(f), which refers to enhancing access to the law of evidence.
Recommendation
- 7.142 We
recommend amending section 30(3)(a) to refer to “the importance of any
right breached or interest infringed by the
impropriety and the seriousness of
the intrusion on it” (see recommendation 10 above).
- 7.143 This
recommendation differs from the option for reform in our Issues Paper, which
would have referred specifically to “the
importance of any right,
statutory requirement, rule of law or procedural protection breached and the
extent of that breach”.
We have decided this is unnecessarily prescriptive
and would not accurately capture the intended application of this factor where
evidence is obtained “unfairly”. The courts may find evidence has
been obtained unfairly where there is no breach of
a specific procedural
protection. As discussed in Chapter 6, we consider this could include situations
where evidence is obtained
using investigatory techniques that risk producing
unreliable evidence (for example, by placing pressure on a suspect to confess).
Evidence may also be obtained “unfairly” through
entrapment587F[588] or by third
parties who are not subject to the NZ Bill of Rights or the Chief
Justice’s Practice Note on Police
Questioning.588F[589]
- 7.144 Referring
instead to “any right breached or interest infringed” more simply
and comprehensively captures the type
of analysis the courts already conduct
under this factor, as discussed above. Where the impropriety does not involve a
breach of
a right, the courts instead consider the importance of the public or
private interests infringed by the illegality or
unfairness.589F[590] We emphasise
that this analysis is only conducted once the court is satisfied there has been
an impropriety falling within section
30(5). This factor (with our proposed
amendment) would then prompt an assessment of the importance of any right or
interest infringed
by that impropriety. It would not widen the basis for finding
that evidence has been obtained “unfairly”, nor would it
require the
court to attach any particular level of weight to an interest once it is
identified — it would remain open to the
court to treat an interest as
being of relatively low importance.
- 7.145 We
considered the submission by Don Mathias that this factor could simply refer to
the “seriousness of the impropriety”.
He suggested there may be
little point in referring to the importance of the right and the extent of the
breach separately since
similar considerations may affect both assessments. We
agree that, in some cases, the courts describe the “right” in
a
fact-specific way that largely mirrors the assessment of the extent of the
breach.590F[591] In other cases,
however, the court recognises the importance of the right in a general sense
(such as “the right to be secure
against unreasonable search and
seizure”) before assessing the extent of the breach by reference to the
facts of the case.591F[592] We
support that approach. As noted above, the fact that a right recognised in the
NZ Bill of Rights has been breached is of independent
importance and will make
exclusion more likely. The same can be true, although often to a lesser extent,
of other interests protected
under section 30. The public has a general interest
in ensuring human rights and the rule of law are respected by investigators and
upheld by the justice system. However, it is also critical that the courts
consider the extent of the intrusion in each case. The
more significant the
intrusion, the higher the public interest in recognising the seriousness of the
impropriety. For example, a
strip search is a more serious intrusion on the
right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure than a perimeter
search
of a farm and should be weighted accordingly.
Nature of the impropriety (section 30(3)(b))
Issue
- 7.146 Section
30(3)(b) refers to “the nature of the impropriety, in particular, whether
it was deliberate, reckless, or done
in bad faith”. In our Issues Paper,
we discussed two issues in relation to this factor.
- 7.147 First, we
queried whether its wording could cause confusion, particularly if section 30(2)
is amended to refer to the “public
interest in recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety” as one side of the balancing equation. The seriousness
of the impropriety
is a broader consideration informed by several of the factors
in section 30(3) (including, for example, whether there were alternative
techniques available and whether there was any urgency). Although broadly
framed, the courts generally accord section 30(3)(b) a
narrower focus on the
knowledge and intent of the people or agency that acted improperly. We also
noted the courts have recognised
negligence and carelessness (which are not
specifically listed in section 30(3)(b)) may be taken into
account.592F[593]
- 7.148 We
received preliminary feedback that the courts may be reluctant to make findings
that law enforcement officers acted in bad
faith. It was suggested this
sometimes results in section 30(3)(b) being given insufficient weight. We
invited feedback on whether
this is the case. We noted that, if this was a
problem, reframing the section 30(3)(b) factor to shift the focus to the
knowledge
of the person or agency obtaining the evidence could assist. It may
help to emphasise that knowingly acting improperly is always
a serious matter
and should be given significant weight in the balancing test.
- 7.149 Second, we
noted there is conflicting case law on the relevance of good faith or
inadvertence to the balancing test. The Court
of Appeal has confirmed on several
occasions that good faith is to be expected so should not favour
admissibility.593F[594] Despite
this, some recent cases appear to treat good faith or inadvertence as favouring
admission of the
evidence.594F[595]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.150 In
relation to the first issue (the wording of the factor), we invited submissions
on whether section 30(3)(b) should be amended
to refer to “the extent to
which the investigatory techniques used were known, or ought to have been known,
to be improper”.
We noted this would remove the potentially confusing or
problematic references to “the nature of the impropriety” and
“bad faith”, instead directing attention to the knowledge of the
people or agency obtaining the evidence. It would also
clarify that the relevant
conduct is not limited to deliberate or reckless behaviour but can also
encompass (for example) negligence
or carelessness.
- 7.151 As to the
second issue (the relevance of good faith or inadvertence), we sought views on
whether good faith and inadvertence
should be treated as neutral. If so, we
suggested the section 30(3)(b) factor could be listed as relating to the public
interest
in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety. This would indicate
that good faith or inadvertence does not increase the public
interest in having
the evidence admitted at trial or positively favour admission of the evidence
(although the fact that an impropriety
was not deliberate would still affect the
overall assessment).
Results of consultation
- 7.152 Nine
submitters responded to our question about rewording this factor. Of those, six
supported our proposed
amendment595F[596] and one opposed
reform.596F[597] Two other
submitters made general comments or suggested an alternative
approach.597F[598]
- 7.153 The
submitters in favour of reform agreed that good faith (or the absence of bad
faith) should be a neutral factor and considered
our proposed amendment would
help to counteract the courts’ reliance on
it.598F[599] The Public Defence
Service said the use of the phrase “ought to have known” would
rightly clarify that the court should
require police officers to have sufficient
understanding of their powers and obligations so they are not negligently or
recklessly
acting beyond them. Don Mathias supported our proposed amendment for
the reasons identified in our Issues Paper — in particular,
that the
public is entitled to assume law enforcement officers will not deliberately
breach the law or act unfairly and that treating
good faith or inadvertence as
positively favouring admission could be seen as undermining the rule of law and
failing to deter future
improprieties.599F[600]
- 7.154 Luke
Cunningham Clere did not directly comment on this issue, but its proposed
redraft of section 30 replaced this factor with
“whether the impropriety
was careless, reckless, or deliberate”. This wording retains the current
references to recklessness
and deliberateness. However, like our proposed
amendment, it focuses solely on the knowledge or intent of the investigating
agency,
removes the reference to “bad faith” and clarifies that a
wider range of conduct (including “carelessness”)
can be
considered.
- 7.155 The NZLS
was neutral on this issue but agreed this factor is currently applied in a
manner that focuses on the knowledge and
intent of the investigating agency
(rather than a wider assessment of the nature of the impropriety). It also
agreed good faith should
be a neutral factor.
- 7.156 Police
opposed reform as it considered our option for amendment would create
uncertainty, not clarity. It would raise questions
about which techniques are
considered “improper” and by whom. Police said our proposed
amendment could arguably lead
to exclusion of cogent and reliable evidence
obtained through an investigatory technique that does not offend the NZ Bill of
Rights
or another directive based on an imprecise value judgement.
- 7.157 Five of
the submitters that supported amendment also agreed this factor should be listed
as relating to the public interest
in recognising the seriousness of the
impropriety.600F[601] No other
submitters addressed this issue.
The need for reform
- 7.158 We
conclude it is necessary to amend section 30(3)(b) to clarify that it is
concerned with the knowledge of the investigating
agency and may extend to a
wider range of conduct than is currently listed (including, for example,
carelessness or recklessness).
- 7.159 The use of
the phrase “nature of the impropriety” encompasses (or ought to
encompass) a much broader set of concerns
outside the scope of this factor. In
recommendation 9 above, we have suggested a very similar phrase —
“seriousness of
the impropriety” — be used to describe one
side of the balancing equation. We think that assessment involves a broad
evaluation of the conduct that has led to a finding that evidence was improperly
obtained under section 30(2)(a) and 30(5) encompassing
several of the section
30(3) factors. If this recommendation is adopted, the continued reference in
section 30(3)(b) to the “nature
of the impropriety” will cause
confusion.
- 7.160 The
current wording does not reflect how the courts typically apply the
section 30(3)(b) factor. The courts’ analysis
of this factor
typically focuses on the knowledge or intent of investigators rather than any
broader assessment of the nature of
the impropriety (which is more likely to
occur under section
30(3)(a)).601F[602] The courts
also take account of a wider range of knowledge than just the examples listed,
including negligent or careless
conduct.602F[603]
- 7.161 We also
consider the reference to “bad faith” is problematic. On the one
hand, it is rare for the courts to make
a finding of bad
faith.603F[604] On the other, the
courts frequently refer to the fact that investigators acted in good faith (or
did not act in bad faith) as favouring
admission of the
evidence.604F[605] We prefer the
view expressed in Shaheed that “the good faith of law enforcement
agencies is to be expected at all times and is not something which, if present,
should
then add weight to argument for the admissibility of
evidence”.605F[606] There
was general support for this approach from submitters.
- 7.162 Our Expert
Advisory Group expressed strong support for this reform, noting current case law
is inconsistent and clarification
is needed. They considered it desirable to
amend this factor even if other changes to section 30 are not progressed. We
agree it
is important to clarify that the factor focuses on the extent of
investigators’ knowledge of the impropriety (whether or not
the
impropriety is categorised as deliberate, reckless or in bad faith). It is also
important to clarify that good faith does not
favour admission of the evidence
— and, conversely, that “bad faith” is not required to exclude
it. Our recommended
amendment to the wording of this factor could be progressed
as a stand-alone reform whether or not our other recommendations for
reform of
section 30 are adopted.
Recommendation
- 7.163 We
recommend amending the section 30(3)(b) factor to refer to “the extent to
which it was known, or ought to have been
known, that the evidence was being
improperly obtained” (see recommendation 10). If section 30(3) is amended
to clarify how
each factor affects the balancing test, this factor should be
listed as relating to the public interest in recognising the seriousness
of the
impropriety. For the avoidance of doubt, however, our recommended amendment to
the wording of the factor could be implemented
on its own.
- 7.164 Our
proposed amendment would direct the courts’ attention to the level of
knowledge of investigators at the time of the
impropriety, including knowledge
that could reasonably be expected of them. This would include carelessness and
negligence (in addition
to recklessness and deliberateness), in line with
existing case law. The wording “the extent to which” makes it clear
this is an evaluative assessment. For example, actual knowledge of improper
conduct would generally be more serious than carelessness.
- 7.165 We
envisage the more general wording of our proposed amendment, which would omit
specific terms such as “bad faith”,
would direct attention to the
degree of knowledge in each case and how that affects the overall assessment of
the public interest
in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety. In
particular, our intention is to avoid a narrow focus on whether the “bad
faith” criterion is satisfied and the conclusion that an absence of bad
faith favours admission of the evidence. This would
not, of course, prevent the
courts from making a finding of bad faith where that is justified on the facts,
but case law suggests
this is rare.
- 7.166 As
discussed above, our proposed amendment to section 30(3) would continue to allow
the courts to treat certain factors as having
reduced weight or as being neutral
where appropriate. Accordingly, the fact that investigators did not know, and
could not be expected
to know, that they were acting improperly may mean the
public interest in recognising the seriousness of the impropriety is assessed
as
being at the lower end of the spectrum. While this would not favour admission of
the evidence, it would make it easier for the
second public interest to outweigh
the first. We consider this is appropriate. Where investigators could not have
been expected to
know of the impropriety (for example, where the law was unclear
at the time), deterrence has no role to play and public confidence
in the
justice system is less likely to be impacted by admitting the evidence.
- 7.167 The
wording we propose has changed slightly from the option in our Issues Paper,
which referred to “the extent to which
the investigatory techniques used
were known, or ought to have been known, to be improper”. Police was
concerned that the reference
to improper investigatory techniques could create
uncertainty, raising questions about which techniques are considered
“improper”.
Our intention is not to require a separate assessment of
what is “improper”. This should occur before the balancing test
is
undertaken when determining whether the evidence was “improperly
obtained” (as required by section 30(2)(a) and defined
in section 30(5)).
We have changed the wording of our proposal to use the term “improperly
obtained” to make this link
clear. In other words, the knowledge of the
investigating agency would be assessed in relation to the conduct that has led
to a finding
that the evidence was improperly obtained. While we acknowledge the
assessment of what is “improper” is not always straightforward,
it
is a task the courts already undertake as the first stage of the section 30
inquiry.
- 7.168 Finally,
for the purposes of considering whether an impropriety was known or ought to
have been known to an investigating agency,
it is the actual and constructive
knowledge of the agency that is relevant. Lack of knowledge by an individual
officer will not necessarily
be determinative. This is already the case under
the current section 30(3)(b). For example, the High Court found in
Alexander v Police that Police should ensure officers completing search
warrant applications are sufficiently educated to know what information must
be
included.606F[607]
Nature and quality of the evidence (section
30(3)(c))
Issue
- 7.169 In
our Issues Paper, we explained that this factor was intended to focus primarily
on the probative value of the evidence, including
its
reliability.607F[608] The more
probative and reliable the evidence, the greater the public interest in having
it admitted at trial.
- 7.170 The
centrality of the evidence to the prosecution case was also identified as
relevant in R v Shaheed and was expressly incorporated into section
30(3)(c) in the Evidence Bill as
introduced.608F[609] However, the
reference to centrality was removed on the recommendation of the select
committee, which found it difficult to see how
this would be relevant since the
seriousness of the offence is included as a separate
factor.609F[610]
- 7.171 Notwithstanding
this background, section 30 decisions often equate the nature and quality of the
evidence with its centrality
or importance to the prosecution case without
explicitly assessing its probative
value.610F[611] In our snapshot
case study, the importance of the evidence was the factor relied on most often
in admitting improperly obtained evidence
despite not being included in section
30(3).611F[612] By contrast, the
probative value of the evidence (including its reliability) was often not
directly considered unless there were
particular concerns about
it.612F[613]
- 7.172 We noted
that focusing on the importance of the evidence rather than its probative value
could be problematic. For instance,
it could provide a weaker deterrence against
improper conduct by Police or other investigating agencies attempting to obtain
evidence
in situations where they have little other evidence against a suspect.
By contrast, the probative value of the evidence does not
depend on the adequacy
of the other evidence available to support the prosecution.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.173 We
sought views on whether it would be preferable for the courts to focus on the
probative value of the evidence, including
its reliability, rather than on the
importance of the evidence to the prosecution case. If so, we suggested this
might be achieved
by amending section 30(3)(c) to refer to the “probative
value of the evidence, including its reliability”. We suggested
this
factor could be listed as relating to the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial.
Results of consultation
- 7.174 Nine
submitters responded to this question. Six supported amendment to focus on the
probative value of the
evidence.613F[614] Three opposed
reform.614F[615]
- 7.175 The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association considered that referring to probative value and
reliability would be consistent with
the rest of the Act. They said the current
wording is ambiguous and invites consideration of the centrality of the evidence
to the
prosecution case, which reinforces an “ends justifies the
means” approach.
- 7.176 The Public
Defence Service agreed the importance of the evidence to the prosecution case
should not be a factor and considered
our proposed amendment would help to
clarify that. It saw benefit in referring specifically to reliability,
suggesting this could
help to prevent unreliable evidence that is not excluded
under section 28 from “slipping through the cracks”. It would
have
gone further, however, and expressly prohibited consideration of the centrality
of the evidence to the prosecution case.
- 7.177 While Luke
Cunningham Clere supported our proposed rewording of this factor, it would also
have included a separate factor for
“the importance of the evidence to the
prosecution case”.
- 7.178 The Crown
Law Office preferred the current wording, which it said is a more encompassing
phrase and sits better with other considerations
such as the nature of the right
or interest breached and the nature of the impropriety. It did not consider our
proposed amendment
would steer judges away from considering the importance of
the evidence to the prosecution case and suggested that, if that was the
intention, it would be better to state it expressly.
- 7.179 The NZLS
noted the current wording allows both probative value and importance to be taken
into account, which it considered
appropriate. It said the impact of exclusion
(and whether it will result in the dismissal of the charge) should be a relevant
consideration.
- 7.180 Police was
wary of referring to reliability as it considered this could “blur the
line” between sections 28 and
30.
- 7.181 If section
30 is amended to specify the relevance of each factor, three submitters agreed
this factor should be listed as relating
to the public interest in having the
evidence considered by the fact-finder at
trial.615F[616] The ADLS and
Defence Lawyers Association disagreed. They submitted probative value and
reliability should be a neutral factor except
where the evidence is of only
modest probative value or has clear reliability issues — in which case, it
should favour exclusion.
Reform not recommended to the wording of this factor
- 7.182 As
we explain below, we remain of the view that it is generally preferable for the
courts to focus on the probative value of
the evidence (including its
reliability) rather than its importance to the prosecution case when assessing
this factor. We do not,
however, recommend amending the wording of the factor to
refer to “probative value”. We are not convinced this would
make a
significant difference in practice and it may risk causing confusion or
uncertainty about the effect of the amendment.
- 7.183 In our
view, the key rationale underlying this factor is that there is a higher public
interest in admitting evidence that the
fact-finder could safely rely on to
establish guilt (particularly where the offence is serious). This depends on the
probative value
of the evidence. The fact that the evidence is important to the
prosecution case does not, on its own, mean it can support a safe
conviction
— for example, the prosecution case may not be particularly strong. While
excluding evidence that is important to
the prosecution case may well result in
a dismissal of charges, that is mainly cause for concern if there is compelling
evidence
that the defendant committed the offence. Accordingly, we consider
focusing on the probative value of the evidence more accurately
captures the
concern underlying this factor. It may also reduce the risk that the courts are
seen as “taking sides” —
or as condoning improper conduct
where it is seen as necessary to achieve a conviction.
- 7.184 Notwithstanding
this, we do not recommend amending the wording of the factor for three reasons.
First, as some submitters and
members of our Expert Advisory Group highlighted,
amendment would not prevent the courts from considering the importance of the
evidence
to the prosecution case unless that was specifically prohibited. This
is because the list of factors in section 30(3) is non-exhaustive
(which we do
not propose changing). We consider such a prohibition would be artificial and
cause interpretational issues. As we observed
in our Issues Paper, high
probative value and importance will often go hand in hand. Accordingly, the
effect of prohibiting consideration
of one while listing the other as a relevant
factor would be unclear. In ordinary language, evidence that is highly probative
of
crime might be said to be “important” evidence.
- 7.185 Second, we
are not convinced our option for amendment would affect the conduct of
investigators. We remain concerned that placing
too much emphasis on the
importance of the evidence to the prosecution case may fail to deter improper
conduct in obtaining evidence
that is likely to be crucial to the prosecution
case. However, we are not convinced this issue would be avoided by focusing on
probative
value. As noted above, evidence that is crucial to the prosecution
case often also has high probative value. Investigators might
still take risks
in obtaining such evidence if it is likely to be admitted on the basis that it
is highly probative. We consider
this concern is best addressed by ensuring this
factor is not given undue weight. The amendments we propose to the balancing
test
in section 30(2)(b) and to categorise the factors in section 30(3) should
assist by encouraging a more structured analysis of the
competing public
interests and requiring that the second public interest outweigh the
first.
- 7.186 Third,
where there are specific concerns about the reliability or probative value of
the evidence, the courts already take this
into account when assessing the
nature and quality of the evidence under section
30(3)(c).616F[617] Amendment is
not required to enable this.
- 7.187 Accordingly,
we consider amending this factor to refer to the probative value of the evidence
is unlikely to make a significant
difference in practice. On the other hand, it
may create confusion about the intended effect of the amendment.
Recommendation on how this factor affects the balancing
test
- 7.188 We
recommend listing the nature and quality of the evidence as relating to the
public interest in having the evidence considered
by the fact-finder at trial
(see recommendation 10).
- 7.189 This
factor was intended to recognise that there is a higher public interest in
admitting evidence that is highly probative
and
reliable.617F[618] Such evidence
is more likely to result in a safe conviction for the relevant offence. Equally,
where the evidence is of low probative
value or reliability, the public interest
in its admission will be reduced (making exclusion of the evidence more likely).
This is
consistent with how the courts currently apply the factor, and we agree
it is the correct approach.
- 7.190 We
therefore do not support the removal of this factor or (as the ADLS and Defence
Lawyers Association suggested) an amendment
to specify that it is only relevant
as a factor favouring exclusion where the evidence is of limited probative value
or reliability.
Seriousness of the offence (section 30(3)(d))
Issue
- 7.191 In
our Issues Paper, we observed there remains some uncertainty about how the
seriousness of the offence is to be weighed, particularly
where the reliability
of the evidence is in
question.618F[619] While the Court
of Appeal said in Underwood that the seriousness of the offence always
favours admission of the
evidence,619F[620] subsequent case
law has not consistently applied that
approach.620F[621] Two Court of
Appeal cases decided in 2018 both involved breaches of the Chief Justice’s
Practice Note on Police Questioning,
giving rise to reliability concerns. In one
case, the seriousness of the offence was treated as favouring admission of the
evidence
(although this was outweighed by other
factors)621F[622] and in the other
as favouring exclusion.622F[623]
Neither decision gave reasons for the approach adopted. More recently,
Winkelmann CJ giving the majority judgment in Reti
said:623F[624]
- If the
offending is serious, that favours admission. However, if the offending is
serious and the nature of the impropriety raises
issues as to the quality of the
evidence, that will tend to favour exclusion. That consideration does not apply
in this case. But
even where the nature of the impropriety does not impugn the
quality of the evidence, there remains public interest in the careful
and lawful
investigation of offences, particularly serious offences.
- 7.192 We
acknowledged in the Issues Paper that reliability concerns may affect the degree
to which the seriousness of the offence
should be taken into account. While the
seriousness of the offence will ordinarily increase the public interest in
having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial, that will not be the
case (at least to the same extent) where the reliability of the evidence
is in
doubt — as the likelihood of a safe conviction is reduced.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.193 We
expressed our preliminary view that the seriousness of the offence should never
be treated as independently favouring exclusion
of the evidence. We noted all
suspects have the same rights and procedural protections irrespective of the
seriousness of the offence.
Instead, we suggested that, where there are concerns
about the reliability of the evidence, it may be appropriate to treat the
seriousness
of the offence as a neutral factor or to give it reduced weight
(depending on the extent of the reliability concerns). The section
30(3)(c)
factor (the nature and quality of the evidence) would also be given less or no
weight. Overall, this would mean the public
interest in admitting the evidence
is significantly lower than would be the case if the evidence were
reliable.
- 7.194 We invited
submissions on whether this is the correct approach. If it is, we suggested this
factor could be listed as relating
to the public interest in having the evidence
considered by the fact-finder at trial. This would indicate that the seriousness
of
the offence does not favour exclusion of the evidence.
Results of consultation
- 7.195 Six
submitters responded to this question. Only one submitter expressly supported
our proposed approach (for the same reasons
we gave in our Issues
Paper).624F[625] Three suggested
repealing this factor
altogether.625F[626] One
considered section 30 is working as intended and did not see a need for
reform.626F[627] The Public
Defence Service did not have a clear view.
- 7.196 The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association said this factor should be repealed because it
invites an approach that condones impropriety
where the offending is serious and
there is ambiguity in its application. Luke Cunningham Clere also omitted this
factor from its
proposed redraft of section 30. Although not expressly
discussing this factor, it said that any factors not included in its draft
were
either subsumed by others or not logically relevant to the core issue.
- 7.197 The Public
Defence Service observed this is not a straightforward issue. On the one hand,
there is a public interest in serious
offending being prosecuted. On the other,
there is a heightened interest in recognising and preventing impropriety where
the risk
to a person’s liberty is higher. It suggested that, if the
seriousness of the charge is going to favour admission, it is essential
that
section 30(3)(c) be amended to include the consideration of reliability. It also
said it could be helpful to provide guidance
on how “seriousness” is
defined.
Repeal or amendment of this factor not recommended
- 7.198 We
do not recommend amending the wording of this factor or repealing it. Some
submitters supported its repeal on the basis that
it risks condoning impropriety
where the offending is serious. We also noted, when discussing the operation of
the balancing test
above, that some submitters were concerned this factor is
sometimes given too much weight. We consider the appropriate way to address
these concerns is through the amendments we have proposed to the section
30(2)(b) balancing test, which should help to ensure the
public interest in
recognising the seriousness of the impropriety is given sufficient weight.
- 7.199 The Public
Defence Service suggested there are questions about how
“seriousness” is defined and that some guidance
in the Act may be
helpful. A member of our Expert Advisory Group made a similar point. The
Commission considered this issue in its
Second Review and concluded no reform
was necessary or
desirable.627F[628] The
submissions received in the Second Review indicated that the main users of the
Act were comfortable with the guidance provided
by the Court of Appeal in
Underwood v R.628F[629] We
are not aware of any developments that require us to revisit that general
conclusion so we have not considered the issue again
in this review.
Clarifying how this factor affects the balancing test
The need for reform
- 7.200 We
conclude it is desirable to clarify how the seriousness of the offence affects
the balancing test. As we discussed in our
Issues Paper, there remains some
uncertainty about whether this factor favours admission or exclusion. The
Judicial Advisory Committee
noted this is a long-standing issue and said it may
be helpful to clarify that this factor does not “cut both
ways”.
- 7.201 We
consider the seriousness of the offence is relevant to assessing the public
interest in having the evidence considered by
the fact-finder at trial. Where
the crime is serious, there will usually be a higher public interest in having
the defendant tried
based on all relevant and probative evidence —
particularly where there is a risk to public safety if the offender is not
convicted.
This was the original intent of the factor. As Blanchard J said in
Shaheed:629F[630]
- The example of
the serial murderer given in Attorney-General’s Reference is
compelling. Public confidence in the justice system would obviously be severely
shaken were probative evidence to be excluded
in such circumstances unless
perhaps the breach was both fundamental and deliberate. Weight is given to the
seriousness of the crime
not because the infringed right is less valuable to an
accused murderer than it would be to, say, an accused burglar, but in
recognition
of the enhanced public interest in convicting and confining the
murderer. In contrast, where the crime with which the accused is
charged is
comparatively minor, it is unlikely that evidence improperly obtained will be
admitted in the face of a more than minor
breach of the accused’s rights.
- 7.202 For this
reason, as the Court of Appeal found in Underwood, the fact an offence is
serious generally favours admission of the
evidence.630F[631] Where the
offence is not very serious, this factor will carry less weight or no weight,
making it unlikely the evidence will be admitted.
We consider that is the
correct approach.
- 7.203 The Public
Defence Service submitted there is a stronger interest in recognising and
preventing impropriety where the risk to
a person’s liberty is higher. A
similar point was made by two of the judges in
Hamed.631F[632] As Tipping
J observed, the public has “a vital interest in having a justice system
that is above reproach, particularly when
the penal stakes for the accused are
high”.632F[633]
- 7.204 In our
view, the current position (that seriousness can be treated as going either way)
is unhelpful and confusing to judges.
Further, we see the concerns raised by
submitters as being most pronounced in situations where the impropriety may have
affected
the reliability of the evidence, raising the possibility of an unsafe
conviction with significant penal consequences for the defendant.
Where there is
concern about the reliability of the evidence, this can already be taken into
account under section 30(3)(c) (the
nature and quality of the evidence). It may
also be appropriate in these situations to treat the seriousness of the offence
as a
neutral factor or as having reduced weight. In such cases, the seriousness
of the offence may not strengthen the public interest
in having the evidence
admitted since the evidence is less likely to result in a safe conviction for
that offence. In combination
with the section 30(3)(c) assessment, this will
usually mean the public interest in having the evidence considered by the
fact-finder
is low (or even non-existent), making exclusion the likely
result.
- 7.205 However,
we do not think the seriousness of the offence should be treated as a factor
favouring exclusion of the evidence. It
does not necessarily increase the public
interest in recognising and preventing impropriety. Improprieties in gathering
evidence
of less serious offending may be equally damaging to public confidence
in the justice system, as they may affect the rights of a
larger number of
people (if they are systemic) or indicate more widespread or routine disregard
for the rule of law. This underscores
the importance of taking improprieties
seriously in every case irrespective of the seriousness of the
offence.
Recommendation
- 7.206 We
recommend listing the seriousness of the offence as relating to the public
interest in having the evidence considered by
the fact-finder at trial (see
recommendation 10).
- 7.207 In
practice, the seriousness of the offence will be assessed alongside the
probative value of the evidence to determine the
strength of the public interest
in having the evidence considered by the fact-finder at trial. The balancing
exercise is most likely
to result in admission of the evidence where both these
factors carry significant weight (that is, where the evidence is highly
probative
of serious offending). Even then, the combined weight of these factors
will not necessarily outweigh a serious impropriety.
Other investigatory techniques (section
30(3)(e))
Issue
- 7.208 In
our Issues Paper, we noted that both the availability and the absence of other
investigatory techniques have been treated
variously as favouring admission or
exclusion of the evidence or as a neutral
factor.633F[634] We explained
that, in its Second Review, the Commission expressed the view that the known
availability of other investigatory techniques
will usually favour exclusion of
the evidence.634F[635] This was
because, if law enforcement officers know of a legitimate way to obtain evidence
but choose not to use it, admitting the
evidence may bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. The Commission considered the absence of other
known techniques will generally be a neutral factor as it would be inappropriate
to justify improper conduct on the basis
that there was no legitimate way to
obtain the evidence.635F[636]
- 7.209 Since the
Second Review, case law has continued to take varying approaches to this factor.
Some decisions have treated the availability
of other techniques as favouring
admission of the
evidence.636F[637] In other cases,
the absence of other techniques has been treated as favouring exclusion. For
example, in M (CA84/2019) v R, the Court of Appeal took the latter
approach because the evidence (fingernail clippings) was subject to a specific
statutory regime
(the Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995) that
required consent and there was no other statutory basis for obtaining
the
evidence.637F[638] The effect of
admitting the evidence under section 30 where it had been obtained without
consent would have been to “create
a non-statutory exception to a
statutory scheme which requires
consent”.638F[639]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.210 In
light of these recent decisions, we sought submissions on whether it is
desirable to clarify whether and how the availability
or absence of alternative
techniques is relevant to the balancing exercise. We identified two possible
options for reform:
(a) Repeal section 30(3)(e), leaving the deliberateness of the impropriety to be
considered under section 30(3)(b). We observed the
underlying concern of
section 30(3)(e) appears to be with investigators deliberately straying
outside the bounds of their lawful
authority. Either lawful alternatives are
improperly disregarded or there are no lawful alternatives and investigators
proceed anyway
knowing they are acting unlawfully. We suggested the extent of
investigators’ knowledge about the bounds of their lawful authority
and
the other options available to them could be considered under section
30(3)(c).
(b) Specify that section 30(3)(e) relates to the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the impropriety. This would indicate
that the availability of
alternative techniques generally favours exclusion of the evidence while the
absence of alternative techniques
is generally neutral.
- 7.211 If section
30(3)(e) is retained, we suggested it may be desirable to clarify that it
applies to other investigatory techniques
“not involving any
impropriety”. Currently, it refers to other techniques “not
involving any breach of rights”.
As discussed in relation to section
30(3)(a), section 30 is not limited to breaches of rights in the narrow sense.
We saw no reason
to limit the application of section 30(3)(e) to cases involving
breaches of rights.
Results of consultation
- 7.212 Nine
submitters commented on whether section 30(3)(e) should be repealed. Four
supported repeal639F[640] while
five preferred to retain the
provision.640F[641] Most did not
give detailed reasons.
- 7.213 The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association supported repeal and suggested the absence of
alternative techniques should be treated
as neutral.
- 7.214 The Public
Defence Service preferred to keep the factor separate for now, at least until
the impact of the proposed change to
section 30(3)(b) becomes apparent. It was
concerned that the section 30(3)(e) inquiry could be lost in the section
30(3)(b) consideration
if they are merged. Police did not think there was
sufficient concern to warrant amendment and suggested any issues were likely to
be resolved by case law.
- 7.215 If this
factor is retained, three submitters supported specifying that it relates to the
public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the
impropriety.641F[642] Don Mathias
agreed with our assessment in the Issues Paper that the availability of other
techniques is generally aggravating although
it may be treated as neutral in
limited circumstances. He considered the absence of alternatives should not be
relevant. The Public
Defence Service submitted that both the existence and
absence of alternative techniques should favour exclusion (the latter because
there is no lawful authority for the technique to be used).
- 7.216 The NZLS
did not express a clear view on this issue but agreed this factor will generally
favour exclusion. However, it said
there may be good reason to admit the
evidence where it was unclear at the time that the techniques used were unlawful
or unfair
and the evidence could have been obtained through some other means. It
considered a lack of alternatives is a neutral factor at best
because the public
are entitled to be protected from evidence-gathering methods that are not
legislatively or judicially approved.
- 7.217 Lastly,
three submitters expressed their agreement that, if section 30(3)(e) is
retained, it should be amended to refer to other
techniques not involving any
impropriety (instead of any breach of
rights).642F[643]
The need for reform
- 7.218 We
conclude reform is needed to address the inconsistency in how this factor is
applied. One recent Court of Appeal decision
referred to the controversy
surrounding the interpretation of this
factor.643F[644] It is clear that
the known availability of other investigatory techniques was originally intended
to favour exclusion of the
evidence.644F[645] As the
Commission observed in its Second Review, where investigators knew of a
legitimate way to obtain the evidence but chose not
to use it, admitting the
evidence may bring the justice system into
disrepute.645F[646] In practice,
however, both the presence and absence of other investigatory techniques are
applied as favouring admission or exclusion
in different cases. We do not
consider there is a principled basis for this.
- 7.219 We
consider this factor is logically quite limited in its application but its
presence in the section 30(3) list has led the
courts to apply it more
broadly in scenarios where we do not consider it to be relevant. For example,
the courts have sometimes found
that the fact the evidence could have been
obtained lawfully favours admission in situations where investigators either did
not know
they were acting unlawfully or
improperly646F[647] or did not
know there was a lawful alternative
available.647F[648] In the latter
case, the factor does not apply on its plain wording — it refers to other
techniques known to be available. In both these scenarios, it is
difficult to see why the availability of alternatives should be relevant to the
balancing
test. On the one hand, investigators cannot be expected to use another
technique if they do not realise it exists or consider they
are acting lawfully.
The majority of the Court of Appeal in Williams envisaged this factor
will be relevant only where there is “a deliberate, reckless or grossly
careless decision not to employ
those other
techniques”.648F[649] On the
other hand, treating the fact that the evidence could have been obtained
lawfully as positively favouring admission may encourage
investigators to take
shortcuts and is directly counter to the original intent of the factor. In
Shaheed, the majority said when explaining that this factor favoured
exclusion:649F[650]
- It is of some
reassurance to the community where evidence is excluded in such circumstances
that, if the same situation arises again,
the police do have an available means
of obtaining the evidence in a proper way.
- 7.220 As we have
said, the courts have also treated the absence of other techniques as
favouring either admission or exclusion in different cases. We remain of the
view, expressed in the Commission’s
Second Review, that the absence of
alternatives will generally be a neutral
factor.650F[651] It would be
inappropriate to justify improper conduct on the basis that there was no
legitimate way to obtain the evidence. It would
also be inappropriate to treat
the absence of alternatives as favouring exclusion as this may duplicate the
assessment of the nature
of the impropriety and whether it was deliberate.
- 7.221 In our
view, section 30(3)(e) is sometimes used to recognise policy considerations that
are more appropriately considered under
other factors. For example, in some
cases, the courts have found this factor favours admission because the failure
to use the alternative,
lawful method did not lead to any additional restraint
or prejudice to the
defendant.651F[652] As discussed
above, in M (CA84/2019) v R, the absence of any lawful alternative was
treated as favouring exclusion because the evidence was obtained in breach of a
carefully
limited statutory
regime.652F[653] We suggest these
types of considerations affect the assessment of the right or interest intruded
on and the extent of the intrusion,
which can be taken into account under
section 30(3)(a).653F[654]
- 7.222 These
examples demonstrate that section 30(3)(e) can effectively be interpreted and
applied to favour any outcome. There is
no consistent, principled understanding
of its function. Further, it is sometimes applied in a manner that duplicates
considerations
under other factors.
Recommendation
- 7.223 We
recommend repealing section 30(3)(e) (see recommendation 10). We consider its
inclusion in section 30(3) is unnecessary and
leads to unpredictable results.
Because of the confusion this factor is causing, this recommendation can be
progressed whether or
not our other recommendations for reform of section 30 are
adopted.
- 7.224 We do not
disagree with the original policy intent of this factor. Rather, we consider the
same considerations can be addressed
through other factors. Most members of our
Expert Advisory Group agreed with this approach.
- 7.225 The key
concern underlying this factor is that investigators should not deliberately
stray outside the bounds of their lawful
authority while disregarding other
legitimate options for obtaining the evidence. It is therefore related to the
section 30(3)(b)
factor as the Court of Appeal has
acknowledged.654F[655] Where
investigators know they are acting improperly and proceed despite being aware of
lawful alternatives, we suggest that can be
taken into account under section
30(3)(b). Indeed, sometimes these types of considerations are already considered
under section 30(3)(b)
as well as under
section 30(3)(e).655F[656]
Repealing section 30(3)(e) will avoid duplication and help to ensure other
techniques are only considered where they were known to
be available
(since section 30(3)(b) directly relates to the knowledge of
investigators). As we have said, section 30(3)(e) already
refers to other
techniques known to be available but is not always applied this way.
- 7.226 As noted
above, other considerations the courts sometimes take into account under this
factor may be relevant under section
30(3)(a). For example, where
Parliament has chosen to carefully limit the obtaining of the evidence by
statute (and so there are
no lawful alternatives available), that may affect the
court’s assessment of the importance of the right or interest
breached.
- 7.227 We
considered whether the issues we have identified with this factor could be
addressed by retaining and clarifying the factor.
However, as discussed above,
the factor already makes it clear that it is limited to other known
techniques — yet it has not always been applied in that way. Any
attempt to further limit its effect may encounter similar issues.
In any event,
amendment would not alter the fact that similar considerations are addressed by
other factors, in particular section
30(3)(b). Overall, we consider the
inclusion of this factor in section 30(3) creates confusion and does not add
substantially to
the analysis.
Alternative remedies (section 30(3)(f))
Issue
- 7.228 We
explained in our Issues Paper that it was unclear why this factor had been
included in section 30(3). The majority in Shaheed said alternative
remedies (such as a declaration that a right has been breached or a reference to
the relevant oversight body) will
rarely be relevant because they are unlikely
to provide vindication of the right
breached.656F[657] Awards of
compensation or reductions in sentence would likely lead to a “perception
that the police could now breach the rules
and still secure ... a
result”.657F[658] The courts
have frequently reinforced the view that there will rarely be any effective
alternatives to
exclusion.658F[659]
- 7.229 We also
noted that there was some uncertainty about whether the absence of alternative
remedies is relevant. It is sometimes
treated as irrelevant or
neutral659F[660] and other times
treated as favouring exclusion of the
evidence.660F[661]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.230 We
sought submissions on whether section 30(3)(f) should be repealed to simplify
the application of the balancing test. In the
rare case where an appropriate
alternative remedy might be available, it could still be considered given the
list in section 30(3)
is non-exhaustive. We noted repealing section 30(3)(f) may
also help to clarify that the absence of alternative remedies is not normally
a
factor that requires consideration. We expressed our preliminary view that this
is properly treated as a neutral factor.
Results of consultation
- 7.231 Eleven
submitters responded to this question. Six supported repeal of the
provision,661F[662] three opposed
repeal662F[663] and two did not
take a clear position.663F[664]
- 7.232 Associate
Professor High considered the provision is redundant for the reasons expressed
in Shaheed — there will rarely be any effective alternatives to
exclusion. Don Mathias also supported repeal for the reasons discussed
in our
Issues Paper and to avoid the suggestion that law enforcement officials might be
tempted to “buy” impropriety
by paying compensation. Tim Cochrane
cautiously supported repeal but with the proviso that, in at least some
circumstances, the absence of alternative remedies should favour
exclusion (rather than being a neutral factor).
- 7.233 The NZLS
was neutral on whether this factor should be repealed but agreed it is only
likely to be relevant in rare circumstances.
The Public Defence Service
suggested that, while there are usually no alternative remedies, it could be
beneficial for the courts
to be reminded of this (presumably by retaining the
factor).
- 7.234 Only
Police gave reasons for retaining the provision. It did not agree there will
rarely be appropriate alternative remedies.
It said that, in appropriate cases,
a person may seek civil redress or complain to a body such as the Independent
Police Conduct
Authority or the Privacy Commissioner.
- 7.235 If this
factor is retained, one submitter, Don Mathias, agreed it should be listed as
relating to the public interest in having
the evidence considered by the
fact-finder at trial. However, he noted that attempting to specify its relevance
at all only serves
to emphasise its inappropriateness as a factor (presumably
because it is not clearly relevant to either of the public interests to
be
weighed). On the other hand, the Public Defence Service and Tim Cochrane were
concerned this approach might prevent the courts
from treating the
absence of alternative remedies as favouring exclusion.
The need for reform
- 7.236 We
conclude this factor should be repealed in the interests of simplifying the
section 30(3) analysis. Most submitters and members
of our Expert Advisory Group
supported repeal since alternative remedies will rarely be appropriate and
sufficient. Only Police submitted
otherwise. The examples given by Police (the
ability to seek civil redress or complain to the Independent Police Conduct
Authority)
are the same remedies the Court in Shaheed suggested would not
generally be relevant.664F[665] We
agree with the concerns expressed in Shaheed and Hamed that most
alternative remedies will not adequately vindicate any right breached and that
taking into account awards of compensation
may lead to a perception that the
admission of improperly obtained evidence can be
“bought”.665F[666] We
also note the difficulty of bringing civil claims and the limited powers of the
Independent Police Conduct Authority.
Recommendation
- 7.237 We
recommend repealing section 30(3)(f) (see recommendation 10). We do not rule out
the possibility that it may be appropriate
to consider alternative remedies in
rare situations.666F[667] That
would remain open to the courts given the non-exhaustive nature of section
30(3). Removing this factor would, however, avoid
prompting its routine
consideration by counsel and the courts, which we think is unnecessary.
Risks to safety and urgency (sections 30(3)(g) and
(h))
Issue
- 7.238 We
noted in our Issues Paper that, since section 30 was enacted, the Search and
Surveillance Act 2012 had come into force. Under
that Act, constables have
express warrantless powers to address urgent situations and risks to the safety
of any person. We referred
to commentary suggesting that urgency and apprehended
physical danger should no longer affect the section 30 analysis because
investigators
should rely on the Search and Surveillance Act
powers.667F[668]
- 7.239 However,
we also said it is arguable that sections 30(3)(g) and (h) remain necessary to
ensure urgency and risks to safety can
be considered in a range of situations.
For example, urgency or danger to a person could be a factor in a police
interview being
conducted improperly (which is not governed by the Search and
Surveillance Act) or enforcement officers could fail to identify and
invoke the
appropriate warrantless power when they are involved in an urgent or high-risk
situation.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.240 We
sought submissions on whether sections 30(3)(g) and (h) should be retained or
repealed. In particular, we invited feedback
on whether there are likely to be
situations where evidence is obtained in urgent situations not adequately
covered by the Search
and Surveillance Act warrantless powers (including by law
enforcement agencies other than Police).
- 7.241 If these
factors are retained, we suggested they could be listed as relating to the
public interest in recognising the seriousness
of the impropriety. Unlike the
other factors on this side of the balancing equation, these factors would
reduce the public interest in recognising the seriousness of the
impropriety (and hence the need for exclusion of the evidence).
Results of consultation
- 7.242 Ten
submitters responded to this question. Three submitters supported repealing
sections 30(3)(g) and (h)668F[669]
while six opposed repeal.669F[670]
Luke Cunningham Clere suggested an alternative approach.
- 7.243 The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association found it difficult to conceive a scenario in
which evidence is obtained in urgent circumstances
but a Search and Surveillance
Act power is not engaged. They considered removing these factors would simplify
the assessment.
- 7.244 On the
other hand, the Crown Law Office considered there are likely to be situations
falling outside the scope of the Search
and Surveillance Act powers where a
sense of urgency is understandable or even desirable. Similarly, the NZLS said
it was appropriate
to have the balancing test as a “fall back” where
investigators have not complied with the Search and Surveillance Act
requirements. This allows the court to take into account how significant the
non-compliance was.
- 7.245 Police
submitted these factors enable consideration of the realities of policing where
sometimes challenging decisions must
be made in difficult and dynamic situations
involving a real risk of harm.
- 7.246 The Public
Defence Service suggested the inclusion of these factors allows the courts to
consider that, where there is no urgency or risk of physical danger,
lawful techniques should be considered and used.
- 7.247 Luke
Cunningham Clere did not comment specifically on whether these factors should be
repealed. However, its proposed redraft
of section 30 replaced them with one
provision stating “whether any circumstances (such as urgency or a risk to
safety) existed
at the time of the impropriety that justify or excuse any
careless, reckless, or deliberate conduct”. This suggests it views
these
factors as mitigating the careless, reckless or deliberate nature of an
impropriety rather than as factors independently favouring
admission.
- 7.248 If these
factors are retained, four submitters agreed they should be listed as relating
to the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the
impropriety.670F[671] The Public
Defence Service did note, however, that this could create confusion since they
would operate differently from the other
factors in this category (that is, they
would reduce the seriousness of the impropriety). It referred to its earlier
suggestion that
any redraft of section 30(3) should make it clear the listed
factors can either increase or decrease the relevant interest, suggesting
this
may provide clarity in relation to these factors in particular.
Repeal not recommended
- 7.249 We
do not recommend repealing these factors. As we noted in our Issues Paper, there
may be situations outside the scope of the
Search and Surveillance Act (for
example, during questioning of suspects) where urgency or risk to safety may
properly be taken into
account. The submissions we received did not respond to
this concern in detail, and indeed most submitters favoured retaining these
factors.
- 7.250 Luke
Cunningham Clere submitted sections 30(3)(g) and (h) should be replaced with one
factor referring to “whether any
circumstances (such as urgency or a risk
to safety) existed at the time of the impropriety that justify or excuse any
careless, reckless,
or deliberate conduct”. We agree urgency and risks to
safety are closely connected to section 30(3)(b). For example, the urgency
of a
situation may affect the assessment of whether investigators “ought to
have known” they were acting improperly under
section 30(3)(b) or may
lessen the seriousness of a known impropriety. We are not, however, aware of any
difficulties with the application
of these factors in their current form. We
recommend retaining them as separate factors to avoid any suggestion that the
courts should
take a different approach to their application.
Recommendation
- 7.251 If
section 30(3) is amended as proposed, we have suggested listing these factors as
relating to the public interest in recognising
the seriousness of the
impropriety (see recommendation 10). As discussed above in relation to that
recommendation, the existence
of urgency or apprehended physical danger will
generally decrease that public interest. We do not think it is necessary
to specify this since our recommended amendments to section 30(3) would simply
state the listed factors may be taken into account when “assessing”
the relevant public interest.
- 7.252 Our
recommendation for reform of section 30(3) contains a minor amendment to the
text of section 30(3)(h) (urgency). Rather
than referring to whether
there was urgency in obtaining the evidence, it would refer to the extent
to which the impropriety resulted from urgency in obtaining the evidence.
This would clarify the need for a link between the urgency and the impropriety,
consistent with
how the courts already apply the
factor.671F[672] We do not suggest
there is any problem in practice in this regard and do not intend to change the
law. Rather, if section 30(3) is
being amended anyway, we see it as an
opportunity to make the effect of the factor clearer on its face and more
consistent with how
similar factors are presented. For example, section 30(3)(g)
(apprehended physical danger) already refers to whether the impropriety
was
necessary to avoid apprehended physical danger, making it clear that a
link between the impropriety and the apprehended physical danger is
required.
- 7.253 We have
suggested using the words “the extent to which the impropriety resulted
from urgency” in section 30(3)(h)
rather than referring to whether the
impropriety was “necessary” given the urgency of the situation. We
think this is
more consistent with the evaluative nature of the factor. For
example, the impropriety may not have been objectively “necessary”
but may be more understandable in light of the urgency officers were acting
under.
Practicalities of policing
Issue
- 7.254 We
noted in our Issues Paper that Police had raised concerns about how readily the
courts turn to section 30 over relatively
technical breaches given the practical
realities of policing. This had been raised with the Commission previously
during the Second
Review and it did not recommend
reform.672F[673]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.255 We
expressed our preliminary view that, to the extent it is appropriate to take the
practicalities of policing into account,
this is already permitted by other
factors in section 30(3) (for example, practicalities may be taken into account
when assessing
the nature of the impropriety and whether there was urgency or a
risk to safety).673F[674] However,
we invited submissions on whether there are situations where the practicalities
of policing should be taken into account
but are not currently.
Results of consultation
- 7.256 Six
submitters responded to this question. Only Police supported reform. Five
submitters did not consider a new factor to be
necessary or
desirable.674F[675]
- 7.257 Police
referred to case law and observed that the practicalities of policing are well
recognised by the senior courts and frequently
taken into consideration. It
considered this is the correct approach and should be expressly reflected in the
Act. Police noted officers
are required to respond to an infinite variety of
circumstances at all hours and it cannot be expected there will always be
adequate
resources available in all locations to respond in a textbook manner.
Officers must be able to make quick assessments without the
benefit of legal
advice. Even if legal advice can be obtained, sometimes police must decide how
to proceed in situations where the
law is unclear or an issue has not yet been
decided by the courts. Officers acting in good faith cannot be expected to get
it right
every time. Finally, Police submitted that strict adherence to legal
requirements in all circumstances may bring into question public
faith in the
justice system.
- 7.258 The
submitters that opposed reform generally considered a separate factor
unnecessary because the practicalities of policing
are already taken into
account under other factors (such as the nature of the impropriety and
urgency).675F[676] They also
expressed concern that adding a separate factor might wrongly signal that
practical considerations or systemic issues can
be used to justify or excuse
improper evidence
gathering.676F[677] The NZLS added
that an amendment could unintentionally signify that convenience on the part of
police can justify illegal or unfair
activities. The Public Defence Service
considered it would create significant evidential issues and invite an approach
that excuses
or condones impropriety.
Reform not recommended
- 7.259 We
do not recommend amendment to explicitly refer to the practicalities of
policing.
- 7.260 Many of
the recommendations for reform we make in this report aim to better reflect the
current practice of the courts in legislation.
Police submitted it would be
consistent with that approach to expressly recognise the practicalities of
policing in section 30. In
this instance, however, we do not consider amendment
is necessary or desirable for two reasons. First, unlike other areas where we
recommend reform, consideration of the practicalities of policing is inherent in
other factors in section 30(3). In our view, those
other factors already
facilitate consideration of the practicalities of policing to the extent that is
appropriate. Including a separate
factor would risk placing undue emphasis on
these types of considerations. Second, referring to the “practicalities of
policing”
would be too broad and could undermine the rule of law. We
explain these two points further below.
- 7.261 In
relation to the first point, as Police acknowledged, the courts already have
regard to the practicalities of policing under
section 30. This includes when
determining whether the evidence was improperly obtained (particularly where
this depends on whether
a warrant should have been obtained rather than relying
on a warrantless search
power),677F[678] when assessing
the extent of the breach or nature of the impropriety (under
section 30(3)(a) and
(b))678F[679] and when assessing
whether there was urgency or apprehended physical danger (under section 30(3)(g)
and (h)).679F[680] We think that
is the correct approach. In particular, the urgency and apprehended physical
danger factors directly account for the
realities of the situation in which
police officers find themselves. We accept Police’s submission that it
cannot be expected
there will always be adequate resources available in all
locations to respond in a textbook manner, but in our view, that will primarily
be relevant where the situation is urgent or dangerous. Where the time can be
taken to follow proper procedures (including waiting
for further assistance or
advice where necessary), that should be done.
- 7.262 As to the
second point, we consider a “practicalities of policing” factor
would be too broad. It would risk undermining
the rule of law and fail to deter
future improprieties by sending the message that enforcement officers can breach
the law for reasons
of convenience. For example, it will usually be more
“practicable” for police to undertake a warrantless search rather
than seeking a warrant. We would not wish to suggest that favours admission of
improperly obtained evidence outside of specific situations
that are already
accounted for (that is, where there is urgency or apprehended physical danger).
OTHER MATTERS RAISED FOR INCLUSION IN THE BALANCING
TEST
Issue
- 7.263 Two
potential new factors were raised with us in preliminary feedback, which we
outlined in our Issues
Paper.680F[681] These
were:
(a) the need to deter future improprieties; and
(b) the extent to which the impropriety intruded on reasonable expectations of
privacy.
- 7.264 Our
preliminary view was that it is unnecessary and undesirable to specify either of
these as separate factors. We suggested
they are already taken into account
under existing factors when appropriate and recognising them separately would
risk duplicating
the analysis and potentially giving them undue
emphasis.681F[682]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.265 We
invited feedback on this approach. We also asked submitters whether any other
amendments to the section 30(3) factors were
necessary or desirable.
Results of consultation
- 7.266 Five
submitters responded to this question.
- 7.267 The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association supported the inclusion of a new factor
recognising the importance of excluding evidence
to encourage future legality.
This is similar to the need to deter future improprieties, which we discussed in
our Issues Paper.
- 7.268 Tim
Cochrane wrote a detailed submission urging the Commission to revisit the
Supreme Court’s decision in R v Alsford and clarify that breach of
the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) in the Privacy Act 2020 amounts to
breach of an enactment for
the purpose of
section 30(5)(a).682F[683]
While his primary submission was that the IPPs should be specifically referenced
in section 30(5), in the absence of such an amendment,
he supported an amendment
referring specifically to privacy in section 30(3). He referred to the
Commission’s preliminary view,
expressed in our Issues Paper, that privacy
expectations are already captured by section 30(3)(a) (the importance of any
right breached
and the extent of the breach). He considered that, while certain
privacy expectations are captured in this manner, section 30 currently
fails to
adequately protect rights of privacy by failing to give sufficient protection to
the IPPs. Alexandra Allen-Franks noted
in her submission that she supported Tim
Cochrane’s comments on Alsford.
- 7.269 Luke
Cunningham Clere proposed a new factor relating to the seriousness of the
impropriety — “any harm caused to
the defendant or other persons
(other than through the commencement of criminal proceedings) as a result of the
impropriety”.
It referred, as examples, to property damaged or seized
pursuant to an unlawful search or physical or psychological harm as a result
of
improper conduct.
Reform not recommended
- 7.270 Having
considered the submissions received on these issues, we do not recommend any
further amendments to section 30 to address
them. We explain our reasons
below.
Encouraging future legality
- 7.271 We
do not recommend including a new factor recognising the importance of excluding
evidence to encourage future legality. We
agree that encouraging future legality
(or deterring future impropriety) is an overarching aim of section 30, as we
discussed in
our Issues
Paper.683F[684] It is an aspect of
the need to maintain an effective and credible system of justice. In our view,
the importance of encouraging future
legality informs the factors that the court
may consider under section 30(3). It is unnecessary to include it as a factor in
its
own right, and to do so would be unhelpful given its breadth.
- 7.272 It is
difficult to see how a judge would assess what weight to give such a factor in
the circumstances of a particular case
other than by reference to other more
specific factors. In our view, the section 30(3)(b) factor is most relevant in
this respect.
Where the person or agency obtaining the evidence knew or ought to
have known of the impropriety, there will be a stronger case for
exclusion to
avoid similar conduct in future. On the other hand, if they could not have known
there was any impropriety (for example,
where the law was unclear at the time),
exclusion will be less necessary for deterrent purposes.
Privacy
- 7.273 We
do not propose any amendments to specifically address the status of the IPPs in
section 30(5) or to refer to privacy interests
in section 30(3).
- 7.274 In our
view, if the IPPs are to be given express recognition in section 30(5), that
should occur in the context of a broader
consideration of the appropriate legal
effect of the IPPs.684F[685] The
courts can have regard to breaches of the IPPs when deciding whether evidence
was improperly obtained although they are not determinative.
The Court of Appeal
in Tamiefuna v R considered breaches of the IPPs when finding there had
been a breach of the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure
(section 21 of the NZ Bill of
Rights).685F[686] The Supreme
Court has granted leave to appeal in Tamiefuna and may provide further
guidance on the relevance of the IPPs to the section 30 analysis in its
forthcoming decision.686F[687]
- 7.275 In
relation to section 30(3), we remain of the view expressed in our Issues Paper
that it is unnecessary and undesirable to
add a new factor referring to privacy
interests. The courts already routinely consider privacy interests under section
30(3)(a) where
there has been an unlawful or unreasonable search (in breach of
section 21 of the NZ Bill of
Rights).687F[688] Where, as in
Tamiefuna, the IPPs are taken into account in finding such a breach, they
could also affect the assessment of the extent of the breach under
that factor.
Our proposed amendment to section 30(3)(a) would clarify that the factor is not
limited to breaches of rights recognised
in the NZ Bill of Rights. It would
explicitly allow consideration of other interests infringed, including where
evidence is obtained
unfairly. Accordingly, if the IPPs — or privacy
interests more generally — were considered when finding that evidence
was
obtained “unfairly” under section
30(5)(c),688F[689] they could also
be taken into account under section 30(3)(a) when applying the balancing test.
- 7.276 Because of
this, we do not consider a separate factor is required. Analysis of privacy
interests is already covered by section
30(3)(a). Including it as a separate
factor would risk giving greater weight to privacy interests than to other
important interests
that may be engaged under that factor.
Harm caused by the impropriety
- 7.277 We
agree that harm caused by the impropriety (such as property damage or physical
or psychological harm to the defendant or
others) may be a relevant
consideration under section 30(3). It may increase the public interest in
recognising the impropriety.
Allowing the prosecution to rely on evidence
obtained through an impropriety that causes significant harm is more likely to
compromise
the integrity of the justice system. There is also a stronger public
interest in discouraging similar conduct in future.
- 7.278 However,
we do not consider a separate factor is required to allow for this. We are not
aware of this issue arising on a regular
basis, and it was not suggested to us
that the courts are failing to take it into account when it is relevant. Where
harm has been
caused by the impropriety (aside from that resulting from the
commencement of criminal proceedings), we suggest this could be considered
when
assessing the extent of the intrusion under section 30(3)(a) or as an
“other matter”.
RACIAL BIAS
Issue
- 7.279 In
the te ao Māori chapter in our Issues Paper, we discussed the application
of section 30 where racial bias may have influenced
the obtaining of
evidence.689F[690] We noted the
Court of Appeal had recognised in Kearns v R that a search influenced by
racial bias could lead to a finding that evidence was improperly obtained (a
matter that was remitted
back to the District Court for
determination).690F[691] For
example, section 19 of the NZ Bill of Rights (freedom from discrimination)
could be engaged.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.280 We
sought submissions on whether the application of section 30 in cases of
potential racial bias is sufficiently clear as a
result of Kearns. In
particular, we asked whether counsel are confident raising issues of racial bias
where appropriate and how judges approach such
matters at trial.
Results of consultation
- 7.281 Only
three submitters responded to this question. Two supported reform to specify
that discriminatory practices weigh against
admissibility.691F[692] One
submitted the Act is operating as
intended.692F[693]
- 7.282 The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association submitted there are systemic factors that act as
a barrier to raising issues of racial
bias under section 30. They said the
polarising phenomenon of racism and misunderstood terminology such as
“unconscious bias”
and “systemic bias” can impact
counsel’s confidence in raising the issue and judicial reception to
related lines
of questioning. They noted it is well-accepted that Māori are
disproportionately disadvantaged by discriminatory state conduct
and justice
outcomes. In their submission, the lack of case law in this area compared to
what is known about the disproportionate
experience of Māori and minority
cultures in police investigations suggests that section 30 is not being applied
correctly in
cases where bias may be an issue. They suggested specifying that
discriminatory practice must weigh against admissibility.
- 7.283 Police
considered the Act is working as intended. It noted Kearns appears to be
authority for the proposition that racially motivated evidence gathering may
breach the NZ Bill of Rights and be excluded
under section 30.
Reform not recommended
- 7.284 We
do not recommend amending section 30 to explicitly address issues of racial
bias.
- 7.285 We
acknowledge the issues raised by the ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association. As we
said in our Issues Paper, there is evidence
that Māori and other ethnic
minorities are stopped and searched by police
disproportionately.693F[694] The
Court of Appeal also referred in Kearns to the persistence of racially
biased attitudes among a minority of police
officers.694F[695] Despite this,
there is very little section 30 case law considering racial bias. This may
suggest there is a reluctance among counsel
and judges to raise or consider
issues of potential racial bias.
- 7.286 However,
in light of the very limited submissions we received on this issue and the
absence of any clear evidence that racial
bias is not being considered by the
courts where it ought to be, we are not in a position to conclude that there is
a problem in
practice with the way the section 30 analysis is being applied.
- 7.287 We
emphasise that, under section 30 as it is currently drafted, racial bias can be
taken into account both when determining
whether evidence has been improperly
obtained and when applying the balancing test. Amendment is not required to
enable that. For
example, racial bias may lead to a finding that evidence was
obtained in breach of the right to freedom from discrimination under
section 19
of the NZ Bill of Rights (as the Court recognised in
Kearns).695F[696] It could
also render a search unlawful or unreasonable — for example, if the
requirements for a warrantless search were not
in fact met. Either of these
findings would mean the evidence is improperly obtained. The importance of the
right breached and the
extent of the breach would then be a significant factor
when applying the balancing test (under section 30(3)(a)).
- 7.288 Kearns
provides clear authority for the fact that the courts can and should be
considering these issues. Since our Issues Paper was published,
we have become
aware of another case in the District Court where two Māori men were
stopped and their vehicle searched because
they matched a certain
profile.696F[697] The evidence
obtained was excluded under section 30. This may suggest increasing awareness
of, and willingness to address, potential
racial bias in the gathering of
evidence. Further case law and education may give counsel and judges greater
confidence in raising
and addressing concerns in this area.
ROLE OF CAUSATION UNDER SECTION 30(5)
Issue
- 7.289 For
evidence to be “improperly obtained” under section 30(5)(a) or (b),
it must have been obtained “in consequence”
of the breach. By
contrast, there is no causative language in section 30(5)(c) in relation to the
unfairness limb. However, the Supreme
Court has held there must “almost
always” be a causative link between the unfairness and the obtaining of
the evidence.697F[698]
- 7.290 If the
courts find there is no causal link between the impropriety and the obtaining of
the evidence, that is the end of the
section 30 inquiry. The balancing test is
not applied, and the evidence will not be excluded under section 30 irrespective
of the
seriousness of any impropriety.
- 7.291 In our
Issues Paper, we explained the courts have applied various tests to determine
whether the necessary causal link is
established.698F[699] In some
cases, the courts have taken a generous approach to causation, finding the
necessary link where the impropriety was a “minor
contributing
cause” to the obtaining of a
statement699F[700] or a search was
“coloured by the
impropriety”.700F[701] The
emphasis is then placed on the balancing test in which the strength or weakness
of the causal link can be taken into account
as a relevant
factor.701F[702] Other cases have
taken a strict approach — for example, finding a defendant’s
statement was not caused by an impropriety
because the court considers the
statement would have been made
anyway.702F[703]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 7.292 In
light of these apparent inconsistencies, we asked submitters whether it is
desirable to clarify the role of causation in
the section 30 analysis and, if
so, what approach should be
preferred.703F[704]
- 7.293 We noted a
strict approach that considers what would have occurred “but for”
the breach requires an assessment that
is necessarily speculative. It may also
be considered inconsistent with the need for an effective and credible system as
significant
breaches may be disregarded based on a threshold inquiry. Taking a
more generous approach to causation at the threshold stage but
taking into
account the extent of the causal connection when applying the balancing test
would allow for a transparent assessment
of the overall public interest.
- 7.294 We
suggested that, if a more generous approach to causation is supported, the
following amendments could be considered:
(a) amend section 30(5)(a) and (b) to broaden the wording specifying the
required causal link (for example, “in consequence
of” could be
replaced with “in connection with”); and/or
(b) amend section 30(3) to reinforce that the extent of the causative connection
between the impropriety and the obtaining of the
evidence is a relevant factor
in the balancing test.
- 7.295 We also
acknowledged there are arguments in favour of retaining the current approach,
which allows the courts to tailor their
approach to the facts of a case. For
example, a generous approach to causation may be considered more appropriate in
the context
of defendants’ statements compared to physical evidence given
the danger of speculating about what a defendant may have done
but for the
breach.
Results of consultation
- 7.296 Five
submitters responded to this question. Three favoured reform to clarify the
approach to causation704F[705]
while two opposed
it.705F[706]
- 7.297 The Public
Defence Service supported amending section 30(5)(a) and (b) to replace “in
consequence of” with “in
connection with” to clarify that a
generous view of causation should be taken. It said this would prevent
unnecessary argument
over causation and prevent highly speculative rulings based
on the reasoning that a defendant “would have confessed anyway”.
It
said that, if the extent of causation is to be considered, that should occur as
part of the balancing test.
- 7.298 Don
Mathias supported both of our suggestions for amendment. Luke Cunningham Clere
did not comment on whether section 30(5)
should be amended but its proposed
re-draft of section 30 included a new factor — “the strength of the
causative link
between the impropriety and the obtaining of the evidence, in
particular whether the evidence would likely have been obtained without
the
impropriety”.
- 7.299 The Crown
Law Office considered there was little point in attempting to clarify the
approach to causation through legislative
amendment given the difficulty of
precise definition. However, it agreed that, broadly speaking, a less exacting
test seems appropriate
(and consistent with the notion of causation elsewhere)
at the threshold stage. The extent of causation in the circumstances would
then
be relevant (when applying the balancing test) to the extent of the intrusion on
the right or interest and the nature of the
impropriety.
- 7.300 The NZLS
submitted the current flexible approach to causation is appropriate. It was
concerned that rewording section 30(5)
to use the words “in connection
with” risks including evidence that is too distinct from the impropriety.
Further, while
it acknowledged the degree of causation may be taken into account
under section 30(3), it considered it unnecessary to include it
as a factor
since it will mainly be relevant at the threshold stage.
Reform not recommended
- 7.301 We
do not recommend reform to address the approach to causation under section
30.
- 7.302 We
received comparatively little feedback from submitters on this issue, which
suggests there is not widespread concern about
the current approach to
causation. There was some support for the general approach to causation we
favoured — that is, taking
a generous view of causation at the threshold
stage and considering any attenuation of causation as part of the balancing
test. However,
there were mixed views on whether reform would achieve that or
what kind of reform was appropriate.
- 7.303 Any
attempt to clarify the approach to causation in section 30(5) (for example, by
replacing “in consequence of”
with “in connection with”)
could create further uncertainty and have the potential for unintended
consequences. We agree
with the Crown Law Office that causation is difficult to
define precisely so any amendment would remain broad and open to interpretation.
As such, we think it is more appropriate to allow case law to develop. As we
have noted, the Supreme Court in Perry (and the courts in some subsequent
cases) appeared to favour a more generous approach to causation at the threshold
stage.706F[707]
- 7.304 We also
have reservations about adding causation as an independent factor in the
balancing test. As the courts have found, it
can be relevant in some cases.
However, we would not wish to suggest the courts should, as a matter of course,
assess the relative
strength of the causative connection and take that into
account in the balancing test. To the extent it is relevant, it can be taken
into account when assessing the extent of the intrusion under section 30(3)(a)
or as an “other matter” relevant to the
public interest in
recognising the seriousness of the impropriety. Case law already supports this
approach.707F[708] We see a risk
that adding a separate causation factor could encourage the reasoning that
evidence should be admitted because it “would
have been obtained
anyway” (for example, where a warrant would likely have been available had
it been sought). That would raise
similar issues as we have discussed in
relation to the “other investigatory techniques” factor above (which
we recommend
repealing). It would fail to discourage investigators from taking
shortcuts rather than following lawful
procedures.708F[709]
CHAPTER 8
Prison informants and incentivised witnesses
INTRODUCTION
- 8.1 In
this chapter, we consider whether the Evidence Act 2006 sufficiently addresses
the risk of unreliability posed by evidence
given by prison informants and other
incentivised witnesses. We address the following:
(a) The admissibility of prison informant evidence. We conclude reform is
necessary to address the risks posed by prison informant
evidence and recommend
introducing a new provision to govern its admissibility.
(b) The use of judicial directions in relation to prison informant evidence that
is admitted at trial. We consider the risks posed
by prison informant evidence
are best addressed at the admissibility stage and so do not recommend reform.
(c) Whether additional safeguards for the use of prison informant evidence are
necessary or desirable. We conclude existing safeguards
are appropriate and
should be left to bed in alongside our recommendation to introduce a new
provision to govern admissibility.
(d) Whether any proposed amendments or additional safeguards should also apply
to other incentivised witnesses. We conclude it is
preferable for this issue to
be addressed by the courts on a case-by-case basis and so do not recommend
reform.
BACKGROUND
- 8.2 Prison
informant evidence is evidence given in a criminal proceeding of a
defendant’s statement purportedly made to another
person while they were
both detained and offered by that other person (the prison
informant).709F[710] This type of
evidence is often called “jailhouse snitch” evidence or a
“cellmate confession”.
- 8.3 Prison
informants may be recipients of confessional or other evidence that may not
otherwise be disclosed by the
defendant.710F[711] Prison
informant evidence can therefore be highly valuable to the prosecution case.
However, there are risks associated with its
use:
(a) Prison informant evidence can be unreliable. This is because informants are
often incentivised to give their evidence —
that is, their evidence may be
given in return for, or in the expectation or hope of, some advantage or benefit
to them.711F[712] These can
include improved prison conditions, preferential treatment from authorities,
early parole or reduced or dismissed sentences
or
charges.712F[713]
(b) Juries tend to find prison informant evidence highly persuasive and give it
undue weight even when warned about its potential
unreliability.713F[714] This has
been ascribed variously to:
(i) a psychological phenomenon known as the “fundamental attribution
error” (whereby people attribute the behaviour of
others to personal
factors such as honesty or a desire to “do the right thing” rather
than situational factors such as
the promise of a
reward);714F[715]
(ii) the fact that prison informants may present a credible account of events
and be capable of lying
convincingly;715F[716] and
(iii) the lack of proper records of incentives promised or received making it
difficult to assess the motivations of the
informant.716F[717]
- 8.4 Taken
together and as acknowledged by te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court in W
(SC 38/2019) v R, these risks have led to a demonstrated link between
prison informant evidence and miscarriages of
justice.717F[718] Although much of
the social science evidence of this link is from overseas jurisdictions, there
have been high-profile cases in Aotearoa
New Zealand of wrongful convictions
that have rested in part on false prison informant
evidence.718F[719] These cases
have attracted significant media and public
attention.719F[720]
- 8.5 Incentives
can also exist for other participants in the criminal justice system (besides
prison informants) to give evidence of
a defendant’s alleged guilt. For
example, a person facing criminal charges might share information about another
individual’s
involvement in unrelated offending in the hope of receiving
preferential treatment from investigating or prosecuting authorities.
We return
to this broader class of incentivised witnesses at the end of this
chapter.
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRISON INFORMANT EVIDENCE
Issue
- 8.6 The
Act does not specifically address the admissibility of prison informant
evidence. Instead, it is assessed under sections 7
(relevance) and 8
(general exclusion).720F[721] In
our Issues Paper, we provided an overview of the case law that guides
admissibility decisions.721F[722]
In Hudson v R, the Supreme Court held there is no
presumption that prison informant evidence is inadmissible as this would be
incompatible with the Act’s intention
that “reliability decisions
should be made by a properly cautioned
jury”.722F[723] At the same
time, the Court acknowledged the risk of unreliability posed by this type of
evidence means it requires “careful
scrutiny”.723F[724]
- 8.7 The notion
of “careful scrutiny” was elaborated on in two cases, W (SC
38/2019) v R and R v Roigard, heard by the Supreme Court
concurrently.724F[725] There the
Court held, in recognition of the risks posed by prison informant evidence, that
reliability could be considered as part
of the section 8 assessment. It
considered that the judge is undertaking a gatekeeping role in this regard,
leaving the ultimate
decision on reliability to a properly cautioned
jury.725F[726] The Court outlined
a framework for assessing prison informant evidence under the section 8 test. In
our Issues Paper, we set out
the different approaches of both the majority and
minority.726F[727] We observed
that the minority proposed a more detailed framework for scrutiny, which would
have led to a different conclusion on
the admissibility of some of the proposed
evidence.
- 8.8 We described
other non-legislative safeguards for the admissibility and use of prison
informant evidence.727F[728] These
include guidance for prosecutors from the Solicitor-General on the use of prison
informant evidence (the Solicitor-General’s
guidelines)728F[729] and a central
register of prison informants maintained by Ngā Pirihimana Aotearoa | New
Zealand Police.729F[730]
- 8.9 We
highlighted the difficulties with assessing practical concerns given the recency
of the judgments in W (SC 38/2019) v R and Roigard. However, we
noted the division between the majority and minority highlights a difference in
opinion as to how the reliability assessment
should be approached. Preliminary
feedback also highlighted continuing concerns about whether the majority’s
approach is sufficient
to protect against the risks posed by prison informant
evidence.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 8.10 We
asked submitters whether the current approach is sufficient to address the risks
associated with prison informant evidence
and, if not, whether the Act should be
amended to include additional controls on its admissibility.
- 8.11 We
presented three options for
reform:730F[731]
(a) Option 1 — create a reliability threshold. This would provide
that evidence of a statement made by the defendant to another person while they
were both detained is only admissible if it meets a certain threshold of
reliability (for example, if the circumstances relating
to the evidence provide
reasonable assurance that that it is
reliable).731F[732]
(b) Option 2 — create a reliability threshold in combination with a
presumption of exclusion. This would create a presumption of exclusion that
could
only be displaced if the judge was satisfied (either on the “balance
of probabilities” or “beyond reasonable doubt”)
that the
statement was reliable.
(c) Option 3 — specify relevant factors the judge should take into
consideration when assessing reliability. This could be implemented alongside
option 1 or 2. As with similar provisions in the Act governing specific
reliability assessments (for example, sections 28 and 45),
this would be a
non-exhaustive list. It could be based on the factors outlined by either the
majority or the minority in W (SC 38/2019) v R.
Results of consultation
The need for reform
- 8.12 Fourteen
submitters responded to this question. Three submitters considered reform is
unnecessary732F[733] while eight
supported reform.733F[734] Three
submitters did not express a clear view on the appropriateness of the current
approach.734F[735]
- 8.13 Submitters
that did not support reform considered that the current approach is working
well. Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown
Law Office and the Wellington Crown
Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere, said the general rules in sections 7 and 8 and
the availability
of a direction on reliability under section 122(2)(d) once
evidence is admitted are sufficient. The Crown Law Office also said the
Solicitor-General’s guidelines act as a threshold consideration in
determining whether to introduce prison informant evidence.
One submitter,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, expressed more general concern about any
change to the law leading to “unnecessary
appellate consideration”
in a reasonably settled area. She underlined the importance of having clear
empirical evidence to
validate any reform.
- 8.14 Submitters
that supported reform considered that prison informant evidence carries an
extremely high risk of unreliability and
that this risk is inadequately
addressed by the current law. Some submitters referred in detail to empirical
evidence of the risks
of prison informant evidence and highly publicised cases
involving its use.735F[736] The
Auckland District Law Society (ADLS) and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers
Association New Zealand suggested “there must be
miscarriages of justice
which go unresolved because of the lack of record-keeping”. Many were
critical of the ability of the
section 7 and 8 tests to address the risks
associated with prison informant evidence at the admissibility stage,
considering them
to be low
thresholds.736F[737] Ratonga Wawao
ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service commented that, under
section 7, prison informant evidence “will
likely always be
probative”.
- 8.15 Many of
these submitters considered the availability of a judicial direction on
reliability under section 122(2)(d) is insufficient
to address the risks once
the evidence has been
admitted.737F[738] They referred
to empirical evidence from mock trials and anecdotal experience of juror
behaviour, which indicate juries overweight
this type of
evidence.738F[739] In their view,
this underlines the need for reform to address the risk of unreliability at the
admissibility stage before it is presented
to the jury.
- 8.16 Two
submitters commented that New Zealand is out of step with comparable
jurisdictions on this issue. The ADLS and Defence Lawyers
Association referred
to a Privy Council
decision739F[740] and other
jurisdictions, including
Canada740F[741] and various US
states,741F[742] that have
recognised the “inherent” unreliability of prison informant evidence
and taken steps to limit or control its
use.
- 8.17 Three
submitters did not express a clear view on the appropriateness of the current
approach. Two submitters considered that
not enough time had passed to fully
assess the impact on practice of the Supreme Court’s decision in W (SC
38/2019) v R and the Solicitor-General’s guidelines for
prosecutors.742F[743] Te
Kāhui Tātari Ture | Criminal Cases Review Commission provided
high-level comment based on the applications currently
under its consideration,
identifying “incentivised witness evidence to be in the top tier of our
identified systemic issues”.
Options for reform
- 8.18 Thirteen
submitters commented on the options for reform. Three submitters did not support
any options for reform.743F[744]
The Crown Law Office and Luke Cunningham Clere expressed concern about reform in
this area circumventing the proper role of the jury
at trial. Luke Cunningham
Clere underlined the importance of allowing the jury to be the ultimate
decision-maker “on the basis
of all available evidence, rather than having
potentially significant evidence excluded from consideration”.
- 8.19 Ten
submitters supported reform of the Act to include additional controls on
admissibility.744F[745] Nine
supported a presumption of exclusion in combination with a reliability threshold
(option 2) either alone745F[746]
or alongside factors for assessing reliability
(option 3).746F[747] Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) supported options 1
and 3 together (a reliability threshold and factors
for assessing reliability).
- 8.20 Submitters
commented that reform would align with other sections of the Act, which contain
specific thresholds for other types
of evidence that present reliability
concerns. Submitters that supported option 2 (a presumption of exclusion and a
reliability threshold)
considered a presumption of exclusion is the only option
sufficient to address the risks associated with prison informant evidence.
According to the ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association:
- The safest
pathway is a statutory presumption of exclusion ... [N]ot only is the evidence
inherently unreliable, but jurors have
also been shown to be incapable of
accurately assessing reliability. Something has to change, the only reasonable
pathway forward
based on the experience of the last few decades, and the
consensus in the literature, is a presumption of inadmissibility.
- 8.21 In our
Issues Paper, we asked a further question about what standard should be required
to displace any presumption of exclusion
— either the balance of
probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt. Of the five submitters that addressed
this question, three
preferred beyond reasonable
doubt.747F[748] The ADLS and
Defence Lawyers Association viewed this as a suitably high standard in light of
the risks prison informant evidence
presents and submitted a presumption of
exclusion should only be displaced if the prosecution can prove beyond
reasonable doubt that
the evidence is truthful — for example, if it led to
the discovery of a body.
- 8.22 Two
submitters, Te Rōpū Tauira Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Students’ Association and Associate Professor
Anna High, preferred a
balance of probabilities standard. They said it would preserve the proper
constitutional roles of judge and
jury by clearly signalling that the final
decision as to reliability rests with the
jury.748F[749] The Crown Law
Office, although not supporting reform in this area, preferred a balance of
probabilities standard for similar reasons.
It was concerned that requiring the
prosecution to prove an evidential matter to the same standard as all the
elements of the offence
(that is, beyond reasonable doubt) would be too
onerous.
- 8.23 Five
submitters supported option 3 — specifying factors to be considered when
assessing reliability.749F[750]
The Criminal Bar Association described such an approach as likely to assist
judges, prosecutors and defence counsel in dealing with
this type of evidence
and noted similar approaches are taken elsewhere in the Act (for example, in
section 30(3)). Four of those
five
submitters750F[751] referred
positively to the list of factors suggested in the Issues Paper (based on the
factors set out by the minority in W (38/2019) v
R).751F[752] The NZLS
considered these factors would help guide the courts’ assessment without
turning the admissibility inquiry into a
“mini-trial”. The Criminal
Bar Association emphasised that these factors should not be exhaustive as the
circumstances
of prison informant evidence can vary significantly and judges
should retain some discretion in their assessment.
- 8.24 Two
submitters made additional suggestions for factors to include. Associate
Professor High proposed the addition of “whether
the witness has offered
informant evidence against any other defendant in an unrelated matter”.
The Public Defence Service
also submitted that the list should refer to the
informant history of the witness. In addition, it suggested the last factor on
the
list (whether the witness has a record of lying) should include
consideration of possible future incentives. This would cover circumstances
where a witness may not ask for anything at the time but may seek reward at a
later date.
The need for reform
- 8.25 We
conclude reform is necessary to address the risk of unreliability associated
with prison informant evidence. The empirical
evidence extensively cited by the
Supreme Court in W (SC 38/2019) v
R752F[753] and referred to by
a number of submitters753F[754] is
compelling evidence of the significant risks posed by the use of prison
informant evidence in criminal proceedings. That evidence,
in the words of the
Supreme Court, provides “plainly scientific support” for the
proposition that prison informant evidence
has contributed to miscarriages of
justice.754F[755] As discussed
above, although much of this empirical evidence comes from overseas
jurisdictions, the risks have already been realised
in a number of high-profile
cases in New Zealand. We consider it significant that the Criminal Cases Review
Commission has identified
incentivised witness testimony as being in the
“top tier” of systemic issues based on the cases that have been
referred
to it.
- 8.26 We do not
consider these risks to be overstated. Police submitted that, in fact, prison
informants open themselves up to personal
risk by being labelled as a
“snitch” and that the negative consequences of doing so would
dissuade people from informing
unless it was
truthful.755F[756] Yet evidence
shows prison informants can, and do, provide false
testimony.756F[757] In
Hudson, the Supreme Court commented that, although there may be adverse
consequences for prisoners deemed to be “snitching”
or
“narking” on fellow inmates, this does not assure reliability as
“such consequences might be thought to be at
least as likely where the
information provided to the police is true as where it is
false”.757F[758]
- 8.27 Amending
the Act to introduce a new standard of admissibility will explicitly acknowledge
the risks associated with prison informant
evidence and guard against them by
requiring that evidence meet a certain standard of reliability before it can be
admitted. Reform
will bring prison informant evidence in line with other
categories of evidence that carry similarly significant risks of unreliability,
which are subject to additional controls on their admissibility. Examples
include section 28 (unreliable statements), section 45
(visual identification
evidence) and section 46 (voice identification evidence). We note the comments
of Winkelmann CJ for the minority
in W (SC 38/2019) v R referring to the
“four leading categories of evidence most often associated with
miscarriages of justice: eyewitness misidentification,
flawed forensic evidence,
false confessions and false informant evidence”. The Chief Justice
observed:758F[759]
- For each of
these categories of evidence, except the false informant category, the Evidence
Act provides either structured mechanisms
to promote the collection of good
quality evidence, or evidential thresholds that protect against the admission of
unreliable evidence.
In some cases it does both.
- 8.28 Our
conclusion regarding the introduction of controls on admissibility is reinforced
by the available empirical evidence relating
to juror attitudes and behaviour
towards this type of evidence. Various mock trial studies, again cited by the
Supreme Court in W (SC 38/2019) v
R759F[760] and referred
to by a number of
submitters,760F[761] have shown
that jurors find prison informant evidence extremely persuasive — often as
compelling as primary confession evidence.
This is so even when they are given
“enhanced” directions as to the potential for
unreliability.761F[762] Even with
the limitations of such
studies,762F[763] the Supreme
Court considered they provide insight into the reasons why prison informant
evidence “figures to the extent it
does in known miscarriages of
justice”763F[764] and
support an approach of careful
scrutiny.764F[765] In light of
this, we consider it particularly important for the Act to allow reliability
concerns to be addressed at the admissibility
stage before evidence is presented
to a jury.
- 8.29 Some
submitters were concerned that inserting additional admissibility provisions
runs counter to both the proper, constitutional
role of the jury in determining
reliability and the general scheme of the
Act.765F[766] We disagree. As we
note above, other provisions in the Act contain admissibility thresholds for
other types of evidence that carry
particular risks of unreliability. Amendment
would also reflect the approach of the Supreme Court in W (SC 38/2019) v
R, which clearly signalled a shift to a more active, pre-trial
gatekeeping role for judges in assessing the reliability of prison informant
evidence. Finally, as discussed further below, our recommended reform can
properly reflect and preserve the distinct role of judge
and
jury.
Recommendation
- R11 Insert
a new provision requiring the judge to exclude prison informant evidence (to be
defined using the wording in section 122(2)(d))
offered by the prosecution in a
criminal proceeding unless satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the
circumstances relating
to the evidence provide reasonable assurance that it is
reliable. The new provision should require a judge in making their assessment
to
have regard to, among other matters:
- any
indications that the evidence is unreliable, including its consistency with
other evidence and whether it has led to the discovery
of other evidence;
- whether
the evidence could have been constructed on the basis of facts and information
gained from sources other than the defendant;
- whether
the witness has been incentivised to give their evidence and the nature of any
incentives offered or received;
- whether
the witness has any other motives to offer unreliable evidence;
- whether
the witness has a record of lying; and
- whether
the witness has any history of offering informant evidence in other proceedings
and, if so, the circumstances and nature of
that evidence and the outcome of
those proceedings.
- 8.30 We
recommend inserting a new provision into the Act that would define prison
informant evidence and require it to be excluded
unless the judge is satisfied
on the balance of probabilities that the circumstances relating to the evidence
provide reasonable
assurance that it is reliable. As we explain below, our
proposal draws on elements of sections 18, 28, 45 and 46, which govern the
admissibility of other types of potentially unreliable evidence.
- 8.31 A key
concern of submitters was that reform would collapse the distinction between the
roles of judge and jury by requiring a
judge to determine ultimate reliability.
For reasons we expand on below, we do not consider our proposed amendment would
have this
effect. It would create a threshold inquiry into whether the evidence
is sufficiently reliable for it to be put to the jury in a
similar way to other
provisions in the Act. Applying a “balance of probabilities”
standard and referring to the circumstances
relating to the evidence and
“reasonable assurance” of reliability would underline this.
A presumption of exclusion displaced by a balance of
probabilities standard
- 8.32 Our
proposed amendment would create a presumption of exclusion for prison informant
evidence. We agree with submitters that this
approach appropriately recognises
the significant risks prison informant evidence carries. Making exclusion the
default position
would ensure that prison informant evidence is only admitted if
it can be shown to be sufficiently reliable. This approach aligns
with the
treatment of other types of evidence in the Act that pose a heightened risk of
unreliability — in particular, section
28 (unreliable statements),
section 45(2) (visual identification evidence) and section 46 (voice
identification). All these sections
provide that evidence is inadmissible or
must be excluded unless it can be shown to meet a certain threshold of
reliability.
- 8.33 Our
recommended provision would adopt a balance of probabilities standard to rebut
the presumption of exclusion for prison informant
evidence. This would ensure a
thorough and robust inquiry into reliability, commensurate with the risks this
evidence poses, before
it can be offered at trial. We consider balance of
probabilities is the more appropriate standard than beyond reasonable doubt.
First,
we agree with submitters that favoured this approach that it most clearly
maintains the distinction between the assessment of threshold
reliability and
ultimate reliability. In the words of Associate Professor High, it
“signal[s] that the final decision as to
reliability is still a matter for
the jury”. A beyond reasonable doubt standard would require the
prosecution to place significant
evidence before the court to meet that standard
and could turn the assessment into a
“mini-trial”.766F[767]
- 8.34 Second, the
balance of probabilities aligns with the standard applied in sections 28(2) and
46 which, as we note above, govern
the admissibility of other types of
potentially unreliable
evidence.767F[768] We note that a
beyond reasonable doubt standard is used in section 45(2) (the admissibility of
visual identification evidence obtained
in the absence of a formal procedure)
and section 29 (statements obtained by oppression). We understand this was based
on legislators’
concerns about the particular risks inherent in these
types of evidence.768F[769]
Although the risks involved in prison informant evidence are significant, we are
not persuaded they are more substantial than the
risks associated with other
evidence subject to a balance of probabilities test so as to justify a higher
threshold for admissibility.
Circumstances provide reasonable assurance of
reliability
- 8.35 The
judge’s inquiry under our proposed amendment would be into whether
circumstances relating to the prison informant evidence
provide reasonable
assurance that it is reliable. This wording is taken from section 18 (general
admissibility of hearsay), which
provides that a hearsay statement is admissible
if (among other criteria) the circumstances relating to the statement provide
reasonable
assurance that the statement is
reliable.769F[770] As with section
18, the reference to “reasonable assurance” (emphasis added)
would ensure the judge is concerned with threshold reliability rather than
ultimate reliability.770F[771]
- 8.36 Our
proposed amendment would direct the judge’s attention to the circumstances
relating to the evidence. We favour the
wording of “circumstances
relating to” the evidence as in section 18 compared to the wording
of “circumstances in which the statement was made” as
in section 28.
It allows for a broader inquiry into circumstances that may suggest an informant
is lying about the contents of the
defendant’s statement or whether it was
made at all.
- 8.37 We
emphasise the assessment would focus on the reliability of the prison
informant’s evidence (that is, whether the informant is accurately
communicating what the defendant said to them) rather than the reliability
of
the defendant’s statement itself.
Factors for assessing reliability
- 8.38 Our
recommended provision would require the judge to consider certain factors when
assessing whether the circumstances relating
to the evidence provide reasonable
assurance of reliability. These are similar to the factors presented for
discussion in our Issues
Paper based on the minority approach in W (SC
38/2019) v R.771F[772] They
received general support from the submitters that addressed
them.772F[773] They also broadly
align with the factors outlined in the Solicitor-General’s guidelines so
will ensure some consistency in
approach and
practice.773F[774] The inclusion
of these factors will promote clarity and certainty as to the application of the
admissibility threshold. We agree
with submitters that the list of factors
should not be exhaustive.774F[775]
As the Criminal Bar Association observed, the circumstances relating to prison
informant evidence can vary significantly and so it
is important to maintain
some discretion and flexibility.
- 8.39 An inquiry
into “the circumstances relating to the evidence” would allow
consideration of a broad range of matters.
As noted above, this wording is based
on section 18, which determines the admissibility of hearsay evidence. The
hearsay provisions
allow consideration of (among other matters) the nature and
contents of the statement, the circumstances relating to the making of
the
statement and the veracity of the maker of the
statement.775F[776] Case law under
section 18 also makes it clear that the “circumstances relating to the
statement” can include consideration
of whether the statement is
corroborated by other
evidence.776F[777] Our recommended
provision would require consideration of similar types of factors when assessing
the reliability of prison informant
evidence.
- 8.40 One of the
factors in our proposed provision refers to “any indications that the
evidence is unreliable”. We emphasise
that the judge’s assessment
under this factor should focus on clear indications of unreliability based on
other evidence or
the content of the
statement.777F[778] The judge
would not be required to carry out an in-depth analysis of the truth of the
evidence, which is matter for the jury.
- 8.41 The wording
of our proposed amendment differs slightly from that presented in our Issues
Paper. Factor (f) has been added in
light of submissions by Associate Professor
High and the Public Defence Service that whether an individual has offered
informant
evidence in other cases (the informant history of the witness) should
also be considered. This is consistent with concerns raised
by other submitters
about “repeat offenders” who repeatedly come forward with false
information.778F[779]
- 8.42 The Public
Defence Service further submitted that consideration of incentives offered or
received should encompass possible future
incentives. It envisaged a situation
where an informant may not seek anything in exchange for their evidence at the
time it is offered
but may request a reward at some future date. This would be a
speculative exercise and one that may be difficult for the judge to
carry out.
That said, the possibility of future incentives could be relevant under factors
(c) and (d) above if there is evidence
that a person intended to seek reward in
the future.
- 8.43 In our
Issues Paper, we suggested that one of the factors for consideration could be
“the significance of the evidence
to the facts at issue, including the
importance of those facts to the proceedings and the probative nature of
evidence presented”.
This was included in the minority discussion of the
relevant factors in W (SC 38/2019) v
R.779F[780] The NZLS
queried its inclusion in the proposed reforms given that “relevance is
already sufficiently dealt with under section
7 of the Act”. We agree this
factor is not relevant to reliability. The admissibility of prison informant
evidence should be
determined based on a threshold reliability assessment.
Unreliable evidence should not be permitted simply because it is important
to
the prosecution.780F[781]
Accordingly, we do not include it in our recommendation.
USE OF JUDICIAL DIRECTIONS
Issue
- 8.44 Section
122(2)(d) requires a judge to consider whether to warn the jury of the need for
caution in deciding whether to accept
prison informant evidence and the weight
to be given to it. In our Issues Paper, we outlined the case law that has
developed in this
area.781F[782]
In Hudson, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a standard
form direction should be given in all cases involving prison informant evidence
but held that a direction will “normally” be
required.782F[783]
- 8.45 This
approach was affirmed by te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal in Baillie
v R, where it held that the considerations that justify
“careful scrutiny” of prison informant evidence when deciding its
admissibility
apply similarly to judicial directions if prison informant
evidence is presented at
trial.783F[784] The Court set out
a number of factors to which judges should consider directing the jury’s
attention, including incentives
promised or expected and how powerful they might
be, the length of time it took the witness to disclose their evidence, any
implausibility
or inconsistency in the evidence and the risks of juries
attributing the evidence to a desire to tell the truth rather than linking
it
with an incentive.784F[785]
- 8.46 In our
Issues Paper, we noted that both the courts and commentators have been critical
of the ability of judicial directions
to address the risks of prison informant
evidence, citing research that indicates such directions (even when enhanced)
have no effect
on
verdicts.785F[786] Despite these
concerns, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to do away with judicial
directions completely,786F[787]
noting that the Act proceeds on the basis that juries do listen and respond to
judicial directions.787F[788]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 8.47 We
sought feedback on whether section 122(2)(d), including the Court’s
guidance in Baillie, is sufficient to address the risks associated
with prison informant evidence once admitted at trial. If not, we asked whether
it should
be amended to enhance judicial directions to the jury. We presented
two options for reform, one or both of which could be
adopted:788F[789]
(a) Option 1 — require judges to provide a warning to the jury on
reliability in every case involving prison informant evidence.
(b) Option 2 — set out factors that a judge should consider
including, or must include, in their warning. We did not express a view on what
factors
should be included but suggested the guidance provided by the court in
Baillie may provide a useful starting point.
Results of consultation
- 8.48 Ten
submitters responded to this question. Three submitters considered section
122(2)(d) is sufficient to address the risks associated
with prison informant
evidence789F[790] while six
submitters said it is
not.790F[791] One submitter
considered that legislative reform should not be pursued in the absence of clear
empirical evidence of a
problem.791F[792]
- 8.49 Submitters
that considered the current approach to be sufficient noted that existing case
law means that a warning will essentially
be given in all cases involving prison
informant evidence even though that is not prescribed by the
Act.792F[793] The Crown Law Office
referred to the general guidance on judicial directions provided by the Supreme
Court in CT v R793F[794]
as well as the Supreme Court’s comments in Hudson that a
warning will normally be required in cases involving prison informant
evidence.794F[795] On this basis
and given the specific guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in
Baillie,795F[796] the Crown
Law Office considered it unnecessary to amend the Act to require any direction
or prescribe its content. It further considered
that it would be undesirable to
do so. It said the current approach allows for judicial discretion as to whether
to give a direction
and what it should cover on the facts of each case rather
than being applied “routinely or mechanistically”. Two other
submitters also considered it is preferable to retain judicial discretion as to
whether to give a warning and what it should
contain.796F[797]
- 8.50 Both the
Crown Law Office and Luke Cunningham Clere reiterated the fundamental
constitutional importance of reliability being
determined by a properly
cautioned jury and the risk of this being diminished by overly prescriptive
rules on judicial directions.
- 8.51 Of the six
submitters that expressed concern about the adequacy of section 122(2)(d), five
pointed to evidence of jury behaviour
as showing that judicial directions cannot
overcome the “fundamental attribution error” that leads to juries
placing
undue weight on prison informant
evidence.797F[798] The Public
Defence Service said it had “clear anecdotal evidence that the appellate
courts’ optimism in respect of the
effectiveness of directions may well be
misplaced”.
- 8.52 Although
the majority of submitters considered section 122(2)(d) provides insufficient
protection against the risks of prison
informant evidence, far fewer submitters
addressed whether and how it should be amended. Only three submitters said that
section
122(2)(d) should be amended and none provided detailed
reasons.798F[799] This may reflect
a view among these submitters that amendment would be unlikely to address their
concerns. For example, Justice for
All Inc stated that “section 122(2)(d)
has been an ineffective safeguard and is likely to still be ineffective even if
it is
modified”.
Reform not recommended
- 8.53 We
do not recommend reform to amend section 122(2)(d) to enhance judicial
directions on the use of prison informant evidence.
We are not persuaded that
the lack of mandatory or prescribed judicial directions is causing problems in
practice. The Crown Law
Office considered that, as a result of recent case law,
judicial directions will in effect be given in every case involving prison
informant evidence. This aligns with earlier feedback we received that judges
will always give a warning about unreliability when
this type of evidence is
offered.
- 8.54 Our
conclusion on this issue is reinforced by our recommendation above to introduce
a new provision governing the admissibility
of prison informant evidence. A
number of submitters referred to the difficulties juries experience in using and
weighing this type
of
evidence.799F[800] Some of these
submitters thought this made judicial directions ineffective in that they come
at too late a stage to address the risks
of
unreliability.800F[801] As we note
above, this emphasises the importance of addressing reliability risks at the
admissibility stage before evidence is presented
to a jury.
- 8.55 Finally, as
the Commission has previously emphasised, it is important to maintain discretion
and flexibility in judicial
directions.801F[802] We agree with
the Crown Law Office that retaining discretion provides “scope for the
unknown” and allows judges to decline
to provide a direction where to do
so would unnecessarily emphasise evidence or where there are good reasons not to
do so on the
facts of the case.
- 8.56 More
guidance on this issue may be forthcoming from the courts. The Supreme Court has
granted leave to appeal in Tihema v R on the question of whether the
principles in W (SC 38/2019) v R and Roigard were correctly
applied in a judicial direction concerning the evidence of a prison
informant.802F[803]
ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Issue
- 8.57 In
W (SC 38/2019) v R, the Supreme Court considered that additional
safeguards for the use of prison informant evidence were “important and
necessary”.803F[804] It went
on to outline some of the safeguards used in some overseas jurisdictions,
including the use of approval committees to review
and agree to the use of
prison informant evidence, record-keeping and disclosure requirements and
prosecutorial policies that limit
the use of prison informant
evidence.804F[805] The Court
ultimately concluded that further guidance for prosecutors and a central
register of prison informants should be explored
further.805F[806]
- 8.58 In our
Issues Paper, we noted that commentators had expressed support for additional
safeguards in this area.806F[807]
Since W (SC 38/2019) v R, the Solicitor-General has produced
guidance for prosecutors on the use of prison informant
evidence807F[808] and Police has
set up and is maintaining a central register of prison
informants.808F[809]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 8.59 We
asked submitters whether other safeguards were necessary or desirable to address
the risks associated with prison informant
evidence and, if so, what these
should be. We did not express a view on this but outlined some possible options
to inform submitters’
views. These included enhancing existing
prosecutorial policies and guidance, oversight and approval of decisions to use
prison informant
evidence and more robust
record-keeping.809F[810]
Results of consultation
- 8.60 Ten
submitters responded to this question. Four considered additional safeguards are
necessary810F[811] while four did
not.811F[812] Two submitters, the
NZLS and Associate Professor High, considered that it is too soon to assess the
impact of recent developments
and so did not express a firm view on whether any
additional safeguards are necessary or desirable.
- 8.61 Those
submitters that did not consider additional safeguards necessary or desirable
had mixed views as to why. Luke Cunningham
Clere considered that additional
safeguards are unnecessary as the current approach is sufficient. In contrast,
the ADLS and Defence
Lawyers Association, both of whom supported reform more
generally, considered that additional safeguards would be insufficient because
only statutory reform on admissibility can address the risks of prison informant
evidence.
- 8.62 Those
submitters that supported the introduction of additional safeguards expressed
particular concern about the lack of
record-keeping.812F[813] They said
this makes it difficult to identify and assess reliability concerns. Both the
Criminal Bar Association and the Public Defence
Service favoured a central
register and gave suggestions as to what information this should hold,
including:
(a) incentives offered, accepted or declined;
(b) any history of the witness acting as a prison informant in other cases and
the circumstances and outcomes of those cases; and
(c) the type and nature of interactions between informants and Police.
- 8.63 These
submitters also emphasised the importance of ensuring information held on the
register is discoverable and disclosed to
defence
counsel.813F[814]
- 8.64 The Public
Defence Service supported requiring the prosecution to make an application in
each instance it wishes to use prison
informant evidence, judges to provide
reasoning for their decision to admit and all prison informant statements to be
recorded to
“mitigate against coaching and accidental tainting, and show
body language”.
Reform not recommended
- 8.65 We
do not recommend reform to introduce additional safeguards on the admissibility
or use of prison informant evidence. Our conclusion
on this issue is reinforced
by our recommendation above to introduce a new admissibility provision for
prison informant evidence.
We consider this proposed amendment will also improve
record-keeping and disclosure because the court will necessarily require
information
to determine admissibility. The reform we have recommended to
specify the factors that a judge must consider when determining admissibility
will therefore drive any changes needed to police record-keeping and disclosure
practices.
- 8.66 A number of
submitters, including some of those expressing support for additional
safeguards, were positive about the potential
impact of the
Solicitor-General’s guidelines. They observed, however, that the
guidelines are still relatively new and so it
is difficult to draw clear
conclusions about how they are working in
practice.814F[815] We consider
this safeguard should be allowed to bed in alongside our recommended
admissibility provision. Feedback from submitters
on other potential safeguards
(such as limiting the number of prison informants called in one proceeding or
requiring interviews
to be recorded) could be useful considerations for future
iterations of the guidelines.
- 8.67 Submitters
were less positive about current approaches to record-keeping and disclosure. As
with the Solicitor-General’s
guidelines, the development of a central
register is relatively new and many of the concerns raised by submitters may
pre-date its
establishment. Further feedback from Police on the central register
of prison informants indicated the challenges of collecting relevant
information. Police said it was not in a position to comment at this stage on
how the register is operating in practice. We consider
it would be inappropriate
to recommend a statutory record-keeping requirement until the operation of the
new register can be properly
assessed.
- 8.68 Defence
lawyers raised a number of concerns about the current approach to disclosure of
relevant information about prison informant
evidence.815F[816] Disclosure
obligations are only as good as the information that is collected and made
available, so any change in practice in this
area is very closely intertwined
with the collection and recording of relevant information. In our view, any
relevant information
about prison informants and the circumstances relating to
their evidence should be disclosed to the defence in line with the general
disclosure obligations under section 13(2)(a) of the Criminal Disclosure Act
2008. Any concerns about how this is currently working
in practice would be
properly addressed by the Criminal Disclosure Act rather than by reform of the
Evidence Act.
OTHER INCENTIVISED WITNESSES
Issue
- 8.69 The
main focus of our Issues Paper chapter was on prison informant evidence.
However, we acknowledged — as the Supreme
Court did in W (SC 38/2019) v
R and Roigard — that there is also a class of witnesses that
can be said to be incentivised in the context of the broader criminal justice
system.816F[817] We noted that the
material concern with prison informant evidence is its unreliability. That
concern does not come from the fact
of detention at the time of the alleged
interaction between the informant and the defendant but from the incentives
available or
offered to the informant in return for giving
evidence.817F[818] There may be
other incentives just as powerful and as compelling for witnesses who are not
detained.
- 8.70 In W (SC
38/2019) v R, the Court was split on whether this wider class of
witness should be approached on the same basis as prison informants. The
majority
limited its approach to prison informants and left consideration of
other incentivised witnesses for when those cases
arise.818F[819] The minority went
further and would have applied its framework to what it described as
“incentivised secondary confession
evidence”.819F[820]
- 8.71 In
Baillie, the Court of Appeal again declined to expand the class of
witnesses who should be covered by the “careful scrutiny”
approach
to prison informant evidence, holding that the issue should be reserved for more
extensive argument in a relevant
case.820F[821] It did, however,
make two further points on the issue of scope. First, the Court said there are
clear definitional difficulties with
identifying a wider class of incentivised
witnesses and that even the definition of “prison informant” is open
to debate.
Second, the Court acknowledged that the reliability concerns
identified in W (SC 38/2019) v R with respect to prison informant
evidence will sometimes also be presented in relation to other incentivised
witnesses. In such cases,
the option to issue a reliability direction under
section 122 is open to the
judge.821F[822]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 8.72 We
sought feedback on whether any amendments to the Act or additional safeguards
should apply to a wider class of incentivised
witnesses beyond prison
informants. If so, we asked how that wider class should be defined.
Results of consultation
- 8.73 Eleven
submitters addressed this question. Four supported extending any amendments to
the Act or additional safeguards to a broader
range of incentivised
witnesses822F[823] while six did
not.823F[824] One submitter did
not express a clear
view.824F[825]
- 8.74 Those
submitters that supported extending amendments and safeguards to other
incentivised witnesses did so on the basis that
the concerns about the risks of
prison informant evidence apply equally to other types of incentivised
witnesses. Three submitters
commented on the similarities between evidence of
prison informants and other incentivised
witnesses.825F[826] They
considered it immaterial whether the witness was in prison at the time of the
alleged confession as both groups of witnesses
have been incentivised to give
their evidence. These submitters did not, however, express a clear view as to
how that broader class
of incentivised witnesses should be
defined.826F[827]
- 8.75 Those
submitters that opposed extending any amendments and safeguards to other
incentivised witnesses did so based on the lack
of clear evidence to justify any
such extension compared with the empirical evidence on the risks associated with
prison informant
evidence.827F[828] To the extent
that evidence from other incentivised witnesses does pose a risk of
unreliability, submitters considered this could
either be appropriately dealt
with through existing provisions of the
Act828F[829] or left to the courts
to address on a case-by-case
basis.829F[830]
Reform not recommended
- 8.76 We
do not recommend any reform concerning a broader class of incentivised
witnesses. The reasons for this are both principled
and practical.
- 8.77 First, our
recommendation represents a significant shift in approach to the admissibility
of prison informant evidence. It is
based on the substantial risks of
unreliability that prison informant evidence has been shown to carry. While
acknowledging that
incentives can exist for other types of witnesses, the risks
of unreliability associated with those incentives have not been demonstrated
to
the same degree as with prison informant evidence. Given the significance of our
proposed amendment, we consider it appropriate,
at least initially, to confine
it to the narrower and more easily identifiable class of prison informant
evidence. The extension
of the reliability threshold to a wider class of
evidence is something that could be examined at a later stage once the courts
have
had the opportunity to consider further the range and effects of different
types of incentives on witness evidence.
- 8.78 Second, it
is notable that, among submitters in favour of an expanded approach, there was
no clear view or consensus as to who
should be included in the wider class of
incentivised witnesses. This mirrors the concerns of the courts in W (SC
38/2019) v R and Baillie about the difficulties in defining this
potential group of witnesses. Following consultation on this issue, we are not
in any better
position to attempt that definitional exercise.
- 8.79 In the
meantime, this issue can be addressed by the courts on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the particular circumstances
of the
case.830F[831] In this respect, we
suggest that the types of considerations set out in our proposed amendment on
the admissibility of prison informant
evidence above may be useful to judges
considering other cases involving incentivised witnesses.
CHAPTER 9
Veracity evidence
INTRODUCTION
- 9.1 In
this chapter, we consider the operation of the veracity rules (sections 37 and
38) in the Evidence Act 2006. We address the
following:
(a) The application of the veracity rules to single lies. We conclude the
application of the veracity rules to evidence of single
lies is well understood
by the courts and that no amendment is needed.
(b) Assessing substantial helpfulness under section 37(3). We recommend
repealing section 37(3) in its entirety on the basis that
it is not fulfilling
its intended function of providing guidance on matters relevant to assessing
whether veracity evidence is “substantially
helpful”.
(c) The application of section 38(2) when a defendant puts veracity in issue. We
recommend reform to extend the circumstances in
which the prosecution can offer
evidence about a defendant’s veracity.
(d) The use of the term “veracity” in other parts of the Act. We
conclude there is no evidence this is causing problems
in practice and do not
recommend reform.
BACKGROUND
- 9.2 In
our Issues Paper, we discussed the history of the veracity
rules.831F[832] Section 37(1) sets
out the general rule that a party may not offer evidence in a civil or criminal
proceeding about a person’s
veracity unless the evidence is
“substantially helpful” in assessing that person’s veracity.
“Veracity”
is defined in section 37(5) as “the disposition of
a person to refrain from lying”. Te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court
has
held that the veracity rules do not apply to evidence that is of direct
relevance to the case.832F[833]
The scope of the veracity rules is therefore relatively narrow, only capturing
evidence that would not otherwise be relevant to the
facts in issue.
APPLICATION OF THE VERACITY RULES TO SINGLE LIES
Issue
- 9.3 In
our Issues Paper, we said there was mixed case law on whether and how the
veracity rules apply to evidence of a single lie
told on a previous
occasion.833F[834] In one early
case, R v Tepu, te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal suggested
evidence of a single lie does not engage the veracity rules in section 37
because
it does not show a disposition or tendency to lie more
generally.834F[835] This would
mean that evidence of a single lie could be admitted without meeting the test of
substantial helpfulness. Since then,
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal have
found that evidence of a single lie does engage the veracity rules and that the
number
of previous lies (or alleged lies) will be relevant when assessing
substantial helpfulness.835F[836]
The Court of Appeal in 2022 suggested evidence of a single lie will seldom be
“substantially
helpful”.836F[837]
- 9.4 Several
provisions in the Act indicate a single previous lie can be considered under the
veracity rules. For example, section
37(3)(a) refers to a “lack of
veracity ... when under a legal obligation to tell the truth (for example, in
an earlier proceeding or in a signed declaration)” and
section 37(3)(b) refers to “1 or more offences that indicate a
propensity for a lack of veracity”.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 9.5 We
sought feedback on whether the treatment of single lies under the veracity rules
is creating confusion or uncertainty in practice
and whether legislative
clarification is desirable. We expressed our preliminary view that evidence of a
single lie should be subject
to the veracity rules so that the heightened
relevance test of substantial helpfulness
applies.837F[838] This would be
consistent with Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s original
intention, recent case law on this issue and
the wider scheme of the Act.
However, we noted this did not necessarily mean legislative amendment is
required — the matter
could simply be left to the
courts.838F[839]
Results of consultation
- 9.6 Twelve
submitters commented on this issue. Three supported amendment to clarify that
evidence of a single lie must be assessed
for admission under the veracity
rules,839F[840] three supported a
different amendment to prevent the admission of single lies as veracity evidence
in relation to complainants of
family and sexual
violence840F[841] and three did
not consider reform is
needed.841F[842] Two other
submitters were not aware of any uncertainty in the law currently but had no
issue with clarifying that evidence of a single
lie can be veracity
evidence.842F[843] One submitter
made general comments but did not express a clear view on the need for
reform.843F[844]‑
- 9.7 The Auckland
District Law Society (ADLS), Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand and Ethan Huda supported reform
to clarify that evidence of a single lie
does engage the veracity rules. The ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association
suggested that
the inclusion of “disposition” in the definition of
veracity implies single incidents are excluded. They suggested replacing
the
term “veracity” with “truthfulness” (as the Commission
recommended in the Evidence Code) or amending
section 37 to make it clear that a
“disposition” can be demonstrated through the telling of a single
lie. Ethan Huda
considered the magnitude of lies does not depend only on
repetition and that some single lies can be significant.
- 9.8 Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Ngā Whare Whakaruruhau o
Aotearoa | Women’s Refuge submitted
the Act should be amended to halt the
admission of single lies as veracity evidence in relation to complainants of
family and sexual
violence. They noted evidence of single lies, including prior
complaints made by a complainant, are often treated as particularly
significant
in sexual and family violence cases and admitted as relevant veracity evidence.
They considered single lies do not show
a tendency to lie.
- 9.9 Submitters
that did not consider reform is necessary all agreed evidence of a single lie
already engages the veracity
rules.844F[845] Associate
Professor Anna High and Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society
(NZLS) both commented that case law has
already reached the correct
interpretation — that is, a single instance of lying can engage the
veracity rules but will seldom
be “substantially helpful”.
Reform not recommended
- 9.10 We
do not recommend reform to address the treatment of single lies under the
veracity rules. We remain of the view that evidence
of a single lie should be
subject to the veracity rules. The number of previous lies or alleged lies will
then be relevant when assessing
whether the evidence is substantially helpful.
As noted, this approach has been endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court and
applied
in several recent Court of Appeal cases. The Court of Appeal has also
suggested that evidence of a single lie will seldom be “substantially
helpful”.845F[846] In our
view, these developments displace the earlier suggestion in Tepu that
evidence of a single lie is not veracity
evidence.846F[847] Because of
this, we do not think amendment is needed.
- 9.11 As we
explained in our Issues Paper, this approach is consistent with the wording of
section 37 as a whole and with the Commission’s
intent when it recommended
the adoption of a “substantially helpful” test in the Evidence Code.
The purpose of the test
was to avoid the admission of evidence that is of
marginal relevance and may distract the fact-finder from the real issues in
dispute.847F[848] We cannot see
why evidence of a single lie should be exempt from this test.
- 9.12 We
acknowledge the concern expressed by some submitters about the admission of
evidence of single lies of complainants in sexual
and family violence
cases.848F[849] In our view,
however, treating evidence of single lies as veracity evidence provides greater
protection for complainants. Requiring
evidence of a single lie to be
“substantially helpful” means it will face greater scrutiny to be
admitted than it would
if the veracity rules did not
apply.849F[850] Case law suggests
evidence of a single prior complaint is unlikely to be considered
“substantially helpful” (and therefore
admissible) where the
complainant does not accept the prior complaint was
false.850F[851]
ASSESSING SUBSTANTIAL HELPFULNESS (SECTION 37(3))
Relevance of the matters listed in section 37(3)
Issue
- 9.13 Section
37(3) purports to provide a non-exhaustive list of matters relevant to deciding
whether veracity evidence is substantially
helpful. This list did not appear in
the draft provision in the Evidence Code but was based on examples given by the
Commission in
its report of matters that could be considered when assessing
substantial helpfulness.851F[852]
- 9.14 The list
reflects the common law exceptions to the collateral issues rule, which was
abolished by section 37.852F[853]
However, the relevance of some of the matters listed was called into question by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hannigan v
R.853F[854] The majority found
that the veracity rules do not apply to evidence that is of direct relevance to
the case (even if that evidence
bears on
veracity).854F[855] This led the
Commission to recommend the repeal of section 37(3)(c) (previous inconsistent
statements) in its Second Review since
a previous inconsistent statement will
almost always have some relevance to the facts in
issue.855F[856] The Government has
accepted this recommendation but the provision has not yet been
repealed.856F[857]
- 9.15 In our
Issues Paper, we noted we had received preliminary feedback suggesting that
section 37(3)(d) and (e) (bias and motive
to be untruthful) are also redundant
following Hannigan because they will also almost always be directly
relevant to the case.857F[858]
Preliminary feedback suggested their inclusion is causing confusion in
practice.858F[859] The Commission
did not consider these provisions in its Second Review.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 9.16 We
asked submitters whether section 37(3)(d) and (e) perform any useful role in
practice or whether they should be repealed (in
addition to section 37(3)(c) as
recommended in the Commission’s Second Review).
Results of consultation
- 9.17 Nine
submitters addressed this question. Seven considered section 37(3)(d) and (e)
should be repealed859F[860] while
two considered they should be
retained.860F[861]
- 9.18 Submitters
that supported repeal considered section 37(3)(d) and (e) redundant for the
reasons outlined in our Issues Paper and
said they could cause
confusion.861F[862]
- 9.19 Submitters
that opposed repeal generally agreed that section 37(3)(d) and (e) are not
frequently relied on but considered they
may be relevant in some cases. Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service noted mixed views on
this issue
among its lawyers but suggested possible bias or motive to lie could
be raised in relation to credibility and past behaviour and
so bring the
evidence within the veracity rules. The NZLS also said that evidence of an issue
between a defendant and a witness showing
bias or motive to lie may bolster
evidence that a witness has a disposition to lie in the proceedings. It
considered it artificial
to separate a general disposition to lie from a motive
to lie in the particular proceedings.
The need for reform
- 9.20 We
conclude section 37(3)(d) and (e) have no useful role in practice and should be
repealed. They address matters that are, simply
put, not veracity evidence. A
person’s bias or motive to be untruthful in a proceeding is relevant to
the reliability of their
evidence and does not, therefore, engage the
rules.862F[863] This view was
shared by most submitters. They considered that, post-Hannigan, these
provisions are “redundant”, seldom relied on and prone to cause
confusion if
retained.863F[864]
- 9.21 The NZLS
and Public Defence Service submitted there may be cases where motive or bias
will be relevant to veracity and so section
37(3)(d) and (e) should be retained.
We consider these cases will be
rare.864F[865] If they do arise,
the relevance of motive or bias could still be considered by the courts on a
case-by-case basis. Section 37(3)
is non-exhaustive and consideration of whether
or not evidence is substantially helpful is not confined to the factors set out
there.
- 9.22 Our
recommendation to repeal section 37(3)(d) and (e) is linked to our discussion on
the substantial helpfulness threshold more
generally. We discuss our
recommendation for reform in relation to both these issues below.
Guidance on assessing substantial helpfulness
Issue
- 9.23 In
our Issues Paper, we noted that, if section 37(3)(c)–(e) are repealed,
this would leave only section 37(3)(a) (lack
of veracity on the part of the
person when under a legal obligation to tell the truth) and 37(3)(b) (that the
person has been convicted
of one or more offences that indicate a propensity for
a lack of veracity).865F[866] We
suggested these matters provide examples of types of veracity evidence
that may be substantially helpful depending on the circumstances. Section 37(3)
does not therefore give guidance
on the kind of evaluative matters the court
should consider when assessing whether veracity evidence is substantially
helpful. This
contrasts with other provisions in the Act that do give guidance
on evaluative matters relevant to determining the admissibility
of
evidence.866F[867]
- 9.24 We
explained that some factors relevant to the substantial helpfulness inquiry have
been identified in Best v R and Horton v
R.867F[868] These include the
remoteness in time of the previous acts or events, the number of previous acts
or events, the nature and seriousness
of those acts or events and the extent to
which the acts or events are accepted by the person to whom the evidence
relates.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 9.25 We
asked whether section 37 should be amended to provide guidance on the factors
relevant to assessing whether veracity evidence
meets the threshold of
substantial helpfulness. If so, we sought feedback on what factors should be
included.
Results of consultation
- 9.26 Eight
submitters addressed this question. Four submitters considered section 37(3)
should be amended to provide guidance on the
substantial helpfulness
threshold868F[869] while three did
not.869F[870] The Public Defence
Service said its lawyers had mixed views on whether this would be helpful.
- 9.27 Submitters
in support of additional guidance considered it would ensure certainty and
consistency in the Act. The ADLS and Defence
Lawyers Association agreed section
37(3)(a) and (b) pose difficulties and supported amendment to provide evaluative
factors for a
court to consider. In their view, this would be for clarity only
as the factors described in Best and Horton are already being used
by the courts. However, they expressed two concerns about these factors. First,
they were concerned by the
Court of Appeal’s comment in Horton that
an assessment of “extenuating circumstances” related to prior
convictions was relevant to the substantial helpfulness
inquiry. They considered
it risked introducing a reliability inquiry, which goes to weight rather than
substantial helpfulness.870F[871]
Second, they considered reference in Best to the need to determine if a
lie is malicious or
fraudulent871F[872] sits
uncomfortably with the role of the judge as a gatekeeper. In their view, this
reinforces the difficulty defendants often face
in meeting the substantial
helpfulness threshold.
- 9.28 The NZLS
said reform would ensure some consistency in approach across the Act, referring
to the factors for assessing the probative
value of propensity evidence under
section 43(3).
- 9.29 Two
submitters that did not support amendment to provide guidance — the
Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere,
and Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald — suggested section 37(3) could be repealed in its
entirety. Professor McDonald said
it is “hardly referred to” and
case law provides sufficient guidance. Associate Professor High considered
guidance on
assessing substantial helpfulness should be left to develop through
case law.
- 9.30 The Public
Defence Service expressed “mixed views” on amendment. It noted some
of its lawyers considered guidance
could be helpful as long as the factors were
sufficiently general and non-exhaustive to allow for flexibility in particular
cases.
Others were concerned it could become “too limiting” or cause
greater confusion than already exists.
The need for reform
- 9.31 We
conclude reform of section 37(3) is desirable. However, for reasons we explain
below, we propose the repeal of the provision
rather than amending it to provide
guidance on substantial helpfulness.
- 9.32 The wording
of section 37(3) suggests it is intended to give guidance on evaluative matters
relevant to the substantial helpfulness
test. However, the section as currently
drafted does not do that.872F[873]
Submitters shared the view that section 37(3) does not currently provide useful
guidance on the application of the substantial helpfulness
test. Most submitters
favoured some sort of reform — either to amend section 37(3) to provide
clearer guidance or to repeal
it completely.
- 9.33 If sections
37(3)(c)–(e) are repealed as we have suggested, that would leave only
sections 37(3)(a) and (b). As we commented
in our Issues Paper, these paragraphs
provide examples of types of veracity evidence that may be substantially
helpful.873F[874] For the reasons
outlined below, we do not consider it is necessary or helpful to highlight these
in legislation.
- 9.34 We do not
consider the status quo (retaining section 37(3), whether as drafted or with the
repeal of section 37(3)(c) and (e))
to be desirable. It might be argued there is
no harm caused by leaving this subsection as is. One submitter commented that it
is
rarely referred to in
practice.874F[875] However, the
provision does not provide the guidance it purports to offer. This is
inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to help
secure the just determination
of proceedings by (among other things) providing for facts to be established by
the application of
logical
rules875F[876] and enhancing
access to the law of
evidence.876F[877]
Recommendation
- R12 Repeal
section 37(3).
- 9.35 We
recommend repealing section 37(3) in its entirety. This is desirable to address
both concerns with the relevance of the factors
in section 37(3)(d) and (e) (as
outlined above) and with the approach to assessing substantial helpfulness more
generally.
- 9.36 We
explained above our conclusion that section 37(3)(d) and (e) have no useful role
in practice and should be repealed. With
the recommendation of the Commission in
its Second Review to repeal section 37(3)(c), this would leave only sections
37(3)(a) and
(b). As we note above, these paragraphs refer to types of
veracity evidence rather than evaluative matters to be taken into account when
assessing whether veracity evidence is substantially
helpful. For this reason,
we do not consider it necessary or desirable to retain them in section 37(3).
- 9.37 In our
Issues Paper, we suggested section 37(3)(a) and (b) could be retained in a
separate subsection that makes clear they are
examples of types of veracity
evidence that may be substantially helpful. The NZLS agreed that retaining
section 37(3)(a) and (b)
has merit, as the factors may give weight to evidence
of a disposition to lie. We did not receive any other submissions addressing
this point or expressing any clear support for the usefulness of the examples in
section 37(3)(a) and (b). Professor McDonald commented
that section 37(3)
is rarely referred to in practice, suggesting the examples are not helpful or
necessary.
- 9.38 Retaining
section 37(3)(a) and (b) in a separate provision may also elevate the
significance of these types of evidence over
other potentially relevant types of
veracity evidence. We emphasise they are only examples of relevant types
of veracity evidence. As the Supreme Court said in Best, it is “not
necessarily the case that the evidence of a type set out in s 37(3) will
always be substantially
helpful.”877F[878] There are
also other types of veracity evidence that are frequently admitted by the
courts. For example, “ordinary lies”
that do not fall within section
37(3)(a) may still be capable of being “substantially
helpful”.878F[879]
- 9.39 Several
submitters considered section 37(3) should be amended to provide further
guidance on the factors relevant to assessing
“substantial
helpfulness”.879F[880]
However, no submitters suggested the absence of guidance is causing problems in
practice, nor was there a clear view among submitters
as to the type of guidance
that might be helpful. Accordingly, we do not recommend reform along these
lines.
- 9.40 The Public
Defence Service expressed concern that specifying factors in legislation may be
overly prescriptive and inflexible.
We agree that, in light of the fact-specific
nature of veracity evidence, it is important to keep the factors sufficiently
open to
allow the law to develop. Statutory amendment risks elevating certain
factors over others simply by their inclusion in statute. Additionally,
although
any list of factors could be non-exhaustive (as is the case in similar
provisions under sections 30(3) and 43(3)), a statutory
list may lend itself to
a “tick-box” approach by the courts and so inhibit consideration of
any other factors not listed.
- 9.41 Although we
did not consult on the total repeal of section 37(3), it was proposed by two
submitters.880F[881] We agree that
repealing section 37(3) is the most appropriate approach to addressing the
problems with its current application and
ensuring clarity and certainty in the
Act. Our recommendation to repeal this subsection is not intended to indicate
any change in
policy or approach and would not alter the threshold for
admissibility. It would simply recognise that the subsection is not fulfilling
its apparent purpose of providing guidance on matters relevant to assessing
substantial helpfulness nor any other useful purpose.
- 9.42 Our
conclusion on repeal is supported by the existence of case law on the assessment
of substantial helpfulness that has developed
largely independently from section
37(3).881F[882] Submitters did not
suggest there is a lack of clarity about how the substantial helpfulness inquiry
should be conducted — indeed,
they considered guidance had been provided
by the case law.882F[883] The
material concern was that this approach is not necessarily reflected in, or
derived from, the statutory guidance. The fact that
there is now detailed
guidance in case law lessens the need for statutory guidance. We emphasise this
existing case law would remain
unaffected. Further guidance on the factors
relevant to assessing substantial helpfulness could continue to be refined,
developed
or expanded on a case-by-case basis.
- 9.43 We do not
consider repeal and the subsequent absence of statutory guidance will cause
uncertainty or confusion beyond that which
can reasonably be expected with any
reform. First, section 37(3) is rarely relied on currently, with the guidance
provided in case
law proving more helpful and relevant in practice. Second,
several other provisions in the Act state a threshold for admissibility
but do
not provide specific guidance on when or how that threshold will be
met.883F[884] This is not,
therefore, an unusual approach to take.
APPLICATION OF SECTION 38(2) WHEN THE DEFENDANT PUTS VERACITY
IN ISSUE
Background
- 9.44 Section
38(2) sets out the limited circumstances in which the prosecution may offer
evidence about a defendant’s veracity
in a criminal proceeding. Under
section 38(2)(a), the prosecution may only offer evidence about the
defendant’s veracity if:
- ... the
defendant has, in court, given oral evidence about his or her veracity or
challenged the veracity of a prosecution witness
by reference to matters other
than the facts in issue.
- 9.45 Under
section 38(2)(b), the judge must also grant permission before the prosecution
can offer the veracity evidence. Section
38(3) lists the matters the judge may
take into account in determining whether to grant permission.
- 9.46 The
rationale for the rule is to allow the prosecution to correct any false
impressions made by the defence about the defendant’s
veracity and to
protect witnesses from gratuitous attacks on their
credibility.884F[885] It codified
two common law
rules:885F[886]
(a) The rule that, if the defendant offers good character evidence about
themselves, the prosecution can introduce bad character
evidence about the
defendant in rebuttal.886F[887]
(b) The rule that, if the defendant attacks the character of a prosecution
witness, the prosecution can “retaliate” by
offering evidence of the
defendant’s own bad character (the “tit for tat”
rule).887F[888]
- 9.47 Section
38(2) attempts to balance protection for the defendant (preventing them from
being cross-examined about matters that
are unfairly prejudicial) against the
need for the fact-finder to hear all relevant evidence (including ensuring a
defendant cannot
give a misleading impression of their own character or the
character of other
witnesses).888F[889]
Issues
- 9.48 Section
38(2) is only triggered if the defendant (a) gives oral evidence in court and
(b) puts veracity at issue in that evidence.
As originally enacted, it only
required that the defendant had “offered evidence about his or her
veracity or has challenged
the veracity of a prosecution witness”.
However, it was amended in 2016 following a recommendation in the
Commission’s
2013 Review to clarify that the defendant must give the
relevant evidence orally in
court.889F[890]
- 9.49 In our
Issues Paper, we discussed whether it remains appropriate in light of modern
trial practices to limit section 38(2)(a)
to cases where the defendant gives
evidence in court.890F[891] At
common law, this approach was justified on the basis that, if the defendant does
not give evidence, the fact-finder is not being
asked to assess their
credibility. However, we noted it is now common for the prosecution to play the
defendant’s evidential
video interview in court and invite the fact-finder
to draw conclusions from it. The defendant may make claims about their own
veracity
or challenge the veracity of a prosecution witness in their evidential
interview. Currently, such statements cannot be rebutted unless
the defendant
chooses to give evidence that addresses their veracity, thereby opening the door
for the prosecution to offer veracity
evidence in response.
- 9.50 We
acknowledged, however, that there are arguments in favour of the current
approach.891F[892] Currently, the
prosecution may choose to play the defendant’s out-of-court statement and
invite the fact-finder to draw conclusions
from it but may not offer it as
evidence of a defendant’s veracity unless the defendant has triggered
section 38(2). A defendant
cannot offer their out-of-court statement without
giving evidence in court.892F[893]
It might be considered unfair if the prosecution could trigger section 38(2) by
offering a defendant’s out-of-court statement
in evidence and then rely on
assertions made in that statement to offer veracity evidence about the
defendant.
- 9.51 A separate
but related issue stems from the requirement in section 38(2)(a) that the
defendant put veracity in issue in their oral evidence. As
we discussed in our Issues Paper, this means it does not apply where veracity is
put in issue through some other aspect of the
conduct of the defence (for
example, during cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses).893F[894] This appears
to be inconsistent with both the common law approach and the Commission’s
original
intent.894F[895]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 9.52 We
asked whether section 38(2) should be amended to extend the circumstances in
which the prosecution can offer evidence about
a defendant’s
veracity.895F[896] In particular,
we asked if section 38(2) should apply (whether or not the defendant gives
evidence) when veracity is put in issue
by:
(a) assertions made in the defendant’s statement to police (or other
prosecuting agency); and/or
(b) the conduct of their defence.
Results of consultation
- 9.53 Eight
submitters commented on the current approach under section 38(2) and the need
for reform. Five submitters favoured
reform896F[897] and three opposed
it.897F[898]
The need for reform
- 9.54 Submitters
generally focused on the options for reform, although some expressed views on
whether reform is generally desirable.
- 9.55 Considerations
of fairness featured prominently in submissions — both those in support of
and those against reform. Submitters
in support of reform referred to the
unfairness they considered arises from the current application of section 38(2).
The NZLS described
it as creating “significant loopholes” that allow
challenges to a witness’s veracity to be put before the fact-finder
without repercussions. Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office similarly
noted a “significant concern” that a defendant
who does not give
evidence in court may bolster their own veracity or denigrate the veracity of
another without facing any consequences.
- 9.56 Submitters
that opposed reform were concerned any reform would cause significant unfairness
to defendants. This was elaborated
on with reference to our options for reform,
discussed below. These submitters considered the current approach is
appropriate. The
ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association, for example, said the
prosecution currently has options and does not have to introduce a
defendant’s
statement. They remarked that the prosecution can choose not
to if the statement is exculpatory and that any challenges to a witness’s
honesty or reliability are part and parcel of cross-examination.
Options for reform
- 9.57 All
five submitters in support of reform supported extending section 38(2) to apply
when veracity is put in issue by assertions
made in the defendant’s
statement to police or another prosecuting
agency.898F[899]
- 9.58 Submitters
that supported this proposal referred to the now common practice of the
prosecution playing a defendant’s pre-trial
statement in
court.899F[900] The Crown Law
Office and NZLS considered amendment would allow the prosecution to correct or
challenge any assertions made about
veracity in a pre-trial statement whether or
not the defendant gives evidence. Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Police
saw value in reviewing section 38(2) given changes in trial practice.
Professor McDonald commented that it is “odd” for
section 38(2) not
to be triggered currently by a pre-trial statement, particularly when juries
consider and assess the reliability
of out-of-court statements in other
situations under the Act.
- 9.59 The Public
Defence Service raised three concerns about the unfairness such an amendment
would create for defendants:
(a) Defendants would not be cautioned before making a statement or have the
benefit of legal advice that any attack they make on
the veracity of a
complainant could result in the admissibility of evidence at trial to impugn
their own veracity. Even if cautioned
to this effect, it is unlikely a defendant
would fully understand the risks and consequences at that stage. Alternatively,
they may
simply refuse to give a statement, which could then prejudice them at
trial.
(b) It could incentivise the prosecution to play the defendant’s video
statement in every case so they could offer veracity
evidence about the
defendant, regardless of whether it is relevant to the case.
(c) It would put the defendant in a difficult situation if a complainant lied
about anything in their statement. If the defendant
pointed that out, they would
risk opening themselves up to an attack on their own veracity.
- 9.60 The Public
Defence Service considered that, if such an amendment was made, it should be
mandatory to consider whether the issue
can be resolved by editing the video
statement to refer only to the relevant parts rather than being introduced as a
whole and triggering
the application of section 38(2).
- 9.61 The Crown
Law Office and NZLS, both of which supported reform, noted similar concerns
about potential unfairness to the defendant.
Both submitters considered,
however, that this would be ameliorated by existing safeguards — namely,
the prosecution would
still need judicial permission to offer veracity evidence
about a defendant under section 38(2) (guided by the factors in section
38(3))
and would still have to meet the “substantially helpful” requirement
in section 37(1). The Crown Law Office also
noted the significance of the
requirement under section 38(2)(a) that the “triggering” veracity
evidence must be related
to “matters other than the facts in issue”.
It suggested this will be relatively uncommon in the context of police
interviews,
which focus on the criminal allegations in question.
- 9.62 Three
submitters considered section 38(2) should also apply, whether or not the
defendant gives evidence, when veracity is put
in issue by the conduct of their
defence (such as through cross-examination of a prosecution
witness).900F[901] The two other
submitters that supported reform did not explicitly comment on this
option.901F[902]
- 9.63 The Crown
Law Office submitted this approach would be fair because, if the defence
“choose as a matter of strategy”
to make either positive statements
about the defendant’s own veracity or negative statements about a
witness’s veracity
in cross-examination, the prosecution should be able to
respond. The requirement for the judge to give permission for the prosecution
to
offer veracity evidence would act as an important safeguard if a defence witness
lashes out in an unexpected manner. The Crown
Law Office considered a judge is
unlikely to grant permission in these circumstances, referring to the Court of
Appeal’s decision
in Blake v
R.902F[903]
- 9.64 The Public
Defence Service had several concerns about such an amendment, including that, in
practice, the section would be triggered
in almost every family or sexual
violence trial (as the veracity of a complainant will frequently be put in issue
by the nature of
the defence). They were also concerned that it would lead to an
increase in trial counsel incompetence appeals either because section
38(2) was
inadvertently triggered or because trial counsel was too cautious.
The need for reform
- 9.65 We
conclude it is desirable to amend section 38(2) to extend the circumstances in
which the prosecution can offer evidence about
a defendant’s
veracity.
- 9.66 Our
conclusion is based on the original policy objectives of the section —
that the prosecution should (a) be able to correct
any false impressions made by
the defence about the defendant’s veracity and (b) protect witnesses from
gratuitous attacks
on their
credibility.903F[904] We are not
seeking to revisit these although we acknowledge long-standing concerns about
the logic and appropriateness of the “tit
for tat”
rule,904F[905] which were alluded
to by submitters that did not support
reform.905F[906] The question is
whether these objectives are being met by the current law. Several submitters
did not think they are.906F[907]
They considered the current requirements to engage section 38(2) have created
gaps that allow one-sided and potentially inaccurate
views of the
defendant’s veracity to go unchallenged and the veracity of prosecution
witnesses to be challenged without consequence.
- 9.67 We agree
with this assessment. In the case of the requirement in section 38(2)(a) for the
defendant to give evidence, the original
justification was that, if the
defendant does not give evidence, the fact-finder is not being asked to assess
the credibility of
their testimony and so evidence about their veracity is
irrelevant.907F[908] However it is
no longer accurate to say that a defendant’s credibility is not in issue
if they do not give evidence in court
given that it is now common for the
prosecution to play the defendant’s evidential video interview in court.
In the case of
the requirement for veracity to be put in issue by the defendant
in their oral evidence, this is too narrowly constructed. It fails
to take
account of the different ways in which veracity may be put in issue at trial
— for example, through challenges to the
veracity of a prosecution witness
made in cross-examination.
- 9.68 The
Commission’s original formulation in the Evidence Code was broadly worded
and would have allowed the prosecution to
offer veracity evidence about the
defendant regardless of whether the defendant gave
evidence.908F[909] The Commission
also appeared to contemplate that veracity could be put in issue by others than
just the defendant — for example,
a defence
witness.909F[910] However, this
approach was rejected at select committee stage and Parliament reinstated
existing law that limited the opportunity
for the prosecution to call evidence
as to the defendant’s veracity to situations where the defendant had
offered evidence
about their own veracity or challenged the veracity of a
prosecution witness.910F[911]
Uncertainty remained, however, because the Act did not make it clear whether the
defendant had to give evidence in court for the
section to be triggered.
- 9.69 In a
subsequent 2008 Report, the Commission considered Parliament’s intention
was uncertain. It favoured a “strict
approach” to the interpretation
of the section — a defendant only puts their veracity in issue if they
give oral evidence.911F[912] On
this basis, the Commission’s 2013 Review recommended amendment to
expressly limit section 38(2) to situations where the
defendant “in court,
has given oral evidence” and the Act was amended
accordingly.912F[913] In the
Commission’s view, the amendment was simply clarificatory rather than the
result of a detailed policy
analysis.913F[914] In its Second
Review, the Commission questioned the policy underlying this amendment but did
not recommend further reform given the
recency of the
change.914F[915] Given this
history, our proposed reform would not only give effect to the original
intention of the Commission in its codification
of the law, it would also
provide absolute clarity of a much-debated and discussed section.
- 9.70 The
developments outlined above may indicate a more conscious decision to err on the
side of a defendant’s fair trial
rights.915F[916] The formulation
of section 38 was a compromise to “balance protection of the defendant
against the need for the fact-finder
to hear all relevant
evidence”.916F[917]
Submitters were cognisant of how finely balanced those competing considerations
are. Several submitters that supported reform referred
to the potential for
unfairness to the defendant that might be caused by any reform. Nonetheless,
they considered the balance is
not being appropriately struck. We agree,
following our conclusion above that the current approach has created gaps that
may prevent
the prosecution from correcting any false impressions made about a
defendant’s veracity and cause unfairness to prosecution
witnesses who
have their veracity impugned.
- 9.71 We do not
consider that reform in this area would dramatically shift the balance in favour
of the prosecution. Rather, it would
help strike the correct balance intended by
the rule. We acknowledge, however, as did many submitters, the potential
unfairness to
defendants of this reform. As we observed in the Issues Paper, one
reason for retaining the requirement for the defendant to give
evidence would be
to prevent the prosecution from offering a defendant’s police statement
and then using that as the basis
for introducing veracity
evidence.917F[918] This problem
was acknowledged by a number of submitters, including those that supported
reform. For example, removing the requirement
may unknowingly open defendants up
to challenges to their own veracity through comments they may make in their
police interview and
are not seeking to rely on at trial. Reform to remove the
requirement for veracity to be put in issue by the defendant in oral evidence
may also cause unfairness where veracity is put in issue not through a strategic
or deliberate approach by the defence but through
an unexpected response to a
line of questioning or a witness “lashing
out”.918F[919]
- 9.72 We agree
with the Crown Law Office and NZLS, however, that any unfairness caused to the
defendant by reform can be appropriately
mitigated through the existence of
other safeguards under the veracity rules. These include:
(a) the requirement under section 38(2)(a) that the triggering veracity evidence
relate to “matters other than the facts in
issue”;
(b) the requirement that any veracity evidence be “substantially
helpful”919F[920] as well as
complying with section
38;920F[921]
(c) the fact that, under section 38(2)(b), the prosecution must obtain the
judge’s permission to offer veracity evidence about
a defendant; and
(d) the factors in section 38(3) that inform a judge’s decision whether to
grant permission (in particular, under section 38(3)(c),
“whether any
evidence given by the defendant about veracity was elicited by the
prosecution”).
- 9.73 Additionally,
we consider the specifics of our proposed reform, outlined below, can also
mitigate potential unfairness to defendants.
Recommendation
- R13 Amend
section 38 to:
- remove
the requirement in section 38(2)(a) for the defendant to give oral evidence in
court so that the paragraph states “the
defendant has put their veracity
in issue or challenged the veracity of a prosecution witness by reference to
matters other than
the facts in issue”;
- insert
a new subsection in section 38 stating that the defendant may put their veracity
in issue or challenge the veracity of a prosecution
witness by giving evidence
at trial, through the conduct of the defence case (including in
cross-examination) or in a defendant’s
statement offered in evidence by
any party;
- amend
section 38(3)(c) to refer to whether any evidence given or statement made by the
defendant about veracity was elicited by the
prosecution or through
investigative questioning; and
- insert
a new paragraph in section 38(3) referring to the extent to which the defendant
seeks to rely on the evidence of their own
veracity or to challenge the veracity
of a prosecution witness to support their case.
- 9.74 Part (a) of
our recommendation would remove the requirement for the defendant to give oral
evidence in court before the prosecution
can offer veracity evidence about the
defendant. Section 38(2) would be capable of applying whether or not the
defendant chooses
to give evidence at trial. For the reasons we have outlined
above, we consider this will better achieve the original policy underpinning
this section.
- 9.75 Part (a)
would also require the defendant to put veracity “in issue”. It
would clarify that the defendant must bear
some responsibility, whether directly
or indirectly, for the circumstances that trigger section 38 and open the door
to the prosecution
offering evidence about the defendant’s veracity.
- 9.76 The term
“put in issue” is already used in section 38(3)(a) but, for the
avoidance of doubt, part (b) of our recommendation
would clarify the situations
in which a defendant may put their veracity in issue or challenge the veracity
of a prosecution witness.
The reference to “the conduct of the defence
case” will help ensure section 38 is not triggered by an unexpected
outburst
by a witness, which was a concern of several submitters. We also
acknowledge the concerns of the Public Defence Service that allowing
section
38(2) to be triggered by the conduct of the defence case will result in more
counsel competency appeals. We do not consider
this concern warrants departing
from our recommendations. There are strong policy reasons for allowing the
prosecution to respond
to challenges to a witness’s veracity made through
the conduct of the defence.
- 9.77 Section
38(3) lists considerations to which the judge may have regard when determining
whether to grant the prosecution permission
to offer evidence of a
defendant’s veracity under section 38(2)(b). Parts (c) and (d) of our
recommendation propose amendments
to this list to cover situations where the
defendant puts veracity in issue or challenges the veracity of a prosecution
witness other
than by giving oral evidence in court.
- 9.78 We
recommend the following amendments to section 38(3):
(a) Amend section 38(3)(c) to refer to whether any evidence given or statement
made by the defendant was elicited by the prosecution
or in response to
investigative
questioning.921F[922]
Section 38(3)(c) guards against a situation where the prosecution, as a
matter of tactic, might “lure” a defendant into
offering evidence of
their own veracity or attacking the veracity of a prosecution’s
witness.922F[923] This amendment
would ensure the same rationale applies where the defendant has put veracity in
issue in their police interview and
it is offered in evidence by the
prosecution.
(b) Insert a new paragraph in section 38(3) to make clear the judge should
consider the extent to which the defendant seeks to rely
on the evidence of
their own veracity or to challenge the veracity of a prosecution witness to
support their case. This could apply,
for example, where the prosecution offers
a defendant’s out-of-court statement in evidence that includes an
assertion about
veracity that the defendant is not seeking to rely on at trial.
Some submitters expressed concern that the prosecution could trigger
section
38(2) by offering a defendant’s statement in evidence and then rely on
assertions made in that statement to offer veracity
evidence about the
defendant. Our recommendation would clarify that the judge can consider this
concern when deciding whether to
grant permission under section 38(2)(b).
In these circumstances, there is less justification for permitting the
prosecution to offer
veracity evidence about a defendant. The policy rationale
for broadening the rule is not engaged in this situation because the defendant
is not seeking to rely on an impression that may be false. More practically, if
a defendant is not seeking to rely on the part of
the statement about veracity,
the parties can simply agree to edit it. Although opposed to reform, the Public
Defence Service supported
this safeguard and said it should be mandatory to
consider whether the issue can be resolved by way of editing the statement
rather
than triggering the section.
- 9.79 If this
recommendation is adopted, a consequential amendment will be required to
section 38(3)(a), which currently includes the
words “in the
defendant’s evidence”. It will need to be amended to reflect the
wider range of circumstances in
which veracity could be put in issue under our
recommendation.
- 9.80 Finally, we
emphasise our recommendation is aimed at striking an appropriate balance between
protecting the defendant from being
cross-examined about matters that are
unfairly prejudicial and the need for the fact-finder to hear all relevant
evidence. As such,
our recommendation to extend the situations in which the
prosecution can offer veracity evidence is closely tied to our proposed
amendments to section 38(3), which provide safeguards for defendants. Our
recommendations regarding section 38(2) should not be adopted
without also
adopting our recommendations regarding section 38(3) as this would tip the
balance too far in favour of the prosecution.
USE OF THE TERM “VERACITY” IN OTHER PARTS OF THE
ACT
Issue
- 9.81 Section
4(1) states that, “unless the context otherwise
requires”,923F[924]
“veracity has the meaning given in section
37”.924F[925] As we have
said, section 37(5) defines “veracity” as “the disposition of
a person to refrain from lying”.
- 9.82 The term
“veracity” is used in other sections of the Act outside the veracity
rules, namely, section 4(1) (definition
of “hostile witness”),
section 16(1) (definition of “circumstances” for the purposes of the
hearsay provisions)
and section 35(2)(a) (previous consistent statements). In
our Issues Paper, we noted that, in some of these sections, the intended
meaning
of veracity differs from its meaning in the veracity
rules.925F[926] In sections 37 and
16(1), “veracity” is concerned with evidence extraneous to the facts
in issue (that is, the general
disposition of the person to refrain from
lying).926F[927] By contrast, in
the section 4(1) definition of “hostile witness” and in section
35(2)(a), it refers to the truthfulness
of the witness in the particular
proceeding. We considered, however, that case law did not suggest this
difference in meaning was
causing problems in
practice.927F[928]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 9.83 We
asked whether it is desirable to amend the Act to make the different meanings
attached to “veracity” explicit
instead of having to rely on case
law.928F[929] We suggested this
could be done by changing the references to “veracity” in the
section 4(1) definition of “hostile
witness” and section 35(2)(a) to
“honesty” or
“truthfulness”.929F[930]
Results of consultation
- 9.84 Seven
submitters addressed this issue. Three supported reform to clarify the meaning
of “veracity” in the context
of the definition of “hostile
witness” and the previous consistent statements
rule.930F[931] Four considered
reform is
unnecessary.931F[932]
- 9.85 The
submitters that supported reform did not suggest the current wording is causing
problems in practice. However, they considered
amendment could improve the
clarity and accessibility of the law and avoid
confusion.932F[933] Luke
Cunningham Clere suggested using the term “truthfulness” instead of
veracity in the definition of “hostile
witness” and in section
35(2)(a). Associate Professor High preferred the term “honesty”
since “truthfulness”
had been used in the Evidence Code and was
removed at the select committee
stage.933F[934]
- 9.86 Submitters
that did not support reform considered that, although the current wording is
“clumsy”,934F[935] it
is not causing problems in practice and amendment could cause
confusion.935F[936]
Reform not recommended
- 9.87 We
do not recommend reform to make the different meanings of “veracity”
in the Act explicit. The submissions we received
did not suggest the use of the
term “veracity” in the definition of “hostile witness”
or section 35(2)(a)
is causing problems in practice, nor did we find any
evidence of such problems in case law. It seems clear the courts are
interpreting
the term “veracity” appropriately having regard to the
context in which it is used. Accordingly, we do not think amendment
is needed to
clarify the position or to enhance access to the law of evidence. Conversely,
amendment could cause uncertainty (for
example, if it led to a perception that
the law has changed in some way).
CHAPTER 10
Propensity evidence
INTRODUCTION
- 10.1 In
this chapter, we consider section 43 of the Evidence Act 2006, which governs
propensity evidence offered by the prosecution
about the defendant. We address
the following:
(a) The general operation of section 43(1). We do not recommend reform in the
absence of clear evidence of a problem in practice.
(b) Prior acquittal evidence. We conclude reform is desirable to clarify the
approach to prior acquittal evidence as propensity evidence
and recommend that
section 43(3) be amended to include guidance as to the specific factors judges
should consider when assessing
its unfair prejudicial effect.
(c) The unusualness factor in section 43(3)(f). We conclude multiple approaches
to the assessment of unusualness are causing uncertainty
in practice. We
recommend the repeal of section 43(3)(f).
(d) The relevance of reliability when determining the admissibility of
propensity evidence. We do not recommend reform. There is
clear case law on this
issue, and statutory amendment would risk causing uncertainty in practice.
BACKGROUND
- 10.2 Propensity
evidence is evidence that tends to show a person’s propensity to act in a
particular way or have a particular
state of
mind.936F[937] As te Kōti
Mana Nui | Supreme Court has observed, the rationale for admitting propensity
evidence rests on the concepts of linkage
and coincidence — the greater
the linkage and coincidence provided by the propensity evidence, the greater the
probative value
that evidence is likely to
have.937F[938]
- 10.3 In general,
a party in a civil or criminal proceeding may offer propensity evidence about
any person.938F[939] However, this
is subject to certain
limitations.939F[940] Section 43
controls the admissibility of propensity evidence offered by the prosecution
about defendants. In our Issues Paper, we
observed that section 43 is one of the
most frequently litigated provisions in the
Act.940F[941] We attributed this
to the significance of propensity evidence to both the prosecution and the
defence case and to the “intensely
fact-specific nature” of the
admissibility test.941F[942]
THE GENERAL OPERATION OF SECTION 43(1)
Issue
- 10.4 Section
43(1) allows the prosecution to offer propensity evidence about a defendant in a
criminal proceeding if its probative
value outweighs the risk that it might have
an unfairly prejudicial effect on the defendant. In our Issues Paper, we
referred to
preliminary feedback from defence lawyers that identified two
concerns about the section 43(1) test as it is being applied by the
courts:942F[943]
(a) It sets the threshold for admitting propensity evidence too low, resulting
in propensity evidence being too readily admitted.
(b) It prevents the development of precedent, resulting in unpredictable and
inconsistent admissibility decisions.
The section 43(1) threshold
- 10.5 In
our Issues Paper, we questioned whether the current approach under section 43
reflects the original policy objectives of the
section.943F[944] We referred to
Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s early work on codifying the law
of evidence where the expressed intention
was for the admission of propensity
evidence to be “strictly
limited”.944F[945] The
Commission sought to codify the common law on similar fact evidence so that
evidence of a defendant’s propensity should
generally be prohibited unless
its probative value “sufficiently outweighs” the danger of
prejudicial effect.945F[946] This
language became “clearly outweighs” in the Evidence Code but
was changed to “outweighs” in the Evidence Bill. The
Solicitor-General’s view was that the language of “clearly
outweighs” would change the
common law approach (by making it harder to
admit propensity evidence) rather than codify
it.946F[947]
- 10.6 On this
basis, we considered that, although a higher standard for propensity evidence
may have originally been intended, when
the Evidence Bill was drafted section 43
was not intended to change the threshold for admitting propensity evidence
(whether to make
it higher or lower than at common law). Despite this, the
passing of the Act and subsequent judicial interpretation of section 43
has
resulted in a “sea change” in the way propensity evidence is
assessed.947F[948] We noted a
general acceptance that section 43 provides for a wider range of propensity
evidence to be admitted than was possible
under the common law similar fact
rule. However, there are differing views on whether this is problematic and
whether further elaboration
of the section 43(1) test would be
helpful.948F[949]
The development of precedent
- 10.7 The
Act does not provide guidance on how judges should perform the weighing exercise
required by section 43(1). In our Issues
Paper, we noted a second concern heard
in preliminary feedback that this was inhibiting the development of
precedent.949F[950] We provided an
overview of case law on how the section 43(1) test has been applied by the
courts.950F[951] An early case
heard under the Act, R v Healy, suggested that the correct balance to be
reached on the section 43(1) test was a matter that would be “developed
over time”.951F[952] In
Vuletich v R, however, te Kōti Pīra | Court of
Appeal explicitly rejected the need for any standard in applying the section
43(1) test.952F[953] The leading
case on section 43, Mahomed v
R,953F[954] has also
been criticised on the basis that the Supreme Court did not provide any further
guidance on the application of the section
43(1)
test,954F[955] leading to
continued
unpredictability.955F[956] We
observed, however, that more recent appellate decisions have not raised similar
concerns, indicating that the courts may now be
reasonably comfortable applying
the section 43(1) test in the absence of any more precise
guidance.956F[957]
- 10.8 Some recent
appellate cases point to one of the central difficulties with seeking to
evaluate the operation of section 43(1)
through case analysis. In Grigg v
R, the Court of Appeal observed that, if a court applies the
provisions to the case with which it is dealing, there should seldom be
a need
to refer to another case. This is because the outcome in each case will turn on
the weight to be given to the factors set
out in section 43(3)
and (4).957F[958] In Brown
v R, the Court considered judges should avoid “pointless
attempts to reconcile” one propensity ruling with another, describing
propensity evidence as “fact and circumstance
specific”.958F[959] This
view is also shared by many commentators who consider variance to be inherent in
the test and not necessarily
problematic.959F[960]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 10.9 We
asked submitters whether the current threshold for admitting propensity evidence
under section 43(1) is causing problems in
practice. We explained that section
43 seeks to balance the competing interests of ensuring that a fact-finder has
all the relevant
evidence before them and guarding against the risk that the
fact-finder might make unwarranted and prejudicial assumptions about
the
defendant.960F[961] We said that
it is ultimately a question of policy whether that balance is being
appropriately struck.
- 10.10 If
submitters considered reform is necessary or desirable, we presented two
possible options for reform, which could be implemented
together or separately.
The options were based on comparable Australian provisions. They would create a
higher threshold for admissibility
and seek to facilitate the development of
precedent. The two options
were:961F[962]
(a) Option 1 — amend section 43(1) to require probative value to
substantially outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice; and/or
(b) Option 2 — amend section 43(1) to require propensity evidence
to have significant probative value.
- 10.11 We
observed that both options may more closely reflect the Commission’s
original intention that the codified test should
continue to favour
exclusion.962F[963] We highlighted
the risk of such an approach — namely, that it could lead to propensity
evidence being too readily excluded.
This has led some Australian jurisdictions
to change their approach to make propensity evidence more readily admissible in
child
sexual offending cases. We acknowledged, however, that courts in Aotearoa
New Zealand have taken a different approach to the admission
of propensity
evidence in child sexual offending cases so similar reasoning is unlikely to
apply here.963F[964]
Results of consultation
- 10.12 Thirteen
submitters addressed this question. Four expressed concern about how
section 43(1) is operating in
practice,964F[965] three of whom
also commented on the options for
reform.965F[966] Nine submitters
said section 43(1) is operating well in practice and did not consider reform
necessary or desirable.966F[967]
- 10.13 One
submitter, Te Kāhui Tātari Ture | Criminal Cases Review Commission,
did not specifically comment on the operation
of section 43(1) or the need for
reform. It noted it was considering 37 open applications where propensity
evidence had been raised
as an issue.
The need for reform
- 10.14 Submitters
that considered there is a problem in practice expressed strong concerns that
the section 43(1) test is operating
to the detriment of defendants and described
an “urgent” need for reform. These submissions reflected the two
concerns
set out in our Issues Paper — that too much propensity evidence
is being admitted and that the current approach has led to
a lack of precedent.
The Auckland District Law Society (ADLS) and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers
Association New Zealand described
a “general consensus that the pendulum
has swung too far”. Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public
Defence
Service referred to propensity evidence “usually” being
admitted. These submitters viewed this as a departure from the
Commission’s original intention and the objective of codification. The
ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association also referred to
the conflicting and
“irreconcilable” chain of case law as creating an inconsistent
approach to admissibility. They described
decision-making as
“insufficiently regulated, arbitrary and ... something resembling a
‘lottery’”.
- 10.15 These
submitters considered statutory amendment necessary to address these problems
because judicial directions are inadequate
to address prejudicial effect. The
ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association referred to academic and appellate
authority suggesting it
is unrealistic to rely on trial directions to constrain
the proper use of propensity evidence. Stephen Hudson, who was convicted
of
murder following a trial involving propensity evidence, gave a more personal
perspective. He agreed trial directions are ineffective
at ensuring unbiased
assessment of propensity evidence. He said in relation to his case that, once
the evidence was admitted, “[t]he
onus had changed from the Crown having
to prove my guilt to me having to prove my innocence”.
- 10.16 Submitters
opposing reform considered section 43(1) is operating appropriately. Two
submitters considered the section is achieving
the intended policy objective of
ensuring fact-finders have probative evidence available to reach a just and fair
determination of
facts.967F[968]
Two submitters, Associate Professor Anna High and Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa
| New Zealand Police, described judges as being
experienced in the application
of the section 43(1) test. Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office and Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa
| New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) drew attention to
other subsections in section 43 that provide additional constraints on
admissibility
— namely, the requirement for specificity under section
43(2) and the factors set out in sections 43(3) and (4) to guide decision-making
under section 43(1).
- 10.17 Some
submitters disagreed with the suggestion that too much propensity evidence is
being admitted under the section 43(1) test
and considered that the correct
balance is being struck.968F[969]
Two submitters, the Crown Law Office and the Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke
Cunningham Clere, referred to their own experience
and recent te
Kōti-ā-Rohe | District Court and te Kōti Matua | High Court cases
where propensity evidence was ruled
inadmissible.969F[970] They
suggested these are examples of controls on the threshold test operating
appropriately. In a more general comment, Luke Cunningham
Clere cautioned
against drawing conclusions about admissibility from appellate authorities as
this sample is unlikely to be representative.
It said the defence is far more
likely to pursue an appeal in marginal cases where evidence has been admitted
than the prosecution
is in similar cases where evidence has been excluded.
- 10.18 One
submitter, Paulette Benton-Greig, suggested that, even if more propensity
evidence is being admitted, this is not necessarily
concerning. In her view, any
change to admit more propensity evidence was an important shift to allow
consideration of more background
and contextual evidence relevant to sexual and
family violence cases. Her submission was supported by Community Law Centres o
Aotearoa
and Ngā Whare Whakaruruhau o Aotearoa | Women’s Refuge.
- 10.19 These
submitters did not consider the lack of precedent as problematic. Three
submitters referred to the “fact-specific”
nature of propensity
evidence and thus the difficulty and, in their view, the undesirability of
creating hard and fast rules for
its
admission.970F[971]
Options for reform
- 10.20 Of
the four submitters that raised concerns about section 43(1), three addressed
the options for reform. Two submitters, the
ADLS and Defence Lawyers
Association, supported option 1 (amending section 43(1) to require probative
value to substantially outweigh
the risk of unfair prejudice). They considered
this would provide a better framework for considering propensity evidence and
would
align with the test for admissibility of veracity evidence under section
37. They were not concerned that the Australian experience
of propensity
evidence being excluded too readily in child sexual offending cases would be
replicated in New Zealand due to the existence
of section 43(3)(f) (the
“unusualness” factor, discussed in more detail below).
- 10.21 The Public
Defence Service similarly considered that option 1 would help to redress the
imbalance in the admission of propensity
evidence it observed in its submission.
However, it suggested that, to really make an impact, both options should be
enacted together.
- 10.22 Five
submitters that opposed reform raised concerns about enacting either
option.971F[972] Paulette
Benton-Greig and Associate Professor High expressed concern that a heightened
threshold for the admissibility of propensity
evidence may lead to evidence
being too readily excluded in sexual and family violence cases, as evidenced by
the Australian experience.
The Crown Law Office highlighted the practical
difficulties of legislative amendment, noting that any attempt to elucidate
probative
value and unfair prejudice in statute would simply replicate the same
problems of interpretation as at common law. Additionally,
as the same test and
similar definitional issues arise in relation to the general exclusion test
under section 8, any amendment to
section 43 would require consideration of
consequential amendment to section 8.
Reform not recommended
- 10.23 We
do not recommend reform to amend the section 43(1) test. While there are firmly
held views among defence lawyers on the need
for reform, we do not consider
there is clear enough evidence of a problem in practice to support reform.
- 10.24 Some
submitters considered propensity evidence is now being routinely admitted to the
extent that it is impacting on the fair
trial rights of
defendants.972F[973] Others
considered the section 43(1) test is working well in practice, that judges are
experienced in applying the test and that they
are striking the right balance in
admitting or excluding propensity
evidence.973F[974] We acknowledge,
as we did in our Issues Paper, the difficulties in relying on case analysis to
reach a determination on this
point.974F[975] This is due both
to the fact-specific nature of the propensity assessment making it difficult to
carry out case comparisons and the
different factors that may influence whether
any appeal is pursued.975F[976] We
have been unable to draw conclusions from the available case law about whether
decisions to admit or exclude propensity evidence
are being appropriately made.
We have also been unable to identify any particular tendency in judicial
decision-making.976F[977]
- 10.25 It is also
unclear whether any change to the section 43(1) threshold would make a
difference to the frequency with which it
is litigated. As noted by the
Commission in an early report, propensity evidence can be hugely significant to
both the prosecution
and the defence case and so will be vigorously
contested.977F[978] The number of
appeals may simply be a reflection of that fact rather than pointing to a
problem with the application of the test.
Whatever the test might be, it is
likely to continue to be a source of contention.
- 10.26 The second
concern we identified in our Issues Paper was that the section 43(1) test may be
leading to inconsistent outcomes
and preventing the development of precedent.
Some submitters described the case law as a series of
“irreconcilable” and
“arbitrary” decisions that have
created an inconsistent
approach.978F[979] Most submitters
agreed that the assessment does result in different outcomes but said this is
not arbitrary or problematic, merely
a necessary consequence of the nature of
propensity evidence.979F[980] In
this respect, most submitters considered the issues we had identified in our
Issues Paper to be acceptable consequences of the
fact-specific inquiry required
by the section 43(1) test.
- 10.27 For these
reasons, we do not recommend reform. We emphasise we do not agree that the
nature of propensity evidence means clear
precedent and judicial guidance can
never develop. The courts have a responsibility to articulate the reasons
for their decisions, including their reasons for taking a different
approach to
cases with similar facts. We note, as we do in Chapter 7, that it is a basic
rule of law principle that the law be consistently
applied, with like cases
being treated alike. While each case applying section 43(1) may turn on its own
facts and involve “value
judgments based on judicial knowledge and
experience”,980F[981]
reasons should still be given for the approach taken to the threshold assessment
in any given case.
PRIOR ACQUITTAL EVIDENCE
Issue
- 10.28 The
Act does not specifically address the status of evidence that has previously
been led at a trial against the defendant that
resulted in an acquittal (prior
acquittal evidence). In Fenemor v R, the Supreme Court confirmed that
prior acquittal evidence should be treated the same as any other kind of
propensity evidence about
a
defendant.981F[982] It added that,
when assessing the prejudicial effect of the evidence, the judge must consider
whether the fact the propensity evidence
is prior acquittal evidence gives rise
to any, or any additional, unfair prejudice (“the acquittal
dimension”).982F[983] To the
extent that it does, the judge should consider how this additional dimension
affects the overall balance between probative
value and unfair prejudice —
focusing in particular on the unfairness of expecting a defendant to respond
again to the evidence
in question given it was not regarded as sufficient to
result in a conviction on the previous occasion.
- 10.29 In our
Issues Paper, we commented that appellate law since Fenemor indicates
that the acquittal dimension of proposed propensity evidence has hardly ever had
a meaningful impact on the section 43(1)
assessment of unfair
prejudice.983F[984] We referred in
particular to Brooks v R, a split decision of the Court of Appeal
in which the majority admitted propensity evidence from proceedings heard 23
years earlier
where most of the records had been
lost.984F[985] Several other Court
of Appeal and Supreme Court cases still subject to publication restrictions have
taken a similar approach.985F[986]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 10.30 We
sought feedback on whether the approach to prior acquittal evidence is causing
problems in practice and, if so, whether section
43 should be amended to provide
guidance on the factors that should be considered when assessing its prejudicial
effect.
- 10.31 If reform
is considered necessary or desirable, we said one possible approach would be to
amend section 43 to require a judge,
when assessing the prejudicial effect of
prior acquittal evidence, to consider certain factors. This could include
whether the defendant
is able to respond fairly to the allegations in the
present proceedings, having regard to the lapse of time since the earlier trial
and the material available to the
court.986F[987]
- 10.32 The
purpose of such an amendment would be to elevate the significance of these
matters in the court’s assessment of unfair
prejudice so as to better
recognise the potential unfairness if defence counsel are unable to rely on
contemporaneous material to
respond to the prior acquittal
evidence.987F[988] We noted,
however, that this option may not go far enough.
Results of consultation
- 10.33 Eight
submitters addressed this question. Three expressed the view that the current
approach is causing problems in practice
and that reform is necessary or
desirable.988F[989] Five said that
the law is working well and no reform is
required.989F[990] The Criminal
Cases Review Commission noted it had received some applications that
“raised specific issues around the unfairness
of the use of prior
acquittal evidence”.
The need for reform
- 10.34 Submitters
that were critical of the current approach considered that prior acquittal
evidence is rarely
excluded.990F[991] They focused on
the unfairness of prior acquittal evidence to defendants, viewing it as uniquely
prejudicial compared to other types
of propensity evidence. Although the courts
have tended to focus on the unfairness caused by loss of documents or the length
of time
between the prior acquittal and the current proceedings, these
submitters considered the unfairness is not limited to historical
trials. All
three submitters referred to the “unjust” and
“prejudicial” effect on a defendant of having to
defend both sets of
allegations when the prior acquittal evidence has already been litigated,
defended and found not to meet the
required standard of proof of beyond
reasonable doubt.
- 10.35 Submitters
in support of the current approach disagreed that prior acquittal evidence is
inherently unfair.991F[992] Two
submitters emphasised that an acquittal is not a finding of innocence. Luke
Cunningham Clere said it “only means that a
fact-finder was not sure
beyond a reasonable doubt of [the defendant’s] guilt”. James
Carruthers elaborated that we do
not, and cannot, know the reasons why an
earlier jury acquitted the defendant, including whether it was a marginal
decision. Both
submitters noted that propensity evidence does not have to be
proven to any evidential standard to be admissible. Fact-finders do
not need to
be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct at issue actually occurred
before they can take it into consideration.
To the extent that any unfair
prejudice is caused by the acquittal dimension, submitters considered this could
be appropriately dealt
with under the current
approach.992F[993]
Options for reform
- 10.36 The
ADLS, Defence Lawyers Association and Public Defence Service considered
section 43 should be amended to explicitly address
the use of prior
acquittal evidence. The ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association submitted that
prior acquittal evidence should not
be admissible at all. The Public Defence
Service noted that some of its lawyers supported making prior acquittal evidence
presumptively
inadmissible unless the prosecution satisfies a high standard for
admission.
- 10.37 In the
absence of reform to exclude prior acquittal evidence, however, all three
submitters supported reform to provide more
guidance on the factors to be
considered when assessing the prejudicial effect of prior acquittal evidence.
The Public Defence Service
commented that statutory guidance should have a focus
on circumstances similar to Brooks (where there had been a significant
lapse in time between the previous and current trial) but should also take
account of the desirability
of finality in litigation and the inherent
unfairness of the defendant having to respond to an allegation twice. The ADLS
and Defence
Lawyers Association submitted reform should include, at a minimum, a
requirement that the court be satisfied the defendant is able
to respond (again)
to the allegation. In their view, however, this would be largely ineffectual
without also increasing the general
threshold for propensity evidence and
requiring the prosecution to prove the alleged propensity beyond reasonable
doubt.
- 10.38 Four
submitters that did not support reform raised concerns about treating prior
acquittal evidence differently from other types
of propensity
evidence.993F[994] The NZLS and
James Carruthers noted that inconsistencies could arise if prior acquittal
evidence is treated differently from similar
types of evidence such as evidence
of historical complaints that were not reported to police or did not proceed to
trial. Submitters
also considered potential inconsistencies with other types of
evidence in different proceedings. James Carruthers said there are
other
proceedings that could raise similar concerns for defendants as prior acquittal
evidence that proceed anyway — for example,
trials for historical
offending that proceed despite the passage of time or potential loss of
contemporaneous witnesses or evidence.
The Crown Law Office also commented that
a presumption that missing evidence causes unfair prejudice to the defendant
runs counter
to general principles of criminal law. It said speculation is
normally impermissible in drawing factual conclusions, and in the context
of a
conviction appeal, evidence lost through undue delay will not be assumed to
assist the defendant.
The need for reform
- 10.39 We
conclude reform is desirable to clarify the approach to prior acquittal
evidence. The Supreme Court in Fenemor provided clear guidance on how
prior acquittal evidence should be assessed under section 43, but
subsequent case law suggests it has not always been applied consistently and
coherently. Statutory amendment to codify Fenemor would promote clarity
and consistency in approach.
- 10.40 This
conclusion is reinforced by two additional considerations. First, we consider
reform is important in the context of our
broader concerns noted above about the
application of the section 43(1) balancing test and the lack of general guidance
for the assessment
of “unfair prejudice” in this context. Statutory
amendment on prior acquittal evidence would provide at least some specific
guidance in the application of the test. Second, further guidance from the
courts may be unlikely to be forthcoming in the foreseeable
future given the
Supreme Court declined leave to appeal in
Brooks.994F[995]
- 10.41 Neither
the Commission nor Parliament originally intended prior acquittal evidence to be
treated differently from other types
of propensity
evidence.995F[996] It is clear
from submissions, however, that this type of evidence remains a matter of
concern for many defence lawyers. It is also
notable that the Criminal Cases
Review Commission has identified prior acquittal evidence as an emerging issue
in the applications
that have been made to it. We think clarifying the approach
to prior acquittal evidence in the Act will respond to these concerns
in a way
that is consistent with both the original intention to permit the evidence (when
appropriate) and existing practice concerning
when it should be admitted.
Recommendation
- R14 Amend
section 43 to provide that, when assessing the prejudicial effect of prior
acquittal evidence on the defendant, the judge must
also consider whether the
defendant can fairly respond to the allegations in the present proceeding,
having regard to:
- the
lapse of time since the earlier investigation and trial;
- the
material available in relation to the earlier investigation and trial; and
- any
other relevant matters.
- 10.42 We
recommend amending section 43 to introduce a new provision providing guidance on
the specific factors to be considered by
judges when assessing the prejudicial
effect of prior acquittal evidence. This new provision would apply to the
assessment of prior
acquittal evidence alongside the existing factors for
assessing the prejudicial effect of propensity evidence set out in section
43(4). Taken together, these provisions will set out the considerations a judge
must consider in their assessment and application
of the section 43(1) test.
- 10.43 The
Supreme Court in Fenemor held that, when a judge is considering the
extent of any unfair prejudice on the defendant, they should examine whether the
fact that
propensity evidence is prior acquittal evidence gives rise to any, or
any additional, unfair prejudice (“the acquittal
dimension”).996F[997]
Subsequent cases have provided guidance on the factors that may be relevant to
that acquittal dimension, including the passage of
time between the previous
trial and current proceedings and the availability of contemporaneous
material.997F[998] We recommend
including these factors in the new provision as specific examples. Other cases
have suggested a relevant factor is the
risk of overwhelming the trial with
prior acquittal evidence and the consequential impact this might have on jury
decision-making.998F[999] In our
view, this consideration is not unique to prior acquittal evidence and is
already considered under section 8 (general exclusion)
where relevant. It is not
necessary to include it in a specific provision aimed at prior acquittal
evidence.
- 10.44 We
recommend keeping the new provision sufficiently flexible to accommodate the
specific facts of any case. For this reason,
it should allow any other relevant
matters to be taken into account when assessing whether the defendant can fairly
respond to the
allegations.
- 10.45 Our
recommendation is limited to prior acquittal evidence. This type of evidence can
be distinguished from incidents of previous
allegations and charges that were
dropped or dismissed before reaching trial. An acquittal has the force of a
ruling on a matter
by the court that, in all other situations, is barred from
being prosecuted
again.999F[1000]
- 10.46 Some
submitters considered amendment would treat prior acquittal evidence differently
from other propensity
evidence.1000F[1001] However,
the purpose of any amendment would be to highlight the factors specific to prior
acquittal evidence in the court’s
assessment of unfair prejudice rather
than to signal a different approach. This will support the courts to better
recognise and articulate
the particular unfairness that can be associated with
prior acquittal evidence through, for example, the loss of records associated
with a trial from many years prior. The same test for admission would continue
to apply to all propensity evidence, including prior
acquittal evidence, under
section 43(1).
THE UNUSUALNESS FACTOR IN SECTION 43(3)(f)
Issue
- 10.47 Section
43(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors the judge may consider when
assessing the probative value of propensity
evidence. Section 43(3)(f) is the
“unusualness factor”. It refers to the extent to which the acts,
omissions, events
or circumstances that are the subject of the propensity
evidence, and those that constitute the offence for which the defendant is
being
tried, are unusual.
- 10.48 In our
Issues Paper, we observed there have long been questions about how
“unusualness” should be
assessed.1001F[1002] We
identified three distinct approaches that have emerged in the case law:
(a) Whether the type of offending is unusual compared to other types of
offending.
(b) Whether the characteristics of the offending are unusual — that
is, whether the characteristics common to the propensity evidence and the
alleged offending disclose something
distinctive and different.
(c) Whether the nature of the offending is unusual, as compared to normal
standards of behaviour.
- 10.49 In its
Second Review, the Commission considered the correct approach was to focus on
distinctive characteristics and patterns
of offending, noting this appeared to
align with the Commission’s original intention in the development of the
Evidence Code.1002F[1003] It
observed there was a trend towards this approach to assessing unusualness in the
courts, and for this reason, it concluded it
was unnecessary to amend the
provision to clarify the correct
approach.1003F[1004]
- 10.50 Cases
since the Second Review have continued to take varying approaches to assessing
unusualness.1004F[1005] For
example, sexual offending against children has now been generally accepted to be
“unusual” based on the nature of
the offending compared to normal
behaviour.1005F[1006] Other
types of offending such as
arson1006F[1007] and bribery and
corruption1007F[1008] have also
been deemed to be “unusual”. Other cases have continued to focus on
the unusualness of the common characteristics
between the propensity evidence
and the alleged
offending.1008F[1009] This
approach is generally taken where the alleged propensity is specific rather than
general in nature. We noted that, on the one
hand, the different approaches may
be causing uncertainty. On the other hand, we said different approaches may be
appropriate when
aimed at assessing different situations.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 10.51 We
sought feedback on whether section 43(3)(f) is causing problems in practice and,
if so, whether and how it should be amended.
If reform was considered desirable,
we presented two options for consideration:
(a) Option 1 — amend section 43(3)(f) to clarify how unusualness should be
assessed.
(b) Option 2 — repeal section 43(3)(f)
altogether.1009F[1010]
- 10.52 We
highlighted that there is no consensus on the “correct”
interpretation of unusualness and that each of the approaches
identified above
is subject to criticism for different reasons. For this reason, we suggested it
may be desirable to leave it to
the courts to determine the appropriate approach
on a case-by-case basis. Repealing section 43(3)(f) would be more
straightforward
than attempting to clarify its application and appropriate if
the concerns associated with this factor are insurmountable. It would,
however,
represent a more significant shift in practice.
Results of consultation
The need for reform
- 10.53 Nine
submitters addressed this question. Only three submitters explicitly addressed
whether section 43(3)(f) is causing problems
in practice with the majority
focusing on the options for reform. Of those three submitters, two expressed the
view that section
43(3)(f) is causing problems in
practice.1010F[1011] Both of
these submitters drew their concerns from the lack of a starting point or
comparator against which to assess unusualness.
Luke Cunningham Clere said this
means decisions are based on “speculation, assumptions and anecdotes (such
as references to
‘judicial experience’ or non-scientific reviews of
past precedent)”. The Public Defence Service also considered
that the lack
of a comparator for “unusualness” was leading to inconsistent
application.
- 10.54 Although
this question was not directly addressed in other submissions, concerns about
inconsistency were reflected in some
submitters’ responses regarding
options for reform. For example, Police expressed the view that reform would
“improve
consistency of practice” and the ADLS and Defence Lawyers
Association supported clarification to ensure the section is applied
“consistently and effectively”.
- 10.55 The Crown
Law Office did not consider section 43(3)(f) is causing problems in practice. It
described this issue as a “matter
of judicial assessment in particular
fact situations”. Further, it was not concerned by the courts taking
different approaches
in different situations. It did not see any unfairness
arising from this as defendants “can be advised with as much certainty
as
any other aspect of litigation” how the courts may consider unusualness on
the facts of the case.
Options for reform
- 10.56 Of
the nine submitters that addressed the need for reform, seven supported
reform1011F[1012] while one (the
NZLS) opposed it. The Crown Law Office did not directly express a view on reform
having already expressed its view
that section 43(3)(f) is not causing problems
in practice.
- 10.57 Six
submitters supported amending section 43(3)(f) to clarify how unusualness should
be assessed.1012F[1013] Two of
these submitters did not express a clear view on the appropriate approach to
clarification.1013F[1014] One
submitter, Luke Cunningham Clere, supported amendment to clarify that a range of
different approaches will be appropriate in
different circumstances. Three
submitters supported amendment to clarify that “unusualness” should
focus on the distinctiveness
of the characteristics of the
offending.1014F[1015] They
considered this approach would reflect the original policy intent of the
provision. They rejected concerns this would lead to
a reversion to the common
law similar fact rule — the ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association on the
basis that the Commission
had never intended to depart from this with
codification and the Public Defence Service on the basis that the courts are
clear this
is not the test to be applied.
- 10.58 Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald suggested section 43(3)(f) “could” be
repealed but did not go into detail as
to why. The Public Defence Service noted
mixed views on this among its lawyers but said some did support repeal. Four
submitters
expressed concern about repealing section 43(3)(f)
completely.1015F[1016] The ADLS
and Defence Lawyers Association said it should be retained as it was “a
useful way to safeguard against the introduction
of evidence that shows no more
than a general tendency to commit the offence concerned”. Luke Cunningham
Clere and Te Rōpū
Tauira Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Students’ Association were concerned about the impact of repeal on cases
involving
child sexual offending where a clear line of cases has emerged
characterising such offending as “inherently unusual”.
- 10.59 The NZLS
did not consider reform was necessary or desirable. In its view, the unusualness
factor should retain flexibility to
account for the different purposes for which
propensity evidence can be used.
The need for reform
- 10.60 We
conclude it is necessary to reform section 43(3)(f). The majority of submitters
agreed that some manner of reform is required.
Submitters expressed concern that
the current approach is creating inconsistency. This stems from the lack of
definition or guidance
in the Act as to what “unusualness” means
and, crucially, the lack of an objective comparator against which
“unusualness”
is to be assessed. This has led to the courts adopting
varying approaches. We consider it is unsatisfactory to lack any common
understanding
or objective standard for applying the unusualness criterion.
- 10.61 Two
submitters disagreed reform is required. They considered that taking different
approaches to unusualness is not problematic
due to the different purposes for
which propensity evidence is used and the range of factual scenarios in which it
applies. Although
the nature of propensity evidence and the section 43 test may
be fact-specific, we do not consider this extends to the criteria to
be applied
when assessing probative value. In our view, it underlines the importance of
having clear and well-understood factors
to guide the application of the test to
different factual scenarios.
Recommendation
- R15 Repeal
section 43(3)(f).
- 10.62 We
recommend repealing section 43(3)(f). Although the majority of submitters
supported reform to clarify the meaning of “unusual”,
there was no
consensus on what the correct definition should be. As many submitters
acknowledged, there are considerable difficulties
with each potential approach
to assessing
unusualness.1016F[1017] This is
further complicated by the lack of any clear indication of intent in legislative
materials.1017F[1018]
- 10.63 For the
reasons outlined above, however, we do not consider it is appropriate to leave
the courts to decide what is “unusual”
on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly, we do not recommend amendment to clarify that a range of different
approaches might be appropriate
depending on the circumstances of the case and
the reasons for which propensity evidence is offered (as one submitter
suggested).
Neither of these approaches would assist clarity, certainty and
consistency in decision-making.
- 10.64 The
majority of submitters that supported a clarificatory amendment supported
focusing on the distinctiveness of the characteristics
of the propensity
evidence and the alleged
offending.1018F[1019] To the
extent that it is appropriate to consider unusualness, we consider this is the
correct approach. We agree with the previously
expressed view of the Commission
that this is the likely original intention behind the
factor.1019F[1020] Early drafts
of section 43 discussed the US Federal Rules of Evidence, section 404(b) of
which creates an exception to the exclusion
of propensity evidence on the
grounds of “identity” — that is, an unusual modus
operandi.1020F[1021] In our
view, and for reasons on which we expand below, this approach most fully
captures the rationale of “linkage and coincidence”
underlying the
admission of propensity evidence. It speaks directly to the degree of connection
between two sets of behaviour (the
behaviour demonstrated in the propensity
evidence and the alleged offending) in a way that is not captured by approaches
based on
the type or nature of offending.
- 10.65 We also
agree with the previously expressed view of the Commission that an approach that
focuses on distinctiveness does not
risk reverting the common law similar fact
rule.1021F[1022] As it is only
one factor in the assessment under section 43(3), it does not risk reintroducing
the concept of striking similarity
as in the common law similar fact
rule.1022F[1023]
- 10.66 However,
we do not consider that it is necessary to retain the “unusualness”
factor with this definition. The distinctiveness
of the behaviours demonstrated
in the propensity evidence and the alleged offending could still be considered
under section 43(3)(c)
(the extent of the similarity between the propensity
evidence and the facts in issue). In its Second Review, the Commission
considered
that, although there is some overlap between sections 43(3)(c) and
43(3)(f), they should be maintained as separate
factors.1023F[1024] It
considered the two were not interchangeable as offending could be similar yet
not unusual. It gave the example of a defendant
who steals money out of an
employer’s cash register on two occasions (similar but not unusual) and a
defendant who steals money
out of an employer’s cash register and replaces
it with Monopoly money on two occasions. The latter, it suggested, has greater
probative value, and this should be acknowledged by maintaining unusualness as a
separate factor.
- 10.67 The
probative value of the evidence is, however, determined by the strength of the
relevant factors rather than the number of
factors that apply. As the Court of
Appeal has held:1024F[1025]
- The task of
analysing the relevant matters in s 43(3) of the Evidence Act requires careful
evaluation and an acknowledgement that
the circumstances of each case have to be
carefully considered. In some cases just one of the factors in s 43(3) will be
determinative
while in others, each factor may carry similar
weight.
- 10.68 Accordingly,
while we agree that events may be “similar” but not
“unusual”, we consider the distinctiveness
of common characteristics
would add weight to the section 43(3)(c) factor. This view was shared by most
members of our Expert Advisory
Group. For this reason, we do not consider it is
necessary to maintain a separate factor for “unusualness”. Retaining
the factor in any form is likely to cause continued confusion over its relevance
and appropriate application.
- 10.69 Repealing
section 43(3)(f) would mean that the unusualness of the type or nature of
offending (compared either to other types
of offending or to normal standards of
behaviour) would no longer be identified explicitly as a relevant factor. Two
submitters were
concerned about the potential impact of this, particularly in
the context of the courts treating sexual offending against children
as
inherently unusual.1025F[1026]
We do not agree with this concern for two reasons.
- 10.70 First, we
do not consider repeal of the unusualness factor would have a marked impact on
outcomes in child sexual offending
cases. Members of our Expert Advisory Group
agreed with this assessment. In our analysis of child sexual offending cases
post-Thompson, unusualness was not the single determinative factor in
decisions to admit propensity
evidence.1026F[1027]
- 10.71 We
acknowledge the importance of propensity evidence in cases involving child
sexual offending. There may be a greater willingness
to admit evidence of
previous offending in these cases on the basis of unlikely
coincidence.1027F[1028] As the
Court of Appeal observed in Smith, “a man who has two sets
of children, neither of whom knows the other, making similar allegations against
him would be, if both
were false, very
unlucky”.1028F[1029] We do
not consider repeal of section 43(3)(f) would change this, and the existence of
section 43(3)(c) would ensure that distinctiveness,
including the
unlikeliness of two similar allegations, could still be considered.
- 10.72 Additionally,
as we noted above, while recent reforms in Australia have sought to bolster the
probative value of propensity
evidence in cases involving child sexual
offending, this was in response to concerns that are unlikely to arise in New
Zealand’s
different legislative
context.1029F[1030]
- 10.73 Second, we
query the policy basis for treating particular conduct (in this case, child
sexual offending) as “inherently”
unusual. It is not clear that
treating a type of conduct as inherently unusual is probative of an
individual’s tendency towards
a particular behaviour or state of mind. It
is a blanket statement rather than a consideration that shows the necessary
“linkage
and coincidence” between an individual and both the current
offending and previous behaviour. This approach may simply rationalise
admitting
evidence in the absence of any such link. Additionally, there is a question
about how the court determines that a particular
type of offending is
“inherently unusual”. Arguably, any type of offending is
“inherently unusual” when compared
to normal standards of behaviour
since the vast majority of individuals will not offend.
- 10.74 This
highlights the difficulties more generally of relying on an approach to
unusualness that is defined by the nature or type
of offending. Both these
approaches require reference to an external comparator, which is not defined in
the Act. Such an exercise
would either require the court to refer to large
amounts of empirical
evidence1030F[1031] or to rely
on individual judicial assessments of societal
norms.1031F[1032] By comparison,
a “distinctive characteristics” approach does not require this. The
relevant comparison is between the
behaviours demonstrated in the propensity
evidence and the alleged offending, both of which are already before the
court.
- 10.75 On this
basis, we consider repeal to be the most effective and appropriate solution to
the issues identified. This was supported
by some
submitters1032F[1033] and
unanimously by the members of our Expert Advisory Group. This would mean
“unusualness” would no longer be listed
as a relevant factor in the
assessment of probative value.
RELEVANCE OF RELIABILITY
Issue
- 10.76 In
our Issues Paper, we noted it is unclear whether reliability should form part of
the judge’s assessment when determining
the admissibility of propensity
evidence.1033F[1034] The Act
only directly addresses the reliability of propensity evidence under section
43(3)(e), which refers to whether the allegations
made by a propensity witness
“may be the result of collusion or suggestibility”. The Court of
Appeal has taken the view
that challenges to the credibility and reliability of
propensity witnesses are generally issues for the fact-finder at
trial.1034F[1035]
- 10.77 This
approach has been called into question indirectly by the decision of the Supreme
Court in W (SC 38/2019) v
R.1035F[1036] The Court held
that the evaluation of probative value (in that case, under section 8) can
include considerations of
reliability.1036F[1037]
The Supreme Court has previously held that there is “little or
no” practical difference between the tests in section 43
and section
8.1037F[1038] The Court’s
approach in W (SC 38/2019) v R has been applied subsequently to
propensity evidence at High Court
level.1038F[1039] However, a
later Court of Appeal judgment, subject to publication restrictions, did not
consider W (SC 38/2019) v R and referred to earlier case law that
suggested reliability issues should be assessed and resolved at
trial.1039F[1040]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 10.78 We
asked submitters whether section 43(3)(e) should be amended to clarify that,
when assessing the probative value of propensity
evidence, the judge may
consider the reliability of the proposed
evidence.1040F[1041] We
expressed the view that, following the Supreme Court’s decision in W
(SC 38/2019) v R, it would be inconsistent to continue to apply a
higher bar to the consideration of reliability under section 43 than section 8.
- 10.79 We noted
that such an amendment may be unnecessary since W (SC 38/2019) v R has
already been applied to a propensity case in the High Court. We referred,
however, to the later Court of Appeal judgment that
took a different approach to
the relevance of reliability. On this basis, we suggested amendment may be
necessary or desirable to
ensure consistency.
Results of consultation
- 10.80 Ten
submitters addressed this issue. Five supported
reform1041F[1042] while four
opposed it.1042F[1043] One
submitter, the NZLS, agreed that “the reliability of proposed evidence
should be capable of being considered as part of
the admissibility
assessment” but did not express a view on whether legislative amendment is
necessary or desirable to achieve
this.
- 10.81 All
submitters agreed that reliability is a relevant consideration under the
section 43 assessment. They disagreed on whether
legislative reform is
necessary or desirable. Submitters that supported reform considered amendment
would ensure clarity and consistency
as to the relevance of reliability across
the Act by addressing the current inconsistency between sections 8 and
43.1043F[1044] They also
referred to the current illogicality of reliability only being relevant to
consideration of “collusion or suggestibility”
under section
43(3)(e) and could see no reason to limit consideration of reliability in this
way.1044F[1045]
- 10.82 Submitters
that opposed reform were not convinced legislative amendment would be helpful.
The Crown Law Office considered there
was no evidence of unreliable propensity
evidence being admitted to warrant reform. Associate Professor High and Police
considered
amendment is unnecessary following the Supreme Court’s clear
guidance in W (SC 38/2019) v R. Associate Professor High noted there is
nothing in section 43 that conflicts with that decision. In particular, the
section 43(3)
factors are not exhaustive so the express reference to collusion
or suggestibility does not currently preclude consideration of other
factors
that might be relevant to reliability. Associate Professor High also expressed
concern that amending section 43 could in
fact cause confusion, on the face of
the Act, as to whether considerations of reliability are also relevant to the
section 8 assessment
(which does not refer expressly to reliability).
Reform not recommended
- 10.83 We
conclude reform is not necessary or desirable. The purpose of amendment would be
to clarify the relevance of reliability
to the assessment of probative value
under section 43 by making it explicit in the provision. As we noted in our
Issues Paper, this
would have the benefit of ensuring the courts take a
consistent approach to the assessment of probative value under both sections
8
and 43.
- 10.84 We
consider, however, that these potential benefits are outweighed by the risk that
statutory amendment could cause confusion.
Associate Professor High was
concerned that amending section 43 to refer to reliability without also amending
section 8 might raise
questions about the relevance of reliability under section
8. We considered a more general amendment to bring reliability within
the
definition of “probative value” but this was not supported by the
Judicial Advisory Committee or our Expert Advisory
Group, both of which
considered it would risk confusion and unduly highlight reliability under
section 43.
- 10.85 Our
conclusion is supported by the judicial reasoning on this issue from the Supreme
Court in W (SC 38/2019) v R and evidence that the courts are generally
applying it. A number of submitters considered this rendered statutory
amendment unnecessary. As noted above, we are aware of one example of the
Supreme Court’s approach being applied by the High Court in the context of
section 43, which suggests reform may not be necessary
to ensure a consistent
approach between sections 8 and 43. To the extent that the subsequent Court of
Appeal decision we refer to
above did not consider W (SC 38/2019) v R,
this may be a single incident more than a signal of more widespread uncertainty
or disagreement. Given the recency of the Supreme
Court’s decision,
it can be expected there will be a necessary period of settling in for the
courts in its application.
CHAPTER 11
Visual identification evidence
INTRODUCTION
- 11.1 In
this chapter, we consider the definition of “visual identification
evidence” in section 4(1) of the Evidence Act
2006. We recommend reform to
clarify that it includes assertions that a defendant was the person observed
performing an act constituting
direct or circumstantial evidence of the
commission of an offence. This would mean the safeguards for visual
identification evidence
in sections 45 and 126 apply to such evidence.
ISSUE
- 11.2 Section
4(1) defines visual identification evidence as an assertion that a defendant
“was present at or near a place where
an act constituting direct or
circumstantial evidence of the commission of an offence was done at, or about,
the time the act was
done”. Under section 45, visual identification
evidence can only be admitted if it has been obtained through a formal
procedure1045F[1046] or there is
a “good reason” for not undertaking the
procedure.1046F[1047] If the
case against the defendant depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of
visual identification evidence, under section
126, a judge must warn the jury of
“the special need for caution” before finding a defendant guilty.
These protections
are designed to address reliability concerns with visual
identification
evidence.1047F[1048]
- 11.3 In our
Issues Paper, we said it was uncertain whether these provisions apply if the
defendant admits to being present at the
scene of the offence but denies being
the perpetrator. An example is if a defendant does not dispute their presence at
a group assault
but claims they were mistakenly identified as the person seen
holding a weapon or committing the
assault.1048F[1049] Evidence of
the alleged actions of a person is known as observation evidence. We considered
this uncertainty stemmed from the definition
of visual identification evidence,
which focuses on assertions that a defendant was “present or near” a
place and not
assertions that the defendant was the person who committed a
particular act.
- 11.4 We
explained there is conflicting case law on this issue. Some cases have held that
the definition of visual identification evidence
does not include observation
evidence.1049F[1050] Other cases
have held that it
does.1050F[1051] The result of
either approach is significant. Under the former interpretation, the section 45
and 126 protections will not apply.
Under the latter, they will.
- 11.5 In 2022, te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal in Pink v R considered whether a
section 126 warning should have been given where the defendant admitted being at
the scene of the offending
and holding the weapon used in the attack but claimed
he was intervening to confiscate the weapon and stop the
attack.1051F[1052] The
Court found that, in both cross-examination and its closing address, the defence
had implicitly advanced the possibility that
the eyewitnesses may have arrived
at the scene before the defendant confiscated the axe and therefore had seen
someone else wielding
it. This meant identification was a live issue so section
126 was engaged. The Court acknowledged the difficulties with the definition
of
visual identification evidence, noting there is no “bright line
distinction” between visual identification evidence
and observation
evidence.1052F[1053] After
examining the earlier authorities, it
concluded:1053F[1054]
- [I]t is wrong
to suggest that an identification warning is only required when the defendant
denies being at the scene. A warning
may still be required where the defendant
admits being present and it is a live issue as to whether he or someone else
present was
the perpetrator.
- 11.6 Despite the
decision in Pink, we noted in our Issues Paper the conflicting case law
on this point meant it remained
unsettled.1054F[1055] Since we
published our Issues Paper, however, the Court of Appeal has considered the
definition of visual identification evidence
in two further
cases.1055F[1056] Both cases
supported the approach in Pink and earlier authority that there is no
“bright line distinction” between visual identification evidence and
observation
evidence.1056F[1057]
In one case, the Court found that, although it was not disputed the defendant
was present at the scene, a jury warning was required
because identification of
the defendant as the perpetrator was still in
issue.1057F[1058] In the other,
the prosecution conceded section 45 applied to circumstances in which the
defendant admitted her presence at the scene
but denied participating in the
assault. However, it argued the failure to meet the requirements of section 45
did not result in
a miscarriage of justice. The Court of Appeal disagreed and
held the introduction of inadmissible visual identification evidence
created a
real risk the outcome of the trial was affected. The Court also indicated a jury
warning may have been
required.1058F[1059] These cases
suggest the law may be more settled than when we consulted on this
issue.
CONSULTATION
What we asked submitters
- 11.7 We
asked submitters if the definition of visual identification evidence in section
4(1) should be amended to explicitly include
observation evidence. We expressed
a preliminary view that it should so that the protections in sections 45 and 126
would apply whenever
the identity of the perpetrator is in
issue.1059F[1060] We agreed with
the reasoning in Pink that, even when the accused admits their presence
at the scene, the risk of mistaken identification can be just as
real.1060F[1061]
- 11.8 We
suggested that, if reform was considered necessary or desirable, one option
would be to insert a new paragraph into the definition
of visual identification
evidence as
follows:1061F[1062]
- ... evidence
that is an assertion by a person, based wholly or partly on what that person
saw, to the effect that a defendant was
the person observed performing an act
constituting direct or circumstantial evidence of the commission of an
offence.
Results of consultation
- 11.9 Eight
submitters addressed this question. Four supported
reform1062F[1063] and four
opposed it.1063F[1064]
Submitters in support of reform considered observation evidence raised the same
risks as visual identification evidence and should
therefore be subject to the
same protections.1064F[1065]
These submitters considered amendment to make clear observation evidence is part
of visual identification evidence would ensure the
section 45 and 126 safeguards
would apply to this type of evidence.
- 11.10 Te Tari
Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, which opposed reform, agreed that
observation evidence could give rise to the
same risks as visual identification
evidence. It disagreed, however, that reform is necessary to address this. It
considered the
distinction between identification evidence and observation
evidence is, in principle, sound. It expressed concern that our proposed
amendment could lead to cases where there is no dispute as to the presence or
identity of a defendant, only a dispute as to a witness’s
description or
characterisation of the defendant’s conduct, being subject to unnecessary
identification procedures and warnings.
This concern was shared by the
Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere, which considered the same
risks of misidentification
did not arise in relation to observation evidence. In
its view, “evidence of what a person who we know was present at the scene
of the crime did while they were present” is simple eyewitness evidence
that should be treated the same as any other eyewitness
evidence.
- 11.11 To similar
effect, the New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) considered it unnecessary to widen
the scope of section 45 to include
observation evidence. It preferred an
approach in which a formal procedure is only required if identification is at
issue and would
be resolved by the procedure. It acknowledged that determining
whether identification is “at issue” would require a judgement
call
by investigators. It said the situations described in the Issues Paper where a
defendant admits to being at the scene would
be capable of amounting to a good
reason not to follow a formal procedure under section 45(4)(d) (that the
investigator or prosecutor
could not reasonably anticipate that identification
would be an issue).1065F[1066]
- 11.12 In
addition, the Crown Law Office queried whether there is material uncertainty in
the case law so as to necessitate reform.
In its view, the recent Court of
Appeal decision in Tupuivao v
R1066F[1067]
indicates the courts are already applying the approach in Pink where
the reliability of identification is in issue.
- 11.13 Two
submitters addressed the practical implications of any reform. Ngā
Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police was concerned
it would impose an
undue administrative burden by requiring police to carry out a formal
identification procedure in every case where
a witness says they saw a person
commit a crime. The Crown Law Office did not think reform would change police
behaviour. It said
that, to the extent police might not follow formal
identification procedures when they should, this is a training
issue.1067F[1068]
- 11.14 Three
submitters, while opposing reform (including our proposed amendment), did
suggest other possible approaches. The Crown
Law Office suggested that, if the
definition is to be amended, it should include some explicit wording that it
applies to observation
evidence only in circumstances when the reliability of
the identification is in issue. Two submitters, Luke Cunningham Clere and
the
NZLS, did not support amending the definition but more tentatively supported
amending section 126 to address situations like
the one arising in
Pink.1068F[1069] Luke
Cunningham Clere said this would maintain the distinction between observation
and identification evidence with respect to the
use of formal identification
procedures while still making the fact-finder cognisant of the relevant risks.
The NZLS said amendment
to section 126 along these lines would be beneficial in
cases where there would be little utility in carrying out a formal procedure
but
there is nevertheless a risk of misidentification. However, both submitters said
this approach is potentially already available
under section 126. Luke
Cunningham Clere also thought judicial guidance might achieve the same
purpose.
THE NEED FOR REFORM
- 11.15 We
conclude reform is desirable to clarify that the definition of visual
identification evidence includes observation evidence.
As we said in our Issues
Paper, the Act is unclear on this point. Under the current section 4(1)
definition, it is not obvious that
observation evidence can be included in the
plain meaning of visual identification evidence. Rather, the courts can only
take this
approach by adopting a purposive interpretation of the definition. In
this respect, the courts have taken different approaches —
although a
clearer approach, tending towards the inclusion of observation evidence, may be
emerging from Pink and its application in two subsequent Court of Appeal
cases. Legislative amendment would reflect the current approach of the courts
and ensure clarity and certainty.
- 11.16 To the
extent the current definition might be interpreted as excluding observation
evidence, it may not adequately protect against
misidentifications. This view
was shared or accepted by a number of
submitters.1069F[1070] We agree.
While in some cases it can be difficult to clearly differentiate between
observation evidence and simple identification
evidence, correctly identifying
the person who did the act is still of profound importance. The risk of
misidentification is just
as real when identifying who committed an act as it is
when identifying who was “present or near” the scene. There may
also
be a particular risk of cross-racial misidentification when those present at the
scene of a crime are of a similar ethnicity.
RECOMMENDATION
- R16 Insert
a new paragraph in the definition of “visual identification
evidence” in section 4(1) referring to evidence that
is an
“assertion by a person, based wholly or partly on what that person saw, to
the effect that a defendant was the person
observed performing an act
constituting direct or circumstantial evidence of the commission of an
offence”.
- 11.17 We
recommend amending the definition of visual identification evidence in section
4(1) to clarify that it includes observation
evidence. This would mean that, in
accordance with section 45, a formal identification procedure would need to be
followed in relation
to this type of evidence. It would also require a judge to
direct the jury, under section 126, when the case depends “wholly
or
substantially” on the correctness of a witness’s visual
identification of the defendant as the person performing the
relevant act.
- 11.18 Our
recommendation will address the risks associated with misidentification of the
defendant where a person asserts they saw
the defendant performing an act
constituting direct or circumstantial evidence of the commission of an offence.
For the reasons stated
above, we consider that observation evidence should not
be put before a fact-finder without the protections in sections 45 and 126.
- 11.19 Amending
section 4(1) would clarify that both section 45 and section 126 apply to
observation evidence as opposed to amending either of those sections in
isolation. As the Court
of Appeal has acknowledged on several occasions, it is
the drafting of the section 4(1) definition of visual identification evidence
that creates difficulties when it is clear the defendant was present but denies
they were the person doing the relevant
act.1070F[1071] The same point
has been made in
commentary.1071F[1072]
- 11.20 Submitters
opposed to reform raised two main concerns with our proposed amendment: that it
may be overly inclusive of observation
evidence and that it may result in an
increased administrative burden for Police and the courts. We address these two
concerns in
turn.
- 11.21 First, we
do not agree our proposed amendment is overly inclusive. There are existing
safeguards in the Act to avoid unnecessary
use of formal identification
procedures when identification is not a significant issue. Section 45(4) lists
in its “good reasons”
for not undertaking a formal procedure that
“no officer involved in the investigation or the prosecution of the
alleged offence
could reasonably anticipate that identification would be an
issue at the trial of the defendant”. As we said in our Issues
Paper, this
may apply where the defendant admits to being at the scene and does not deny the
witness saw them commit the offence
when this is put to them in an interview. In
addition to the reasons listed in section 45(4), te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme
Court
has found that the list of “good reasons” in section 45(4) is
not exhaustive.1072F[1073] For
example, it is well established in case law that identification based on strong
recognition evidence (where, for example, the
witness knows the defendant) can
satisfy this ground.1073F[1074]
Even when a formal procedure is not followed, the prosecution can still admit
visual identification evidence under section 45(2)
if it can prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the circumstances in which the identification was made
have produced a reliable identification.
This acts as a backstop in situations
where a formal procedure should have been undertaken but the evidence that the
defendant was
the person observed committing an offence is overwhelming.
- 11.22 As also
noted by the NZLS, an identification procedure should be held as soon as
possible after an event, meaning that it may
be required before a defendant has
given a statement confirming their presence at the scene of an offence. In other
words, under
current law and practice, a formal procedure may already have been
or need to be undertaken before the defendant admits their presence.
- 11.23 Section
126 is also drafted to avoid identification warnings being required
unnecessarily. Section 126 only requires an identification
warning to be given
where “the case against the defendant depends wholly or substantially on
the correctness of 1 or more visual
or voice identifications of the defendant or
any other person”. No warning would be needed if a witness’s
evidence met
the definition of visual identification evidence but identification
was not a significant issue at trial.
- 11.24 Second, to
the extent our recommendation could result in an increased administrative burden
for police and the courts, we think
this is justified given the risks of
misidentification. Under our proposed amendment, identification procedures might
sometimes be
run when they are not ultimately required. As noted above, it
appears this already occurs to some degree under the current law. We
consider
this is preferable to not having formal identification procedures run when there
is a risk of misidentification. For example,
in a group attack situation where
it is clear the defendant was present, it will be important to know if a witness
can or cannot
identify the defendant through a formal procedure. This will be
especially important where people in the group appeared to look similar
to the
witness (for example, if they are of a similar ethnicity) and/or where a key
issue is who started a fight where several people
have already pleaded guilty to
assault.
- 11.25 For
completeness, we note that eyewitness evidence will continue to be admissible
without being subject to a formal procedure.
A witness’s description of
actions they observed can be and is regularly severed from the question of who
performed those actions.
Descriptions of an alleged offender’s appearance
would remain admissible provided they do not include a positive identification
(for instance, making a dock identification during the trial).
CHAPTER 12
Medical privilege
INTRODUCTION
- 12.1 In
this chapter, we consider the operation of section 59 of the Evidence Act 2006,
which governs privilege in criminal proceedings
for information obtained by
medical practitioners and clinical psychologists. We address the
following:
(a) The scope of the exception to privilege created by section 59(1)(b). We
recommend clarifying that court-ordered treatment does
not fall within this
exception.
(b) The circumstances in which someone acts “on behalf of” a medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist under section
59(5). We recommend amending
section 59(5) to clarify the meaning of “on behalf of”. We also
recommend widening the privilege
created by section 59 to apply to
communications made to a broader range of health practitioners.
(c) Protections for the counselling and therapeutic notes of sexual and family
violence complainants and parties in te Kōti
Whānau | Family Court
proceedings. This was a new issue raised by several submitters. We recommend the
Ministry of Justice examine
protections for counselling notes and other personal
records of complainants in sexual and family violence cases or parties and
children
in Family Court proceedings.
BACKGROUND
- 12.2 Section
59 creates a privilege in criminal proceedings for communications made to, and
information obtained by, medical practitioners
and clinical psychologists in the
course of the examination, treatment or care of a person in relation to drug
dependency or other
conditions or behaviour that may manifest in criminal
conduct. Section 59(5) extends the privilege to people “acting in a
professional
capacity on behalf of a medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist”.
- 12.3 In our
Issues Paper, we examined the origins and purpose of medical privilege, noting
that some form of medical privilege has
existed in statute since the late 19th
century.1074F[1075] We noted
three policy justifications for the existence of a medical
privilege:1075F[1076]
(a) Society has a general interest in encouraging people to seek medical
attention and to communicate openly and honestly when doing
so.
(b) The public has a general preference for and expectation of privacy when it
comes to medical consultations.
(c) In the criminal justice context of someone seeking treatment for drug
dependency or other behaviours that might manifest in criminal
conduct,
compliance with the law is more likely to be achieved through medical treatment
than through prosecution.
- 12.4 If people
are aware that any information they share in the course of seeking medical
attention could be used against them in
court, this could prevent them from
seeking medical attention or inhibit communication or engagement when they do
so.1076F[1077] Medical privilege
recognises that, in particular circumstances, the public interest in
confidentiality outweighs the public interest
in securing the administration of
justice by placing all relevant evidence in front of a
court.1077F[1078]
SCOPE OF THE SECTION 59(1)(b) EXCEPTION
Issue
- 12.5 Section
59(1)(b) creates an exception to medical privilege in situations where a person
“has been required by an order
of a judge, or by other lawful authority,
to submit himself or herself to the medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist for any
examination, test, or for any other purpose”. We
received preliminary feedback that it is not clear whether court-ordered
treatment (as opposed to a court-ordered examination or
test) would be captured by section 59(1)(b). For example, it may not be
clear whether information obtained in the course of a rehabilitative
counselling
programme a person has been directed to attend as part of an extended
supervision order (ESO) under the Parole Act 2002
would be privileged.
- 12.6 In our
Issues Paper, we observed it is unlikely the section 59(1)(b) exception was
intended to apply so broadly as to cover court-ordered
treatment.1078F[1079] Earlier
versions of this exception and subsequent discussion were focused on ensuring
that information required by the court to resolve
particular medico-legal
questions (such as fitness to stand trial) is not withheld on the basis of
privilege.1079F[1080] We
considered that such a broad interpretation would be at odds with the underlying
policy of the section (to encourage people to
seek
treatment).1080F[1081] It could
also have unintended consequences — for example, that information obtained
during compulsory treatment under the Mental
Health (Compulsory Assessment and
Treatment) Act 1992 or the Substance Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and
Treatment) Act 2017 would
not be
privileged.1081F[1082]
- 12.7 A related
concern with the scope of section 59(1)(b) is that it appears to permit
information obtained for one purpose (for example,
an assessment as part of a
preventive detention application under the Sentencing Act 2002) to be similarly
excepted from privilege
and so used for another unrelated purpose (for example,
to support criminal charges in unrelated
offending).1082F[1083] This
issue was identified in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s 2013
Review but not resolved due to the lack of submissions
addressing
it.1083F[1084] The Commission
recommended the issue be explored in the context of a wider review of the
Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons)
Act 2003 but, to date, we are not
aware of any subsequent consideration of this issue. In our Issues Paper, we
suggested that an
approach that would permit information obtained for one
purpose to be used for another could be inconsistent with the original policy
justification underlying the existence of medical privilege.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 12.8 We
sought feedback on whether section 59(1)(b) should be amended to clarify its
application to court-ordered treatment. We expressed
a preliminary view that it
would be desirable to amend section 59(1)(b) to clarify the circumstances in
which the exception
applies.1084F[1085]
- 12.9 We sought
feedback from submitters on two alternative options for
reform:1085F[1086]
(a) Option 1 — amend section 59(1)(b) to remove the words
“for any other purpose”.
(b) Option 2 — amend section 59(1)(b) to remove the words
“for any other purpose” and limit the exception by reference
to the purpose for which the information or communication is obtained.
Results of consultation
The need for reform
- 12.10 Ten
submitters addressed this question. Eight agreed section 59(1)(b) should be
amended to clarify the scope of its
application1086F[1087] while two
opposed reform.1087F[1088]
- 12.11 Several
submitters that supported amendment said reform would be in line with the
original intention of the provision —
ensuring relevant information is
available to the court to reach a determination — which was never intended
to include court-ordered
treatment.1088F[1089] Emeritus
Professor John Dawson said there is a very clear expectation of confidentiality
and privilege in court-ordered treatment
settings (particularly in cases of
compulsory treatment or where treatment is a condition of parole or supervision
orders). If that
were not the case, he submitted, there would be no incentive
for people to engage fully and honestly in those treatment programmes.
He
supported a more substantial redrafting of section 59, including the inclusion
of a purpose provision, and expressed concern that
more piecemeal amendments
could further complicate an already complex provision.
- 12.12 Of the
submitters that opposed amendment, the Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke
Cunningham Clere, thought legislative clarification
is unnecessary following
R v Tamati.1089F[1090] It
considered this decision is consistent with the view that court-ordered
treatment is not included in the scope of the section
59(1)(b) exception. Te
Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office understood the rationale behind the
proposed reform but was concerned
about the “overly restrictive”
practical implications it might have (discussed below in relation to the options
for reform).
Options for reform
- 12.13 Of
the submitters supporting reform, four submitters supported option
11090F[1091] and four supported
option 2.1091F[1092] Submitters
in favour of option 1 (remove the words “for any other purpose”) saw
it as clarifying the correct approach
that court-ordered treatment does not fall
within the section 59(1)(b) exception.
- 12.14 The Crown
Law Office, which opposed reform, expressed concern that excluding treatment
from the section 59(1)(b) exception would
limit the availability of important
information to the courts. It suggested section 59(1)(b) currently provides
another route for
securing disclosure of information where defendants do not
consent to the disclosure of health information under other legislative
regimes.
In particular, it was concerned reform might limit the availability of
information required by judges to assess risk under
the
ESO1092F[1093] and public
protection order
(PPO)1093F[1094] regimes or to
decide whether to impose preventive
detention.1094F[1095]
- 12.15 Manatū
Hauora | Ministry of Health noted a risk that removing “or for any other
purpose” may inadvertently
narrow the scope of clinical assessments
covered by the exception. It said the clinical process for assessment can be
broader than
just examination and tests, giving the example of gathering
information from others close to a patient such as parents or whānau
to
inform assessment. Professor Dawson commented similarly that “examination
or test” should be replaced with “assessment”.
The latter term
is more widely understood in the healthcare context and covers examinations and
tests as well as other actions that
might not sit neatly within the current
wording of the provision. He gave the example of information obtained by a nurse
carrying
out observations on a ward being used to inform assessment or diagnosis
(as was the case in R v
Parkinson).1095F[1096]
- 12.16 Two
submitters, the Crown Law Office and Professor Dawson, suggested there are
sometimes difficulties in clearly delineating
between “assessment”
and “treatment” so as to exclude information obtained during
treatment from the section
59(1)(b) exception in a workable way. The Crown Law
Office commented that the divide between actions taken as part of assessment
and
those taken as part of treatment may not always be clear, while Professor Dawson
observed assessment and treatment will often
take place simultaneously in the
court-ordered
context.1096F[1097]
- 12.17 Four
submitters expressed a preference for option 2 (remove the words “or for
any other purpose” and limit the exception by reference to the
purpose for which the information or communication was
obtained).1097F[1098] In
addition to expressing support for option 1, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa |
New Zealand Police also expressed “tentative”
support for
option 2.
- 12.18 Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service saw option 2 as
more closely reflecting the intention behind
medical privilege and ensuring the
exception “only operates to the extent necessary for the court to be able
to make relevant
determinations”.
- 12.19 In support
of option 2, Professor Dawson drew attention to section 59(1A). He viewed this
as an important qualifier that the
section 59(1)(b) exception applies only to
the communications made or information obtained during the court-ordered
examination or
test and that any past medical records or notes remain
privileged. He suggested section 59(1)(b) could be amended to refer to
information
“freshly” or “newly” learned in the course
of examination or test to make this distinction clearer.
- 12.20 Four
submitters raised concerns about the practical implications of option
2.1098F[1099] The Auckland
District Law Society (ADLS) and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand were supportive of the “protective
sentiment” underlying
option 2 but suggested current shortcomings in the court system mean flexibility
in the use and reuse
of information should be retained. They noted the long
waitlist to obtain forensic mental health reports means it will often benefit
the defendant if reports from a previous proceeding are reused in another. The
Crown Law Office again expressed concern that this
approach may limit the
availability of important information to judges when making decisions about
whether to impose preventive detention
or grant bail.
- 12.21 Luke
Cunningham Clere submitted there is a far stronger public interest in the
administration of justice that outweighs any
desirability of limiting the use of
information gathered through a court-ordered examination to the proceedings for
which it was
ordered. It considered voluntary confessions to serious criminal
offending unrelated to the report but made in the course of court-ordered
assessment should not be privileged.
The need for reform
- 12.22 We
conclude it is desirable to amend section 59(1)(b) to clarify that the exception
does not apply to court-ordered treatment.
Although there is little evidence of
a problem in practice currently, the different interpretations of the current
position raised
in preliminary feedback and by submitters suggest it is
desirable to resolve any ambiguity.
- 12.23 The
majority of submitters thought the exception does not, and was never intended
to, apply to court-ordered treatment. We agree
and consider amendment would
clarify and codify the current (and intended) approach. Removing privilege from
court-ordered treatment
would be contrary to the objective of medical privilege
— to encourage individuals to seek treatment and engage fully and honestly
when doing so.1099F[1100]
Additionally, it would be more encompassing than the intention behind the
section 59(1)(b) exception, which was to ensure that information
required by the
court to reach a specific legal determination (for example, on fitness to stand
trial) was not
privileged.1100F[1101]
- 12.24 The Crown
Law Office expressed concern that the exclusion of court-ordered treatment from
the section 59(1)(b) exception would
lead to important and “highly
relevant” information being withheld from the court. For example, it said
information obtained
during court-ordered treatment will often be highly
relevant to assessing risk for the purposes of imposing ESOs, PPOs and
preventive
detention. This was echoed by Luke Cunningham Clere, which considered
that a wide privilege or a prohibition on information being
used for other
purposes would “undermine the importance of holding people to account for
serious crimes”.
- 12.25 The Crown
Law Office’s preference to include court-ordered treatment in the
section 59(1)(b) exception does not reflect
current practice as understood
by other submitters. The withholding of potentially relevant information is a
necessary result of
a privilege. The fact that privilege is recognised in
various circumstances in the Act is a clear signal from Parliament that, in
some
circumstances, other interests outweigh the desirability of having all relevant
information disclosed.
- 12.26 It is not
clear that our proposed reform will affect how assessments are made for the
purposes of imposing ESOs, PPOs or preventive
detention. We received informal
feedback that information obtained from treatment does not currently form part
of health assessment
reports under these regimes beyond noting what treatment
programmes a person has completed and, if relevant, a “pass”
or
“fail”. We understand restrictions on treatment information are well
understood in this regard although the ability
of patients to waive the
privilege may be less
so.1101F[1102] Some people
subject to these types of orders have expressed frustration that medical
practitioners or clinical psychologists will
not share treatment information as
part of those assessments even when an indication of progress or engagement may
benefit them.1102F[1103] If
there are broader concerns about the availability of relevant health information
for the purposes of making a determination on
ESOs, PPOs or preventive
detention, we consider these would best be addressed through the legislation
governing those regimes.
- 12.27 Finally,
we acknowledge the concerns raised by Professor Dawson that further amendment,
as opposed to more substantial redrafting,
will further complicate the section
as a whole. We have some sympathy for the view that this section is complex and
would benefit
from more extensive redrafting. However, we did not consult on
more extensive amendments. Given the potential impact of substantial
redrafting,
it would be inappropriate to make such a recommendation in the absence of
consultation. We anticipate that our recommended
reform set out below will
clarify rather than confuse the approach to medical privilege.
Recommendation
- R17 Amend
section 59 to:
- remove
the words “or for any other purpose” in section 59(1)(b); and
- replace
references to “examination”, “examine”,
“examined” and “test” with “assessment”,
“assess” or “assessed” (as
appropriate).
- 12.28 We
recommend removing the words “or for any other purpose” from section
59(1)(b) and amending the language of the
section to refer to
“assessment” rather than “examination” or
“test”.
- 12.29 The
removal of the words “or for any other purpose” will clarify that
the section 59(1)(b) exception only applies
to court-ordered assessments —
it does not apply to court-ordered treatment. This was the preferred approach of
the majority
of submitters that supported reform.
- 12.30 Some
submitters raised concern about the removal of these words unduly restricting
the operation of the section and so reducing
flexibility. We consider our
recommendation to amend the section to refer to “assessment” rather
than “examination
or test” will assist in this regard by providing a
more expansive approach to acts carried out in the course of evaluation
and
diagnosis. As noted by Professor Dawson, “assessment” is the more
widely understood terminology and captures all
actions carried out in the course
of diagnosis and prior to treatment. It was also the preferred language used by
the Ministry of
Health in its submission. Our recommendation affects the rest of
the section, which refers to “examination”, “examine”,
“examined” and/or “test” in multiple
provisions.1103F[1104] We
recommend consequential amendment to section 59 to refer to assessment
across the whole provision to ensure consistency.
- 12.31 The Crown
Law Office and Professor Dawson were concerned it may be difficult to clearly
distinguish between acts done for the
purposes of assessment and those done for
the purpose of treatment. We received informal feedback from stakeholders that,
for health
practitioners, in practice, the assessment/treatment distinction is
well understood. Professor Dawson remarked in his submission
that it would be
“unwise” to try to completely separate assessment and treatment as
treatment may be provided in the
course of assessment ordered by the
courts.1104F[1105]
- 12.32 Section
59(1A) makes clear that the exception applies only to information newly learned
in the course of court-ordered assessments.
We consider section 59(1A), with our
proposed amendment, will give effect to the intention of the section —
that neither information
obtained during previous court-ordered treatment nor
information obtained where treatment is the sole aim of what has been ordered
by
the court (for example, compulsory treatment under mental health legislation)
can be disclosed under the section 59(1)(b) exception.
There may be some
situations, however, where treatment is not the sole aim of a process but is
provided in the course of assessments
ordered by the courts. This was the
situation envisaged by Professor Dawson. This may require the courts to consider
whether information
is drawn from assessment or treatment on the facts of a
particular case. In some circumstances (where the source of the information
cannot be clearly identified), it may result in information obtained from
treatment during the assessment process being excepted
from the privilege. We
are content, however, that the overarching purpose of the medical privilege
provision and the exception to
it will be achieved.
- 12.33 We do not
recommend amending the section to limit the use of information to the
proceedings and the purpose for which it was
obtained. There was some support
among submitters for such a limitation. However, no submitters expressed a view
on whether its absence
is causing confusion or problems in practice either in
the courts or for health practitioners working in this area. Two submitters,
the
ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association, raised concerns about the practical
problems such a limitation might create. In particular,
they referred to the
difficulties of obtaining new health assessments for each new proceeding or
purpose in light of the current
resource constraints at te Kōti-ā-Rohe
| District Court level. In the absence of clear evidence of problems being
caused
by the current approach and in light of the potential implications of
reform on resources and processes, we do not consider reform
is
desirable.
ACTING “ON BEHALF OF” A MEDICAL PRACTITIONER OR
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST
Issue
- 12.34 Section
59(5) states that medical privilege extends to communications made to or
information obtained by:
- ... a person
acting in a professional capacity on behalf of a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist in the course of the
examination or treatment of, or care
of, the person by that medical practitioner or clinical psychologist.
- 12.35 In our
Issues Paper, we noted there is some uncertainty as to when a person is
“acting on behalf of” a medical practitioner
or clinical
psychologist and, accordingly, whether information received by them is
privileged.1105F[1106] The
courts have interpreted this provision narrowly — holding, for example,
that it can only be claimed in a situation where
a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist has already initiated examination, treatment or care and
not before. In other words,
there must be a pre-existing relationship between a
patient and a medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist.1106F[1107]
- 12.36 Case law
has also taken a narrow view of the categories of healthcare practitioners who
might qualify as acting “on behalf
of” a medical practitioner or
clinical psychologist. In pre-Act cases, the courts held this included hospital
nurses acting
at the direction of a medical practitioner or clinical
psychologist1107F[1108] but not
a counsellor working in a programme to which the defendant had been referred by
a psychologist.1108F[1109] More
recently, in D (CA54/2018) v R, it was argued that a call-taker at a
mental health helpline was acting in a professional capacity on behalf of a
medical practitioner
or clinical psychologist by filtering and referring calls
to the local Crisis Assessment Team (CAT) for that team’s
intervention.1109F[1110] Te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to provide a
definitive answer to this
question.1110F[1111] Te
Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court accepted the interpretation of section 59
potentially gave rise to a point of public importance
but declined leave to
appeal as it was not an appropriate case to consider the
issue.1111F[1112]
- 12.37 In our
Issues Paper, we expressed a preliminary view that reform could be desirable to
address ongoing uncertainty as to whether
and when information shared with
healthcare practitioners other than medical practitioners or clinical
psychologists is protected
by medical
privilege.1112F[1113] We
suggested it was unclear whether section 69 (conferring a general discretion to
prevent disclosure of confidential information)
provides adequate
protection.1113F[1114] The
Commission intended section 69 to provide “fallback” protection for
information not captured by section
59.1114F[1115] We also observed
that the current approach may be inconsistent with modern multi-disciplinary
team approaches to healthcare and the
increased use of digital and remote
healthcare services.1115F[1116]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 12.38 We
sought feedback on whether section 59 should be amended to clarify when
communications to, or information obtained by, healthcare
professionals other
than a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist are privileged.
- 12.39 We
presented two options for how section 59 could be
amended:1116F[1117]
(a) Option 1 — amend section 59(5) to clarify the meaning of
“on behalf of”.
(b) Option 2 — expand the section 59 privilege to apply to a
broader range of healthcare practitioners beyond only medical practitioners and
clinical
psychologists. This presents a further question about how to define
those practitioners, whether by reference to the Healthcare Practitioners
Competence Assurance Act 2003 (HPCA Act) or by formulating a definitive list of
professions to be covered.
Results of consultation
The need for reform
- 12.40 Twelve
submitters addressed this question. Three did not express a clear
view,1117F[1118] although two of
those expressed more tentative support for
reform.1118F[1119] Seven
expressed broad support for amending section 59 to clarify when communications
to, or information obtained by, healthcare practitioners
other than a medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist are
privileged.1119F[1120] Two
opposed any reform.1120F[1121]
- 12.41 The
submitters that supported amendment generally focused on the options for reform.
A smaller number of submitters discussed
why reform is desirable. They
considered a strict interpretation of “acting on behalf of” could
cause unfairness to individuals
and that the section 69 discretion provides
inadequate protection in circumstances deemed to fall outside the scope of
section 59.1121F[1122]
- 12.42 James
Carruthers drew a comparison to healthcare more generally where individuals may
be able to choose to see various practitioners
for the same problem. He gave the
example of choosing to see either a chiropractor, osteopath or physiotherapist
for back problems.
He considered it is unfair and arbitrary for someone to be in
a worse-off position (that is, subject to the less stringent protections
of
section 69) with respect to privilege because of which health practitioner they
chose to approach with their concern. Te Poari
o ngā Kaihaumanu Hinengaro o
Aotearoa | Psychotherapists Board of Aotearoa New Zealand similarly described
the anomaly of having
what they view as two nearly identical professions —
clinical psychology and psychotherapy — receiving different treatment
under the Act. They noted this is “confusing for the public, and makes
little practical sense now that psychotherapists are
regulated under the HPCA
Act”.
- 12.43 The
Ministry of Health said “privilege should not be reduced simply because it
might be another healthcare professional
fulfilling part of a treatment
programme” and observed that the proposed reform options would fit with
the health system’s
current models of interdisciplinary clinical
assessment and care.
- 12.44 The two
submitters that opposed reform, the ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association,
considered the question of whether someone
is acting “on behalf of”
a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist is a fact-specific question that
is best left
to the court to determine on a case-by-case basis. They said that,
although there is “understandable concern” that the
courts have
taken a narrow approach to this question (as in R v
Hodgson),1122F[1123] this
could be confined to the facts of the case. Any person seeking to rely on
section 59 could now argue that healthcare provision
has changed since the Act
was passed and earlier cases decided so as to support a wider reading of the
phrase “on behalf of”.
Options for reform
- 12.45 Eight
submitters commented on the options for reform. Two of those submitters did not
express a clear view.1123F[1124]
- 12.46 One
submitter, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS),
supported option 1 (clarify when someone is acting
“on behalf of” a
medical practitioner or clinical psychologist under section 59(5)) alone. It
said option 1 is “more
closely aligned to the purpose of the
section”. James Carruthers favoured a broad interpretation of section 59
and supported
option 1 in addition to option 2. Professor Dawson also supported
options 1 and 2. He considered the underlying policy of the section
meant
privilege should extend to other personnel who act as a conduit to treatment. He
suggested amending section 59(5) to use wording
of “people from whom
a referral is being sought” or, alternatively, “those through whom a
person is seeking assistance”.
- 12.47 Two
submitters noted potential drawbacks of option 1, focusing on its narrowness.
The Public Defence Service said some of its
lawyers were concerned it may
“not go far enough” and could leave many healthcare interactions
uncovered — particularly
those where practitioners make assessments or
provide treatment independently of medical practitioners or clinical
psychologists.
The Crown Law Office similarly observed that it may not fully
capture interactions with forensic nurses who, they said, play an important
role
in criminal proceedings in light of the current shortage of medical
practitioners and clinical psychologists (as noted in Maaka-Wanahi v
Attorney-General).1124F[1125]
- 12.48 Five
submitters supported option 2 (to extend the privilege to a wider range of
healthcare
practitioners).1125F[1126] The
Psychotherapists Board said option 2 would better reflect the reality of modern
healthcare practice. It said that, in day-to-day
clinical work, psychotherapists
work independently of clinical psychologists and frequently without any input
from a medical practitioner
(in this case, a psychiatrist).
- 12.49 Fewer
submitters expressed a clear view on how that wider class of healthcare
practitioners should be defined. Some submitters
supported an approach guided by
the professions regulated under the HPCA
Act.1126F[1127] The Ministry of
Health commented the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act was
amended in 2021 to adopt a broader
definition of “mental health
practitioner” in line with the HPCA
Act.1127F[1128] Professor Dawson
supported such an approach as it would allow the HPCA Act to expand or contract
over time, in line with contemporary
healthcare structures and systems, without
requiring concurrent amendment to the Evidence Act.
- 12.50 Other
submitters were critical of an approach based on the HPCA Act on the basis that
it would be either too narrow or too broad.
The ADLS and Defence Lawyers
Association were concerned it would expand section 59 to cover a much wider
range of health practitioners
who treat relatively minor issues, damaging the
public perception of justice if potentially vital information was withheld from
criminal
proceedings on this basis.
- 12.51 In
contrast, other submitters (including some who supported this option) raised
concerns that defining the privilege by reference
to the HPCA Act would be too
restrictive.1128F[1129] The
Public Defence Service said this approach would “leave no room for
development through case law in the event it is considered
that some healthcare
professionals have been missed”. The Ministry of Health and Professor
Dawson both commented that it would
not capture other roles in the health sector
— for example, peer support workforces, counsellors, receptionists and
call centre/helpline
workers (as in D (CA54/2018) v
R).1129F[1130]
- 12.52 Other
submitters supported different approaches. The Psychotherapists Board proposed a
more specific amendment to section 59,
specifically naming psychotherapists
alongside medical practitioners and clinical psychologists. James Carruthers
noted the Commission’s
central focus in the development of the Evidence
Code was on “clarity and certainty” so saw the appeal of an approach
guided by the HPCA Act. He questioned, however, whether this would truly promote
the purpose of section 59. He preferred a more subjective
approach to the
privilege that would apply to anyone a person approached in the belief that they
were qualified to assist them with
their condition.
The need for reform
- 12.53 We
conclude it is desirable to reform section 59 to clarify the scope of section
59(5) and the status of disclosures made to
health practitioners who are not
medical practitioners or clinical psychologists. We received submissions from a
range of interested
parties expressing support for reform, including prosecution
and defence counsel and (to a lesser extent) submitters in the healthcare
sector. Submitters highlighted two key concerns with the current approach.
First, it has the potential to cause significant unfairness
to individuals by
subjecting relevant interactions to two different approaches to admissibility
(under section 59 or section 69)
depending on which type of health practitioner
is engaged. Second, the limited scope of the privilege does not align with
current
models of healthcare provision and practice. These views are consistent
with our preliminary view expressed in the Issues
Paper.1130F[1131]
- 12.54 We
consider reform is consistent with the policy objective of the privilege, which
is to encourage individuals to seek help
and treatment for drug dependency and
other conditions that may manifest in criminal conduct without fear of
recrimination in the
criminal justice system. As the Torts and General Law
Reform Committee observed, “the force of the rationale of privilege is
not
reduced merely because it is the nurse, physiotherapist and the like” who
sees the patient.1131F[1132] In
this respect, we note the Court of Appeal’s view in Parkinson v R
that the policy justifications underlying medical privilege “require a
generous interpretation” of section
59(1)(a).1132F[1133] Reform
would ensure the courts can apply section 59 in a way that meets those
underlying policy objectives.
Recommendation
- R18 Amend
section 59 to:
- replace
references to “medical practitioner or clinical psychologist” with
“health practitioner”; and
- define
“health practitioner” in section 59(6) as having the meaning given
to it in section 5(1) of the Health Practitioners
Competence Assurance Act 2003.
- R19 Amend
section 59(5) to refer to “a person acting in a professional capacity on
behalf of a health practitioner from whom the
person is seeking
assistance”.
- 12.55 We
recommend amending section 59 to extend the privilege beyond medical
practitioners and clinical psychologists to “health
practitioners”.
We also recommend clarifying the meaning of “on behalf of” under
section 59(5). Although these
were presented as separate options in the Issues
Paper, several submitters supported both options together. We consider combining
both options best addresses the original concern raised with us about the
uncertainty caused by a narrow interpretation of “on
behalf of”.
- 12.56 Extending
the privilege to apply to a wider range of health practitioners was the
preferred approach of most submitters that
supported reform. We recommend the
relevant class of “health practitioners” should be defined by
reference to the HPCA
Act. We are guided in this respect by the principles of
clarity and certainty that underpin the Act as a whole and the
Commission’s
previous consideration of this
provision.1133F[1134] We agree
with Professor Dawson that, in addition to providing clarity and certainty, this
approach also allows flexibility for the
law to expand or adapt as healthcare
provision continues to develop and as emerging healthcare professions are
registered and regulated
under the HPCA Act.
- 12.57 We make
two comments in response to concerns about this approach being either too broad
or too narrow. The ADLS and Defence
Lawyers Association expressed concern this
approach would widen the application of medical privilege to such an extent that
it undermines
the administration of justice and public faith in the justice
system. We do not consider that broadening the categories of health
practitioners covered by the privilege will have this result. The rest of
section 59 is narrowly constructed and will remain so —
the privilege only
applies when a person is seeking help for drug dependency or other conditions
that may manifest in criminal conduct
and only to communications the person
believes are necessary to facilitate care or treatment for those conditions. For
this reason,
the section is naturally self-limiting. Professor Dawson’s
suggestion to limit the provision to health practitioners (as defined
by the
HPCA Act) working only in the relevant areas of practice (that is,
addiction and mental health) could be a solution to any concerns about
unintended widening
of scope. We do not consider this to be necessary, however,
in the context of the rest of the provision.
- 12.58 Some
submitters expressed concern that an approach based on the HPCA Act would be too
narrow. It would not cover wider allied
healthcare staff who may be the
recipients of relevant information — for example, receptionists (who were
considered to be
within scope by the Torts and General Law Reform
Committee)1134F[1135] or other
call-takers (as was at issue in D (CA54/2018) v
R).1135F[1136] For this
reason, we also consider it desirable to amend section 59(5) to clarify when
someone is acting “on behalf of”
a health practitioner. We propose
this should be done by deleting the requirement in section 59(5) that, for the
privilege to apply,
the person acting in a professional capacity on behalf of a
health practitioner must be doing so “in the course” of examination,
treatment or care of the person by that health practitioner.
- 12.59 In our
view, it is the inclusion of the words “in the course of the
examination or treatment of, or care for, the person by that medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist” that draws
the parameters of the
section narrowly. It suggests a person must have already been seen by a medical
practitioner or clinical psychologist,
and examination or treatment already
initiated, for the subsection to
apply.1136F[1137] Removing this
wording would permit the courts to take a generous interpretation of the
section, including bringing receptionists
and call-takers within its scope. The
original intention of the Torts and General Law Reform Committee in the
development of the
privilege was that it should cover “tasks both
preliminary as well as following actual examination or treatment by the
doctor”
and “extend to the doctor’s
receptionist”.1137F[1138]
We also consider our recommendation better reflects the nature of many
healthcare interactions where, currently, a patient may engage
with a number of
different professionals and practitioners ahead of being assessed or treated by
a doctor or clinical psychologist.
- 12.60 Finally,
we note James Carruthers favoured a more subjective approach to the question of
which professions might be covered
by the privilege. He suggested it should be
sufficient for a person seeking assistance to have genuinely believed that the
person
they consulted was appropriately qualified to assist with their
condition. This option was considered and rejected by the Commission
previously
as risking
uncertainty.1138F[1139] For the
same reason, we do not propose amendment along these lines now. We consider,
however, that the section retains an important
subjective element in that it
only applies to communications a patient believes are necessary to enable or
facilitate care and treatment
for drug dependency or other conditions that may
manifest in criminal conduct.
PROTECTIONS FOR COUNSELLING AND THERAPEUTIC NOTES
Issue
- 12.61 Although
we did not consult on this issue, four submitters raised concerns about the
approach to the disclosure of counselling
records of complainants in sexual and
family violence
cases.1139F[1140]
- 12.62 These
submitters expressed concern that it has become increasingly common for defence
counsel to make non-party requests for
disclosure of counselling notes for
complainants in sexual and family violence cases and to use information
contained in these notes
to discredit the complainant. Submitters described this
practice as traumatising to complainants, a potential inhibitor to help-seeking
behaviours, a deterrent to reporting offences and engaging in the criminal
justice process and contrary to normal expectations of
privacy and
confidentiality in the context of a therapeutic relationship. They supported the
introduction of a “sexual assault
communications privilege”, similar
to what exists in some Australian
jurisdictions,1140F[1141] which
would create a privilege for the counselling notes of sexual and family violence
complainants.
- 12.63 We
received an additional submission from Vivienne Crawshaw KC that made a similar
point in the civil Family Court context.
She referred to a recent case where
notes taken by a lawyer for a child were held not to be privileged but instead
confidential under
section
69.1141F[1142] Her concern was
that section 69 may not be strong enough to protect information like this and
other types of information like counselling
notes. She did not suggest
information is being released inappropriately but rather that the current
statutory scheme may not provide
enough certainty. In her view, this could be
appropriately dealt with by “beefing up” the protections in section
69.
Our view
- 12.64 Section
69 creates a discretion for a judge to give a direction not to disclose
confidential information. Section 69(3) refers
to particular factors to be
considered in the exercise of that discretion, including “society’s
interest in protecting
the privacy of victims of offences and, in particular,
victims of sexual
offences”.1142F[1143] The
Commission explained the justification for such a provision when developing the
Evidence Code:1143F[1144]
- The Law
Commission recognises that compelling the production of personal information
about victims of sexual assault — particularly
if the victims sought
counselling as a result of the assault — may deter the reporting of such
offences to the police and,
in some cases, may force victims to choose between
seeking treatment and reporting of the offence. By requiring the judge to take
account of society’s interest in protecting the privacy of victims of
sexual offences, the section seeks to limit disclosure
to those cases where the
information concerned is of substantial probative value, and to prevent
speculative “fishing expeditions”.
- 12.65 It is
clear from submissions received and the anecdotal experiences reported in them
that some submitters did not consider section
69 is currently operating as
intended. A search of recent cases found a relatively small number in which this
issue has arisen although
we recognise that these will not give a full picture
of practice as, in the majority of cases, pre-trial decisions about disclosure
are not reported.1144F[1145]
- 12.66 We are not
in a position to recommend reform on this issue. This is a new issue raised with
us by submitters. We did not consult
on it in our Issues Paper and so did not
have the opportunity to hear from other interested parties on the nature and
extent of any
problems in practice or on possible options for reform.
- 12.67 However,
this issue was raised with us spontaneously by several submitters. It is clearly
causing considerable concern to those
working in the sexual and family violence
sector. As the Commission previously explained, there is a strong public
interest in protecting
the privacy of victims of sexual offences. There is also
a public interest in ensuring that people who have experienced sexual assault
and family violence seek support and treatment and that offending is reported
and dealt with appropriately in the justice system.
Submitters considered there
is a risk that neither of those interests are being met, with the knowledge that
counselling records
may be disclosed acting as a deterrent to both help-seeking
behaviours and engagement with the criminal justice process.
Recommendation
- R20 The
Ministry of Justice should examine protections for counselling notes and other
personal records of complainants in sexual and
family violence cases and of
parties and children in civil cases.
- 12.68 Given
submitters suggest section 69 may not be providing sufficient protection for the
counselling records of sexual and family
violence complainants, we recommend the
Ministry of Justice review the adequacy of current protections. This is
particularly important
in light of other more recent amendments to the Act made
through the Sexual Violence Legislation Act 2021 aimed specifically at reducing
potential trauma to sexual violence complainants giving evidence in court. The
Ministry’s review
should include broader consideration of protections from
disclosure of records in family violence cases — section 69 currently
only
refers explicitly to victims of sexual violence under section 69(3)(g).
- 12.69 We also
suggest the Ministry consider the approach taken to personal records of parties
and children in Family Court proceedings.
In this context, different public
interests may be engaged such as maintaining the free flow of information
required for the efficacy
of the role of the lawyer for the
child.1145F[1146] If there is
any uncertainty as to the extent to which this type of information is protected
by section 69, this should be explored
by the Ministry alongside the adequacy of
protections for complainants in sexual and family violence cases.
CHAPTER 13
Other privilege issues
INTRODUCTION
- 13.1 In
this chapter, we consider the following issues relating to the privilege
provisions in the Evidence Act 2006:
(a) The application of legal advice privilege (section 54) to documents prepared
but not communicated between clients and legal advisers.
We recommend amending
section 54 to clarify that that legal advice privilege applies to documents
prepared for the purpose of obtaining
or providing legal advice but not
communicated.
(b) Termination of litigation privilege (section 56). We recommend reform to
clarify that litigation privilege (alongside other legal
privilege does not
terminate except as provided in the Act.
(c) Litigation privilege and confidentiality (section 56). We recommend amending
section 56 to clarify that litigation privilege
only applies to a communication
or information if it was intended to be confidential.
(d) Settlement privilege and the interests of justice exception (section
57(3)(d)). We do not recommend reform to the interests of
justice exception to
settlement privilege.
(e) Successive interests in privileged material (section 66(2)–(4)). We
recommend amending section 66 to clarify that a personal
representative or any
other successor in title is entitled to assert a successive interest in a
privilege.
LEGAL ADVICE PRIVILEGE AND DOCUMENTS PREPARED BUT NOT
COMMUNICATED BETWEEN CLIENTS AND LEGAL ADVISERS
Issue
- 13.2 Section
54 provides for “legal advice privilege”. It codifies what was
solicitor-client privilege at common law.
Under section 54, communications with
legal advisers are privileged provided the communication was intended to be
confidential and
was made in the course of and for the purpose of obtaining (or
providing) professional legal services.
- 13.3 In our
Issues Paper, we noted that section 54 only refers to
“communications” with legal
advisers.1146F[1147] However, at
common law, solicitor-client privilege extended to material brought into
existence for the purpose of obtaining or providing
legal services even if the
material was not in fact
communicated.1147F[1148] We said
that section 54 appears to be inconsistent with Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law
Commission’s intention when developing
the Evidence Code, which was to
codify the common law position in relation to solicitor-client
privilege.1148F[1149] We noted
some te Kōti Matua | High Court authority for the proposition that legal
advice privilege extends to documents prepared
but not communicated. However, we
said these decisions do not explain how that position is available on the
current wording of
section
54.1149F[1150]
Lastly, we noted the authors of Mahoney on Evidence have observed that
excluding documents prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice but not
actually communicated to a lawyer
“is arguably inconsistent with the
policy rationale for the privilege, namely to encourage full and frank
communication with
lawyers”.1150F[1151]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 13.4 In
our Issues Paper, we asked whether section 54 should be amended so that legal
advice privilege applies to documents prepared
but not communicated for the
purpose of obtaining or providing legal
advice.1151F[1152]
- 13.5 We
presented one option for reform, which was to amend section 54(1) so that the
privilege applies to communications and related
documents.1152F[1153]
We noted the word “document” is broadly defined in the Act to
mean “any material ... and information electronically
recorded or
stored”.1153F[1154] The
requirements in sections 54(1)(a) and (b) would, however, still apply. This
means the related document would need to have been
intended to be confidential
and made in the course of and for the purposes of obtaining or providing legal
services. We said this
would avoid the need to further define the concept of
“related document” as it would only capture documents connected
to
the request for or provision of legal advice. Documents that are merely sent to
a lawyer but not prepared for the purpose of seeking
legal advice would not
attract the
privilege.1154F[1155] We noted
this option is similar to approaches adopted in
Australia.1155F[1156]
Results of consultation
- 13.6 Ten
submitters addressed whether section 54 should be amended so that legal advice
privilege applies to preparatory documents
that meet the conditions described in
sections 54(1)(a) and (b) but are not communicated. Eight supported this
approach.1156F[1157] Two did
not.1157F[1158]
- 13.7 Submitters
that supported amendment said that section 54 does not accurately reflect the
previous common law
position,1158F[1159] that
clarification would resolve uncertainty and related
costs1159F[1160] and that the
purpose of legal advice privilege supports the privilege covering preparatory
documents.1160F[1161]
- 13.8 However,
submitters that supported reform took different views regarding our proposed
amendment. Two agreed with what we
proposed1161F[1162] while two
were concerned that “related documents” would not capture documents
prepared in relation to the provision of
legal services by people other than the
lawyer and the person seeking legal
services.1162F[1163] Te
Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) gave a reason for
this view, saying the conceptual link should be
back to the legal advice itself
and not the qualifying communication.
- 13.9 Te Matakahi
| New Zealand Defence Lawyers Association and Auckland District Law Society did
not support amendment. They said
a person is unlikely to be deterred from
seeking legal advice simply because his or her preparatory notes are not
privileged, particularly
as those notes may still be confidential under section
69 (general discretion not to disclose confidential information).
The need for reform
- 13.10 We
conclude the Act should be amended to clarify that legal advice privilege
applies to documents prepared but not communicated
for the purpose of obtaining
or providing legal advice. This was supported by the vast majority of submitters
on this issue.
- 13.11 As we
noted in our Issues Paper, it does not appear that there was any intention to
depart from the previous common law approach
when the Act was
passed.1163F[1164] The High
Court has also considered section 54 and said it applies to documents not
communicated despite the wording of the section
being clear that it only applies
“in respect of any
communication”.1164F[1165]
- 13.12 Additionally,
reform would better realise the purpose of legal advice privilege, which is to
encourage full and frank communication
with
lawyers.1165F[1166] This
supports the privilege applying to documents prepared but not communicated.
Otherwise, parties would be incentivised to minimise
preparation for
communicating with lawyers, which would clearly affect the effectiveness of any
future communication.
Recommendation
- R21 Amend
section 54(1) to:
- remove
the requirement that the communication be made “between the person and the
legal adviser”; and
- extend
the privilege to any document (in addition to any communication) that meets the
requirements in section 54(1)(a) and (b).
- 13.13 We
recommend amending section 54(1) to clarify that legal advice privilege applies
to every communication and document that
meets the requirements of subsections
(a) and (b). We therefore recommend removing the requirement that the
communication be between
the person seeking legal advice and the legal adviser
and extending the privilege to any document that meets the requirements in
subsections (a) and (b). This recommendation is consistent with the previous
common law position that section 54 was intended to
codify. It is also similar
to approaches taken in Australian
legislation.1166F[1167]
- 13.14 Some
submitters were concerned that our suggested amendment to extend the privilege
to “related documents” would
not capture documents that are prepared
by people other than the lawyer and the person seeking legal advice but
nevertheless meet
the requirements of subsections (a) and (b). The NZLS said it
would not be clear from our suggested amendment whether the “related
documents” would have to be related to the communications between the
person and the legal adviser or the relevant legal advice.
We agree. We also
note that neither the current wording of section 54(1) nor the option we
presented in our Issues Paper would cover
communications between the
lawyer and others (besides the person seeking legal advice) even if they meet
the requirements of subsections (a) and
(b). Provided these communications are
intended to be confidential and made in the course of and for the purpose of
seeking or providing
legal advice, they should attract
privilege.1167F[1168] As noted
above, this is consistent with the intention of section 54 to capture the
previous common law position. We also consider
that these communications are
appropriately captured in principle. It would be odd, for example, if a document
prepared by an expert
in the course of and for the purpose of a lawyer providing
legal advice attracted privilege but communications between that expert
and the
lawyer about the document did not.
- 13.15 We also
consider that “document” is the appropriate term to cover materials
that are not communicated. Document
is defined in the Act as any
“material... that bears symbols (including words and figures), images, or
sounds or from which
symbols, images or sounds can be derived”. The
definition also includes “information electronically recorded or stored,
and information derived from that information”. We note the word
“information” is used with respect to litigation
privilege. However,
we prefer the term “document” because it has a definition in the Act
and is consistent with the language
used in the prior case
law.1168F[1169]
TERMINATION OF LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
Issue
- 13.16 Section
56 establishes a privilege in relation to preparatory materials for court
proceedings, known as “litigation
privilege”.1169F[1170] The
purpose of litigation privilege is to protect the adversarial
process.1170F[1171] The Act does
not address whether (and, if so, when) litigation privilege terminates.
- 13.17 In our
Issues Paper, we noted the question of whether litigation privilege should
terminate is a long-standing issue that was
considered in both the
Commission’s previous reviews of the
Act.1171F[1172] Case law since
the Second Review demonstrates that the law remains unsettled on this point
— a fact that continues to attract
attention from
commentators.1172F[1173]
- 13.18 There are
different views on whether litigation privilege should
terminate.1173F[1174] One view
is that litigation privilege should terminate once the litigation that created
the privilege (and any related litigation)
comes to an
end.1174F[1175] The rationale
behind this approach is that, once the litigation has concluded, there is no
need for the privilege to endure. This
is the approach taken in Canada and
favoured by the Commission in its Second Review.
- 13.19 Another
view is that litigation privilege should not terminate. This appears to be the
preferred approach in England and
Wales.1175F[1176] It treats
litigation privilege the same as legal advice privilege and settlement privilege
(both of which do
terminate),1176F[1177] thereby
promoting a more coherent scheme. This approach would also avoid the practical
difficulties that would inevitably arise in
trying to determine when litigation,
including any “related litigation”, is at an
end.1177F[1178]
- 13.20 Lastly, we
also observed that, for the other types of privilege in the Act, privileged
documents remain privileged unless that
privilege is
waived.1178F[1179]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 13.21 We
asked submitters whether the uncertainty in the Act is causing any problems in
practice. If so, we asked whether the Act
should be amended to clarify whether
(and, if so, when) litigation privilege
terminates.1179F[1180]
- 13.22 We also
said that, if the preferred view is that litigation privilege should not
terminate, it may be desirable to amend the
Act by including a new provision
that also confirms the position with respect to legal advice privilege
and settlement
privilege.1180F[1181] While the
position in respect of these privileges is more settled, it would be
inconsistent to amend the Act to address the termination
status of one but not
the other legal privileges.
Results of consultation
- 13.23 Five
submitters responded to the question of whether the uncertainty in the Act is
causing problems in
practice.1181F[1182] All
submitters said that it is. The NZLS expressed a general view about the
undesirability of having divergent and inconclusive authority
on the issue and
the potential for this to continue and lead to further problems in practice. The
specific practical concerns highlighted
by submitters included confusion as to
whether litigation privilege endures in related litigation brought many years
after the original
proceedings,1182F[1183]
uncertainty as to the confidentiality of interactions with factual and expert
witnesses, which can affect the fullness and frankness
of those
interactions,1183F[1184] and
practical challenges for decisions about what to reveal during discovery or
disclosure.1184F[1185]
- 13.24 Ten
submitters addressed whether litigation privilege should
terminate.1185F[1186] All
submitters said that it should not. Reasons given were the “chilling
effect” on free and frank discussion that temporary
privilege would
have,1186F[1187] the
difficulties of privilege “re-attaching” in related
proceedings1187F[1188] and that
the policy rationale for privilege supports enduring
privilege.1188F[1189] Two
submitters also commented on the importance of ensuring certainty for clients as
to the status of their communications at the
time they make
them.1189F[1190]
- 13.25 Five
submitters commented on our proposed provision to clarify that litigation
privilege, along with legal advice privilege
and settlement privilege, does not
terminate except as provided for in the Act. Four submitters supported this
amendment.1190F[1191] James
Anson-Holland did not support amendment to clarify that settlement privilege
does not terminate. He considered that the policy
principles underpinning
settlement privilege support the privilege terminating once a settlement has
been reached as the need for
privilege has ended. The only exception to this
would be in related disputes.
The need for reform
- 13.26 We
conclude reform is necessary to clarify whether litigation privilege terminates.
Submitters were clear the current, unsettled
case law is causing problems in
practice. Submitters identified two issues in particular. First, the current
uncertainty is causing
issues with respect to disclosure or discovery of
documents from previous proceedings because it is unclear whether those
documents
are
privileged.1191F[1192] Second,
the current uncertainty makes it difficult to engage in free and frank
conversations with expert and factual witnesses because
it is unclear whether
those discussions will remain
confidential.1192F[1193]
- 13.27 These are
issues that affect the efficient and effective preparation for litigation,
creating unnecessary expense and delay.
Reform to clarify whether litigation
privilege terminates will help to avoid unjustifiable expense and delay —
a key principle
in the
Act.1193F[1194]
Recommendation
- R22 Insert
a new subsection in section 53 to provide that any privilege conferred under
sections 54 (legal advice privilege), 56 (litigation
privilege) or 57
(settlement privilege) does not terminate except as provided for in the
Act.
Litigation privilege should not terminate except in accordance
with the Act
- 13.28 We
recommend amending the Act to clarify that litigation privilege does not
terminate except as provided for in the
Act.1194F[1195]
- 13.29 Whether
litigation privilege should terminate is ultimately a question of policy.
Litigation privilege is a “limitation
on the general policy of openness
and disclosure in
litigation”.1195F[1196]
The limitation on disclosure for material created “for the dominant
purpose of preparing for a proceeding or an apprehended
proceeding” is
justified by the need to protect “the interests of justice in proper
preparation for
litigation”.1196F[1197]
The relevant policy question when considering whether litigation privilege
should terminate is therefore whether temporary privilege
is sufficient to
enable parties to properly prepare for litigation. We conclude it is not, for
the following reasons.
- 13.30 All
submitters said litigation privilege should not terminate. Most submitters were
concerned that, if the Act were amended
to clarify that litigation privilege
did terminate, it would make it difficult to engage in the free and frank
discussions necessary to properly prepare for litigation because
of the
knowledge that any documents produced could be disclosed in the future. Given
the purpose of the privilege is to protect the
adversarial
process,1197F[1198] part of
which is lawyers engaging in free and frank discussions with experts and
witnesses,1198F[1199] it would
be inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege for it to terminate. This
universal support among submitters for enduring
privilege is notable because all
submitters were lawyers or legal professional organisations who can be expected
to work with and
understand privilege. We do not consider that lawyers have a
particular interest in privilege enduring. In adversarial proceedings,
there are
always two or more parties, with the benefits and frustrations of privilege
shared by all parties involved.
- 13.31 There are
also recognised difficulties that accompany the termination of litigation
privilege. It is unlikely that parties will
know when litigation, including any
related litigation, will
end.1199F[1200] Because of this,
it becomes difficult for parties to know whether material remains privileged or
not. Another related issue is that
privilege may have to “re-attach”
to documents after they have been disclosed if they become privileged again in
later
related
litigation.1200F[1201] If other
parties to the litigation have already gained access to previously privileged
documents, this calls into question the practical
use of privilege in these
situations.
- 13.32 We also
consider it would promote coherency and consistency across the Act if litigation
privilege endured, similar to legal
advice privilege and settlement privilege.
This point was made by several
submitters.1201F[1202] Some of
these submitters noted that the reasons for each privilege are not so distinct
that they should be treated differently in
this
regard.1202F[1203]
- 13.33 In its
Second Review, the Commission preferred to let this issue develop through case
law.1203F[1204] We consider a
different approach is now justified because case law since the Second Review
remains unsettled as to whether privilege
terminates.1204F[1205] We also
received substantially more submissions on this point than in the Second
Review.1205F[1206] As we note
above, all submitters considered this to be a problem and supported reform to
confirm that litigation privilege does not
terminate.
- 13.34 We were
pressed by a member of our Expert Advisory Group to consider further the
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Blank v Minister of Justice,
which held that litigation privilege does
terminate.1206F[1207] We
acknowledge the member’s views and note, as we do above, that whether
litigation privilege should terminate is ultimately
a question of policy. It is
reasonable to conclude that the public interest in openness and disclosure in
litigation requires litigation
privilege to terminate once proceedings end.
However, for the reasons given above, we take a different view.
Clarifying the law with respect to litigation privilege, legal
advice privilege and settlement privilege
- 13.35 We
also recommend amending the Act to clarify that legal advice privilege and
settlement privilege do not terminate except in
accordance with the Act. All but
one submitter who commented on this point supported
clarification.1207F[1208]
- 13.36 Clarifying
the law with respect to litigation privilege but not legal advice privilege or
settlement privilege would create
unnecessary inconsistency in the Act between
these privileges. It may also open arguments as to whether legal advice
privilege or
settlement privilege properly endure under the Act given that the
Act would otherwise only specify that litigation privilege endures.
- 13.37 As we note
above, the settled position with respect to legal advice privilege is that it
does not terminate.1208F[1209]
There is no authority that conclusively determines that settlement privilege
does not terminate. The High Court has suggested that
it does not
terminate,1209F[1210] and te
Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal in T v R confirmed that it does not
terminate in the criminal context with respect to plea
discussions.1210F[1211] The
Court of Appeal explained that the rationale for the privilege is to encourage
frank discussions between prosecution authorities
and defendants with the aim of
enhancing the prospect of agreement being
reached.1211F[1212] This
reasoning is equally applicable in the civil context when parties are
negotiating a settlement.
- 13.38 In our
view, it is consistent with the purpose of settlement privilege to confirm that
settlement privilege endures in the Act.
This is consistent with the view of the
majority of submitters and the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in T v
R.1212F[1213] Parties may
well engage in free and frank discussions under temporary privilege if they
could be certain about when negotiations
would end, what the outcome might be
and the possibilities of any related negotiations or litigation opening in the
future. These
possibilities, however, are rarely known to parties at the time
they are conducting their negotiations. It is difficult to see how
the reason
for settlement privilege ends when a settlement is reached given parties have
likely undertaken free and frank discussions
to reach a settlement on the basis
that their communications will have enduring protection.
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Issue
- 13.39 In
our Issues Paper, we noted that, unlike sections 54 and 57, section 56 does not
include any reference to
confidentiality.1213F[1214] We
said this appears to be a drafting error. There is clear authority from te
Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court confirming that,
for litigation privilege to
attach to a communication or information, it must have been intended to be
confidential.1214F[1215]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 13.40 We
asked submitters whether the absence of a reference to confidentiality in
section 56 is creating confusion or otherwise causing
problems in practice.
We said it may be desirable to correct the drafting issue by amending section
56(1) so that it provides as
follows (additions underlined):
- Subsection (2)
applies to a communication or information only if the communication or
information is:
- (a)
intended to be confidential; and
- (b)
made, received, compiled, or prepared for the dominant purpose of preparing for
a proceeding or an apprehended proceeding (the proceeding).
Results of consultation
- 13.41 Nine
submitters responded to this
question.1215F[1216] No
submitters had experienced problems in practice with the absence of a reference
to confidentiality. Some submitters commented
that there was a general
understanding among practitioners that confidentiality is a prerequisite for
privilege.1216F[1217] Te Tari
Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office and NZLS also referred to Supreme Court
authority confirming the requirement for confidentiality.
- 13.42 However,
despite the lack of confusion in practice, all submitters that commented on
whether the Act should be amended supported
reform to clarify the correct
approach. Wilson Harle, for example, commented that this would “correct
what appears to be a
drafting error, bring the drafting of section 56 in line
with other provisions in the Act, and remove any potential for
uncertainty”.
The need for reform
- 13.43 In
our view, it is desirable to clarify the law in the Act. Where possible, the Act
should reflect settled law to promote certainty
and accessibility. This is
consistent with section 6(f), which refers to enhancing access to the law
of evidence. Currently, the
only way to know if confidentiality is a
prerequisite to litigation privilege is to access the Supreme Court’s
judgment in
Beckham v
R.1217F[1218] Although no
submitters identified issues with this, submitters were all lawyers, academics,
law firms or legal professional organisations.
It can be expected that the rules
of litigation privilege are familiar to these submitters.
Recommendation
- R23 Amend
section 56(1) to provide that, in addition to the existing requirements,
subsection (2) applies to a communication or information
only if the
communication or information is intended to be confidential.
- 13.44 We
recommend amending section 56(1) to provide that, in addition to the existing
requirements, subsection 2 applies to a communication
or information only if it
is intended to be confidential. We consider this amendment is a minor correction
to a drafting error and
reflects settled law and practice.
SETTLEMENT PRIVILEGE AND THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
EXCEPTION
Issue
- 13.45 In
our Issues Paper, we explained that section 57(3)(d) codified the previous
common law exceptions to settlement privilege
into a general “interests of
justice”
exception.1218F[1219] It
provides that settlement privilege does not apply to:
- ... the use in
a proceeding of a communication or document made or prepared in connection with
any settlement negotiations or mediation
if the court considers that, in the
interests of justice, the need for the communication or document to be disclosed
in the proceeding
outweighs the need for the privilege, taking into account the
particular nature and benefit of the settlement negotiations or
mediation.
- 13.46 We noted
several High Court decisions that have largely confirmed that the pre-Act common
law exceptions now inform the test
under section 57(3)(d), although some have
suggested its scope may be
wider.1219F[1220]
- 13.47 We said
that some uncertainty in the case law might be expected at this stage,
particularly since section 57(3)(d) has not yet
been considered by the Court of
Appeal or Supreme Court. We noted, however, that concerns have been expressed
about any interpretation
of the interests of justice exception that would see it
applying to a broader range of situations than the common law exceptions.
It has
been argued that any significant expansion to the common law exceptions to
settlement privilege would inappropriately erode
the protections of the
privilege.1220F[1221]
- 13.48 We noted
the rationale for settlement privilege is twofold. First, parties should be
encouraged to settle disputes out of court,
secure in the knowledge that
whatever is said for that purpose will remain confidential and will not be used
against them in later
proceedings. Second, the law should respect the
parties’ agreement to communicate on a without prejudice
basis.1221F[1222]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 13.49 Given
the recent cases that have tested the boundaries of settlement privilege and the
concerns expressed by commentators, we
asked for feedback on whether
section 57(3)(d) is causing problems in
practice.1222F[1223] If so, we
asked whether the Act should be amended to clarify the scope of the
exception.
Results of consultation
- 13.50 Six
submitters responded to this question. Four submitters had not experienced any
problems in practice,1223F[1224]
although the ADLS and Defence Lawyers Association noted it may be a more
contentious problem in civil proceedings.
- 13.51 The NZLS
did not explicitly address whether section 57(3)(d) is causing problems in
practice but noted the potential issue with
the exception is that it may assess
“interests of justice” in a way that is limited to the interests of
the party without
due consideration of the broader policy reasons of the
section.1224F[1225]
- 13.52 One
submitter considered section 57(3)(d) is causing problems in practice. James
Anson-Holland outlined some recent decisions
he considered relied on
“interests of justice” as a stand-alone exception without reference
to any established common
law exceptions. He expressed concern that extension in
this way is unprincipled and risks rendering the established common law
exceptions
obsolete and eroding the strong public policy principle encouraging
the settlement of disputes.
- 13.53 Three
submitters addressed whether the Act should be amended to clarify the scope of
section 57(3)(d). One said it
should1225F[1226] and two said
it should not.1226F[1227] Laura
O’Gorman KC supported clarifying section 57(3)(d) to ensure there is no
weakening of the common law position it was intended
to codify.
- 13.54 James
Anson-Holland and the NZLS did not support amendment and preferred instead to
let the courts develop the law. The NZLS
said it is not necessarily an issue
that new exceptions may be developed under the interests of justice test as this
would have been
open to the courts at common law anyway. It did say, however,
that care should be taken not to erode the reasons for privilege. It
cited
Smith v Shaw as a positive example of the courts interpreting section
57(3)(d).1227F[1228]
- 13.55 James
Anson-Holland submitted that any attempt to clarify the scope of the exception
in statute may cause further confusion
and replicate the original difficulties
faced by the Commission when considering whether to codify the common law
exceptions. He
also observed that the courts have traditionally had the role of
setting the boundaries of settlement privilege. In his view, litigation
on the
new provision is to be expected and that, even with his concerns about some
recent decisions weakening the established common
law exceptions to settlement
privilege, the first-instance decisions “that have properly analysed the
interests of justice
exception” so far have been
encouraging.1228F[1229] Both
James Anson-Holland and the NZLS were concerned that some cases have approached
the “interests of justice” test
as a question of how relevant the
privileged material is to the proceedings. They said this undermines the purpose
of the privilege.
Reform not recommended
- 13.56 We
do not recommend reform to clarify the scope of section 57(3)(d). As noted
above, the cases that have considered section
57(3)(d) so far have largely
confirmed that the pre-Act common law exceptions now inform the court’s
exercise of discretion
under the statutory “interests of justice”
exception. Limiting section 57(3)(d) to the previous common law exceptions
is
undesirable because, as NZLS noted in its submission, it is not necessarily a
problem that the courts may apply the interests
of justice exception more
broadly than the pre-Act common law exceptions. Creating new exceptions or
modifying existing ones would
have been open to the courts at common law anyway.
As the Commission noted in its 2013
Review:1229F[1230]
- We consider
there is a greater risk in seeking to spell out the exceptions. There is a
difficulty in adequately capturing them in
statutory form. In addition, a
provision that unwittingly introduces limits on or differences with the
pre-existing law may continue
to invite courts to seek to employ other sections
of the Act to circumvent the provision. In our view it is better that the Act
acknowledge
the courts’ role in setting the boundaries of the
privilege.
- 13.57 We agree
with the concerns of some submitters that approaching the “interests of
justice” exception to settlement
privilege as a question of how relevant
the privileged material is to the current proceedings risks undermining the
purpose of the
privilege.1230F[1231] This
approach would essentially render the privilege useless because any material
that was sufficiently relevant to any given proceeding
would lose the protection
of the privilege. This is not, however, the approach that most of the case law
has taken. It would also
be a significant departure from the previous common law
exceptions and contrary to the views of commentators if the courts were to
adopt
this view.1231F[1232]
- 13.58 Lastly,
all but one submitter said section 57(3)(d) is not causing any issues in
practice. Most submitters preferred to let
the courts develop the law. The only
submitter who supported reform did so on the basis it would prevent erosion of
the privilege
but did not consider the provision is causing problems in
practice.1232F[1233] Notably,
the only submitter who said section 57(3)(d) is causing problems still preferred
to let the courts develop the law on the
basis that the appellate courts are
likely to consider the scope of the exception properly against the broader
rationale for the
privilege.1233F[1234]
SUCCESSIVE INTERESTS IN PRIVILEGED MATERIAL
Issue
- 13.59 In
our Issues Paper, we noted a potential drafting issue with section 66, which
deals with successive interests in privileged
material.1234F[1235] Section
66(2) provides:
- On or after the
death of a person who has a privilege conferred by any of sections 54 to 57 in
respect of a communication, information,
opinion, or document, the personal
representative of the deceased person or other successor in title to property of
the deceased
person —
- (a) is entitled
to assert the privilege against third parties; and
- (b) is not
restricted by any of sections 54 to 57 from having access or seeking access to
the privileged matter.
- 13.60 We noted
that the words “or other successor in title to property of the
deceased person” (emphasis added) means that a successor in title
can no longer claim privilege while the prior owner of the property
survives.1235F[1236] After
examining the history of the section, we said it does not appear this was
intended. In fact, the courts in practice have dealt
with issues under section
66 as if there is no requirement for a successor in title to receive the title
from a deceased
person.1236F[1237]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 13.61 In
our Issues Paper, we expressed a preliminary view that the insertion of
“deceased” in respect of successors in
title in section 66(2) was a
drafting error. We asked for feedback on whether section 66(2) should be amended
to remove the word
“deceased” from the phrase “successor in
title to property of the deceased
person”.1237F[1238]
Results of consultation
- 13.62 Six
submitters responded to this question, all of whom supported amending
section 66(2).1238F[1239]
The NZLS and Professor Michael Stockdale and Associate Professor Rebecca
Mitchell agreed the current wording is a drafting error.
Bell Gully noted that,
although many practitioners understood the section to apply in circumstances
where there has not been a death,
there is sufficient ambiguity to cause
problems in practice.
- 13.63 However,
two submitters noted that simply removing the word “deceased” would
not solve the problem as the whole
section is still qualified by the words
“[o]n or after the death of a
person”.1239F[1240] They
offered two possible alternatives. Paul Michalik suggested removing the
reference to time limitation completely and splitting
the section to provide for
the two distinct categories of successive privilege holders (a personal
representative of a deceased privilege-holder
has died and a successor in title
to the property of a privilege-holder).
- 13.64 Bell Gully
suggested amending section 66(2) in the following way:
- If a person has
a privilege conferred by any of sections 54 to 57 in respect of a communication,
information, opinion, or document,
the personal representative of the person on
or after their death, or other successor in title to property of the person
—
- (a) is
entitled to assert the privilege against third parties; and
- (b) is not
restricted by any of sections 54 to 57 from having access or seeking access to
the privileged matter.
The need for reform
- 13.65 We
conclude section 66(2) should be clarified. The current wording is the result of
a drafting error and does not achieve the
intention of the provision. All
submitters supported clarification. Bell Gully also said the current wording is
causing issues where
a holder of a privilege ceases to exist but has not died
— for example, where a company has been de-registered. In the case
law we
examined in our Issues Paper, the courts seem to be applying section 66(2) in
the context of company liquidation and receivership
as if there is no
requirement for a successor in title to property to have received it from a
deceased
person.1240F[1241]
Recommendation
- R24 Amend
section 66(2) to clarify that a privilege held by a person under sections
54–57 can pass to the personal representative
of that person on or after
their death or other successor in title to property of that
person.
- 13.66 As some
submitters noted, simply removing the word “deceased” from the end
of section 66(2) would not solve all
of the issues with that section. The
whole section would still only have effect “[o]n or after the death of a
person”.
- 13.67 We agree
with Bell Gully’s suggested approach, which is to retain substantially the
current text except for the addition
of the initial qualifying words “On
or after the death” and the removal of the word “deceased”
with regards
to the successor in title to property of a person. This achieves
the Commission’s original intention when it recommended amending
the
section in the 2013 Review. That is, the provision should apply to all
successors in title to property of the person whether
or not the person is
deceased, but that for personal representatives, the provision would only apply
on or after the death of the
person.1241F[1242]
CHAPTER 14
Trial process
INTRODUCTION
- 14.1 In
this chapter, we consider three provisions in the Evidence Act 2006 that deal
with aspects of the trial process. We address
the following:
(a) The restriction on disclosure of complainants’ occupation in sexual
cases (section 88). We conclude it is preferable for
low compliance to be
addressed through judicial and legal education rather than legislative reform
and make a recommendation for
enhanced guidance for prosecutors and judges. We
do not recommend reform to widen section 88 to protect a wider range of
information.
(b) Cross-examination duties (section 92). We recommend amending section 92 to
clarify that an obligation to cross-examine only arises
if the witness or the
party that called the witness is or may be unaware of the basis on which their
evidence is contradicted.
(c) Cross-examination on behalf of another (section 95). We recommend amending
section 95(5)(b) to clarify that the role of a person
appointed to cross-examine
on behalf of an unrepresented party is limited to putting the party’s
questions to the witness.
If a lawyer is appointed to this role, they do not act
as counsel for the unrepresented party.
RESTRICTION ON DISCLOSURE OF COMPLAINANT’S OCCUPATION IN
SEXUAL CASES
Issue
- 14.2 Section
88 prevents questioning about or comment on the complainant’s occupation
in a sexual case except with the permission
of the
judge.1242F[1243] Permission can
only be granted if the evidence is “of sufficient direct relevance to the
facts in issue that to exclude it
would be contrary to the interests of
justice”.1243F[1244]
Section 88 re-enacted an existing rule of
evidence1244F[1245] that was
first enacted in 1985 in response to complainants’ requests for further
protection of their identity and privacy in
sexual
cases.1245F[1246]
- 14.3 In our
Issues Paper, we identified two issues in relation to section
88:1246F[1247]
(a) Compliance with the section is low. Research published by Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald in 2020 highlighted that complainants
are routinely asked
about their occupation or whether they are employed or studying without the
judge considering section
88.1247F[1248] We noted
preliminary feedback that questions about a complainant’s occupation are
often used as a way of “settling”
the complainant and that judges
may be reluctant to intervene and interrupt a complainant at an early stage of
their testimony.1248F[1249]
(b) The scope of the section may be too narrow in that it only refers to
“occupation”.1249F[1250]
It does not apply, for example, to evidence about the complainant’s status
as a student, parent or beneficiary or evidence
about their education or
qualifications.1250F[1251] It
also does not differentiate between the complainant’s occupation at the
time of the offending and at the time of the
trial.1251F[1252] This may
result in the complainant being asked about both when only one is relevant.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 14.4 We
sought feedback from submitters
on:1252F[1253]
(a) whether there is an issue with low compliance with section 88 and, if so,
how that should be addressed; and
(b) whether section 88 should be amended to protect a wider range of personal
information and, if so, what it should include.
Results of consultation
Low compliance
- 14.5 Eleven
submitters responded to the question about low compliance with section 88. Nine
indicated concerns about the current application
of section 88 and discussed how
low compliance might be
addressed.1253F[1254] Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service did not comment
explicitly on issues of low compliance but considered
that, “to the
extent” there is a problem with low compliance, this is on the part of
prosecutors and should be addressed
through prosecutorial guidance and
education.
- 14.6 Only one
submitter, the Auckland District Law Society (ADLS), considered there is no
cause for concern about the way the section
is currently being applied. It said
that “any relevant information should be admitted, and irrelevant
information omitted in
trial, irrespective of the category”.
- 14.7 The
majority of submitters did not specifically comment on the extent of
non-compliance with section 88 in practice but were
supportive of steps to
improve compliance, indicating some acceptance of a
problem.1254F[1255] Some
submitters also referred to Professor McDonald’s 2020 research, as set out
in our Issues Paper, and expressed support
for her conclusions and
recommendations.1255F[1256]
- 14.8 A number of
submitters highlighted concerns about the impact on complainants of
non-compliance with section 88. Paulette Benton-Greig,
Te Tari Ture o te Karauna
| Crown Law Office, New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse and Ngā
Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Police all drew attention to the breach of
privacy and dignity of complainants that can occur with disclosure of
occupation.
Some submitters also commented on the effects of disclosure of
occupation on proceedings more broadly. The New Zealand Family Violence
Clearinghouse and Ngā Whare Whakaruruhau o Aotearoa | Women’s Refuge
expressed concern that the complexities of the relationship
between employment
and control and abuse may not be fully understood by the fact-finder in sexual
cases. Women’s Refuge described
how economic abuse and coercive control by
partners can affect a complainant’s employment status and position (for
example,
by dictating, directly or indirectly, where and how they are employed
or by controlling their access to money and finances). It concluded
that
“the misinterpretation of the significance of a victim’s occupation
or employment status can create harmful assumptions
and judgements attributed to
the victim, instead of being more appropriately attributed to the
perpetrator’s behaviour”.
- 14.9 Despite the
concerns expressed by submitters, none considered statutory amendment would help
improve compliance. There was a
clear view among submitters that the best way to
improve compliance would be through:
(a) amending practice notes and guidelines to ensure section 88 is brought to
the attention of counsel and
judges;1256F[1257] and
(b) educating lawyers and judges on the section, how it should be applied and
how any breaches should be dealt
with.1257F[1258]
Scope of section 88
- 14.10 Eleven
submitters responded to the question of whether section 88 should be amended to
protect a wider range of information.
Professor McDonald referred us to her 2020
research and recommendation that the scope of section 88 should be
extended,1258F[1259] which was
supported by Associate Professor Anna High in her submission.
- 14.11 Nine
submitters thought the scope of section 88 should be
broadened.1259F[1260] Several of
these submitters considered the policy behind the section — that
questioning complainants about their occupation
may cause unnecessary shame,
embarrassment or fear of harassment — applies equally to other types of
personal information about
a
complainant.1260F[1261]
Accordingly, they saw no justification for limiting section 88 to a
complainant’s occupation. Many submitters were also concerned
that the
attitudes or stigma attached to information about occupation and other types of
personal information could perpetuate or
reinforce rape myths and misconceptions
— for example, a perception that a particular woman is the “type of
person”
who would make a false
complaint.1261F[1262]
- 14.12 Two
submitters opposed any reform in this
area.1262F[1263] The Public
Defence Service did so on the basis that the actual intention of section 88 was
to protect anonymity and so protect the
complainant from fear or risk of
intimidation. It submitted the policy reasoning set out in the Issues Paper
— preventing indignity,
trauma or intimidation — was the intention
of all the changes proposed by the Evidence Amendment Bill (No 2) 1980
rather than section 88 alone. Along with the ADLS, which also opposed
reform, it considered relevant evidence should be permitted and that any
distress caused to the complainant by questioning needed
to be balanced against
a defendant’s fair trial rights.
- 14.13 Submitters
that supported broadening section 88 suggested what other types of information
it should cover. There was general
support for the recommendations in Professor
McDonald’s 2020 report, which would cover the complainant’s
occupation at
both the time of the alleged offence and the time of trial,
whether the complainant was unemployed or studying, any care responsibilities
and educational
qualifications.1263F[1264] Other
suggestions included the complainant’s immigration
status,1264F[1265] whether they
were receiving
benefits1265F[1266] and
extending the protection to all complainants in sexual and family violence cases
or other vulnerable
witnesses.1266F[1267]
Reform not recommended
Low compliance
- 14.14 We
do not recommend reform to address concerns about low compliance with
section 88. As we observed in the Issues Paper, the
requirement for
judicial approval is already clear on the face of the Act. Low compliance
appears to stem from its interpretation
and application at trial rather than
from a drafting issue. This conclusion is consistent with the submissions we
received on this
issue, none of which considered that statutory amendment is the
appropriate way to address low compliance. On this basis, we do not
consider
statutory amendment would improve compliance with the provision.
- 14.15 We agree
with submitters that legal and judicial education is the most effective way to
raise awareness among individual practitioners
and ensure consistent
application. The Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Prosecuting Sexual
Violence currently refer to section
88 in providing guidance that
“prosecutors must be mindful of the statutory prohibition on disclosing
the complainant’s
contact details (including their occupation, residential
address, email address or telephone
number)”.1267F[1268] This
is in addition to other guidance on dealing with victims of crime in accordance
with the Victims’ Rights Act
2002.1268F[1269] We are aware
that the Guidelines for Prosecuting Sexual Violence are being reviewed, which
will present an opportunity to further
highlight the section 88 restriction.
- 14.16 Additionally,
judicial guidance could be provided to judges to assist with dealing with
breaches of section 88. Responsibility
for providing such guidelines should be
with Te Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of Judicial
Studies.1269F[1270] This
guidance could cover when and how to appropriately intervene in a potential
breach of section 88 at trial but also whether and
when a judge should direct
juries to ignore evidence given in breach of section 88. We note the conclusion
of Professor McDonald
in her 2020 research that judges should “consider
immediately directing juries to ignore evidence” given in breach of
section 88.1270F[1271] This is
on the basis not only of the inadmissibility of the evidence but to guard
against potential embarrassment or shame on the
part of the complainant. We
further consider a judicial direction may play an important role in addressing
any prejudices or misconceptions
that may have arisen from the evidence given,
which was a central concern of a number of
submitters.1271F[1272]
- 14.17 Judicial
guidance could also address issues relating to the case management process.
Early identification of evidence that may
require the judge’s permission
under section 88 will ensure this is considered at an early stage, outside of
proceedings. Guidance
could emphasise the role of the judge in preventing
breaches of section 88 at the pre-trial stage and provide guidance as to how
to
manage section 88 considerations as part of the case management process.
Finally, this guidance should be supported by additional training by the
relevant professional bodies. The NZLS commented that it
is aware of training on
this issue already being provided in some Crown Solicitors’ offices.
- R25 Te
Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of Judicial Studies should consider developing
new or existing guidance for judges on the application
of section 88. This could
include guidance on when and how to grant permission for questioning pre-trial
or intervene in potential
breaches and whether to direct juries to ignore
evidence given in breach of section 88.
Scope of section 88
- 14.19 We
do not recommend amending section 88 to cover a wider range of information.
There was a strong view among submitters that
the section’s policy
rationale applies equally to other information about a complainant and clear
support for amendment to
expand the scope of section 88. Submitters were
concerned the narrow scope of the section means improper lines of questioning on
other issues can go unchallenged. Several submitters considered this allows
juries to draw improper inferences from responses to
questioning and could
contribute to perpetuating or reinforcing rape myths and misconceptions.
- 14.20 We agree
that this is cause for concern. We do not consider, however, that reform would
necessarily address submitters’
concerns. As discussed above, the
prevailing view among submitters was that there is low compliance with section
88. If this is the
case, there is little to be gained currently by widening it
to apply in a broader number of circumstances.
- 14.21 Additionally,
we are concerned about the unintended consequences of such a reform. Widening
the scope of the section would create
a much larger set of information that
would be “off limits”. This may have practical implications for
trial processes.
For example, it may lead to a greater number of interruptions
due to parties challenging lines of questioning or seeking leave from
the judge
to ask particular questions. This would disrupt and lengthen proceedings and
could inadvertently cause more distress to
a complainant.
- 14.22 These
concerns were shared by the project’s Judicial Advisory Committee and our
Expert Advisory Group. They appreciated
the good intention any amendment would
have but considered the potential disadvantages outweighed the potential
benefits. Both the
Judicial Advisory Committee and our Expert Advisory Group
expressed particular concern that widening the scope of the section could
also
make it more difficult for counsel to humanise the complainant and contextualise
their experiences by preventing most background
information from being heard by
the fact-finder.
- 14.23 The
Judicial Advisory Committee considered the concerns of submitters could be
better addressed through section 85 (requiring
judges to disallow
“unacceptable questions”). Members of our Expert Advisory Group
suggested the new prosecution guidelines
on sexual violence may also
assist.1272F[1273]
CROSS-EXAMINATION DUTIES
Issue
- 14.24 Section
92 establishes a duty to cross-examine witnesses. Section 92(1) states:
- In any
proceeding, a party must cross-examine a witness on significant matters that are
relevant and in issue and that contradict
the evidence of the witness, if the
witness could reasonably be expected to be in a position to give admissible
evidence on those
matters.
- 14.25 Section 92
codified a long-standing common law rule concerned with fairness to the witness
and the party that called
them.1273F[1274] It ensures the
witness has an opportunity to reply to any criticism of their evidence based on
competing evidence that is to be called
later.1274F[1275] A second
purpose of section 92 is to ensure accuracy in fact-finding. The fact-finder
should not be denied the opportunity to assess
the evidence from all
perspectives, including, for example, conflicting recollections of
events.1275F[1276]
- 14.26 In our
Issues Paper, we suggested there may be some uncertainty as to what is required
to discharge the section 92
duty.1276F[1277] A literal
interpretation of section 92 requires cross-examination of witnesses on every
item of evidence in a party’s case
that meets the requirements in section
92(1).1277F[1278] The courts
have confirmed a flexible and purposive approach should be taken to determine
whether a breach of section 92 has occurred.
Section 92 “need not be
slavishly followed where the witness is perfectly well aware that his or her
evidence is not accepted
on a particular
point”.1278F[1279]
- 14.27 Neither
the reasons for section 92 nor the courts’ general approach are, however,
apparent on the face of the section.
We noted this may be causing lawyers to
“err in the direction of excess” to avoid potential non-compliance
with the duty,1279F[1280]
resulting in unnecessary and overcautious
questioning.1280F[1281] This has
the potential to cause problems in both civil and criminal proceedings. In the
former, it may lead to unnecessarily lengthy
cross-examination causing
unjustifiable expense and
delay.1281F[1282] In the latter,
repetitive and improper questioning can have an impact on vulnerable
witnesses.1282F[1283]
- 14.28 Commentators
have also suggested that section 92 does not provide the judge with sufficient
guidance as to (a) when to intervene
in repetitive questioning or (b) when the
trial counsel’s duty to put the case is
discharged.1283F[1284]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 14.29 We
asked submitters whether section 92 should be amended to clarify the extent of a
party’s cross-examination duties.
If so, we asked for views on our
preferred option for reform, which was to amend section 92 to state that the
obligation to cross-examine
only arises if the witness or the party that called
the witness may be unaware of the basis on which their evidence is challenged.
- 14.30 This
proposed amendment was based on Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission’s
original recommendation to expressly limit
the duty to when “the witness
or the party who called the witness may be unaware that they are a part of the
cross-examining
party’s
case”.1284F[1285] This was
intended by the Commission to encourage parties to address these issues during
examination-in-chief.1285F[1286]
This recommendation was not included, however, in the Evidence Bill introduced
into Parliament.
Results of consultation
- 14.31 Nine
submitters responded to this question. Six considered the scope of section 92 is
causing problems in
practice.1286F[1287] Two said
amendment is not
warranted1287F[1288] and one was
“neutral”.1288F[1289]
The need for reform
- 14.32 Two
submitters considered the scope of section 92 is unclear and that there are
differing views of what it
requires.1289F[1290] The Public
Defence Service drew attention to the divergent approaches of different judges
and practitioners: some judges will criticise
counsel for “not putting
every little point” to a witness, while others will criticise them for
doing so. In other cases,
a judge may not intervene in questioning but sum up or
deliver a verdict in a judge-alone trial in a way that discounts issues that
were not put in cross-examination. Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law Society (NZLS) said in the context of civil proceedings
that, given the
uncertainty and the potential for criticism from judges, it is not surprising
lawyers often take a cautious approach
to the section.
- 14.33 Some
submitters that supported reform expressed particular concern about the impact
of section 92 on witnesses in criminal proceedings.
Paulette Benton-Greig and
Women’s Refuge were particularly concerned about the harm caused to
vulnerable witnesses (including
sexual violence complainants and children and
young people) by lengthy and repetitive questioning. Professor McDonald referred
to
her previous research on adult rape trials where she similarly observed
complainants’ distress at lengthy and repetitive questioning
by defence
counsel in reliance on the section 92
duty.1290F[1291]
- 14.34 The NZLS
focused its submission on the application of section 92 in the civil
jurisdiction and supported reform on the basis
it would increase efficiency in
these proceedings. It observed that, in civil cases, pleadings and written
briefs (or affidavits)
are exchanged in advance of the hearing, and so with the
exception of fresh or updating evidence, both parties will be aware of the
evidence each intends to offer. On this basis, the purpose of section 92 (to
provide a witness an opportunity to respond and allow
the fact-finder the
opportunity to assess conflicting evidence) has already been achieved and
requiring a party to “put its
case” in cross-examination adds little
if anything once pleadings and briefs are exchanged.
- 14.35 The ADLS
and Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere, both opposed reform. The
ADLS submitted the provision is there
to ensure that the defence case is
properly heard and responded to and said it is important this is done before a
jury. Luke Cunningham
Clere suggested the section is appropriately worded at
present and that any issues can instead be addressed through education or
practice notes. It was concerned a judge may not be well placed to know if a
witness or party is unaware of the basis on which their
evidence is
challenged.
- 14.36 The Crown
Law Office was “neutral” about reform. On the one hand, it said the
proposed amendment reflects the current
law and so there may be some utility in
amendment. It also suggested reform may give judges greater scope to intervene
in unnecessarily
lengthy cross-examination. It was, however, doubtful it would
address more “entrenched” problems in practice such as
overly
cautious behaviour of lawyers or judicial hesitancy to intervene that stems from
other causes (such as a concern about being
appealed).
Options for reform
- 14.37 Five
submitters supported amending section 92 to clarify that the obligation to
cross-examine only arises if the witness or
party who called the witness may be
unaware of the basis on which their evidence is
challenged.1291F[1292] One
submitter, the Public Defence Service, expressed partial support for amendment
along these lines.
- 14.38 Paulette
Benton-Greig considered that, if section 92 was limited as proposed, this would
ensure the duty only arose where a
complainant has not already had a fair
opportunity to comment on evidence being offered by the defence that will
challenge the complainant’s
evidence. She considered evidence-in-chief and
prior questions in cross-examination could provide those opportunities to
comment.
Her submission was endorsed by Women’s Refuge and Community Law
Centres o Aotearoa.
- 14.39 The NZLS
supported amendment in the context of civil proceedings. It considered the
proposed change would remove the need for
protracted cross-examination and so
improve efficiency and reduce hearing time. It said this is consistent with both
the purpose
of the
Act1292F[1293] and the
objectives of the High Court Rules 2016 and the District Court Rules
2014.1293F[1294] It also said
amendment would be consistent with te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti |
Rules Committee’s proposal to place
more emphasis in civil proceedings on
documents rather than factual witness
evidence.1294F[1295]
- 14.40 However,
the NZLS considered the section 92 duty should remain unchanged for evidence led
at trial (for example, updating evidence)
or where a submission expressly
contradicts a witness’s evidence. It proposed an additional amendment to
expressly provide
that, in a civil proceeding, a witness for a party is deemed
to be aware of contradictory evidence contained in a brief of evidence
or
affidavit served on that party by another party to the proceeding. It said this
will place an ancillary obligation on lawyers
to ensure the opposition briefs of
evidence are circulated to witnesses for any response.
- 14.41 It was
more sceptical, however, about the benefits of reform in criminal proceedings.
It commented that it is relatively common
for witnesses in criminal proceedings
to not come up to brief or for evidence not included in a prosecution
witness’s formal
written statement to become available — sometimes
unexpectedly. Because of this, counsel can get unexpected benefits from detailed
cross-examination. It thought many practitioners would probably continue with
their current cross-examination practices. Additionally,
trial judges may be
reluctant to intervene both because, as the defendant is not required to file
formal statements, it can be less
clear what is in dispute and because judges do
not want to be seen as favouring either side in front of a jury.
- 14.42 Similarly,
although it considered the scope of section 92 to be unclear, the Public Defence
Service was unconvinced the proposed
amendment would address the problem in the
criminal jurisdiction. It supported an amendment that would change the current
requirement
to “put the case” to the witness by removing the need to
put every small aspect of the case to them. However, it was
not sure the
proposed wording of the amendment would have that effect.
- 14.43 It also
expressed some concern about the proposed test of whether “the witness or
the party who called the witness may
be unaware of the basis on which their
evidence is challenged”. It questioned if this was an objective or
subjective standard
and whether evidence being “challenged” in the
proposed amendment meant the same thing as evidence being
“contradicted”
(which is the wording currently used in section 92).
The former approach may in fact broaden the cross-examination duties of defence
counsel. Lastly, it noted particular concern about any approach that would
suggest that, if the defence case is put to a complainant
in
examination-in-chief, there is no need for the defence to do so in
cross-examination. It said that this would unduly restrict
cross-examination by
the defence.
The need for reform
- 14.44 We
conclude reform is necessary to clarify the extent of cross-examination duties.
This will give lawyers and judges greater
assurance that rigid and exhaustive
cross-examination is not required by section 92.
- 14.45 A majority
of submitters said reform is desirable due to the concerns we raised in our
Issues Paper. These included that the
duties under the section are uncertain,
leading to improper or unnecessarily repetitive questioning in some criminal
cases and unnecessary
and overcautious questioning in civil cases. We consider
this is contrary to the Act’s purpose of helping to secure the just
determination of proceedings by, among other things, promoting fairness to
parties and witnesses and avoiding unjustifiable expense
and
delay.1295F[1296]
- 14.46 These
problems have endured in spite of efforts by the appellate courts to address
them. We also think practice notes and education
are insufficient to address
them given they stem from uncertainty about what the section itself requires.
Recommendation
- R26 Amend
section 92(1) to provide that, in any proceeding, a party must cross-examine a
witness on significant matters that are relevant
and in issue and that
contradict the evidence of the witness when it is reasonable to expect
that:
- the
witness is or may be in a position to give admissible evidence on those matters;
and
- the
witness or the party that called the witness is or may be unaware of the basis
on which their evidence is contradicted.
- 14.47 We
recommend amending section 92(1) to clarify that an obligation to cross-examine
only arises if the witness or the party that
called the witness is or may be
unaware of the basis on which their evidence is contradicted. Submitters agreed
this could generate
increased efficiency in civil cases. While submitters were
more divided about the benefits in criminal cases, we think clarifying
the scope
of section 92(1) will have a positive impact on criminal proceedings by
providing firmer assurances to both judges and
counsel that rigid and exhaustive
cross-examination is not required.
- 14.48 We have,
however, modified the wording of our original proposed amendment. We accept the
Public Defence Service’s concerns
about the divergence between the
language of our original proposal and the current language of section 92(1). It
said it was unclear
whether the test in our proposal was intended to be
subjective or objective and whether the term “challenge” could mean
something different to “contradicted”. Section 92(1) currently
has an objective test and uses the term “contradicted”
rather than
“challenged”. We agree a subjective test would be unworkable. We
also think consistency with the current
wording of section 92(1) is desirable to
avoid implying a difference where none is intended.
- 14.49 Taking
this into account, we recommend section 92(1) be amended to require a party to
cross-examine a witness on significant
matters that are relevant and in issue
and that contradict the evidence of the witness “when it is reasonable to
expect that
... the witness or the party that called the witness is or may be
unaware of the basis on which their evidence is contradicted”.
This
incorporates the existing approach under section 92(1), which focuses on whether
the witness “could reasonably be expected”
to give evidence on a
relevant issue. It also retains the objective test adopted by Parliament when
passing the Evidence Bill.
- 14.50 Our
recommendation makes it clear the test is about what it is reasonable for
cross-examining counsel to expect of the opposing
party, or the witness in the
particular circumstances of the case, at the time of cross-examination. As such,
cross-examining counsel
should consider the characteristics of the witness or
the party that called them, including factors such as vulnerability (for
example,
a witness with a cognitive impairment) or familiarity with the legal
process (for example, an expert witness who frequently appears
in court). We
also think this recommendation focuses judicial attention on the evidence that
is most likely to result in a miscarriage
of justice if a witness is not given
an opportunity to respond.
- 14.51 Our
recommendation refers to “the witness or the party that called the
witness”. This ensures that, if a witness
can be expected to be aware of a
significant matter contradicting their evidence but the party that called them
cannot be, the matter
must still be covered in cross-examination. For example,
the defence might plan to call a witness who will give evidence that a
prosecution
witness is lying about being present when the alleged offending
occurred. The prosecution witness might be aware this contradictory
evidence is likely to be led because they know the defence witness can prove
their actual whereabouts
around the time of the offence. However, it might be
reasonable to expect the prosecution to be unaware of this contradiction
because the witness has convincingly lied to the prosecutor. In this scenario,
defence counsel
would need to put the contradictory evidence to the prosecution
witness because it would be reasonable to expect the prosecution
is unaware of
the basis on which the witness’s evidence will be contradicted.
- 14.52 The ADLS
and Public Defence Service were concerned about cross-examination becoming
overly restricted under our proposed amendment.
We agree that the fact an issue
has been addressed by the prosecution in examination-in-chief should not prevent
the defence from
directly putting its case to the witness. However, we do not
think our recommendation would lead to this outcome. The duty to cross-examine
sets a minimum standard for counsel to comply with before they can rely on a
witness’s response, or lack thereof, in their
closing address. It is a
floor, not a ceiling. It does not limit the kinds of questions that counsel can
ask. Rather, judges can
disallow questions under section 85 if they consider
them to be “improper, unfair, misleading, needlessly repetitive, or
expressed
in language that is too complicated for the witness to
understand”. While the question of what is “needlessly
repetitive”
will be affected by what is required by cross-examination
duties, we do not think this can extend to preventing the defence from
putting
the case to a witness even when the prosecution has put much of a
defendant’s case to them in examination-in-chief.
The defence having an
opportunity to put their case to the witness is not “needless”
repetition and has been recognised
as a fundamental common law
right.1296F[1297] Section 25(f)
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 also guarantees the right of the
defence to examine witnesses for the prosecution
under the same conditions as
the prosecution.1297F[1298]
CROSS-EXAMINATION ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER
Issue
- 14.53 Section
95(1) provides that, in cases involving sexual offending, family violence or
harassment, the defendant is not entitled
to cross-examine personally the
complainant or certain other vulnerable
witnesses.1298F[1299] Section
95(2) also allows the judge to prevent any party from personally cross-examining
a witness.1299F[1300] When a
party is prevented from personally cross-examining a witness, they may have
their questions put to the witness by a person
appointed by the judge under
section 95(5)(b). The person appointed can include a lawyer.
- 14.54 In 2020,
the Principal Family Court Judge issued guidance to te Kōti Whanau | Family
Court judges noting there were differing
views on the role of counsel appointed
to put a party’s questions to a witness under section
95(5)(b).1300F[1301] This
guidance indicated that, rather than merely asking the party’s questions,
counsel are required to comply with the rules
governing cross-examination,
including cross-examination duties under section 92. However, the courts
have continued to express differing
views on whether the role of counsel
appointed under section 95(5)(b) is simply to ask the provided questions
verbatim, as held by
te Kōti Matua | High Court in Irving v
Irving,1301F[1302] or
whether they have broader
duties.1302F[1303]
- 14.55 We said in
our Issues Paper that it appears there is uncertainty and inconsistency in
practice and that this has significant
implications for people appointed under
section 95(5)(b) and the parties being
assisted.1303F[1304]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 14.56 We
expressed a preliminary view that the correct approach (as held in
Irving) is that the role of a person appointed under section 95(5) is
limited to putting the unrepresented party’s questions to the
witness.1304F[1305]
- 14.57 We asked
submitters whether section 95 should be amended to clarify that:
(a) the role of a person appointed under section 95(5)(b) is limited to putting
the unrepresented party’s questions to the
witness; and/or
(b) a lawyer appointed under section 95(5)(b) to put the defendant’s or
party’s questions to the witness is not acting
as counsel for the
defendant or party.
Results of consultation
- 14.58 Ten
submitters responded to this question. Nine supported amendment to clarify the
role of a person appointed under section
95(5)(b).1305F[1306] One opposed
it.1306F[1307]
- 14.59 Submitters
in support of reform considered amendment to clarify that a person appointed
under section 95(5)(b) is limited to
putting the unrepresented party’s
questions to a witness would better reflect the purpose of the
section.1307F[1308] As we
observed in our Issues Paper, it exists to protect witnesses from being
personally cross-examined by their alleged abuser,
not to assist the
unrepresented party.1308F[1309]
- 14.60 A number
of submitters commented in particular on the role of a lawyer appointed under
section 95(5)(b) and considered reform
is important to clarify that, even when a
lawyer is appointed, they are also limited to putting the questions of the
unrepresented
party to the
witness.1309F[1310] Submitters
considered, again, that this would better reflect the purpose of the section.
Two submitters highlighted that, if there
is potential for a lawyer appointed
under section 95(5)(b) to have wider involvement in a case (for example,
questioning other witnesses
or making submissions), they should be clearly and
distinctly appointed as amicus curiae or standby
counsel.1310F[1311]
The need for reform
- 14.61 We
recommend amending section 95(5)(b) to clarify the role of the person appointed
to put questions to the witness. The majority
of submitters supported such a
clarification.
- 14.62 In
particular, submitters emphasised that the role of any lawyer appointed for a
limited purpose needs to be clearly specified.
Both case law and submissions
suggest there has been inconsistent practice regarding the role of a lawyer
appointed under
section
95(5)(b).1311F[1312]
Submitters also expressed concern about lawyers straying beyond the limited
purpose of the section and noted that, if a wider role
is actually needed or
intended, the court should appoint an amicus or assisting counsel. We agree. We
also acknowledge the unfairness
if some unrepresented parties have the benefit
of a court-appointed counsel providing wider assistance during cross-examination
and
others do not.
Recommendation
- R27 Amend
section 95(5)(b) to clarify that:
- the
role of a person appointed under section 95(5)(b) is limited to putting the
unrepresented defendant’s or party’s questions
to the witness;
and
- a
lawyer appointed under section 95(5)(b) to put the unrepresented
defendant’s or party’s questions to the witness is
not acting as
counsel for the defendant or party.
- 14.63 We
recommend that the role of any person appointed under section 95(5)(b),
including a lawyer, should be expressly limited to
putting the unrepresented
party’s questions to the witness. They should not be subject to wider
duties such as cross-examination
duties under section 92. For the avoidance of
doubt, we also recommend making it clear that, where a lawyer is appointed under
section
95(5)(b), they are not acting as counsel for the unrepresented party. As
we say above, the role of a lawyer should be clearly defined
if appointed for a
limited purpose.
- 14.64 We are not
persuaded the role of a lawyer appointed under section 95(5)(b) should be wider.
The NZLS expressed concerns about
ensuring self-represented litigants comply
with the rules regulating cross-examination. However, we do not think appointing
a lawyer
under section 95(5)(b) is the appropriate way to achieve this. As we
note above, the purpose of section 95 is to protect witnesses,
not to
assist unrepresented parties. There are many reasons why people self-represent,
including financial reasons. We do not consider
expanding the role of lawyers
appointed under section 95(5)(b) is an appropriate response to the challenges
they may face. It would
also cause unfairness to other self-represented
litigants by providing an advantage to those that are prevented from personally
cross-examining
witnesses.
CHAPTER 15
Other issues
INTRODUCTION
- 15.1 In
this chapter, we consider three stand-alone issues relating to parts of the
Evidence Act 2006. We address the following:
(a) Section 9 (admission by agreement) and the role of the judge. Based on
feedback received, we do not recommend reform.
(b) Novel scientific evidence. We do not recommend reform. We have not found
evidence of a problem and conclude it is preferable
to let the law develop in
the courts.
(c) Evidence from undercover police officers (sections 108 and 109). We do not
recommend reform due to a lack of evidence of problems
in practice and the
limited scope of this review.
SECTION 9 (ADMISSION BY AGREEMENT) AND THE ROLE OF THE
JUDGE
Issue
- 15.2 Section
9(1)(a) permits a judge to admit evidence that is not otherwise admissible with
the written or oral agreement of all
parties. It applies in both civil and
criminal proceedings.
- 15.3 Section 9
is based on a provision recommended by Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission
in the Evidence Code.1312F[1313]
The intent was to avoid unnecessarily lengthening proceedings by dispensing with
the requirement for admissibility rulings on relatively
insignificant
evidence.1313F[1314] The
Commission also noted the section was “in line with the objective of
avoiding unjustifiable expense and
delay”.1314F[1315]
However, section 9(1)(a) is worded more broadly than the Commission’s
explanation would suggest. It simply states that the
judge may, “with the
written or oral agreement of all parties, admit evidence that is not otherwise
admissible”. It neither
explains how the judge should determine whether to
exercise the power to admit nor imposes any limits on it.
- 15.4 In our
Issues Paper, we explained that case law differs on the extent to which
section 9(1)(a) permits admission by agreement
of evidence that is
otherwise inadmissible under another provision of the Act or is subject to
exclusion under section 8 (general
exclusion).1315F[1316]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 15.5 We
sought feedback on whether section 9 should be amended to clarify the scope of
the court’s power to admit evidence by
agreement under section
9(1)(a).
Results of consultation
- 15.6 Four
submitters addressed this
question.1316F[1317] None saw a
need to amend section 9. The Wellington Crown Solicitor, Luke Cunningham Clere,
and Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui
| Public Defence Service did not
have concerns with the way section 9(1)(a) operates in practice. Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa |
New Zealand Law Society (NZLS) questioned whether the
significance of the issue warranted reform. The Auckland District Law Society
(ADLS) considered reform is not needed because inadmissible evidence should not
be within the scope of a section 9(1)(a) agreement.
- 15.7 The Public
Defence Service considered there may be undesirable consequences of pursuing
reform to section 9. It said the defendant
needs to be able to run the case the
way they wish and there would be significant uncertainty if section 9 agreements
were routinely
subjected to judicial approval. It also questioned whether there
would need to be pre-trial argument in relation to section 9 agreements.
In its
view, either situation would defeat the purpose of section 9 of avoiding
unnecessary expense and delay.
Reform not recommended
- 15.8 We
do not recommend reform in respect of section 9(1)(a). The uncertainty in case
law does not appear to be creating any problems
in practice, and reform to
address it may lead to inefficiency and further uncertainty.
- 15.9 In
practice, it appears from submissions there is an expectation that, in the case
of evidence that is potentially subject to
exclusion under section 8(1)(a)
(general exclusion of prejudicial evidence), the evidence should not be offered
under section 9(1)(a)
by
agreement.1317F[1318]
Inadmissible evidence may otherwise be offered by agreement. As noted by the
Public Defence Service, where such evidence is material
or significant in
volume, it may be useful (and sufficient) for the parties to seek judicial
guidance at an early stage on the use
of section 9. We also note a comment by
the Public Defence Service that the judge can resort to the residual discretion
in section
9(1) in the rare instances where admission by agreement is
problematic.
NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Issue
- 15.10 Through
preliminary feedback, a question was raised with us about the need for
additional guidance in the Act on the admissibility
of scientific evidence based
on methodologies that are novel or are argued to lack scientific validity (novel
scientific
evidence).1318F[1319]
- 15.11 Expert
opinion evidence is admissible under section 25 if it is likely to be of
substantial help to the fact-finder. In applying
the substantial helpfulness
test to novel scientific evidence, the courts consider several non-statutory
factors identified by the
United States Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc.1319F[1320] These
factors include the extent to which the evidence has been tested, peer reviewed
and generally accepted by the scientific
community.1320F[1321]
- 15.12 In
Lundy v R, te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal reaffirmed the
relevance of the Daubert
factors1321F[1322] and
considered it “axiomatic” that expert evidence must meet a
reliability threshold before it can assist a
fact-finder.1322F[1323] It also
said the validity of a methodology must be established pre-trial through a track
record of acceptance in a body of scientific
opinion1323F[1324] and judges
and juries cannot be expected to resolve these complex scientific
debates.1324F[1325]
- 15.13 We said in
our Issues Paper that we had not identified evidence of a problem in practice
with the approach in Lundy. We also said it is not yet clear what impact
Lundy will have — in particular, whether it might be leading to
more frequent pre-trial consideration of scientific evidence and/or
a stricter
approach to assessing reliability under section
25.1325F[1326] We therefore
expressed the preliminary view that reform would be premature.
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 15.14 We
asked submitters whether there are problems in practice determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence since
the decision in Lundy
and, if so, what amendments to the Act (if any) are appropriate to address
them.
Results of consultation
- 15.15 Six
submitters addressed this question. Five submitters said there is no issue
requiring reform.1326F[1327] One
submitter did not express a
position.1327F[1328]
- 15.16 Luke
Cunningham Clere agreed with our preliminary view that amendment to codify the
approach in Lundy would be premature and that it may be preferable to let
the law develop in the courts. Ben Vanderkolk and the ADLS noted the rarity
of
these issues. Both considered the content of the Daubert factors is clear
and appropriate. Three submitters also agreed it is appropriate for the
admissibility of cutting-edge and highly
technical scientific evidence to be
determined pre-trial, as clarified in
Lundy.1328F[1329]
Reform not recommended
- 15.17 We
remain of the view that it is better to let the law develop in the courts. All
submitters supported the approach in Daubert as affirmed in Lundy.
None considered codification will increase clarity. In our Issues Paper, we
suggested it may be difficult to define what class of
evidence the Lundy
test should apply to. It is also unclear whether the Daubert factors
are equally applicable to all classes of scientific evidence. Given the
potential for uncertainty if the Lundy test is codified, we think the
flexibility of the current approach is preferable.
EVIDENCE FROM UNDERCOVER POLICE OFFICERS
Issue
- 15.18 The
Minister of Justice’s letter referring this review to the Commission
suggested we may wish to consider whether the
provisions governing anonymous
evidence of undercover police officers require
amendment.1329F[1330]
- 15.19 Sections
108–109 set out a process by which an undercover police officer can give
evidence under an assumed name to protect
their true identity. The protection is
only available in proceedings involving the prosecution of sufficiently serious
crimes. It
is also only available once the Commissioner of Police files a
certificate in court confirming the witness acted as an undercover
officer and
addressing specified matters that may affect the officer’s
credibility.1330F[1331] These
limits seek to balance two competing interests. On the one hand, it is important
that undercover officers can provide evidence
at trial safely and not be
subjected to a significant risk of reprisal so that criminals can be prosecuted
and do not escape
conviction.1331F[1332] On the
other, the right to a fair trial must be upheld. This includes the right of a
defendant to know the name of their accuser
so that the defendant can
investigate their credibility and use that information to mount a fair
defence.1332F[1333] In Wilson
v R, te Kōti Mana Nui | Supreme Court described the protection of
undercover police officers’ identity under sections 108–109
as
demonstrating Parliament’s acceptance of the legitimacy of undercover
operations and their impact on court
proceedings.1333F[1334]
- 15.20 Under
section 108(1), the protection of identity is limited to proceedings involving
an offence punishable by at least seven
years’ imprisonment (for
convenience, the “qualifying
threshold”)1334F[1335] and
proceedings in respect of certain prescribed offences (the “qualifying
offences”).1335F[1336]
Under section 108(6), protection also applies with “any necessary
modifications” to proceedings under the Criminal Proceeds
(Recovery) Act
2009 or sections 142A to 142Q of the Sentencing Act 2002 (relating to
forfeiture).
- 15.21 During
consultation for the Commission’s Second Review, Police submitted that
various aspects of sections 108–109
should be amended. In its final
report, the Commission concluded the suggested amendments were
unnecessary.1336F[1337]
- 15.22 We said in
our Issues Paper that our review of case law and commentary did not identify any
issues with sections 108–109
that may justify reform. We also acknowledged
that the nature of the protections for undercover officers may make any issues
with
the procedures in the Act difficult to identify through such a review. We
said the fact these issues were raised again suggested
there may be ongoing
concerns with their
operation.1337F[1338]
Consultation
What we asked submitters
- 15.23 We
asked submitters if sections 108–109 are causing problems in practice and,
if so, how they should be amended.
Results of consultation
- 15.24 Four
submitters addressed this issue. Three submitters said they are unaware of
problems in practice.1338F[1339]
Police submitted there are several problems in practice requiring reform and
made suggestions for reform.
- 15.25 As an
overarching comment, Police said undercover officers will not be deployed if
there is uncertainty regarding the availability
of protection under sections
108–109. Police commented that undercover operations are both expensive
and high risk for the
individuals involved, their families and the Police
network. Police then raised three issues relating to availability of protections
in criminal proceedings, proceedings under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act
and other civil proceedings, respectively.
Criminal proceedings — qualifying threshold and
qualifying offences
- 15.26 Police
did not dispute that anonymity should be limited to proceedings involving
serious offences, as was Parliament’s
intention when it passed the
Protection of Undercover Police Officers Bill in
1986.1339F[1340] However, Police
“do not agree the considerations in 1986, and the criminal environment at
that time, are necessarily applicable
in 2023”. Police said recent
amendments adding further qualifying offences to section 108(1) indicate
“acceptance by
Parliament that section 108 should be available in a wider
range of circumstances and for offences with lower penalties”. It
also
submitted the current scope of qualifying offences is out of step with
equivalent provisions in section 45 of the Search and
Surveillance Act 2012,
which sets out when trespass surveillance and interception can be
used.1340F[1341] Section 45
includes the same qualifying threshold as section 108(1)(a) of a seven-year
minimum term of imprisonment. However, it
also contains several other qualifying
offences, including some offences that were added to section 45 since the
Commission’s
Second Review. Police commented that some undercover
operations may actually be less intrusive than trespass surveillance and the
use
of interception devices.
- 15.27 Further
discussions with Police clarified that it did not have a list of specific
offences it thought should attract protection.
Rather, in its view, the current
qualifying threshold of at least seven years’ imprisonment is problematic
because it withholds
protection in situations where undercover operations would
be helpful. Because of this, Police said it has to create
“workarounds”
by selecting investigations based on whether an
additional offence with protection under sections 108–109 is available
such
as money laundering.1341F[1342]
Police considered amending section 108 to cover the same offences as
section 45 of the Search and Surveillance Act would be a step
forward but would
not resolve the problems Police saw with the qualifying threshold itself.
- 15.28 Police
said concerns about potential overuse of the protections for undercover officers
following a lowering of the qualifying
threshold could be addressed by some
other oversight mechanism. It said that the Act is not the right place to
address oversight
and did not want to speculate on what the correct oversight
mechanism might be.
Proceedings under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act
- 15.29 Police
said there is uncertainty about how section 108 applies where a person is being,
or is to be, proceeded against under
the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act. It
said that it appears the offence at issue needs to be a qualifying offence under
section
108(1) for that protection to apply. However, it thought clarity would
be desirable.
Other civil proceedings
- 15.30 Police
accepted that undercover officers will rarely be called to give evidence in
civil proceedings. However, Police submitted
that certainty is desirable and
sections 108–109 should protect an undercover officer’s identity
whether the proceedings
are criminal in nature or not. In our further
discussion, Police said that, while these cases are not common, this is an
ongoing
issue and the fact it only arises infrequently does not mean there is no
need for additional protection.
- 15.31 Police
also said it is illogical that civil proceedings are not covered by sections
108–109. While the courts have discretionary
powers to protect the
identity of undercover officers, discretionary protection is too uncertain.
- 15.32 Police
also told us the same safety concerns reflected in sections 108–109 can
arise in civil proceedings and civil proceedings
can be brought against Police
as an offshoot or consequence of an investigation of an offence. It also noted
the Act already gives
protection in civil proceedings under the Criminal
Proceeds (Recovery) Act.
Reform not recommended
Criminal proceedings
- 15.33 We
do not recommend reform to lower the qualifying threshold or add further
qualifying offences to section 108(1). We are not
persuaded there is a problem
in practice. The fact that undercover officers are not being deployed because
the offence is not covered
by section 108(1) is not evidence of a problem.
Rather, it is a direct consequence of the underlying policy choices made by
Parliament
in 1986, which were reaffirmed with the passing of the Act in
2006.
- 15.34 Recent
amendments to section 108 to create additional qualifying offences do not
indicate that Parliament intended to change
that underlying policy. Further,
recent amendments to the Search and Surveillance Act regarding the use of
trespass surveillance
and interception were contained in the same legislation
that made amendments to section 108. It therefore appears that the differences
in scope between section 45 of the Search and Surveillance Act and section 108
of the Evidence Act were intended.
Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act proceedings
- 15.35 We
also do not recommend reform to section 108 regarding the use of anonymous
evidence by undercover officers in cases under
the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery)
Act.
- 15.36 We agree
with Police that the drafting of section 108(6) is unclear as to whether
proceedings under the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery)
Act must relate to a
qualifying offence under section 108(1). The provision simply states that
section 108 applies with “any
necessary modifications” in “any
case” where a person is proceeded against under that Act.
- 15.37 Despite
the ambiguity, we have found no evidence it is causing problems in practice. All
the cases we have identified under
the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act that
also utilised the protections of sections 108–109 relate to qualifying
offences under
section 108(1).
- 15.38 The
ambiguity (and the risk of a problem arising in the future) could be addressed
through redrafting section 108(6). However,
we have been unable to ascertain a
clear policy intent through research on the provision and so are not in a
position to recommend
reform.
Other civil proceedings
- 15.39 We
do not recommend reform to sections 108 and 109 to protect the identity of
undercover officers in civil cases against Police.
We acknowledge the concern
raised by Police that civil proceedings can arise from investigations into
serious offences. In such cases,
the consequences of disclosing the identity of
a witness who is an undercover officer are likely to be similar whether the
proceeding
in which they are giving evidence is civil or criminal. We agree the
lack of clear protection in these civil cases is a gap that
may undermine the
purpose of sections 108–109 in protecting the identity of undercover
officers.
- 15.40 We also
acknowledge it is undesirable for Police to be unable to defend civil claims
properly due to uncertainty about the extent
of identity protection that may be
available for undercover officers investigating offences covered by section
108(1). That uncertainty
may give plaintiffs an unfair advantage, keep valuable
evidence from the fact-finder and risk reputational damage to Police if it
is
found civilly liable for a claim it could otherwise defend. It may also result
in added expense and delay if Police needs to make
convoluted pleadings to
protect an officer’s identity.
- 15.41 However,
extending sections 108 and 109 to include civil proceedings against Police would
be a significant broadening of identity
protection for undercover officers. It
would raise two important issues. First, the principle of open justice
recognises the public
interest in open hearings and is fundamental to the
accountability of the court
system.1342F[1343] Ordinarily,
this requires the public identification of
witnesses.1343F[1344] The
principle should only be departed from to the extent necessary to serve the
interests of justice.1344F[1345]
- 15.42 Second, in
civil proceedings against the Crown, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ
Bill of Rights) confers the right
to have the proceedings heard in the same way
as civil proceedings between
individuals.1345F[1346] Under
current law, te Kōti Matua | High Court may protect the identity of a
witness in civil proceedings through discretionary
exercise of its inherent
power.1346F[1347] In one case,
the Court granted an undercover officer anonymity to enable the defence to
proceed adequately and
effectively.1347F[1348] The
reform sought by Police would make identity protection of undercover officers
automatic. In effect, Police would have an advantage
that is not available to
other civil defendants, thus limiting the plaintiff’s right to have their
claim determined through
a normal process.
- 15.43 As we
explained in Chapter 1, the Act’s purpose is to help secure the just
determination of proceedings. Section 6 states
that this can be achieved by,
among other things, providing rules of evidence that recognise the importance of
the rights affirmed
by the NZ Bill of Rights, promoting fairness to parties and
witnesses and protecting rights of confidentiality and other important
interests.1348F[1349] The public
interest in calling evidence of undercover officers in civil cases needs to be
weighed carefully against the open justice
principle and the plaintiff’s
right under the NZ Bill of Rights to have their claim determined in the same way
as civil proceedings
between individuals. We consider this weighing exercise to
be beyond the scope of our operational review of the Act. Any limitation
on open
justice and the plaintiff’s procedural rights under the NZ Bill of Rights
is instead a matter that deserves a full
policy analysis.
APPENDIX 1
List of submitters
Te Aka Matua o te Ture
| Law Commission received 46 submissions on its Issues Paper. This comprised 25
organisational submissions
and 21 individual submissions, primarily from lawyers
and academics.
ORGANISATIONS
- Auckland
District Law Society (now “The Law Association”)
- Bell Gully
- Chapman
Tripp
- Criminal Bar
Association
- Te Kāhui
Tātari Ture | Criminal Cases Review Commission
- Te Tari Ture o
te Karauna | Crown Law Office
- Coalition for
the Safety of Women and Children (Auckland)
- Community Law
Centres o Aotearoa
- Te Matakahi |
Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand
- Te Tari Taake |
Inland Revenue
- Justice for All
Inc
- Luke Cunningham
Clere
- Manatū
Hauora | Ministry of Health
- New Zealand Air
Line Pilots’ Association
- New Zealand
Family Violence Clearinghouse (as convenor of a workshop of stakeholders from
the family and sexual violence sectors)
- Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society
- Te
Rōpū Tauira Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Students'
Association
- Ngā
Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police
- Te Poari o
ngā Kaihaumanu Hinengaro o Aotearoa | Psychotherapists Board of Aotearoa
New Zealand
- Ratonga Wawao
ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service
- Te Tari Hara
Tāware | Serious Fraud Office
- Talking Trouble
Aotearoa NZ
- Wellington
Community Justice Project
- Wilson
Harle
- Ngā Whare
Whakaruruhau o Aotearoa | Women’s
Refuge
INDIVIDUAL SUBMITTERS
- Alexandra
Allen-Franks
- James
Anson-Holland
- Paulette
Benton-Greig
- James
Carruthers
- Tim Cochrane
- Vivienne
Crawshaw KC
- Emeritus
Professor John Dawson
- Associate
Professor Anna High
- Ethan Huda
- Stephen
Hudson
- Associate
Professor Carrie Leonetti
- Don Mathias
- Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald
- Paul
Michalik
- Laura
O’Gorman KC (now Justice O’Gorman)
- Nick Preece
- Lynette
Stevens
- Professor
Michael Stockdale and Associate Professor Rebecca Mitchell (joint
submission)
- Ivan
Tarlton
- Ben
Vanderkolk
- Alan
Webb
APPENDIX 2
Terms of reference
Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission will undertake a review of the Evidence Act 2006 (the Act) in
accordance with section 202
of the Act.
This will be the Commission’s third review of the Act. The first review
was completed in 2013 and the second review was completed
in 2019. This will
also likely be the Commission’s final review of the Act under section 202,
as the Statutes Amendment Act
2022 has now repealed section 202 from the
Act.
SCOPE OF THE REVIEW
In accordance with section 202 of the Act, the Commission will consider:
- the operation of
the provisions of the Act in civil and criminal proceedings, with a particular
focus on the operation of the Act
since the Commission’s second review;
and
- whether repeal
or amendment of any provisions of the Act are necessary or desirable.
The Commission will publish an issues paper for public consultation in mid-2023.
The issues paper will explore issues with the operation
of the Evidence Act and
options for reform. Some key areas that the issues paper will address include:
- the
admissibility of defendants’ statements in criminal proceedings (ss
27-30);
- the process for
determining the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in criminal
proceedings (s 30);
- the
admissibility of statements allegedly made by defendants to fellow prisoners and
other incentivised witnesses; and
- the
admissibility of propensity evidence offered by the prosecution about
defendants (s 43).
The review will include consideration of te Tiriti o Waitangi | the Treaty of
Waitangi, ao Māori perspectives on evidence and
any matters of particular
concern to Māori.
This review will not consider amendments to the Act made by the Sexual Violence
Legislation Act 2021 given the recency of those amendments.
The Commission is required to report to the Minister in February 2024.
- 1238B1238B1238B
Level 9, Solnet House, 70 The Terrace, Wellington
6011
PO Box 2590, Wellington 6140
Telephone: 0800 832 526
Email: com@lawcom.govt.nz
[1] Winter v R [2019] NZSC
98, [2019] 1 NZLR 710.
[2] R v Wichman [2015] NZSC
98.
[3] R v Wichman [2015] NZSC
198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [83]–[84].
[4] Kearns v R [2017] NZCA
51, [2017] 2 NZLR 835.
[5] Fenemor v R [2011] NZSC
127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [4].
[6] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382.
[7] R v Wallace [2020] NZHC
2559.
[8] Beckham v R [2015] NZSC
98 at [93]–[94].
[9] Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc [1993] USSC 99; 509 US 579 (1993).
[10] Lundy v R [2018]
NZCA 410.
[11] The review is required by
Evidence Act 2006, s 202 (now repealed).
[12] Some courts, including te
Kooti Whenua Māori | Māori Land Court, te Kōti Taiao |
Environment Court and te Kōti
Whānau | Family Court are not bound by
the Evidence Act 2006.
[13] Evidence Act 2006, s 6.
[14] Evidence Act 2006, s 7(1)
and (2).
[15] Evidence Act 2006, s
7(3).
[16] Evidence Act 2006, s
8(1).
[17] Evidence Act 2006, s
8(2).
[18] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999); Law
Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2,
1999).
[19] Including, but not limited
to, the Evidence Act 1908, see Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [1.2].
[20] Law Commission Evidence:
Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at xviii.
[21] Law Commission Evidence:
Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at xviii.
[22] Law Commission Evidence:
Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [8].
[23] Evidence Bill 2005
(256–2) (select committee report) at 1.
[24] Law Commission The 2013
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013).
[25] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019).
[26] Letter from Kris Faafoi
(Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (President of the Law Commission)
regarding the third statutory
review of the Evidence Act 2006 (23 February
2022).
[27] The terms of reference are
set out in Appendix 2.
[28] The Commission must report
to the Minister within two years of the date on which the reference occurs (that
is, within two years
of 23 February 2022), see Evidence Act 2006, s 202(2).
[29] Pursuant to the Evidence
Act 2006, s 202(1)(a), we focused our research on the five years since the
publication of the Issues Paper
in the Second Review in March 2018.
[30] Letter from Kris Faafoi
(Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (President of the Law Commission)
regarding the third statutory
review of the Evidence Act 2006 (23 February
2022).
[31] Law Commission Te
Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review of the Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023).
[32] Evidence Act 2006, s 6. For
discussion of the purpose provision, see Law Commission The Second Review of
the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006
(NZLC IP42, 2018) at [1.22]–[1.38].
[33] For further detail, see Law
Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i
te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [1.26]–[1.30].
[34] Law Commission Te
Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review of the Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023).
[35] Law Commission Evidence:
Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999).
[36] Law Commission The 2013
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013).
[37] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019).
[38] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence Law Reform: Te Ao Māori Consultation
(unpublished consultation paper, 1997).
[39] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019), recommendation 2.
[40] Government Response to
the Law Commission Report: The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (September 2019) at 7.
[41] See Law Commission He
Poutama (NZLC SP24, 2023) at [1.22] and [2.9]–[2.12].
[42] Law Commission He
Poutama (NZLC SP24, 2023) at [1.22] (referring to different types of
localised expressions of tikanga).
[43] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at n 151 per Glazebrook J and [273] per Williams J.
[44] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [273] per Williams J and [181] per Winkelmann
CJ.
[45] Discussed in Law Commission
Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review of the Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at [2.7].
[46] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “hearsay statement”).
[47] Law Commission Hearsay
Evidence (NZLC PP10, 1989) at [1]–[8]; Law Commission Evidence Law
Reform: Te Ao Māori Consultation (unpublished consultation paper, 1997)
at [5].
[48] See also Evidence Act 2006,
s 16(2) explaining “unavailable as a witness”.
[49] Law Commission Evidence:
Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [72].
[50] Law Commission Evidence
Law: Expert Evidence and Opinion Evidence (NZLC PP18, 1991) at [10] and
[12].
[51] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV23.04].
[52] Evidence Act 2006, s 25.
Section 24 also permits a witness to state an opinion in evidence if that
opinion is necessary to enable
the witness to communicate, or the fact-finder to
understand, what the witness saw, heard or otherwise perceived.
[53] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “expert”).
[54] Evidence Act 2006, s
25(1).
[55] Compliance with the Code is
required by s 26 of the Evidence Act 2006.
[56] Issues Paper at
[2.29]–[2.30].
[57] Issues Paper at [2.22].
[58] For example, see
Proprietors of Wakatū Inc v Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 1461,
[2012] BCL 396 at [41]–[42]; Issues Paper at [2.22]–[2.27].
[59] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882.
[60] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882 at
[142].
[61] Te Ara Rangatū o Te
Iwi o Ngāti Te Ata Waiohua Inc v Attorney-General [2020] NZHC 1882 at
[18].
[62] Issues Paper at [2.17].
[63] For example, in the
Commonwealth legislation, see Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 72 (hearsay exception)
and s 78A (exception to the opinion rule). These exceptions are replicated in
most states and territories.
[64] For background, see
Australian Law Reform Commission and others Uniform Evidence Law: Report
(ALRC R102, NSWLRC R112, VLRC Final Report, December 2005), ch 19.
[65] Chapman Tripp, Te Tari Ture
o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Associate Professor Anna High, Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald,
Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society, Te Rōpū Tauira Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Students’
Association, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Police, Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service,
Wellington Community Justice Project.
[66] New Zealand Law
Students’ Association.
[67] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Police, Public Defence Service.
[68] Crown Law Office, Public
Defence Service.
[69] Chapman Tripp, Karen Feint
KC, Matthew Smith and feedback received through a wānanga with rōia
Māori facilitated
by Te Hunga Rōia Māori o Aotearoa (referred to
subsequently in this chapter as “wānanga with rōia
Māori”).
[70] Crown Law Office, Public
Defence Service.
[71] Karen Feint KC, Matthew
Smith.
[72] Chapman Tripp, New Zealand
Law Society.
[73] Crown Law Office.
[74] New Zealand Law
Students’ Association.
[75] See Australian Law Reform
Commission and others Uniform Evidence Law: Report (ALRC R102, NSWLRC
R112, VLRC Final Report, December 2005) at [19.72].
[76] See Australian Law Reform
Commission and others Uniform Evidence Law: Report (ALRC R102, NSWLRC
R112, VLRC Final Report, December 2005) at [19.73].
[77] Chapman Tripp, Crown Law
Office.
[78] New Zealand Law
Society.
[79] Associate Professor Anna
High.
[80] Natalie Coates, New Zealand
Law Students’ Association, wānanga with rōia Māori.
[81] Karen Feint KC,
wānanga with rōia Māori.
[82] Karen Feint KC.
[83] Karen Feint KC.
[84] Karen Feint KC, Matthew
Smith, wānanga with rōia Māori.
[85] Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald (expressed support for the exception), New Zealand Law Students’
Association, Wellington
Community Justice Project.
[86] Associate Professor Anna
High, Public Defence Service.
[87] Associate Professor Anna
High.
[88] Public Defence Service.
[89] New Zealand Law
Students’ Association.
[90] New Zealand Law
Students’ Association.
[91] New Zealand Law
Students’ Association.
[92] For case law examples, see
Issues Paper at [2.28].
[93] See Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [125] per Glazebrook J.
[94] Ellis v R [2022]
NZSC 114, [2022] 1 NZLR 239 at [273] per Williams J and [181] per Winkelmann
CJ.
[95] For an example of the legal
implications of oral history, see the discussion of mana whenua in Ngāti
Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General (No 4) [2022] NZHC
843, [2022] 3 NZLR 601 from [391] onwards. See also the discussion of the legal
implications of mana in Law Commission He Poutama (NZLC SP24, 2023) at
[3.77]–[3.86].
[96] Regarding oral history
generally, see Jane McRae Māori Oral Tradition: He Kōrero nō
te Ao Tawhito (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2017) at 11, 26, 30 and
202. For earlier accounts, see Makereti Papakura The Old-Time Maori
(Victor Gollancz Limited, London, 1938) at 37 and 42 (whakapapa and other
knowledge was passed down to an exacting standard of accuracy);
Elsdon Best
The Māori as he was: A brief account of Māori life as it was in
pre-European days (Dominion Museum, Wellington, 1924) at 8.
[97] Ranginui Walker “The
Relevance of Maori Myth and Tradition” in Michael King (ed) Te Ao
Hurihuri: Aspects of Maoritanga (Reed Publishing, Auckland, 1992) at 170 and
180.
[98] For analysis of
interactions between law (including the law of evidence) and history in the
context of the Waitangi Tribunal, see
Kayla Grant “A Finding of Fact? The
Risks of Courts Settling Uncertain Histories” (2018) 24 AULR 149.
[99] Delgamuukw v British
Columbia [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at 1067 and 1069. See also Tsilhqot’in
Nation v British Columbia [2014] 2 SCR 257. In New Zealand law, more
accommodating approaches exist in jurisdictions where the Act does not apply and
under
s 105 of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. See Issues
Paper at [2.32].
[100] Karen Feint KC.
[101] For example, see
Wakatu Incorporation v The Attorney-General HC Nelson CIV-2010-442-181, 7
December 2010 at [45], as cited in Proprietors of Wakatū Inc v
Attorney-General [2012] NZHC 1461 at [41] and n 23. In the 2010
judgment, Clifford J observed “it would be surprising” if
appropriate evidence of oral history
was not admissible because it did not fit
easily within the concepts of hearsay and opinion evidence.
[102] Australian Law Reform
Commission and others Uniform Evidence Law: Report (ALRC R102, NSWLRC
R112, VLRC Final Report, December 2005) at [19.73].
[103] Wānanga with
rōia Māori.
[104] These may include, for
example, whether there are waiata or whakataukī that support an account of
kōrero tuku iho and
the level of community support for an account of
kōrero tuku iho.
[105] See, for example, Water
Services Entities Act 2022, ss 5, 6, 14, 38 and 59.
[106] Evidence Act 2006, s
25(1).
[107] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV25.01].
[108] Natalie Coates, Karen
Feint KC.
[109] Karen Feint KC.
[110] Karen Feint KC.
[111] Prattley Enterprises
Ltd v Vero Insurance New Zealand Ltd [2016] NZCA 67, [2016] 2 NZLR 750 at
[99].
[112] Issues Paper at
[2.46]–[2.62].
[113] Karen Feint KC.
[114] Matthew Smith.
[115] Government Response
to the Law Commission Report: The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (September 2019) at 7.
[116] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at 103.
This is codified in s 83 of the Evidence Act 2006.
[117] Taniwha v R
[2016] NZSC 123, [2017] 1 NZLR 116 at [1].
[118] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “witness”).
[119] These exceptions include
the Sovereign and other heads of state, judges, defendants and associated
defendants.
[120] Evidence Act 2006, s 4
(definition of “hearsay statement”).
[121] Criminal Procedure Act
2011, s 165(3)(a).
[122] Criminal Procedure Act
2011, s 165(2)(a). See also s 159, which provides that it is not an offence to
refuse to appear in court
in response to a witness summons if the person has a
“reasonable excuse”, and s 161, which provides that a judicial
officer
may issue a warrant to arrest a person who has failed to appear in
response to a summons if “no reasonable excuse is offered”
for that
failure.
[123] Law Commission Te
Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review of the Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at [3.7]–[3.8].
[124] Issues Paper at
[3.20].
[125] Issues Paper at
[3.12].
[126] Issues Paper at
[3.13]–[3.14].
[127] New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990, s 25(f). See also s 27. We discuss s 25(f) in Chapter 14.
[128] Issues Paper at
[3.9]–[3.11].
[129] See Law Commission
Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at
44–55; Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1,
1999) at [344]–[347]; Evidence Bill 2005 (256–2) (select committee
report) at 9. Common ways of giving
evidence in an alternative manner include
pre-recorded cross-examination or giving evidence via CCTV.
[130] Issues Paper at
[3.26].
[131] The Evidence Code was
published in 1999, with preliminary papers on hearsay evidence published as
early as 1989. See Law Commission
Hearsay Evidence (NZLC PP10, 1989).
[132] Issues Paper at [3.11]
and [3.26]. See also Elisabeth McDonald “Hearsay in domestic violence
cases” [2003] NZLJ 174 at 176.
[133] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 6 ECHR 191 (Grand Chamber) at [123]; Issues Paper at
[3.31]–[3.38].
[134] Issues Paper at
[3.14].
[135] Issues Paper at
[3.16].
[136] Issues Paper at
[3.24].
[137] Issues Paper at
[3.39].
[138] Issues Paper at
[3.40].
[139] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, Wellington Community Justice
Project.
[140] Associate Professor Anna
High, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald.
[141] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere. Wellington Community Justice Project did not give reasons for
its views.
[142] Associate Professor Anna
High cited Downes v R [2022] NZCA 639 at [37].
[143] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald cited King v PFL Finance [2015] NZCA 517.
[144] As we discuss later in
this chapter, under s 16(2)(d) of the Evidence Act 2006, a person is
“unavailable as a witness”
for the purposes of the hearsay
provisions if they “cannot with reasonable diligence be identified or
found”.
[145] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, New
Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse,
Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Police, Ngā Whare Whakaruruhau o Aotearoa | Women’s
Refuge.
[146] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Stephen Hudson, Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture
Tūmatanui | Public Defence
Service.
[147] Te Kāhui Ture o
Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society.
[148] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Crown Law Office, New Zealand Family Violence
Clearinghouse, Women’s
Refuge. The Crown Law Office did not specifically
refer to victims of family or sexual violence, instead referring to the
“vulnerable
witness”. Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and New
Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse both noted that the issues in this
area
are compounded for migrant and ethnic victims as they may fear community
exclusion and stigma for reporting family or sexual
violence.
[149] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, New Zealand Police. Paulette Benton-Greig
noted that scenarios similar
to Awatere v R [2018] NZHC 883 are becoming
more common with the use of mobile technologies that capture statements
proximate to the incident. In that case, a complainant
became too distressed to
give evidence in court and so a prior police statement was rendered inadmissible
as hearsay.
[150] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse.
[151] The Crown Law Office
cited L (CA631/2021) v R [2023] NZCA 246.
[152] Paulette Benton-Greig,
New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, Women’s Refuge.
[153] New Zealand Police said
prosecutors regularly deal with witnesses who are reluctant to give evidence in
court due to pressure exerted
on them by the defendant or others. See also, for
example, Rameka v R [2019] NZCA 105.
[154] New Zealand Police said
s 16(2)(c) is insufficient to recognise the fear experienced by witnesses and
this might prevent them from
being able to give evidence at trial.
[155] New Zealand Police said
they do not often use provisions relating to the arrest and imprisonment of
witnesses because it may undermine
trust and confidence in Police and the wider
justice system.
[156] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Stephen Hudson, Public Defence Service.
[157] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Associate Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham
Clere, New Zealand Family
Violence Clearinghouse, Wellington Community Justice
Project, Women’s Refuge.
[158] Criminal Bar
Association, Crown Law Office, New Zealand Law Society, Public Defence
Service.
[159] Auckland District Law
Society, New Zealand Police.
[160] Paulette Benton-Greig,
New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, New Zealand Law Society,
Women’s Refuge. The Crown Law Office
and New Zealand Law Society noted
these difficulties but still preferred a fear-based ground to a more general
good reason ground.
[161] The Crown Law Office,
Associate Professor Anna High, New Zealand Law Society and Public Defence
Service all said that a general
discretion would infringe too far on fair trial
rights.
[162] We discussed R v
Shabir in our issues Paper at [3.31]–[3.38].
[163] Criminal Bar
Association, Public Defence Service, Wellington Community Justice Project.
[164] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Crown Law Office, Women’s Refuge.
[165] Luke Cunningham Clere,
New Zealand Law Society.
[166] Paulette Benton-Grieg,
Crown Law Office, New Zealand Law Society. Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and
Women’s Refuge generally
supported Paulette Benton-Greig’s
submission.
[167] See, for example,
Awatere v R [2018] NZHC 883 at [39]; King v PFL Finance [2015]
NZCA 517.
[168] Criminal Procedure Act
2011, s 3.
[169] See, for example,
Zespri Group Ltd v Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule — Hearsay Rulings
at [26]–[28].
[170] Section 165 only applies
to people “present in court”. See Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s
165(1).
[171] This was illustrated in
Huritu v Police [2021] NZCA 15 at [7]. The complainant was arrested on
warrant to secure her attendance at the trial and then bailed to attend the
retrial. A second warrant
was executed for her arrest when she failed to appear
but she could not be found. See also Elisabeth McDonald Principles of
Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at
122–125.
[172] See, for example,
Rameka v R [2019] NZCA 105.
[173] The Criminal Bar
Association, in particular, submitted that the practical implications of
expanding the grounds for unavailability
would be that the court is inundated
with requests from complainants to be excused from evidence, adding significant
delay to the
criminal justice system.
[174] Paulette Benton-Greig
submitted that situations akin to those in Awatere v R [2018] NZHC 883
are not uncommon (where a complainant in a violent relationship with the
defendant resiles from giving evidence), citing Elisabeth
McDonald and Paulette
Benton-Greig “Arresting complainants: Negative impacts of well-intentioned
reform” (paper presented
at National Sexual Violence Conference,
Wellington, November 2022). She also submitted that anecdotal evidence from
people working
directly with sexual and family violence victims suggests that
such scenarios are increasing with the use of mobile technologies
that capture
statements made proximate to the incident.
[175] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, New Zealand Police.
[176] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 4 ECHR 2127 (Grand Chamber) at [123].
[177] Associate Professor Anna
High submitted that clarifying the law may result in unintended consequences.
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald did not see a way to codify any exception
that is not fraught.
[178] Referring to Downes v
R [2022] NZCA 639 at [37].
[179] Issues Paper at [3.41];
Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at
[58].
[180] The Criminal Bar
Association and Public Defence Service both referred to CCTV and video
statements as methods of protecting witnesses’
interests that had less
impact on fair trial rights.
[181] Issues Paper at
[3.23].
[182] Issues Paper at
[3.25].
[183] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(2)(e). The term “fear” is to be “widely
construed” and includes fear
of the death or injury of another person or
of financial loss. See Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK), s 116(3).
[184] Evidence Act 1929 (SA),
s 34KA.
[185] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
Dictionary, pt 2 cl 4; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Dictionary, pt 2 cl 4; Evidence
Act 2008 (Vic), pt 2 cl 4; Evidence Act 1977 (QLD), s 93B; Evidence Act (ACT),
Dictionary, pt 2 cl 4; Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT),
Schedule, pt 2 cl 4; Evidence Act 2001 (TAS), s 3B; Evidence Act 1977 (QLD), s
93B.
[186] See, for example, R v
Khan [1990] 2 SCR 531 and R v Rockey [1996] 3 SCR 829.
[187] Al-Khawaja and Tahery
v United Kingdom [2011] 4 ECHR 2127 (Grand Chamber) at [123].
[188] See Evidence Act 2006,
ss 16(2) and 18(1).
[189] Some submitters were
concerned that any discretion would need to consider these areas and involve
advice from experts.
[190] Awatere v R
[2018] NZHC 883 at [22]. In Principles of Evidence in Criminal
Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012), Elisabeth McDonald noted that
extending the definition of unavailability to cover witnesses who
are fearful
“is probably unnecessary”. However, that was on the assumption that
a decision to excuse a person from giving
evidence triggers the hearsay
provisions in the Act: at 149 and Appendix 1.
[191] Elisabeth McDonald
“Hearsay in domestic violence cases” [2003] NZLJ 174 at 176.
[192] For a discussion of the
different reasons why a complainant might be reluctant to give evidence against
an abusive partner, see
Law Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC
PP23, 1994) at [229]–[231] and Elisabeth McDonald “Hearsay in
domestic violence cases” [2003] NZLJ 174 at 176.
[193] As Elisabeth McDonald
has said, “[t]hose who make sufficiently dire threats in order to decrease
the amount of prosecution
evidence are unlikely to be influenced by how the
evidence was offered”: Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases
(Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 148–149.
[194] Issues Paper at
[3.40].
[195] Paulette Benton-Greig,
New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, Women’s Refuge.
[196] Paulette Benton-Greig,
New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, Women’s Refuge.
[197] See similar comments by
the Grand Chamber in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom [2011] 4 ECHR
2127 (Grand Chamber) at [123].
[198] Evidence Act 2006, s
18(1).
[199] Evidence Act 2006, s
8(2).
[200] Evidence Act 2006, ss
37(1) and 40(2).
[201] Criminal Procedure Act
2011, s 147.
[202] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society.
[203] Criminal Justice Act
2003 (UK), s 116(4); Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 34KA(4).
[204] Evidence Act 2006, s
18(1)(a).
[205] Issues Paper at
[3.46].
[206] Issues Paper at
[3.48]–[3.50].
[207] Issues Paper at
[3.51]–[3.53].
[208] Issues Paper at
[3.54]–[3.55].
[209] Auckland District Law
Society, Crown Law Office, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald.
[210] New Zealand Police.
[211] Criminal Bar
Association, Public Defence Service, Wellington Criminal Justice Project.
[212] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, New
Zealand Police, Women’s
Refuge.
[213] Criminal Bar
Association, Public Defence Service.
[214] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Police.
[215] Luke Cunningham
Clere.
[216] New Zealand Police,
Women’s Refuge.
[217] Criminal Bar
Association, Public Defence Service, Wellington Community Justice Project.
[218] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Crown Law Office, New Zealand Law Society,
Women’s Refuge.
[219] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald.
[220] In the comparative
jurisdictions we have examined, guidance has come from the courts and not
legislation.
[221] Rules of evidence are
prescribed in pt 9 of the High Court Rules 2016 and pt 9 of the District Court
Rules 2014. For simplicity,
in this chapter, we refer to the High Court Rules
only.
[222] Pursuant to s 83(1)(c)
of the Evidence Act 2006 and r 9.12 of the High Court Rules 2016.
[223] High Court Rules 2016, r
9.7.
[224] High Court Rules 2016, r
9.4.
[225] Te Komiti Mō
Ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice
(November 2022).
[226] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at 58 (recommendation
22(b)).
[227] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at [239].
[228] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at [243].
[229] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at [243].
[230] Issues Paper at
[3.61].
[231] Andrew Beck A to Z of
New Zealand Law (online ed, Thomson Reuters, 2012) at [13.10.8.4].
[232] Issues Paper at
[3.64].
[233] Issues Paper at
[3.64]–[3.67]. See, for example, Zespri Group Ltd v Gao [2020] NZHC
109, Schedule — Hearsay Rulings at [12]; Taylor v Asteron Life Ltd
[2020] NZCA 354, [2021] 2 NZLR 561 at [66]–[68].
[234] For example, see
Zespri Group Ltd v Gao [2020] NZHC 109, Schedule — Hearsay Rulings
at [14]. For a discussion of the courts’ approach to making pre-trial
admissibility rulings,
see Gillian Coumbe “Just prove it: Lay witness
statements and admissibility in civil cases” (paper presented to Legalwise
“Evidence and Advocacy Masterclass” webinar, 2 June 2022) at
[94]–[108].
[235] Issues Paper at
[3.69].
[236] Evidence Act, s 17. See
also Taylor v Asteron Life Ltd [2020] NZCA 354, [2021] 2 NZLR 561 at
[68].
[237] Issues Paper at
[3.70].
[238] See, for example,
Apollo Bathroom and Kitchen Ltd (In liq) v Ling [2019] NZHC 237 at
[15]–[17]. In this case, the admissibility of hearsay statements was
challenged but only at trial after the Court drew attention
to the hearsay
nature of the evidence (at [17]). However, because no foundation was provided to
support the admissibility of the
statements under s 18, the case is potentially
analogous to the situation where admissibility of hearsay statements is simply
not
addressed. See also Brauninger v Westend [2020] NZHC 2512 at
[45].
[239] Issues Paper at
[3.71]–[3.72]. We noted, however, that s 9 contemplates the existence of a
written or oral agreement of the
parties and it is debatable whether it was
intended to apply when the parties simply do not turn their minds to the
issue.
[240] Issues Paper at
[3.75]–[3.89].
[241] Issues Paper at
[3.76]–[3.83].
[242] Issues Paper at
[3.84]–[3.89].
[243] Evidence Act 2006, s
22.
[244] Evidence Bill 2005
(256–2) (select committee report) at 3–4.
[245] Civil Evidence Act 1995
(UK), s 2; Civil Procedure Rules (UK), r 33.2.
[246] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society, Laura O’Gorman KC. Laura O’Gorman KC supported
abolishing the hearsay rule
entirely with respect to civil proceedings. The New
Zealand Law Society only supported limiting s 17 with regards to documentary
evidence.
[247] Wilson Harle.
[248] New Zealand Law
Society.
[249] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society.
[250] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society.
[251] Crown Law Office.
[252] Laura O’Gorman
KC.
[253] New Zealand Law Society,
Laura O’Gorman KC.
[254] New Zealand Law Society,
Wellington Community Justice Project.
[255] Crown Law Office, Laura
O’Gorman KC.
[256] Crown Law Office, Laura
O’Gorman KC.
[257] Commerce Commission v
Giltrap City Ltd [2001] BCL 1008 (HC) at [25]–[28].
[258] See High Court Rules
2016, rr 9.5(2), 9.11; District Court Rules 2014, rr 9.5(2), 9.11.
[259] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(e).
[260] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at 58 (recommendation
22(b)).
[261] Issues Paper at
[3.82].
[262] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991) at [7].
[263] Andrew Beck
“Evidence rules in civil proceedings: A renaissance?” [2021] NZLJ
263 at 263. Also see Law Commission Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15,
1991) at [7].
[264] The Commission
originally proposed, in a preliminary paper on hearsay, abolishing the hearsay
rule in civil proceedings subject
to a general power to exclude evidence that is
unfairly prejudicial, misleading, confusing or time-wasting. It was of the view
that,
in a judge-alone civil case, “the judge, by reason of experience and
training, should be able to assess the risks pertaining
to hearsay
evidence”: Law Commission Evidence Law: Hearsay (NZLC PP15, 1991)
at [3] and [19]. Ultimately, the Commission did not adopt these proposals in its
proposed Evidence Code and instead
recommended a common set of hearsay rules for
all proceedings.
[265] See Civil Evidence Act
1995 (UK), s 1 (effectively abolishing the rule against hearsay); Evidence Act
1995 (Cth) ss 63 and 64, adopted in other uniform evidence act jurisdictions and
abolishing the rule in relation to first-hand hearsay; Civil Evidence (Scotland)
Act 1988, s 2.
[266] See discussion in Rules
Committee Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at
[237]–[239].
[267] If a document in the
common bundle contains a statement made by someone who is not a witness and that
statement is relied on for
the truth of its contents, it will be a hearsay
statement under the Evidence Act 2006 and inadmissible unless one of the
exceptions
in the Act applies.
[268] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at 58 (recommendation
22(a)).
[269] Issues Paper at [3.81].
Zespri Group Ltd v Gao [2020] NZHC 109; Taylor v Asteron Life Ltd
[2020] NZCA 354, [2021] 2 NZLR 561; Matvin Group Ltd v Crown Finance Ltd
[2022] NZHC 2239.
[270] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at 45 (recommendation
17).
[271] Evidence Act 2006, s
22(5).
[272] The New Zealand Law
Society and Laura O’Gorman KC supported the court retaining discretion to
hear late challenges to admissibility.
However, the New Zealand Law Society also
supported introducing a notice procedure and said late challenges should not
generally
be permitted where proper notice is given.
[273] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at 58 (recommendation
22(a)).
[274] Zespri Group Ltd v
Gao [2020] NZHC 109.
[275] Issues Paper at [3.89],
citing Gillian Coumbe “Just prove it: Lay witness statements and
admissibility in civil cases”
(paper presented to Legalwise
“Evidence and Advocacy Masterclass” webinar, 2 June 2022) at
[111].
[276] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at 22. See also
Chapter 2 of this report.
[277] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review
of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at
[4.5]–[4.15].
[278] R v King [2009]
NZCA 607, (2009) 24 CRNZ 527 at [19]; R v Felise (No 1) HC Auckland
CRI-2008-092-8864, 8 February 2010 at [14]. This is based on the inherent powers
of judges to control criminal proceedings.
[279] S (CA481/2018) v R
[2019] NZCA 169 at [21].
[280] See, for example, R v
Felise (No 1) HC Auckland CRI-2008-092-8864, 8 February 2010; R v Parata
[2021] NZHC 3573; discussion in Foster v R [2021] NZSC 90 at [14].
[281] See Foster v R
[2021] NZSC 90 at [14] (although we note this was a leave decision).
[282] As in R v Felise (No
1) HC Auckland CRI-2008-092-8864, 8 February 2010.
[283] Issues Paper at
[4.3]–[4.29].
[284] See R v Parata
[2021] NZHC 3573 at [36]–[53] where the prosecution sought to offer
the defendant’s police interview in evidence but to have certain parts of
it excluded.
[285] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23. Nguyen is discussed in our Issues Paper at
[4.16]–[4.18].
[286] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [36]–[39].
[287] Nguyen v R [2020]
HCA 23 at [45]. The Court’s findings were limited to “mixed”
statements given the relevant statutory scheme. However, Nguyen was not a
case of “cherry picking” by the prosecution — the prosecution
did not wish to rely on any part of the
statement. The Court found (at [41] and
[44]) that prosecutors would be expected to tender evidence of mixed statements
unless there
was “good reason” not to do so (for example, where the
defendant declined to comment or in rare situations where the
statement is
demonstrably lacking in credibility or reliability).
[288] Auckland District Law
Society, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Te Kāhui
Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law Society, Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture
Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service.
[289] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Office, Associate Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham
Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa |
New Zealand Police.
[290] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society (based
on feedback received from
defence counsel), Public Defence Service.
[291] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[292] Crown Law Office,
Associate Professor Anna High, New Zealand Law Society, Public Defence Service
(although noting there is still
some inconsistency despite this).
[293] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society.
[294] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society,
Public Defence Service.
[295] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[296] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[297] The Auckland District
Law Society and Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand said this will
“almost always” be the
case. The Public Defence Service, on the
other hand, submitted that, where a defendant’s interview is not offered,
there is
inconsistency regarding whether and to what extent defence counsel is
permitted to cross-examine the Officer in Charge in relation
to the
statement.
[298] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[299] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[300] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[301] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service. The
Auckland District Law Society
and Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand also
submitted it is inconsistent with r 13.12 of the Rules of Conduct and Client
Care
for Lawyers, which requires prosecution lawyers to act fairly and
impartially.
[302] Public Defence
Service.
[303] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[304] Public Defence
Service.
[305] Crown Law Office.
[306] Associate Professor Anna
High, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Police.
[307] New Zealand Police.
[308] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere. See Evidence Act 2006, s 32.
[309] Luke Cunningham
Clere.
[310] S (CA481/2018) v R
[2019] NZCA 169 at [21]. Police understood that, in some cases, this was
done in reliance on s 113(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (which allows
the
court to require the prosecution to call a witness).
[311] S (CA481/2018) v
R [2019] NZCA 169 at [21].
[312] Frew v Police
[2022] NZHC 1961 at [37]–[39]; Foster v R [2021] NZSC 90 at [14]
(leave decision). Compare R v Singh DC Tauranga CRI-2012-070-4867, 7
August 2013 at [47].
[313] R v Singh DC
Tauranga CRI-2012-070-4867, 7 August 2013.
[314] R v Singh DC
Tauranga CRI-2012-070-4867, 7 August 2013 at [47].
[315] R v Boynton
[2013] NZHC 2415 (No 2) at [16]; Police v Thomas [2018] NZDC 7206 at
[49].
[316] Evidence Act 2006, s
18(1)(a).
[317] R v W [2018] NZHC
2457 at [39], [48] and [67].
[318] R v Hoggart
[2019] NZCA 89 at [50].
[319] Anna High “The Red
Fox Tavern trial and the Evidence Act” [2020] NZLJ 69 at 70; Bernard
Robertson “Student Companion — Evidence” [2019] NZLJ 157 at
157.
[320] Issues Paper at
[4.36]–[4.37].
[321] This issue is not
directly addressed in the Commission’s previous publications on hearsay or
confessions: see Issues Paper
at [4.38].
[322] Auckland District Law
Society, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society, Public Defence Service,
Te Tari Hara Tāware
| Serious Fraud Office, Wellington Community Justice
Project.
[323] Crown Law Office,
Associate Professor Anna High.
[324] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald.
[325] R v Hoggart
[2019] NZCA 89.
[326] Auckland District Law
Society, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society, Public Defence
Service.
[327] R v Hoggart
[2019] NZCA 89.
[328] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382.
[329] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald queried whether the s 28 inquiry would cover this situation.
Section 28 provides for exclusion
of unreliable defendants’ statements. It
would not apply where the reliability concerns relate to a statement by another
person
that contains a defendant’s statement (as opposed to the
defendant’s statement itself).
[330] Section 27(2) provides
that evidence offered by the prosecution of a statement made by a defendant is
not admissible against that
defendant if it is excluded under ss 28, 29 or 30.
These sections provide for exclusion of defendants’ statements that are
unreliable (s 28), influenced by oppression (s 29) or improperly obtained (s
30). We discuss these sections in Chapters 5–7.
[331] Law Commission
Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992) at 72.
[332] Evidence Act 2006, s
27(1) and (3).
[333] Evidence Act 2006, s
27(1).
[334] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.11].
[335] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.8].
[336] See the discussion in
Fa’avae v R [2012] NZCA 528, [2013] 1 NZLR 311 at [42].
[337] As the Commission has
previously observed, in amending what would become s 27, “the Select
Committee mistakenly believed it
was maintaining the common law position”:
Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013)
at [3.91]. See also Evidence Bill 2005 (256–2) (select committee report)
at 4, which states that the Committee’s
view was that the Act would
“maintain the current law relating to statements by
co-defendants”.
[338] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.18].
[339] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at 242 (R26), [15.21]–[15.22] and Appendix
1, cl 9.
[340] This recommendation also
removed the notice requirement for adducing evidence under s 22A: Law Commission
The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te
Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [15.22].
[341] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98, [2019] 1 NZLR 710 at [60]–[63].
[342] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98, [2019] 1 NZLR 710 at [20].
[343] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98, [2019] 1 NZLR 710 at [62].
[344] Winter v R [2019]
NZSC 98, [2019] 1 NZLR 710 at [63].
[345] Issues Paper at
[4.52].
[346] As recognised in
Winter v R [2019] NZSC 98, [2019] 1 NZLR 710 at [40].
[347] For example, as the
Supreme Court pointed out in Winter, there must be reasonable evidence of
a conspiracy or joint-enterprise before hearsay can be admissible under the
co-conspirators’
rule, but this reasonable evidence cannot include hearsay
evidence: Winter v R [2019] NZSC 98, [2019] 1 NZLR 710 at [63], citing at
R v Messenger [2008] NZCA 13, [2011] 3 NZLR 779 at [13]. It is unclear
how this test would operate if all co-defendants’ statements had to go
through the same assessment, regardless
of whether they are hearsay.
[348] Crown Law Office, Ethan
Huda, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society, New Zealand Police,
Serious Fraud Office, Wellington
Community Justice Project.
[349] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[350] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald, Laura O’Gorman KC, Public Defence Service.
[351] Ethan Huda, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society, Serious Fraud Office, Wellington
Community Justice Project.
[352] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald, Laura O’Gorman KC, Public Defence Service.
[353] See, for example, R v
Wellington [2018] NZHC 1199 at [14].
[354] R v Wellington
[2018] NZHC 2080 at [66], citing R v Pearce [2007] NZCA 40 at
[26].
[355] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753.
[356] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [282].
[357] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at
[5.18]–[5.19] and [5.21]. As discussed in our Issues Paper and below, the
common law voluntariness
rule that s 28 was in part designed to replace was also
concerned with deterring unacceptable investigatory conduct. However, case
law
on s 28 has departed from that approach.
[358] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753.
[359] A “Mr Big”
operation involves undercover officers inducting the suspect into a bogus
criminal organisation. At the conclusion
of the operation, the suspect is
interviewed by Mr Big — the boss of the organisation — to determine
whether they will
be allowed to join the organisation. The suspect is encouraged
to confess to any previous wrongdoing that could be used against them.
Cases
discussing the use of this technique include R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198,
[2016] 1 NZLR 753 and Lyttle v R [2021] NZCA 46.
[360] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [79]–[84].
[361] This was the deciding
factor for Glazebrook J in R v Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR
753. In her separate judgment, she agreed with the majority that the statement
should not be excluded under s 28 based on indications
of actual reliability.
But she said at [451]: “If just the circumstances are taken into account,
this would fail the test under
28. There was a significant risk that an innocent
person in Mr Wichman’s position would falsely confess.” It is not
clear
whether the majority would have excluded the evidence had they not
considered indications of actual reliability. However, they did
acknowledge the
defendant was under pressure to confess and that “in circumstances of this
kind, it is not inconceivable that
someone who is innocent might think it
worthwhile confessing” (at [86] per William Young J).
[362] Issues Paper at
[6.19].
[363] Issues Paper at
[6.19].
[364] Issues Paper at
[6.23].
[365] We found no indication,
for example, that the approach in Wichman is leading to defendants’
statements being admitted too readily where the circumstances raise reliability
concerns. The courts
have ruled defendants’ statements inadmissible under
s 28 in three recent cases (Lyttle v R [2021] NZCA 46; R v Fawcett
[2021] NZHC 2406 (see also Fawcett v R [2017] NZCA 597, overturning Mr
Fawcett’s original conviction and ordering a retrial); Gebhardt v R
[2022] NZCA 54).
[366] Bernard Robertson
“Evidence section” ([2019]) NZLJ 198 at 200; Bernard Robertson
“Student Companion — Criminal
Justice/Evidence” ([2021]) NZLJ
166 at 166.
[367] Issues Paper at
[5.6]–[5.10] and [5.18]–[5.22].
[368] Law Commission
Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992), Part II:
Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [127] and [131].
[369] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [109]; Law
Commission Criminal Evidence: Police Questioning (NZLC PP21, 1992), Part
II: Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence at [127] and [136]; Evidence
Bill 2005 (256–2) (select
committee report) at 4.
[370] Issues Paper at
[5.6]–[5.9].
[371] Issues Paper at
[5.6]–[5.9] and [5.19]–[5.20].
[372] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [80]–[81].
[373] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [81].
[374] Bernard Robertson
“Evidence section” ([2019]) NZLJ 198 at 200; Bernard Robertson
“Student Companion — Criminal
Justice/Evidence” ([2021]) NZLJ
166 at 166.
[375] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [82].
[376] See the discussion in
Bernard Robertson “Evidence section” ([2019]) NZLJ 198 at 200.
[377] Issues Paper at
[5.22].
[378] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [84] per William Young J (emphasising that
a reliability hearing is not a mini-trial and that “a confession induced
by threats or
promises of a character likely to result in a false confession
will usually be held to be inadmissible”). See also at [436]–[438]
per Glazebrook J.
[379] Issues Paper at
[5.25]–[5.35].
[380] Criminal Bar
Association, Luke Cunningham Clere, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Law Society, Wellington Community Justice
Project.
[381] Associate Professor Anna
High, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Police.
[382] Auckland District Law
Society, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Ratonga Wawao
ā-Ture Tūmatanui |
Public Defence Service.
[383] Criminal Bar
Association. Similarly, the New Zealand Law Society supported clarifying that
the courts can consider the statement’s
consistency with other evidence
(that is, the approach in Wichman). It said this can be a good indicator
of reliability or unreliability (referring, in particular, to the situation
where a defendant’s
statement includes information that would only be
known by a defendant if their account was true).
[384] Luke Cunningham Clere,
New Zealand Law Society.
[385] Associate Professor Anna
High, New Zealand Police. Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald made a general
comment (relating to the
issues discussed in this chapter and a range of others)
suggesting that “empirical research is needed to validate the reform
of
sections which will lead to unnecessary appellate consideration of an area that
is now settled, in the main”.
[386] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46.
[387] See, for example,
Lyttle v R [2021] NZCA 46 at [178]–[208]; R v Fawcett [2021]
NZHC 2406 at [226] and [291]–[293]; Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at
[78]–[84].
[388] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(f).
[389] See the discussion in
our Issues Paper at [5.42].
[390] See, for example,
Lyttle v R [2021] NZCA 46 at [178]–[208]; R v Fawcett [2021]
NZHC 2406 at [226] and [291]–[293]; Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at
[78]–[84].
[391] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 at [201]–[208]; R v Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 at
[290]–[293] and [298]; Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at [79].
[392] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [431]–[432] per Glazebrook J; Law
Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake
Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (R142, 2019) at [6.22].
[393] Criminal Bar
Association, Stephen Hudson.
[394] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [48], [70] and [191]. The Court found
that reliability could affect the relevance assessment under s 7 as well but
only if the evidence
was “so unreliable that it could not be accepted or
given any weight at all by a reasonable jury or a judge in a judge-alone
trial” (at [41]).
[395] Issues Paper at
[5.37].
[396] Issues Paper at
[5.41].
[397] Issues Paper at [5.38]
and [5.42]–[5.43].
[398] The Complex
Investigation Phased Engagement Model is an interview technique that uses a
relaxed, conversational style to build rapport
with the suspect or witness. The
interviewers seek to get the suspect or witness talking by reframing the
narrative, which can include
introducing a “softer” accusation or
rationalising, minimising and justifying the alleged offending. The use of the
technique
was discussed in R v X [2021] NZHC 2444.
[399] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 at [175]–[176] and [207]–[208]; R v X [2021] NZHC
2444 at [174]–[177] (although in R v X the statement was excluded
under s 30 rather than s 28).
[400] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Wellington Community Justice
Project.
[401] Criminal Bar
Association, Te Tari Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham
Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald,
New Zealand Law Society, New
Zealand Police.
[402] Auckland District Law
Society and Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, referring to overseas cases
involving DNA exonerations
and the New Zealand examples of Teina Pora, Mahua
Fawcett and David Lyttle (all of whom were convicted based on confessions later
found to be unreliable). The Wellington Community Justice Project also supported
raising the standard of proof but did not provide
reasons.
[403] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [431]–[432]. They also cited R v
Hart 2014 SCC 52, [2014] 2 SCR 544 at [105]: “The greater the concerns
raised by the circumstances in which the confession was made, the more important
it will
be to find markers of reliability in the confession itself or the
surrounding evidence.”
[404] Criminal Bar
Association, Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law
Society.
[405] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46.
[406] Gebhardt v R
[2022] NZCA 54.
[407] Issues Paper at
[5.42].
[408] Law Commission
Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at 78.
[409] Cabinet Paper
“Evidence Bill: Paper 2: Admissibility of Evidence” (4 December
2002) at [27].
[410] Although Mr
Lyttle’s unreliable statement was admitted at his original trial and he
was convicted, his conviction was overturned
on appeal (Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46). Other known examples in New Zealand of convictions based on unreliable
statements related to trials occurring before the Evidence
Act 2006 was in force
(for example, Pora v R [2015] UKPC 9, [2016] 1 NZLR 277) or new evidence
not available at the original trial (for example, Fawcett v R [2017] NZCA
597).
[411] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46; R v Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 (see also Fawcett v R [2017]
NZCA 597, overturning Mr Fawcett’s original conviction and ordering a
retrial); Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54.
[412] By contrast, see our
discussion in Chapter 8 relating to prison informant evidence (which requires
consideration of the actual reliability
of the statement).
[413] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [84] per William Young J and [438] per
Glazebrook J.
[414] Compare ss 28(4) and
29(4) of the Evidence Act 2006.
[415] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at [6.15].
[416] See Issues Paper at
[5.38] for a discussion of these techniques and the criticism they have
attracted.
[417] Issues Paper at [6.1].
See also at [6.2]–[6.6] for a summary of the respective roles of each
section.
[418] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [91], [94] and
[101].
[419] Section 28(2) requires
the judge to exclude a statement, once the issue of its reliability has been
raised, unless satisfied on
the balance of probabilities that the circumstances
in which the statement was made were not likely to have adversely affected its
reliability.
[420] R v Fatu [1989] NZCA 166; [1989] 3
NZLR 419 (CA) at 430. See also R v McCuin [1982] 1 NZLR 13 (CA) at
15.
[421] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [83]–[84] (see also at
[433]–[438] per Glazebrook J, who dissented but agreed with the majority
on this point). We also discussed
this case in our Issues Paper at
[6.7]–[6.14].
[422] Issues Paper at
[5.18]–[5.19] and [5.21].
[423] But only if the breach
is by a person to whom s 3 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 applies
— that is, by the legislative,
executive or judicial branches of the
Government of New Zealand or any person or body in the performance of any public
function,
power or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or
pursuant to law.
[424] Practice Note on
Police Questioning (s 30(6) Evidence Act 2006) [2007] 3 NZLR 297. A breach
of the Practice Note does not automatically mean evidence was obtained
“unfairly” but is taken into account
when making that assessment
(Evidence Act 2006, s 30(6)). As we noted in our Issues Paper at [6.27], the
Practice Note is limited
in scope and does not address every type of police
conduct that may result in unfairness. For example, evidence obtained through
entrapment may also be unfairly obtained: R v G [2022] NZHC 2820 at
[63].
[425] Issues Paper at
[6.5].
[426] Issues Paper at
[6.17]–[6.20].
[427] Issues Paper at
[6.10]–[6.11] and [6.19]–[6.20].
[428] Issues Paper at [6.21].
[429] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 (evidence excluded under s 28, in part because it was inconsistent with
other evidence so was likely to be unreliable in fact); R v X [2021] NZHC
2444 at [59]–[75] and [128]–[146] (evidence excluded under s 30 on
the basis that it was obtained in breach of the Chief Justice’s
Practice
Note on Police Questioning); R v Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 at [238] and
[301] (evidence excluded under s 28 based on factors internal to the
defendant).
[430] Issues Paper at
[6.25].
[431] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand, Te Kāhui Ture
o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society, Ratonga Wawao
ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service, Wellington Community
Justice
Project.
[432] Tari Ture o te Karauna |
Crown Law Office, Associate Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham Clere, Ngā
Pirihimana o Aotearoa
| New Zealand Police. Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald
commented in relation to this chapter and others in the Issues Paper that
she
did not support any of the changes suggested and considered some empirical
research is needed to validate the reform of sections
that will lead to
unnecessary appellate consideration of an area that is now settled in the
main.
[433] Citing R v
Wichman [2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [74], [77] and [403].
[434] Noting te Kōti
Matua | High Court has found this technique “to produce highly unreliable
inculpatory statements”
— presumably in reference to R v X
[2021] NZHC 2444.
[435] The New Zealand Law
Society and Crown Law Office both cited the s 30(3)(b) factor (“the nature
of the impropriety, in particular,
whether it was deliberate, reckless, or done
in bad faith”). The Crown Law Office also referred to s 30(3)(a) (the
nature of
the right breached and the extent of the intrusion on it) and s
30(3)(c)) (the nature and quality of the evidence).
[436] Crown Law Office,
Associate Professor Anna High, New Zealand Police.
[437] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [69] (read in the context of M v R
[2014] NZCA 339, [2015] 2 NZLR 137 at [43], [46], [64]–[67] and
[80]–[83]).
[438] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [510]. See also at [511].
[439] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [122].
[440] Practice Note on
Police Questioning (s 30(6) Evidence Act 2006) [2007] 3 NZLR 297.
[441] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [51] (read in the context of paras
[28]–[29]).
[442] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [13]–[14] and [51].
[443] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [46] and [51].
[444] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [51].
[445] Zurich v R [2020]
NZCA 577 at [21](b).
[446] Lyttle v R [2021]
NZCA 46 at [178]–[208]; R v Fawcett [2021] NZHC 2406 at [226] and
[291]–[293]; Gebhardt v R [2022] NZCA 54 at [78]–[84].
[447] R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 198, [2016] 1 NZLR 753 at [84].
[448] See further Chapter 7
and the discussion in our Issues Paper at [7.15]–[7.20].
[449] As discussed in Chapter
7, the reliability of the evidence in question is relevant to the application of
the s 30 balancing test
(under the s 30(3)(c) factor) because it affects the
public interest in having the evidence admitted at trial. It is an evaluative
consideration to be weighed against the public interest in recognising the
seriousness of the impropriety. However, s 30 does not
provide for a threshold
reliability assessment in the same way as s 28. It is not concerned with
ensuring evidence is sufficiently
reliable to be considered by the
fact-finder.
[450] Evidence is
“improperly obtained” if it is obtained in consequence of a breach
of any enactment or rule of law by a
person to whom s 3 of the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act 1990 applies, in consequence of a statement made by a defendant
that is
or would be inadmissible if it were offered in evidence by the
prosecution or unfairly (Evidence Act 2006, s 30(5)).
[451] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(2)(b).
[452] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(4).
[453] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at
[7.4]–[7.31].
[454] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA).
[455] R v Kirifi [1991] NZCA 111; [1992]
2 NZLR 8 (CA) at 12; R v Butcher [1991] NZCA 135; [1992] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) at 266; R v
Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 (CA) at 181 per Cooke P, and 191 and 194 per
Richardson J. See also the discussion in Marwood v Commissioner of Police
[2016] NZSC 139, [2017] 1 NZLR 260 at [23]–[27].
[456] Law Commission
Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at 84 and
86. The provision would have required exclusion of improperly obtained evidence
unless it would
be contrary to the interests of justice.
[457] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [140] per Blanchard J (giving the judgment of
Richardson P, Blanchard and Tipping JJ). Blanchard J’s approach was also
endorsed
by Gault J (at [172]), McGrath J (at [192]) and Anderson J (at
[200]–[201]).
[458] Cabinet Paper
“Evidence Bill: Paper 2: Admissibility of Evidence” (4 December
2002) CAB 100/2002/1 at [29]; Letter from Joanna Davidson (Crown Counsel) to the
Attorney-General “Legal Advice — Consistency with the New
Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990: Evidence Bill” (5 April 2005) at [6].
[459] See Evidence Act 2006, s
30(5).
[460] Issues Paper at
[7.9]–[7.21]. To “vindicate” a right means to uphold its value
and defend it against interference
(Taunoa v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC
70, [2008] 1 NZLR 429 at [253] per Blanchard J, [300] per Tipping J and [366]
per McGrath J).
[461] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [148] per Blanchard J for the majority; Hamed v
R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [187] per Blanchard J and [230] per
Tipping J; Evidence Act 2006, s 30(2)(b).
[462] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [142]–[143]. The majority also referred to
vindicating breaches of rights when explaining how the balancing test would
operate
(see, for example, at [147], [149] and [153]).
[463] R v Toki [2017]
NZCA 513, [2018] 2 NZLR 362 at [28]. See also Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101,
[2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [66] per Elias CJ, [191] and [204] per Blanchard J and
[252] per Tipping J.
[464] See, for example, R v
Toki [2017] NZCA 513, [2018] 2 NZLR 362 at [26], citing R v Hoare
CA310/04, 21 April 2005 at [42].
[465] Issues Paper at
[7.36]–[7.38].
[466] As at 31 October 2023, a
Lexis Advance search for appellate court cases citing s 30 returned 499 results
in the Court of Appeal
and 59 results in the Supreme Court (including decisions
on applications for leave to appeal). The High Court also considers appeals
from
District Court decisions, but in a case search, it is difficult to separate
these from first-instance High Court decisions.
A search of High Court decisions
returned 515 results.
[467] For example, Hamed v
R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305; R v Chetty [2016] NZSC 68,
[2018] 1 NZLR 26; R v Perry [2016] NZSC 102; R v Alsford [2017]
NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710; R v Reti [2020] NZSC 16, [2020] 1 NZLR 108;
Kalekale v R [2016] NZCA 259; W (CA226/2019) v R [2019] NZCA 558.
[468] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [147].
[469] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [59] per Elias CJ, [189] per Blanchard J, [230]
per Tipping J (suggesting the seriousness of the offence “is apt to cut
both ways”)
and [282] per Gault J.
[470] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [282].
[471] Letter from Hon Kris
Faafoi (Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (Tumu Whakarae | President, Law
Commission) regarding the third
statutory review of the Evidence Act 2006 (23
February 2022).
[472] Issues Paper at
[7.26]–[7.31]. The case study considered 70 decisions in which evidence
was found to be improperly obtained.
It was limited to High Court, Court of
Appeal and Supreme Court decisions available on LexisNexis, Westlaw and Capital
Letter databases
between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2022. First-instance and
appeal decisions were reviewed.
[473] Real evidence was
considered in 54 of the 70 cases identified. The evidence was admitted in full
in 35 cases, admitted in part in
one case and excluded in 18 cases.
[474] Defendants’
statements were considered in 17 of the 70 cases identified. The evidence was
only admitted in full in three cases
and in part in one case. One case
considered both real evidence and a defendant’s statement so is included
in both categories.
[475] Issues Paper at
[7.42].
[476] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA).
[477] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [156].
[478] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[479] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [144].
[480] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[481] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand, Ethan Huda, Stephen
Hudson, Luke Cunningham Clere, Don Mathias, Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service.
[482] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke
Cunningham Clere, Don Mathias.
[483] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Ethan Huda, Public Defence
Service.
[484] Criminal Bar
Association, Stephen Hudson, Public Defence Service.
[485] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Ethan Huda, Stephen Hudson
(referring in particular to the
fact that allowing evidence in on the basis that
it relates to a serious offence incentivises unlawful action by police in
serious
matters), Public Defence Service.
[486] Associate Professor Anna
High, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society, Ngā
Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Police.
[487] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[488] Cabinet Paper
“Evidence Bill: Paper 2: Admissibility of Evidence” (4 December
2002) CAB 100/2002/1 at [29]; Letter to Joanna Davidson (Crown Counsel) to the
Attorney-General “Legal Advice — Consistency with the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990: Evidence Bill” (5 April 2005) at [6].
[489] Criminal Bar
Association, Ethan Huda, Public Defence Service. See also Tania Singh
“Criminal Practice Section: The exclusion
of improperly obtained
evidence” [2021] NZLJ 59 at 59.
[490] For the avoidance of
doubt, s 30 can apply to evidence obtained unfairly by private individuals (see,
for example, Dabous v R [2014] NZCA 7). However, such cases will be rare
and will still involve a decision by the prosecutor to rely on the evidence
(since s 30 only applies
to criminal cases).
[491] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [282].
[492] For example, Hamed v
R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305, R v Chetty [2016] NZSC 68,
[2018] 1 NZLR 26; R v Perry [2016] NZSC 102; R v Alsford [2017]
NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710; R v Reti [2020] NZSC 16, [2020] 1 NZLR 108;
Kalekale v R [2016] NZCA 259; W (CA226/2019) v R [2019] NZCA 558.
[493] See, for example, Scott
Optican “The Kiwi Way: New Zealand’s Approach to the Exclusion in
Criminal Trials of Evidence
Improperly Obtained by the Police” (2021) 24
New Crim L Rev 254 at 269; Bernard Robertson “Student Companion —
Evidence” [2020] NZLJ 99 at 99; Kent Roach “Reclaiming Prima Facie
Exclusionary Rules in Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United States: The
Importance
of Compensation, Proportionality, and Non-Repetition” (2020)
43(3) Manitoba Law Journal 1 at 26; Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos Improperly
obtained evidence in Anglo-American and Continental Law (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2019) at 240–241; Bernard Robertson “Evidence” [2018]
NZLJ 210 at 211; Nikita Mitskevitch and Tania Singh “W v R
(CA597/2016) [2017] NZCA 522: A privacy dichotomy within the context of New
Zealand’s human rights obligations and “seriousness” under s
30 of
the Evidence Act” [2018] NZLJ 240 at 243; Scott Optican
“Hamed, Williams and the exclusionary rule: critiquing the Supreme
Court’s approach to s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006” (2012) NZ L Rev
605 at 620.
[494] In particular, the
Auckland District Law Society and Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand considered our options
for reform would not adequately protect
defendants’ rights. They said there should be a clear statement of
principle that an
effective and credible system of justice favours exclusion
unless the prosecution satisfies the court that admission will not condone
improprieties in gathering evidence and fail to give substantive effect to human
rights and the rule of law. Similarly, Stephen Hudson
advocated automatic
exclusion of evidence that is unfairly obtained.
[495] For further detail, see
our discussion of New Zealand’s approach to exclusion of improperly
obtained evidence in our Issues
Paper at [7.6]–[7.8] and
[7.15]–[7.21].
[496] Evidence Act 2006, s
30(2)(b).
[497] For example, ss
17–18 (hearsay); ss 23–25 (opinion evidence); s 35 (previous
consistent statements).
[498] Evidence Act 2006, ss
28(2) and 29(2).
[499] Evidence Act 2006, ss 8
and 43(1). See similarly ss 57(3)(d), 68(2), 69(2) and 70(1), which relate to
privilege and disclosure.
[500] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143].
[501] Issues Paper at
[7.45].
[502] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
s 138(1); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 138(1); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138(1);
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 138(1); Evidence Act
2001 (Tas), s 138(1); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 138(1). These provisions state
that improperly obtained evidence “is not to be admitted unless the
desirability of admitting the evidence
outweighs the undesirability of admitting
evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was
obtained”. See
also Issues Paper at [7.51]–[7.52].
[503] Issues Paper at
[7.46].
[504] Issues Paper at
[7.52]–[7.53].
[505] Issues Paper at
[7.48]–[7.50].
[506] Alexandra Allen-Franks,
Auckland District Law Society, Tim Cochrane, Criminal Bar Association, Defence
Lawyers Association New Zealand,
Stephen Hudson, Luke Cunningham Clere, Don
Mathias, Public Defence Service, Wellington Community Justice Project.
[507] Tari Ture o te Karauna |
Crown Law Office, Associate Professor Anna High, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald, New Zealand Law
Society, New Zealand Police.
[508] Ethan Huda (referring,
in particular, to the number of warrantless searches now carried out in New
Zealand).
[509] Noting, in particular,
that s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 means every finding of a
breach of a right is a finding
that the restriction on the right was not
justified.
[510] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [144].
[511] See, for example,
Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos Improperly Obtained Evidence in Anglo-American and
Continental Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2018) at 240–241; Scott
Optican “Hamed, Williams and the exclusionary rule:
Critiquing the Supreme Court’s approach to s 30 of the Evidence Act
2006” [2012] NZ L Rev 605 at 636–637; Kent Roach “Reclaiming
Prima Facie Exclusionary Rules in Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United
States:
The Importance of Compensation, Proportionality, and
Non-Repetition” (2020) 43(3) Manitoba Law Journal 1 at 26; Bernard
Robertson “Student Companion — Evidence” [2020] NZLJ 99 at 99
(referring to s 30 as “a lottery”).
[512] Evidence Act 2006, ss 28
and 29.
[513] Public Defence
Service.
[514] Alexandra Allen-Franks,
Tim Cochrane.
[515] New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990, s 23.
[516] Practice Note on
Police Questioning (s 30(6) Evidence Act 2006) [2007] 3 NZLR 297.
[517] Where an impropriety
gives rise to concerns about the reliability of the evidence obtained, that can
be considered under s 30(3)(c)
as part of the balancing test (R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [151]). However, the focus of s 30 is on the
improper conduct rather than preventing the admission of unreliable evidence
(which
is directly addressed by s 28).
[518] See, for example,
Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and
Victorian Law Reform Commission Review of the Uniform Evidence Acts (ALRC
DP 69/NSWLRC DP 47/VLRC DP, 2005) at [14.78]; Australian Law Reform Commission
Evidence (Volume 1) (ALRC 26 (Interim), 1985) at 536–537.
[519] See, for example, ss
28(2), 29(2), 44(2) and 44AA(4). Compare ss 45(2) and 46, which require the
prosecution to prove on the balance
of probabilities that the circumstances in
which an identification was made have produced a reliable identification. Unlike
the assessment
under s 30, this is essentially a factual inquiry.
[520] Australian Law Reform
Commission Evidence (Volume 1) (ALRC 26 (Interim), 1985) at
536–537. See more recently Australian Law Reform Commission and others
Uniform Evidence Law: Report (ALRC R102, NSWLRC R112, VLRC Final Report,
December 2005) at [16.92], suggesting shifting the onus to the prosecution
“emphasises
that crime control considerations should be balanced equally
with the public interest in deterring police illegality, protecting
individual
rights and maintaining judicial legitimacy”.
[521] The Australian
experience supports the view that any increase in exclusion of evidence is
likely to be small. The adoption in Australian
legislation of an onus on the
prosecution to establish the case for admission may have led to a small increase
in the number of cases
in which improperly obtained evidence is excluded
compared to the position at common law (Bram Presser “Public Policy,
Police
Interest: A Re-Evaluation of the Judicial Discretion to Exclude
Improperly or Illegally Obtained Evidence” [2001] MelbULawRw 24; [2001] 25 MULR 757 at
784–785). Overall, our review of Australian case law suggests improperly
obtained evidence is still admitted in more cases
than not. However, our review
of Australian cases was not comprehensive. It captured 47 criminal cases (from
2013–2023) in
which evidence was found to be improperly obtained.
[522] Issues Paper at
[7.48]–[7.50].
[523] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(a).
[524] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(b).
[525] Issues Paper at
[7.55]–[7.58].
[526] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [60]–[63] per Elias CJ, [187]–[189]
per Blanchard J, [229]–[230] per Tipping J and [258] per McGrath J.
[527] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [187].
[528] Section 30(2)(b)
originally required a balancing process that “gives appropriate weight to
the impropriety but also takes proper account of the need for an
effective and credible system of justice” (emphasis added). The “but
also”
was changed to “and” by s 10 of the Evidence Amendment
Act 2016.
[529] Alexandra Allen-Franks,
Criminal Bar Association, Associate Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham Clere,
Don Mathias, New Zealand
Law Society, Public Defence Service, Wellington
Community Justice Project.
[530] New Zealand Police.
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald did not specifically comment on this issue
but said she did not support
any of the proposed changes to s 30 and considered
empirical research was required to validate any reform.
[531] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[532] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Don Mathias, New Zealand Law Society, Public Defence Service.
[533] Associate Professor Anna
High.
[534] Alexandra Allen-Franks,
Criminal Bar Association, Wellington Community Justice Project.
[535] New Zealand Law
Society.
[536] Public Defence
Service.
[537] Don Mathias.
[538] Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
s 138; Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 138; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 138; Evidence
(National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 138; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), s
138; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 138. Subsection (1) of these provisions refers
to whether the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the
undesirability of admitting
the evidence.
[539] Don Mathias.
[540] Associate Professor Anna
High, Don Mathias, Public Defence Service.
[541] Criminal Bar
Association, New Zealand Police.
[542] Alexandra Allen-Franks,
New Zealand Law Society.
[543] Associate Professor Anna
High, Don Mathias, Public Defence Service.
[544] See Issues Paper at
[7.56]–[7.58].
[545] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [60]–[63] per Elias CJ, [187]–[189]
per Blanchard J, [229]–[230] per Tipping J and [258] per McGrath J. See
also R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [148].
[546] Lee v R [2020]
NZCA 276 at [38] (emphasis added).
[547] A recent case that
remains subject to publication restrictions referred to an effective and
credible system of justice as requiring
those who offend to be held to
account.
[548] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(a) and (f).
[549] Issues Paper at
[7.62]–[7.65].
[550] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [60]–[63] per Elias CJ, [187]–[189]
per Blanchard J, [229]–[230] per Tipping J and [258] per McGrath J.
[551] Associate Professor Anna
High.
[552] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [245]–[247] (referring to the
seriousness or magnitude of the breach).
[553] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [148]. See also Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101,
[2012] 2 NZLR 305 per Blanchard J at [187].
[554] Legislation Design and
Advisory Committee Legislation Guidelines (September 2021), Supplementary
Materials: “Designing purpose provisions and statements of
principle”.
[555] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(f).
[556] Issues Paper at
[7.73].
[557] Issues Paper at
[7.80]–[7.146].
[558] Issues Paper at [7.72].
See, for example, the discussion of good faith or inadvertence (at [7.94]), the
seriousness of the offence
(at [7.107]–[7.109]) and other investigatory
techniques (at [7.113]–[7.117]).
[559] Criminal Bar
Association, Luke Cunningham Clere, Don Mathias, Public Defence Service,
Wellington Community Justice Project.
[560] Associate Professor Anna
High, New Zealand Law Society, New Zealand Police. Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald did not specifically
comment on this issue but said she did not support
any of the proposed changes to s 30 and considered empirical research was
required
to validate any reform.
[561] Don Mathias.
[562] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Wellington Community Justice Project.
[563] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [152]; Underwood v R [2016] NZCA 312,
[2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [39]–[41].
[564] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [65] per Elias CJ and [230] per Tipping J (the
other judges did not consider this issue).
[565] Public Defence Service.
See further our discussion of this factor below.
[566] Consistent with R v
Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [152]; Underwood v R [2016] NZCA
312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [38]–[41].
[567] We discuss this issue
further below in relation to the “seriousness of the offence”
factor.
[568] Issues Paper at
[7.81].
[569] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [66] per Elias CJ and [191] per Blanchard J; R
v Toki [2017] NZCA 513, [2018] 2 NZLR 362 at [28].
[570] Issues Paper at
[7.83].
[571] See, for example, R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [53]–[55]; R v X
[2021] NZHC 2444 at [156]; Edmonds v R [2012] NZCA 472 at [77].
[572] Issues Paper at
[7.86].
[573] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand
Law Society, Public Defence Service, Wellington
Community Justice Project.
[574] Associate Professor Anna
High, New Zealand Police. Additionally, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald did
not specifically comment
on this issue but opposed reform of s 30 generally.
[575] Don Mathias.
[576] New Zealand Law Society,
Public Defence Service.
[577] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[578] Associate Professor Anna
High, Don Mathias, New Zealand Police.
[579] Don Mathias submitted
this appears to be what occurred in Tamiefuna v R [2023] NZCA 163.
[580] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association, Luke Cunningham Clere, Don Mathias, Public
Defence Service, Wellington
Community Justice Project. Associate Professor Anna
High disagreed on the basis of her more general submission that it would be
unduly
restrictive to amend s 30(3) to clarify the relevance of each factor (but
did not express a view on how this factor should be classified
if s 30(3) is
amended).
[581] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [66] per Elias CJ and [191] per Blanchard J; R
v Toki [2017] NZCA 513, [2018] 2 NZLR 362 at [28].
[582] See, for example, R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [53]–[55]; Butland v
R [2019] NZCA 376 at [49]; R v X [2021] NZHC 2444 at [156];
Edmonds v R [2012] NZCA 472 at [77].
[583] Jeffries v Ministry
of Social Development [2020] NZHC 1450 at [45]; Butland v R [2019]
NZCA 376 at [49]; M (CA84/2019) v R [2019] NZCA 203 at [39].
[584] R v JZH [2009]
NZCA 363 at [30], cited with approval in R v Chetty [2016] NZSC 68,
[2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [49].
[585] R v Alsford
[2017] NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710 at [38] (suggesting a breach of an Information
Privacy Principle could be relevant to the s 30 balancing exercise); Butland
v R [2019] NZCA 376 at [49]–[50].
[586] M (CA84/2019) v R
[2019] NZCA 203 at [39].
[587] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [147].
[588] R v G [2022] NZHC
2820 at [63].
[589] R v Reynolds
[2017] NZCA 611 at [48].
[590] See, for example, R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [49] and [54]; T v R
[2016] NZCA 148 at [36], [41] and [43]; Butland v R [2019] NZCA 376
at [49]; R v X [2021] NZHC 2444 at [156].
[591] Aranguiz v Police
[2019] NZHC 1765 at [46]; Beanland v R [2020] NZCA 528 at [45].
[592] Lee v R [2020]
NZCA 276 at [40]–[42]; Baylis v R [2018] NZCA 271 at [56]; S v
Police [2018] NZHC 1582, [2019] 2 NZLR 392 at [74]; T v R [2016] NZCA
148 at [43]; Edmonds v R [2012] NZCA 472 at [77]–[79].
[593] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [161]; Beanland v R [2020] NZCA 528 at [47];
Murray v R [2016] NZCA 221 at [174]–[176]; Ferens v R [2015]
NZCA 564 at [61]; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at
[120]; Alexander v Police [2019] NZHC 2920 at [49]–[50].
[594] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [149]; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3
NZLR 207 at [130]; Fenwick v R [2017] NZCA 422 at [15].
[595] See, for example, R v
Vaitohi [2022] NZHC 1165 at [117] and [120]; Roskam v R [2019] NZCA
53 at [42]; McGarrett v R [2017] NZCA 204 at [37]; Kelly v Police
[2017] NZHC 1611 at [44]. In total, 15 of the 40 cases we examined in our
snapshot case study in which improperly obtained evidence was admitted appeared
to treat good faith or the fact that the impropriety was of low seriousness as a
factor favouring admission of the evidence.
[596] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Don
Mathias, Public Defence Service,
Wellington Community Justice Project.
[597] New Zealand Police.
Additionally, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald did not specifically comment
on this issue but opposed reform
of s 30 generally.
[598] Luke Cunningham Clere,
New Zealand Law Society.
[599] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[600] Issues Paper at
[7.95].
[601] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Don Mathias, Public Defence
Service, Wellington Community
Justice Project.
[602] See, for example, T v
R [2016] NZCA 148 at [44]: “The particular focus of the nature of the
impropriety is whether it was deliberate, reckless, or done in bad
faith.”
[603] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [161]; Beanland v R [2020] NZCA 528 at [47];
Lee v R [2020] NZCA 276 at [43]; Murray v R [2016] NZCA 221 at
[174]–[176]; Ferens v R [2015] NZCA 564 at [61]; R v
Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [120]; Alexander v
Police [2019] NZHC 2920 at [49]–[50].
[604] As we said in our Issues
Paper, we found no examples of such a finding in our snapshot case study.
[605] Jeffries v Ministry
of Social Development [2020] NZHC 1450 at [48]; R v Vaitohi [2022]
NZHC 1165 at [117] and [120]; Roskam v R [2019] NZCA 53 at [42]; Waite
v Police [2019] NZHC 213 at [54(i)]; McGarrett v R [2017] NZCA 204 at
[37]; Kelly v Police [2017] NZHC 1611 at [44].
[606] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [149]. See also R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52,
[2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [130]; Fenwick v R [2017] NZCA 422 at [15].
[607] Alexander v
Police [2019] NZHC 2920 at [51] (citing R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52,
[2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [121]). See also Elley v Police [2021] NZHC 2097 at
[44].
[608] Issues Paper at
[7.99].
[609] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [152].
[610] Evidence Bill 2005
(256–2) (select committee report) at 4. See also (21 November 2006) 635
NZPD 6647 (in committee).
[611] See, for example, D
(CA419/2021) v R [2021] NZCA 678 at [71]; Mehrtens v R [2018] NZCA
446 at [20]; R v Vaitohi [2022] NZHC 1165 at [124]–[126]; Grigg
v Police [2021] NZHC 3611 at [52].
[612] Cited in 29 out of 40
cases in which improperly obtained evidence was admitted.
[613] See, for example,
Robertson v R [2020] NZCA 658 at [31] where the nature of the impropriety
called into question the reliability of the evidence.
[614] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke
Cunningham Clere, Don Mathias,
Public Defence Service.
[615] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society, New Zealand Police. Additionally, Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald did not specifically
comment on this issue but opposed reform
of s 30 in general.
[616] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Don Mathias, Public Defence Service.
[617] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [64].
[618] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [143] and [151]; R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52,
[2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [140].
[619] Issues Paper at
[7.107]–[7.109].
[620] Underwood v R
[2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [39]–[41].
[621] Some cases continue to
refer to the seriousness of the offence as a factor that can cut both ways. See,
for example, Grigg v Police [2021] NZHC 3611 at [52].
[622] Bowden v R [2018]
NZCA 618 at [28].
[623] D (CA104/2017) v
R [2018] NZCA 173 at [36].
[624] R v Reti [2020]
NZSC 16, [2020] 1 NZLR 108 at [90].
[625] Don Mathias.
[626] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke Cunningham Clere.
[627] New Zealand Police.
Additionally, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald did not specifically comment
on this issue but opposed reform
of s 30 in general.
[628] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [7.27]–[7.28].
[629] Underwood v R
[2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433.
[630] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [152].
[631] Underwood v R
[2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [41].
[632] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [65] per Elias CJ and [230] per Tipping J. See
also Ahuja v Police [2019] NZHC 2010 at [70].
[633] Hamed v R [2011]
NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [230] per Tipping J.
[634] Issues Paper at
[7.113].
[635] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [7.36].
[636] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [7.38]–[7.39]. The Commission said it would
also be inappropriate to treat the absence of alternatives
as favouring
exclusion since the “nature of the impropriety” (including whether
it was deliberate) is already considered
as a separate factor.
[637] Cooper v Police
[2020] NZHC 2514 at [38]; Nassery v R [2020] NZCA 511 at [44]; Elley v
Police [2021] NZHC 2097 at [46]. Another recent case took a similar approach
but remains subject to publication restrictions until final disposition of
trial.
[638] M (CA84/2019) v R
[2019] NZCA 203 at [50]–[51].
[639] M (CA84/2019) v R
[2019] NZCA 203 at [51].
[640] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke
Cunningham Clere.
[641] Don Mathias, New Zealand
Law Society, New Zealand Police, Public Defence Service, Wellington Community
Justice Project. Additionally,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald did not
specifically comment on this issue but opposed reform of s 30 in general.
[642] Don Mathias, Public
Defence Service, Wellington Community Justice Project.
[643] Don Mathias, New Zealand
Law Society, Public Defence Service. No other submitters commented on this
issue.
[644] This case remains
subject to publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[645] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [150].
[646] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [7.36].
[647] Kueh v R [2013]
NZCA 616 at [51]–[53].
[648] Rihia v R [2016]
NZCA 200 at [36].
[649] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [127].
[650] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [150].
[651] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [7.38]–[7.39].
[652] Rihia v R [2016]
NZCA 200 at [35]–[36]; Cooper v Police [2020] NZHC 2514 at
[38]–[41] (although as noted above, in these cases, investigators did not
appear to be aware of the availability of the lawful method
so arguably the
factor did not apply in any event).
[653] M (CA84/2019) v R
[2019] NZCA 203 at [51].
[654] For example, in M
(CA84/2019) v R [2019] NZCA 203, similar considerations were taken into
account under s 30(3)(a) and (e) (compare [39] and [51]).
[655] T v R [2016] NZCA
148 at [54]–[55].
[656] See, for example,
McGarrett v R [2017] NZCA 204 at [37]–[38], taking into account the
reasons for investigators’ failure to seek a search warrant under both s
30(3)(b) and s
30(3)(e).
[657] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [153].
[658] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [154].
[659] See, for example,
Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR at [202] per Blanchard J and
[247] per Tipping J; R v Balsley [2013] NZCA 258 at [34]; Underwood v
R [2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [21]. More recent decisions making
this point remain subject to publication restrictions until final disposition of
trial.
[660] Ward v R [2016]
NZCA 580 at [58]–[59].
[661] R v Balsley
[2013] NZCA 258 at [34]; Ahuja v Police [2019] NZHC 2010 at [71]
(reversed in Ahuja v Police [2019] NZCA 643 but without comment on this
point); Police v Fox [2017] NZDC 21454 at [31]; Cameron v Police
[2015] NZHC 2957 at [54].
[662] Auckland District Law
Society, Tim Cochrane, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Associate
Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham
Clere, Don Mathias.
[663] Criminal Bar
Association, New Zealand Police, Wellington Community Justice Project.
Additionally, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald
did not specifically comment
on this issue but opposed reform of s 30 in general.
[664] New Zealand Law Society,
Public Defence Service.
[665] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [153].
[666] R v Shaheed
[2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at [153]; Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR
305 at [202] per Blanchard J. See also Marwood v Commissioner of Police
[2016] NZSC 139, [2017] 1 NZLR 260 at [27].
[667] For example, in
Marwood v Commissioner of Police [2016] NZSC 139, [2017] 1 NZLR 260 at
[50]–[52], the fact that improperly obtained evidence had already been
excluded in criminal proceedings (resulting in a discharge)
was taken into
account when deciding to admit the evidence in a subsequent forfeiture
proceeding (although s 30 did not apply directly
in that case since it is
limited to criminal proceedings). See further the discussion of this issue in
Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua
i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [7.53]–[7.64].
[668] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EA30.12(9)].
[669] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Don Mathias.
[670] Criminal Bar
Association, Crown Law Office, New Zealand Law Society, New Zealand Police,
Public Defence Service, Wellington Community
Justice Project. Additionally,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald did not specifically comment on this issue
but opposed reform
of s 30 in general.
[671] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Don Mathias, Public Defence Service, Wellington Community Justice Project.
[672] See, for example, R v
Chetty [2016] NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [70]; Johnson v R [2020]
NZCA 404 at [29]; Alexander v Police [2019] NZHC 2920 at [58] (all
suggesting the urgency would need to help explain or justify the actions of
Police to be relevant under s 30).
[673] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [7.42].
[674] See further the
discussion in our Issues Paper at [7.42]–[7.146].
[675] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Don Mathias, New Zealand Law
Society, Public Defence Service.
Additionally, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald did not specifically comment on this issue but opposed reform of s 30
in general.
[676] Don Mathias, New Zealand
Law Society, Public Defence Service.
[677] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society,
Public Defence Service.
[678] McGarrett v R
[2017] NZCA 204 at [24]–[25]; Nassery v R [2020] NZCA 511 at
[38]–[41]; Renson v Police [2021] NZHC 2342 at [31]; Kerr v
Police [2017] NZHC 2595 at [21].
[679] G v R [2012] NZCA
152 at [34]; Underwood v R [2016] NZCA 312, [2017] 2 NZLR 433 at [57];
Asgedom v R [2016] NZCA 334 at [34]–[36]; Nassery v R [2020]
NZCA 511.
[680] Grant v Police
[2021] NZHC 2297 at [95]; Alamoti v R [2016] NZCA 402 at
[54]–[57].
[681] Issues Paper at
[7.150]–[7.152].
[682] For further discussion,
see our Issues Paper at [7.150]–[7.152].
[683] R v Alsford
[2017] NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710.
[684] Issues Paper at
[7.19]–[7.20].
[685] The Privacy Act 2020 did
not alter the legal status of the IPPs although it was enacted after the Supreme
Court’s decision
in R v Alsford [2017] NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710.
Section 31 provides “the IPPs do not confer on any person any right that
is enforceable in a court of law” (s 31(1))
aside from those conferred by
IPP 6(1) (s 31(2)). These provisions are similar to s 11 of the Privacy Act
1993.
[686] Tamiefuna v R
[2023] NZCA 163 at [80]–[83] and [97].
[687] Tamiefuna v R
[2023] NZSC 93 (leave decision).
[688] See, for example,
Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [191] per Blanchard J;
Makaea v R [2018] NZCA 284 at [45].
[689] As the Supreme Court in
Alsford envisaged could potentially occur in relation to the IPPs: R v
Alsford [2017] NZSC 42, [2017] 1 NZLR 710 at [38].
[690] Issues Paper at
[2.46]–[2.50].
[691] Kearns v R [2017]
NZCA 51, [2017] 2 NZLR 835 at [38]–[42].
[692] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[693] New Zealand Police.
[694] Eugene Bingham, Felippe
Rodrigues and Chris McKeen “Unwarranted: The little-known, but widely-used
police tactic” Stuff (online ed, 2020).
[695] Kearns v R [2017]
NZCA 51, [2017] 2 NZLR 835 at [25].
[696] Kearns v R [2017]
NZCA 51, [2017] 2 NZLR 835 at [22].
[697] Shannon Pitman
“Police profiled two Whangārei Māori men as gang members when
they conducted ‘unlawful’
search” The New Zealand Herald
(online ed, Whangārei, 9 October 2023).
[698] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [46]–[47].
[699] Issues Paper at
[7.154]–[7.158].
[700] R v Perry [2016]
NZSC 102 at [56]–[57].
[701] S v Police [2018]
NZHC 1582, [2019] 2 NZLR 392 at [71]. See also Nicol v R [2017] NZCA 140
at [30]. Another more recent Court of Appeal decision remains subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[702] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [61]–[63]; R v Perry [2016] NZSC 102
at [59].
[703] See, for example, W
(CA226/2019) v R [2019] NZCA 558 at [132] (compare Mallon J dissenting at
[139]); Swainbank v R [2021] NZCA 93 at [59].
[704] Issues Paper at
[7.160]–[7.164].
[705] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Don Mathias, Public Defence Service.
[706] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society. Additionally, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald did not
specifically comment on this
issue but opposed reform of s 30 in general.
[707] R v Perry [2016]
NZSC 102 at [56]–[57]; Nicol v R [2017] NZCA 140 at [30]; S v
Police [2018] NZHC 1582, [2019] 2 NZLR 392 at [71]. Another more recent
Court of Appeal decision remains subject to publication restrictions until final
disposition of trial.
[708] R v Chetty [2016]
NZSC 68, [2018] 1 NZLR 26 at [61]–[63]; R v Perry [2016] NZSC 102
at [59]; Crawford v Police [2018] NZHC 407, [2018] 3 NZLR 89 at [25].
[709] R v Williams
[2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [129].
[710] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25(3) E&P 217 at
217. In its submission to the review, Ngā
Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police suggested that this terminology was
incorrect
and potentially problematic. It noted that “informer” has
a distinct meaning under s 64 of the Evidence Act. It refers
to someone who is
not called by the prosecution to give evidence. By contrast, “prison
informant” as used in the Issues
Paper refers to someone who is called as
a witness in proceedings. For the purpose of this discussion and our
recommendations for
reform, we continue to use the terminology of “prison
informant”. We consider this to be the generally accepted and understood
terminology used by the courts and in the relevant literature.
[711] Marie Dyhrberg
“Informants: finding the truth beneath self-interest” New Zealand
Lawyer (New Zealand, 8 February 2001).
[712] See, for example, the
comments on the incentivised nature of prison informant evidence by the Supreme
Court in Hudson v R [2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 (at [33]) and W
(SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 (at n 104 and [88(c)]).
Commentators have also noted the role that incentives play in prison informant
evidence. See, for example,
Anna High “The exclusion of prison informant
evidence for unreliability in New Zealand” (2021) 25(3) E&P 217 at
219;
Patrick Anderson “Snitched on or stitched up? — a review of the
law in New Zealand in relation to jailhouse informant
evidence” [2021]
NZLJ 199 at 121.
[713] Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New Zealand”
(2021) 25(3) E&P 217 at
219.
[714] See, for example, W
(SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [74]–[86]
(majority) and [233]–[239] (minority).
[715] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [80] (majority) and [237] (minority).
[716] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [83] (majority) and [240] (minority).
[717] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [94]–[95] (majority) and
[242]–[243] (minority).
[718] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [76]–[79] (majority) and
[221]–[225] (minority). The Court relied on three major studies from the
United States that demonstrate
a link between prison informant evidence and
wrongful convictions: Brandon L Garrett Convicting the Innocent: Where
Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass),
2011); Samuel R Gross and Michael Shaffer Exonerations in the United States
1989–2012: report by the National Registry of Exonerations (National
Registry of Exonerations, June 2012); Northwestern University School of Law
Center on Wrongful Convictions The Snitch System (Northwestern
University, 2004).
[719] See, for example, the
overturning of convictions against Mauha Fawcett, Teina Pora and Arthur Allan
Thomas. Prison informant evidence
has also featured in other high-profile (and
sometimes controversial) convictions — for example, in the convictions of
Scott
Watson and David Tamihere, both of whom have appeals pending. Particularly
significant in David Tamihere’s case was the evidence
given by
“Witness C”, later revealed to be Robert Conchie Harris, who was
convicted in a private prosecution of eight
counts of perjury for the evidence
he gave at Mr Tamihere’s 1990 trial: Taylor v Witness C [2017] NZHC
2610.
[720] See, for example, Phil
Taylor “The murky world of jailhouse snitches” New Zealand Herald
(online ed, 30 April 2018); Mike White “The tragic and terrible case
of Mauha Fawcett’s wrongful conviction” Stuff (online ed, 11
June 2022). A public petition entitled “Stop Jailhouse Informants From
Causing Wrongful Convictions” was
presented to Parliament in November
2019. The Justice Committee provided its final report in August 2023, declining
to take the issue
further. The Committee considered that juries were best placed
to make assessments of reliability and also noted the Commission’s
consideration of this issue in the review of the Evidence Act. Justice Committee
Petition of Lois McGirr for Justice for All Inc: Stop jail-house informant
testimony from causing wrongful convictions (August 2023).
[721] Sections 27–30 may
also be relevant — see Hudson v R [2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289
at [36]; W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [101]
and n 6. See also discussion in Te Aka Matua o te Ture | Law Commission Te
Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review of the Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper), ch 8 at n 20.
[722] Issues Paper at
[8.16]–[8.21].
[723] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [36].
[724] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [33].
[725] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382; Roigard v R [2020] NZSC 94.
[726] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [69]–[70], [88] and [91]
(majority) and [191] (minority).
[727] Issues Paper at
[8.18]–[8.19].
[728] Issues Paper at [8.21]
and [8.53].
[729] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Office Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Use of
Inmate Admissions (August 2021).
[730] As reported in Mike
White “Law Commission will examine ‘jailhouse snitches’”
Stuff (1 October 2022).
[731] Issues Paper at
[8.31]–[8.39].
[732] Similar to the approach
taken to the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Evidence Act 2006, s 18(1)(a).
[733] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald.
[734] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand, Associate Professor
Anna High, Stephen Hudson, Justice For All Inc, Te
Rōpū Tauira Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Students’
Association,
Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture | Public Defence Service.
[735] Te Kāhui
Tātari Ture | Criminal Cases Review Commission, Te Kāhui Ture o
Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society, New
Zealand Police.
[736] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Te Rōpū Tauira Ture
o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Students’ Association.
[737] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[738] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[739] This empirical evidence
included a number of studies cited by the Supreme Court in W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [80]–[84] (majority) and
[233]–[239] (minority). These included Stacy Ann Wetmore, Jeffrey S
Neuschatz and Scott D Gronlund
“On the power of secondary confession
evidence” (2014) 20 Psychology, Crime & Law 339 at 346; Jeffrey S
Neuschatz and others “Secondary Confessions, Expert Testimony, and
Unreliable Testimony” (2012) 27
J Police Crim Psych 179; Christopher T
Robertson and D Alex Winkelman “Incentives, Lies, and Disclosure”
(2017) 20 U
Pa J Const L 33; Evelyn M Maeder and Emily Pica “Secondary
Confessions: The Influence (or Lack Thereof) of Incentive Size and
Scientific
Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Perceptions of Informant Testimony”
(2014) 38 Law & Hum Behav 560.
[740] See consideration of the
issue by the Privy Council in Benedetto and Labrador v R [2003] UKPC 27,
[2003] 1 WLR 1545.
[741] See, for example, Peter
Cory The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow: The Investigation, Prosecution
and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation (Manitoba Justice, 2001).
[742] See, for example,
California Penal Code s 1127a(b)–(v); Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art
39.14; Illinois Code of Criminal
Procedure 1963 725 ILCS 5/115-21; Connecticut
Public Act No. 19–131: An Act Concerning the Testimony of Jailhouse
Witnesses;
Revised Code of Washington 10.56.050.
[743] New Zealand Law Society,
New Zealand Police.
[744] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Police.
[745] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand,
Associate Professor Anna High,
Stephen Hudson, Justice for All Inc, New Zealand
Law Society, New Zealand Law Students’ Association, Public Defence
Service,
Wellington Community Justice Project.
[746] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Justice for All Inc, New
Zealand Law Students’ Association,
Wellington Community Justice
Project.
[747] Criminal Bar
Association, Associate Professor Anna High, Stephen Hudson, Public Defence
Service.
[748] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Justice for All Inc.
[749] Associate Professor Anna
High did comment, however, that this was a provisional view and that there may
be a place for different
standards depending on different factors — for
example, if information was solicited rather than offered, a higher standard
of
“beyond reasonable doubt” might be appropriate.
[750] Criminal Bar
Association, Associate Professor Anna High, Stephen Hudson, New Zealand Law
Society, Public Defence Service.
[751] Criminal Bar
Association, Associate Professor Anna High, New Zealand Law Society, Public
Defence Service.
[752] Issues Paper at [8.38];
W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at
[254]–[270].
[753] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [76]–[78] (majority) and
[221]–[225] (minority). The Court relied on three major studies from the
United States that demonstrate
a link between prison informant evidence and
wrongful convictions: Brandon Garrett Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal
Prosecutions Go Wrong (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass), 2011);
Samuel R Gross and Michael Shaffer Exonerations in the United States
1989–2012: report by the National Registry of Exonerations (National
Registry of Exonerations, June 2012); Northwestern University School of Law
Center for Wrongful Convictions The Snitch System (Northwestern
University, 2004).
[754] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association, Public Defence
Service.
[755] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [79] (majority). See also at
[76]–[78] (majority) and [232] (minority).
[756] This argument was
advanced by the prosecution in Hudson v R [2011] NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR
289 at [32].
[757] See, for example, the
conviction of Roberto Conchie Harris on eight counts of perjury for evidence he
gave at David Tamihere’s
1990 trial for the murder of Swedish tourists
Urban Höglin and Heidi Paakkonen (Taylor v Witness C [2017] NZHC
2610). Another example is the evidence from a prison informant in the trial of
Joseph William Johnson for the murder of Palmiro MacDonald
alleging Johnson
confessed to him while in the shower block of Manawatū Prison. It was ruled
inadmissible at a pre-trial hearing
when Department of Corrections records
showed that the informant and Mr Johnson were never in the shower block together
in the period
of their incarceration (R v Johnson [2018] NZHC 2998).
[758] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [33].
[759] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [227].
[760] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [80]–[84] (majority) and
[233]–[239] (minority). The Court cites a number of studies, including
Stacy Ann Wetmore, Jeffrey
S Neuschatz and Scott D Gronlund “On the power
of secondary confession evidence” (2014) 20 Psychology, Crime & Law
339 at 346; Jeffrey S Neuschatz and others “Secondary Confessions, Expert
Testimony, and Unreliable Testimony” (2012) 27
J Police Crim Psych 179;
Christopher T Robertson and D Alex Winkelman “Incentives, Lies, and
Disclosure” (2017) 20 U
Pa J Const L 33; Evelyn M Maeder and Emily Pica
“Secondary Confessions: The Influence (or Lack Thereof) of Incentive Size
and
Scientific Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Perceptions of Informant
Testimony” (2014) 38 Law & Hum Behav 560.
[761] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand,
Public Defence Service.
[762] See, for example, W
(SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [84]–[85] and
[246]; Anna High “The exclusion of prison informant evidence for
unreliability in New Zealand” (2021)
25(3) E&P 217 at 232; Patrick
Anderson “Snitched on or stitched up? — a review of the law in New
Zealand in relation
to jailhouse informant evidence” [2021] NZLJ 119 at
123.
[763] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, 1 NZLR 382 at [82] (majority) and [239] (minority). These
limitations include “the limited number of empirical studies, that the
studies all involved
mock trials without actual consequences and do not involve
either lengthy or group deliberation, and the limited composition of
samples”.
[764] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, 1 NZLR 382 at [239].
[765] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, 1 NZLR 382 at [86].
[766] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere.
[767] See discussion on the
importance of avoiding a “mini-trial” in W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2021] 1 NZLR 382 at [71] and [88].
[768] The Commission’s
original proposals for these sections included a threshold of beyond reasonable
doubt, which was changed
to balance of probabilities when the Evidence Bill was
introduced — see Cabinet Paper “Evidence Bill: Paper 2:
Admissibility
of Evidence” (4 December 2002) at [10], [27] and [44]. We
understand this was done on the basis that the beyond reasonable
doubt threshold
was too high and would preclude admission and consideration by the fact-finder.
[769] See, for example,
Hohipa v R [2015] NZCA 73, where the Court suggested the different
standard for visual identification evidence may reflect the
“legislature’s estimation
of the risks inherent in visual
identification evidence” (at [67]).
[770] We note prison informant
evidence often contains a defendant’s “hearsay statement” (as
defined in s 4(1)), but
under s 27(3), the hearsay rules do not apply to a
defendant’s statement offered by the prosecution. In some circumstances,
the prison informant evidence itself will be subject to the hearsay rules
— for example, where the informant is unavailable
as a witness and their
evidence is presented through a written statement or recorded interview. This
was the approach taken by the
Court of Appeal in R v Hoggart [2019] NZCA
89 at [49]–[51], as discussed in Chapter 4. See also Anna High “The
exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in
New Zealand”
(2021) 25(3) E&P 217 at 224.
[771] See, for example,
Adams v R [2012] NZCA 386 at [26].
[772] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [248] onwards.
[773] Criminal Bar
Association, Associate Professor Anna High, New Zealand Law Society, Public
Defence Service.
[774] Crown Law Office
Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Use of Inmate Admissions (August
2021) at [3.17.1]–[3.17.5].
[775] Criminal Bar
Association, Associate Professor Anna High, Public Defence Service
[776] Evidence Act 2006, s
16(1) (definition of “circumstances”).
[777] See, for example, Gao
v Zespri Group Ltd [2021] NZCA 442 at [50].
[778] We consider this
approach to be consistent with the view of the Supreme Court in R v Wichman
[2015] NZSC 98 that, in the context of s 28, indications of actual
reliability should only be considered where they are clear and obvious. See our
discussion
on the application of s 28 in Chapter 5.
[779] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Stephen Hudson.
[780] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [254].
[781] The other provisions we
have discussed that address the admissibility of evidence that may be unreliable
do not provide for consideration
of such matters (ss 18, 28, 45 and 46). We note
that a reference to the centrality of the evidence to the prosecution case under
s 30 was removed from the Evidence Bill at select committee stage (Evidence Bill
2005 (256–2) (select committee report) at
4). We discuss this issue in the
context of s 30 in Chapter 7.
[782] Issues Paper at
[8.41]–[8.42].
[783] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [40]–[41].
[784] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [58].
[785] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [59] (footnotes omitted).
[786] See, for example, W
(SC 38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [84]–[85] and
[246]; Anna High “The exclusion of prison informant evidence for
unreliability in New Zealand” (2021)
25(3) E&P 217 at 232; Patrick
Anderson “Snitched on or stitched up? — a review of the law in New
Zealand in relation
to jailhouse informant evidence” [2021] NZLJ 119 at
123.
[787] The majority in W (SC
38/2019) v R [2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 took the view that the
available evidence on judicial directions gave even greater weight to the need
for “careful scrutiny”
of this evidence (at [86]). The minority
concluded that the scheme of the Act proceeded on the basis that juries did
listen to judicial
directions and the available evidence did not make the case
for getting rid of judicial directions (at [246]).
[788] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, 1 NZLR 382 at [246] per Winkelmann CJ.
[789] Issues Paper at
[8.47]–[8.51].
[790] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[791] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand,
Stephen Hudson, Justice for All
Inc, Public Defence Service.
[792] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald.
[793] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[794] CT (SC 88/2013) v R
[2014] NZSC 155, [2015] 1 NZLR 465 at [50].
[795] Hudson v R [2011]
NZSC 51, [2011] 3 NZLR 289 at [40]–[41].
[796] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458.
[797] Luke Cunningham Clere,
New Zealand Law Society.
[798] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand,
Justice for All Inc, Public Defence
Service.
[799] Auckland District Law
Society, Stephen Hudson, Public Defence Service.
[800] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association, Public Defence
Service.
[801] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association.
[802] See, for example, Law
Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at
[11.107]; Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 |
Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [2.62]
(judicial directions on cross-racial identifications) and [13.21] (judicial
directions in cases of delay).
[803] Tihema v R [2023]
NZSC 37 at [1].
[804] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [91]. Minority agreement at [218].
[805] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [92](a)–(e).
[806] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [93] (majority) and [218] (minority).
[807] See, for example, Scott
Optican “Evidence” [2021] NZ L Rev 313 at 328–329; Anna High
“The exclusion of prison informant evidence for unreliability in New
Zealand” (2021) 25(3)
E&P 217.
[808] Crown Law Office
Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Use of Inmate Admissions (August
2021).
[809] Mike White “Law
Commission will examine ‘jailhouse snitches’” Stuff
(online ed, 1 October 2022).
[810] See discussion in the
Issues Paper at [8.53].
[811] Criminal Bar
Association, Stephen Hudson, Justice For All Inc, Public Defence Service.
[812] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association, Luke Cunningham Clere, Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald.
[813] Criminal Bar
Association, Public Defence Service.
[814] The Auckland District
Law Society and Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand also commented on their
experiences of disclosure
in response to an earlier question.
[815] Criminal Bar
Association, Crown Law Office, New Zealand Law Society, New Zealand Police,
Public Defence Service.
[816] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Defence Lawyers Association, Public Defence
Service.
[817] See discussion in Issues
Paper at [8.54]–[8.62].
[818] Issues Paper at [8.59].
[819] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [87].
[820] Defined as
“witnesses the Crown wishes to call who will give evidence alleging that
the defendant has in some way admitted
guilt in return for some advantage or
benefit — an advantage or benefit that operates within the criminal
justice context.
The witnesses were not involved in the offending and,
typically, their only source of knowledge for their evidence is the statements
they claim the defendant made to them”: W (SC 38/2019) v R [2020]
NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [201].
[821] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [69].
[822] Baillie v R
[2021] NZCA 458 at [69].
[823] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association, Stephen Hudson, Public Defence
Service.
[824] Crown Law Office,
Criminal Bar Association, Associate Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham Clere,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald,
New Zealand Law Society.
[825] New Zealand Police
commented on the similarities between prison informants and other incentivised
witnesses. It was not clear, however,
whether it considered any reform should
apply to both groups of witnesses or simply that prison informants were not
deserving of
“special” treatment to begin with.
[826] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association, Public Defence Service.
[827] The Auckland District
Law Society and the Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand referred to
“accomplices and witnesses generally
who gain or hope for advantage by
making statements in support of a prosecution”, and the Public Defence
Service considered
it could include “any witness who is given favourable
treatment or an advantage as a result of, or in conjunction with making
their
statement/giving evidence”. It gave the example of informants not in
prison who have unrelated charges withdrawn or reduced
or witnesses who receive
a cash reward for information.
[828] Criminal Bar
Association, Crown Law Office, New Zealand Law Society.
[829] Criminal Bar
Association, Crown Law Office, New Zealand Law Society.
[830] Associate Professor Anna
High, Luke Cunningham Clere.
[831] We are aware of one
case, currently subject to publication restrictions, where the Court of Appeal
has distinguished the approach
of W (SC 38/2019) v R to prison informants
from reliability concerns about eye-witness accomplice evidence more generally.
[832] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review
of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at
[9.2]–[9.4].
[833] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [135] and [138].
[834] Issues Paper at
[9.7]–[9.12].
[835] R v Tepu [2008]
NZCA 460, [2009] 3 NZLR 216 at [19].
[836] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [73]; Williams v R [2021] NZCA 535 at
[84]–[89]. We are aware of two other Court of Appeal cases that have
applied the approach in Best but remain subject to publication
restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[837] This case is subject to
publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[838] Issues Paper at
[9.13]–[9.14].
[839] Issues Paper at
[9.15].
[840] Auckland District Law
Society, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Ethan Huda.
[841] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Ngā Whare Whakaruruhau o Aotearoa |
Women’s Refuge. In addition
to their own submissions on this issue,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s Refuge supported Paulette
Benton-Greig’s
submission.
[842] Associate Professor Anna
High, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Law Society.
[843] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service.
[844] Stephen Hudson said any
laws that can stop or reduce lies being presented in court as the truth can only
be good for the justice
system.
[845] Associate Professor Anna
High, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Law Society. Luke
Cunningham Clere and the Public
Defence Service also were not aware of any
uncertainty in the law currently, although they were not opposed to clarifying
that evidence
as a single lie can qualify as veracity evidence.
[846] This case remains
subject to publication restrictions until final disposition of trial.
[847] R v Tepu [2008]
NZCA 460, [2009] 3 NZLR 216 at [19].
[848] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [152] and
[157].
[849] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Women’s Refuge.
[850] Evidence of a single lie
would be generally admissible provided it was “relevant” under s 7
of the Evidence Act 2006
(assuming no other specific admissibility provisions in
the Act apply).
[851] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [85], [88] and [91]. A more recent Court of
Appeal case on this point remains subject to publication restrictions until
final disposition
of trial.
[852] Law Commission
Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C179].
[853] Simon France (ed)
Adams on Criminal Law — Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson
Reuters) at [EA37.03(7)].
[854] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612.
[855] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [135] and [138].
[856] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at 232 (R24).
[857] Government Response
to the Law Commission report: The Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 Te
Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (September 2019) at 6.
[858] Issues Paper at
[9.21].
[859] Issues Paper at
[9.21].
[860] Auckland District Law
Society, Te Tari Ture o Karauna | Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association
New Zealand, Associate Professor
Anna High, Luke Cunningham Clere, Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Police.
[861] New Zealand Law Society,
Public Defence Service.
[862] Auckland District Law
Society, Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Associate
Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham
Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald, New Zealand Police.
[863] Issues Paper at [9.22].
[864] Auckland District Law
Society, Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Associate
Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham
Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald, New Zealand Police.
[865] In the Issues Paper, we
noted we had been unable to identify any cases where veracity evidence has met
the substantial helpfulness
threshold because it revealed a bias or motive to
lie. Issues Paper at [9.23], n 32.
[866] Issues Paper at
[9.25].
[867] See, for example, s
30(3) (improperly obtained evidence) and ss 43(3)–(4) (propensity
evidence).
[868] Issues Paper at
[9.26]–[9.28], referring to Best v R [2016] NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR
186 at [73]–[74] and Horton v R [2021] NZCA 82 at [30].
[869] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society, New
Zealand Police.
[870] Associate Professor Anna
High, Luke Cunningham Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald.
[871] In Horton [2021]
NZCA 82, the Court of Appeal held that evidence of extenuating
circumstances relating to previous convictions can be relevant when assessing
substantial helpfulness. They gave the example of “significant material
hardship” on the part of the complainant —
for example, financial
pressure leadings to dishonesty offending such as burglary or theft — as
that bears on the extent to
which the conviction illustrates a wider propensity
to lie (at [30]). See also R v Chase [2016] NZHC 2665 at [44].
[872] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122 at [73].
[873] Issues Paper at
[9.25]–[9.30].
[874] Issues Paper at
[9.25].
[875] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald.
[876] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(a).
[877] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(f).
[878] Best v R [2016]
NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 at [72] (emphasis added). See Ieremia v R
[2020] NZCA 17 and Key v R [2010] NZCA 115 as examples of cases where
evidence of a witness’s prior convictions for minor dishonesty offending
is generally unlikely to
be substantially helpful to assessing their veracity.
See also Horton v R [2021] NZCA 82 at [29]–[31] where the Court
agreed with the view expressed in Ieremia and Key and considered
that the complainant’s history of dishonesty offending, although
“fairly extensive and sustained”,
had limited relevance to her now
giving evidence of assault and rape.
[879] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [6.75].
[880] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society, New
Zealand Police.
[881] Luke Cunningham Clere,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald.
[882] See the discussion of
Best v R [2016] NZSC 122, [2017] 1 NZLR 186 and Horton v R [2021]
NZCA 82 in the Issues Paper at [9.26]–[9.28].
[883] The Auckland District
Law Society and Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand both noted that the
courts are already applying the
Best and Horton guidance.
[884] Most notably s 8 but
also s 25 on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, which uses the
language of “substantial help”.
[885] Issues Paper at
[9.45].
[886] Issues Paper at [9.33]
and [9.39]–[9.40].
[887] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at
[189]–[190].
[888] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at
[196]–[197].
[889] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at [204].
[890] Evidence Amendment Act
2016, s 13. See also Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006
(NZLC R127, 2013) at [6.108]. For further background on the legislative
history of s 38(2)(a), see our Issues Paper at [9.38]–[9.40].
[891] Issues Paper at
[9.35]–[9.36].
[892] Issues Paper at
[9.37].
[893] Evidence Act 2006, s 21
(which prevents a defendant from offering their own hearsay statement).
[894] Issues Paper at [9.42]
and [9.44].
[895] Issues Paper at [9.43].
R v Clark [1953] NZCA 18; [1953] NZLR 823 (CA) at 830. See also discussion in Law
Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at
[196]–[197].
[896] Issues Paper at
[9.49].
[897] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Law Society,
New Zealand Police.
[898] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[899] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Law Society,
New Zealand Police.
[900] Crown Law Office,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Law Society, New Zealand
Police.
[901] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[902] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Police.
[903] Blake v R [2010]
NZCA 61, [2010] BCL 264.
[904] Issues Paper at [9.45].
[905] See Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at [205].
[906] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[907] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society, New Zealand Police.
[908] Issues Paper at [9.35].
[909] See Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at [218]; Law
Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999)
at 110 and [C188]; Law Commission Disclosure to Court of Defendants’
Previous Convictions, Similar Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008)
at [3.33]–[3.36].
[910] See Law Commission
Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C189].
[911] Evidence Bill 2005
(256–2) (select committee report) at 6. See also Issues Paper at [9.39].
[912] Law Commission
Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions, Similar
Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [3.37]–[3.40] and
[9.15].
[913] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at
[6.104]–[6.108] and R13.
[914] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [6.108].
[915] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [14.27].
[916] See, for example,
Evidence Bill 2005 (256–2) (select committee report): “We consider
that the clause as introduced would
move the balance in favour of the
prosecution” (at 6); Law Commission The Second Review of the Evidence
Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R142,
2019): “We note the Commission has consistently taken the view that
defendants’ rights in this area should
be protected” (at [14.27]).
[917] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at [204].
[918] Issues Paper at
[9.37].
[919] Public Defence Service.
This was also mentioned by the Crown Law Office in its submission supporting
reform.
[920] Evidence Act 2006, s
37(1), which states that s 37 applies to all evidence “about a
person’s veracity”.
[921] Evidence Act 2006, s
37(2).
[922] “Investigative
questioning” is already defined in s 4(1) as “questioning in
connection with the investigation
of an offence or a possible offence by, or in
the presence of, (a) a member of the Police; or (b) a person whose functions
include
the investigation of offences”.
[923] Elisabeth McDonald and
Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV38.07(3)].
[924] Evidence Act 2006, s
4(1).
[925] Evidence Act 2006, s
4(1) (definition of “veracity”).
[926] Issues Paper at
[9.52]–[9.53].
[927] Hannigan v R
[2013] NZSC 41, [2013] 2 NZLR 612 at [120].
[928] For example, in Body
v R [2019] NZCA 378 at [19] and n 4, the Court noted it was applying the
term “veracity” “[a]s that phrase is understood in the context
of
s 35” (when referring to a challenge to the witness’s veracity in
relation to matters in dispute in the proceeding).
[929] Issues Paper at
[9.56].
[930] Issues Paper at
[9.57].
[931] Associate Professor Anna
High, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[932] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald, Public Defence Service.
[933] Associate Professor Anna
High, New Zealand Law Society.
[934] Evidence Bill 2005
(256–2) (select committee report) at 5. The Committee considered
“the word “veracity”
is more appropriate as it places the
emphasis upon the intention to tell the truth, whereas
“truthfulness” is more readily
confused with factual
correctness”.
[935] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald.
[936] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[937] Evidence Act 2006, s
40(1)(a).
[938] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145 at [3] (majority) and [51] and [81]
(minority).
[939] Evidence Act 2006, s
40(2).
[940] Evidence Act 2006, s
40(3).
[941] As at 14 October 2022, a
Lexis Advance search for cases citing s 43 of the Evidence Act 2006 returned 969
results. Most s 43 cases
deal with the appropriate application of the s 43(1)
tests: Scott Optican “Evidence” [2019] 4 NZ L Rev 565 at 577.
[942] Te Aka Matua o te Ture |
Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review
of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at [10.3].
[943] Issues Paper at [10.4].
[944] Issues Paper at [10.10].
[945] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at [291].
[946] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at 9–10
and [249].
[947] Issues Paper at
[10.11]–[10.12].
[948] Issues Paper at [10.14].
[949] Issues Paper at [10.5].
[950] Issues Paper at [10.15].
[951] Issues Paper at
[10.6]–[10.8].
[952] R v Healy [2007]
NZCA 451 at [52].
[953] Vuletich v R
[2010] NZCA 102 at [27] per Glazebrook J and [96] per Randerson J
(Baragwanath J dissenting at [52]).
[954] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145.
[955] See, for example, Scott
Optican “The Supreme Court and the Law of Evidence” in Andrew
Stockley and Michael Littlewood
(eds) The New Zealand Supreme Court: The First
Ten Years (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) 409 at 414–418 and Richard
Mahoney
“Evidence” [2012] NZ L Rev 721 at 729.
[956] See, for example,
Elisabeth McDonald and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act &
Analysis (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington 2018) at [EV43.04(2)] and
Richard Mahoney “Evidence” NZ L Rev 547 at 549.
[957] See, for example,
Grigg v R [2015] NZCA 27 at [17]. Wild J described the propensity
provisions as “comprehensive and admirably clear and concise”.
[958] Grigg v R [2015]
NZCA 27 at [17].
[959] Brown v R [2020]
NZCA 97 at [13].
[960] See, for example, Mathew
Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Lexis Nexis) at
[EVA43.15] saying “doubt attaches to whether [the Act] could”
provide guidance on
how the weighing up exercise should occur. Compare Scott
Optican “Evidence” [2015] NZ L Rev 473 at 485–486:
“fundamental common law methodology — together with basic tenets of
jurisprudential constancy —
demands some judicial effort at ensuring
consistent application of the s 43 balancing test. Indeed, the whole point of
judgments
giving statements of principle as to how s 43 should be approached is
to create precisely that kind of regularity.” See also
Law Commission
Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions, Similar
Offending and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [35]; Issues Paper at
[10.9].
[961] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [167]–[169].
[962] Issues Paper at
[10.21]–[10.27].
[963] Issues Paper at [10.23].
[964] Issues Paper at
[10.23]–[10.24].
[965] Auckland District Law
Society, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Stephen Hudson,
Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture
Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service.
[966] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[967] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Te Tari Ture te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Associate Professor Anna High, Luke
Cunningham Clere, Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald, Te Kāhui Ture o
Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society, Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Police. Paulette Benton-Greig’s submission was supported by Community Law
Centres o Aotearoa and Ngā Whare Whakaruruhau
o Aotearoa | Women’s
Refuge.
[968] Luke Cunningham Clere,
New Zealand Law Society.
[969] Crown Law Office, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Police.
[970] The Crown Law
Office’s submission cited 10 recent High Court cases where Crown
applications to admit propensity evidence were
rejected either in full or
partially: R v Ngarongo [2023] NZHC 547; R v E [2022] NZHC 2868;
R v Prasad [2021] NZHC 3513; R v M [2021] NZHC 1767; R v Filoa
[2021] NZHC 1357; R v Ahlawat [2021] NZHC 1129; R v Heremaia
[2021] NZHC 473; R v Richardson [2021] 243. Two other cases cited by
the Crown Law Office are subject to publication restrictions pending final
disposition of trial.
[971] Associate Professor Anna
High, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[972] Paulette Benton-Greig,
Crown Law Office, Associate Professor Anna High. Paulette Benton-Greig’s
submission was supported by
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s
Refuge.
[973] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[974] Crown Law Office,
Associate Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Police.
[975] Issues Paper at [10.9].
[976] This description of the
propensity assessment as “fact-specific” was shared by some
submitters: see Associate Professor
Anna High, Luke Cunningham Clere and the New
Zealand Law Society.
[977] This can be
distinguished from our approach in Chapter 7 on improperly obtained evidence. In
contrast to the case law on s 30, we
did not find any clear indications in the
case law on s 43(1) that it is being applied inconsistently or that evidence is
being too
readily admitted.
[978] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at [268].
[979] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[980] Associate Professor Anna
High, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[981] Law Commission
Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions, Similar
Offending, and Bad Character (NZLC R103, 2008) at [35].
[982] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [4]–[5].
[983] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [4].
[984] Issues Paper at [10.30].
[985] Brooks v R [2019]
NZCA 280, [2020] 2 NZLR 161.
[986] Issues Paper at
[10.32]–[10.35].
[987] Issues Paper at [10.38].
[988] Issues Paper at [10.39].
[989] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[990] James Carruthers, Crown
Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New
Zealand Law Society.
[991] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[992] James Carruthers, Crown
Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[993] James Carruthers, Crown
Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[994] James Carruthers, Crown
Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[995] Brooks v R [2019]
NZSC 107 at [17].
[996] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127 at [5]–[6].
[997] Fenemor v R
[2011] NZSC 127, [2012] 1 NZLR 298 at [8].
[998] Mead v R [2013]
NZCA 59 at [16]–[19].
[999] RPG v R [2015]
NZCA 275. In this case, the prior acquittal evidence related to more serious
offending than the present charges and had already been the subject
of three
earlier trials. While the propensity evidence was deemed to be highly probative,
there was a risk it would overwhelm the
present trial given that all the
evidence from the earlier trials would need to be offered and it would be
difficult for the jury
not to give that disproportionate weight in their
assessment of the present charges (at [25]).
[1000] New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990, s 26(2).
[1001] James Carruthers,
Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[1002] Issues Paper at
[10.43].
[1003] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.32].
[1004] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.33].
[1005] Issues Paper at
[10.45].
[1006] See, for example,
Rowell v R [2020] NZCA 9 at [13]–[16]; R v C [2021] NZHC
1715 at [46]–[48]; Armishaw v R [2019] NZCA 456 at [36];
Faaosofia v R [2020] NZCA 405 at [32]; R v Stevens [2020] NZHC 760
at [31]–[36]; T v R [2022] NZHC 189 at [19]; R v F [2022]
NZHC 1341 at [48]; Kennedy v R [2022] NZHC 2977 at [27].
[1007] R v Ahlawat
[2021] NZCA 610 at [37].
[1008]
Goel v R [2022] NZCA 263 at [63].
[1009] We are aware of a
number of cases applying this approach, all of which are subject to publication
restrictions until final disposition
of trial.
[1010] Issues Paper at
[10.48]–[10.49].
[1011] Luke Cunningham
Clere, Public Defence Service.
[1012] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke Cunningham Clere, Adjunct
Professor Elisabeth McDonald,
Te Rōpū Tauira Ture o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Law Students’ Association, New Zealand Police, Public Defence
Service.
[1013] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke Cunningham Clere, New
Zealand Law Students’ Association,
New Zealand Police, Public Defence
Service.
[1014] New Zealand Law
Students’ Association, New Zealand Police.
[1015] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[1016] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke Cunningham Clere, New
Zealand Law Students’ Association.
[1017] See discussion in our
Issues Paper at [10.48].
[1018] See Elisabeth
McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters,
Wellington, 2012) at 197: “Although the Law Commission expressed the view
that they were primarily codifying
the common law, there is little discussion of
the validity of this particular line of inquiry in the Commission’s
research.”
See also the absence of discussion on the meaning of
“unusualness” in the Commission’s original discussion of the
propensity rules (Law Commission Evidence Law: Character and Credibility
(NZLC PP27, 1997) at [277]; Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law
(NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C205]) and at select committee stage (Evidence
Bill 2005 (256–2) (select committee report)).
[1019] The Auckland District
Law Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand and Public Defence Service
all supported this approach.
The New Zealand Law Students’ Association
noted the potential advantages as well as the drawbacks of such an approach.
[1020] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.32].
[1021] See Law Commission
Evidence Law: Character and Credibility (NZLC PP27, 1997) at Appendix C.
See also Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases
(Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 197.
[1022] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.32].
[1023] Prior to the Evidence
Act 2006, the courts developed a requirement that the two events needed to be
strikingly similar before they
could be considered as propensity evidence (then
called similar fact evidence). This required the court to look for
“particular,
often peculiar aspects, of past events and test whether this
peculiarity was replicated in the offending before the Court”:
Preston
v R [2012] NZCA 542 at [49].
[1024] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [18.32].
[1025] M v R [2019]
NZCA 357 at [17].
[1026] Luke Cunningham
Clere, New Zealand Law Students’ Association.
[1027] Other factors were
also relevant, including the frequency with which the alleged acts or events
have occurred (s 43(3)(a)) and the
connection in time (s 43(3)(b)) and
similarities (s 43(3)(c)) between the propensity evidence and offending in
issue. See, for example,
Faasofia v R [2020] NZCA 405 at [34]; Falamoe
v R [2022] NZHC 1341 at [51]; Armishaw v R [2019] NZCA 456 at [36];
R v Stevens [2020] NZHC 760 at [22] and [30]; T v R [2022] NZHC
189 at [19].
[1028] Elisabeth McDonald
Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington,
2012) at 196.
[1029] Smith v R
[2010] NZCA 361 at [17].
[1030] The changes in
Australia were made in response to the higher threshold for admissibility that
exists in Australian legislation —
see Issues Paper at [10.23] and [10.27]
and the discussion at para [10.11]
above. Since we are not recommending reform of the s 43(1) threshold, there is
no reason to think that removing the unusualness
factor would result in
propensity evidence being too readily excluded in child sexual offending cases
in New Zealand. The overall
test for admitting such evidence will remain the
same.
[1031] As was the case in
Thompson v R [2019] NZCA 385, where the court referred to the diagnosis
of paraphilic disorder in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5)
and a volume of academic studies on child sex offending in support of
its conclusion (at [32]–[33]).
[1032] Thompson v R
[2019] NZCA 385 at [31] and n 23.
[1033] Adjunct Professor
Elisabeth McDonald. The Public Defence Service also noted some support for this
option among defence lawyers.
[1034] Issues Paper at
[10.50].
[1035] See, for example,
Fraser v R [2019] NZCA 662 at [27], citing Lyons v R [2015] NZCA
318 at [28]; W (CA290/2017) v R [2017] NZCA 405 at [19]; George v R
[2017] NZCA 318 at [26].
[1036] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382.
[1037] W (SC 38/2019) v R
[2020] NZSC 93, [2020] 1 NZLR 382 at [48] (majority) and [191] (minority).
[1038] Mahomed v R
[2011] NZSC 52, [2011] 3 NZLR 145 at [66]–[67].
[1039] R v Wallace
[2020] NZHC 2559 at [34].
[1040] The case is subject
to publication restrictions until final disposition of trial. It cited, with
approval, George v R [2017] NZCA 318 at [26].
[1041] Issues Paper at
[10.58].
[1042] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke Cunningham Clere, New
Zealand Law Students’ Association,
Public Defence Service.
[1043] Crown Law Office,
Associate Professor Anna High, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand
Police.
[1044] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke Cunningham Clere, New
Zealand Law Students’ Association,
Public Defence Service.
[1045] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law
Students’ Association, Public Defence
Service.
[1046] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(3) sets out what constitutes a “formal procedure”.
[1047] Evidence Act 2006, s
45(4) sets out the circumstances in which there will be “good
reasons” for not following a formal
procedure.
[1048] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [187].
[1049] Law Commission Te
Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review of the Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at [11.5]–[11.10].
[1050] See, for example,
R v Turaki [2009] NZCA 310; R v Edmonds [2009] NZCA 303, [2010] 1
NZLR 762.
[1051] See, for example,
R v Uasi [2009] NZCA 236, [2010] 1 NZLR 733; Peato v R [2009] NZCA
333, [2010] 1 NZLR 788.
[1052] Pink v R
[2022] NZCA 306.
[1053] Pink v R
[2022] NZCA 306 at [59].
[1054] Pink v R
[2022] NZCA 306 at [59].
[1055] Issues Paper at
[11.5]–[11.15]. See R v Howard [2017] NZCA 159 at [26]; R v
Turaki [2009] NZCA 310 at [92]–[93]; R v Edmonds [2009] NZCA
303, [2010] 1 NZLR 762 at [42].
[1056] Sheed v R
[2023] NZCA 488; Tupuivao v R [2023] NZCA 254.
[1057] Sheed v R
[2023] NZCA 488 at [40]–[45]; Tupuivao v R [2023] NZCA 254 at
[24].
[1058] Sheed v R
[2023] NZCA 488 at [45].
[1059] Tupuivao v R
[2023] NZCA 254 at [22] and [26].
[1060] Issues Paper at
[11.19].
[1061] Pink v R
[2022] NZCA 306 at [53], citing Peato v R [2009] NZCA 333, [2010] 1 NZLR
788 at [35].
[1062] Issues Paper at
[11.20].
[1063] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New
Zealand, Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture
Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service.
[1064] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa
| New Zealand Law Society, Ngā
Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New Zealand
Police.
[1065] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association, Public Defence Service.
[1066] In the Issues Paper,
we suggested there would be a good reason for not following a formal
identification procedure if the defendant
admits being present and does not
suggest the witness was mistaken as to who they saw commit the offence (at
[11.21]).
[1067] Tupuivao v R
[2023] NZCA 254.
[1068] They gave the failure
of the police to conduct a formal identification procedure in Tupuivao v R
as an example: [2023] NZCA 254.
[1069] Neither submitter
said exactly what those situations were. In Pink, the defendant admitted
to holding the weapon, but his counsel also suggested implicitly during
cross-examination that the witness
may have seen someone else with the weapon:
Pink v R [2022] NZCA 306 at [60]–[63].
[1070] Auckland District Law
Society, Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Public
Defence Service.
[1071] Pink v R
[2022] NZCA 306 at [49]; Peato v R [2009] NZCA 333, [2010] 1 NZLR 788 at
[26]; Witehira v R [2011] NZCA 658 at [46]–[47].
[1072] Nick Chisnall
“Reducing the risk of misidentification: it starts with the Evidence Act
2006’s definition of “Visual
Identification Evidence””
[2015] NZLJ 299 at 299.
[1073] Harney v
Police [2011] NZSC 107, [2012] 1 NZLR 725 at [25].
[1074] Harney v
Police [2011] NZSC 107, [2012] 1 NZLR 725 at [17]; Thornton v R
[2017] NZCA 256 at [28]. Recognition by a witness does not, however,
automatically mean that no formal procedure is required. It will still depend on
the
circumstances of the case: Galloway v R [2018] NZCA 211 at [35].
[1075] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at
[12.5]–[12.9].
[1076] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [290]–[293].
[1077] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [306].
[1078] C v Complaints
Assessment Committee [2006] NZSC 48, [2006] 3 NZLR 577 at [13].
[1079] Issues Paper at
[12.13]–[12.15] and [12.19].
[1080] See s 9(2) of the
Evidence Further Amendment Act 1895 (carried over to s 8 of the Evidence Act
1908), which created a privilege
“unless the sanity of the patient be the
matter in dispute”; and s 32(2)(a) of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2)
1980,
which held medical privilege did not apply in civil proceedings “in
respect of any proceeding in which the sanity, testamentary
capacity or other
legal capacity of the patient is the matter in dispute”. See also the
discussion of the Torts and General
Law Reform Committee Professional
Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March 1977) at Appendix I
“Report on Medical Privilege” at 13.
[1081] Issues Paper at
[12.20]–[12.22].
[1082] Issues Paper at
[12.21].
[1083] See, for example,
R v King CA162/05 18 July 2005 where evidence of further offending made
to a psychiatrist and psychologist for the purpose of an assessment
for
preventive detention was admissible in the defendant’s retrial where
additional charges were added based on the information
disclosed.
[1084] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at
[10.111]–[10.119].
[1085] Issues Paper at
[12.23].
[1086] Issues Paper at
[12.24]–[12.30].
[1087] Auckland District Law
Society, Criminal Bar Association, Emeritus Professor John Dawson, Te Matakahi |
Defence Lawyers Association
New Zealand, Manatū Hauora | Ministry of
Health, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society, Ngā
Pirihimana
o Aotearoa | New Zealand Police, Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture
Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service.
[1088] Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna | Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere.
[1089] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Ministry of Health, New
Zealand Law Society.
[1090] R v Tamati
[2021] NZHC 1451.
[1091] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society, New
Zealand Police.
[1092] Criminal Bar
Association, Emeritus Professor John Dawson, Ministry of Health, Public Defence
Service. New Zealand Police also expressed
“tentative support” for
option 2.
[1093] Parole Act 2002, s
107F(2A).
[1094] Public Safety (Public
Protection Order) Act 2014, s 9(b).
[1095] Sentencing Act 2002,
s 88(1)(b).
[1096] R v Parkinson
[2017] NZCA 600.
[1097] See also John Dawson
“Medical Privilege and Court-Ordered Psychiatric Reports” (2012) 25
NZULR 239 at 260: “assessment will often take place during a remand of the
patient to hospital for a period of about two weeks. During
this assessment
period, treatment may be provided — even treatment for a condition that
may manifest itself in criminal conduct
(it may be the very condition and
conduct that has produced the current charges).”
[1098] Criminal Bar
Association, Emeritus Professor John Dawson, Ministry of Health, Public Defence
Service.
[1099] Auckland District Law
Society, Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke
Cunningham Clere.
[1100] Issues Paper at
[12.5]–[12.6].
[1101] Issues Paper at
[12.19]–[12.21].
[1102] Under s 65 of the
Evidence Act 2006, a person who has a privilege conferred (in this case, the
patient) may waive that privilege
either expressly or impliedly and so allow
that information to be shared.
[1103] We heard this via
feedback and submissions made to the Commission’s ongoing review on
preventive detention and post-sentence
orders.
[1104] Evidence Act 2006, ss
59(1)(a), 59(1A), 59(2), 59(3), 59(4) and 59(5).
[1105] See also his 2012
article, John Dawson “Medical privilege and court-ordered psychiatric
reports” (2012) 25 NZULR 239 at 260.
[1106] Issues Paper at
[12.32].
[1107] R v Hodgson HC
Timaru CRI-2008-076-001397, 30 March 2009 at [46]. This point was not challenged
on appeal to the Court of Appeal, heard as R v X (CA553/2009) [2009] NZCA
531, [2010] 2 NZLR 181.
[1108] R v Rapana
[1994] NZHC 1927; [1995] 2 NZLR 381 (HC) at 383. In this case, communications made by Mr
Rapana were not privileged as they had been made to a nurse who had
“offered
to make a preliminary assessment as to whether a formal
psychiatric examination of Mr Rapana was required”.
[1109] R v Gulliver
CA51/05, 9 June 2005 at [42]. This was on the basis that the equivalent
section of the Evidence Amendment Act (No 2) 1980 only contemplated
“vertical delegation or instruction where the delegate or person
instructed is involved in carrying out the course of treatment,
or part of it,
being undertaken by the clinical psychologist” and not “horizontal
delegation” where services are
provided independently of the referrer.
[1110] D (CA54/2018) v R
[2019] NZCA 1.
[1111] D (CA54/2018) v R
[2019] NZCA 1. The Court concluded that privilege did not attach as D was
not seeking treatment for drug dependency or another condition or behaviour
that
might manifest in criminal conduct (as per s 59(1)(a)). The suicidal ideation
for which he sought help was the result of the
allegations being made against
him and the subsequent police investigation rather than the result of his sexual
attraction towards
young children.
[1112] D (SC 26/2019) v R
[2019] NZSC 72 at [7].
[1113] Issues Paper at
[12.46].
[1114] Issues Paper at
[12.40]–[12.41].
[1115] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [10.123].
[1116] Issues Paper at
[12.43].
[1117] Issues Paper at
[12.47].
[1118] Crown Law Office,
Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Police.
[1119] Luke Cunningham
Clere, New Zealand Police.
[1120] James Carruthers,
Criminal Bar Association, Emeritus Professor John Dawson, Ministry of Health,
New Zealand Law Society, Te Poari
o ngā Kaihaumanu Hinengaro o Aotearoa |
Psychotherapists Board of Aotearoa New Zealand, Public Defence Service.
[1121] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[1122] James Carruthers,
Ministry of Health, Psychotherapists Board of Aotearoa New Zealand.
[1123] R v Hodgson HC
Timaru CRI-2008-076-001397, 30 March 2009.
[1124] New Zealand Police
noted that there “may be merit” in option 2 (extending the privilege
to a wider group of health practitioners),
and the Public Defence Service noted
“different views” among defence counsel as to the correct approach.
[1125] Maaka-Wanahi v
Attorney-General [2023] NZHC 187 at [6].
[1126] James Carruthers,
Criminal Bar Association, Emeritus Professor John Dawson, Ministry of Health,
Psychotherapists Board of Aotearoa
New Zealand.
[1127] Emeritus Professor
John Dawson, Ministry of Health, Psychotherapists Board of Aotearoa New Zealand.
[1128] Mental Health
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 2(1) (definition of
“mental health practitioner”).
[1129] Emeritus Professor
John Dawson, Ministry of Health, Public Defence Service.
[1130] D (CA54/2018) v R
[2019] NZCA 1.
[1131] Issues Paper at
[12.42]–[12.46].
[1132] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 14.
[1133] R v Parkinson
[2017] NZCA 600 at [34].
[1134] See, for example, Law
Commission Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [308]; Law
Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2013 (NZLC R127, 2013) at
[10.125].
[1135] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 15.
[1136] D (CA54/2018) v R
[2019] NZCA 1. The Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to provide a
definitive answer to whether a mental health helpline call-taker was acting
“on behalf of” a medical practitioner or clinical psychologist as it
held that privilege did not apply because D was
not seeking treatment for drug
dependency or any other condition or behaviour that might manifest in criminal
conduct. The Supreme
Court declined leave to appeal although noted that it gave
rise to a point of public importance: D (SC 26/2019) v R [2019] NZSC 72.
[1137] This was indeed the
approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in the pre-Act case R v Gulliver
CA51/05, 9 June 2005, where it was held that privilege did not attach to
apply to communications made to a counsellor in a programme
for sexual offenders
to whom the defendant had been referred by a clinical psychologist. This was on
the basis that s 59(5) only
contemplated “vertical delegation or
instruction where the delegate or person instructed is involved in carrying out
the course
of treatment, or part of it, being undertaken by the clinical
psychologist” and not “horizontal delegation”, where
services
are provided independently of the referrer (at [42]).
[1138] Torts and General Law
Reform Committee Professional Privilege in the Law of Evidence (March
1977) at Appendix I “Report on Medical Privilege” at 15.
[1139] Law Commission
Evidence Law: Privilege (NZLC PP23, 1994) at [308].
[1140] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, New Zealand Family Violence
Clearinghouse, Ngā Whare Whakaruruhau
o Aotearoa | Women’s
Refuge.
[1141] See, for example,
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ch 6, pt 5, div 2; Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s
67E.
[1142] DN v Family Court
at Auckland [2019] NZHC 2346, [2019] NZFLR 205. In this case, the applicant
sought discovery of notes and correspondence of discussions with a previous
lawyer for the children involved
and with teachers of one of the children.
[1143] Evidence Act 2006, s
69(3)(g).
[1144] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [306].
[1145] Search on Lexis Nexis
and Westlaw databases for “section 69” and “medical”
and/or “sexual” and/or
“counselling notes” from 1
February 2019. This search returned 10 results of judgments primarily in te
Kōti Matua
| High Court or te Kōti Whānau | Family Court, with
one in te Kōti Pīra | Court of Appeal and one in te Kōti
Take
Mahi | Employment Court.
[1146] See discussion in
DN v Family Court at Auckland [2019] NZHC 2346, [2019] NZFLR 205 at
[29]‑–[30].
[1147] See Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The
Third Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at
[13.2].
[1148] This included drafts
and working papers prepared by lawyers or notes prepared by clients that were
not in fact communicated. See,
for example, Kupe Group Ltd v Seamar Holdings
Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 209 (HC) at 213; Saunders v Commissioner, Australian
Federal Police [1998] FCA 1652; (1998) 160 ALR 469 at 472; Simon France (ed) Adams on
Criminal Law — Evidence (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at
[EC20.09(5)].
[1149] Issues Paper at
[13.3]; Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999)
at [254]. Also see Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary
(NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C244] which states that the relevant provision
“spells out what is essentially the present law on
privilege for legal
advice”.
[1150] Issues Paper at
[13.4].
[1151] See Issues Paper at
[13.5]; Elisabeth McDonald and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act
& Analysis (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at
[EV54.02(2)].
[1152] Issues Paper at
202.
[1153] Issues Paper at
[13.6].
[1154] Evidence Act 2006, s
4 (definition of “document”).
[1155] See, for example,
Simunovich Fisheries Ltd v Television New Zealand Ltd [2008] NZCA 350 at
[165] and [169].
[1156] In Australia, legal
advice privilege extends to confidential documents “whether delivered or
not” prepared by the client,
lawyer or another person for the dominant
purpose of the lawyer or one or more of the lawyers providing legal advice to
the client:
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 118(c); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s
118(c); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 118(c); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s 118(c);
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 118(c).
[1157] Bell Gully, Te Tari
Ture o te Karauna | Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, Te Kāhui Ture
o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society, Laura O’Gorman KC, Ratonga Wawao
ā-Ture Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service, Professor Michael Stockdale
and Associate Professor Rebecca Mitchell, Wilson Harle.
[1158] Auckland District Law
Society, Te Matakahi | Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[1159] Bell Gully, Wilson
Harle.
[1160] Bell Gully, Crown Law
Office, New Zealand Law Society.
[1161] New Zealand Law
Society, Public Defence Service, Professor Michael Stockdale and Associate
Professor Rebecca Mitchell.
[1162] Laura O’Gorman
KC, Professor Michael Stockdale and Associate Professor Rebecca Mitchell.
[1163] New Zealand Law
Society, Wilson Harle.
[1164] Issues Paper at
[13.5]. The Commission’s intent when developing the Evidence Code was to
restate the existing law (Law Commission
Evidence: Evidence Code and
Commentary (NZLC R55 Vol 2, 1999) at [C244]). The wording of s 54 when it
was enacted was identical to the wording proposed by the Commission,
and we
found no evidence of any Parliamentary intent to alter the common law position.
[1165] R v Huang HC
Auckland CRI-2005-004-21953, 19 September 2007 at [54]–[56]; Bain v
Minister of Justice [2013] NZHC 2123 at [143].
[1166] Elisabeth McDonald
and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV54.02(2)].
[1167] Evidence Act 1995
(NSW), s 118(c); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 118(c); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), s
118(c); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT), s 118(c).
[1168] For clarity, our
recommendations would give a witness being cross-examined the right to refuse to
disclose any communications with
their legal adviser to the cross-examiner that
meet the requirements of (a) and (b).
[1169] See, for example,
Kupe Group Ltd v Seamar Holdings Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 209 (HC).
[1170] Litigation privilege
is different to legal advice privilege. Legal advice privilege applies to any
communications between a legal
adviser and any person seeking legal advice that
meet the requirements in s 54(1). Litigation privilege applies to all materials
made, received, compiled or prepared for the “dominant purpose” of
preparing
for a proceeding. This can include material that would be covered by
legal advice privilege but can also include other material created
to prepare
for litigation such as communications with witnesses.
[1171] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [10.62];
Jeffries v Privacy Commissioner [2010] NZSC 99, [2011] 1 NZLR 45 at
[16].
[1172] See Issues Paper at
[13.8]. See Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R127, 2013) at [10.58]–[10.65]; Law Commission The Second Review of the
Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC
R142, 2019) at [16.19]–[16.30].
[1173] See, for example,
Allison Ferguson and Guy Tompkins “Update on Evidence Act for Civil
Litigators” (paper presented to
New Zealand Law Society Evidence Act
Update for Civil Litigators webinar, 14 June 2022) at 36–41; Sean McAnally
“Litigation
privilege: permanent or temporary?” [2022] NZLJ 8.
[1174] See Issues Paper at
[13.11]–[13.12].
[1175] See Issues Paper at
[13.11].
[1176] See discussion in
NZH Ltd v Ramspecs Ltd [2015] NZHC 2396 at [31].
[1177] See Issues Paper at
[13.12].
[1178] Difficulties in
assessing when the privilege should end were recognised in Blank v Minister
of Justice [2006] SCC 39, [2006] 2 SCR 319 and by the Commission in Law
Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at
[10.62]–[10.63].
[1179] See, for example,
Osborne v Worksafe New Zealand [2015] NZHC 264, [2015] NZAR 293 at [22],
citing B v Auckland District Law Society [2003] UKPC 38; [2004] 1 NZLR 326 (PC) at
[44].
[1180] Issues Paper at
[13.19].
[1181] Issues Paper at
[13.20].
[1182] Auckland District Law
Society, Bell Gully, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law
Society, Wilson Harle.
[1183] Bell Gully.
[1184] Wilson Harle.
[1185] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, New Zealand Law Society.
[1186] Auckland District Law
Society, Bell Gully, Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand,
Te Tari Taake | Inland Revenue,
Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society,
Laura O’Gorman KC, Public Defence Service, Wilson Harle.
[1187] Auckland District Law
Society, Bell Gully, Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand,
Luke Cunningham Clere, New
Zealand Law Society, Laura O’Gorman KC, Wilson
Harle.
[1188] Bell Gully, Crown Law
Office, Luke Cunningham Clere.
[1189] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society, Wilson Harle.
[1190] Bell Gully, Laura
O’Gorman KC.
[1191] Bell Gully, New
Zealand Law Society, Laura O’Gorman KC, Wilson Harle.
[1192] Auckland District Law
Society, Bell Gully, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Wilson Harle.
[1193] Wilson Harle.
[1194] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(e).
[1195] Mechanisms for
termination in the Act include waiver (s 65) and the powers of a judge to
disallow privilege (s 67).
[1196] Jeffries v Privacy
Commissioner [2010] NZSC 99, [2011] 1 NZLR 45 at [19].
[1197] Evidence Act 2006, s
56(1); Jeffries v Privacy Commissioner [2010] NZSC 99, [2011] 1 NZLR 45
at [16].
[1198] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [10.62]. See also
the Supreme Court’s formulation of the purpose for privilege in
Jeffries v Privacy Commissioner [2010] NZSC 99, [2011] 1 NZLR 45 at [16].
The Court describes the purpose as “the interests of justice in proper
preparation for litigation”.
[1199] Guardian Royal
Exchange Assurance of New Zealand Ltd v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596 (CA) at
605–606.
[1200] See recognition of
this issue in Blank v Minister of Justice [2006] SCC 39, [2006] 2 SCR 319
and by the Commission in Law Commission The 2013 Review of the Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [10.62]–[10.63].
[1201] Bell Gully, Crown Law
Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, Wilson Harle.
[1202] Bell Gully, Crown Law
Office, New Zealand Law Society, Laura O’Gorman KC.
[1203] Crown Law Office, New
Zealand Law Society, Wilson Harle.
[1204] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [16.24]–[16.30].
[1205] See commentary on
this point in Allison Ferguson and Guy Tompkins “Update on Evidence Act
for Civil Litigators” (paper
presented to New Zealand Law Society Evidence
Act Update for Civil Litigators webinar, 14 June 2022) at 36–41; Sean
McAnally
“Litigation privilege: permanent or temporary?” [2022] NZLJ
8.
[1206] Law Commission The
Second Review of the Evidence Act 2006 | Te Arotake Tuarua i te Evidence Act
2006 (NZLC R142, 2019) at [16.21]–[16.23].
[1207] Blank v Minister
of Justice [2006] SCC 39, [2006] 2 SCR 319 at [34]. See also Issues Paper at
[13.11].
[1208] Bell Gully, the New
Zealand Law Society, Laura O’Gorman KC and Wilson Harle supported amending
the Act to clarify that legal
advice privilege and settlement privilege also do
not terminate except in accordance with the Act. James Anson-Holland did
not.
[1209] Osborne v Worksafe
New Zealand [2015] NZHC 264, [2015] NZAR 293 at [22], citing B v Auckland
District Law Society [2003] UKPC 38; [2004] 1 NZLR 326 (PC) at [44].
[1210] Jung v
Templeton HC Auckland CIV-2007-404-5383, 30 September 2009 at [64].
[1211] T v R [2020]
NZCA 15. See also Re Harder [2023] NZHC 620 at [15].
[1212] T v R [2020]
NZCA 15 at [28].
[1213] T v R [2020]
NZCA 15.
[1214] Issues Paper at
[13.22].
[1215] Beckham v R
[2015] NZSC 98, [2016] 1 NZLR 505 at [93]–[94].
[1216] Auckland District Law
Society, Crown Law Office, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke
Cunningham Clere, Laura O’Gorman
KC, Professor Michael Stockdale and
Associate Professor Rebecca Mitchell, Wilson Harle.
[1217] Luke Cunningham
Clere, Wilson Harle.
[1218] Beckham v R
[2015] NZSC 98, [2016] 1 NZLR 505.
[1219] Issues Paper at
[13.24]–[13.28].
[1220] Issues Paper at
[13.29]–[13.34].
[1221] Issues Paper at
[13.36], citing James Anson-Holland “The Limits of Settlement Privilege in
New Zealand: Distilling the Guiding
Principles” [2022] 30 NZULR 79 at 98.
[1222] See, for example,
Morgan v Whanganui College Board of Trustees [2014] NZCA 340, [2014] 3
NZLR 713 at [11]; Sheppard Industries Ltd v Specialised Bicycle Components
Inc [2011] NZCA 346, [2011] 3 NZLR 620 at [23]–[32].
[1223] The question posed in
our Issues Paper was “Is section 53(3)(d) causing problems in practice? If
so, should the Act be amended
to clarify the scope of the exception?” This
was a typographical error and should have referred to section 57(3)(d).
[1224] Auckland District Law
Society, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Luke Cunningham Clere, Laura
O’Gorman KC.
[1225] It considered this
was the approach that had been taken in Smith v Claims Resolution Service Ltd
[2021] NZHC 3424 at [39].
[1226] Laura O’Gorman
KC.
[1227] James Anson-Holland,
New Zealand Law Society.
[1228] Smith v Shaw
[2020] NZHC 238, [2020] 3 NZLR 661. In this case, the Court had rejected an
application to order disclosure of privileged material under the interests of
justice exception,
finding that the case fell far short of the high threshold of
“unambiguous impropriety”. The Court observed that “given
the
very clear policy reasons for and benefits of settlement privilege, it is right
that any exceptions to it are narrow”.
See paragraphs [45]–[46].
[1229] Citing Smith v
Shaw [2020] NZHC 238, [2020] 3 NZLR 661; Gibbs v Windmeyer [2021]
NZHC 2582.
[1230] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at [10.57].
[1231] James Anson-Holland
and the New Zealand Law Society said that reducing the interests of justice test
to one of relevance risks eroding
the purpose of settlement privilege.
[1232] See Mathew Downs (ed)
Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed, LexisNexis) at [EVA57.12]; James
Anson-Holland “The Limits of Settlement Privilege in New Zealand:
Distilling
the Guiding Principles” [2022] 30 NZULR 79 at 98.
[1233] Laura O’Gorman
KC.
[1234] James
Anson-Holland.
[1235] Issues Paper at
[13.39]–[13.46].
[1236] Issues Paper at
[13.44].
[1237] Issues Paper at
[13.46], citing Mathew Downs (ed) Cross on Evidence (online looseleaf ed,
LexisNexis) at [EVA66.4]. See Whitley (as liquidator of Property Ventures Ltd
(in liq)) v Connell (sued as a firm) [2022] NZHC 2994 at [62]–[64];
Katoria Trustee Ltd (ato CA Quinn Trust) v Toon [2022] NZHC 3037 at
[35]–[37]. Neither case refers to ss 66(2)–(4) when determining who
“owned” the privilege in the relevant material.
We have not
identified any other decisions that address the impact of the amendment to s
66(2).
[1238] Issues Paper at
[13.47]–[13.48].
[1239] Auckland District Law
Society, Bell Gully, Defence Lawyers Association New Zealand, Paul Michalik, New
Zealand Law Society, Professor
Michael Stockdale and Associate Professor Rebecca
Mitchell.
[1240] Bell Gully, Paul
Michalik.
[1241] Issues Paper at
[13.46].
[1242] Law Commission The
2013 Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC R127, 2013) at
[10.184]–[10.189].
[1243] Evidence Act 2006, s
88(1).
[1244] Evidence Act 2006, s
88(2).
[1245] Evidence Act 1908, s
23AA.
[1246] Elisabeth McDonald
Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Thomson Reuters, Wellington,
2012) at 96.
[1247] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Te Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third
Review of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at
[14.2]–[14.3].
[1248] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 200–203 and 243. See also
Elisabeth McDonald In the absence of a jury: Examining judge-alone rape
trials (Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 2022) at 117–118.
[1249] Issues Paper at
[14.5].
[1250] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 201 and 243.
[1251] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 243. See also, for example, R v
Morgan (No 1) [2016] NZHC 1427 at [9] (finding that “occupation”
under s 88 does not include beneficiary status).
[1252] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 200–201.
[1253] Issues Paper at
[14.2]–[14.10].
[1254] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Te Tari Ture o Karauna | Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New
Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse,
Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law Society, Ngā Pirihimana o
Aotearoa |
New Zealand Police, Ngā Whakaruruhau o Aotearoa | Women’s
Refuge. Paulette Benton-Greig’s submission was supported
by Community Law
Centres o Aotearoa and, in addition to their own submissions on this question,
Women’s Refuge.
[1255] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Crown Law Office, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Family
Violence Clearinghouse, New Zealand Law Society,
New Zealand Police,
Women’s Refuge. Paulette Benton-Greig’s submission was supported by
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa
and, in addition to its own submissions on this
question, Women’s Refuge.
[1256] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Crown Law Office, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald. Paulette
Benton-Greig’s submission was supported
by Community Law Centres o
Aotearoa and Women’s Refuge.
[1257] Crown Law Office,
Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[1258] Luke Cunningham
Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Law Society, Ratonga
Wawao ā-Ture Tūmatanui |
Public Defence Service. The Crown Law Office
also thought education may assist but considered pragmatic measures and
reminders were
more likely to be effective.
[1259] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 500 (recommendation 48).
[1260] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Crown Law Office, Associate
Professor Anna High, Luke Cunningham Clere,
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth
McDonald, New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse, New Zealand Law Society,
Women’s Refuge. In
addition to their own submissions on this issue, both
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s Refuge endorsed Paulette
Benton-Greig’s comments.
[1261] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Crown Law Office, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald. Community
Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s
Refuge supported Paulette
Benton-Greig’s submission on this issue.
[1262] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, New Zealand Family Violence
Clearinghouse, Women’s Refuge. In addition
to their own submissions on
this issue, both Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s Refuge
endorsed Paulette Benton-Greig’s
comments.
[1263] Auckland District Law
Society, Public Defence Service.
[1264] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch 2020) at 500 (recommendation 48). The factors
identified in McDonald’s recommendations
were supported, in some form, by
Paulette Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, the Crown Law Office,
Luke Cunningham Clere,
the New Zealand Law Society and Women’s Refuge.
[1265] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, New Zealand Family Violence
Clearinghouse. In addition to its own submissions
on this issue, Community Law
Centres o Aotearoa endorsed Paulette Benton-Greig’s comments.
Women’s Refuge also supported
Paulette Benton-Greig’s submission on
this issue.
[1266] Community Law Centres
o Aotearoa, Crown Law Office.
[1267] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, New Zealand Law Society,
Women’s Refuge. In addition to their own
submissions on this issue, both
Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s Refuge endorsed Paulette
Benton-Greig’s
comments.
[1268] Crown Law Office
Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Prosecuting Sexual Violence (3
July 2023) at [6.17].
[1269] Crown Law Office
Victims of Crime — Guidelines for Prosecutors (1 December 2014) at
[6]. These guidelines also refer to the need for prosecutors to be mindful of
the specific needs of particular
victims, including victims of sexual offending
(at [15]).
[1270] We note that not all
educational materials or guidance for judges (“bench books”) are
currently publicly available,
so there may be existing guidance on this issue.
Accordingly, this work may be able to be carried out as an expansion or
amendment
to existing materials of Te Kura Kaiwhakawā | Institute of
Judicial Studies.
[1271] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 203.
[1272] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, New Zealand Family Violence
Clearinghouse, Women’s Refuge. In addition
to their own submissions on
this issue, both Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s Refuge
endorsed Paulette Benton-Greig’s
comments.
[1273] Crown Law Office
Solicitor-General’s Guidelines for Prosecuting Sexual Violence (3
July 2023).
[1274] Browne v Dunn
(1893) 6 R 67 (HL). The rule was affirmed by te Kōti Pīra | Court
of Appeal in Gutierrez v R [1996] NZCA 444; [1997] 1 NZLR 192 (CA) at 199.
[1275] See, for example,
C v R [2019] NZCA 653 at [76]; Martin v R [2015] NZCA 606 at [44];
Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 40 at
[44]; Pitceathly v R [2010] NZCA 95 at [22]. It is there to protect the
interests of the party that called the witness, not the interests of the
party who is cross-examining the witness. Additionally, the rationale of
accuracy in fact-finding is also said
to underpin section 92: Issues Paper at
[14.13].
[1276] Wallace v
Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 375 at [155], citing R v Dewar [2008]
NZCA 344 and R v S (2002) 19 CRNZ 442 (CA).
[1277] Issues Paper at
[14.13]–[14.18].
[1278] Elisabeth McDonald
and Scott Optican (eds) Mahoney on Evidence: Act & Analysis (4th ed,
Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2018) at [EV92.03].
[1279] R v Dewar
[2008] NZCA 344 at [44]; R v S [2009] NZCA 227 at [27]. Affirmed in
Kent Sing Trading Company Ltd v JNJ Holdings Ltd [2019] NZCA 388 at [92]
and Manukau v R [2013] NZCA 217 at [24].
[1280] Richard Mahoney
“Putting the Case Against the Duty to Put the Case” [2004] NZ L Rev
313 at 337.
[1281] Issues Paper at
[14.20]. See also Law Commission Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55
Vol 1, 1999) at [404]; Andrew Barker KC Submission to Rules Committee on
Consultation Paper on Improving Access to Civil Justice (July 2021) at
[28]); Te Komiti mō ngā Tikanga Kooti | Rules Committee Improving
Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at [191].
[1282] Issues Paper at
[14.19]–[14.20].
[1283] Issues Paper at
[14.21]–[14.27].
[1284] Issues Paper at
[14.21]–[14.27].
[1285] It is unclear why
this was the case. The Cabinet paper that sought agreement on the proposal to
codify the cross-examination duty
in the Evidence Bill reflected the
Commission’s proposed wording: Cabinet Paper “Evidence Bill: Paper
4: The Trial Process”
(4 December 2002) at [21].
[1286] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [403]–[404].
See also Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at [C334].
[1287] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Law Society,
Public Defence Service, Women’s Refuge.
In addition to its own submission
on this issue, Women’s Refuge endorsed Paulette Benton-Greig’s
comments. Community
Law Centres o Aotearoa also supported Paulette
Benton-Greig’s submission on this issue.
[1288] Auckland District Law
Society, Luke Cunningham Clere.
[1289] Crown Law Office.
[1290] New Zealand Law
Society, Public Defence Service.
[1291] Elisabeth McDonald
and others Rape Myths as Barriers to Fair Trial Process: Comparing adult rape
trials with those in the Aotearoa Sexual Violence Court Pilot (Canterbury
University Press, Christchurch, 2020) at 354–358.
[1292] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald, New Zealand Law Society,
Women’s Refuge. In addition to its own
submissions on this issue,
Women’s Refuge endorsed Paulette Benton-Greig’s comments. Community
Law Centres o Aotearoa
also supported Paulette Benton-Greig’s submission
on this issue.
[1293] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(e).
[1294] See High Court Rules
2016, r 1.2 and District Court Rules 2014, r 1.3.
[1295] Rules Committee
Improving Access to Civil Justice (November 2022) at [2](d).
[1296] Evidence Act 2006, ss
6(c) and (e).
[1297] See The Queen v
Dagg [1962] NZPoliceLawRp 21; [1962] NZLR 817 (CA) at 820 per North J, R v L [1999] 2 NZLR 54
(CA) at 61; Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2015) at 1365. The
Supreme Court has noted that cross-examination is “fundamental to the
adversarial
trial” — see Minister of Justice v Kim [2021]
NZSC 57, [2021] 1 NZLR 338 at [414]–[415].
[1298] Section 25(f) was
based on art 14(3)(e) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and is aimed at “equality
of arms”, ensuring that defendants
have the same rights to cross-examination as the prosecution — see
Geoffrey Palmer
A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper
[1984–1985] I AJHR A6 at 102. However, case law has tended to
take a broader interpretation of s 25(f), viewing it as concerned with ensuring
wider fair
trial rights beyond just parity between prosecution and defence
— see Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act: A Commentary (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2015) at
1365–1375.
[1299] Evidence Act 2006, s
95(1).
[1300] The grounds for
making such an order are set out in section 95(3). They include the
characteristics of the witness and their relationship
to the unrepresented
party.
[1301] See discussion in
Irving v Irving [2021] NZHC 2269 at [9]–[10].
[1302] Irving v
Irving [2021] NZHC 2269.
[1303] See Issues Paper at
[14.36], discussing Irving v Irving [2021] NZHC 2269, Finley v
Wiggins [2020] NZFC 6481, [2020] NZFLR 958, Millar v R [2021]
NZCA 548; Ross v Family Court [2021] NZHC 3204.
[1304] Issues Paper at
[14.39].
[1305] Issues Paper at
[14.40]–[14.41], discussing Irving v Irving [2021] NZHC 2269.
[1306] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Community Law Centres o Aotearoa, Vivienne Crawshaw KC, Luke
Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Family Violence
Clearinghouse, New Zealand Law
Society, Public Defence Service, Alan Webb. In addition to its own submissions
on this issue, Community
Law Centres o Aotearoa endorsed Paulette
Benton-Greig’s comments. Women’s Refuge also supported Paulette
Benton-Greig’s
submission on this issue.
[1307] Auckland District Law
Society.
[1308] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Vivienne Crawshaw KC, New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse,
New Zealand Law Society. Community Law Centres
o Aotearoa and Women’s
Refuge supported Paulette Benton-Greig’s submission on this issue.
[1309] Issues Paper at
[14.41].
[1310] Paulette
Benton-Greig, Vivienne Crawshaw KC, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Family
Violence Clearinghouse, New Zealand Law Society,
Public Defence Service, Alan
Webb. Community Law Centres o Aotearoa and Women’s Refuge supported
Paulette Benton-Greig’s
submission on this issue.
[1311] New Zealand Law
Society, Public Defence Service.
[1312] See, for example,
Issues Paper at [14.34]–[14.38].
[1313] Te Aka Matua o te
Ture | Law Commission Evidence: Evidence Code and Commentary (NZLC R55
Vol 2, 1999) at 36.
[1314] Law Commission Te
Arotake Tuatoru i te Evidence Act 2006 | The Third Review of the Evidence
Act 2006 (NZLC IP50, 2023) (Issues Paper) at [15.3]–[15.5].
[1315] Law Commission
Evidence: Reform of the Law (NZLC R55 Vol 1, 1999) at [31].
[1316] The case law is
summarised in the Issues Paper at [15.6].
[1317] Auckland District Law
Society, Luke Cunningham Clere, Te Kāhui Ture o Aotearoa | New Zealand Law
Society, Ratonga Wawao ā-Ture
Tūmatanui | Public Defence Service.
Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald and Ngā Pirihimana o Aotearoa | New
Zealand Police
also submitted on the options for reform we presented in the
Issues Paper.
[1318] Luke Cunningham
Clere, Adjunct Professor Elisabeth McDonald.
[1319] See also Jack
Oliver-Hood “Challenging the Admissibility of Scientifically Invalid
Evidence” [2018] NZ L Rev 399.
[1320] Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc [1993] USSC 99; 509 US 579 (1993). Endorsed in New Zealand in
Lundy v R [2013] UKPC 28, [2014] 2 NZLR 273 at [138]–[139].
[1321] Lundy v R
[2013] UKPC 28, [2014] 2 NZLR 273 at [138].
[1322] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [237]–[248].
[1323] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [239].
[1324] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [241]–[242].
[1325] Lundy v R
[2018] NZCA 410 at [241] and [243].
[1326] Issues Paper at
[15.21]–[15.24]. We noted that Attorney-General v Strathboss Kiwifruit
Ltd [2020] NZCA 98, [2020] 3 NZLR 247 suggests the courts may now be more
willing to exclude expert evidence on the basis that the relevant methodology
has not received
general acceptance within the scientific community (see at
[497]–[498]).
[1327] Auckland District Law
Society, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society, Public Defence Service,
Ben Vanderkolk.
[1328] Te Matakahi | Defence
Lawyers Association New Zealand.
[1329] Defence Lawyers
Association New Zealand, Public Defence Service, Ben Vanderkolk.
[1330] Letter from Hon Kris
Faafoi (Minister of Justice) to Amokura Kawharu (President of the Law
Commission) regarding the third statutory
review of the Evidence Act 2006 (23
February 2022).
[1331] Evidence Act 2006, ss
108(2)–(3) and 109(1).
[1332] R v Hughes
[1986] NZCA 56; [1986] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 134 and 142–143 per Cooke P and 151 per
McMullin J.
[1333] R v Hughes
[1986] NZCA 56; [1986] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) at 144 per Cooke P and 152–153 per McMullin J.
In enacting the predecessor of section 108, Parliament sought to give effect
to
the reasoning of the dissenting judges Cooke P and McMullin J in R v
Hughes. See Protection of Undercover Police Officers Bill 1986 (33–1),
explanatory note. See also (8 July 1986) 472 NZPD 2741, (8 July 1986) 472 NZPD
2746, (11 September 1986) 474 NZPD 4190–4191 and (18 September 1986) 474
NZPD 4441–4443.
[1334] Wilson v R
[2015] NZSC 189 at [37].
[1335] Evidence Act 2006, s
108(1)(a).
[1336] Evidence Act 2006, s
108(1)(b)–(d). Section 108(1)(b) refers to offences against the Misuse of
Drugs Act 1975 with a qualifying
threshold of five years’ imprisonment.
[1337] See Issues Paper at
[15.29].
[1338] Issues Paper at
[15.32].
[1339] Auckland District Law
Society, Luke Cunningham Clere, New Zealand Law Society.
[1340] Enacted as the
Evidence Amendment Act 1986. The New Zealand Police submission refers to the
passing of the “Evidence (Witness
Anonymity) Bill in 1986” but this
Bill was enacted in 1997 and explicitly does not relate to undercover officers.
We have assumed
the submission was meant to refer to the Protection of
Undercover Police Officers Bill 1986.
[1341] Including in relation
to offences under the Psychoactive Substances Act 2013 and the Arms Act 1983 and
the offence in s 308A of
the Crimes Act 1961 of discharging a firearm to
intimidate.
[1342] For example, an
undercover operation could be effective in investigating a suspected case of
someone dealing in prescription medicines/products,
but these offences are not
qualifying offences, meaning that Police would need to prosecute the person for
an offence meeting the
qualifying threshold or a qualifying offence instead.
[1343] The principle of open
justice has been affirmed on many occasions by the senior courts, including in
civil cases. See, for example,
Erceg v Erceg [2016] NZSC 135, [2017] 1
NZLR 310 at [2] “[t]he principle of open justice is fundamental to the
common law system of civil and criminal justice”.
[1344] Clark v
Attorney-General (No 1) [2005] NZAR 481 (CA) at [36] (open justice includes
the public identification of all involved in proceedings).
[1345] Erceg v Erceg
[2016] NZSC 135, [2017] 1 NZLR 310 at [3].
[1346] New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990, s 27(3).
[1347] See Her
Majesty’s Attorney-General for England and Wales v R HC Auckland
CP641/98, 24 October 2000 at [2]. Te Kōti-ā-Rohe | District Court is
founded on statute and therefore only has
“implied powers” to manage
its procedures. Implied powers might include the capacity to provide protection
for undercover
officers but this has not been tested. For general discussion of
inherent powers, non-party suppression orders and witness anonymity,
see
Siemer v Solicitor-General [2013] NZSC 68, [2013] 3 NZLR 441 at [110],
[113]–[114], [124]–[125] and [169]–[172].
[1348] Withey v
Attorney-General HC Palmerston North CP10/95, 18 May 1998 at 9.
[1349] Evidence Act 2006, s
6(b), (c) and (d).
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